LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
| dc.contributor.author | RAMOGAYANE, RAMOSHIDI PIET | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-08T13:31:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-08T13:31:10Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-06-08 | |
| dc.description | MM - P&DM | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This study examines legislative oversight and executive accountability in the Gauteng Provincial Government. Legislative oversight forms part of the constitutional obligations of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. The study is based on a premise that Gauteng Provincial Legislature is, as a representative institution and the custodian of the will of the people of the province, constitutionally enjoined to perform oversight over the provincial executive (cabinet) to ensure effective public policy implementation (public service delivery) and management of public finances. The executive is also constitutionally obligated to account to the legislature. The study begins the analysis by first doing international comparative analysis of the British and United States case studies to draw parallels and differences, and more importantly, to project key lessons relevant to South Africa with regard to the exercise of legislative oversight and executive accountability. The study then goes further to analyse legislative oversight and executive accountability in South Africa to provide a broader national perspective and background to the empirical analysis of Gauteng Provincial Government as a case study. The analysis unpacks fundamental issues such as key approaches, methods and instruments used to conduct legislative oversight over the executive, the institutional relationship (power politics) between parliament and the executive, the influence of both the electoral and party politics on legislative oversight and executive accountability, etc. The empirical analysis of legislative oversight and executive accountability in the Gauteng Provincial Government also deals with these fundamental issues. Overall understandings, insights and lessons from this study are then projected into the domain of recommendations, which, among others, include the electoral reforms, investment in institutional capacity of the legislature, the strengthening of the legislature’s monitoring and evaluation systems, the enforcement of oversight sanctions, legislative measures to enable the legislature to amend money bills, shift in approach to opposition politics, etc | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10539/10053 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.subject | Gauteng Provincial Government | en_US |
| dc.subject | Legislative oversight | en_US |
| dc.title | LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |