

Citizenship Education in Malawi: A critique in defence of maximal citizenship

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Abstract

This dissertation analyses assumptions about citizenship education in Malawi since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1993 and reveals a minimalist conception of citizenship. It asserts that Malawi's historical and traditional context require concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. Central to the discussion are conceptual distinctions between minimal and maximal citizenship alongside a discussion of concepts of freedom, human rights and development, which can be attributed to minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship. The dissertation argues that deliberative and participatory forms of democracy, with their parallel notions of contestatory and republican freedoms and rights, are more attuned to creating an active and strong citizenship while at the same time developing a positive relationship between democratic participation and participation in local and national development, a relationship which representative approaches in Malawi seemingly disavow.

Key words:

Education

Citizenship

Democracy

Representation

Participation

Malawi

Declaration

This dissertation is entirely my own work except where otherwise acknowledged. This work has not been submitted anywhere else for examination purposes.

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Dedication

To (late) Jinja-John Divala (father),

from whom I owe my interests in the political.

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CHAPTER ONE

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN MALAWI: SETTING THE AGENDA

1.0 Introduction

This dissertation argues that citizenship education programmes in Malawi after 1993, when the multi-party political system was re-introduced, promote a minimalist conception of citizenship. The re-introduction of a multi-party system of government is perceived to be synonymous with the re-introduction of democracy although these two developments do not mean one and the same thing. The assessment of citizenship education initiatives in Malawi will mainly concentrate on assumptions made on the type of citizen deemed as appropriate for the democratic dispensation. In order to do this, general underpinnings coming from Malawi's civic education programmes will be considered. Such programmes, though predominantly found in community outreach activities, can also be found within the school curriculum.

As a critical response to these developments, the dissertation argues that in order for the nation to create conditions where citizens would be enabled to participate fully, a maximal conception of democratic citizenship within the frameworks of both deliberation and participation is required. In order to do this, the dissertation first embarks on an examination of the implications for citizenship education of competing conceptions of democracy, which Malawi claims to practise (Chirwa, Kanyongolo & Kayambazinthu, 2004). These competing conceptions are representation and participatory democracy. Crucially related to these competing conceptions of democracy are the links to conceptions of freedom, human rights and national development. Such relations will be examined in view of the passive forms of citizenship that they are perceived to promote and how alternative conceptions of the same are likely to cultivate active and engaging citizenship.

1.1 Malawi's historical setting

Addressing the task of citizenship education in Malawi after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1993 requires an understanding of its historical context. Malawi's history and politics are marked by lack of proper citizenship education for democracy on the one hand, and insufficient citizenship education in cases where that has been attempted. This resulted in many people considering participation in politics as specialist issues. For instance, the pre-independence period - before 1963 - saw Malawi under British rule in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland¹. Some traditional leaders and other political elites became allies in the colonial government, where the local people did not define their political policies and values.

As an underdeveloped nation, Malawi's traditional patterns of life have remained predominant, in time and space. In her traditional life, kinship dominates forms of leadership and organisation. The ruling family and associated families fulfilled the roles of counsellors to the chief. Members of the ruling family exercised full citizenship rights, and one such case is the ngoni traditional life and society in Ntcheu district. The rest of the members of society were subjects (subordinates) to the chief and the royal family. This historical and traditional background is one where it is difficult to find enabling conditions for active citizenship².

The inability to develop Malawi's economy through mineral resources turned Malawi into an agriculture-based economy and provider of human resources to other parts of the

¹ The Federation consisted of the current states of Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia).

² It should be noted here that there is need for an in-depth policy analysis of how the pre-colonial, post-colonial and the recent multiparty dispensation in Malawi have affected educational policy. This dissertation does not assume to mount a full-fledged analysis of the presence or shift of policy regarding citizenship education or any other policy shifts apart from the generally observed characteristics that have serious ramifications on citizenship preparations. A complete comparative analysis of that sort is beyond the scope and nature of this work

federation where mining formed the economic core. At a local level, the colonial administration also introduced the *Thangata System*³ (Ross, 1996, p.15). This background is indicative of a nation whose citizens did not enjoy or practice active and full human agency in the operations of their social and political systems, let alone their traditional system. In other words, such a background is also detrimental to the development of a required form of citizenship that could see people meaningfully participate in their political system and other sectors of society. Hence the background necessitates the cultivation of strong and active citizenship.

In the post-independence period⁴, education for citizenship was offered through officially controlled and structured courses in primary schools known as 'Civics'. Civics was built around and aimed at promoting the national values of Unity, Loyalty, Discipline and Obedience. Other than these values, Civics also dealt with issues of public awareness about the constitution of the republic, the different parts and functions of government, duties and responsibilities of a good citizen in relation to the party dictates, differences between local government and central government (Kasambara, 1998, p.239). Despite Kasambara's observations, it is possible to look at Civics with the ordinary spectacles that regard it as simply a primary school subject among others.

Other fora for citizenship education included the various mechanisms put in place by the ruling system. Attendance of political rallies was mandatory. The state-owned broadcaster, then the only radio in the country, also played a major role. There was also a Youth Week every year when citizens had to participate in some development work. The forced purchase of party cards became a distinguishing mark of a true citizen. The party card

³ The term *Thangata* means 'helping without expecting any reward'. In the colonial days natives were expected to work on plots of land owned by European estate owners without any payment, in the name of developing the nation.

⁴ Malawi's independence was gained in 1964 under the leadership of Dr. Kamuzu Banda and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). In 1971 Dr. K. Banda was made life president of the nation and the MCP became the only legal party in the nation (see Fiedler, 1996, p.149)

played a crucial role, as it became the sole condition for participation and entrance into important places like markets, hospitals, classrooms, bus stages and others. While the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), a paramilitary wing of the ruling party, mainly acted as watchdogs for the system, it also conducted programmes meant to support the ideology of the day. Some of these forms of mandatory participation could as well have enabled the conditions for cultivating an active citizenship should it not have been for their lack of substantive freedoms.

The different forms and ways of conducting citizenship education as outlined above determined and dictated the type of knowledge citizens were getting; who was offering what and how it was being offered. In the different ways of imparting citizenship education, the type of knowledge that citizens could receive became completely determined and dictated by the single party and the state, both in content and methodology. One simple analysis of this period also shows that there was no distinction between the ruling party and the government as the famous slogan '*chipani ndi boma*' (literal translations: 'party and government' or 'party is government' and vice versa) attests to. In general, the form of citizenship education that was promoted could easily be labelled an apology for the single party state, a glorification of the 'heroism' of the president and a systematic attempt to uncompromisingly rally the nation behind the four national values mentioned above. Deviation from this dominant thinking was tantamount to treason. Personal identification with the party and its values became the order of the day. In addition, Kasambara (1998) argues that there was a concerted effort to keep the masses ignorant of extensive and active political awareness and participation and to make the masses feel this was their best possible world, which needed their support. Any opposition to this ideological hegemony resulted in unceremonious deaths. The president apparently

endorsed such practices. The president is quoted: "... to those who oppose us, accidents will happen..." (Ross, op. cit., p. 17, n.9), after the death of one political opponent.

The ideal of unity was used for bringing the diverse tribes of Malawi into a feeling of nationhood. Unfortunately, by the same value political difference was perceived as 'dissidence', a threat to nationhood and unity itself. Loyalty and obedience mostly operated alongside each other. Every Malawian citizen was supposed to show and practice allegiance to the ruling Malawi Congress Party and its president. Critical examination of the operations of the party and government were considered beyond the range of accepted political behaviour. Sentimentally, citizens were encouraged to sacrifice and die for the party and the nation. Each member became a watchman for his or her neighbour in so far as loyalty and allegiance to the party was concerned. As a result, fear and suspicion were instilled in each citizen against each other.

Discipline became the overriding 'virtue' binding citizens in the one party state and the ideals and goals of political hegemony in Malawi. Discipline was used to suppress political difference. This led to mysterious disappearance of those whose opinions were not blessed within mainstream political thinking. Organizations such as the Malawi Youth League and the Malawi Young Pioneers played the major role of instilling this discipline into the people. These organizations became the most feared and finally turned out to be associated with political terror for those who dared to express difference.

The general citizenship picture of this era strongly attests to the idea that many citizens did not have the chance to be participatory citizens in the social and political affairs. This historical background shows that Malawi badly needs an appropriate form of citizenship education if proper active citizenship engagement is to be developed. The case for active citizenship education is made more imperative by additional factors such as Malawi's

demographic conditions. Malawi's population is largely distributed in terms of 11% urban and 89% rural. The illiteracy rate is at 54% and over half of the population lives below the poverty line (see UNDP, 2002, Human Development Index and Country Reports 2002). Given these demographic features, it is difficult to expect an engaged citizenry. Some have argued that such a background further amounted to a deliberate attempt to keep the masses ignorant (Kasambara, 1998, p.239).

Malawi's background shows that the masses were kept away from meaningful active citizenship engagement; that at the inception of a multi-party system of government in 1993, citizens were ill prepared and ill informed to actively and effectively participate in the new democratic process. This further limited their contribution to national development. The dissertation argues that most efforts to developing a democratic citizenship are more favourable to the development of passive citizenship than the active citizenship that Malawi requires. As such, it further proposes a conceptual framework for developing active and deliberate democratic citizenship required for the new democratic dispensation.

1.2 Imperatives for renewed citizenship education discourse

The above overview serves to show that Malawi's historical and traditional context require concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. The 20th Century democratisation of many countries has mainly been understood and practised in relation to structural changes. Setting up of electoral systems, judicial structures and other administrative structures in government have been assumed to be the essence of democratisation. Alongside such changes, democratisation has also been understood as the institution of structures for the protection and promotion of human rights.

This dissertation is of the view that such changes have mainly occurred as structural face-lifts, which to a large extent assume that the structural changes will inevitably lead to the cultivation of the democratic character. Structural changes alone are inadequate if we are to consistently move towards participatory citizenship because the concentration on such changes, although providing the basics, pays little attention to the cultivation of the democratic character and what it would take of citizenship for a democracy to thrive. It gives the “impression that democracy could effectively function even in the absence of a virtuous citizenry” (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 285). Young (1990), Benhabib (1996) and other scholars have been in the forefront of proposing alternate spaces in realising democracy by transcending a mere pre-occupation with structures. While these proposals do not definitively ignore structures *per se*, priority is placed on full human agency over and above the well ordered-ness of the basic society that assumes stability through state bureaucracy.

An over-concentration on structural changes unnecessarily juxtaposes democratic structures with the democratic character, resulting in a “democracy of laws and not of men” (Gould, 1990. p.283). Change to democratic attitudes and character considered only as a side-effect of such structural changes is tantamount to a simplistic understanding of character change, let alone what is required of democratic characters. Rawls’ (1971) ideal of a democratic society pays more attention to laws than it does to democratic character. Such assumptions further imply that non-democratic characters do not make any difference, provided sufficient checks and mechanisms are put in place for democracy to thrive; provided rules regulating the distribution of resources and deserts are fixed. Contrary to these assumptions, Gould (1990) thinks that the prevalence of some traits of a democratic character is indispensable though not a sufficient condition for the existence of democratic institutional forms (p.285). In other words, democratic institutions and

principles are not on their own enough for a democratic culture unless there are democratic characters to work in and with the structures and principles. Similarly it is not easy for persons to become democrats suddenly, as most African re-introductions of democracy would make us believe. The cultivation of strong democratic citizenship is therefore a condition for democracy's success (Gould, 1990).

Two characteristics of democratic agency and democratic reciprocity are crucial in this examination of the democratic character. Democratic agency is the capacity in individuals to take rational and free initiative in democratic decision-making as members of society (op. cit., p.290). It demands that participating agents have reasons for their collective decisions and that they should understand why, as individuals, they are involved in such collectivity. Democratic reciprocity "... involves an ability to understand the perspective of the other as equivalent to one's own, and a readiness to act with respect to the other in ways that are equivalent to the other's actions with respect to oneself, as well as to have an expectation that the other will understand and act similarly ..." (ibid). Democratic reciprocity assumes and requires the recognition of each other as unique and equal agents. This is a seedbed for the cultivation of other democratic values such as tolerance, flexibility, open mindedness, commitment, responsibility sharing and communication. As such, communicative and deliberative conditions need to alter how democratic citizenship is conceived and cultivated in Malawi.

The shift to democratic agency and reciprocity with the purpose of cultivating active democratic citizenship has been the centre of democratic discourse in the last decade. There is a movement away from mere consideration of constitutional rights, acquisition and exercise of power, political decision-making procedures and structures, to concentration on the identity and conduct of citizens in relation to their responsibilities, loyalties and roles (Kymlicka, 2002, p.285; see also McLaughlin, 1992). Kymlicka also

notes, "... the virtues and identities of citizens are an important and independent factor in democratic governance..."(ibid). Democracy remains incomplete without any consideration of agency.

1.3 Methodological Considerations

This dissertation is an exercise in applied political philosophy. It seeks to provide a critique of educational programmes that are intended to cultivate citizenship identities, skills and values. The dissertation will argue that citizenship education programmes in Malawi fail to embrace maximal conceptions of citizenship, and as such are very likely to promote passive citizenship. On the other hand, an attempt to develop and defend an active citizenship will be made, relying on a participatory concept of democracy that promises to bring about a strong and deliberative democracy. This theoretical agenda, while not necessarily polarising the major themes of representation and participation, and the competing perspectives in the associated conceptions of human rights, freedom and development, will consider these themes using a 'minimal-maximal' conceptual framework (McLaughlin, 1992). The framework will be used to examine the tensions and ambiguities that exist between representative and participatory forms of democracy; between contestatory forms, and formal and abstract notions of freedom and rights; and the dichotomous relations between development and democratic participation and citizenship.

The maximal and minimal interpretations of the notion of citizenship are understood to exist in a continuum and not necessarily as discrete conceptions (McLaughlin, 1992, p.236). Such a conception further implies that, in the first place, it is possible to have interpretations that are neither completely minimal nor maximal, that is, features can tend towards the minimal while others tend towards the maximal in the same system. Hence

citizenship characterisations stretch between limited and extended forms. For example, considering human rights as universal and applicable to everyone in the same way tends to be minimal for it to be practical but overlooks difference and need, and the contention arising from the latter that may require preferential treatment. Secondly, the nature of the continuum in citizenship conceptions gives room for interpretations to be dynamic. The interpretations can take different general characterizations or faces depending on concentration or focus. For instance, people's political involvement can fluctuate between the barest forms of involvement such as in voting, to more extended forms like frequent deliberations on the issues that affect one's society and continuous action to realise society's common good.

McLaughlin (1992) develops the minimal-maximal characterisations of the concept of citizenship in four features. These are "...the *identity* that is seen as conferring upon an individual, the *virtues* of the citizen that are required, the extent of the *political involvement* on the part of the individual that is thought to follow, and the *social prerequisites* seen as necessary for effective citizenship..." (op. cit., p.236, emphasis original). I suggest that it is possible to consider that identity and virtues are the major features of any such characterisations; and that the political involvement and social pre-requisites are necessary consequents of these major features. In other words, for the purposes of this dissertation the two major features suffice to mark a distinction between the maximal and minimal interpretations of citizenship.

Minimal interpretations of citizenship are marked by an emphasis on formal, legal and juridical status. Citizenship similarly gets its meaning through formal definitions and enforcements of rights, which definitively take shape in constitutional rights. The individual person becomes both a recipient of rights from government and its constitution and an executor of human rights to promote and protect self. Similarly, citizenship

education emphasizes knowledge of the law and individuals' rights to vote in order to choose leaders. This form of citizenship requires virtues whose loyalties and responsibilities only stretch as far as the local community is involved. Being a law-abiding citizen and volunteering in some public works is also recommended. Therefore, minimal citizenship does not carry any more burdens than following the law and some periodical volunteer work, which is not an obligation either. In other words, I argue that this model does not encourage widespread citizen involvement in public things. Once the vote is cast and the rights are secured an individual need have little to do with the daily affairs of society. Representatives are perceived as properly positioned to engage in active participation. I will argue that in public life, such forms of citizenship are likely to promote passive citizens whose considerations are mostly formal, and legal. This can also be attributed to their lack of collective perspective and proper interaction, which eventually consolidates the identities, thereby remaining static.

On the other hand, McLaughlin's maximal forms of citizenship, other than being multi-dimensional, require forms of community consciousness that stretch beyond the local and the immediate as one is moved by a sense of the common good in the light of universal considerations (op. cit., p.236). Forms of citizenship that demand extended participation of citizens in most cases also require that citizens deliberate over matters of common concern. Such deliberation is likely to create a shared and extended culture of democratic rights, responsibilities and obligations. These forms make citizenship dynamic, not confined to constitutional issues, though they are important; and they promote justice. Such forms of citizenship are likely to encourage and develop active participation in the public realm in which citizenship also gets defined. Continued re-definition, debate and contestation over the identities and virtues as is the case in maximal orientations is most likely to produce active citizens.

This dissertation contends that education for democratic citizens must adopt a maximal approach. Given that educating for democratic citizens is not simply general education meant to promote philosophic/rational inquiry into the nature of government or elections (op. cit.), it is important that such an education for democratic citizens should seek to achieve a specific range of dispositions and virtues that enable citizens to live in and support their democratic political economy. The Crick Report (1998) argues that the purpose of citizenship education "... is to make secure and to increase the knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy. The above values also enhance awareness of rights and duties, and the sense of responsibilities needed for the development of active citizens ... thereby establishing the value of involvement in the local and wider community..." (p.40).

This model for educating citizens conceives of active citizenship as the engagement in a habitual interaction between the legal, the moral and political arenas of public life (Crick report, p.11). Educating for democratic citizenship in Malawi would also have to come to terms with the need for a sound knowledge of basic concepts of democratic life such as human rights and the institutional operations of a democratic government. But such a concentration of the knowledge system does not make democracy itself secure (Crick Report, p.8); neither does it provide sufficient conditions for citizen engagement in civic affairs. Whereas civic participation is desired for its capacity to enable citizens to become active in their affairs, the proposal for active citizenship does not ultimately rule out certain forms of representation at some levels, for example where national decisions are called for. The participating citizen is one who lives through a culture of human rights and freedom that goes beyond the constitutional framework to an ongoing consideration of how such rights and freedoms are negotiated and exercised in daily social and public life. In other words, teaching for active citizenship would need to include the cultivation of social and

moral responsibility, community involvement and not merely imparting political knowledge. These values are believed to assist in teaching self-confidence, and socially and morally responsible behaviour and community involvement (Crick Report, p.12). The dissertation also proposes that such a citizenship model is also better positioned to foster participation in local and national development. Education for active citizenship should therefore create sufficient conditions for the cultivation of values and dispositions, skills and aptitudes, and also knowledge and understanding necessary for active participation in society. (Op. cit., p.41)

As such, any education for citizenship that pretends to be apolitical, as is the case with the National Initiative for Civic Education programmes in Malawi and other community and school programmes, misses out being a legitimate civic education for democratic citizens. The concentration on formal government structures, forms of democracy, formal human rights and their constitutional and structural protection, while it informs the citizens, is likely to undermine the promotion of active citizenship!

