Oesi, Janine2007-03-022007-03-022007-03-02http://hdl.handle.net/10539/2201Student Number : 0114064T - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of HumanitiesThis dissertation looks at the ontology of ideas as a philosophical paradigm. It traces the ontology from its origins in Descartes to its adoption by the British Empiricists through to the writings of Frege and Moore. It argues that the ontology is unable to provide an object category independent of the subject with the consequence that all objects that fall within the ontology are subjective. An ontology of subjective objects cannot adequately account for external reality since it cannot account for difference and otherness. The ‘problem of the external world’ to which this ontology gives rise, attests to this. I argue that the intentionality thesis served as a corrective to the ontology of ideas by providing a metaphysic that could account for these elements and that allowed for an adequate treatment of external or corporeal objects.11346 bytes124649 bytes9728 bytes10470 bytes93084 bytes255976 bytes237436 bytes268128 bytes190173 bytes14770 bytes9565 bytes10339 bytesapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfenideasintentionalityThesis