Disciplinary power and the proactive monitoring unit

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dc.contributor.authorFlowers, Kevin Eitan
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-23T11:33:26Z
dc.date.available2021-08-23T11:33:26Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.descriptionA research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Commerce in Accounting, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, 2020en_ZA
dc.description.abstractThe value of independent bodies charged with monitoring and improving the quality of financial reporting is becoming increasingly recognised around the world. The United States of America, United Kingdom and the European Union are examples of where such bodies exist. South Africa has created the Proactive Monitoring Unit (PMU). The PMU monitors the financial statements of companies listed on the JSE to ensure that they comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).As most of these bodies are relatively new, there is limited research exploring how they function. This thesis aims to understand monitoring bodies better. Specifically, it will investigate if the PMU’s activities utilise Foucault’s disciplinary power to achieve results. 17 semi-structured, open-ended interviews with financial statement preparers, auditors, regulators and academics were conducted. The PMU is indicative of a partitioning mechanism used by the JSE in order to monitor and control the financial reporting space of listed companies. Preparers and auditors resemble well trained individuals who follow the PMU’s guidance without question. Respondents felt the constant gaze of the PMU which, combined with the negative reputational impact of an adverse review, leaves preparers and auditors fearful of the PMU. This anxiety seems to create a belief that preparers and auditors must present their financial statements as instructed by the PMU. This is one of the first theses which examines how external monitoring bodies function in a real-world setting. It adds to the limited accounting research which investigates why monitoring mechanisms achieve or do not achieve compliance. This is the first study to consider the functioning of external monitoring bodies in an African setting. This will provide insight into how monitoring bodies may best be constructed to improve corporate governanceen_ZA
dc.description.librarianCK2021en_ZA
dc.facultyFaculty of Commerce, Law and Managementen_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10539/31522
dc.language.isoenen_ZA
dc.rights.holderUniversity of the Witswatersrand, Johannesburg
dc.schoolSchool of Accountancyen_ZA
dc.subjectDisciplinary power
dc.subjectProactive Monitoring Unit
dc.subjectCorporate Reporting
dc.subjectIFRS Compliance
dc.subjectUCTD
dc.subject.otherSDG-17: Partnerships for the goals
dc.titleDisciplinary power and the proactive monitoring uniten_ZA
dc.typeDissertationen_ZA
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