Aiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship.
|dc.description.abstract||One of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality.||en_ZA|
|dc.subject.lcsh||Belief and doubt.|
|dc.title||Aiming at rationality : an alternative account of the truth-belief relationship.||en_ZA|
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