1.4 Outline of the argument.

In setting the agenda for a maximal conception of citizenship in Malawi, this chapter has undertaken the task of indicating that citizenship programmes in use after the re-introduction of a multi-party system in Malawi are likely to promote an unengaged and passive citizenry. Nevertheless, Malawi's historical and traditional context set an imperative to create concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. Malawi's historical background, both pre- and post-independence, and the four cornerstones adopted in the post-independence period do not provide enabling conditions for the development of active democratic citizenship. I make

this notation in consideration of the global trends that point towards newer forms of democratisation where democratic agency and reciprocity have become a renowned mark of these forms (Gould, 1990). The chapter also sets out a theoretical methodology of the maximal-minimal shifts in order to clarify the competing conceptions and their influence in cultivating democratic citizenship. The subsequent chapters provide a critical analysis of competing conceptions of democracy, freedom, human rights and their implications for development. Analysis of these themes provides a better ground for understanding citizenship.

Chapter Two discusses the competing conceptions of democracy and their roles in developing active citizenship. These conceptions refer to representative forms and participatory forms. The analysis shows that notions of representation and participation should not be understood simplistically for each of them contains a continuum of interpretation within itself. The analysis, while appreciating the strengths of extended forms of representation as presented by Pitkin (1996), ultimately settles for direct democracy because of its strong participatory and deliberative incentives, and their capacity to teach citizenship through participation. The chapter concludes that a maximal, participatory conception of democracy is more appropriate to citizenship education for strong democracy than a minimal, representative one.

I further suggest that the two competing conceptions need to be considered in terms of the freedoms and rights they allow for citizenship. Within this understanding, chapter three further explores a continuum within each of the concepts. This continuum also has relevance in understanding both minimal and maximal forms of citizenship. Nevertheless, the discussion settles on the republican conception as appropriate for developing active citizenship and considers the liberal conception as limiting, though providing a basic framework for democratic change. The chapter finally draws a parallel between republican

forms of freedom and dynamic conceptions of human rights, and argues that this combination is likely to promote active citizenship education. Formal concepts, on the other hand, do not move far enough towards developing the required dispositions for active citizenship, although they provide a basic framework for democratisation.

Chapter four addresses the relationship between development and democracy in the preparation for citizenship. Among other things, the chapter reveals the dichotomous way in which development, and citizenship education and democratisation, are associated in the Africa region - in Malawi in particular. This analysis stretches from a synopsis of this relationship in the first independent states of Africa, to current positions within the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The chapter further claims that the apparent dichotomy between development and democracy in citizenship education can be resolved using Amartya Sen's approach that understands 'freedom as development', thereby consolidating maximal notions of citizenship in participatory democracy with a republican notion of freedom and human rights.

Our last major chapter, Chapter Five, unpacks and analyses themes and approaches to citizenship education in Malawi in relation to the major themes of the conceptions of democracy, human rights, freedom and development that chapters two to four consider. In this chapter I proceed by considering the lack of proper citizenship education in the pre-independence period, and under the leadership of Dr. Banda. I also show that the equation of voter education to civic education as a whole in the first years of multi-party democracy is inadequate. In fact, I argue that the activities undertaken in this period in the name of citizenship education, while providing the required basic knowledge for democratic citizenship, fall short of providing adequate conditions for the cultivation of active democratic citizenship. I finally settle for a practise-based approach to citizenship

education in contrast to a sole concentration of the knowledge of the structures and constitution.

CHAPTER TWO

DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: REPRESENTATIVE AND /OR PARTICIPATORY

2.1 Introduction

In order to understand the challenges confronting citizenship and education for democratic citizenship in Malawi and to understand how best the concept of citizenship can be applied, we need to examine two competing conceptions of democratic theory. These are representative and participatory democracy. I make this consideration because the resurgence of the citizenship debate is a prominent theme in recent democratic theory. While my account in this dissertation aims at ultimately defending participatory models of democracy, representative and participatory democracy should not be simplistically contrasted. Some representative models, if properly conceived and used, can promote active citizenship. But, I shall argue that participatory modes of democracy are better positioned to promote active citizenship.

2.2 Representative democracy: an exploration

Mill (1996), among others, thinks that representative democracy is the most practical form of democracy; that in contemporary discourses of democracy, this form is obviously assumed to be the norm.⁵ Bearing in mind the prevalence of the democratic ideal, the assumption that representation is an obvious case when democracy is being considered

⁵ My starting point for this discussion is aware of the belief, among many scholars, that an exploration of democratic theory needs to pay serious attention to its historical development. However my passion for participatory democracy demands this particular approach so that the limitations of representation are made evident. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that direct and participatory democracy is the earliest form of democracy.

calls for serious critique. Other scholars like Giddens (1994, p.112) locate the theory of representative democracy within liberal democracy and liberal theory in general. Dahl traces the prevalence of the notion to the monarchical periods of the Swedish and the British (Dahl, 1989, p.29). According to Dahl (1989), representation referred to the non-democratic procedure in running the affairs of the state where a king or any monarch had the prerogative of summoning community representatives to give input to specific issues of government. It is further considered that the idea of representation saw its way into political systems with an extended meaning when monarchies were phasing out. Hence, the idea became associated with the enlargement of the people's right to vote (Bobbio, 1989), and an elected position became synonymous to 'representation'.

Dahl (1989) further notes, "... by joining the democratic idea of rule by the people to the non-democratic use of representatives, democracy started taking up a new form and dimension..." (p.29). Nevertheless, others see this transformation to the concept of representation as an introduction of an anti-democracy but one that is supported by the majority (Hirst & Khilmani, 1993, p.160), although that democratic representation was developed primarily to secure government from any single majority.

This historical foreground has, in our time, led to the perception that representative democracy means extending the people's rights to vote through universal suffrage. Hence democracy becomes associated primarily with electoral systems and political leadership. The historical development of representation has also shifted democracy from its classical domain of involving all citizens to a point where only a few are involved except in voting. This has led to the creation of autonomous institutions, like parliamentary, cabinet, interest groups, etc, as indispensable for a successful large-scale democracy (Dahl, 1989, p.30). Political parties and their competition for people's vote originate from this understanding.

2.2.1 Representative democracy's competing claims

Theoretical claims within representation can also be understood as lying in a maximal–minimal continuum, depending on the level of participation citizens are conceived to have. As such, representative forms stretch between high and low forms; between simple allowance to participate in the electoral vote to continuous and full citizen engagement in the running of the affairs of the state while the representatives mediate in order to arrive at final tangible decisions. Pitkin (1996) thinks that the different forms of representation are largely dependent on “... what is represented ... the nature of interests, welfare, or wishes ... capacities of representative and constituents, and the nature of issues the representative must deal with ...” (p.418). Pitkin argues that representation is less likely to be consultative when it concerns *a priori* decision making on what is good for citizens. If we use ‘Burkean’ representation, political representation becomes representation of interests not particular or special to any one person or group of persons such that the group defines this interest (ibid). Hence the representative acquires “... a superior elite of wisdom and reason ...” (Pitkin, p.419). On the other hand, the more one sees political issues as involving arbitrary and irrational choices, the more representation cannot proceed without consulting those for whom one is acting (ibid). In this case, the interests and wants of the people are perceived to be best definable by the people themselves. This understanding allows for more substantive representation.

‘Burkean’ representation is manifested in Schumpeter’s (1954) proposal that limits popular participation to periodic election of representatives, thereby promoting a formalistic understanding of representation. Representation is conceived as merely a “... system of arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people’s votes ...” (Schumpeter in Kariel, 1970, p. 17). This understanding stands over and against an assumed classical notion of representation, which

entertains that there should be a "...definite and rational opinion about every individual question in society..." (Mill, 1996, p.14). In this form of representation, people choose the representatives in order to effectively bring this will to its actualisation. On the other hand, Schumpeter (1954) claims that there is no commonly perceived sense of the good to the extent that what one sees as good has no guarantee of applying to another. Similarly, he discards as ridiculous the conception of an 'obvious good' that would also guide in making national policies.

Schumpeter's position relies on an assumed monistic interpretation of the classical understanding of the common good and society. Hence, the argument: "...different individuals and groups have varied conceptions of the good and are bound to conceive a common good differently..." (Schumpeter, 1954, p.15). According to him, we cannot determine or translate what the good means to every individual person. This stance leads to the abolition of 'general will' as presented in some contractual and democratic theorists.

Schumpeter's dominant assumptions create an elite democracy where the citizens only have the power to choose their representatives but have no power to effectively and substantively control them. Citizens hand over power of self-rule to their representatives through the vote; and once chosen, the leaders will only quit office when voted out in a follow-up general election. Therefore, Schumpeter's democracy is:

...a political *method*, ... a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political–legislative and administrative–decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions ... (Schumpeter, 1957, p.242)

Schumpeter's democracy becomes a tool for deciding questions of leadership of government. Hence democracy's value lies in it being a method only and not an end in itself or a way of life (see by contrast Dewey, 1970).

A connection can be drawn between Schumpeter's ideal of democracy and his economic theories. Schumpeter's economic theory favours market or capital monopoly and not liberal market competition. He thinks that monopolistic practices in the economy are good because they are the seedbeds of innovation and new products (Schumpeter, 1957, Chapter VIII: Monopolistic Practices, pp. 87–106). Although he acknowledges that competition is always imperfect in both spheres of life (p.271), he thinks that when competition in politics is associated with competition for a free vote, democracy becomes justified. But then the competition is *primarily* a drive to get a monopoly of the votes from the electorate so that one becomes elected as a democratic leader.

Democracy through Schumpeter's eyes becomes 'clientele democracy'. In this democracy, the politician has his or her goods through which s/he seeks to satisfy the customers, the electorate. But understanding democracy from this perspective would introduce difficulties in considering the level of personal freedom citizens enjoy in relation to their political arrangements and the level of civic engagement in public matters, except for those periods designated for the political mechanism of ruler-selection. Such a 'clientele democracy' is void of a common good, except for the apparent smooth operation of the system. People are individualised, each in one's own pursuance of selfish goals; and the leader and the electorate become juxtaposed. Furthermore, while the citizens in their masses cannot rationally aggregate their wishes into some common good to stand as a beacon light of policy, it can be deduced that those vying for positions of leadership either have the capacity to see the much needed direction that the rest need, or that what these leaders think is by itself good, something to be pursued by the whole group (Schumpeter, in Kariel, 1970, p.15). The view controversially assumes different levels of rationality between people, a denial of humanity to the electorate despite the truth that goodness is perceived differently between individuals.

In relation to citizenship education, Schumpeter's views would be taken to mean that we need to place enough emphasis on leadership qualities and skills in the process of educating the citizens. Our citizenship education among others would include such features as: the electoral process, legislation conditioning the electoral process, positions of leadership and required duties, conditions for such positions in clear distinction to the ruled or the followers. As a way of clearly marking the roles of leadership and general citizenship, a Schumpeterian format of education is also very likely to promote people's knowledge of their human rights, constitutions, and other judicial procedures. These are the bases on which success or lack of success for people chosen into positions of power would be assessed! A Schumpeterian education draws some similarity with Plato's proposal for the training of 'philosopher kings' in distinction to the education of the masses. Schumpeter's education for citizenship would only be for the leaders, who in his mind bear the torch of light.

Similarly, Schumpeter can also be thought of as proposing the idea that citizens need not meddle in politics, the daily running of the state, except when they have to choose a representative. Democracy is reduced to democratic choice of leaders as citizens are called in only periodically. What makes this type of democracy limited in terms of Pitkin's framework is the fact that citizens are not engaged in running their own political affairs except in determining who wins in the race for political leadership. The common citizen and his or her capacities are not trusted enough to let them run their own civic affairs. This view leaves the politician with the capability and hopefully the public trust to conceive and construct what may be good to all the citizens.

Mill's (1996) idea of representation, on the other hand, accommodates citizen capacity to formulate political opinions and make decisions through continuous citizen engagement in political issues beyond the ballot. His initial proposal offers a form of government where

every member of society takes some part in the running of such a government. He argues that it is only by personal participation that "...the rights and interests of every, or any persons are secure from being disregarded..." (p.336). Participation forms one of the basic means of ensuring that what one wants is achieved and protected. Secondly, he argues that such involvement or participation tends to increase a person's capacity to exercise one's rights and interests thereby also increasing the range and level of participation.

According to Mill (1996), some of the merits of this citizen engagement in society include defeating tendencies to selfishness. By promoting the interests of the whole one would see to it that one's interests are also cared for. Mill argues: "... by their own hands *only* (italic mine) can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out..." (Mill, p.337). In other words, people can avoid social injustices and crime by jointly creating and participating in a free society of equals. In fact, he emphasizes "...the participation of all as the ideally perfect conception of free government..." (p.338).

Mills' illustration of a contented character as opposed to an uncontented character clearly illustrates this understanding. The contented spirit takes pride in achieving a specific status in life and wants to keep the attained status. As result, this spirit stagnates at one position and rarely moves forward because there is "...no ambition to make any one else happier, to promote the good of their country or their neighbourhood, or to improve themselves in moral excellence ..." (Mill, p.339). The uncontented spirit, on the other hand, is engaged in life for the sake of improving itself and others. "... Thus, the active, self-helping character is not only intrinsically the best, but is the likeliest to acquire all that is really excellent or desirable" (p.340). Mill's understanding promotes active people's capacities and faculties as they continuously struggle against limitation and barriers in life towards some desired good. Such engagement of the faculties does not only lead to the achievement of the desired goals, but also improves the faculties used to reach the desired goal. Hence

participation educates! No wonder Mill (1996) also thinks that "... people who think it is a shame when anything goes wrong – who rush to the conclusion that the evil could and ought to have been prevented, are those who, in the long run, do most to make the world better..." (ibid).

The inactivity of mind and of aspiration that bothers Mill can lead a government to be complacent about its duties to the citizens; hence no improvement happens. Elite governments are naturally at home with passive citizens because the elite's status quo is less put to a challenge. Alternatively, properly democratic states that recognise and practise the equality of citizen should promote an active citizenship, which means perpetual dissatisfaction with any status quos. Such dissatisfaction remains meaningful to the extent that engaged citizens see it within themselves to improve life and not to expect others as more entitled to assist them improve their life. Mill (1996) conclusively states, "... any government that can satisfy the needs of the social state is the one where the whole participate, ... and that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow, and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable, than the admission of all to share in the sovereign power of the state ..." (P. 342). Nevertheless, his position is ridden with some ambiguities on such things as: at what point can a person meaningfully participate? Who decides on what people will participate in?

Despite the elaborate explanations of the nature of personal continuous participation in affairs that concern one and the merits thereof, Mill does not believe that such participation is practicable because of the large sizes of modern populations. This creates the necessity for a representative system of government. At this point, Mill alters his concept of what a perfect government is. He uses the same phrases in defences of the participation and representation simultaneously (see Mill, 1996, pp.336 & 342). Hence, it is difficult to say

Mill believes in the beneficial consequences of a popular government except when you aggregate. He insists that sovereign power in society needs to be vested in the entire aggregate of the community. But aggregational processes are not so much interested in the processes as in the ultimate results. Mill's use of the aggregational concept leaves the much deserved concept of popular government to a body of representatives chosen by all the people through which all people are seen to take charge of their government for what he refers to as better execution (Mill, p.342-344). Nevertheless, Mill's (1986) representative system is only a bridge between government machinery and the general will of the people, as the representative ensures that "...every interest and shade of opinion is passionately represented..." (Chapter v).

Mill's conceptual framework has serious implications in an educational context. In the first place, his insistence on participation as a factor for the improvement of moral and intellectual faculties of the person directs to the idea of local participation of members of society as good for their own social and moral development. This reasoning further implies that teaching and learning of democratic citizenship needs to be grounded in practice. In fact one would need to know democracy and democratic citizenship by experiencing and living it at local level before bringing this practice to a wider horizon. The participation of citizens in government develops an active character and promotes the good management of society as a whole. Mill's proposal calls for commitment on all stakeholders (see Mill, 1996, p.350-355).

Despite the educative strengths in Mill's representative model, Pitkin (1967 & 1996) presents a competitive format of citizen engagement in representation that is also substantive. Pitkin believes that both the representative and those to be represented are independent and rational persons. As such, each of the two sides in their own right and capacity is capable of independent action and judgement. In other words, representation

does not mean the represented are incapable of independent judgement and action in the running of their public affairs. Political representation therefore takes on the notion of *'taking care of'*. This idea of representation demands that the process of representation be characterised with reasons that people may have for a particular objective or objection in their political processes. Conversely, it also means that the represented should be able to see why their representative would want to represent them in a particular way should there be some difference. In other words, it is not in the interest of substantive representation to have the wishes of the two groups, representative and represented, always at odds (Pitkin, 1996, p.418).

Pitkin's substantive concept of representation strikes a balance between the power and capacities of the representative and those of the people being represented. While the representative in the process of representation is neither an expert nor a complete brute, "...who merely consults and reflects without (personally) acting..." (p.419), "...the people on the other hand are not like helpless children who simply have to be helped without seeking their substantial input..." (p.421). Substantive political representation does not necessarily require a genius or an elite because such a person would not see the need to consult before representing the will of the people. In fact Pitkin (1966) is of the view that political issues do not present themselves in black and white thereby demanding easy answers that could be delivered without listening to the other party. Political issues are by their very nature controversial (see also Rawls, 1971, Young, 1990). Because of the bargaining, compromise and conflict involved in all political issues, Pitkin proposes that the representative must pursue his constituents' interest in a manner at least responsive to their wishes, and that conflict between them must be justifiable in terms of that interest (p.420). In relation to the differences between local and national interests in representation, she proposes that "...local and partial interests should not be ruthlessly overridden and

sacrificed in the name of the nation; neither should the local and partial interests outweigh the needs and interests of the nation as a whole...” (p.422).

