

Use of Monitoring and Evaluation for Oversight and Accountability by the Ekurhuleni Legislature

By

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ABSTRACT

Legislatures at all levels are tasked with the oversight of the executive. However, one of the challenges identified in oversight is the ineffectiveness of legislatures resulting from the executive not being held accountable for performance, and the need to strengthen oversight processes to ensure better monitoring of performance. These issues are also a challenge in the Ekurhuleni Legislature, where issues such as request for information yielding information that is not comprehensive from the executive; as well as a need to strengthen monitoring practices and assess service delivery impact.

The aim of the research study is to assess the use of monitoring and evaluation practices by the Ekurhuleni Legislature for oversight and accountability as the cornerstone of legislatures across the spectrum. In answering this question, the study leaned to a qualitative research methodology that made use of a case study approach. The data was collected through respondent interviews, which was triangulated by use of document analysis as a secondary data collection method.

The key findings of the research were grouped into four themes with each having its own sub-theme. One of the themes making up the findings of the study was that performance monitoring of the executive focused on analysis of documents and reports, which did not assess the realization of the outcomes and impacts of service delivery initiatives. The study found that no evaluation studies were conducted which would determine whether the realization of the municipality's objectives was achieved. The structure of the oversight, monitoring and evaluation function was identify as an

impediment in the function of oversight and accountability due to a lack of personnel who are equipped in monitoring and evaluation practices which would play a role in sound decision making. The additional findings of the study were that the lack of skilled personnel in M&E put the Legislature at a disadvantage when having to approve what to monitor in the results framework of the municipality. No meaningful inputs or recommendation has been made by the Legislature in this regard.

The key recommendations that emanate from the study are that there is a need to strengthen performance monitoring by ensuring that the oversight goes beyond merely monitoring reports that have been sent to the Council. This will involve actively conducting more FISs and engaging with all operational and strategic plans of the municipality to ensure that all processes in the service delivery value chain are monitored, and that the responsible managers are held accountable for poor performance. The research also recommends that the Legislature inculcate evaluative studies to determine whether the service delivery impact of the municipality have been met and to what degree. The imposing of sanctions is also recommended as an accountability measure. The last recommendations put forth the need to capacitate the already existing personnel on M&E practices for the purpose of improving effective oversight and accountability.

DECLARATION

I confirm that the work I submit for all assessment for the above course is my own unaided work. I have followed required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others. I am aware that the correct method for referencing material and a discussion on what plagiarism is are explained in the P & DM Study Guide and these issues have been discussed in class during Orientation sessions and documented in the introduction and Orientation Guide.

I am aware that plagiarism (the use of someone else's words without their permission and/or without acknowledging the original source) is wrong. I understand that the University of the Witwatersrand may take disciplinary action against me if there is a belief that this is not my own work or that I have failed to correctly acknowledge of the ideas or words in my writing.

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Date: 7/04/2017

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

A	Agent
APP	Annual Performance Plan
CAPEX	Capital Expenditure
D	Domain Subject to Accountability
EMM	Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality
FIS	Focused Intervention Studies
GDS	Growth and Development Strategy
GWMES	Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
NEPF	National Evaluation Policy Framework
OCMOL	Oversight Committee over the Mayor and Legislature
OEM	Office of the Executive Mayor
P	Principal
PAT	Principal Agent Theory
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
SDBIP	Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan
SOP	Separation of Powers
ToC	Theory of Change

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION OF THE CHAPTER

This introduction will be used to give the context of the research to be undertaken as well as direct the reader regarding how the objectives of the research will be achieved. The study of governance has been seen to be of critical concern across the international spectrum due to its attribution to development and sound utilization of limited resources to address unlimited public demands. Its evolution has seen it grow beyond the affirmations made by Aristotle in the *Politics*, to diversify to usage in other areas of development, whether national or trans-national; and public or private. Major concern has been given to the key dimensions of governance, how to attain them, and ensure their proper functionality for attainment of the overall public good.

One of the key major governance dimensions is accountability which like the concept of governance has multiple definitions; however, the consistent and most used is its denotation of a state of answerability for actions undertaken. This relates particularly in areas where the use of resources bestowed upon an individual, arm of state, or institution. The state of requiring a form of account for actions undertaken requires a sound determination of the under-performance in the use of public resources for service delivery. In recent times, the process of determining such gaps in performance has

employed a process called 'monitoring and evaluation', as well as oversight. Although a fairly new discipline, M&E can be traced back to authors such as Paton in 1994, and has been received with vigor at an international level by institutions such as the World Bank; at continental level by countries requiring aid from multi-national organizations; and at national level with the introduction of the Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (GWMES) in South Africa. At the core of this is to bring about a level of account for the steps undertaken, and the usage of financial and non-financial resources of the state.

In the local government sphere, the South Africa government has opted to employ the separation of powers (SOP) model that sees the executive as the implementing arm of local government accounting to the legislature. In the main, this principle lies within the concept of governance whereby issues such as accountability, oversight, transparency, and openness are dealt with. An important component in the oversight undertaken by the legislature on the executive, is the role that monitoring and evaluation plays in ensuring that accountability is enhanced for service delivery initiatives. This is where this research will be placed. This study will have two focal areas: the first will be a determination of accountability and oversight processes used in the Legislature; and the second will be to determine how monitoring and evaluation is used to oversee the executive's performance thereby enhancing accountability.

Anecdotal evidence has shown that monitoring and evaluation plays an important role in enhancing accountability and oversight through the provision of empirical evidence that

accounts for the usage of public resources; assists in policy development and assessment; aids in the management of service delivery activities; and enhances oversight (Govendor, 2013, p. 811). In the context of answering this question in the Ekurhuleni Legislature, it will aid to identify the level of effectiveness of legislative oversight in the form of M&E. An additional significance of the study is that it will aid to assess how/if at all the Legislature undertakes evaluation studies.

1.1 BACKGROUND

The South African local government sphere is increasingly required to produce results that can be seen through an improvement in the standard of living of its citizens. This has increased a need to have a supervisory body that can continuously track the performance of municipal departments tasked with the delivery of services and administration of public goods. This has prompted the dissemination of the separation of powers (SOP) model at local government that mirrors that of national level.

In the past eight years there has been a creation of legislatures at local government level across South Africa, these have been in the City of Cape Town and the City of Johannesburg respectively. In the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM), the SOP model was enacted in 2011 through a council resolution for immediate implementation. Legislative oversight offers a critical advantage of continuous performance tracking and assessment which allows for the re-direction of service delivery activities to optimize the achievement of municipal objectives.

Across the board, legislatures are tasked with making the law, oversight, and ensuring the inclusion of the public in government processes (Madue, 2013). The mission of the Ekurhuleni Legislature is to be a representative and proactive legislature that drives the creation of a smart, creative, proactive and developmental city, through transparency, responsiveness and accountability to its residents. From an implementation perspective, this is partly undertaken through a focus on policy research that seeks to verify the impact of service delivery initiatives on citizens. In order to operationalize the Legislature's mission, a research agenda was developed in 2013 that serves to guide the manner in which the research unit conducts research that seeks to monitor and evaluate claims made by the executive arm of the municipality.

More so, this document states the overall objectives of the Legislature and the resource capacitation thereof. In the main, the role of the Legislature is to strengthen governance dimensions of departmental accountability; responsiveness to citizens of the municipality; openness regarding public resources and ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery.

Oversight at the Legislative sector is undertaken through the continuous tracking of the performance of the executive. This is undertaken by analysis of performance reports tabled to Council and Oversight Committees. The processes followed after the analysis involves deliberating on the reported performance and formulating questions around identified areas of underperformance. These are later responded too by the executive, following which the Committees will have to report back to Council with

recommendations on how service delivery performance can be improved. Madue (2012) identify that within the South African context, legislatures at times lack 'independence, expertise and resources to perform their oversight role'. The author further pinpoints that the executive is not always willing to assist through truthful reporting of performance and openness in the processes undertaken (Madue, 2012, p. 432).

The function of oversight over the executive is geared toward ensuring that the executive is held accountable for actions undertaken or the lack thereof. This is largely done through the questions process mentioned above, as well through the recommendations that are tabled to Council. From an accountability perspective, the major challenge has been ineffective measures to hold the executive accountable through processes such as the imposing of sanctions. The EMM Legislature is no exception, its accountability measures are limited to oral engagement and written replies to oversight questions.

Components of monitoring and evaluation are rooted in the verification of the authenticity of performance reports; as well as the determination of the positive change that service delivery initiatives have on the recipients of such initiatives. In the EMM Legislature, verification of reports is done through cross-checking of multiple reports tabled to council and respective Oversight Committees for correlation; as well as conducting of site visits by Committees where some are limited to four or five in a given financial year.

It is behind this background that this research will be undertaken. The research will assess the monitoring and evaluation process undertaken by the Ekurhuleni legislature of the executive service delivery initiatives. This will be undertaken focusing on one unit under the legislature, namely the Research Unit that supports Oversight Committees. The role of this unit involves tracking the performance of the executive in addressing service delivery issues, as well as determining whether these address the demands of the community. An additional focus of the research will be a determination of how the Legislature holds the executive accountable for poor performance. This will be done by defining the accountability processes used, as well as their effectiveness in re-directing the performance of the executive.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Due to the inefficient monitoring and evaluation processes in the EMM Legislature, there has been ineffective accountability over the executive for purposes of improving service delivery. Legislatures at all levels are tasked with the oversight of the executive. However, one of the challenges identified in oversight is the ineffectiveness of the legislature resulting from the executive not being held accountable for performance, and the poor performance reports tabled to the legislature that requires independent verification (Madue, 2014, p. 866). These contentious issues are also a challenge in the EMM Legislature, where responses to Legislature questions do not mirror performance, and the verification of reports is limited by merely cross-checking their authenticity through correlating them with other reports.

Furthermore, the site visits undertaken by Oversight Committee are insufficient to thoroughly verify reports of performance with Committees conducting three or four in a given financial year. These processes do not effectively determine whether performance was done. Additionally, the processes undertaken to hold the executive accountable are limited to oral replies, and the writing of reports with recommendations that must be implemented. There are no hard sanctions imposed such as withholding of budgets, or payment of performance budgets.

Due to the gap of little knowledge on M&E within the local government legislature sector it is important to know how Ekurhuleni Municipality's Legislature oversees the executive to ensure effective and efficient management and control of public assets and the assurance of service delivery. In the absence of this knowledge, the EMM legislature cannot effectively know whether their efforts at oversight undertaken through monitoring and evaluation practices are successful in adapting and re-directing the implementation direction of the executive geared toward effective service delivery. A study such as this one will also feed into the absent knowledge of the role of monitoring and evaluation in the South African local government legislative sphere; as well as aid in improving accountability over the executive.

1.3PURPOSE STATEMENT

The purpose of the research study is to assess how the Ekurhuleni Legislature utilizes M&E to enhance oversight and accountability of the executive for the purpose of

efficient and effective service delivery. Through a process that solicits information from strategic individuals within the legislature who are integrally involved in facilitating and undertaking oversight on the executive, the research will seek to answer how the forms of M&E activities undertaken by the legislature enhance accountability and oversight.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How is Monitoring and Evaluation used by the Legislature to enhance oversight and accountability over the executive?

1.4.1 Sub-questions

- i. What forms of monitoring and evaluations processes are used by the Legislature in the oversight it undertakes over the executive?
- ii. What are the oversight challenges that are experienced by the Legislature?
- iii. What are the accountability measures used by the EMM Legislature over its executive?

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this research are to:

- Assess the accountability process used by the Legislature over its executive.
- Assess how the Ekurhuleni Legislature applies monitoring and evaluation in its oversight over the executive.
- Assess the connection between M&E and governance over the executive.

- Provide recommendations that can improve M&E for purposes of increasing accountability and oversight over the executive.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

There have been few studies on the process and effects of monitoring and evaluations in local government legislature with more focus being given to provincial legislature and national parliament. This as a result of the establishment of local government legislatures being a new phenomenon in South Africa. There is a need for more research into this area given the role that legislatures play in overseeing the implementation of service delivery. Therefore, this research can aid strengthen the monitoring and evaluation processes in the Ekurhuleni legislature, and enhance accountability in pursuit of service delivery. In the main, the research will generate lessons to inform M&E functionality in enhancing accountability; and can further be used as a basis for future research in other legislatures.

1.7 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

The outline of the chapters in this research report will be as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter serves as a foundation to the research that will be undertaken. This chapter serves to introduce the topic of the research, background of the research, and the key concepts that the research will be rooted in. It also encapsulates the problem statement, purpose statement, research questions, research objectives, and the overall rationale for undertaking the research study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review. This chapter provides the body of knowledge around the subject of governance, and monitoring and evaluation. It does this by first defining governance, its key dimensions, and its dominant theories are that applicable to this research study. The chapter will go further and delve into the monitoring and evaluation through also defining it, and engaging with its key theory. In the main, this literature review will seek to provide linkages between governance and M&E within the EMM legislature.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology. This chapter states the research approach to be used in the study which is qualitative. The data collection, and analysis methods are also presented in this chapter. Furthermore, credibility issues such as validity and reliability are dealt with; along with the ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

Chapter 4: Findings. The qualitative data findings acquired through the primary data collection method would be presented. The primary data findings will be compared to the secondary data and presented through thematic analysis.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Interpretation. The data gathered in the previous chapter will be analyzed and interpreted in this chapter. This will be done through use of thematic analysis which codes responses. This will analyze the data to answer the primary research question of how the EMM legislature used M&E to enhance governance of the executive.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations. This chapter will conclude the research study and table recommendations on how the EMM Legislature can improve its governance process through improved M&E activities and thereby fulfilling the last objective of this research study.

2. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the introduction and a background into the study that was conducted. The introduction focused on the concept of governance as the foundation of the study, locating the concept of SOP with governance. An element of M&E was introduced in the relationship between the legislature and executive.

The background of the study expanded on the SOP model and its implementation in the EMM Legislature. The concept of oversight as a key function in the EMM Legislature was touched on and how it interlinked with accountability within the legislature/executive relationship.

Broadly, this chapter covered the problem statement, purpose statement, research question and objectives; as well as a brief outline of the chapters in this research report.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2. INTRODUCTION

It is imperative that the term literature review is defined and discussed in order to understand the role it will play in this research project. A literature review should 'contain an argument about what exists in literature' (Badenhorst, 2010, p. 43). It lays out previous research into a particular subject area and the methods used in conducting that research (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012). This history will provide a context by which the research at hand will be undertaken. A literature review can also be defined as a process of 'reviewing accumulated knowledge about a question' (Neuman, 2011, p. 20). It is important to establish what has been said about a particular subject area in the beginning of a research project. Literature reviews also contain a conceptual framework to be used in the research, counter-arguments, and the knowledge gap identified.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 Defining Governance

Heywood (2002) takes note that the concept of governance has no agreed definition. He defines governance as "the various ways in which social life is coordinated in which government is merely one" (Heywood, 2002, p. 6). He goes further to expand on this concept by pointing out its broader use to refer to a diffusion of state and society which

has resulted from the 'development of new forms of public management, the growth of public private partnerships, and increasing importance of public policy' (Heywood, 2002, p. 100). It can be drawn from this approach that governance no longer pertains to government processes only, but has grown to become inclusive of other sectors and the use of multidisciplinary processes in pursuit of a better life for citizens.

Chibba (2009) rationalizes governance by two dimensions. The first dimension refers to all aspects of the way a nation is governed or runs its affairs, including its institutions, policies, laws, regulations, processes and oversight mechanisms (Chibba, 2009). The second dimension has to do with its cultural and ideological setting. This stems from the recognition that governance is 'perceived and shaped by social values, culture, traditions and ideology' (Chibba, 2009, p. 79).

It is drawn from the above definitions that governance is the element of improving people's lives or bringing about development. Chibba (2009) goes further to list schools of thought that link good governance and development. The first is the successful society where the major aspects of governance from developed countries are replicated by developing countries. The concept of context in development should be highlighted in this case. This means that in learning from developed countries, it is crucial that developing countries contextualize developmental processes to suit their environment to highthen their chances of success attainment of their objectives.

An element of 'good' is introduced to governance by asserting that good governance is the end-point of a 'combination of values such as efficiency, productivity, performance, participation, democracy, consultation, transparency, accountability, and universality' (Hugue, 2013, p. 1). It can be derived from the author's definition that good governance comprises of components that must be in place or strived for in order to bring about a positive developmental outcome in a country. Furthermore, principles of governance such as accountability by the state, openness and transparency in the business of government, and public inclusion in policy-making are integral and a prerequisite in bringing change and development.

There are many variations of governance that are geared toward the attainment of a good quality of life for citizens. It is important to understand some of these as they are embedded in theories of governance. One of the approaches is the interactive governance approach which is describes as 'a way of conducting policies whereby a government involves its citizens, social organizations, enterprises, and other stakeholders in the early stages of public policy-making' (Edelenbos, 2005, p. 111). This process has also been referred to as participatory policy-making. It implies a form of public participation in decision-making to ensure that the views and interests of the public are taken into account when making decisions.

Following the definitions of governance provided above, it is identified that governance has the following components: decision-making about policy, interactive processes in decision-making, efficiency and effectiveness in implementation, and monitoring and

evaluation of the process and outcomes of policy and development. To enhance the understanding of the concept of governance, its history needs to be engaged which will detail the evolution of the concept and its application over time.

2.1.2 History of Governance

According to Fukuyama (2013) the concept of governance can be traced back to Marx Weber in his famous characterization of the modern bureaucracy, where governance is explained from a procedures perspective. Chibba (2009) on the other hand, traces the history of governance back to philosophers such as Aristotle, Confucius, and Rousseau.

The concept of governance has since evolved to a point where it is applied in different disciplines. One can date its use in the private sector back to the 1970s when it grew from fields such Economics and Organization Theory, which is now conventionally referred to as corporate governance. Pierrie and Peters (2006) on the other hand, attribute the use of corporate governance to a translation that was done by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability as late as the 1990s to denote an efficient governance in the public sector domain. This implies the use of private sector principles and processes to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in realizing the goals of government.

Welz (2013) touches on the history of governance from a regional perspective. He stresses that governance should not be looked at only from country level. For instance, governance occurred at a continental level in Africa where institutions such as the

African Union advanced governance processes that facilitated collective rule, facilitation and the cooperation with non-state actors. Furthermore, governance processes were also called for in the 1990's by the World Bank with countries that required financial aid or relief. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund prescribed certain principles and economic policies in line with their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for developing countries to adhere to qualify for aid. These were in the form of neo-liberal capitalist policies that advanced processes such as reduction in state interference in economic development, and a decrease in the provision of social welfare.

In South Africa, governance was introduced with the advent of democracy. The constitution of South Africa enshrines governance processes that all institutions of government must adhere to. Gildenhuys and Knipe (2007) identify two sets of governance principles that are highlighted in the South African constitution. The first set pertains to the rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances, and civil rights. The second sets of principles are political in nature, such as participation and political accountability. These principles serve as barometer for all public institutions that guide development.

2.1.3 Principles of Good Governance

The next phase of engagement will be to interface with the principles that underpin the concept that this study will immerse itself in. The main principle is accountability and its different facets; however, there will be a brief description of other conglomerate governance principles.

According to Cloete and Auriacombe (2007) accountability is an action of answerability by public officials/executive to parliament and the public given that their authority is derived from these two parties. Olum (2014) elaborates on the concept of accountability by stating that it involves a relationship in which an actor has to justify actions taken. The author expands on this within the public sector domain by stating that accountability 'ensures that actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to community needs' (Olum, 2014, p. 604). It can thus be said that accountability is the process by which an agent accounts or gives testament for actions taken within the process of executing their assigned duties.

The concept of accountability is a value-laden term that is dependent on the lens by which one approaches it. This warrants a brief undertaking to express the different types of accountability definitions out there. For purposes of this study, only three will be briefly defined. These are political accountability, public accountability and administrative accountability. In the main, political accountability denotes a form of political responsibility by political leaders for their electoral promises (Omotoso, 2014).

This has its roots in the ancient philosopher Aristotle's book *The Politics*, in which he affirms a notion that all use of public finances needs to be made available to the public for assessment.

There are inherent similarities between the second type of accountability - public accountability - and political accountability, given that both are rooted in the idea that public servants are bestowed up a form of delegated power. This allows them the authority to utilize allocated resources, and by virtue of such delegation of power, public servants remain accountable to the public and their elected representatives (Omotoso, 2014). Administrative accountability on the other hand, refers to the 'hierarchicality of the public service and emphasizes the need for control and reporting systems' (Omotoso, 2014). This form of accountability is institutional where employees account to their superiors for performance undertaken.

The above characteristics of delegation, utilisation, and reporting on the use of power and authority are also shared by Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans (2014). These authors re-affirm the need to identify who delegates power; who uses that power; who reports on the exercise of that power; and the steps that can be undertaken to reprimand misuse of delegated power.

Accountability plays an important role in preventing the misuse of power in the context of government departments. It ensures that the misappropriation of funds is minimized, and can assist in redirecting the direction of service delivery that agents within an

organization are taking. For instance, in the relationship that takes place between a legislature and the executive, the executive is summoned to answer for decisions taken in the execution of its functions. This will give the legislature an opportunity to ensure that elements of delivery that are not undertaken are brought to the fore and rectified of which monitoring plays a very crucial role.

Another important principle of good governance is transparency. Transparency 'refers to the availability of information about government activities to the general public and involves, among other things, the provision of relevant information such as public accounts' (Cloete & Auriacombe, 2007, p. 195). The authors further state that transparency is closely linked to the principle of accountability. This rooted in the notion that when the process of answerability is taking place, it is important that all the information that is needed in order to assess the performance of the executive is not withheld. For instance, when the executive accounts to the legislature, the documents and financial reports need to be disclosed to the legislature and the general public.

In order for transparency to take place, access to information is important which brings in the third principle of governance. Access is defined as 'the ability of citizens to obtain information in the possession of the state' (Cloete & Auriacombe, 2007, p. 196). In order for access to contribute to state building and good governance there needs to be mass media that can assist in disseminating information to the community. This will need an adequate literacy level to ensure that the community receives that information and processes that information.

Furthermore, access needs appropriate platforms that allow the engagement and feedback between citizens and the government. Government can take the appropriate steps to ensure that citizens get the information. These could be in the form of public meeting where the community is addressed in their own language and engagement with community leaders. This provides the basis for participation by the public. Public participation falls within the ambit of inclusive governance which according to (Edelenbos, 2005, p. 111) involves promotion and inclusion of all sectors in a country in policy making.

2.1.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE

This section of the chapter looked at the predominate theories in the study of governance that were used to guide this research exercise. These are the traditional authority theory, rational choice theory, and institutional authority theory.

- **Traditional Authority Theory**

It is important to start with the traditional authority theory when one engages with the concept of governance. This is the oldest form of governance theory which was championed by Max Weber. The theory assumes a top-down authority vested in the state where government is the only source of governance in a country (Pierre & Peters, 2000). The major instruments of governance in this theory are law and coercion. Heywood (2002) also points out that Max Weber's concept of traditional authority is based on the long standing elements of 'customs and authority'. The author identifies this form of governance as a 'traditional authoritative position' of government where

power is centralized at the top. It is also referred to as a 'hierarchical view of government' where there is a need for a form of dictatorship to sustain the system.

This form of governance was mostly applicable in Europe in the eighteenth century and developing countries before the advent of democracy. In the current era, this system will not be applicable especially in democratic regimes like South Africa. This stems from principles and systems such as the separation of powers models that create checks and balances between the legislature, executive, and judiciary being upheld. Furthermore, the use of this theory fails to recognize that too much concentration of power in one area of state can lead to a misuse of power.

- **Rational-Choice Theory**

The rational choice theory (RCT) is drawn from the utilitarian logic of economics of building institutions which stresses procedural rules about the 'rational self-interested behavior of the individual' (Heywood, 2002). The theory provides an 'analytical device' on the actions of public servants and the choices they make in service delivery. RCT is focused on activities that are taken by agents within an institution that will be beneficial to the institution. Furthermore, RCT puts to the fore the criteria of selecting the best activity by agents within the institution (Martinas & Reguly, 2013). The most beneficial activity to be chosen is based on the overall outcome that the organization is pursuing. It further postulates that before a decision is made, a cost-and-benefit analysis should be undertaken which will determine which activity to undertake.

There have been points of contention with the use of this approach in governance and politics. The first point, as highlighted by Heywood (2002) notes that the rational choice approach 'overestimates human rationality' in the processes of decision-making. This is a result of failing to take external factors such as history and the process of socialization as having an influence on the principles and values that might influence the decisions made by public servants. Furthermore, the author highlights the notion that people are not always guided by a clear set of goals and principles when making decision. It is because of these contentious issues that the RCT will not form the conceptual framework of this study.

- **Theory of Public Value**

Mark Moore's conceptualisation of public value was established to build a framework for public managers to use in making strategic decisions in their work. His public value engagement puts to the fore the need for public managers to engage the overall value add their decisions and actions will have on the community at large. In bringing about public value, Moore (2013: 105) also puts forth the concept of the strategic triangle which speaks to three elements that are a prerequisite in generating public value, these are: defining the public value to be pursued, operational capacity to be employed, and legitimacy and support for the public value in question. Crucial to these elements is contextualising their interplay in generating public value.

The definition of the public value outcome largely depends on the 'philosophical work' that public managers must undertake. Public managers are tasked with identifying the

public value outcome and the strategic goals in meeting them that resonate in the community and bringing it to the attention of the politicians for pursuit in the policy making process (Moore, 2013: 90).

Moore (2013) stresses that managers need to ensure that the public value pursued is well supported in the political arena, so that all stakeholders are on board with the goals and outcomes strived for. Crucial to building support within the authorizing environment is taking cognizance of the environmental changes that might take place in that new political parties might come into power which means public managers need to be adaptable. It is also important for public managers to take account of the external stakeholders that might influence the direction of public value to be pursued i.e. interest groups, and the media.

Lastly, in pursuing public value it is crucial for public managers to determine the operational capacity at their disposal and whether or not it will suffice in pursuing the public value outcome.

▪ **Institutional Analysis Theory**

Another theory of governance advocates for the assessment of governance from an institutional perspective. This theory advocates for assessing the role that institutions play in governance processes. Pierre and Peters (2006) highlight the important role of the choice that presidential or parliamentary institutions make in establishing the capacity of governments toward meeting their goals. In the local government context, the role of the legislature in approving the executive policies and the oversight it has to play on the implementation of those policies is highlighted as important.

Beyond the role of legislatures as forms of parliamentary institutions at local government level, there are other institutions such as the judiciary, and bureaucracies whose role is also assessed in the institutional theory. Moreover, the impact that these institutions have on the developmental mandate of government is assessed within this theory.

