3. Electronic Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) - All submissions

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    A sower of discord- God, Atheism and the Argument from Doxastic Discord
    (2019) Fasser, Eron
    In this thesis I explore the pressing and perennial ontological question of the existence of God. In so doing, I set out to develop a (somewhat) novel deductively valid argument against the existence of God, more particularly, the type of God that is thought to constitute the common metaphysical and theological capital of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The argument, known as the Argument from Doxastic Discord, is an affirmative argument for Atheism and seeks to demonstrate that there is an explicit logical contradiction between (i) the observable empirical fact of doxastic heterogeneity amongst finite persons on the one hand, and (ii) the classic ‘great-making’ properties usually ascribed to God on the other. It will be argued that the empirical existence of doxastic heterogeneity (of a particular kind) cannot be logically reconciled with a perfect supernatural being that is supposed to simultaneously co-instantiate the properties of omnipotence, omniscience and omni-benevolence and who desires to have a deep, long lasting and meaningful relationship with all human persons. I intend to divide the discussion into three broad sections. In the first section, I articulate the general landscape in which this discussion is taking place by first clearly explicating the core concerns that lie behind, and motivate, the Argument from Doxastic Discord. In so doing, it will be necessary to disambiguate two concerns viz. the epistemic and metaphysical concerns. Of the two concerns, it will be the latter that will form the principal subject matter of this thesis. It will also be necessary to explicate and distinguish the crucial concepts of ‘God’, ‘Theism’, ‘Atheism’, ‘Ultimism’ and ‘Belief’ as well as outline the inter-relationships between these concepts. Part of this exercise will involve distinguishing personal and impersonal conceptions of God as well as articulating what we really mean when we speak of the so called ‘great making’ properties of omnipotence, omniscience and omni-benevolence i.e. the properties of realist cataphatic ‘perfect being’ theology. In the second section I set out the positive argument - the Argument from Doxastic Discord. The argument itself is divided into two parts. The first part of the argument contains just two premises - one theological and the other empirical – as well as the main conclusion. The second part of the argument is an extended sub-argument justifying the theological premise. In this section I, therefore, explain and unpack the content of both the theological premise and the empirical premise, as well as present the prima facie case for the crucial premises constituting the sub-argument. Finally, in the third section I set out the principal objections that might be made by a theist to both the theological and empirical premises of the first part of the argument. In particular, the focus shall be on articulating the most promising theistic response to the crucial premises in the sub-argument and why, in the final analysis such responses are, to my mind, unpersuasive. In conclusion, I hope to persuade the reflective reader that the Argument from Doxastic Discord is a worthwhile affirmative argument for Atheism that can, and should, take its place in the atheistic armamentarium, alongside other prominent cognate atheological arguments such as the Argument from Evil and the Argument from Divine Hiddenness.
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    Dispositional essentialism and the problem of unmanifested dispositions
    (2017) Coates, Ashley Stephen
    Powers theory is the view that some ontic or sparse properties are essentially powerful in the sense that they are “for” or “directed toward” certain manifestations. In this thesis, I consider in detail the idea that the nature of unmanifested dispositions generates serious difficulties for powers theory. I argue that extant arguments based on this idea do not succeed but also that a novel argument based on the idea does raise significant problems for powers theory and, especially, for dispositional essentialism – the version of powers theory on which some powers are fundamental natural properties. In the first two chapters, I argue that on the most charitable interpretation the most plausible extant arguments from unmanifested dispositions against powers theory collapse into a single basic argument. The putative problem that this argument raises for powers theory is that some powers stand in a relation with manifestations that do not actually exist. In chapter three, I develop an argument from unmanifested dispositions that does not depend on this idea. According to this argument, unmanifested dispositions commit the powers theorist to the problematic idea that entities that do not actually exist have a sort of ontological priority over entities that actually exist. In chapter four, I argue that the arguments discussed in the first three chapters are seriously undermined by the fact that the “directedness” of a power instance need involve only the possibility of that power instance’s token manifestation and not the token manifestation itself. In chapters five and six, I use Kit Fine’s conception of ontological dependence to reformulate the argument developed in chapter three so that it gets around this difficulty. I argue that this argument provides good grounds to think that the dispositional essentialist is committed to the claim that unrealised possibilities have a significant sort of explanatory priority over concrete reality. This result is problematic for the dispositional essentialist, as this claim is strongly counterintuitive, entails the falsity of significant forms of ontological naturalism, and is inconsistent with important parts of the standard motivation for dispositional essentialism.
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    Philosophy for children : the quest for an African perspective.
    (2013-09-30) Ndofirepi, Amasa Philip
    An education that does not recognise schools as places for the mere transmission and assimilation of knowledge, but as places for critical and creative inquiry, is quality education. Philosophising with children in schools assumes that children are actively and deliberately encouraged in seeking responses to the questions about reality they raise at a very early age. The practice of philosophy is undoubtedly one of the underpinnings of a quality education for all. By contributing to opening children‘s minds, building their critical reflection and autonomous thinking, philosophy contributes to the protection against manipulation and exclusion at the hands of adults. If education in general must open up to children the maps of an intricate world in a continuous state of tension, then philosophy is a compass for navigating that world. Hence children, irrespective of their geographical location and regardless of their social milieu or state of development of their country, deserve to be equipped with the tools so motivated for. Using conceptual analysis as a tool, I explore the Lipman method of Philosophy for Children by presenting a case for an African perspective of the same. I situate doing philosophy with children in the context of the African philosophy debate. While Lipman‘s model provides the case for the role of rational, logical and systematic thinking in children, the African background promises the raw materials on which the said instruments work. I therefore settle for a hybridised Philosophy for Children programme that marries the universalist and the particularist views of doing philosophy. I argue that the traditional African notion of community plays a significant role in our understanding of the community of inquiry as pedagogy of doing philosophy with children. Embedded in African ―community‖ is the concept of ukama qua relationality, which constitutes a keystone in the envisaged African perspective of Philosophy for Children. I conclude that doing philosophy with children in schools in Africa contributes to the interpretation of the cultural, economic and circumstances of the African situation.
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    Renewing perceptions: an architecture centre in Newtown
    (2009-06-19T08:48:31Z) Kununka, Francis K. P.
    No abstract
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