In Pitkin’s understanding, it can further be drawn that when it comes to representation the two interests are not necessarily antagonistic just because they arise from two different perspectives of society. The conflict between the local and the national is only apparent. Quite subtly, Pitkin looks at representation from a holistic perspective. Other than considering representation from the commonsensical perspective of an individual representing a particular society or group of people by presenting a particular view or objective, she considers political representation as involving the whole public in its many complex ways of life or social arrangements. The “...overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people ...” (p.425) become the centre of representation. Substantive representation takes the heart of the people’s wishes and blends them into national interests and goals. The role of the representative becomes that of safeguarding the public interest.

Pitkin’s format of substantive representation can be regarded as more usable in school governing bodies because of the dual authority she gives to both the representative and the represented. But what makes substantive representation crucial, in Pitkin’s view, is the place and role that it gives to the general public, otherwise also referred to as the masses. All the citizens are ideally given space to participate in running the affairs of their government by maintaining continuous influence on what the representative will represent them on and how, whenever such issues arise. This representation gives the masses a chance to be informed or become educated on how the whole political system operates. Government actions and affairs become their affairs too. The development of people’s capacities to state, reason about and defend their wishes; to communicate what they want; to negotiate their wishes amongst themselves and between themselves and the

representative, become some of the important objectives of citizenship education that is meant to foster representative democracy.

Can representation achieve what it promises to deliver? The above analysis shows that representative models of democracy exist in a continuum, consisting of both low and high forms of citizen participation. Schumpeter's elite representation does not give as much space to the citizens in general as it gives the elite leaders. The general public participates only in terms of choosing their leaders and thereafter the leaders engage in continuous decision making processes in the public life of the state or country. On the other hand, substantive representation allows for full citizen control of representatives by the general public. This involves citizens choosing what issues to discuss and actual discussion of issues that affect them. In other cases, citizens maintain effective influence over their representative (Mill, Pitkin). Models of representation that allow for extensive citizen participation in their affairs do not, nevertheless, succeed in resolving the dilemma that exists between which roles one can ascribe to representatives and which ones can be ascribed to the represented, in the whole political process. Given that there is more public participation, will the representatives be reduced to mere conduits of the people's will or will they still apply their rational judgment over the issues the citizens have already decided upon? Pitkin keeps the representatives and the represented in tandem. In this arrangement, problems are likely to arise in cases where the citizens are not prepared to express their will to the representatives. And as such the level of participation distinguishing the representative from the represented is something not definitively settled.

2.3 The case for participatory forms of democracy

Despite the promises of participation that one finds in extended forms of representation, I claim that representative approaches to citizenship education are not sufficiently proactive. Barber (1984) for instance, accuses representation of making the voter free only on the day that he or she casts the vote. Beyond the ballot, the citizen enjoys less control of the democratic system, thereby faring badly in terms of teaching citizens freedom (Barber, p.145). In general practice, representative systems rarely seek for continuous citizen consent in the governing system, giving the impression that "... the instant a people allows itself to be represented, it loses its freedom ..." (Barber, {quoting Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, book 3, chap. 15}, *ibid*). This view claims that once people have been legitimately represented through the ballot, it is as if they have also surrendered their freedom through the imminent representation. The people are reduced to the level of abstract personhood, characterized by legal and electoral equity (p.146). Such a conception omits the other crucial factors that shape and give meaning to human life such as the social and communal ties that exist between individuals in society. To that extent, Barber thinks the conception predominant in representative democracy is also incompatible with social justice because it robs people of their freedom and equality.

Calls for participation of citizens in affairs that affect them have at times been considered as nostalgia for the past, especially for the ancient Greek city states and their way of politics. Nevertheless, current participatory theorists do not conceive participation from this perspective. Instead, participation has largely been considered as a challenge to the liberal tradition's over-protection of individual autonomy in public affairs (Gutman, 1995, p.411). Gutman considers low voter turnout and the acceleration of corruption and public non-accountability as direct results of limited and inadequate political understanding and information that representative forms offer to citizens (*ibid*). According to this

understanding, representative forms of democracy shift focus from making politics an issue of all to being an issue of a privileged few. The masses on the other hand look at politics with disdain and as something that has to be avoided if one wants to concentrate on one's development.

The avoidance of politics and direct participation in politics by the citizens is much to citizens' own disadvantage. Direct citizen participation in the political increases the citizens' understanding of politics and their political system. This increases their level of participation (Gutman, p.411). Thus, politics does not remain too complex to be the domain of ordinary citizens anymore. Once the barriers to political knowledge are removed, the assumed complexities of politics become the *habitus* of all the people in society. Nevertheless, I use Gutman's notion of political participation not to imply a simplistic understanding of politics. Far from it, all politics is complex otherwise it becomes an administration of the public. Barber (1984) neatly brings home this sense of politics when he argues:

... The need for politics arises when some *action of public* consequence becomes *necessary* and when men (women, addition mine) must make a *public choice* that is *reasonable* in the face of *conflict* despite the *absence of an independent ground* of judgment... (Barber, 1984, p.122, emphasis original).

Politics is distinguished from other realms when people have to make decisions and act on issues that do not only have a bearing on the individual but also on the whole group. Its decisions and actions necessarily become public. In addition, issues become political when they can neither be black nor white, in the sense that there are no easy answers until all the people have a negotiated understanding of how reasonable choices to all could be arrived at. The moment that such issues are sorted by a ground of judgment that the people have opted for in their particular circumstances, such issues lose their political characteristics

(Barber, 1984). Barber's re-definition of politics necessarily becomes democratic and participatory. The stress that conflict between reasonable choices marks the political necessitates a continuous process of political negotiation. Through this process participants acquire knowledge of themselves and their political life (see Barber, pp. 122-131). Barber's argument concludes that it is only strong democracy of a participatory mode that offers the basic conditions of political life (op.cit., p.121). The concept of 'strong democracy' has a number of far reaching implications for other central themes in conceptualising citizenship such as issues of autonomy, which this dissertation discusses in the following chapter.

Pitkin's (1996) line of argument (above) is wrongly understood and labelled as a matter of representation, substantive or not. In fact she defends participation primarily and holds that political issues lie in the intermediate range where questions about action involve both facts and value commitments; both ends and means; thereby making the political a "...combination of bargaining and compromise, and common deliberation about public policy, to which facts and rational argument are relevant..." (Pitkin, 1996, pp.419-420). The nature of political matters as described by Pitkin leads more to the conclusion that we cannot leave political matters to experts because much as there are no black and white demarcations in that which is political (Barber, 1984, pp120-3), such issues also involve values that we hold dear to ourselves. This is more the reason why individuals need to represent their own ideas and values; hence the need for direct citizen participation in politics.

The ideal of participation has several merits in a democratic government (see also section 2.2 above). In the first place participation creates the conditions under which self-development will take place. According to Mill (1996) people are better protected and safe when they endeavour to protect themselves and depend on their own capacities than they would be by relying on others. Mill states: "... by their own hands only can any positive

and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out..." (op. cit., p.337). The desire to keep moving, to accomplish new things for ourselves and for others result from our speculative and practical talent. Hence, Mill (1996) regards three varieties of mental excellence as a fruit of active effort. These mental excellences refer to the intellectual, practical and moral capacities (op. cit., p.338). According to this understanding, only those characters that struggle with natural obstacles in a drive to reach fresher heights improve human life. The active and the energetic are better positioned to promoting the advantage of each individual member of community as well as their own advantage. Citizen political participation that assumes the activity of all members of society is similarly better placed for the improvement of the members' own faculties. Participation educates!

The concept of participation as an ideal of citizen engagement in civic affairs is also central in republican formulations of democratic citizenship. The republican version considers participation from two points of views. On the one hand, individual members' participation is conceived as an end in itself and is equated with public order, the public good (Kymlicka, 2002, pp.294-312). This view holds that participation is itself good. Participation becomes the desired end of every society and the wish of every citizen in society. Hence, teaching citizens to get involved with their political life leads them to achieve their own desired end. Therefore, traditional republican theory or Aristotelian Republicanism as Kymlicka (2002) calls it, holds that participation in the public is good in itself, and the goal of all activity. On the other hand, non-participation becomes a sign of unfulfilled and incomplete civic life on the part of the citizens.

On the other hand, Kymlicka (2002) argues that 'modern republicanism' conceives participation as neither constitutive of public order nor valuable in itself. Participation is an extrinsic good, directing members of society to achieve the intrinsic good for which they

are members of society. Modern republicanism emphasizes a strong civic character and public spirit, and the willingness of citizens to join in union as one state. The republican active citizenship embraces all the aspect of public life, and promotes both the individual and the group. Participation is a crucial factor for the cultivation of public virtue or civility.

This dissertation defends a preference for democratic participation as a means to certain civil goods. The conception that “participation equals democracy” is a dangerous position because not all participation amounts to democracy; otherwise ethnic cleansing could have been democratic for masses have participated in this for a long time in history. Democratic participation is different from other forms of participation for it only meets that criterion within democratic conditions such as freedom, equality and others. As such, the teaching of political involvement as an end in itself is not a viable alternative. The idea of participation as having an extrinsic value, on the other hand, enables participating citizens to acquire civility and other virtues that hold society together and make human life meaningful (see Kymlicka, *ibid*). Teaching citizens the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that are expected from a republican citizen enables the citizen to play an active role in political debates and decision-making (Kymlicka, 2002, Miller, 2000, Crick, 2000, pp.343–346). This education enables citizens to participate in order to cultivate civility and other virtues and also enables them to advance in self-development.

The idea and practice of direct citizen participation has been the major bone of contention between those advocating representative democracy and advocates of direct democracy⁶. National programmes of democratisation, for instance, have in many cases uncritically taken direct democracy to be impossible simply because of large populations in nations. Kayambazinthu, Chirwa and Kanyongolo (2004) writing on Malawi, argue that

⁶ Direct Democracy refers to a system of government where all citizens are assumed to participate directly in all processes that concern their government (see Chirwa, C., Kanyongolo, E., & Kayambazinthu, E. 2004, p.92). Its theoretical expositions date back to ancient Greek democracy. In modern day, it is regarded to be the *modus operandi* of small associations and clubs

participatory democracy is not possible because it requires everyone to have a say in major governance issues. According to this view, expecting participatory democracy from current nations would either make democracy more expensive than it already is or it would lead to national chaos (p.93). This view is similar to other views from Mill (1996) and others, who despite acknowledging the merits of participation think that modern populations and economies make participatory democracy virtually impossible.

Contrary to the above perceptions, advocates of direct democracy consider widespread democratic participation possible. In the first case, citizens can actually take part in all major decisions in a state through perpetual referenda, contrary to claims made above. One way to achieve this is to remove parties or any mediating agents or advisory bodies and to let people discuss and decide on issues that affect them in the way they affect them (see Budge, 1994, p.23). Budge's proposal for this way of conducting direct democracy is problematic despite its promotion of the equality of citizens and their capability to handle their own affairs. Critics dismiss this model because of its inherent capability to create social chaos.

The most competitive and challenging form of republicanism is 'Modern Republicanism'. This form teaches direct democracy where parties exist but they are only left with the role of mediation while the whole citizenry subjects legislative bills and other political decisions to popular vote (Budge, 1993, p.24). Budge's (1993) reasoning is set against representation's contestation that in many cases popular majorities are too weak and shifting to offer a basis for a permanent executive; that most of the citizens are unqualified, ill informed, apathetically orientated to engage in high policy matters and the everyday political decisions (p.27-28). While this may not be the case with all representative forms, it can still be maintained that representation usually disengages the majority, as the leaders are perceived to be properly running the affairs of the state. Budge holds, "...extension of

opportunities will itself change the political nature of many citizens from apathy and lack of interest, which produce withdrawal and ignorance, to involvement and interest, which produce more sophistication and information...” (p.33). Budge’s direct democracy implies that knowledge is not the preserve of experts. No barrier exists between groups of populations barring one from full political participation. As such, political ignorance is not static because people’s engagement in debate makes them more knowledgeable. Nevertheless, Budge’s conceptualisation of participatory democracy misses out on deliberation in preference for plebiscites.

The limitations that critics of participatory democracy are worried about could, to a large extent, be answered by extending the participatory realm to include extensive deliberation of all people. Recent participatory notions of deliberative democracy (Benhabib, 1996) and communicative democracy (Young, 1996) suggest a way forward to a strong democratic citizenship. Benhabib (1996, pp.68-70) focuses on democracy as legitimate when all concerned people are capable of reaching reasonable decisions. In her view, decisions affecting the well-being of a group should be seen as the outcome of free and reasoned deliberation among equals, within principles of equality and symmetry for all to initiate speech, interrogate and debate (p.70). The agenda is that which is open to all and there are no prior rules guiding the conversation except those the deliberating members form. Benhabib’s framework can be used to defend deliberative democracy as a way of building a strong citizenship education. Her proposal accommodates a broader public across difference. This understanding is similar to Barber’s conception of ‘publicness’ where community is defined and conditioned by the people’s deliberations in refusal of a priori constructions (Barber, p.133). Teaching democratic citizenship, therefore, would involve instilling into the citizens an awareness and exercise of their power to collectively consider what is good for them, to reason and discuss as equal moral and political agents. Those

who enter into deliberation are all those likely to be affected by the very process and content of the deliberation.

Young (1996) however extends this model to include forms of communication and how these influence the inputs and outcomes of the deliberative democratic culture. In her view, representative democracy is interest-based and aggregates preferences without allowing sufficient discursive interaction between the citizens. Aggregation in representative democracy does not really result in decisions reasonably acceptable to all members, except the majority. Young's (1996) extension of the deliberative model to include norms of conversation requires an equal voice for all citizens to make proposals and criticize them in an attempt to draw conclusions on the basis of a better argument. By adding *greeting*, *rhetoric* and *storytelling* to critical argument, Young hopes to arrive at true democratic communication that does not only engage deliberation in forms that are assertive, confrontational and masculine (Young, 2000). The communicative forms of democracy are especially more relevant to African democracies and Malawi for that matter, because narration and greeting, among others, speak more to Africa's daily patterns of traditional life, which have also been predominant in people's ways of life for ages.

Other than considering modes of communication that are impediments to democratic participation, Young (1990) is more sympathetic to representation as she reconsiders (substantive) group difference and how more space for participation can be created through the interactions of diverse groups. In her view, the notions of substantive group representation endorse a politics of difference and reconfigure the meaning of equality to incorporate substantive equality. Group difference promotes a positive group self-definition, which further emancipates the group's value and specificity. This standpoint enables all people and groups to criticise prevailing norms and institutions from an egalitarian perspective (p.167). Young (1990) also argues that recognition of group

difference assures procedural fairness in setting the public agenda and hearing about its items. Secondly, it assures a voice for the oppressed as well as the privileged; all the needs and interests in the public are recognized in democratic deliberations. Thirdly, it encourages the expression of individual and group needs and interests in terms of an appeal to justice, thereby promoting just outcomes as it maximizes the social knowledge expressed in discussion. This further promotes practical wisdom (pp.185-187). Young's understanding of the incorporation of group difference into the way democracy operates promises to thwart the perceived dominance of elites or powerful societal groups. In fact, the recognition, affirmation and celebration of group identities should also be understood as better promoted within liberal democratic values (Macedo, 2003, p.414)

Nevertheless, such an affirmation for the group difference of groups that should be internally democratic, and the requirement for their permanent structural representation in democratic decision-making structures is not propaganda for representative democracy, as it might sound (see Young, 2000, p.45). She proposes a de-centred model of deliberative democracy where the democratic process will be given normative and rational meaning by a perpetual communication and not simply because of its identification with an institution or a set of institutions (p.46). In this process:

...there is no final moment of decision, such that the democratic forum can itself come under review. The norm-guided communicative process of open and public democracy occurs across wide distances and over long times, with diverse social sectors speaking to one another across difference of perspective as well as space and time. (Young, 2000, p.46)

Young's view of communicative democracy and its recognition of difference provides more enabling conditions for the active participation of citizens in their diversity. While this view ensures collective empowerment, collective decision-making resulting from free

and equal deliberation and group veto power regarding specific policies that affect groups directly, it is also likely to teach citizens to recognize, acknowledge and tolerate group differences. As such, teaching citizenship according to communicative and deliberative models is more likely to open up a diverse array of political expressions and engagement between all concerned citizens in order for them to deliberate on all matters of concern until a right course agreeable to all concerned citizens is discovered. Hence, such forms are also better positioned to promote active democratic citizenship.

The labours to cultivate and achieve a strong democratic citizenship as argued by Budge, Benhabib and Young demand more than just a clear conception of participatory and deliberative democracy. The pursuance and maintenance of any democratic culture has globally been marked against specific benchmarks. The most crucial of these benchmarks include the level and extent to which people's freedoms and rights are promoted and protected. In the following chapter, we take a look at what it means to teach democratic citizenship amidst these benchmarks. We examine the concepts of freedom and human rights as we also probe into the forms of freedoms and human rights that are most likely to promote the democratic agenda at hand, the cultivation of strong democratic and deliberative citizenship. The chapter further explores the ramifications of particular conceptions of freedom and human rights for national development and the whole concept of development.

CHAPTER THREE

FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we have mapped out competing conceptions of democracy. These conceptions are a foreground against which we can also understand notions of freedom and human rights. Notions of freedom and human rights have become contested in democratic theory, particularly with regard to how they help to promote or undermine participatory citizenships and the nature of the freedoms people enjoy. Conversely, the extent to which a society conceptualises and practices freedom and human rights is regarded as the litmus test for the extent to which such a society is seen as democratic and as promoting democratic citizenship. The level and extent of these freedoms and rights has a direct impact on the conception and practice of development. In this light, this chapter argues that not all conceptions of freedom and human rights promote active citizenship. Formal and abstract notions of freedom and human rights are very likely to promote passive citizenship; whereas contestatory notions are likely to promote active citizenship.

Some scholars have rated the goodness of democratic government against the proficiency of government in promoting the existing faculties of its members, such as the moral, intellectual and the active capacities. In this light, popular government is seen as that where a large number of the citizens in the nation have a stake and a say in the affairs of this government (Mill, 1996). Pettit (2002) consolidates this view by proposing: “the freedom of citizens can be furthered if steps are taken to curb state or public power over individuals and private power of interference by other agents” (p.152). Promoting capacities of members and curbing negative forces against the same faculties is understood as two sides

of the same thing. A government that promotes this sense of freedom is seen as good not just because people take part in the running of its affairs, but because such participation improves their own moral, intellectual and active faculties, and gives them an audible and powerful voice that enables them to articulate their common avowable interests, which in turn government needs to promote (Mill, 1996; Pettit, 2002, p.159). The people's sense of freedom takes them out into social action for the sake of their society. Similarly, a government would be rated as bad in terms of how it deteriorates the same faculties and freedoms of people to articulate their interests.

