A case for epistemological realism.
Date
1998
Authors
Cook, Victoria Bancroft.
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Abstract
The Epistemological Realist (ER)project, recently initiated by John McDowell in
Mind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is an
extremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism'
about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophical
climate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of the
reason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realism
has traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from Traditional
Realism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enables
empirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of how
our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to give
perfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsense
realism' as a philosophically respectable position.
Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism antirealism
perception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind and
World Hilary Putnam
Description
A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Keywords
Realism, Knowledge, Theory of., McDowell, John. Mind and World., Putnam, Hilary