2.1.5 Defining Oversight

Legislative oversight has been defined from various perspective over the years. According to Ogul (1979, p.11) legislative oversight is defined as ‘behavior by legislators and their staff, individually or collectively, which results with an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior’. Other authors like Gregory (1990) put forth a more comprehensive definition of legislative oversight. The author defined oversight looking at four aspects, with the first two being classified as weak, and the latter strong. These four aspects involve a Legislative process were by Parliamentarians to:

‘check, verify, scrutinise and examine; the second refers to criticism and censure, challenge, questioning and a call to account; the third is imposition of legal or disciplinary sanctions against a person or a body in office; and the fourth is imposition of punitive sanctions against a person or body in office (such as preventing his re-election or appointment).’

Madue (2012) grounds the definition of oversight as 'the review, monitoring and supervision of government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy and legislation'.

Embedded in the above-definitions of oversight is the effectiveness of Legislature's as a crucial element for oversight and accountability of the executive. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) advances two theoretical claims on the effectiveness of legislative oversight. The first claim advances the notion that the availability of oversight tools and legislative capacity (staff and information) has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of Legislatures. The authors purport that Legislative capacity plays a significant role in the effectiveness of Legislatures, and its shortage can have adverse consequences on the effectiveness of oversight. The second claims, is rooted in the notion that political will, as an oversight tool, is of greatest importance. This claim sees the convergence between capacity, a clear mandate, and political will as having the greatest impact on the effectiveness of Legislatures.

The mandate of the Legislature needs to be clearly defined in relation to what the Legislature is tasked with doing, and how much of it can be done (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, p. 257, 2014).

The key oversight tools found in theory pertain to the following:

- Resources (Financial, Human, and Information)
- Committees

- Site Visits
- Focused Intervention Studies
- Summons (Question and Answer sessions)

At the core of the Legislative oversight function is a process that involves monitoring and evaluating the performance of the executive to ensure compliance to legal statutory prescriptions and the proper usage of resources.

2.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

Kusek and Gorgens (2009, p. 55) define monitoring as ‘a continuous function that uses the systemic collection of data on specific indicators, provides management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds’. The authors go on to further define evaluation as the ‘systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme, or policy, including its design, implementation, and results’ (Kusek & Gorgens, 2009, p. 56). In this regard, monitoring centers around tracking performance on a continuous basis to establish whether the deliverables of interventions align with the targets set.

In discussing monitoring and evaluation it is imperative to begin to engage on a key framework that is used to measure progress, this is the results framework. A results framework is defined as ‘an explicit articulation of the different levels, or chains, of

results expected from a particular intervention – project, program, or development strategy’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2012). Thus the results framework captures the essential elements of the logical and expected cause-effect relationships among inputs, outputs, intermediate results or outcomes, and impact’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2012).

A results framework inherently comprises of five components: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact that should strategically align to realize the inherent theory of change of an intervention. A results framework has particular benefits such as: a focus on outcomes, defines the theory of change at the core of the intervention, makes measuring performance toward attainment of strategic goals easier, and assists in realizing strategic objectives of a development intervention or strategy. It is important that each component or at every level of the results chain there are indicators and targets that play a critical role in determining progress toward achievement of goals. It is therefore imperative that these are clearly defined and set-out to ensure that proper measurement of results take place.

According to Hutto and Belote (2013) the exercise of monitoring can be distinguished based on four types monitoring: surveillance, implementation, effectiveness, and ecological effect monitoring. The most typical of the four is implementation monitoring which is a process of determining whether the prescriptions set out were undertaken as per the contract. Evaluation on the other hand needs to be guided by key principles.

The American Evaluation Association (2004) identified five of these principles which are: systemic inquiry; competence; respect for people; integrity/honesty; and responsibility for the general and public welfare. In brief, these principles can refer to conducting 'systematic and data based inquiries'; provision of competent evaluations; upholding honesty and integrity throughout the evaluation process; ensuring that people are treated with dignity and respect; and ensuring that the interests and values of the general public are taken into account at all times (American Evaluation Association, 2004).

For Patton (1994) an important principle in evaluation is participant involvement, whereby respondents themselves play a significant role in determining the goals of the evaluation which speaks to elements of participatory governance. More-so, it should be noted that this form of participation can take place at different phases of the life-span of a programme, strategy, policy, or operational area. This speaks to the different forms of evaluations: formative evaluation that happens at the planning phases of policy or programmes; process evaluations that takes place during implementation, summative evaluations that happens after implementation along with impact evaluation that assess whether the desired impact was reached by whatever developmental intervention.

In the South African context, the first official policy document on Monitoring and Evaluation is the Government-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System (GWMES) policy framework. This document orients all spheres of government on the concept and application of monitoring and evaluation. The framework does this by setting the

foundation for the development of an M&E system at a national level for replication at the lower levels of government (Presidency, 2007:80). Additionally, the National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) solidifies the processes of conducting evaluations in the public service. The NEPF is aimed at:

*“Improving policy or **programme performance** (evaluation for continuous improvement) – providing feedback to managers; improving **accountability** for where public spending is going and the difference it is making; improving **decision-making** e.g. on what is working or not-working; **increasing knowledge** about what works and what does not with regards to a public policy, plan, programme, or project.”*

This is corroborated by Latib (2014) through affirming that the value that can be derived from a monitoring and evaluation system is the level of extent to which results from M&E contribute in informed-decision making, thereby ‘deepening accountability’ on the executive for the utilization of allocated public goods. Through monitoring practices, both the implementers of programmes/policies and their overseers are able to clarify programme/policy objectives; link activities and their resources to objectives; enhance accountability; and measure organizational performance.

According to the World Health Organisation Evaluation Handbook (2013), evaluation involves the following key steps:




Figure 1: Key Steps in Evaluation

Organizational performance is critical in monitoring and evaluation. It allows for an assessment of the implementation trajectory that the organisation is taking. Organizational performance is assessed by four key variables as identified by Mitchell (2002):



Figure 2: Four Variables to Organisation Measurement

The above can be utilized to determine the level of functionality or performance of organizations such as Legislatures in relation to the mandated functions. By so-doing, this allows decision makers to exercise an element of re-direction of the functions being implemented. This then allows decision-makers to contribute to the alignment of organizational performance with the objectives of the institution, and thereby positioning the organisation effectively for the attainment of its objectives.

A reporting strategy is a critical element in the organizational performance value chain. Reporting refers to a systematic account of the activities undertaken to attain a particular end. In organizational performance, it refers to the manner in which the planned performance of the organisation are relayed or accounted both internally and externally to oversight structures (Mayne, 1997). Embedded in the reporting strategy is a decision on which part of the organizational performance needs to be reported when, how, and to whom. A well thought-out reporting strategy strives to drive the key purpose of performance reporting being:

- Demonstrating performance;
- Affecting operational management;
- Informing sound decision-making;
- Enhancing accountability.

Before the management of performance, or the reporting thereof, there needs to be effective planning put in place to ensure the directional implementation of service

delivery initiatives for the attainment of organizational objectives. In Monitoring and Evaluation, the application of the Theory of Change (ToC) allows for assessment of plans that have been put in place to ensure that plans are rooted in pragmatism, and thus offer value for money.

2.2.1 Theory of Change

The predominant theory in M&E is Theory of Change, which is also known as Programme Theory. According to Silva, Breuer, Lee, Asher, Neerja, Chowdhary, Lund and Patel (2014) ToC can be traced back to the 1930s and the 1950s by Kirkpatrick, and in the 1980s to Chen. At the core of these was a theory that explains how change comes about in a programme or developmental initiatives.

Breuer, Fekadu, Luitel, Lund, Murhar, Nakku, and Petersen (2014) describe ToC as a 'participatory theory driven approach to programme design and evaluation whose underlying principle is to improve our understanding of how and why a programme works'. Gready (2013) further defines ToC as 'underlying assumptions about the relationships between desired outcomes and the way proposed interventions are expected to bring them about'. A common theme in these two definitions is that ToC requires the existence of 'casual pathways' that clearly narrate how to attain the objectives of a programme, policy, service delivery initiative, or any form of developmental objectives.

A key component in ToC as reiterated by Breuer *et al.*, (2014) is its interactive governance processes with key stakeholders. This posits that key individuals need to be engaged in the planning and evaluation phases of a programme, and service delivery initiatives. The authors further advance that ToC is also used as a 'planning tool for implementation' along with providing an evaluation framework. From a service delivery perspective, ToC can be used to define and discuss how planned service delivery initiatives are expected to arise. Although not discussed in literature from that perspective, this application can be used whereby the executive is required to describe how it expects to use resources to deliver services; and further explain why the planned results were not met. ToC can be tested by measuring indicators at every stage of the results framework (inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, impact). In governance, ToC can be used to hold implementers accountable for under-performance in the process of bring about service delivery or development.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY

2.3.1 The Principal Agent Theory

The principal agent theory (PAT) emerged with Adam Smith in his rationalization of the relationship between farmer and worker in agriculture. He noted that these two parties had competing interests with the worker requesting more wages than the farmer was willing to give. He further noted that the bargaining power leaned more with the farmer who had the means of production and the power to decentralize. According to Lee (2013) this theory presents an economic model of exchange between the 'principal' and the 'agent' where one party is contracted to render services for the other. The agency theory claims that the agent is at most self-serving and self-interested and does not hold

the interests of the principal at best. Due to this, the principal needs to create processes of aligning interests between these two parties. In essence, social life is explained as a series of contractual agreements between parties in a system (Madue, 2014).

Lee (2013) further postulates that remedial actions to reduce the mismatch between interests are largely dependent on the nature of the contract that the principal and agent are engaged in. This will also be dependent on the type of working environment. He categorizes these contracts into two: behavioral-based contracts, and outcomes-based contracts. Outcomes-based contracts are centered on the types of incentives that the agent acquires from the principal.

The principal agent theory has been used in public administration and political science to determine the issues associated with how management handles issues pertaining to decentralization. When applied to public administration, this theory relates to a contractual agreement between the state and its citizens (Madue, 2013). This relationship can be described as the 'principal' being the citizen contracting the 'agent' being the state to commission services for them.

Madue (2013) further explained the principal agent theory from the perspective of the legislature (principal) and the executive (agent) who are engaged in a contractual arrangement. In this context, the legislature has commissioned the executive to undertake certain services which make the executive directly account to the legislature through oversight processes. This interplay is based on the theory advancing that the

principal and agent have divergent interests. It is because of this divergence that the principal needs to create incentives and monitor the agent to ensure that pre-determined goals are met.

Pashang (2003) provides the following key characteristics of accountability which are integral to the PAT:

- Principal (P);
- Agent (A);
- Domain subject to accountability (D);
- The right of the principal to require the agent to answer for actions taken; and
- The right of the principal to impose sanctions on the agent.

Pashang (2003) applies PAT through the characteristics of accountability into a timeline illustrated below:




Figure 3: Timeline for Accountability (Adapted from Pashang 2003)

What can be drawn from the timeline provided by Pashang (2003) is that the principal needs to assess the performance of the agent to determine whether it meets the standards that is required for the goals delegated to the principal to be met. Such assessments are undertaken through monitoring and evaluation processes. Following this determination, a request is made by the principal for clarity in performance undertaken. Furthermore, there is a need to determine the types of sanctions imposed and their level of effectiveness in re-directing the actions of the agent to meet the goals set by the principal.

Masehela *et al.*, (2012) affirm the use of the principal agent theory in public administration by stating that it has been used to explain the relationship that takes place between the legislature and executive. The authors affirm that the principal is seen to be a powerful political representative who has the power, influence and authority over the decisions and policies taken by the administrative agent, and has to further monitor and evaluate the activities the agent undertakes through oversight processes.

Herein lies the need for effective processes to establish whether the executive is performing to levels that will realize the legislature's service delivery goals. The processes by which this can unfold are vested in the Separation of Powers (SOP) model that speaks of a separation between the legislature, executive, and judiciary. This enables checks and balances, and prevents the concentration of power in one arm of

the state. In the South African context, the SOP model is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996).

One of the mechanisms of the SOP model is oversight of which monitoring and evaluation can play a critical role. Legislatures undertake their oversight roles through questions sessions, interpellations, budget analyses, report analysis, the ombudsman, auditors-general, subpoena and other court-type powers (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004; Hall, 2010). Building on the principal agent theory, the next section will give a brief discussion of the concept of oversight by the legislature (principal) on the executive (agent) and an extensive analysis of the role of monitoring and evaluation pertaining to answerability by the executive on the legislature.

2.3.2 Linking Accountability, Oversight, and M&E in the PAT

Accountability denotes a relationship in which an actor has to justify actions taken. He further expands on this within the public sector domain by stating that accountability 'ensures that actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the community needs' (Olum, 2014, p. 610). Oversight is a processes of supervision in which the principal monitors and evaluates the processes of the agent in pursuing their interests. Legislature oversight is an important component in the relationship between the legislature and executive.

Madue (2013) posits that oversight of the executive by the legislature is indicative of good governance. It is through oversight that the legislature gets to determine the executive's commitment to pursuing their interests of meeting the demands of the citizens; and further establishing the extent by which policy implementation has been undertaken. The author goes further to discuss one of the objectives of oversight as being able to hold the executive accountable through scrutiny of policy implementation and a determination of whether these are having the desired impact. Madue (2012, p. 431) further states the importance of oversight by stating that 'through its fundamental elements of audit, evaluation, monitoring, inspection and investigation; oversight helps an organization to enhance its effectiveness, productivity and integrity.'

Therefore, the principal agent theory is suitable to explaining the relationship between the legislature and the executive due to the element of decentralization that exists. Given that the principal decentralizes some power and decision-making to the agent, there is room for supervision and oversight; and within the concept of oversight lies an element of monitoring and evaluation of policy and programmes to establish whether they are being properly implemented and having the desired impact. These serve as mechanisms by which monitoring and evaluation processes get to establish the extent of service delivery that has taken place to meet the developmental goals set by the principal.

