Whether we have free-will and whether it matters

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dc.contributor.author Ostrowick, John Montague
dc.date.accessioned 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.date.available 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.date.issued 2007-03-01T12:33:53Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10539/2182
dc.description Student Number : 9112588A - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities en
dc.description.abstract There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will. en
dc.format.extent 930160 bytes
dc.format.extent 37229 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en en
dc.subject Compatibilism en
dc.subject Incompatibilism en
dc.subject Libertarianism en
dc.subject Hard Determinism en
dc.subject Free-will en
dc.subject the Self en
dc.subject Libet en
dc.subject Dennett en
dc.subject Reactive Attitudes en
dc.subject Penal system en
dc.title Whether we have free-will and whether it matters en
dc.type Thesis en


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