Artificial intelligence, machines and understanding - a critique of John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment

Abstract

Can machines think? In this paper, I will argue against John Searle’s Chinese Room Thought Experiment. The Chinese Room Thought Experiment argues against the claim that “the appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states and that the programs thereby explain human cognition” (Searle 1980, 417). The central thesis that I intend to pursue is that it is/will be possible for machines to exhibit cognition. I will engage with various replies to Searle’s argument, such as The Systems Reply, The Virtual Mind Reply, The Robot Reply and The Brain Simulator Reply, to argue for my thesis. I argue for an externalist account of “understanding” and I argue that if a machine were created that combines these responses then it would be able to understand the world around it. I then move on to argue for the theory of mind known as connectionism. I argue that machines should be programmed with a connectionist system as connectionist systems are able to learn from experience. In this paper, I intend to argue against Searle, put forward a concept of cognition and understanding, and argue for the theory of mind known as connectionism to conclude that a machine will be able to exhibit understanding of the world around it.