Figure 4 below gives an illustration of the relationship between M&E as a tool of oversight and good governance that can be explained through the PAT.




Figure 4: Source: (Adapted from Govendor, 2013, p 819)

According to Governor (2013) M&E plays a critical role in improving good governance. The author grounds this position on the benefits that M&E plays in the activities that have to be undertaken by the legislature in overseeing the executive. M&E not only supports evidence based decision-making pertaining to policy and development programmes but also assists in the development of policy and strategies; as well as the assessment that have to take place following the implementation of policy. Lastly, M&E enhances transparency and accountability.

3. CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the theories that dominate the discourse of governance. The concept of governance was defined by locating it within the manner in which a state runs its affairs. The brief went on to bring in an element of 'good' to governance, which includes a set values that must be strived for in order to bring about a positive developmental impact in the lives of people. The key principles of governance were delved into, identifying them as accountability which forms part of the focus of this research exercise; openness, transparency, and access. Theories that dominate in the subject of governance were unpacked, identifying them as traditional authority theory and the rational-choice theory.

The second part of the chapter delved into the subject of monitoring and evaluation as defined in theory. The two concepts were found to involve an aspect of continuous tracking of performance in the service delivery value chain; as well as an assessment of the results emanating from the service delivery value chain. The in-depth engagement of these concept looked at the various steps, and components that make up an M&E system and how to bring about the desired results. The key theory that is dominant in the M&E discourse being ToC was briefly introduced.

The last part of this chapter unpacked the theoretical framework that underpinned this study, which is the PAT. The literature traced the emergence of the PAT to Adam Smith

when he characterized the economic exchange relationship between farmer and worker (principal and agent) where the principal delegates authority to the agent to render a set of services. This theory was applied to the Legislature / Executive relationship that exists within the SOP Model. The concept of M&E was also located with the PAT relationship in SOP setting to determine how it influences oversight and accountability.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3. INTRODUCTION

This section of the research describes the research methodology that was undertaken in conducting this research. The study used a single case study in answering the research questions and sub-questions. The selection for the case study is based on the unit of analysis chosen, and the nature of the study. Furthermore, this section included the research approach, research design, data collection, data analysis, validity and reliability, limitations of the study, as well as significance of the study.

3.1 Research Approach

This research study utilized a qualitative research approach which is an approach utilized particularly for understanding how phenomenon un-folds and further giving explanations to that effect. In the context of this research study, this form of research methodology offered an opportunity to fully understand the Legislature's monitoring and evaluation process through the lens of those tasked with undertaking such an exercise; as well as giving an opportunity for critical engagements with institutional documents that will allow for further analysis of processes. In order to understand the decision to

utilize a qualitative approach, this section reflected on the two approaches in research which are quantitative and qualitative.

3.1.1 Quantitative Research

Quantitative research is defined as 'a type of empirical research into social phenomenon or human problem, testing a theory consisting of variables which are measured with numbers and analyzed with statistics in order to explain if the theory explains or predicts phenomena of interest' (Yilmaz, 2013, p 313). According to Creswell (2014), quantitative research is used to test theories that explain relationships between variables. The author further explains that this consists of numerical data of the variables can be measured through statistical procedures. Creswell (2014, p 4) further states that this involves 'testing theories deductively' and adhering to generalizability and replication to mention but a few principles. Quantitative research is articulated by Neuman (2000) as a 'research design that uses data in the form of numbers, used to describe or explain social phenomena, determine relationships between variables and look at cause effect.

Creswell (2014) states that both the qualitative and quantitative approach involve two core components which are the 'philosophical worldview' or paradigm and the 'distinct methods/ procedure'. The author expands on this by emphasizing the interconnection between three components in what he calls the research framework depicted in *figure 5*,

which are: Philosophical worldviews, research methods, and research methods.




Figure 5: Sourced from Creswell (2013)

According to Punch (2014, p 204) quantitative research achieves central issues:

- Conceptualizes reality in terms of variables
- Measures these variables
- Studies relationships between variables

Given the nature of the study at hand, issues of replication and aspects of reliability were not of critical concern due to the single case that was assessed.

3.1.2 Qualitative Research

According to Badenhorst (2010) qualitative research is 'an umbrella term which covers several forms of enquiry. It is a loosely defined category of research designs or models which focus on understanding and explaining the meaning of social phenomena'. The

author goes on to further list the methods used to gather data under this approach which is through verbal means, visual techniques, 'tactile, olfactory, or gustatory data in the form of descriptive narratives such as field notes, transcriptions, audio or video recordings, artefacts, and other recordings'. Braun and Clarke (2013) refer to qualitative research as both a technique for gathering data and a framework or paradigm for conducting research. Therefore, qualitative research refers to the usage of qualitative data collection methods within a qualitative approach or paradigm.

Badenhorst (2010) puts forth that the qualitative research approach is 'constructed by individuals interacting with their social reality'. This notion can be explained by interacting with the explanation provided by Merriam (1998) who stated that qualitative research is based on the ideas that individuals have constructed to explain their social reality; interpreted as their surroundings (environment), their understanding of those surroundings, and their interactions with them.

Baun and Clark (2013) provide the following characteristics of the qualitative research approach which differentiates it from quantitative research:

- Words are utilized as data
- Seeks to understand and interpret more local meanings; recognized data as gathered in a context; sometimes produces knowledge that can be generalized to a more general understanding

- Generates narrow but rich data, thick descriptions - detailed but complex accounts from each participant, not many take part
- Tends to seek patterns but recognized and accommodates and explores divergence within data
- Tends to be theory generating, and inductive (working up from data)
- Values personal involvement and partiality
- Method is less fixed
- Tends to take longer to complete because it is interpretive and there is no formula

In the context of this study, the qualitative research approach was selected due to the nature of the information sought and the overall research question which is exploratory in nature. Given that the study sought to understand the oversight and monitoring and evaluation processes used in the Ekurhuleni Legislature through the lens of those who facilitate these processes, a qualitative method was most suitable. In addition, the flexibility of this approach was beneficial to the research process through the use of semi-structured interviews which allowed further engagement with areas that were not directly covered in the questionnaire.

Qualitative research has various research designs that can be used to achieve the objectives of the research. These are:

- Action Research
- Ethnography

- Grounded Theory
- Phenomenology
- Narrative analysis
- Action Research
- Case Study

The nature of the study at hand used a case study. According to Baxter and Jack (2013, p 544) a qualitative case study 'is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood'. Given the exploratory nature of the research at hand, a case study was chosen as the most appropriate. Furthermore, given that the study wants to cover what Yin (2003) calls 'contextual arrangements', a qualitative case study was more relevant.

3.2 Research Design

The case study that was undertaken was explanatory in nature, which sought to answer an overall 'how' question to the nature of the Legislature's monitoring and evaluation process and how these enhance accountability of the executive branch of that local government. Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 545) give a definition of explanatory research in the context of a case study as a study that 'would be used if you were seeking to

answer a question that sought to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies’.

3.3 Data Collection

According to Baxter and Jack (2008) case studies require the use of numerous ‘strategies’ that will enhance the trustworthiness of the research process and findings. The authors postulate that triangulation of multiple data sources can be utilized to study the case or ‘phenomenon’ under investigation from different perspectives which will enhance the quality of the data collected and analyzed. Both primary and secondary data have been used in this research study.

3.3.1 Primary Data

Primary data comprises of data collected for a current research purpose. In this context, the research conducted one-on-one and telephonic key informant interviews, as well as document analysis. Key informant interviews are a data collection tool that uses an interviews session where key or instrumental individuals within a particular organizations are presented with a set of interview questions for response which pertains to their experiences, attitudes, or opinions. These was undertaken by purposively sampling individuals working within the Research and Committee Support Unit which is tasked with research, monitoring and evaluating executive performance.

The Research and Committee Support Unit has a small number of Researchers, five to be exact, and seven Committee Officers, which is a small sample. This led to a reliance on the document analysis to augment the information needed for the research. The rationale for the selection of interviews as the primary data collection method is based on the adaptive nature of interviews which allow for the Researcher to tap into a variety of topics within the parameters of the questions that can enrich the process as well as bring up additional key issues that the Researcher might have not addressed.

The interviews focused on understanding the activities that these individuals undertake to monitor and evaluate the respective departments assigned to them. The following aspects were covered in the interviews: determination of accountability measures used; knowledge of monitoring and evaluation processes in the legislature context; knowledge of conducting evaluation exercises over executive performance and programmes; practical illustrations of conducting evaluations exercises; and perceived challenges on the role of monitoring and evaluation in enhancing how the executive responds to the Legislature's oversight.

The interview sessions were conducted by using an interview guide that clearly spells out all questions to be asked of the interviewee and the sequence in which these questions were presented during the interview session. The questions that were posed to the interviewee were semi-structured questions. Interviews pose a potential bias which in this process was minimized through de-briefing interviewees about their responses.

3.3.2 Secondary Data

The secondary data that was used was document analysis which is defined as a 'an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analyzing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning' (Altheide, 1996, p.2). The secondary data that was engaged with was in the form of journals, and previous research papers into the legislative oversight, accountability and M&E at provincial and national government.

These documents were used to corroborate the primary data that was gathered from the interviews. This is how the research triangulated the data collected through interviews.

The documents that were used to assess how the Legislature used M&E for oversight and accountability are the following:

- Service Delivery Budget and Implementation Framework
- Research Agenda Document
- Committee reports and minutes (quarterly, annual, IDP reports, Committee performance reports, and resolution tracking reports).
- Public Participation and Petitions Reports
- Executive responses to oversight committee questions.

The triangulation of the data collection method assisted in ensuring validity and reliability of the data in answering the research question.

3.4 Data Analysis

The study used thematic analysis in line with qualitative research. The primary data in the form of interviews was transcribed using Microsoft Word following which it was coded. Coding is defined as 'a process of combining data for themes, ideas and categories and then marking similar packages of text with a code label so that they can easily be retrieved at a later stage for further comparison and analysis' (Taylor & Gibbs, 2010, p. 1). In line with the definition, coding will occur in 'terms of themes, ideas or categories'. In terms of Bryman (2012) adjustments to the interview schedule can be made following every interview which will immediately be coded to allow for the adjustments. Following the process of coding, themes were identified looking at 'repetitions; indigenous typologies; metaphors and analogies; transitions; similarities and differences; or missing data' (Bryman, 2012, p. 580).

Secondary data was used in the form of the Service Delivery Budget and Implementation Framework, research agenda document, committee reports (quarterly, annual, IDP reports, committee performance reports), public participation reports, executive responses to oversight committee questions was also used to corroborate the primary data that was gathered through interviews.

3.5 Data Presentation

The presentation of the data was done in a systematic manner. The Researcher covered the following areas in each chapter:

Chapter 1	<u>Introduction</u> ▪ An introduction into the subject matter at hand ▪ Problem Statement ▪ Purpose Statement ▪ Research Questions ▪ Research Objectives ▪ Outline of the Chapters
Chapter 2	<u>Literature Review</u> ▪ Theoretical Framework: Governance ▪ Conceptual Framework
Chapter 3	<u>Research Methodology</u> ▪ Introduction of the Chapter ▪ Research Approach ▪ Research Design ▪ Data Collection ▪ Data Analysis ▪ Data Presentation ▪ Validity and Reliability ▪ Limitations of the study ▪ Ethical Considerations ▪ Significance of the study ▪ Analysis ▪ Conclusion of Chapter
Chapter 4	<u>Findings</u> ▪ Introduction of the Chapter ▪ Demographics of respondents ▪ Context (Situation) of EMM and other Legislatures ▪ Interviews with Researchers ▪ Interviews with Committee Officers ▪ Examination of records for cross-validation ▪ Conclusion of Chapter
Chapter 5	<u>Discussion</u> ▪ Introduction of the Chapter ▪ Performance Monitoring and Oversight of the Executive ▪ Structure of Oversight, Monitoring and Evaluation ▪ Summons, Recommendations and Sanctions ▪ Conclusion of Chapter

Chapter 6	<u>Conclusion and Recommendation</u> ▪ Introduction of the Chapter ▪ Summary of all Chapters ▪ Recommendations
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3.6 Validity and Reliability

There is a need in social research for the data collection, analysis, and the findings of a research project to be trustworthy and credible. This involves ensuring that the research adheres to validity and reliability. Validity in social research pertains to ‘the extent to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure’ (Wagner et., 2012, p. 275). Given that social sciences are not exact sciences which involve scientific measurement that come to the same conclusion on a repetitive basis, it is important the research process minimizes external influence that might arise from, for example, human influence. In this case it is imperative that internal validity, is ensured.

External validity is particularly concerned with generalizability of the research findings from the perspective of how the research findings from the chosen sample can be generalized to the wider population. In this research study, external validity was not particularly a concern given that the findings will only be applicable to the current case and institution at that particular time. Internal validity on the other hand implies ‘the degree to which reliable conclusions can be made about the relationships between variables, on the grounds that all other external influences have been eliminated’ (Wagner et., 2012, p. 271). In the context of this research study, internal validity was

ensured through the triangulation of comparing theme patterns, and using secondary data in the form of document analysis.

Reliability simply put has to do with the 'consistency of the measurement' (Wagner et., 2012, p. 273). This has to do with the repetitiveness of a study, meaning the degree to which the same results can be acquired if the same study was conducted in a different context. The study used tools such as an interview guide and other processes to enhance reliability. Other measures that were undertaken included the use of reliable data sources, and ensuring a systematic way of capturing data.

An audit trail was also used which involved keeping a comprehensive account of all the processes following in the research process (data collection preparation and collection, data analysis, and the findings).