The above understanding gives governments one choice, i.e. to promote the welfare and interests of its citizens. These interests are secured when the interested persons *participate* in the protection and promotion of these interests. The process of actively securing one's interests is also a mark of one's freedom. Participation gives a sense of freedom that is central to political life for its dual emancipatory power. While participation is a way of liberating self, it is itself an act or exercise of freedom.

The promotion of the interest of the citizens has not taken a homogeneous path. Much as competing conceptions of democratic theory have implied varied and competing conceptions of citizen participation; this has influenced how democratic freedom is conceived and promoted. This chapter considers that a proper understanding of the concept and use of freedom is indispensable to the discourse of education for democracy and democratic citizenship and the teaching of democratic freedom. For the purpose of the argument in this dissertation, freedom and autonomy will be taken as equivalent.

3.2 Competing conceptions of autonomy

Freedom plays a crucial role in democratic theory. In the first place, freedom understood from representative perspectives has often led to notions of freedom as comprising the legal protection of individual rights; state or societal non-interference in individual projects of existence. Pogge (2002) describes this as a minimalist conception in the sense that it emphasises negative duties (p.64). The concentration on freedom as something that has to be protected in order for individuals simply to enjoy it ascribes to freedom general characterisations that are devoid of any social obligations and responsibilities and participation. This is contrary to maximalist expectations. The minimalist's dominant forms of education for democratic citizenship concentrate on freedom as a citizen's entitlement, to be provided for and protected by the state. Maximalist defenders think this approach largely misses out on freedom as empowerment towards social obligation because of the limited forms of citizen participation in civic affairs that are involved in it. In their regard, the maximalists acknowledge that human rights entail both negative duties and positive duties (Pogge, 2002). On the other hand, the maximalist agenda is also too extensive when it proposes, "... human rights require efforts to fulfil everyone's human rights anywhere on earth ..." (Pogge, *ibid*), thereby overstressing the freedom that accompanies social obligations.

The ambiguity and diversity in the notion of freedom, as shown above, can be attributed to the complexity and dynamism inherent in the concept itself. Dworkin (1991) argues that our understanding of freedom depends on the nature of problems and questions that confront us at the time that we are trying to understand freedom (p.359). Freedom has been understood variously: as positive (entitlement), as negative (restraint) and even as neutral. For instance Berlin (1996) distinguishes between positive and negative liberty. He understands negative freedom as a condition whereby individuals *can* act without being

obstructed by others. Berlin argues that negative freedom only becomes so in the face of human interference and not natural capacity or incapacity. (p.90-91). Negative freedom arises from the belief that human beings can advance their goals only when they are left to pursue them without any other interference. Berlin also considers positive freedom as an internal drive to originate and live one's wishes. According to him, positive freedom also involves the wish "to be conscious of oneself as a thinking, willing, active being bearing responsibility for one's choices and able to explain them by reference to one's own ideas and goals" (op. cit., p.94). On the other hand, Dworkin uses hypothetical consent in order to reconsider freedom as a person's capacity to form, revise and rationally pursue what he or she sees as good (op. cit., p.361-362).

Nevertheless, major debate on the concept of freedom surrounds the distinction between positive and negative freedom. The two concepts of liberty / freedom, although usually presented as opposed to each other, according to popular conception, operate on the basis of each other. For instance, if one were asked why one would not want others to influence or coerce one's actions in any way, one loose answer would be that the person wants to determine him/herself. Similarly, the capacity and will to live one's wishes would be in question if there were no influence from others. O'Neill (1992) exemplifies this conceptual interdependence through her examination of autonomy / freedom from a Kantian perspective. In this perspective, positive freedom is seen as 'independence from alien causes' (p.213). In other words, one cannot talk about positive freedom without some indication of the absence of external influences. Nevertheless, O'Neill's (1992) evaluation of Kantian autonomy points to the idea that such a conception only acts as a capacity indicator of all rational beings and "...takes too little account of human bonds and solidarity...", and the institutional and social settings that may affect our capacities (p.219). The interconnection between the positive and negative concepts of freedom means that

freedom is a relational concept. The two sides or perspectives operate to enhance each other.

Because of the centrality of issues of freedom in public action and life democratic discourse on freedom takes different forms and shapes, depending on the dominant and competing perspective of democratic order available. Every conception of freedom has its presupposed political order and vice versa. The examination of liberal notions of autonomy and republican ideas of freedom has a lot of bearing with regard to re-conceptualising active citizenship in Malawi. I will argue that contestatory and republican forms of freedom and human rights, which are also related to deliberative and participatory forms of democracy, provide better chances of developing active citizenship than do liberal conceptions of these key concepts.

3.2.1 Liberal conceptions of freedom and their limitations

Liberal conceptions of freedom provide favourable ground for a minimalist conception of citizenship. The liberal conception of freedom, (hereafter also referred to as autonomy liberalism) is a framework that puts emphasis on individual freedoms and rights and proposes that individual persons have the capacity to decide what they want, including the type of life that each may choose to lead (Kymlicka, 2000; Burtonwood, 2003; Boyte, 2003). This understanding of freedom evokes Berlin's positive freedom (see Pettit, 1999). In this understanding, one owes duties to oneself primarily, and not to society. In return society has no mandate to intervene in the exercise of people's personal autonomy and the making and implementation of their choices, except individuals' recognition of each other as equals entitled to freedom (Waldron, 1998).

Autonomy liberalism in general puts a greater emphasis on the rights of individual members of society. Such emphasis allows members of society to decide on what they want to do and the type of life they want to lead in society. The rights of individuals are an entitlement and not some benefit arising from the good will of leaders. Hence, when it comes to citizen –state or citizen –society relations, the state or society is not expected to interfere in the rightful possession and exercise of rights that individual members of the state or society claim to have, except when such possession harms or is likely to harm other people or the greater good in society. In other cases, state or societal interference in the possession and exercise of individual rights is allowed when such interference is meant to institute redress of rights not accorded to some members of state or society (Kymlicka, et. al.).

The kind of citizen envisaged in autonomy liberalism is one who safeguards one’s own rights and is at liberty to exercise one’s rights, within the framework of freedom of thought. But such values of freedom of thought can also be fulfilled when one becomes critical of all surrounding authority. Autonomy liberalism is committed to individualism in the sense that in all social and political considerations, it is the individual person whose interests and considerations matter. Pogge (2002) thinks that negative freedom is promoted only as a way of driving at and protecting the individual freedoms people are supposed to have (p.64). The emphasis on the supremacy of individuality arises from a recognition of the capacity individual human beings have to direct their affairs and their capacity to recognize each other as equals in the same capacities (Waldron, 1998). As such freedom becomes a mark of their equality. Similarly, autonomy liberalism perceives political participation as valuable only when it enhances the individuals, otherwise requiring individual participation intrudes into individual freedoms. When individuals participate, they do so on their own liking and not that this participation is a social pre-requisite. Hence, it would be reasonable

to argue that autonomy liberalism is likely to promote limited forms of civic engagement just as minimalist virtues are suspicious of widespread civic involvement (McLaughlin, 1992, p.236).

Citizenship education that is framed in line with autonomy liberalism is likely to concentrate on the teaching of people's rights and awareness of these democratic rights and entitlements. In other words, political knowledge of democratic principles and constitutional affairs and knowledge of individual rights become more valued than enabling citizens to acquire the skills and dispositions necessary for a democratic culture. In autonomy liberalism, citizenship becomes more a private issue than it is a public issue. In other words, citizens are seen as fulfilling their civic duties when they engage in the promotion and protection of the values that are central to individual human living rather than societal life as such. In particular, this understanding places greater emphasis on individual rights than on social and political obligations.

3.2.2 Republican conceptions of freedom

Whereas conceptions of freedom in autonomy liberalism have the tendency of promoting low civic engagement among citizens, republican conceptions of freedom enable participation and engagement from the citizens (Kymlicka, 2002). The republican notion of freedom is embedded in the ideal of active citizen participation. Nevertheless, republican freedom varies in emphasis, between the Aristotelian republicans and the modern republicans. Aristotelian republicanism advocates participation as the goal and end of all political involvement while modern republicanism regards participation as important for the cultivation of civic virtues.

Pettit (1999 and 2002) thinks that republican freedom comes into effect when individuals are not interfered with in relation to what they want to realize in their life; and that these individuals are also in a state of non-domination. This understanding of freedom relates to the condition that empowers people in their assertion of their perceived interests. Without over-stretching the two sides of freedom as dichotomous, it is possible for different perspectives to consider freedom largely from a negative perspective, in terms of being *free from*, while others concentrate on the positive perspective in terms of being *free to*. Pettit (1999) thinks that certain forms of freedom can be inimical to democratic freedom and education for democracy itself. He argues that it is difficult to defend a conception of positive or negative liberty from a simplistic point of view. In other words, the conception of freedom *as freedom from* and *freedom to something* is a narrow understanding of freedom within democratic discourse.

Pettit argues that a consideration of freedom as negative liberty or as positive liberty does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that issues of individual liberty are necessarily issues of or in democracy. Discourse on the concepts and applicability of the notions of negative freedom and positive freedom can apply to any system or way of life apart from the democratic way of life (Pettit, 1999, p.168). The two concepts of liberty, although they provide a break through to understanding issues surrounding human freedom, do not, on their own, provide a stable basis for understanding democratic freedom. Using Berlin's notion of the two concepts of liberty, Pettit further argues that negative freedom is problematic in the sense that it presupposes absence of coercive government law to the extent that government itself cannot coercively reform its own law in line with some democratic principles. Nevertheless, he thinks that it is possible to have legislation that is friendly to people's freedom when such laws represent what the people want and that this is also a reflection of their interests. Pettit actually gives room for legislation that may be

coercive in the democratic framework. In other words legislation has a chance to be people friendly when it promotes the perceived interests of the people and in so far as it does not violate or compromise that same liberty it purports to defend and promote (Pettit, 1999, p.171). Pettit (2002) later suggests: "...democratic institutions must have a positive-and-identity dimension, and a negative scrutiny-and-disallow dimension..." (p.159). This thinking arises from the belief that in a democracy citizens need to have an audible and powerful voice through which they search and uphold their avowed interests in life. The same voice should enable the citizens to scrutinise government policy and disallow those policies that are seen not to promote their avowed interests.

This notion of freedom has a social dimension in the sense that aspects of non-interference and non-domination put one in the context of relation with other people. The recognition of the social condition that can exist between people and their environment makes republican freedom contestatory (Pettit, 1999). Such an approach would insist on teaching citizens an overlapping set of virtues from an overlapping set of institutions (Kymlicka. p.310). This approach would eventually enable parliamentary democracy to become more deliberative than being aggregational on party lines. The contestatory forms would in turn require all government decisions to become open to public inspection and reason (Pettit, p.193). Contestatory forms of republican freedom are more conducive to the cultivation of active citizens than liberal conceptions by allowing citizens to realize their avowable interests.

The republican notion of freedom that conceives freedom as 'non-domination and non-interference' (Van Parijs, p. 191), is nevertheless not conducive to the education of democratic active citizens. Van Parijs thinks that the idea of non-domination and non-interference falls short of stipulating itself in an affirmative sense. Similarly, our conception of social responsibilities and obligations, which are central to the conception and operation of a project for democratic citizenship and education for participatory

citizenship, would not easily be drawn from such negative conceptions of freedom. This thinking also holds that it is on the basis of some positive notions that we can build appropriate conceptions of autonomy (Smith, 1997). The making of personal choices goes hand in hand with circumstances that oblige individuals or groups to make such options (see also Wringer, 1997, p.123). It is a freedom that is lived and negotiated through people's social 'envirning'. Similarly, Smith (1997) quoting Benhabib (1992, p.81) defends a sense of autonomy that gives people "...a say in the economic, political and civic arrangements, which define their lives together..." (p.136).

Is democratic freedom 'non-domination', 'contestatory', or really a third sense of the notion of freedom? Re-reading Berlin's (1996) account of positive freedom shows that what Pettit and others would prefer to call a third sense is not that different from positive freedom itself. The latter are worried that positive freedom as explained by Berlin does not take into full consideration the self-determination and self-mastery required of a positive notion of freedom. Most of them think that such a concept does not completely bring out the sense of freedom as absence of domination. It is as if the two concepts of liberty in Berlin are in a disjuncture, and that positive freedom itself leaves the way too open for totalitarianism! Nevertheless, my impression is that Berlin's notion of positive freedom can be read beyond what it apparently appears to be, to include self-mastery as well as a recognition that freedom cannot be achieved if one is being prevented from choosing what one desires by other people (Berlin, p. 94-95).

From the preceding, positive freedom is both self-masterly and non-domination. The emphasis on non-domination does not only mean that people be considered severally or distributively but also that 'the politically avowable and perceived interests' of the minority groups be accorded similar recognition and treatment (Pettit, 1999, p.178; 2002, pp157-160). The architects of the classical liberal tradition cannot agree to the later interpretation

of the notion of freedom as part of their own. In a way, the third sense of freedom in Pettit's two discussions, or Kymlicka's call for redress of the rights of minority groups, as some of the central notions of the concept of freedom, belong more to the republican tradition than the liberal autonomy tradition.

The central notions in republican freedom are essentially both participatory and deliberative. The idea of freedom as non-domination and non-interference means that in the democratic process all people have a capacity to initiate and participate in any of their discussions. No single person or group holds a privileged position in relation to the other. As such, issues of discussion and the manner in which these things are discussed are matters of public agreement at the moment of discourse. Hence Pettit argues: "...contestatory democracy empowers people in the assertion of their perceived interests..." (p.193). An education system that encourages public deliberation and reasonableness is crucial to the cultivation of republican notions of freedom. This understanding makes democracy a government by contestation by all members of society. Hence democracy intrinsically becomes "freedom-friendly" (ibid).

The notion and exercise of republican freedom embraces what Kymlicka (2002) calls civility. But, acknowledging the need for the cultivation of civility and actual practice of civility are two different but interdependent things. While it is not in the main interest of this dissertation to explain and justify how republican freedom can in practice be promoted, it is important that we outline what such a project would look like. Kymlicka (2002, pp 302 -312) in his discussion of "the seedbeds of civic virtue" comes to conclude that such a virtue can be inculcated through the market place, civic associations, and the family among others (p.304). Nevertheless, Kymlicka argues that no single institution would bear upon itself as the sole vehicle for the teaching of republican freedom. The interplay of all institutions in society brings about civic freedom (ibid).

3.2.3 Cultivating freedom for active citizenship

Participatory models of democracy, while cherishing the need for the fundamentals around freedom such as legal enforcement, proceed to concentrate on issues of civic responsibility and obligation for the realisation and promotion of freedom as part of the exercise of one's freedom. Such realisations are more possible where the participation in question is accompanied with republican notions of freedom. In this perspective, freedom does not become so much of an entitlement or a state provision that has to be jealously guarded, as it becomes an act of social engagement in the affairs of society. Freedom becomes a virtue that has to be socially cultivated. Sandel's (1996) conception of republican freedom becomes authoritative in this regard. According to him, republican freedom is crucial for active participation because other than sharing in self-government, it also means, "...deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political economy..." (p.5). This type of civic engagement also requires "...a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake..." (ibid). Such a positioning of the shared sense of freedom requires civic virtues and values that can better sustain self-government.

The above discussion has tried to bring out an age-old confrontation and tension between a formal realization of freedoms on the one hand, and substantive realization of the same (Bell, 1993, pp.2-3). Such a debate is situated within the reformulation of the liberal theory between the classical theorists such as Mill and its critics such as Rawls, and recently of Pettit. The debate also alludes to the idea that it is one thing to have formal recognition of the rights, freedoms and entitlements; and it is quite another thing to demand that these rights, freedoms and entitlements be realized in actual life (Pogge, 2002, p.62). This

position leads to substantive realization of these values in people's lives. Contestatory and participatory forms of freedom accommodate basic freedoms in so far as their background enables individuals to exercise their powers of self-determination, which is "...the power to shape, pursue and revise life-plans..." (Bell, *ibid*). Along similar lines, Pettit (2002) quotes Sen (1978) and Nussbaum (1992) in their affirmation that citizens' freedom as non-domination can be achieved if each person "...enjoys a robust capability of functioning in one's local society..." (Pettit, 2002, p.152). The local functionings that people have to access include the functioning to enable them to acquire food, shelter, medical care, education, information and cultural network, to work and mobility and many others (*ibid*). Such a substantive set of freedoms is most likely to promote active citizenship (see also Sen, 1999).

3.3 Human rights approaches in citizenship education

Human rights, freedom and democracy are intertwined concepts. One cannot talk of a meaningful democratic process without consideration of how human rights are promoted in the system. As such, this section argues that certain ways of understanding and implementing human rights are conducive to the development of active citizenship while others are likely to promote passive citizenship. In a number of democratisation processes, such as in South Africa and in Malawi, the emphasis on a culture of human rights has been a major indicator of the democratic process. The preceding section alludes to the idea that an assessment of human rights cannot be made without recourse to the freedoms and extent of the freedoms people enjoy. To a large extent, processes and systems have been regarded as democratic depending on the level of respect for human rights that the specific society has. The fact that human rights and human rights approaches have become indispensable

for democratic processes moves us to yet another complex set of issues. If democracy itself is not one neat set of principles readily available for application and if approaches to questions of human freedom are similarly complex depending on the type of emphasis one puts on them, then it would be erroneous if human rights and human rights approaches were not considered as diverse within democratic discourse.

Carrim (2000), for example, thinks that there are different ways of understanding human rights, which affect the way these rights are framed and promoted. We argue here that the conceptualisation, framing and practice of human rights further determine how democratic citizenship develops. Carrim (2000) understands this process to lead to three different conceptions of human rights. These three are the legalistic understanding, the integration of human rights, democracy and citizenship in courses, and the framing that focuses on controversial issues, debates etc. (Carrim, p.34). In other words, within democratic discourse and education for democratic citizenship, not all human rights talk would be homogeneous. Carrim (2000) thinks that understanding the constitutionality of rights is different from teaching rights in a classroom just as all this is different from looking at rights as controversial issues!

The above categorisation involves some problematic issues that need clarification. While it may arguably be stated that the nature of human rights and democracy are so complex that there are bound to be different perspectives on the ways in which these would lead to effective citizenship education; one needs to note, in any case, that the incorporation of citizenship education is not *per se* a way of framing human rights as Carrim presents it. The way we understand conceptual issues surrounding human rights and the forms that we eventually make human rights to have are one thing. Transmitting this body of knowledge so that it becomes effective is another thing. The former only deals with methodological issues while the latter has the substantive issues at heart. On the substantive level, it can

still be maintained using his argument that human rights can be conceptualised as legal instruments in terms of simply being informative pieces as he later comes to explain them, which I agree with. On the same level, it is also possible to understand human rights and democracy as essentially about controversial issues and debates involving dilemmas, tensions and contradictions.

