Artificial Selfhood and Communal Becoming

Abstract

In the age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), Africa faces the profound question of how artificial general intelligence (AGI) – a technology capable of reasoning, contextual perception, and complex decision making – fits within its cultural and philosophical landscape. The question is not merely technological but ontological: can AGI attain Menkiti's maximal conception of personhood. Menkiti underscores that personhood is an acquired achievement that is ‘not given simply because one is born of human seed’ (Menkiti, 1984:172). Unlike most Western perspectives that often assume individual autonomy as the foundation of moral standing, African personhood is deeply relational – emerging within communal ties, moral responsibility, and social recognition, for identity is formed through social interactions. If AGI exhibits intelligence akin to human rational and integrates into human communities, can it acquire personhood in the African context? For Menkiti, there is a distinction between personhood-as-being and personhood-as-becoming, implying that moral development and social participation is a never-ending objective. If AGI lacks the ability to engage in moral agency within the human community, will it forever remain an outsider in the African ontological space? This project interrogates whether AGI could ever fulfill the moral and communal obligations that constitute personhood in African societies. By situating AGI within Menkiti’s framework, we critically assess whether nonhuman entities can attain moral status rather than the semblance of personhood. Ultimately, this work contributes to broader debates on technological inclusivity, ethical AI, and African philosophy in the digital age.