Whether we have free-will and whether it matters
dc.contributor.author | Ostrowick, John Montague | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z | |
dc.description | Student Number : 9112588A - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities | en |
dc.description.abstract | There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will. | en |
dc.format.extent | 930160 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 37229 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10539/2182 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.subject | Compatibilism | en |
dc.subject | Incompatibilism | en |
dc.subject | Libertarianism | en |
dc.subject | Hard Determinism | en |
dc.subject | Free-will | en |
dc.subject | the Self | en |
dc.subject | Libet | en |
dc.subject | Dennett | en |
dc.subject | Reactive Attitudes | en |
dc.subject | Penal system | en |
dc.title | Whether we have free-will and whether it matters | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
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