Aiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship.

dc.contributor.authorViedge, Nikolai
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-19T07:33:09Z
dc.date.available2014-06-19T07:33:09Z
dc.date.issued2014-06-19
dc.description.abstractOne of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality.en_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net10539/14805
dc.language.isoenen_ZA
dc.subject.lcshBelief and doubt.
dc.subject.lcshTruth.
dc.subject.lcshPractical reason.
dc.titleAiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship.en_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA

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