3.7 Limitations of the study

The study was undertaken using a case study and limited to one institution, the Ekurhuleni Legislature, and therefore, the results cannot be inferred to a wider legislative population.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

According to Wagner et al., (2012, p. 62) ethical considerations should be considered at every stage of the research process. Issues of ethics in research are important to safe

guard against doing harm to participants, not taking advantage of them, and keeping their identity for the research. The first ethical issue to be considered is informed consent in research which has to do with the participant in the research having the right to participate or withdraw at any time in the research process. This should follow a process whereby the researcher has explained the purpose of the research, information that will be needed, and how that information from them will be used.

An informed consent document was shared with the participants which relayed the following: that participation is voluntary, the participant can withdraw without reprisals, that the research might have an effect on their lives, purpose and duration of research, risks and benefits, confidentiality and anonymity, and handling of records (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 150). Additional ethical issues that were considered are anonymity, confidentiality, respect, participant safety, and minimization of researcher bias.

3.9 Analysis

Qualitative research requires the triangulation of data collection methods as a means to enhance the validity of the research findings. The purpose of triangulating data is to 'provide different perspective of the topic under study to as a means of cross-checking the results' (Wagner et, p274). This ensures that the information generated is credible and trustworthy. Interviews were the main source of data collection in this current study and as a way to enhance the credibility of the data, document analysis was employed.

The steps that we following in analyzing the data are as follows:

- i. Transcribing the interviews
- ii. Creating Codes
- iii. Creating themes and sub-themes
- iv. Comparing the themes to existing frameworks

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter dealt with the research methodology that was utilized in this research exercises. The study used a case study to answer the research question of how the EMM Legislature utilizes M&E for oversight and accountability. This section also provided the context in which the data was collected in the research study. This was done by discussing the different methodological approaches in research which set the setting for defending the qualitative research methodology that was chosen. The study gave a processes description of how data was collected and analyzed how issues of validity and reliability were addressed; as well as giving a full account of the limitations and significance of the study.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

4. INTRODUCTION

According to Badenhorst (2008), organizing the data from the research is the first step in data analysis. The author states that Researchers often merge the findings of the research with the presentation of the data which creates confusion in trying to swift through the chapters. In this research study, the findings will be presented separately from the interpretation of the data.

In this chapter the findings emanating from the study will be presented. The Researcher will take the reader through a brief background of the unit of study being the EMM Legislature by looking at its establishment, mandate, and organogram with brief comparisons being made to other legislatures at different tiers of government. The second part of this chapter will delve into the actual findings of the research emanating from interviews as the primary data collection method. This will be followed by a detailed description of the findings made from document analysis for cross-validation. The last part of the chapter will provide a conclusion that sums up the key findings that were made.

4.1 THE EMM LEGISLATURE SITUATION

The Council of Ekurhuleni enacted the SOP model that saw the establishment of the EMM Legislature in 2011. The establishment of the Legislature was part of the inculcation of the SOP model at local government level to assist with the core functions of oversight, by-law making and public participation. At a national level, this model has been implemented by bodies such as Parliament, which play a significant role in overseeing the performance of the executive. Provincially, all provinces across South Africa have Legislature's tasked with overseeing the executive. At a local level, the trend of Legislature establishment began in the last eight years, which saw the creation of Legislature institutions in the City of Cape Town, City of Johannesburg, Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, and the Ekurhuleni Municipality in 2011.

The mission of the Ekurhuleni Legislature is to be a representative and proactive legislature that drives the creation of a smart, creative, proactive and developmental city, through transparency, responsiveness and accountability to its residents. As identified by Pelizzo & Staphenurst (2014), the clear definition of the mandate of legislature institutions is crucial to their effectiveness. The mandate of the EMM Legislature is rooted in three focal functions as depicted in figure 8:




Figure 6 Legislature' Functions

The oversight function of the EMM Legislature is premised on oversight as a mechanism of scrutiny over the executives contribution in the service delivery value chain; public participation as a governance principle of openness and transparency; and by-law making to ensure that necessary legal prescriptions are in place to advance and review laws geared at service delivery.

The creation of the Legislature in EMM first began with its capacitation with Researchers in 2012 to assist with oversight and accountability functions performed by respective committees. Committee Officers were already part of the structure of the Municipality performing the same role in different committees, however, they were merely transferred to the Legislature.

The EMM Legislature has a total of thirteen oversight Committees, each with their strategic objectives which seek to:

‘Conduct oversight and scrutiny over the Executive and Legislature to ensure that they carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently; involve the public in overseeing the work of the executive and Legislature, by securing public input as a means to verify performance on the IDP/budget and Annual Report. Enhance the capacity of committees to be able to perform their roles and responsibilities efficiently and effectively; and oversee, develop and review by-laws and by law making to ensure optimal service delivery to residents.’

The structure of the EMM Legislature as at the time when the research was undertaken is illustrated below:




Figure 7: Legislature Structure

An analysis of the EMM Legislature in comparison to similar institutions at different tiers of government sees an existence of similarities of how processes are undertaken, and the overall results sought. The mandate of the EMM Legislature is similar to that of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, the City of Johannesburg, Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, City of Cape Town and Western Cape Provincial Legislature. However, from a monitoring and evaluation perspective, the EMM legislature and other South African legislature differ when it comes to the structure of the M&E function from a human resource perspective in comparison to legislature's outside the country. The North Carolina State Legislature, for instance, has a dedicated 'Program Evaluation Division' that is focused on conducting evaluation on service delivery initiatives undertaken by government geared toward the realization of specific outcomes and impacts. In the South African context, there is no clear definition of this function.

The key processes followed by the EMM Legislature in rendering its mandate are rooted in the performance of oversight committees which are tasked with the following as stated in the document titled "The Oversight Role of Section 79 Oversight Committees and the Budget Cycle":

"Against the background of the above, the Section 79 Portfolio Committees will be required to: Review, monitor and evaluate Departmental policies; Review Plans and Budgets; Consider Departmental quarterly and Annual Reports; and Examine the link between the policy (sector plan) and budget (business plan); and v. Monitor the implementation of plans."

The next section will look at the demographical profile of the respondents that participated in the data collection.

4.2 DEMOGRAPHICAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Given that this is a qualitative research, a very small sample was used from the Research and Committee Support (RCS) of the Legislature. At the time of conducting this study, the RCS had a total number of fifteen staff members with the sample choosing seven (7) respondents as illustrated in figure 9 along with their contribution to the monitoring and evaluation system of the Legislature in figure 10.

4.2.1 Title of Respondents

As depicted in the graph below, 80% of respondents were Researchers of Oversight Committees. The remaining 20% were Committee Officers who offer an administrative function to various Committees within the Legislature.




Figure 8: Respondent Interviews

4.2.2 Distribution of Respondents per function

Below is a distribution of the respondents as per the function performed in various Oversight Committees and the Legislature in its entirety. The categorization is made according to three levels: administrative; oversight and monitoring; and the reporting role.




Figure 9: Function in the Organisation

The interviews conducted were comprised of 80% of Researchers and 20% of Committee Officers. In relation to the functions performed by respondents within the institution, 11% offer an administrative functions, 44% a reporting role, and 45% an oversight and monitoring role. The rationale for selecting a sample within this organizational environment is based on who can give the best and informed information to contribute to the research.

4.2.3 Number of Years in Current Position

Below is an illustration of the number of years that each respondent has been in their current position:




Figure 10: Number of Years in Current Position

4.3 INTERVIEWS WITH RESEARCHERS AND COMMITTEE OFFICERS

The interviews focused on the definition and understanding of key concepts of oversight, monitoring and evaluation by Legislature staff; how they use monitoring and evaluation practices, and whether these are utilized to enhance oversight and accountability over the executive. The areas of oversight and accountability are critical components used to unpack the relation that takes place within the PAT framework.

Additional areas that formed the core of the research were the perceptions held by staff members around the demand for monitoring and evaluation data by political principals.

The interviews were transcribed, coded and grouped into themes using Microsoft Word. The following themes were created, as well as sub-themes. These are listed in table 2 (below):

Themes	Sub-Themes
Performance Monitoring and structural arrangements	a. Performance Monitoring b. Structure of the M&E function
Reporting Systems	c. M&E Framework d. Performance Reporting Systems
Measures of Accountability	e. Summons and recommendations f. Need for Improved Accountability

Table 2: Coded themes

4.3.1 Performance Monitoring and Structural Arrangements

The first theme that was identified was Performance Monitoring and structural arrangements. Below will be a brief summary of the responses that formed the core of the findings from the respondents.

▪ Performance Monitoring

With specific focus given to identifying the nature of organizational performance in the Legislature, there emerged a need to unpack the manner in which performance of the Executive is monitored by the Oversight Structures through monitoring and evaluation practices.

The interviews conducted revealed that the major tool to assess the performance of the executive by Oversight Committees is through assessment of reports, policies, by-laws, and programmes. This assessment is referred to as an 'Analysis'. Analyses are undertaken by Committee Researchers on items that have been tabled to the Oversight Committee for scrutiny in line with the Separation of Powers Model. The major focus of these analyses are on quarterly reports in the form of the municipality's Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP), Integrated Development Plan (IDP), and the Annual Report. At the core of these analyses is an assessment of the financial and non-financial performance of the Municipality as well as the performance of capital expenditure (CAPEX). Interviewee 1 captured this by stating that:

“Monitoring in the context of the Legislature is largely done through analyzing the Departments work. Whether it be reports or any document that the Oversight Committee deems it necessary to monitor. Documents being SDBIP and Annual Reports looking at how the Departments are working. Another way in which the Oversight Committee does monitoring is through site visits which monitors how the departments projects are progressing vis-à-vis their expenditure in terms of their budgets.”

This was corroborated by Interviewee 2, when asked about what their understanding of monitoring and evaluation in the context of the Legislature. The response is captured below:

“It’s a mechanism to take stock of the work done by the executive in meeting the service delivery requirements as espoused by key policy directives such as the Batho Pele principles, SDGs, the Constitution and various other pro-development directives. This is to assess the work done, highlight challenges where applicable in order to establish solutions when necessary.”

The major process employed by the Legislature that utilises the bulk of monitoring practices was found to be oversight committees. In responding to a question on how the Legislature uses monitoring practices over the executive for oversight and accountability, interviewee 2 made reference to how the legislature monitors this process by making use of document assessment:

“The first one is monitoring the departments IDP which is a 5 year plan. From the IDP, they break it down into the SDBIP. We also check how the department has achieved its target on an annual level. Then again, I just think we are lacking as a Legislature, we are supposed to give more emphasis on the GDS 2055, because all these IDPs and SDBIP are working toward achieving the GDS. Yet as a Legislature, we do not make comparison with this document. I just think we need to put more focus on the GDS and see how the departments we are overseeing are working towards the achievement of the GDS targets.”

The response provided above gives an indication of a gap in how the Legislature engages with the performance reports received from the executive in that these are not assessed thoroughly. In addition, the response also hints at a need to assess achievements made toward realizing longer-term plans of the municipality which speaks to an attainment of certain developmental impacts.

- **Evaluation**

Respondents were asked about their understanding of evaluation, the current evaluation practices employed in the Legislature, and a demonstration of instances where such evaluation practices were used. Respondent 1 offered the only instance found by this research when some form of evaluation exercise was undertaken, although it did not adhere to the theoretical processes on how to conduct an evaluation. This response is summarized below:

“On evaluation, out of a 100%, it is still conducted on a minimal level. One of the reasons that evaluation is lacking is that the Legislature is still new in Ekurhuleni. For one to do evaluation one needs to monitor a programme or project that has been done and go back after a year or two to check whether the projects are delivering or whether they have met the objectives of the project. This can be done in various ways, through site visit as an example if the department has delivered a project.

As officials we have to go back and determine whether the project has been delivered according to the users requirements. We are doing that at a minimal level. However, I have evaluated a project on the usage of a water and sanitation project in Zonkizizwe.

We went back and found that the users were happy with the facility but the quality was substandard. We had to engage the department to re-do the work again which they have done. That's part and parcel of evaluation. Given that we are still new maybe in the next coming five-year term evaluation can be conducted more, because we will be able to go back to old projects and do evaluations."

The same question was asked on Respondent 7 to get a better understanding of whether there was consensus in understanding and practice in evaluation. The response provided stated the following:

"I understand the concept of evaluation to involve a goal-oriented assessment of a particular unit of study. This is done with the intention to verify whether a particular implement is reaching the set goal, to pinpoint deficiencies where applicable

with the aim of establishing mitigating strategies or to identify success areas with the intention of consolidating them.”

From the above response, the research finding on evaluations is that they are not conducted at all with only one instance where such an exercise was undertaken. The process followed by the Committee simply involved the engagement with community members without clearly defining scientific methods of data collection, assessment or reporting. This involves evaluation planning, implementation, reporting and communication as advocated for by the WHO (2013). There is however, a general understanding of evaluation, although not much knowledge about the processes of conducting evaluation and the general benefits this might have on oversight and accountability.

▪ **Structure of the M&E Function**

One of the objectives of this research is to assess the application of the monitoring and evaluation processes by the Legislature to inform oversight and accountability. This warranted the need to engage the human resource capacity of the Legislature which plays a significant role in oversight and accountability. The areas identified pertain to the staff organisation devoted to M&E and oversight, and the M&E Framework used to monitor the executive.

The key deficiencies identified pertain to lack of skilled staff to undertake M&E in the current organizational organogram; and the lack of thorough input on the compilation of

the framework used to track the executives performance. The implication for oversight and accountability emanating from the afore-mentioned areas will be assessed in the next chapter.

The following responses were provided by Respondent 1 when asked about the kind of skills required to monitor and evaluate the executive's performance:

"We are short-staffed currently. I do think that the staff has capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate. But I think the issue of capacity is playing a role due to us being short-staffed."

