Incentivised self-regulation and the practice of health and safety representatives on South African underground mines

Abstract

Pluralist arrangements requiring consultation between employer occupational health and safety (OHS) appointments and employee selected health and safety representatives (HSRs) are aligned with the ILO Convention 176 Safety and Health in Mining and are well established worldwide. The post-apartheid promulgation of the Mine Health and Safety Act (MHSA) No. 29 of 1996 as amended marked the first time the appointment of worker elected HSRs became a legal requirement on South African mines. A two-tier structure of full-time HSRs (appointed to work full-time across the whole mine site) and workplace HSRs (appointed to a designated workplace only) represent workers’ health and safety interests on large mines. Globally worker representatives are a product of labour struggles and are associated with improved OHS outcomes, but their effectiveness has been undermined by neoliberalism. While this is well documented in highly industrialised countries very little has been written about the experience of worker representatives in middle-income contexts, such as South Africa and/or in Africa. Given the positive contribution of HSRs is under threat worldwide, it is timeous to consider what has happened in democratic South Africa. Methods Four in-depth descriptive case studies on underground gold, platinum and diamond mines with ˃500 employees were conducted between February 2015 and December 2016. The case studies involved repeat in-depth interviews (up to four times) with HSRs (n=35). In depth interviews were conducted with members of the employer OHS management system (n=18), members of the trade union health and safety structure (n=6) and focus groups (n=4) with production workers (n=37). Document review, non-participant observation at the mine health and safety committee and monthly telephone calls completed the data collection. Interview transcripts and other data were coded in Max QDA version 18 using inductive and deductive codes. Thereafter, exploratory and explanatory iterative cross-case synthesis ensued. Secondary data analysis of a sector wide, concurrent mixed methods study that examined the implementation of the Right to Refuse Dangerous Work (RRDW) supplemented the case studies. The right to withdraw workers from a dangerous workplace being an important power granted to HSRs. viii Findings The South African HSR experience resonated with global studies, but was shaped by the high disease burden and socio-economic context. The findings of this study resulted in four peer reviewed publications: Paper 1: HSRs referenced the law incorrectly and took on the perspectives and responsibilities of the employer, which I described as “creeping responsibilisation.” They faced discriminatory and retaliatory actions by the employer in their role. I developed a four domain framework to provide an underlying explanation of this. As a consequence, workers considered being an HSR as “risky” and did not want to take on the role. Policy and training gaps were found in the globally recognised pre conditions necessary to support the implementation of worker representation. Paper 2: HSRs were captured by the employer and unable to challenge the production imperative. Full-time HSRs reported to the employer safety department, who largely determined their day-to-day activities. They were party to two dominant communication loops which ensured they were unable to operate autonomously of the employer with respect to safety incidents. This was partially underpinned by incentives paid by the employer to HSRs. In the event of an inspectorate order for mine closure, trade union representatives and full-time HSRs sided with the employer to keep a mine open and productive. Paper 3: South African mines are characterised by a triple disease burden; occupational, communicable and non-communicable disease are all of concern. Full time HSRs were involved with all three disease burdens and carried out “worker-led” and “employer-led” activities. The employer exploited the two-tier HSR system to support their management of health challenges. Employers resisted the representative role for which HSRs were poorly resourced and ill-prepared. Where HSRs operated autonomously of the employer it was as the compassionate voice to workers; visiting workers in hospitals, ensuring workers accessed treatment, and supporting individuals with health problems to face hostile supervisors. Paper 4: The HSR has the right to withdraw workers from a mine workplace that he or she subjectively deems dangerous (section 23, MHSA). Workers were found to be more likely to withdraw from a dangerous workplace under instruction from an HSR than of their own volition. Supervisors did not take HSRs seriously, and there was no ix guarantee that a workplace would be made safe even after a withdrawal. Workers felt HSRs had no power and/or did not understand their role. Mandatory guidance issued by the regulator addressed some implementation gaps, but introduced management partiality by giving the employer the final decision in any dispute over an unsafe workplace. Contrary to the intention of the MHSA, a disingenuous model of worker representation has emerged on South African mines that has undermined the autonomy of HSRs, which I term, “incentivised self-regulation.” Five overarching themes shape the model: 1) The partial compliance of the employer and the positive value of HSRs to OHS; 2) the habitual dominance of the employer over the HSR, which was found to be severe despite high density trade union membership; 3) the fragile set of power relations around HSRs that concerned both their relationship with organised labour and with their own constituencies; 4) the non compliance and irregularities that have become commonplace, specifically the provision of employer incentives to HSRs; and 5) the policy and implementation gaps in the sector concerned with the role of HSRs, their resourcing and their training. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) made the earliest demand for worker elected safety stewards during the mass mobilisation of the anti-apartheid struggle years. Post apartheid, the mobilisation of workers and OHS became detached and the dominant trade unions have pursued individualistic rather than collective agendas for OHS. For the future, new challenges in the South African mining context concerned with mine modernisation, the escalation of informal mining, the increased numbers of contract labour and the health and safety impacts of mining on local communities will rapidly reshape the agenda for HSRs and worker representation in South Africa. Conclusion The positions taken by both the employer and trade unions post-apartheid contributed to HSRs being undermined. Sectoral developments have not kept pace with the necessary policy and training requirements to support HSRs. Organised labour can strengthen the position of HSRs by revisiting the existing legislative provisions for workplace collectivism under the MHSA. New opportunities for labour OHS practice are emerging as elements of the South African labour movement repositions itself to mobilise the most disadvantaged, explores mechanisms for multi-union solidarity and shifts to more left leaning democratic practice in the workplace