The consideration of tensions, controversies and dilemmas in teaching human rights is dependent on one's understanding of the general framework of how human rights and democracy are supposed to be understood and to operate. The second approach, as it were, goes further towards a consideration of controversies, tensions or contradictions. Such a consideration can also be understood as resting on formal conceptions of human rights. But in many cases, and such is my assumption, a proper focus on controversial issues and debates retains more of its meaning or becomes really controversial in cases where the body of knowledge is confronted with issues of practice as opposed to issues that are merely theoretical. Hence, implicit in the second way of understanding human rights is the idea of framing human rights, democracy and citizenship education with a bearing on how they would appear in people's actual practices. The second way of understanding human rights certainly relies on a good understanding of the forms of human rights. But this approach goes beyond mere formalism to consideration of how actual life practices and experiences should shape human rights discourse in democratic citizenship and its education.

Pogge (2002), on the other hand, presents three ways of understanding human rights. On the one hand, the minimalists maintain that human rights duties are exclusively negative. This position promotes restraint and holds that human rights only require self-restraint from harming others. On the other hand, Pogge believes that the maximalist views human rights as entailing both negative and positive duty to the extent that human rights duties call

for people's "...efforts to fulfil everyone's human right anywhere on earth..." (Pogge, p.64). Contrary to the two views, Pogge proposes a conception of human rights that entails moral duties within one's social system, a middle-ground between the maximalist and the minimalist (p.66). According to Pogge (2002), serious problems concerning human rights conceptions centre on the difference between moral rights and legal rights. Moral rights refer to those that go beyond space and time in the sense of not being dependent on particular systems in societies. They form a ground from which universal humanity owes its claim to rights. Legal rights are made to effect the moral rights but remain bound within particular societies or governments in the sense that they represent what such societies have agreed to be binding (Pogge, 2002, p.59).

What this dissertation refers to as a legalistic understanding of human rights, democracy and citizenship education, is a pre-occupation with constitutional issues, bills of rights, legislation, voter education, the definition and functions of parliament and its members (see also Carrim, *ibid*). Although such an approach provides the basic content of the requirement for democratic citizenship, the approach is not proactive in terms of its capacity to directly encourage participation by the citizens in public affairs. Essentially, the approach accommodates imparting knowledge of these institutions as its democratic mandate. It can further be implied that knowledge of these democratic systems or exposure to what is contained in the constitution and other legal instruments presupposes promotion of democracy (Carrim, p. 35). The legalistic approach sharply goes against the position that "...the enduring respect of human rights is sustained not just by the country's constitution, its legal and political system, and the attitudes of its politicians, judges and police; and that it can only be sustained more deeply by the attitudes of its people, and shaped by the education system ..." (Pogge, p.63)

The basic exposure to human rights, democracy and citizenship education is necessary only in so far as it provides a ground for transforming into a democratic system. While concepts of 'citizenship', 'state' and 'rights' gain their meanings from a legalistic grounding, treating human rights from such a stance makes human rights to embrace formal and universalistic patterns. In this way, the individuality and uniqueness of citizens suffer in an attempt to bring sameness across fundamentally different categories that require special attention for justice to be achieved (Carrim, p.36). Such universal approaches "...only equip people with general and macro understandings of concepts..." and as such are not substantial enough and specific to people's lives (op. cit). These legalistic approaches cannot meaningfully be translated to practice and as such they are likely to minimize people's experiences.

Pogge (2002) holds that a vigilant citizenry that is deeply committed to human rights and disposed to work for its political realization is the major way of securing human rights (p.62). In fact, "...the legalistic and universalistic tendencies do not necessarily lead to actual democratic practices and behaviour, due to their lack of engagement with what they would mean in particular cases with specific people in actual circumstances..." (Carrim, 2000, p.36). In other words we cannot rely on human rights discourse that is characterised by formal and universal pictures of humanity to cultivate democratic citizenship, let alone use it to cultivate people's strong engagement in civic affairs! The major contention here is not that legal rights are useless, for without them our moral rights would never be realised in our particular historical moments. The consolidation of moral rights is commonly regarded as depending on their legal enforceability (as noted by Enslin & Pendlebury, 2000, pp. 434-435). What makes matters different is that citizens do not sit waiting for government to give them these rights, but that citizens persistently demand of government these rights without relegating them to archived matters of the constitution (Pogge, 2002).

The moral consideration of human rights becomes crucial for democratic citizenship because it enhances the capacity of individual persons to "...develop a sense of self-worth and equal recognition of the worth of others..." (Enslin & Pendlebury, p.437). Both moral and legal rights need to be promoted and maintained for a culture of human rights and democracy. As such, a system of democratic citizenship acquires its legitimacy in relation to how well it maintains the legal framework within its social environment (op.cit., p.435). The moral dimension of rights leads one to consider other people not merely as equals before the law but also as equal persons in all dimensions of human life. It is to this extent that the moral consideration of rights acquires a virtuous dimension.

The consideration of both legal rights and moral rights in any framework and implementation of human rights has several merits. The approach promotes the permeation of human rights in all aspects of people's lives. To this extent the approach to human rights and democracy is better equipped to break the wall between the public and the private and bring in effective promotion and protection of human rights. It has also been argued that a consideration of moral rights in the private and domestic domain is a crucial factor for the recognition of rights in the public and civic spheres of life (op. cit., p.437). Although legal rights are important in the whole framework of democratic citizenship it is important to note that legalistic and universalistic tendencies will not necessarily lead to the building of democratic practices (Carrim, p.36) and that legal rights and civic rights alone are insufficient for the promotion of a culture of human rights (Enslin & Pendlebury, p.437).

3.4 Cultivating an active democratic citizen engagement through republican notions of freedom and human rights: a concluding comment

This discussion has highlighted that freedom and human rights can be perceived and promoted from different perspectives. Not all perspectives on freedom and human rights would promote active citizenship to the same extent. As such, the chapter argues that republican and contestatory forms of freedom, and approaches to human rights that on the one hand recognise that human rights issues are controversial and allow citizens to consistently make claims of their governments are more likely to promote active citizenship. Liberty requires a sense of community and civic engagement (Sandel, 1996), which can better be realised through the various complex circumstances and dilemmas that confront actual life circumstances. The emphasis on the dynamic side of human rights and freedom does not ultimately do away with the formal and abstract conceptions, neither is it a suggestion that we do not need the minimal and maximal sides in considering human rights and republican forms of freedom. In many cases, the formal and abstract conceptions are a foundation for the realisation of active democratic citizenship. In other words, although practice that considers the engagement of citizens is important, there is need for a certain threshold of understanding on human rights issues, which is indispensable for any application of the same. Yet we argue that approaches in human rights conceptions should not be primarily based on the mere fundamentals because such approaches disable citizens from transcending the frameworks in which they are wrapped.

This dissertation proposes that for the sake of developing active citizens that are concerned with all aspects of their lives, republican forms of freedom need to be taught, developed and nurtured. Republican forms of freedom have a broader perspective of the public and the demands of the public than are liberal conceptions. In the broader framework of freedom, freedom is discovered in the citizen contestation over how their life should be

managed. Teaching citizens freedom essentially denotes teaching them self-mastery and self-determination, other than merely ensuring that their rights are not violated or that accorded to them by some agent elsewhere.

In the following chapter, the importance of republican notions of freedom and human rights is highlighted through the interconnections that exist between development and freedom. Much as conceptions of democracy find their definitive meanings in the way human rights and freedoms are lived, there is a serious link between the conception of these rights and freedoms with the way development becomes associated with citizen engagement. The following chapter takes as its starting point the realisation of a dichotomous approach to conceptions of development and democracy that one commonly finds in Africa. It seeks to unveil its probable origins while indicating its dangers to democratic citizenship education. The chapter proposes the conception of 'freedom as development' as a way forward.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

4.1 Introduction

In our previous chapter, we have considered competing conceptions of freedom and human rights and their bearing on particular forms of citizenship and citizenship education. This chapter takes the discussion further by considering how conceptions of citizenship emanating from such competing forms further influence the way people conceptualise and engage in development work placed within the mandate of their democratic citizenship. The chapter analyses how the discourse on development and democracy construct notions of citizenship and citizenship education. In relation to the notions of participatory forms of democracy and republican and contestatory forms of human rights and freedom that have been discussed above, particular attention will be paid to examining the extent to which competing conceptions of the relationship between development and democracy are more likely to promote active citizenship.

The mapping of our task in this chapter is dogged with a number of dilemmas. The relationship between democracy and development is certainly not an easy one to construct. This is because both concepts have never had single referents in their own usages. But despite this fact, the opening chapters of this dissertation have argued for a particular conception of democracy that is participatory and whose freedoms are republican, for instance. Having argued for such options, the current chapter seeks to bring out complimentary conceptions of development. This task brings us to our second dilemma. Should development and democracy be linked? Or does our theorization bring a false

marriage between the two? I suggest that we sort out this dilemma by reconsidering the meaning of development. Ake (1996) reconstructs the meaning of development as:

A process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values (p.125).

Ake's conception places development and democracy intractably together. This conception of development places importance on people's choices and their agency in the processes of their development. Such an understanding is later refreshed by Sen (1999) who sees development as the expansion of the freedoms people enjoy. The model is congruent with participatory democracy, republican and contestatory forms of freedom. It also shifts our understanding of development from an infrastructural and technological perspective to a holistic concept of development as expanding the freedoms that we enjoy through the expansion of our capabilities. This chapter opts for and discusses these conceptions later.

In the following sections, we survey the dichotomy I argue has been created between development and democracy, which has caused much scepticism about the way the two are linked. Apart from Ake's re-conceptualisation of the link between development and democracy in Africa, there has not been much definitive exposition of the delicate links between the two. In many cases there are assumptions that the two are simply closely related to each other or that development is an instrument of democracy (Cloete, 1994, p.53). In other words, the idea that development and democracy are aspects of each other still remains unexplored. This also mainly refers to how such a relationship affects democratic citizenship discourse and education. In taking to task this apparent gap, the chapter examines the dichotomy that exists in the treatment of development and democracy in Africa, and argues that this works to the disadvantage for a conception for active democratic citizenship and its education. The chapter attempts to understand this

dichotomy by examining the onset of democratic politics in Africa and the conception of citizenship implied in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

While acknowledging that to a lot of people development means economic growth and is associated with development projects, this dissertation opts to understand development from positions espoused by Claude Ake (1996) and Amartya Sen (1999) where a holistic approach is favoured. This understanding is better positioned to consolidate the proposal for the education of an active participatory citizenship.

4.2 Democracy and development: a dichotomy?

The relationship between development and democracy has, in many cases, been assumed as obvious, although such an assumption does not resolve the entailed problems and dilemmas. Little has been written on the conceptual links between the two. In some cases, attempts to link the two have mostly ended up in affirming their consequential relationship. This tendency has not received widespread scrutiny. The assumed consequential relationship of development to democracy and the other way round has led some people to further think that democracy works in the west because the west is developed and that the same cannot be the case in Africa because of Africa's rampant poverty, famines and wars that have torn peoples and societies apart. This assumption demands our attention. Below, we examine the possible sources of this apparent dichotomous thinking.

Claude Ake (1996) provides us with one of the probable historical accounts of this dichotomy. He suggests that the interplay between politics and development should be understood through an examination of its development from the colonial periods to the first independent African states. He argues that the struggle for political power at independence

suffocated the efforts to development because the need for development was politically manipulated to wield power (p.7). Consequent to this, the colonial master was expected to consolidate development programmes, while the African leadership continued to talk about development only as tool for maintaining its power base within the wishes of the people and not for the sake of development itself. The ambition to amass political power was made successful through a clear distinction between politics and development.

“...The African leadership proclaimed the need for development and made development the new ideology without necessarily translating it into a programme of societal transformation. The struggle for power and survival crowded their vision of development...” (Ake, 1996, op. cit., p.9). At war with each other at this stage was the obvious realisation that Africa’s politics, economics and social life needed to be improved whilst requiring citizen obedience and conformity at the same time. Consequently, the wish to separate development from politics created problems in conceiving what would be the clearly manifested objectives and goals of development and the other potential political agendas that development would be used for.

From this early stage, one notes a tendency in Africa to see development programmes as apolitical. This has also resulted in political hegemony and an active suffocation of opposition politics or dissent in the name of national development, for instance in Malawi’s first independent government. I argue later that Malawi shows these features even after its re-introduction of multi-party politics; the development agenda has consistently acquired apolitical characteristics. From this understanding, one could conclude that development and democracy are not parallel processes; that in Africa development should precede democracy; and that democracy in Africa would be meaningless without economic development. This understanding assumes development and politics to be autonomously separated processes.

The above view is backed up by a number of scholars on Africa who contend that democracy is simply a particular stage in the development of a nation, and that it is only after attaining a specific stage of development that a nation can begin to talk about the implementation of democracy (Mugenyi, 1988). This argument conceives of development as a process of increasing the capacity to cope with internal and external demands (op. cit., p.178). The concepts of 'capacity' and 'demand' are not clarified, but one can deduce that the reference goes to how well people can manage to cope with both internal and external economic demands and other demands to do with technological know-how. The concept in use assumes that development has to be related with something that is very tangible and uniquely observable. This argument is closely related to the historical argument analysed above.

A resource argument is also used to defend the dichotomy. It states that the resources to manage a democracy in Africa are missing (Mugenyi and others, 1988). In this argument observation is made that Africa's economy is not one that can sustain democracy and its thorough implementation. This thinking is close to the 'Lee thesis' which defends the denial of political liberty and basic civil rights as a condition for the stimulation of economic growth (Sen, 1999, p. 15). Hence the question of resources does not have much to do with the availability of the citizens, but economic and infrastructural resources. This argument inevitably excludes notions of democratic agency and the freedoms people have in order for them to pursue their own development. People become means for development. Similarly low capacity, which is a mark of under-development, is understood to mean low prospects for democracy. Certain levels of communication and managerial infrastructure, such as trained personnel, become a mark of development and a precondition for a democracy (Mugenyi, M., p.181). That the west did not begin with democracy is also used as an additional reason for the argument!

The above arguments claim that sustainable development only requires a sufficient sum of supportive persons to keep the system steadily going, and not the majority will. In other words, democracy in the spirit of open and continuous deliberation becomes an antithesis to development. The proponents of the separation also argue that the systems that have led to development have depended on effective law and order, government provision of basic resources, which in turn wins people's confidence. The underlying assumption here is minimalist. It assumes that once the conditions for sustainable development have been put in place and are stable, only then can a nation take seriously its democratisation agenda (Mugenyi, 1988, p.185; see also Wanjohi, 1998).

The minimalist path described above is also recommended for Africa, according to Mugenyi (1988) and others, because of multiple factors. In the first place, Africa's low capacity in both human resources and her low economic development create the low prospects for Africa's democracy. Hence, economic and human resource development precedes anything else. For instance: "...rural electrification and access to roads should take priority over expanding the participation of the rural folk..." (op. cit., p.182). Using studies of the experiences of Kenya and Tanzania under Nyerere and Kenyetta respectively, Mugenyi argues, "...in Africa the adoption of development strategy precedes and supersedes the adoption and promotion of democracy..." (ibid). The simultaneous realization of both is seen as an impossible path for Africa (Wanjohi, 1988, p.207). There is a growing feeling among these scholars that where democracy has preceded economic development, the short-term effects of development have been suffocated until a well-founded and secure economic system has been laid down. In such cases, the pace of economic accumulation has tended to slow down. Nevertheless no engagement with cases with simultaneous processes is made.

The third argument in defence of the dichotomy states: "...qualities that determine electability are not always relevant to the performance of the development roles. Electability is not the same as capability in handling public policy and management..." (Mugenyi, p.186). The argument does away with democratic government, let alone democratic participation as a way of managing development in Africa (see also Oyugi, p.46). Similarly citizens would need to know and be taught how to develop themselves economically and technologically instead of teaching them to participate in politics. Echoes of this have also come from some of Africa's second democracies' presidents like that of Malawi who is popularly known for the view that we should leave politics aside when it comes to development; that people do not eat democracy, but eat maize and other foods.

The above dichotomous conceptions impact negatively on democratic citizenship and education. The conceptions are comfortable with a democracy of the leaders and not of the people. Citizenship education takes the citizens as recipients of civic programmes and not their framers. In fact representative democracy is also considered as a synonym for all democracy. According to Mugenyi (1988) the masses cannot be entrusted to choose a leader who will steer a nation in development because political effectiveness does not mean that the same could be true if the person were also to lead in the development of the people. Secondly, the idea of national development is heavily linked with technocracy and not necessarily mass participation or citizen empowerment in the hatching of development ideas and their implementation. Hence development belongs to individual leaders and not the people. These conceptions present serious problems for the conceptualisation of active democratic citizenship.

4.2.1 Re-conceptualizing the development and democracy link: NEPAD's continued dichotomy

The problematic relationship between development and democracy resurfaces in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is one of the current programmes that calls for Africa's renewed and collective commitment to social, economic and political development. It is viewed as "...a vision and strategic framework for Africa's renewal..." and was "...adopted at the 37th and last summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 2001, as the socio-economic development programme of the African Union (AU)..." (NEPAD in Brief, www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php, accessed on 19/3/2005). NEPAD is also regarded to originate from "...the common vision, firm and shared conviction of African leaders in their sense of duty to eradicate poverty..." (South Africa - Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001, p.1). Many commentators agree that in its mission, NEPAD is a development agenda for Africa, prioritising sustainable development in the areas of economic development, social development and environmental protection (see also NEPAD Articles 9 – 17). This section intends to show that while NEPAD makes a number of strides in re-conceptualising the link between development and democracy, it does not go far enough in providing a conception for active democratic citizenship and the education for that citizenship. We focus first on what the official NEPAD constitutive act says before we consider critical views of it.

On the whole the NEPAD shows positive signs of heading towards the development of active citizenship. The first of these is the priority that is given to matters of African urgency; that Africans will not be determined by outside circumstances apart from the conditioning of their own circumstances (Articles 7, 54-56). Together with this, the document acknowledges that development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance (Article 27); which gives the impression that development is a process and a shift from

being dictated upon to self-affirmation, thereby also implying emancipatory freedom. This notion of development accommodates citizens' involvement for the improvement of their capabilities.