The element of personnel shortages was corroborated by Respondent 5 by stating the following:

"No, there is insufficient staff with Researchers being split between two committees."

The responses provided above, merely touched on the issue of personnel shortages, and not necessarily on the nature of skills required. Respondent 3 provided a more appropriate response in relation of the element of the required skills. This response is captured below:

"I think one should have an academic background in M&E, an understanding of the government/political sphere as well as an

understanding of the key functions of the legislature and the executive. Further, one should have analytic skills and be able to pay attention to detail.”

Respondents were asked to elaborate on the M&E framework that is used to track and monitor the performance of the executive. In responding to this Respondent 4 showed some form of understanding for the concept of a monitoring framework. The response is captured below:

“The framework used is the GDS which is broken down into pieces into the IDP and the SDBIP. The guys from the Strategic Planning compile the framework and in the event they change the framework they consult all relevant parties including the Legislature. No, we haven’t proposed any changes to the framework. The changes that we have made have been in the form of targets. However, on the actual framework, the Legislature has not done that so far. For one to make changes to the framework, one needs to understand what is happening in the organisation and this goes back to the Legislature being young and most of us with only being in the Legislature for 4 years. We just got the processes in place when we got here. Maybe in the new political term we can make changes to the framework.

There has been changes proposed in terms of targets by oversight committees but the implementation is not now-now. When we propose changes to be made in the 1st and 3rd quarter, they are going to implement that in the next financial year. It first needs to be incorporated in the IDP and that's how we see the change."

Respondent 4 failed to elaborate on the framework used to monitor and evaluate the executive by stating the following:

"I am not in a position to give a conclusive response in this regard."

The only response provided by Respondent 2 on whether the Legislature can propose changes to the M&E framework was the following:

"The Legislature proposes changes to the framework to Council, if agreed the Committee adopts the framework".

Additional findings to support the above, or as add-ons will be engaged in the next section which deals with the finding made from the document analysis.

4.3.2 Oversight Practices

Legislatures have various tools and systems that they employ to oversee, monitor and evaluate the performance of the executive. As defined by Madue (2012) oversight being one of the three functions legislatures 'involves monitoring the activities of the executive'. As such, monitoring and evaluation are embedded in oversight. The key tools and systems used by the Ekurhuleni Legislature to determine the performance of the executive and subsequently hold it accountable are Oversight Committees, site visits, and Focused Intervention Studies (FIS).

- **Oversight Committees**

Oversight Committees are the cornerstone of the Legislature's performance. The bulk of the functions mandate to the Legislature are performed by Oversight Committees. The oversight tools utilized by the Legislature are executed by these committees. This is captured by Respondent 4 when responding to how oversight committees determine whether the executive has met its service delivery objectives:

"Firstly, the service delivery objectives are outline in the IDP and SDBIP so we check and compare on an annual basis, they set themselves targets that they are going to conduct on a quarterly basis. So the Committee checks on a quarterly basis how far they are doing in terms of service delivery objectives and we take it from there."

There seems to be a general understanding of how Oversight Committees serve as a tool to monitor the performance of the executive. The response provided by Respondent 3 illustrates an understanding that with oversight, lies an element of monitoring and evaluation:

“Amongst other mechanisms, the legislature has oversight committees which assist with monitoring the work of the executive. Here, the legislature is able to follow the work of the executive through assessing its financial and non-financial performance. The Legislature also has a petition system which allows the citizenry to deposit any public service delivery related complains. The main purpose is to adhere to democratic imperatives of good governance: accountability, answerability, transparency, involvement and openness. This is complementary to the efforts of ensuring effective and efficient use of state revenue and by extension service delivery.”

- **Legislature Research Functions**

The research found that the Legislature also conducts Focused Intervention Studies (FIS). A FIS is an investigative process initiated and implemented by a committee in order to obtain further information beyond what has already been presented by the department during its normal reporting to the committee. Such a study would be conducted by a committee upon identifying an area of contention on the part of the

performance by the department. These performance deficiencies are identified through the scrutiny the committee undertakes on reports on a quarterly, annual, or ad hoc basis. Respondents linked the FISs as a mechanism by which the Legislature can determine whether the service delivery initiatives of the municipality were attained. This is captured by Respondent 5:

“Through conducting analyses of quarterly SDBIP performances. Here, the legislature compares departmental service delivery objectives against their actual performance. The Legislature also conducts FISs and site visits.”

Respondent 3 elaborates on the importance of conducting FISs and site visits to determine whether the service delivery objectives of the municipality have been met:

“Through conducting analyses of quarterly SDBIP performances. Here, the legislature compares departmental service delivery objectives against their actual performance. The Legislature also conducts FISs and site visits.”

There was no consensus from respondents in terms of whether or not there was political demand for information gathered through monitoring and evaluation. Respondent 1 highlighted the following:

“Yes, politicians take their work seriously very seriously because they know that if they don’t do their work, chances of them coming back are very minimal. Regardless of that, they also want to see service delivery in communities because they are human beings. They have a conscious. If they say something, even if that is not happening it may be due to lack of adequate funding. Yes, I do think there is political drive. When we conducted the evaluation, no one was pushing the Committee. It was part of the work of the Committee.”

Respondent 3 and 4 however, did not share the same sentiment, merely giving a response on “no” on whether there is political demand for M&E results.

4.4 EXAMINATION OF RECORDS FOR CROSS-VALIDATION

In chapter 3, the Researcher stated that the key methods of data collection will be made through interviews which will be validated through document analysis. This section in the chapter will look at the findings made from the document analysis.

- **Performance Monitoring**

One of the key findings made through document analysis is that the main method of monitoring the performance of the executive is through the analysis of reports tabled to the Legislature by the executive. This was also highlighted in the responses provided through interviews.

An assessment of the 'Third Quarter SDBIP Report Analysis of the Corporate and Shared Services Cluster – 2013/14' illustrated how these analyses are undertaken by Oversight Committee support structures. This document has three focal areas that are of importance. These are the financial analysis (financial viability), service delivery analysis (non-financial analysis) and questions for consideration. The financial aspect of the analysis zooms in on how the respective departments performed in relation to their allocated budget for the quarter. The SDBIP report gives a breakdown of the financial spending of the department in a given period vis-à-vis their allocated budget. In taking a service delivery orientation, the Committee is interested in making connections between the budgets spent and actual outputs created at a community level.

In the event that poor performance is flagged by committees, programme managers responsible for those areas are summoned to appear before the committees to elaborate on these performance issues. The end results emanating from such engagements are the compilation of reports to Council for adoption which include a set of recommendations that the executive needs to implement to rectify service delivery performance.

- **M&E Framework**

An assessment of the result chain (inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impact) shows how the monitoring and evaluation functions of Oversight Committees are devoted to the first three components of the results chain as illustrated below:




Figure 11: Legislature's result chain focus

The analyses undertaken by the Committee support staff focuses solely on these three components. The annual performance of the Customer Relations Management Department had output targets only, which the Oversight Committee used as a basis for their analysis. In all documents that were reviewed, there was no mention of actual assessments made of the outcomes and impact generated by the Executive undertaken by the Legislature itself. This is corroborated by the 'Analysis of the Office of the Executive Mayor and Legislature for the 4th quarter of the 2014/15 Financial Year' which stated that:

"With the exception of the Legislature, all departments analysed here seem to have performed very well with regards to non-financial performance. This, however, says very little about the impact of the administration on the communities of Ekurhuleni. In essence, the SDBIP

reports do not trace long-term impact of the municipal performance, but traces and monitors the departments' achievement of targets set against their indicators and key strategic objectives.”

This supports the notion that out of the four areas used to assess organizational performance, the Legislature does not fully partake in determining the effectiveness of the Executive performance on citizens. There was no demonstration of how systematic processes for assessing whether the Executive was successful in achieving its mission, purpose, and goal was done by the Legislature. This assessment would focus on the outcomes and impact of service delivery initiatives by the municipality.

As it stands, the frameworks used to monitor and assess the performance of the municipality are compiled by the executive. The executive is also responsible for the collection of performance data, the verification of the submitted information as well as the reporting that emanates from that performance.

In the context of the M&E Framework, the role of the Legislature is not to compile the framework, however, it is to track the performance reported in performance reports and conduct its own independent verification of such performance. As stated in the Research Agenda, the Legislature employs participatory governance processes with community members when tracking their performance.

At most, the Legislature is limited to making recommendations on the nature of the framework used. Many of the inputs made on the framework are in relation to the targets set which was highlighted in the interview section. Only one respondent cited an instance where a Committee made inputs on the nature of the indicators or the general construction of the framework.

- **Legislature Organogram**

The Legislature organogram caters for a set of 12 Researchers along with their Committee Officers who cater for the logistical aspect of the Committee work. In addition, each Oversight Committee is designed to be capacitated with its own Legal Advisor. The role allocation is designed that the Researchers render a research function to Oversight Committee which included the scrutiny of executive's performance through the assessment of planning and performance documents to the Committee, and through conducting independent research. Committee Officers render a logistical role to the Committee function, with the Legal Advisors focusing on legal aspects to plans, reports, and bylaws tabled before the Committee and Council. One of key issues of contention evident in the current structure is the absence of a devoted Monitoring and Evaluation Specialists or the requirement for Researchers to have a working knowledge of key principles and processes that underpin the M&E practice. This research found that this seemed to be addressed in the new structure, which makes provision for a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer who will report to the Research Manager.

- **Research Activities**

The major research activities conducted by the Legislature are through FISs and analyses which has already been discussed. At the core of FISs is the need to hold relevant executive personnel responsible for the deficiencies identified in implementation. Once FISs are conducted, a question and answer session is ensued where the executive is afforded the opportunity to respond to the finding made by the committees. This is generally followed by the compilation of a report that is table in Council for approval with a set of recommendations that are geared at redressing the deficiency. This process will be elaborated on in the next section.

The document analysis also found that oversight committees serves as a basis by which the other oversight, monitoring and evaluation practices can be utilized. Oversight Committees conduct analysis of performance reports submitted by the executive as discussed in the findings from the primary data. To triangulate the findings of the performance monitoring, the Committees conduct independent verification of performance through announced and unannounced site visits. Site visits are a prerequisite function that needs to be conducted by the Legislature, and are contained in the Terms of Reference of all oversight committees. Site visits also form part of the strategic planning documents of the Legislature and relevant Committees. In the 5-year and APP of the Oversight Committee over the Office of the Executive Mayor and Legislature there is an Key Performance Area devoted to conducting of site visits to verify performance.

As mentioned in the previous section, only one responded reported to have conducted an evaluation on the results of a project implemented by the Executive. There is a lack of understanding and will to initiate evaluative studies even though some of the strategic documents of the Legislature states that part of its functions is to conduct evaluative studies. The shortcoming of this is that the Legislature will not be able to determine whether community members are yielding the set benefits from service delivery initiatives and thereby negatively affecting the accountability that can be imposed on the executive.

▪ **Summons and Recommendations**

The structures in place are designed to create easy engagement by the Legislature with the Executive. The Legislature has a Council approved calendar detailing the exact dates when the Committees will be holding meetings. The Executive is expected to be present in all these meetings in addition to Special Meetings that might arise due to imminent issues. Summons are a key accountability tool used by the executive to interrogate the performance of the Executive over-and-above what has been reported on. In monitoring the performance of the Executive, the Legislature used its power to summon the Executive to appear before it. This is preceded by an analysis of performance that has already been discussed which includes compilation of questions based on the deficiencies identified that need further engagement. The request for responses to questions is seen as a request for information as cited by Madue (2014).

This engagements is used to exercise the horizontal accountability of the Legislature on the Executive.

At the far end of this process is the Legislature committees writing reports on the findings with a set of clear recommendations that must be implemented by the executive to address the findings of the Legislature's engagements. However, an important tool in ensuring that the recommendations are followed through is resolution tracking. However, since the inception of the Legislature in 2012, this process has only happened once. This is compounded by the shortage of Resolution Tracking Officers who were only appointed in 2015 which has negative bearing determining whether resolution have been met, and holding the relevant parties accountable if they are not met.

- **Sanctions**

In the Legislature's context, sanctions are an accountability measure that are used to reprimand poor performance or failure to deliver on the mandate delegated to the principal being the executive. This can be soft sanction or hard sanctions. Respondents indicated that the Legislature does not and has not engaged in imposing of hard sanction of the executive. This is illustrated in the absence of historic data being found that illustrates instances where the Legislature has imposed hard sanctions. This can be seen with the level of recommendations imposed by the Corporate Services Oversight Committee on the Human Resource Department after failing to meet all of their targets

in the 2014/15 Financial year. The recommendations made addressed the operational issues that might have hindered the achievement of the Departments targets, but failed to impose penalty on the Department for failing to meet their planned performance in all quarters of that financial year.

There has never been hard sanctions imposed on the executive in the form of withholding performance bonuses or the reduction of budgets in the event that previous allocations were not spent. Part of the relationship of the principal and agent is that in the event that the interest of the principal are not met, sanctions should be imposed. The research found that the Legislature fails in this regard, thus making its accountability measures soft.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The findings of the research have given a description of the M&E processes used by the Legislature for oversight and accountability of the executive. The first theme that emerged from the research was performance monitoring specifically dealing with performance monitoring and the structure of the M&E function within the EMM Legislature. The second theme found that no evaluation studies were conducted which would determine whether the realization of the municipality's objectives were achieved.

