Aiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship.
dc.contributor.author | Viedge, Nikolai | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-19T07:33:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-19T07:33:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-06-19 | |
dc.description.abstract | One of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality. | en_ZA |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net10539/14805 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_ZA |
dc.subject.lcsh | Belief and doubt. | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Truth. | |
dc.subject.lcsh | Practical reason. | |
dc.title | Aiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship. | en_ZA |
dc.type | Thesis | en_ZA |
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