Furthermore democracy and state legitimacy have been redefined to place as its central elements accountable government, a culture of human rights and popular participation (Article 43). This acts as a basis for the responsibility of African leaders (Article 49). Article 79 soberly acknowledges, "...development is impossible in the absence of democracy..." (NEPAD, p.31). People's participation has been evoked in a number of places as a pre-condition for the success of the system (see also Articles: 71, 83, and 106) and as part of Africa's duty to eradicate poverty and head towards sustainable development. The role of women also receives marked emphasis.

Nevertheless, NEPAD trades off this agenda and risks creating passive citizens in its pursuit of a development agenda that does not arise from below, thereby perpetuating the dichotomy between development and democracy. In the first place, the stated reasons for the introduction of NEPAD seem to be the development of a new relationship with other continents especially the highly industrialized (Article 8), otherwise also stated as a re-definition of Africa's relationship with the western world. Thus, industrialization and globalisation become core issues in Africa's re-definition of development. This is re-enforced by the idea that the imperative of development is not only a moral requirement but it is fundamental to the sustainability of the globalisation process (Article 39); and that NEPAD's main objective is "...to bridge gaps in development so that Africa catches up with developed parts of the world..." (Article 65). In other words, NEPAD's pro-western model of industrialization and civilization jeopardises its own mission to determine its development agenda.

The nature and scope of development emanating from these sections is limited despite its extension to other aspects of human existence such as the social, cultural and political factors (Article 49). The regional and sub-regional approaches to development in NEPAD (93-98) cover such sectors as markets, economic integration, disease and poverty eradication (Articles 38, 67) and environmental protection among others. The development of civic virtues is grossly missing.

One other dominant position within NEPAD's development philosophy is the idea that Africa needs a development paradigm that is developed by Africans for African problems, and that Africa will work this out by herself. Article 52 affirms this understanding by emphasizing that there is a need to "...harness and utilize Africa's natural and human resources in order to lead to equitable and sustainable growth of the continent and its integration into the world economy..." This article represents a growing consensus within Africa against donor dictated development agendas to movement towards indigenous ideas for the development of Africa, the need to be self-defined. Despite the general umbrella under which Africans are assumed to be determining their circumstances, the model is very economic and technological in character. In other words, NEPAD tries to provide Africa with an economic renaissance that falls short of holistic development. In this kind of approach, the idea that development precedes democracy becomes justifiable.

NEPAD's development Goals (Article 68) and expected outcomes (Article 69) move from issues of growth in GNP to Gender equality and market integration among others. Although there is also recognition of democracy, good governance and human rights, and sound economic management as conditions for sustainable development, these factors are not the primary goals nor are they the expected outcomes of NEPAD. NEPAD's goals and strategies (67-70) have nothing particularly democratic in them except that they can be better achieved in a democratic environment (Articles 79, 81,83). Democracy and

democratic citizenship (including human rights, rule of law, peace and good governance) are peripheral and only stand as facilitators to development. In other words, the need for the cultivation of democratic citizenship becomes extrinsic.

From other perspectives, NEPAD is wanting in its development concept. It is seen as techno-economic, exotic and that its project-approach to development limits its own conception of development (Nyuylime, LP, 2004). The project-approach to development limits the concept to economic and infrastructural matters at the expense of people's emancipation and expansion of their freedoms. It is only deductively that we arrive at the other aspects of development, for instance, the idea that economic growth and a reduction in poverty and inequalities will make Africans more free to live the lives they choose. But even this is only a leap of faith because it is possible for a nation to be declared free of poverty and as having a good economic performance while people live in social and political unfreedoms (Sen, 1999). In other words, the millennium goals put too much emphasis on the economic deliverables thereby compromising NEPAD's democratic ideals.

Section 47 of this development paradigm is equally problematic. Acknowledging that "the agenda is being set by the leaders for the renewal of the continent" further removes the ordinary citizens from the picture as owners and makers of policy except as beneficiaries, a clear example of an exogenous development agenda. The Schumpeterian framework of the programme is made evident in the sense that it requires "...bold and imaginative leadership so that the trend of poverty is reversed in Africa..." (NEPAD Article 6). This view becomes reinforced when some national citizenship education programmes, such as those of Malawi, see NEPAD as "... an international agreement under which the African states that sign up in NEPAD promise to put in place governance processes and practices. In return, countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France,

Germany, Canada, Japan and other rich countries promise the African countries financial help...” (Chirwa, Kanyongolo, & Kayambazinthu, 2004, p.149). The education for citizen participation hence becomes a side effect of the exogenic programmes.

Patrick Bond (www.web.net/~iccaf/debtsap/nepad_aidc.htm, accessed 25/10/2004) notes that one of NEPAD’s weaknesses resides in its formulation phase where little consultation was made with the peoples of Africa. In other words, the people’s ideals, wishes, ambitions and aspiration are not directly reflected in this agenda. He observes,

... During the formulation of NEPAD, no trade union, civil society group, church, political-party, parliamentary, or other potentially democratic or progressive forces were consulted. In contrast, extensive consultations occurred with the World Bank and IMF (November 2000 and February 2001), trans-national corporations and associated government leaders (at Davos in January 2001 and New York in February 2002), the G-8 (in Tokyo in July 2000 and Genoa in July 2001), the European Union (November 2001) and individual Northern heads of state ... (ibid)

The Africa Social Forum (2002) and other critics also think that NEPAD represents a neo-imperial agenda for Africa. and that it needs replacement because there was “... no genuine commitment to involve the citizens of Africa actively in decisions and programmes targeting at their destiny and reflecting a citizen-centred development process as an imperative...” (www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/NEPAExecSummaryFinal.pdf, p.4, accessed 17/11/2004). This forum holds that values of respect for life would have reigned superior to profit values and the ‘triumphalism’ of scientific and technological advances. In other words, values of UBUNTU remain overshadowed in NEPAD

In conclusion, this section recognises the strides NEPAD makes in fostering democracy and development. It places some emphasis on the urgency of African peoples to develop their continent. In fact development is regarded as empowering to the people. The

document also makes a number of calls to African leaders to create enabling conditions for the participation of people in their development. Nevertheless, I do not think that NEPAD moves far enough towards creating active citizenship in Africa. NEPAD is bogged down by a number of problems such as the general characteristic that it does not really represent the aspirations from the people except those of its leadership. Its pre-occupation with industrialization and techno-development reduce its efforts to mount a holistic development programme, from where active citizenship could more readily have been cultivated. What compounds NEPAD's lack in cultivating active democratic citizenship is also the fact that its development goals have very little to do with democracy and democratic citizenship apart from being an enabling condition for its 'sustainable development'. Democracy is only incidental to the development of Africa. The intrinsic values of a democracy are not the primary interests in NEPAD's agenda, neither is the parallel implementation of development and democracy programmes.

4.3 The dichotomy between democracy and development: a missing 'kairotic' moment

The dichotomous relationship between development and democracy should not be assumed as obvious and necessary. That not much attention has been paid to the possibilities of running simultaneous processes of development and democracy does not mean that the two cannot operate simultaneously. For instance, as early as 1990, Norway's foreign development policy dismissed this dichotomy when it noted that the commitment to the observance of human rights was not an independent or separate goal from that of development (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Fighting Poverty Together – a comprehensive Development Policy*). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article

55, notes that in order to ensure peace and development, it is also necessary to promote the universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom. Development and democracy co-operate within an indispensable relationship. This dissertation argues that it is untenable to make one precede another because the process of expanding people's freedoms is in itself development. In other words, there is no '*kairos*' moment⁷ at which Malawi's and other African countries' development will be enough for them to start democratising. The apparent dichotomy between development and democracy puts all education for democratic citizenship in disarray and the spontaneity and reciprocity of human life and relationships becomes stale.

Much as poverty, hunger, civil strife, and perpetual regression of development work have become associated with Africa, it is not the case that these factors further regress Africa's democratisation and education for democratic citizenship. Research done in about 10 sub-Saharan countries between 1999 and 2000 shows that it is more difficult to sustain democracy in poor societies than in relatively wealthy societies, but fails to find sufficient evidence why poverty is believed to be the main cause for the inhibition of democratic values (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 4, January 2003, www.afrobarometer.org, accessed on 2/10/2004). The belief that links poverty to lack of democratisation also links people's powerlessness in economics and lack of information about their own political system to the resultant political powerlessness.

Nevertheless, the disparaging views about the inability of Africa to democratise because of poverty have no empirical justification. The Afrobarometer, using 'lived poverty and individual political values and behaviours' (ABP 4. pp6-8), shows no linkage between individual poverty and individual citizenship behaviours and preferences. Four research

A "Kairos Moment" has been used to be understood as an opportune time at which something comes to be as a culmination of certain processes.

results indicate, "... poverty does not only fail to decrease interests in politics, but actually increases it ..." (p.6-7). Poverty only manages to reduce people's exposure to media news and their ability to live and act to their own expectations. Second, poverty does not affect how people define 'democracy' as a set of political procedures. The results show that the poorer people become the more they are likely to define democracy within a substantive set of goods such as health and education (p.7). Thirdly, the results showed that people who go without basic necessities are likely to attend more community meetings, and contact their political leaders. In addition, the research also shows that poor people are twice as much more likely to urge government to urgent action on substantive goods such as healthcare, national economy, commodity prices and others, than those who are relatively managing in life.

Going by our marks, this means that poor people are more likely to appreciate and embrace participatory forms of democracy alongside substantive and republican forms of freedom and human rights. In other words, poverty, despite its dark side, creates a sense of democratic urgency and a desire to exercise political agency. This is more the reason why development and democracy should be seen as one and the same process. Hence the case of poverty in Malawi and in the sub-Saharan countries does not create any imperative for us to derail education for democratic participation and active citizenship and make development, so technocratically understood, our only priority. Poverty creates the urgency and impels us to create educational structures and methodologies that will promote both democracy and development; cultivate the people's liking for democratic procedures as the only way to their social, political and economic development. Sen (1999) and Ake (1996) have suggested competitive frameworks for conceptualising such simultaneous processes of development and democracy in the education for democratic citizenship.

4.4 Development as freedom⁸: Sen's proactive solutions

Sen (1999) sums up and examines the assumed dichotomy between development and democracy in three ways. His examination of the Lee Thesis acknowledges the existence of the belief that freedoms and rights hamper economic growth and development. The second assumption that he examines is the belief that poor people would choose fulfilling economic needs rather than care about social and political freedoms, if they were given the freedom to choose between the two. This assumption presupposes a sharp conflict between socio-political freedoms and the fulfilment of economic needs (Sen, p.148-149). He also examines the belief that political freedoms, liberties and democracy are a “Western priority” (ibid) and opposed to African/Asian cultural values.

From Sen's point of view, the above understanding of the relationship between development and democracy is essentially flawed. Sen (1999) notes that such an understanding uses a historical fallacy of thinking that since some democracies have developed after sustaining stable economic achievements, then no democracy is possible without a firm economic base; or that the economically underdeveloped countries have no chance of being democratic until their economies have become stable or developed. Although there are limited historical cases where authoritarian governments have been the most successful; authoritarianism does not necessarily lead to economic growth, as the argument would want us to believe. Sen (1999) notes, “...there is little general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial in encouraging economic growth...” (p.150). The growth of GNP or some other indicators is not a sufficient indicator of economic development for a nation. Citing poverty as a deterrent to democratic participation also does not pass Sen's test. Sen argues

⁸ The title of this subsection reflects Sen's (1999) book titled: *Development as Freedom* (USA: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), which provides the framework of the alternative I am presenting for re-conceptualising the relationship between development and democracy in Africa.

that the cases that are cited in defence of this assumption are themselves authoritarian and there is no point in supposing that if poor people were given a choice between political freedoms and food they would obviously choose the food. In this case, Sen leaves open the idea that even poor people can opt for social and political freedoms amidst a realised sense of poverty. The argument that cites poverty as a deterrent to political participation is even more flawed because of its simplistic comparison between the choice for food and that for political freedoms, which is likely to end up in a categorical fallacy (see also Afrobarometer, Briefing Paper No. 4).

The idea that the values of freedoms, liberties and democracy are a “Western priority” is also flawed because it rests on another false assumption: that liberty is a western value! This false assumption denies Africans the possession of the concept of liberty in their traditional cultures, as if traditional culture in Africa is completely mechanistic, deterministic and authoritarian such that people never enjoy any freedom whatsoever. Despite the prevalence of traditional patterns of life in Africa, research on African Traditions does not support the view of an African culture that is devoid of notions of freedom (see Mbiti, 1990; Hountondji, 1996). On the other hand, Sen (1999) tries to reply to the argument through a comparative analysis of Eastern and Oriental religions. He notes that the values of personal freedom and equality have been present in other cultures as well for a long time in history. The ideas of the nobility of conduct, liberation, and free choice have equally played important roles in these cultures that are seen as authoritarian by some western perspectives (Sen, p.235).

What is really problematic in the above case is the concept of freedom/liberty, which the argument assumes to be in use. The question of whose freedom or liberty is at stake largely depends on how we opt to define our reality, and on whether it is the individual or community that defines it. Defining through communal eyes makes freedom acquire a

communal perspective where freedom resides in what community defines as freedom. Western societies similarly define the same freedom from the individual's eye and such a definition does not mean other perspectives are fraudulent. Much as we cannot dispute the primacy of individual persons and meaning-giving, we can neither dispute the right of societies to define themselves and the confines of their freedom. In other words, it is logically incorrect to assume that democracy operates only with liberal values of autonomy. According to Sen, the cultural-specific argument assumes that once democracy is regarded as found and nourished by liberal values, then all democracy all times must live within liberal traditions. Other traditions than the liberal tradition also have the capacity to live within values considered the sole reserve of the liberal tradition. In other words, values that have been associated with liberalism are not an exclusive entitlement of liberalism. Hence the claim that freedom and democracy are a western priority, therefore, is tantamount to the claim for superiority and power by those who propagate the idea and by western culture itself.

The competitive concept of development that Sen (1999) constructs moves away from traditional models of theorising development and regards development as “the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy and have reason to enjoy” (p. 3). Hence development becomes “...the expansion of the capabilities of people to lead the kind of lives they have value and reason to live...” (ibid). Sen's redefinition makes neither freedom nor development the sole preserve of one particular culture or tradition. Two distinct aspects come up in Sen's re-conceptualisation of development. In the first place, Sen places enormous importance on the role of human capabilities in development. While it is true that all development is meant to ease human life, it is not the case that all development takes the human person as a priority in some of its considerations. For instance, acquisition of high-tech materials may not have the people who are going to use

the targets in mind and the extent of freedoms created by them, except for the profits that will be generated. It could simply be an aspect of economic competition. As such, not all technological and infrastructural development would expand the freedoms people enjoy as their primary objectives. Needless to say that some of NEPAD's conceptions, for instance, do not have the people at their heart, other than matching the development rate of Africa with other developed parts of the world.

In a second way, Sen's re-conceptualisation brings a holistic perspective into the discussion of the notion of development. It marks a shift away from the hyper economic and technological concept of development, from a conception of development that emphasises GNP and other economically determined indicators and moves the concept of development towards the humanistic end, where human beings become the ultimate deciders and beneficiaries; where removing the unfreedoms people face in their life becomes the essence of development (Sen, p.36). In this way, one's ideas of development reach their fulfilment when the faculties - social, moral, and intellectual - of people are also improved (Mill, 1996). But it is not possible to think of the expansion of the capabilities people have if their faculties are not similarly taken into consideration.

Sen regards substantive freedoms as "...the capabilities to choose a life one has reason to value..." (p.74) The capability approach that Sen is proposing also considers "...alternative combinations of functioning that are feasible for one to achieve..." as central (p.75). In other words, freedom involves a person's capability to achieve the things that can be achieved given one's level of achievement. A person is not free, therefore, if she or he cannot achieve that which is possible within one's limits. Such a condition also results in negative development. Hence development consists of setting the persons free to realise what they are capable of achieving in their lives alongside the improvement of their functioning. This conception of development is broader than conceiving development in

terms of infrastructure and technology, for instance. The latter do not necessarily and directly free people's capacity to be persons they desire to be. Although such may be the case, the overall freedoms that people enjoy are also enhanced by what Sen (1999) calls instrumental freedoms. These include political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security (p.38). "...The instrumental freedoms tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, while they also serve to complement each other..." (ibid). The capability approach to citizenship education and development is more extensive.

According to Sen, freedom and development are intertwined processes for two main reasons. Primarily, it is because no human progress can be legitimately evaluated without considering whether the freedoms people have reason to value are promoted (p.4). Self-assessment is therefore a necessary component of any education for democratic citizenship. Sen emphasizes that the development of any society can only be evaluated primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of the society enjoy (p.18). Sen (1999) thinks that this approach goes beyond other methods of assessing development, such as the conception of considering a system fair or just by recognising the priority of personal liberty or the realisation of the greatest possible happiness. He thinks that the latter often injures those who are not possibly in larger number of beneficiaries (see Sen, 199, p.63- 72). Although Rawls' egalitarian project includes social and economic factors, Sen (1999) thinks it still does not provide us with an adequate concept of development because it loses focus of the role of human capabilities in the event that resources are redistributed to achieve justice. By including the role and cultivation of human capabilities as central to development itself, Sen extends the dimension of the inter-relation between democracy and development. If adopted and applied properly, the concept of 'development as freedom' is likely to refresh NEPAD's approach to development and democratic citizenship education, where

development is considered from a technological perspective; and democracy is regarded as an enabling condition for development.

Sen's proposal for a newer version of development compliments, in many ways, the proposals that Ake (1996) makes on Africa. Ake's concept of a renewed sense of democracy is one in which real decision-making power lies with the people in addition to the electoral choice (Ake, pp. 132–142). Such repositioning turns the people into agents and ends of their own development with the process of development. As a result, citizenship becomes enhanced through empowerment, confidence and self-realisation.

4.5 Educating citizens for freedom and development

This chapter has tried to show that educating citizens for freedom accelerates and broadens the process of development. This argument is made against the common approaches, some of which this debate has brought to the fore, that poor nations like Malawi and other African countries should pay more attention to development than to democracy. While it is acknowledged that western countries developed first before democratising, it is not the case that a certain technical development threshold is a prerequisite for democracy and people's participation. The projects-approach to development is parochial because it narrows down the concept of development, thereby introducing minimalist conceptions of people's participation in development. The approach overlooks the wider implications of adopting a broader concept of development, which apart from adopting multiple facets of what development is, also seeks to develop the capacity of people to live the lives they want. The Afrobarometer results quoted above show that most poor people maintain a substantive notion of democracy stretching far beyond mere political affirming to the

affirmation of simultaneous processes of democracy and development. This approach seeks to improve the faculties of people as they engage in both development and democracy.