The structure of the oversight, monitoring and evaluation function was identified as being a handicap in the function of oversight and accountability due to a lack of personnel with the required skills. The additional findings of the study were that the is a

lack of skilled personnel in M&E which put the Legislature at a disadvantage when having to approve what to monitor in the results framework of the municipality. No meaningful inputs or recommendation has been made by the Legislature in this regard.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion

5. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and interpret the findings stated in the previous chapter. A reference to the literature review, particularly the conceptual framework will be made to strengthen the arguments made by the Researcher. In taking the reader through this chapter, a recap of the problem statement will be made, along with the conceptual framework being the Principal Agent Theory. In addition, the key findings made will be classified for data interpretation purposes and discussed in reference to the literature. An attempt will be made to detail positive elements that other legislatures can take stock from the functioning of the EMM Legislature.

The study made the following findings:

- There is a lack of thorough use of the monitoring practice to monitor and evaluate the performance of the executive by the Legislature.
- Disjuncture in the structure of the M&E function and its impact on accountability and oversight.
- The ineffectiveness of summons, recommendations, and sanctions

5.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The problem statement as stated in chapter one is rooted in the knowledge gap on the use of M&E within the local government legislature sector in South Africa. There is a challenge in the manner in which the EMM Legislature uses monitoring and evaluation practices to determine whether performance has been met by the executive, and the level by which this leads to the service delivery outcomes and impact of the municipality. A study as this one will aid in scientifically making a determination of whether the M&E practices employed by the Legislature are effective for oversight and accountability over the executive.

The conceptual framework chosen by the Researcher is the Principal-Agent Theory. This theory is premised on the notion that there is a disjuncture between the interest of the principal and agent at any given time. This is rooted in the nature of the relationship whereby the principal – in this instance being the Legislature - delegating power and authority to the agent – being the executive – to fulfill. Due to this element of decentralization, there is a need for oversight to ensure that the agent keeps the interests of the principal at the forefront. In the event that this does not happen, the principal has the power to impose sanction on the agent as a form of punishment.

This conceptual framework is best suited for this study due to its element of oversight – which embeds monitoring and evaluation practices to track performance and ensure that service delivery objectives are met.

5.3 CHALLENGES IN THE LEGISLATURE'S USE OF M&E FOR OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

5.3.1 Understanding of M&E, Oversight and Accountability

The engagements with the respondents have shown that there is a level of understanding for the concepts of monitoring, oversight and accountability by the Legislature's personnel. However, the concept of evaluation was elusive to some respondents, who had no thorough understanding of it and the benefits it can have for oversight and accountability.

5.3.2 Performance Monitoring of the Executive

The study found that the Legislature does not use thorough monitoring and evaluation practices to assess the performance of the Executive. Key informant interviews identified the major tool of performance monitoring of the executive as being done through the analysis of performance reports that are tabled to Oversight Committees on a quarterly, annual, and ad hoc basis. Through document analysis of these committee analysis, it emerged that there was a weak connection being made by the Legislature between the financial resources channeled to service delivery initiatives and the actual results produced. This is illustrated by an extract from the OCMOL Committee which focused the function of Committees on the inputs channeled to service delivery, the activities undertaken and the outputs achieved in delivering service delivery.

Given that the mandate of government is to deliver services to the public, there should be a determination of the effectiveness of government's initiatives in meeting these demands. There is a lack of focus by the Legislature on determining the outcomes and impact that these service delivery initiatives have on the community based on systematic assessment. In the absence of evaluating the impact of these initiatives it becomes hard to hold the executive accountable for the results of service delivery which are geared at improving the lives of the community.

The performance reports brought before the Legislature require independent verification of the authenticity of the claims made in them. In monitoring terms, this is known as the verification of data that informs the reports presented. This data verification happens at a very minimal level with the use of site visits as the sole measure employed by the Legislature. It emerged through document analysis that the site visits undertaken by Committees are planned for twelve (12), at most, in a given financial year. Many of these site visits are on capital expenditure projects, leaving a lack of focus on other services such as in the health or economic sector.

A lack of focus on outcomes and impacts produced through service delivery, as well as the lack of sound performance verification processes on the part of the Legislature has adverse implications for oversight and accountability. On one end, this weakens the Legislature's role in making a meaningful impact in changing deficiencies in the Executive's service delivery value chain through making relevant and informed

recommendations needing the Executive's implementation. On the other hand, the lack of verification of reports also has an adverse effect on accountability.

5.3.3 M&E Framework

The Legislature has no clear determination or framework to assess whether the claims of services rendered to the community have had a meaningful impact in improving the lives of the community. The implication for oversight and accountability is that no determination of outcomes and impacts emanating from service delivery initiatives is undertaken which allows for holding the executive accountable for their impact or the lack thereof.

The legislatures monitoring focus is generally performance-oriented, it has no high-level outcomes and impact measures. A result framework comprises five components. The EMM results framework in the form of the SDBIP measures only inputs, activities, and outputs. There is an absence of outcome or impact measures. The role of the Legislature in engaging with the framework that is developed and reported by the executive has failed to raise this issue. In all the IDP reports that the Legislature has produced that approves this framework, there was no recognition of the absence of the outcome and impact measures. This is indicative of the need to capacitate both the personnel and political heads on the role, function, processes and benefits of the M&E for accountability and oversight.

The finding of thorough engagement with the results framework has negative implications on the benefits that can be derived from an adequately compiled results framework. These benefits as are focusing on specific outcomes, making linkages in the theory of change that brings about change, assists in tracking progress toward the attainment of strategic objectives of an organisation or programme, assists in achieving these strategic objective (Independent Evaluation Group, 2012). Through these benefits a principal such as the Legislature is able to hold the agent accountable for performance.

5.3.4 Structure of Oversight, Monitoring and Evaluation

Gorgens and Kusek (2009) recognize that in order to effectively and efficiently execute the monitoring and evaluation function an organisation requires trained personnel in the M&E function. The Legislature's oversight function involves an element of monitoring that occurs through the tracking of the executive performance on a quarterly, annual and ad hoc basis. However, there is an inherent disjuncture in the structure of the M&E function in the Legislature. Each Oversight Committee is capacitated with a Researcher, Committee Officer and a Legal Advisor. The Researcher executes most of the oversight and monitoring related functions for the Committee and the Legislature in its entirety.

The disjuncture exists in the organizational functions that Researchers are tasked with executing. These functions as contained in the Research Agenda do not explicitly detail the evaluation that Researchers must perform in the oversight committees that they serve. This poses a structural challenge in oversight and holding the executive

accountable for the service delivery performance. Madue (2014) recognizes the lack of technical expertise on the part of the Oversight Committee members in making meaningful impact on the economic planning and analysis on executive performance which tends to dilute meaningful impact.

The Legislature's monitoring and evaluation structure and its implication for oversight and accountability is illustrated in the figure 11 below:




Figure 11: Monitoring and Evaluation Structure in relation to Accountability

The Legislature's personnel's concentration on oversight activities (site visits, analysis, FIS's) and monitoring as illustrated in the figure above has negative implications for the executive's accountability. Oversight and accountability are not conducted effectively

given that there is no thorough determination of the grass root impact of the functions and activities and outputs produced by the executive at a community level due to a breakage in the evaluation functions that can assist with making impact determinations.

The document analysis revealed that the Legislature has a new organizational structure that makes provision for a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist. Gorgens and Kusek (2009) have found that there needs to be well-defined M&E functions, which need not be assigning devoted personnel to this function, however, the existing personnel may be capacitated with the M&E processes to effectively carry out the function. As it stands, the Legislature's Research Unit engages in minimal evaluative studies, and more on monitoring performance. Although the Specialist position might go a long way in addressing this gap, the Legislature should look into strengthening the evaluation capacity of Researchers to allow them to play a significant role in the evaluation function.

According to Shenga (2007, p4) the African Legislature Framework puts forth two components in measuring the capacity of Legislatures. These are the powers and autonomy of Legislatures; as well as the resources available for executing its oversight function such as financial and human resources. Although the EMM Legislature has the financial resources afforded to it to execute its duties, there is a deficiency found in the human capacity of the Legislature in using sound evaluative exercises to assess the achievement of the executive's outcomes and impact goals.

5.3.5 The summons, recommendations, and sanctions

Legislatures across the spectrum utilise oversight tools such as summons, recommendations, reporting and sanctions to hold the executive accountable for their performance. The oversight tools vary in different legislature's however; the most used are committees, summons, questions and answer sessions, performance reports, and sanctions (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004; Hall, 2010).

The EMM Legislature has made significant strides to utilise oversight tools at its disposal to hold the executive accountable. The usage of Oversight Committees is a widely used tool by the Legislature, where most of the monitoring functions are vested which ultimately assists the entire Legislature in the decision-making value chain. Many of the other tools employed by the Legislature to oversee, monitor, and hold the executive accountable in one form or another are utilised by these Committees.

The process of question and answer sessions with the executive to deliberate on performance reported is undertake by these Committees. The tool of sanctioning the executive to appear before Committees is governed by an annual, council approved calendar that the executive is mandated to honour in appearing before these Committees. The procedural results of the aforementioned activities are reports that Committees compile with a set of recommendations which are tabled to Council for approval, for the Executives implementation.

However, a lack of understanding for what should be monitored and evaluated in the M&E framework, and minimal site visits and FISs has a negative impact on the recommendations that are made by Oversight Committees which are more operational, than high-level in meeting the ultimate goals of the municipality. In addition, the Legislature a very minimal role in tracking the implementation of resolutions taken by the Council tabled by Committees. This left no form of monitoring of whether improvements that were recommended by the Legislature were implemented or not. This has a negative effect on the accountability that the Legislature requests from the executive.

The implication for accountability is a breakage in the accountability timeline as proposed by Pashang (2003). The author states that in the event that the agent fails to provide an adequate response to the principal for failure to action instructions such as recommendations, the principal can chose to impose sanctions as a form of accountability. The Legislature's failure to use monitoring tools of tracking implementation of resolutions has a negative effect on the sanctions that can be imposed.

The study also found that there has not been minimal sanctions the Legislature has imposed on the executive for poor performance. This is illustrated through the document analysis that showed that the only action taken against the Corporate Services Oversight Committee on the Human Resource Department for failing to meet all of their

targets in the 2014/15 Financial year was to instruct the Department through Council approved recommendations that it address operational issues.

5.3.6 Measures of Accountability

Accountability is defined as ‘denoting a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other’ (Bovens et al., 2005:5). Olum (2013) further states that accountability ‘ensures that actions and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the community’s needs, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction’.

Accountability in the Legislature setting was found to be influenced by monitoring activities that are mostly document oriented, with insufficient performance verification activities being undertaken. The below gives, an illustration of the findings made on how M&E and oversight influence horizontal accountability in the Legislature:

M&E, Oversight Function	Role in Accountability
Analysis of performance as per the planned targets	Interrogation of the Executive on the reasons underlying the non-delivery of planned targets as per the IDP, SDBIP, and Business Plans.
Performance Verification through conducting announced and unannounced site.	Identification of misalignment between the reported achievements vis-à-vis the actual deliverables on the ground. Biased on CAPEX projects. Failure to hold the executive accountable for performance in other areas such

	as provision of medication on time.
Independent Research (FIS) identifying key issues that influence poor performance.	Through undertaking focused research seeking to understand the reasons influencing poor performance the Legislature is able to delve deeper into reasons underlying such performance that is not reported on in reports tabled to Council and Committees. These have been conducted minimally. The Legislature misses an opportunity to use results emanating from such studies to hold the executive accountable.
Summons to appear before the Committee and Recommendation tabled to Council	Summons are used as a main engagement forum by the Legislature structures with the executive. This tool allows Legislature Committees to engage the highest management structures in the executive on their performance. It is found that the verbal responses allow for identification of existing gaps in written reports that can be substantiated orally. However, the gap identified is that the only sanctions imposed are limited to summons and operational recommendations that are not monitored for implementation which translates into a misuse of the opportunity to impose hard sanctions.

Table 3: *Role of M&E in Oversight and Accountability*

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter embarked on a critical discussion based on the key findings identified in the previous chapter. The key issues that are at the forefront are that the performance monitoring conducted by the Legislature over the executive has shortcomings in terms

of scope. This is based on the current focus of monitoring which focused on performance reports and a few site visits on capital expenditure projects. This leaves a large area of performance on the part of the executive unmonitored with no party held accountable for poor performance in that regard.

The structure of oversight, monitoring and evaluation was also discussed. This was found to be handicapped by the lack of sufficient and adequately trained personnel in monitoring and evaluation. The results are that performance at an outcome and impact level is not monitored, which is compounded by the lack of evaluation studies that are not conducted to determine the achievement of municipal objectives and service delivery impact. The accountability measures employed by the Legislature were found to be soft in the manner that were instituted. These measures are confined to summoning the executive to appear before the Legislature, tabling of recommendations that are operational and based solely on reports brought before the Legislature. The lack of imposing of hard sanctions for poor performance has to be addressed by the Legislature.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will present the conclusion and recommendations of the research vis-a-vis the findings made in Chapter 4 and their detailed discussion in Chapter 5.

In this research paper, the Research sought to establish how the monitoring and evaluation are used for oversight and accountability in the Ekurhuleni Legislature. In answering this question, the research sought to fulfill in purpose of the study which was to assess how the Ekurhuleni Legislature utilizes M&E to enhance oversight and accountability of the executive for the purpose of efficient and effective service delivery.

Oversight and accountability are the cornerstone of all Legislature's. In the South African context these functions are of the Constitutionally prescribed. The EMM Legislature's oversight and accountability processes have had slight deficiencies in the evaluative processes that are minimally employed; the lack of thorough verification of performance reports; the mild utility of accountability measures; and human capacity constraints.

The research found that the EMM Legislature does not utilise thorough monitoring and evaluation practices to determine and verify the performance of the Executive in meeting the objectives and impacts of the municipality. There is a disjuncture in the M&E function which does not cater for evaluative process, as well as monitoring being largely focused on inputs, activities, and outputs.

