Analyticity: Boghossian on Quine
Date
2010-08-11
Authors
Liebenberg, Nicolyn
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Abstract
Abstract
Analyticity: Boghossian on Quine
In the wake of scepticism over the lucidity of the analytic/synthetic distinction, Paul
Boghossian defends the distinction, albeit, the distinction between those statements
which are synthetic, and those statements which are analytic in a specific kind of way.
Boghossian holds that analytic statements are either metaphysically analytic (where
the meaning of the terms in the statement determine the truth of the statement), or
epistemically analytic (where knowledge of the meaning of the terms in the statement
justifies our knowledge of the truth of the statement). Boghossian’s claim is that
Quine is ambiguous regarding which kind of analyticity is the target of his attack in
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and that his failure to draw a distinction between
different types of analyticity leads to his erroneous dismissal of both kinds of
analyticity and their concomitant theories. His thought is that Quine was correct to
dismiss the metaphysical notion of analyticity, and thus the linguistic theory of
necessary truth; but mistaken in dismissing the epistemic notion of analyticity, and
hence the analytic theory of the a priori. Within this paper, I offer an exposition of
Quine’s arguments, as well as Boghossian’s replies, before critically discussing
Boghossian’s arguments against metaphysical analyticity, as well as purported
separation of metaphysical and epistemic analyticity.