The capability approach in education for democracy and development is incomparable to other previous approaches. While this approach seeks to improve all human faculties so that people are enabled to live their lives to the full, it also includes the removal of all unfreedoms: social, economic and political. It seeks to develop people's greater sense of freedom to do the things they have reason to value. This approach is significant in itself and also for one's overall freedom. Educating people for this model of democratic participation enhances their overall freedom. Freedom is not only a basis for the evaluation of success and failure, but it is also a principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and change their lives and systems. Hence the intertwining relation between development and democratic citizenship is more likely to develop active citizenship and participation.

The following chapter examines how conceptions of democracy, freedom, human rights and development are depicted in Malawi's citizenship education materials. It also endeavours to show that although certain forms of maximalist citizenship are evident, by and large, Malawi's approach is likely to promote passive citizenship. The section then highlights the disadvantages of minimalist conceptions in preference for strong and active citizenship education.

CHAPTER FIVE

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN MALAWI: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

5.1 A civic education ‘vacuum’: an historical introduction

This chapter sets out to show how citizenship education in Malawi predominantly reflects a representative, minimal conception of democracy. Concurrently with this view, it also shows that the dominant approach to development in Malawi has created an erroneous dichotomy between development and democracy. But in order for us to establish why education for democratic citizenship in Malawi between 1994 and the present is like this, it is imperative that we understand the background on which such citizenship education is being built. This analysis starts with the independence period (1964 – 1992/3) because of its influence on the post-independence period (post 1994).

Malawi’s citizenship education, after independence, was inculcated through the official political and educational system by the use of state agencies. Political rallies, a controlled school curriculum, and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) were the major state agents. The school curriculum and its daily activities were heavily screened and censored by the state. In recounting forms of citizenship education in the first period, Englund (2004) quoting Kasambara (1998) states:

Primary schools had a subject known as civics, giving deliberately unspecific view of government, while the Malawi Young Pioneers visited villages to impose physical and agricultural training on adults. As with much else that took place in public, the glorification of the country’s Life President was an integral part of this activity. (p. 5-6)

Government's effort to conduct civic education during the independence period centred on four themes: Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline. These were also called the Four Cornerstones and the foundation of the nation (Kasambara, 1998, p.240-243). These cornerstones became the primary values and objects of knowledge for all citizens. Below, we see how the promotion of these values assisted in developing a passive sense of citizenship in Malawi.

The theme of unity was used in order to bring the diverse groups of the nation under one leadership. This theme also evoked sentiments of developing the nation into a single family like the extended family in the traditional system. As time went by the ideal was used to suppress views that diverged from mainstream political thought, that were essentially ideas of the president that were encased in the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Unity was understood as unanimity of views and perspectives on all political issues. The ideal of choosing a representative for effective government as one finds in Mill's formula of representation (Mill, 1996) was understood to mean that people's political views should also converge as a symbol of being united under a single leader. Difference became a threat to national unity, an act of sedition. The ideal of loyalty was used to demand allegiance to the dictates of the single political party system. Attendance at party meetings, purchasing of party membership cards and actual subscription to party ideals were made compulsory. Other than being a symbol for homogenous thought, unity also became a symbol for maintaining a hierarchical order and due 'respect' for the status quos in society. Lack of such respect turned individuals into enemies of the state, whereas obedience and unwavering docility were considered public virtues.

Discipline and obedience were also demanded alongside unity and loyalty. These were used in the same way as the first two in order to demand citizen allegiance to what the party *cum* government wanted, to its letter. A disciplined and obedient citizen was one who

could not question what the party and its leadership were demanding. Such a citizen would also take proper recognition of hierarchies in society. The effects of these values on actual citizen dispositions were, among others, lack of citizen initiative to engage in action that was not properly sanctioned by the system for fear of reprisals. Citizens became docile to party and government demands. In this regime, all power and honour belonged to the life president, and any claims thereof, even when apolitical, were perceived as open defiance to the country's leadership. This leadership described itself as dynamic, charismatic, messianic and wise.

The four cornerstones virtually became the centre of all citizenship education in Malawi for 30 years, from 1964 to 1993; and they permeated all aspects of life in the nation. As a result, citizens in most cases kept their political views to themselves and attended forced political rallies just for the sake of pleasing authorities and keeping out of trouble. Imprisonment without trial, political detentions and loss of property were some of the punishments meted on those who dared oppose the system. For this reason it is difficult to argue that there was meaningful political participation of free agents within these circumstances. This dissertation argues that the background described above is very likely to create a passive citizenry. And as such, it is also very likely that citizens educated through such a system would not meaningfully participate in the civic affairs of the nation.

It may be counter-argued that the above introduction begs the question: What is citizenship education? Of course, whether the background described above amounts to anything like a citizenship education or a mal-education becomes problematic. Englund (2003) thinks that perceptions of the period, as described by Kasambara, affirm that there was no citizenship education. Kasambara (1998) has argued: "... political and social life was completely hegemonised by the ruling and sole political party, the masses were completely silenced into thinking along party lines, and that a majority of Malawians were left ill-equipped for

meaningful participation in the political life of the nation...” (p.238). Despite Kasambara’s rhetoric, the recognition of lack of proper citizenship education, a mal-education of the masses, does not mean absence of civic education. While the prevalent education for citizens was hegemonic and intolerant to diverse and opposing views, there *was* a form of citizenship education although accompanied by undesirable outcomes, non-democratic tendencies such as the imposing of views on what the general public was allowed to think about and the suppression of a critical attitude to public issues in general.

If we were to reconsider Kasambara’s thoughts from the perspective of Barber’s (1984) repositioning of citizenship education, the idea that there was no civic education outside the Ministry of Education classrooms because hegemonism reigned would become evident. In this period, civic education courses such as Civics taught about different systems of government, the duties and responsibilities of citizens, the role and duties of central and local government, and the election process (Kasambara, p.239). The narrow scope of Civics leaves a lot to be desired from such democratic position. Civics, among others, avoided discussion of current political issues. Learners were not encouraged to think actively of what their political system meant to them. It became an ordinary and an apolitical subject, and was not intended for the cultivation of civic virtues except for some forms of civic knowledge. The broader perspective of this course saw it complimented by other secondary schools’ citizenship education programmes taught by the MYP, which concentrated on physical education and limited forms of political education in terms of teaching political structures to the learners. All of these were also confined to the glorification of Dr Banda’s statesmanship (*ibid*). This system, which was immune from all critical reflection and criticism, within and without, could not be a favourable ground for cultivating democratic citizenship.

The question of lack of citizenship education could still arise in reference to the apparent naturalisation of the political and the deliberate efforts to keep the masses ignorant. This thinking acknowledges citizenship education as proper if and only if it is geared to actively engage the citizens in their affairs. In this case, the form of citizenship on the ground was such that it fundamentally disabled the citizen from carrying out meaningful civic duties. The four cornerstones discussed above were a form of citizenship but their formulation resulted in curbing the exercise of meaningful citizen engagement in the affairs of the public. The vacuum in citizenship education, therefore, relates to a deliberate attempt to keep everyone and everything apolitical. People were made to believe that issues of basic survival such as food, shelter and clothing were their only concern and that these had nothing to do with politics. Such a conception of Malawian citizenship misses out on the other dynamics of human life such as the extent to which people exercise their social, political and economic freedoms. In this stage of Malawi's history citizens were taught and expected to be passive, unquestioning citizens.

5.1.1 Citizenship education as voter education: an historical aberration

The need for a new democratic citizenship and citizenship education in Malawi arose in 1992 when the system was changing from a single party system of government to a multi-party system. New forms of citizenship education erupted as a result of the campaign for democracy and a multiparty system of government. Those who opposed the system of the day promoted a multi-party system of government whereas those who saw otherwise continued to support the single party system. The latter continued to promote values of unity, obedience, loyalty and discipline. The former began to promote human rights and an end to human rights abuse as the sole advantage of a democratic system.

The intense re-development of citizenship education in Malawi was supposed to mark a shift from a patriotic position of knowing one's obligations and duties within the framework of strong political hegemony, to the recognition and an understanding of difference in politics and the cultivation of democratic citizenship virtues, duties and obligations. Unfortunately, the early on-set of citizenship education for democracy assumed to deliver its mandate by simple comparison of single party system of government from a multiparty system of government. This approach resulted in citizenship education being equated with voter education in relation to the upcoming referendum of 1993 and the general elections of 1994. Secondly, what prompted a change of political system in Malawi were the alarming levels of human rights violations. Discontent about the national state of affairs among the citizens was observed in the universities, among members of the law society and in churches and businesses (Kasambara, p.240). The onset of democratic forms of citizenship in Malawi was also surrounded by factors such as lack of opposition parties, official disrespect of various types of human freedoms and rights. Pastoral letters, anonymous political writings and mass demonstrations became a way of persuading international governments and donor agencies to intervene in Malawi's socio-political life. This initial background affected the nature and method of conducting citizenship education as well as its agents and method. A human rights approach to citizenship education became inevitable.

The agents who conduct citizenship programmes as well as the choice of the nature and content of such citizenship education influence modes of citizenship education currently in practice in Malawi. Two sets of key players can be highlighted at this point. The national department of education and the national broadcaster, the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC), were officially mandated to impart civic education. The two ended up promoting the single party ideals because of the control the single party system had on

these national institutions. As such, their emphasis was placed on the purported advantages of single party politics such as the ability to unite diverse groups. The proponents also assumed and taught that a single system of politics is capable of maintaining law and order in the state; that there were the orderliness of state affairs, and the easier prospects for development under these conditions. They imparted a citizenship education that was centrally geared to protecting the system of the day.

On the other hand, the pressure groups who later became parties, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs)⁹, concentrated on teaching the people the “...reasons for the referendum; what citizens were expected to do on voting day; their duty as citizens in taking part in the referendum...” (Kasambara, p.243). While they claimed neutrality, the efforts of these groups endeavoured to provide people with a choice that had long been denied. The Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC) and the Legal Resource Centre (LRC) promoted voter rights education. This education assumes that by voting, the citizens are ensuring a democratic regime that would protect and promote their rights. In other words, the voter education approach that was adopted was intended to offset the legacy of elections as mere endorsement of pre-chosen candidates favourable to the ruling leadership, which had prevailed in the single party system.

In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the orientation towards voter education as civic education did not change, partly confirming Kasambara’s (1998) observation that there is general failure on the part of government to embark on full-fledged citizenship education (p.251). The National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) is one such example. In one of its policy documents, NICE places civic education programmes into two phases (Faiti, 1999). The first phase, usually a run-up to general elections, concentrates on ‘civic and voter

⁹ The NGOs involved, although not at the same time, were Public Affairs Committee (PAC), Malawi Law Society (MLS), Legal Resource Centre (LRC), Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC), National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE). The prominent pressure groups that turned into parties were United Democratic Front (UDF) and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), among others.

education' in order to reduce voter apathy, whereas the second stage deals with the creation of a data bank of civic education trainers; creation of outreach programmes and provision of sources of democratic knowledge through the creation of community /district libraries (p. 4). The trainers and outreach programmes in the second phase are also mentioned in relation to voter education and elections.

Apart from understanding citizenship education in terms of a simple comparison between a single party system of government and a multiparty system of government on the one hand and simply as voter education on the other hand, several problems have dogged Malawi's efforts towards teaching for democratic citizenship. Most of the citizenship education efforts in Malawi are *ad hoc*. The need for civic education is perceived as necessary only prior to elections and government does not seem to be prepared for massive citizenship education (Kasambara, *op. cit*, p.241). Apart from the fact that civic education providers focus on far too few and narrow topics, there does not seem to have been a civic education curriculum and a Malawi-specific reference book for use by stakeholders (Kamphambe Nkhoma, in Chirwa, et al, 2004, *Foreword*, p. iv). On the other hand, Chirwa thinks that lack of and poor citizenship education in Malawi is much due to poverty and its disempowering effects on people, which eventually reduce their political will (pp.208 – 210). They also think that institutions expected to be democratic such as public (sector) institutions do not generate enough trust among Malawians, hence they are seedbeds for low-level democratic participation (see Chirwa et. al, pp 216-219). Nevertheless, the argument that a negative mindset is created by the failure to meet the basic standard of life for prolonged periods due to poverty, low salaries, regionalism and tribalism and the vulnerability of the poor against political manipulation is difficult to sustain (see 4.3, above). I have shown in this regard that poverty is not necessarily antithetical to the cultivation of a political will that is required for citizen participation in democracy.

5.2 Major areas of citizenship education programmes in Malawi.

In order to show that Malawi's citizenship education reflects representative and minimal conceptions of democracy, this sub-section examines how themes of democracy and participation, human rights and freedom, and the interplay between development and democracy are depicted in the citizenship education materials. The materials under question are those that are used in teacher training programmes, voter and civic education materials used by NICE and other groups, and the newly introduced 'Democracy Consolidation' materials. While the inadequacies of the current modes are being exposed, the dissertation will also highlight how citizenship education within a democratic Malawi should be approached in order to develop active democratic citizenship.

5.2.1 Democracy and participation

Citizenship education materials in Malawi have largely been pre-occupied with trying to define and characterize democracy (see: Gwira Mpini Kwacha, 1996; Teacher Development Unit – Student Teacher Handbook; Chirwa, Kayambazinthu & Kanyongolo, 2004). Most of such characterizations fluctuate between terminological definitions of rights and duties of citizens in a nation to functions of an elected government. For instance descriptions of the electoral system rest on the idea that people choose who is to lead them and the leaders have to follow the wishes of the electorate. Nevertheless, the materials largely concede that there is no single system known as *the* democratic system except what the majority agree on. This can easily be taken to imply a loose conception of democracy whereby whatever people agree on is justifiably democratic to them. The vernacular

position “...anthu okhala m’dziko limodzi angathe kugwirizana pakati pao njira yoyenera kuyendetsera demokalase...” (translated as: citizens within a nation concede to adopt a way of conducting themselves democratically) (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.2) epitomises this thinking. Apart from aspects of self-determination that the understanding brings out, it largely remains very fluid or non-definitive on the meaning and implications of democracy and its processes. While citizens’ consent is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for democratic life, more so that which is intended to cultivate active democratic citizenship.

The idea of citizen power is one of the frequent features in Malawi’s citizenship education materials. This ‘power’ is described in terms of the capacity of citizens to participate in “...civic affairs of one’s community...” (Teacher Development Unit, Student Teacher Handbook, p.870); the people’s rights to political activity; power to decide how and who is to govern them (op. cit., p. 990; Community Civic Educators’ Voter Education Handbook, p.11). Nevertheless, the recognition that power rests with the participation of all citizens in the political life of the nation (ibid) appears to reside in the ability of citizens to choose representatives, to make decisions, to formulate laws and also the power to administer programmes for the good of the community (Teachers’ Handbook, pp.990-1). The materials also indicate that once government is in power it can only be challenged in the next election polls, since the consent of the people “...is expressed though ... periodic elections...” (Chirwa, et. al., p.56).

The materials also promote the assumption that the will of the people is known and carried out through the government. General elections and a referendum are regarded the crucial forms of this expression. Some direct ways for the same expression of the people’s will include demonstrations, boycotts, strikes or petitions (Chirwa, et. al, p.45). Although Chirwa does not try to indicate how often and to what extent such direct means of participation the system can allow bearing in mind their retrogressive character, it is

obvious that these means are regarded as rare and periodical otherwise the democratic system itself would collapse. As such, this mode of democratic participation, at best, puts citizens on the receiving end as their participation becomes reactive rather than proactive since the quest for reasons in public affairs is far removed from being a habit of seeking for reasons in affairs of society.

Direct forms of participation such as demonstrations, boycotts or mass action have often been barred by the Malawi Police. This leaves people with periodic participation as their only option. This scenario consequently leads to a conception of the democratic process as people's handover of their will and power to government so that government acts on their behalf. No wonder, it has also been referred to as state management of the behaviour of the people within its borders and the distribution of resources to the same people through government (op. cit., p.46). Such an understanding turns citizens into spectators of their system.

Civic education materials in Malawi perceive democracy as a political process, a social process and also as a moral value (op. cit., p.88). As a political process, they argue that democratic government concerns people's will, consent, participation and the good derived from the system. As a social process, democracy is seen as comprising the "...continuous process of promoting, respecting and upholding people's rights..." (ibid). The moral dimension of democracy consists of people's aspirations for a better social and economic order from which democracy's imperative is also drawn. The ideal of participation and the moral dimension indicate a substantive notion of democracy. Nevertheless, the feeling that participatory forms of democracy are difficult to arrange because they demand that everyone directly takes part in the exercise of choice when a major decision has to be taken (op. cit., p.93) defeats the chances of cultivating maximal citizenship. Hence representative forms of government are opted for because of their apparent easiness in implementation.

The citizenship education materials associate democracy with principles of equality, tolerance, participation, regular free and fair elections, a multiparty system, rule of law, accountability and transparency, control of abuse of power, human rights and responsibilities and economic freedoms (Student Teachers Handbook, pp 991-995). The materials recognise that all people are equal, alongside the idea that we need to recognise differences in cultures, personalities, languages and beliefs (p.991). Nevertheless, equality is regarded as more a fundamental aspect of society than the recognition of difference since no further effort is made to explore how recognition of difference is a valued asset to the democratic process. In many cases, recognition of difference is played down, except where it stands as a foundation for tolerance (Teacher Development Unit, p.992, Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.2). The understanding of equality commonly evoked is that which is associated with the just society, equality before the law, equal freedoms and opportunities of all people within a nation (Chirwa, et. al, pp.89-90). Similarly, freedom is taken as "... the creation of political, social or economic spaces between one individual and others.." (p.90). As such, the materials promote a liberal democratic society and not necessarily a republican conception of society (see also Chapter Three). For instance political freedom is said to involve the ability to have views and to talk about what one thinks and believes in; the right to associate with others and move freely without hindrances; whereas economic freedom relates to private property rights, rights to work and freedom from forced labour. The social freedoms equally take a liberal stance as they are perceived to be about fair treatment of all (each individual person) and the non-interference and the avoidance of inhumane treatment of other people. (op. cit. p.91)

Democratic participation is largely understood in terms of it being a citizen's right and duty. This participation is seen as involving standing for election, debating issues, attending civic meetings, being members of organizations, paying taxes and protesting

(Student Teacher Handbook, p.992), and these are regarded as obligations in the democratic society (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, pp.2-3). Nevertheless, the right to participation falls short of delivering an active citizenship conception. The central framework of participation conceives the citizens as the acted upon and the political leaders as the actors. Proper participation by citizens involves the ability to control abuse of power by leaders; taking part in elections; *informing* their leaders about their problems and making sure leaders respond to these problems (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.11). In other words, such conceptions of participation do not consider the representative and the represented as equals who equally have the capacity to set the agenda, interrogate, and arrive at agreed solutions together. Other rights include those of expression and the press; association and the right to access information even if state bodies hold the information. These rights are understood as a pre-requisite to participation (Chirwa, et. al., pp.110, 322). In other words, given a situation where there is no abuse of power, no elections, and no problems impinging on society for immediate solutions and where leaders are dutiful without being reminded to do so, citizen participation becomes unnecessary. The major forms of participation evoked in this conception are likely to promote passive citizenship despite the recognition of citizens' right to demand information of their government. The dominant understanding considers proper participation as residing in the leaders. Consequently, the citizenship education materials easily make concessions to voting as the easiest and most accessible form of democratic participation (op. cit., p.12). The terms 'participation' and 'consultation' are also used interchangeably (Chirwa, et. al., p.110).

