Firm Wage Premia, Rent-Sharing and Monopsony When Underemployment is High

dc.article.end-page45
dc.article.start-page1
dc.contributor.authorBassier, Ihsaan
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-21T12:22:22Z
dc.date.available2022-12-21T12:22:22Z
dc.date.issued2021-02
dc.description.abstractHow important are firms in the labour markets of developing countries? Using matched employer-employee data from South Africa, I find firms explain a larger share of wages than in other, richer countries. I show this can be parsimoniously explained by the high degree of underemployment. Estimating separations elasticities by instrumenting wages of matched workers with firm wages, among other methods, I find a low separations elasticity which generates a high degree of monopsony. The correspondingly high estimated rent-sharing elasticity explains the important role of firm wage policies, even in an economy with a large labour surplus. This paper is a work in progress.
dc.description.librarianES2022
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10539/33953
dc.language.isoen
dc.orcid.id0000-0001-8793-2182
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSCIS Working Paper; 16
dc.titleFirm Wage Premia, Rent-Sharing and Monopsony When Underemployment is High
dc.typeWorking Paper
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