An analysis of the implication of the ICC mandate on the consolidation of democracy in the DRC

Abstract

In the Democratic Republic of Congo the transition from dictatorship to democracy took place at the cost of violence that resulted in more than three million civilian deaths and caused a trail of heinous crimes committed by all sides to the conflict. Beside the existence of required indicators, the healthy functioning of democracy also requires the existence of a viable, vibrant opposition to incumbents to hold them accountable for their omissions and commissions, and also to act as a watchdog to ensure that the incumbent does not relapse into dictatorial practices. In 1998 the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created to formally end the persistence of the culture of impunity for individuals accused of crimes of concern to the international community. This case study examines the impact of the ICC on democracy in the DRC from Liberal Institutionalism perspective. I find that the ICC processes as observed so far, display elements of bias against the opposition and in favor of incumbent and which impacts negatively on early and fragile political processes as it offers incumbents with the opportunity to reinvent the crackdown on opposition by using the court for political goals. The thesis closes by arguing that the ICC processes inhibit the consolidation of early political processes.