The crisis of trade union representation in post-1973 unions and the role of the full-time shop steward (FTSS): A case study of NUMSA at BMW Rosslyn Plant Tshwane South Africa

Abstract

Full-time shop stewards (FTSSs) are elected trade union shop stewards paid by the employer to do full-time union work. This is a peculiar arrangement in the South African industrial landscape which draws from the German model of workers’ councils. These FTSSs were first negotiated in the early 1980s at Ford and Volkswagen (VW) in South Africa. The main reason for these FTSSs was, as noted by Gomomo (1985), to deal with production pressures and disruptions caused by ordinary shop stewards, who, from time to time, would be pulled from the production line to attend to trade union business. The employer offered these positions as a tool for addressing this dilemma. This benefitted the trade unions that were growing exponentially and did not have money to hire organisers to service every organised and non- organised workplace. The s served to augment the role of the organisers; they became a de facto organiser. This study, through in-depth interviews, document analysis, focus groups, ethnography and participant observation, explores the contradictory role of FTSSs through the case study method at BMW. The findings highlight the significance of the FTSSs in building the power of the trade union at the shopfloor level and the potential they have in building a strong, vibrant and militant trade union movement on the ground or branch level. The evidence shows that, if not properly managed, FTSSs’ positions can be used for upward social mobility by self-interested individuals. This is because of the benefits and resources attached to these positions, which accord incumbents some level of social status. Hence these positions are highly and fiercely contested. For these positions to yield positive outcomes, FTSSs ought to be accountable to the rank-and-file members through regular meetings for feedback and mandate takings, and regular 4 elections ought to be institutionalised. Notions of career pathing of FTSSs need not be entertained as they will open space for the institutionalisation of upward social mobility of FTSS. Although upward social mobility is one of the options for an FTSS, those who are not re-elected to office face social downgrading, which includes going back to the production line. This comes with a huge personal loss and has a psychological impact as they lose the benefits associated with these positions and the social status that comes with it. The thesis turns Michels’ (1958) notion of ‘iron law of oligarchy’ on its head as it shows that FTSSs should act as a countervailing force against the development of oligarchic tendencies in the workplace. Because accountable FTSSs suffocate the development of oligarchic tendencies in the trade union. The thesis argues that accountability is a pain of democracy—it should be embraced and promoted, and regular elections of FTSSs should be encouraged and institutionalised as a countervailing force to the development of oligarchic tendencies. This will promote the worker control principle, which is the cornerstone of these post-1973 trade unions. The thesis further argues that the FTSS falls into the trap of being a tool of management if not properly managed. They become a communication bridge of management or information brokers1 (see Malabela, 2012) by communicating production schedules. Borrowing from Tony Lane's (1974) thesis of shop stewards being the man with two masters, it argues that the FTSS is the man with three masters. The three masters are the workers who elected them, the second one is the employer who pays their salary, and finally, the trade union who they represent and on whose card they were elected. I posit that all these masters have different expectations: the 1 See Malabela, 2012 5 first is to represent them against the employer, the second is to maintain labour peace and avoid unnecessary strikes and stoppages, and the third is to build a strong workplace organisation. In the final analysis FTSSs are an important and integral part of South African industrial relations—and benefit both the employer and the trade union. The trade union needs to develop clear policies to manage FTSSs, so that the positions are not abused for upward social mobility and to hold them accountable. Accountability occurs through regular general meetings with workers to solicit mandates and report back, and FTSS elections should be institutionalised. Trade unions ought to benefit a great deal from FTSSs only if these positions serve the intentions of the trade unions and build a vibrant workplace organisation that serves the interest of the rank-and-file.