The South African government auction mechanism: inference from cross-country analysis

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dc.contributor.authorDu Plessis, Johannes Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-03T11:25:24Z
dc.date.available2013-06-03T11:25:24Z
dc.date.issued2013-06-03
dc.descriptionThesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management in Finance and Investment in the faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Wits Businesss School, University of the Witwatersrand, 2012.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractIdiosyncratic considerations relevant to South Africa’s economic and legal framework, as well as determining factors taken from the financial markets and the asset being auctioned are used to critically review the current auction mechanism used by the South African government to borrow funds publicly. A logistic regression with panel data is used in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable has a dichotomous outcome of uniform-price and discriminatory auction mechanisms. Data from 43 different countries over the period 2005 to 2011 are used for the analysis. It was hypothesized that countries with higher uncertainty about the price of their public debt, should use the auction mechanism that reduces under-pricing. Results from the logit regression supported this view. Upon comparing South Africa’s profile with the logit regression results, alongside a review of the literature, it becomes apparent that the proposed model does not provide a definitive answer. However, the model does aid policymakers’ decision on which auction mechanism should be preferred over the other for South Africa.en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10539/12759
dc.language.isoenen_ZA
dc.subjectAuctionen_ZA
dc.subjectDiscriminatory auction mechanismen_ZA
dc.subjectGovernment bonden_ZA
dc.titleThe South African government auction mechanism: inference from cross-country analysisen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
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