"Toothless regulator?" a critical analysis of ICASA's regulation of the SABC so that it functions as a public services broadcaster
Date
2010-04-01T08:13:46Z
Authors
Govenden, Prinola
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Abstract
Abstract
This study critically analyses whether ICASA effectively regulates the SABC so that it plays
its role as a public service broadcaster in the public interest and promotes democracy. The
study applies a combination of critical political economy of the media, theories of regulation
and public service broadcasting as an analytical framework, and employs document analysis
and qualitative interviews as methods.
The study finds that in relation to monitoring the SABC’s license conditions, ICASA is to a
large degree effective in the regulatory practices it employs. However ICASA tends to take a
problematic stance by limiting its regulatory mandate to only monitor the license conditions.
The study argues that ICASA’s mandate is and should be broader. Further, the study
identifies an antagonistic relationship between ICASA and the SABC, which undermines the
regulator’s ability to effectively regulate the SABC.
The study also finds that ICASA’s regulation in general is characterized by a lack of proactive
regulation in several areas. In this regard, the study demonstrates that ICASA has a
regulatory practice that can be characterized as silent. The areas in which ICASA is silent
when it should act include the SABC’s problematic commercial funding model which
undermines its public service role. Editorial biases towards those in authority and
controversial practices like withdrawing programmes and “blacklisting” commentators who
are considered too critical of those in power, in ways that undermines its editorial and
programming independence. The suspensions of the SABC’s two Executive members and
calls for the SABC board to step down, which undermine the institutional independence that
a public service broadcaster should possess.
The study identifies a number of ICASA’s institutional weaknesses, which include its lack of
independence in reality, its “politicised” appointment process, a lack of skilled personnel and
“poaching”, “politicised” and inefficient accountability mechanisms, a lack of clarity of
mandate and power regarding the SABC, as well as a lack of adequate and independent
funding which result in ineffective regulatory practices. Finally the study makes
recommendations for the strengthening of ICASA so that it becomes in an effective regulator
functioning in the public interest.