Whether we have free-will and whether it matters

dc.contributor.authorOstrowick, John Montague
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.date.available2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.date.issued2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.descriptionStudent Number : 9112588A - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanitiesen
dc.description.abstractThere is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.en
dc.format.extent930160 bytes
dc.format.extent37229 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10539/2182
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCompatibilismen
dc.subjectIncompatibilismen
dc.subjectLibertarianismen
dc.subjectHard Determinismen
dc.subjectFree-willen
dc.subjectthe Selfen
dc.subjectLibeten
dc.subjectDennetten
dc.subjectReactive Attitudesen
dc.subjectPenal systemen
dc.titleWhether we have free-will and whether it mattersen
dc.typeThesisen
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
abstract.pdf
Size:
36.36 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
J M Ostrowick.pdf
Size:
908.36 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
87 B
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Collections