The Ontology of Ideas and the Intentionality Thesis
No Thumbnail Available
Date
2007-03-02T11:54:05Z
Authors
Oesi, Janine
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
This dissertation looks at the ontology of ideas as a
philosophical paradigm. It traces the ontology from its
origins in Descartes to its adoption by the British
Empiricists through to the writings of Frege and Moore. It
argues that the ontology is unable to provide an object
category independent of the subject with the consequence
that all objects that fall within the ontology are
subjective. An ontology of subjective objects cannot
adequately account for external reality since it cannot
account for difference and otherness. The ‘problem of the
external world’ to which this ontology gives rise, attests
to this. I argue that the intentionality thesis served as
a corrective to the ontology of ideas by providing a
metaphysic that could account for these elements and that
allowed for an adequate treatment of external or corporeal
objects.
Description
Student Number : 0114064T -
MA Dissertation -
School of Social Sciences -
Faculty of Humanities
Keywords
ideas, intentionality