The research also found that the main processes used by the EMM Legislature are oriented on analysis, site visits, Committees, summons, questions, recommendations, and sanctions. However, the research did find that that some of these processes are used at a minimal level and could be strengthened.

6.1 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

The first chapter of this research paper served as an introduction and background to the study at hand. The introductory part of the paper laid the foundation for a deeper engagement with the concept of governance with the Legislative sector by tracing its origination, and key principles that are rooted in this discipline. This introduction to governance led to an introduction of the concept of the Separation of Powers Model and its implementation in the South African context.

The concept of the SOP was delved into in the background of the research focusing on how it is implemented in the local government space by the development of Legislatures in the City of Johannesburg and Cape Town municipality, followed by that of the EMM. This was preceded by an introduction of the mandate of legislature's across the

spectrum being focused on oversight, public participation and by-law making. Within the oversight realm of this mandate, the section of the chapter brought in an element of monitoring and evaluation as a process of enhancing oversight, and using it to hold the executive accountable for performance.

This chapter also catered for the problem that this research focused on and how this will be tackled by responding to how the Legislature uses monitoring and evaluation for oversight and accountability of the executive. In responding to this area, the chapter identified that data will be gathered from key individuals who are tasked with offering content support to the legislature in its entirety. The key questions and objective of the research were presented, along with the significance of the study and how it will inform the body of knowledge of M&E processes in the legislature context.

The second chapter focused on the literature review on which the research was founded. Badenhorst (2010) articulated that a literature review serves to provide what exists about a particular subject area in literature. This involves a systematic review of what has been introduced, discussed, and affirmed around a particular area in literature. As mentioned in chapter 2, a literature review provides an opportunity for the researcher to use what has been said around an area as a foundation for their study. This assists in offering validation on what has been discussed. A literature reviews contains a theoretical and conceptual framework that the research will be based on.

The literature review in this study began by introducing the theoretical framework which is governance. The history of governance was discussed, from its origination to evolution over time and usage in multiple disciplines. This was followed by engaging the key principles of governance, more-so the principle of accountability as a state of answerability for actions taken or not taken in the service delivery value chain.

Some of the key theories of governance were discussed, being: the traditional authority theory, rational-choice theory, theory of public value, and institutional analysis theory. This was followed by a definition of oversight and mention of some of the tools used by Legislatures in overseeing the executive. Monitoring and evaluation was also defined with its theory being, Theory of Change. The literature review concluded by defining the conceptual framework being the Principal Agent Theory that will be used to discuss the relationship between M&E and oversight and accountability in the EMM Legislature.

Chapter 3 was devoted to the research methodology. This began by taking the reader through a description of qualitative and quantitative research methodology. This was followed by a selection of the research design that informed the core of the research being exploratory in nature. The data collection methods that were used in the research were defined and explained within the context of the research. The primary data collection method was through interviews with the secondary data being document analysis to validate the findings made in the interviews. The chapter also focused on data presentation, validity and reliability, limitations of the study, ethical considerations, and how data will be analysed.

The purpose of chapter 4 was to present the findings made through the data collection and analysis. This chapter gave a description of the contextual arrangements or situation of the EMM Legislature. This was done by focusing on its establishment in 2011, its core mandate and the structure of the institution focusing on the Research and Committee Support Unit. The demographical profile of respondents was provided by the title of the respondents, the function performed in the institution, and number of years in their current position. The next phase delved into the findings emanating from the interviews with Researchers and Committee Officers which were grouped onto themes. The key findings pertain to performance monitoring, evaluation function, structure of M&E and research; oversight practices; and the soft measures of accountability.

Chapter 5 was devoted to making sense and interpreting the findings made in the previous chapter. This was done by discussing the findings under the following headings: performance monitoring of the executive; structure of the oversight and monitoring and evaluation; summons, recommendations and sanctions.

6.2 CONCLUSIONS

This research study sought to determine how the EMM Legislature uses M&E to enhance oversight over and accountability by the executive. In answering this question, the researcher conducted interviews with personnel in the Research and Committees Unit in the Legislature. The findings made through the interviews were validated through document analysis. The data was coded and grouped into themes for interpretation to

make sense of the overall research findings. The key research question had the following sub-questions:

- What forms of monitoring and evaluations processes are used by the Legislature in the oversight it undertakes over the executive?
- What are the oversight challenges that are experienced by the Legislature?
- What are the accountability measures used by the EMM Legislature over its executive?

The following objectives of the research have been met:

- Assessing the accountability process used by the Legislature over its executive;
- Assessing how the Ekurhuleni Legislature applies monitoring and evaluation in its oversight over the executive;
- Assess the connection between M&E and governance over the executive; and
- Providing recommendations that can improve M&E for purposes of increasing accountability and oversight over the executive.

In answering the research question and achieving the objectives of the research, the conclusions drawn from this exercise are the following:

- The Legislature utilized monitoring practices in overseeing the performance of the executive. This is illustrated through continues engagement with reports and conducting of site visits. However, the Legislature needs to strengthen these measures by conducting more site visits, FISs, and engaging other reports.

- The Legislature undertakes minimal evaluative studies, and the knowledge on evaluation practices is not sound in the personnel of the Legislature. Due to this the Legislature does not have sound mechanism to determine whether outcomes and impacts of service delivery are met and to what extent. The result is that the responsible managers are not held fully accountable for failing to meet the impact or objectives of the municipality.

- The Legislature has a serious shortage of staff which has been attributed to a lack of comprehensive oversight functions being conducted. The sharing of researchers among committees was found to have an adverse effect on the quality of work and focus of the Committees.

- The research found that there is more knowledge of monitoring than evaluation which might require skills transfer for Researchers on M&E and the benefits this might have for oversight and accountability.

- The findings on how accountability is impacted by M&E is in the form the lack of its usage. It was found that there is no thorough monitoring of the implementation of resolutions made by Council by the executive. In the absence of such monitoring, the Legislature cannot determine whether their requests were implemented and to what degree. In addition, the executive is not held accountable for failing to action Council directives.
- The research found that the legislature utilises minimal accountability measures in the form of summoning the executive to appear before it to offer additional responses to writing requests. The research failed to find a recommendation made by Council that performance bonus be withheld from poorly performing manager, warning letters, or the removal of such managers. The study found that reprisals are limited to recommendations that are not monitored, request for written reports and oral replies.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Emanating from the above, the following aspect of monitoring and evaluation processes need to be strengthen to ensure a greater impact on oversight and accountability.

- **Strengthen Performance Monitoring**

Oversight is the cornerstone of Legislature's across the spectrum. Within the oversight function are monitoring and evaluative practices that can be used to hold the executive accountable for poor performance. It is recommended that the Legislature strengthen its monitoring criteria used over the performance of the executive. The Legislature needs to go beyond the assessment of reports presented by the Executive. There needs to be thorough correlation between the financial performance and non-financial performance to assist in determining the efficiency of the resources utilized in delivering a set of outputs. This could be done by increasing the number and focus of FISs that are conducted by Committees in a given financial year. Monitoring could also be strengthened by re-focusing the site visits undertaken to include visits to areas where soft services are provided to observe how these services are provided to the community. This will assist in moving the focus from a capital expenditure orientation.

- **Engage other planning documents and the reporting framework**

The Legislature needs to monitor other plans that the Executive have such as the municipalities 30 year plan in the form of the GDS, their operational plans which the Executive tends to utilize to move problematic or hard-to-achieve indicators too.

- **Inculcate Evaluative Processes**

The evaluation practice has multiple management and governance uses as identified in theory. The benefits identified by the World Bank involve strategy, operations, learning, as well as a determination of the impact emanating from the aforementioned benefits. Given the EMM Legislature's focus on the inputs, activities, and outputs through its monitoring and oversight function, this study recommends that more focus be given to evaluative exercises. This requires that evaluation studies be conducted to determine whether the Executive has been successful in realizing its developmental impact on the residents of the municipality. In so doing, the Legislature can use these findings to hold the relevant programme managers accountable for performance. This will allow the Legislature to use systematic exercises to inform sound decision-making about what works, what doesn't, and who is responsible for performance deficiencies.

- **Impose sanctions for poor performance**

Part of the timeline in the principal agent relationship that takes place between parties such as Legislatures and their executives is that there are sanctions that are imposed by the Principal in the event that the Agent fails to render the mandate delegated to them. In the case of the EMM Legislature and its executive, the key finding is that there are minimal sanctions being imposed on the executive for poor performance. Therefore, the recommendation emanating from this research is that the Legislature needs to begin to impose hard sanctions such as withholding performance bonuses in the event that

the Executive fails to perform as planned, or even go as far as removing Heads of Departments that do not perform. The decision to impose these sanctions should be influenced by the results of monitoring and evaluation practices.

- **Capacitate Personnel**

The theory engaged in this research has found that the effective functionality of Legislatures is reliant on the skills possessed by its personnel, particularly, the research component. Given the benefits of monitoring and evaluation on accountability, it is recommended that Legislature's research unit be capacitated in the practice of monitoring and evaluation. Although the Legislature's new organizational structure caters for an M&E Specialist, this function could be augmented by the capacitation of the already existing personnel in the research unit to ensure that they carry out these functions, especially the evaluation function. This will play a significant role in acquiring information that can be used to make sound decisions, and hold the Executive accountable for performance.

6.4 PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The Researcher proposes the following areas to be looked at through future research studies:

- How the Legislature can develop their own M7E framework or systems to measure the performance of the executive.

- How the Legislature can use more sanctions on poorly performance executive departments.
- How to strengthen the evaluation skills of legislature personnel and increase political will for M&E results.

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APPENDIX A

Introduction by interviewer

My name is Matlala Maureen Malatjie, working for the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality's (EMM) Legislature as a Researcher, and a student of the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa working toward a Masters of Management in the field of Public and Development Sector Monitoring and Evaluation.

I am conducting an interview with the EMM's Legislature staff as part of my research. The interview will be used to determine the monitoring and evaluation process used by the Legislature to hold the executive accountable for service delivery performance areas.

I therefore request that you participate in this interview process to assist me determine these areas. This interview is voluntary were your name will be kept confidential when analyzing and reporting on the data. The interview will take 40 minutes of your time.

You are not being coerced into participating in this interview session. Your assistance will be gravely appreciated. You should know that you may decide not to participate or discontinue participating in this process at any time without fear of reprisals. No penalties will be imposed in any way should you decide not to continue participating in this session.

Due to the confidentiality of the interview, your name will not be recorded on the questionnaire.

The below details are provided should you need to contact anyone if you have any concerns or have been harmed:

If at any time you develop an issues pertaining to the ethical aspects or harmed through participating in this research process, feel free to contact the University of Witwatersrand on (011) 717 7108.

Consent Form

I provide consent to participate in a one-on-one interview with the Matlala Maureen Malatjie for purposes of her Master's research study. I have been made aware that the information provided will be for purposes of this research and that my real name will not be used.

I have also been made aware of my freedom that I can use at any time to terminate the interview process without repercussions at any time should I feel I do not want to participate further.

I am participating in this interview voluntary.

I have been made aware that feedback on this research project may be given to my organization.

I have been aware that I will not derive any benefit from participating in this research project.

I understand that this interview consent form will not be part of the interview questionnaire; furthermore, the answers that I provide will remain confidential.

Name of Respondent

Respondent's Signature

Date

Name of Interviewer

Interviewer's Signature

Date

Interview guide

Section A *(completed before commencement of interview)*

Date and time of the interview:	Interviewer name and surname:	Place of interview:

Section B: Background Information

(Completed after providing introduction; mark with X where option selection required)

No.	Question	Response		Code
1.1	What is your gender?	Male	Female	none
1.2	What is your job title?			
1.3	What is your employment level?	Middle	Top	
1.4	Which unit do you work for?	Research	Committess	
1.5	How long have you been working for the Legislature?			

Section C: Detailed Questions

No.	Questions and Responses	Code
2.1	How would you define the purpose of monitoring and evaluation in the context of the Legislature's oversight over the executive?	
2.2	What are the current monitoring practices undertaken by the Legislature over the executive? 2.2.1 How do you use these practices? 2.2.2 What is the main use of monitoring in the Legislature? 2.2.3 Are you able to propose new methods of monitoring by the Legislature? 2.2.4 Have you done this before? If yes, how did you do so?	

2.3	What is your understanding of evaluation? 2.3.1 What are the current evaluations practices used by the Legislature on the executive? 2.3.2 How do you use these practices? 2.3.3 Please demonstrate instances where evaluation has been used if applicable?	
2.4	How do Legislature Committees determine whether the executive has met its service delivery objectives?	
2.5	What M&E framework is used to track the performance of the executive? 2.5.1 Who compiles this framework? 2.5.2 Has there been an instance were Committees proposed changes to this framework? 2.5.3 Provide one example where changes were proposed by committees? 2.5.4 What method did you use to determine whether these	

	changes were effected, and do you think that this method is sufficient?	
2.6	What skills do you think are required to effectively monitor and evaluate the executive? 2.5.1 Does the Legislature have the intellectual and human capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate the executive?	
2.7	Is there political demand for M&E results in the Legislature?	
2.8	How does the Legislature hold the executive accountable for poor performance?	

	2.8.1 What forms of sanctions have been imposed on the executive for failure to meet performance targets? 2.8.2 Provide an example where such sanctions were imposed, and the result of such?	
2.9	How does the Legislature determine whether its recommendations have been implemented by the executive? 2.9.1 Provide examples of such methods? 2.9.2 Following determination of non-implementation of recommendations by the executive, what actions are taken by the Legislature?	