Democratic participation is taken to mean information-sharing, consultation, joint decision-making and initiation, and control by stakeholders. Not much space is given to ordinary citizens here because their idea of stake-holding does not include the masses, but only organisations or bodies that are representative of the general citizen population. Civil

society organisations are given more space than the citizens. This conception of democratic participation, while appearing maximal, limits the level of participation needed for a democratic culture as consultations become the routine requirements of the system. The nature of consultations above fail the deliberative test as people are put at different levels of importance thereby abrogating the deliberative conditions of equality and the capacity of all to initiate and set conditions of the discussions as well as to question and interrogate issues as equals (see Benhabib, 1996).

The Malawian citizenry is also considered to meaningfully take part in the affairs of their government through the cabinet, the judiciary and the legislature (Chirwa, et. al., p.112-113). But the reference to citizen participation in formulating policies such as Vision 2020, the Poverty Alleviation Programme, the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy and others (p.112), as the citizenship education manual would want us to believe, is difficult to sustain. Ironically, although it is indicated that people were consulted, the same handbook has argued that consultation lacks the essence of democratic participation (p.110). The fact that people were consulted through surveys does not bring the process any near to democratic participation. In addition, citizen participation in the legislative and executive arms of government is fundamentally limited because it is only a tiny minority that enjoys such participation, as is the case with juries. How the general public would influence these bodies is equally problematic. The intimation of citizen participation in the legislature by choosing its members and pushing through private bills is difficult to sustain within the frameworks of participatory democratic citizenship because elections are periodic and independent private member bills are equally rare, although when they are moved, they represent party lines of thought and not necessarily citizens' wishes.

The way power is conceived and exercised in leadership positions in Malawi overshadows the importance of citizen participation. For instance, a political party is defined as “..a

group of people who are willing to assume power and to govern the nation...” (PACGEM, p.12). This view further holds that the interaction or relationship that exists between the parties and the people before any general election is that whereby the parties hold meetings and present themselves to the people and explain how they will govern the nation once in power. The citizens, on the other hand, are the ones who “... listen and then, in the general election, choose the party which will govern them...” (ibid). These conceptions juxtapose the electorate and the parties as two different sides working to win against each other. The citizens’ responsibilities are similarly reduced to registration, checking the voters’ roll, gathering enough information on parties and candidates; respecting the rights of other voters, accepting the results and desisting from fraud etc. (Chirwa, Kanyongolo, & Kayambazinthu, p.198-199). Grossly missing from such conceptualisations are questions of citizen participation in the process of forming opinions about these parties and individuals who stand for elections. The citizenship education materials are also silent on whether people and parties who stand for election should subject their manifestos to continuous public scrutiny and debate. At best, the individual is characterised as someone who continuously keeps one’s cards close to one’s chest without ever allowing anyone to know them.

A conception of active citizenship in this regard needs to conceive and define a framework of citizenship that enables the continuous participation of all. Irrespective of democracy being vulnerable to numerous shapes, the requirement for the development of democratic virtues such as meaningful respect of difference, toleration and the spirit in everyone to make the public one’s own domain of activity are essential for the cultivation of active citizenship. Although the concept of general will is one of the major concepts in developing democracy, an over-emphasis of this concept unnecessarily leads to aggregative processes. In a way this factor removes the need for a deliberative process where the quest

for a consensus is continual and assumes the equality of all involved to initiate and participate in the public talk. The quest for an active democratic citizenship would require us to create an education model where the conditions for the creation of a deliberative citizen are nurtured. In other words, learners need to be developed to make a reasoned argument that would be compelling to others while acknowledging the worth and values of others. This further means that learners or any democrats for that matter should cultivate the skills to co-operate with others while appreciating the perspectives and experiences of others (Enslin, Pendlebury, & Tjiattas, 2001. p 116).

5.2.2 Human rights and freedom

The discussion of human rights and freedoms in Chapter Three (above) acknowledges that these two are constitutive features and goals of any democracy (see also Chirwa, et. al. p.89-90). They are an entitlement of every person in a democratic nation. Nevertheless, the particular way in which human rights and freedoms are brought to bear on people's daily lives indicates whether such a conception can or cannot cultivate active citizenship. In Malawi's citizenship programmes, freedom is conceived as "...the ability to make choices or do things without being worried or stopped by others as one creates the political, social or economic space *between oneself and others ...*" (op. cit, p.90, emphasis mine). Political freedoms are, therefore, characterised by the ability to have one's views and talk about personal thoughts and beliefs, to associate with others and the freedom of movement. On the other hand, economic freedoms are marked by the ability to own and use property, to work and the absence of forced labour, whereas social freedoms are about equality and non-interference in individual privacy and dignity (op. cit. p.91). These conceptions of freedom are formal and private or individual orientated. They are silent on whether such

individual freedoms take their social positioning seriously in terms of engaging the individual holder of the freedoms in interaction for some common or society good. For instance, despite the recognition that levels of education are generally low especially among females in Malawi and that females have less access to schools and other formal educational institutions, the handbook still maintains that everyone has a right to education irrespective of these differential circumstances, let alone without mention of the differential circumstances as reasons that may deny others the right to education because they cannot simply be in school. In this regard, a conception of active citizenship would require strong recognition of the differential circumstances people are born into, even in poor rural societies; where women and children need special attention for them to realise their freedoms and rights to education, for instance.

The rights and freedoms are conceived and taught as the principles and values of democracy. They form part of the heart of the constitution of Malawi (Faiti, p.11; Student Teacher Handbook p.3). From the rights enshrined in the constitution arise the freedoms that people have in a nation. The materials further hold that people's knowledge of human rights sustains and promotes a democratic culture. Human rights are regarded to be a form of citizen empowerment (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.14). These include the right to life, liberty, equality, respect for human dignity, the right to privacy, freedom of association; the rights of a child, women's rights; freedom of thought, freedom of the press; the right to education; culture and language; the right to equal access to justice (Teachers' Handbook, pp 981-987). The nation is expected to protect these individual rights (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.3). Through such a conception, the individual person and government are set apart. There is also a growing indication that if law and order, peace, security and stability are enabling conditions to national prosperity and development, then the state is under an obligation to provide these to its citizens. This is in addition to expecting the state to make

laws and regulations to protect the citizens and their property (Kayambazinthu, et al, p.40). In other words, by solely concentrating on knowledge, the materials heavily miss out on other equally important enabling conditions for the cultivation of active democratic citizenships. The idea that the values should translate into appropriate democratic dispositions enabling the citizens to cultivate democratic skills and aptitudes (Crick Report, 6.8.3, p.41) should have become another central pillar for developing democratic citizenship. The conceptualisation given to the rights between the state and individual leaves the state and citizens in a 'clientele' relationship, requiring no major action from the citizens apart from keeping peace, law and order in response to the state keeping its duties (p.41-42). Such conceptions resemble Schumpeter's elite forms of democracy and are likely to develop and promote a passive form of citizenship.

Two forms of rights, already mentioned above, are worth discussing in this particular case. These are women's rights and children's rights. The two categories have often sparked controversy because of diverse historical and cultural backgrounds. For instance, Malawi's cultural practices have for a long time perceived the woman as a second-class citizen, subordinate to and servant to a man. On the other hand, children because of age and apparent lack of knowledge and full induction into society's ways have similarly been considered second-class citizens. In other words, traditional conceptions of a woman and a child ascribe lesser forms of personhood, dignity and status to women and children. This historical cultural background necessarily demands a substantive approach to the rights of women and children. Instead, women's and children's rights are accorded equal and formal recognition just as any other rights and without consideration of the historical and cultural factors, and how this background affects the execution of such rights. In this regard, the idea that the "...presence and absence of a particular group within human rights and how such presence or lack of it appears affects the fundamental defining characteristics of those

rights...” (Taylor, 1994, p.105) is not considered, thereby putting all women and children, all poor and rich under the watchful eye of an abstract and universal construct of rightness. Such an approach, as is also the case in Malawi, has negative effects on the right to education and is likely to hinder the cultivation of appropriate democratic skills and aptitudes for citizenship.

While it is common knowledge that conditions of schooling in rural and urban areas are not the same, a formal recognition of the right to education puts every school going person on an equal footing with another. It assumes that differences and fundamental gaps do not exist between different categories of people to an extent that they would affect educational goals. Therefore, no effort is made to acknowledge difference in social, cultural and economic positions and how these affect the teaching of human rights, let alone how rights are ascribed to the different categories of people in question. As a result, the approach produces different understandings of human rights and freedom because of the influence of access and exposure.

Human rights link up with other equally important issues in citizenship education such as issues of governance and development. Chirwa, et. al (2004, Ch.4) connect the importance of human rights with the empowerment of individuals and the communities in solving their social and economic problems. According to them, human rights observance enables the people to maintain their solidarity, which is founded on equal entitlements and dues. Human rights are also regarded as a pivot in conflict resolution and solution-seeking initiatives in society. On the other hand, the link between human rights and good governance comes in through people’s participation. Effective accountability is seen as possible only in those cases where the citizens know their rights and duties and duly exercise their power to control representatives (p.323). While government and public institutions are placed in a position where they need to be transparent in their activities, this

transparency does not presuppose that citizens already know how government and public institutions are supposed to operate. The call to transparency needs to be accompanied with appropriate civic education about the institutions to ensure that citizens know that such transparency is meant to enable them to have a say in those public institutions. In so far as citizen participation is concerned in things that affect citizens' life, the citizenship education initiative in this source remains non-definitive on the extent of active citizen participation.

Secondly, the connection between human rights, governance and development is central. Our discussion in Chapter Four shows that cultivating an active citizenship requires parallel processes of development and democratisation. It also requires a republican conception of freedom and human rights. The conceptual links between human rights, development and democracy in Malawi's citizenship education are problematic. The relationship between these three is framed in legalistic claims and entitlements, thereby inducing the same impression seen above of the state as provider and protector of citizen's goods while the citizen waits to be protected and provided for, as the citizen also pursues private interests. This understanding has a direct impact on citizens' responsibilities and duties to each other, which are characterised here as the enjoyment of one's rights without interference with and from others. The tit-for-tat conception implied here would rarely promote peaceful existence, as the handbook would want us to assume. Citizens' responsibilities to the state emerge as an exchange for the benefits one gets by living in a community of democracy (Chirwa, et. al. pp337-340).

Citizenship education on rights and freedoms promotes a limited conception of citizen engagement by assuming that one's responsibilities towards other individuals are met through abiding by the constitution in terms of respecting equal dignity and equal status before the law. Even the Biblical *dictum* that "...you do unto other what you would like

them to do to you...” (op. cit., p.338) as an international measure of how human rights agreements impose responsibilities of non-interference into other people’s freedoms is not a sufficient condition to enable the cultivation of active democratic citizenship. On the other hand, citizenship education in Malawi requires the teaching of human rights where sufficient consideration is made of the problems, dilemmas and confrontations in the conception and application of rights and freedoms. This consideration needs to take us to the recognition and appropriate use of difference; that other sections of society even within the school environment require more and explicit social recognition and action in order for them to realise their freedoms and rights. Rather than putting tradition and modernity in stark confrontation, learners in schools need to be taught how they can engage with both as they try to realise everyone’s freedoms and rights. This approach can ensure that both unity and diversity are understood and used to enhance development and democracy.

The approach in teaching human rights and freedoms by avoiding deeper and controversial issues that leads to formal and surface treatment of these issues needs to be replaced by teaching the very controversial issues we are dodging, such as the practical relationship between individual rights and social obligations. Rights related to individual sexual matters are also controversial especially that Malawi predominantly favours cultural and religious traditional sexual morals. There is also a need for schools to promote the right to have a view and the right to speak about one’s formed views in public without fear of reprisals or social exclusion. The teaching of such issues will enable learners to strengthen their spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (Crick Report, p. 36). There are a number of merits to this approach. Other than generating knowledge, the teaching of controversial issues prepares learners to properly situate themselves within the social, political and cultural milieu, thereby providing them with appropriate skills of engaging with difference, finding their spaces as active agents in society. This way of educating learners renews their

sense of duties and responsibilities as they also develop skills necessary for sustaining a culture of democracy. A long-term concentration on formal freedoms and rights is likely to hinder the very promotion of active citizenship.

5.2.3 Democracy and development in Malawi's citizenship education

Good leaders promote the development of their area whereas bad leaders bring problems that may retard development (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.14).

The concept of development that is promoted in citizenship education in Malawi is largely leader-driven. It is assumed that it is the type of leadership that affects the nature and pace of development. For instance, NICE laments, "... in spite of the political transition from one party to a multiparty system of government, Malawi continues to reel under the legacy of the one party state. She continues to suffer from abject poverty, high incidence of HIV/AIDS; a higher illiteracy rate and she is largely ill-prepared and ill-informed to actively and effectively participate in the democratic process to contribute to the country's development..." (Faiti, p.2). Hence development and democracy are linked. The second periodisation of citizenship education, according to NICE, concentrates on HIV/AIDS, environment, gender, health, youth empowerment, and poverty and food security. Although this appears maximal in its approach, there is a consistent shift from being political to being apolitical, to divorce development from politics (see also Englund, 2004, p.12). Such shifts demand a proper re-conceptualisation of the relationship between development and democracy.

Others parade adequate resources as a condition for the enjoyment of social and economic rights. These resources include education, health and other social services which government has to provide to its people. Given that Malawi has a low GDP and widespread

poverty, they also argue that government cannot afford to pay for these services for the people (Chirwa, et. al., op. cit.). As such, the argument claims that poverty puts Malawi in an awkward situation where neither government can provide for people's basic needs nor can the people provide for themselves. This understanding assumes a maximalist perspective. Nevertheless, the maximal implications do not go far enough because of the apparent equation between low GDP and poverty with eventual lack of citizen participation. The Afrobarometer (Briefing Paper No.4) shows that such an equation is erroneous.

There is some evidence of maximalist elements in the assumed relationship between democracy, human rights and development (Chirwa, Kanyongolo & Kayambazinthu, p.304-305). For instance, one's rights include "... the right to be a central subject of development; the right to participate in development; the right to fair distribution of development benefits and the right to development itself..." (p.117). While the promotion of human rights as a drive towards self-determination has maximalist implications, these sentiments are overridden by minimalist conceptions when the right to achieve and live to one's potential become an individual's own prerogative (op. cit., p.316). Hence minimal conceptions become predominant, as development is understood to lean heavily on formal concepts and formal recognition of human rights.

Malawi's approach to citizenship education includes the idea that development comes from the investment of financial and technical resources and the proper utilisation of natural resources; and that the misuse of resources results in distorted patterns of development where some areas become more developed than others (op. cit.). Although poverty and development acquire minimalist technical expressions, some recognition of human capability is made (p.235). This idea is maximal. Poverty puts one in a state of continuous deprivation and is antithetical to development. While it may be true that the poor have less

capacity to participate in productive activities, it is again difficult to ascertain that they would not actively participate in their political system given the opportunity.

Poverty Alleviation Programmes are referred to as development projects. Other similar programmes include the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS), the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), the Targeted Input Programme (TIP), The Decentralization Programme, the Youth Fund and the Free Primary Education. These programmes are designed to address the needs of the poor. Most of these programmes, except for free primary education, target the economic upliftment of the citizens; and it is assumed that increased participation of citizens in the economic activities of the country would lead to their development (Chirwa, et. al., p.238-242). MASAF, for instance is said to provide direct employment, provide food safety nets, and enable government to monitor levels of poverty (241). Interestingly, the conception of development that is harboured in these programmes leans more on economic and material development other than holistic human development. MASAF is a loan from the World Bank for infrastructural development. With regard to MASAF phases 1 and 2, the citizens had a say only in terms of indicating what needed to be constructed in their area.¹⁰ The structure of the programme was such that it recruited village volunteers to work on the project for a daily pay. The projects were directly under the district coordinator. The village committees were there to see to it that there were enough people working on the project. As an employed provider, the project recruited people only from its own catchment area and the expert subcontracted to do the project had nothing much to do with recruitment. The MASAF programme is meant to provide “direct employment to poor families to provide safety nets in poor and food deficient areas through food-for-work, among others” (p.241). The framework of MASAF

¹⁰ There is indication that MASAF Phase III has taken a different approach of locating all the processes from project proposal to implementation in the local people themselves (Liwonde, MASAF Official, 10-01-05). Efforts to source official documents on this shift proved futile

I and II puts doubt on the extent to which people are free and participate in shaping their social, economic and political life as claimed by some of the civic programmes. Formulation is by elite members whereas implementation is motivated by the need to survive. It is the impoverished livelihoods that are expected to participate so that they sustain themselves. As such a conception of democratic citizenship arising from these sources is likely to promote passive citizenship because its conception of citizen participation is narrow.

Nevertheless, in a few cases, the citizenship education materials come to terms with a United Nations perspective on development that is people-centred. A people centred conception of development measures development in terms of the dignity and value of people that is promoted and protected. In order to do this, the development rating considers such factors as adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, education, work and sustainable environment as integral to the defining development.

Human rights are central to the promotion of development that focuses on people because the rights empower people not only to satisfy their basic needs but also to realise their full potential as human beings (p.324)

This view of development involves all aspects of human existence, although it makes entitlement the major condition for people realising their full potential. Nevertheless, a rights perspective still dodges such understanding because Chirwa argues that a “person who has a right has the legal power to compel the relevant duty-bearer to deliver services or goods to which the right-holder is entitled” (p.324). But in this case, the rights have a maximal implication only if people actively and continuously demand of their government to provide for necessary conditions through which people would partake of their own development. While a culture of human rights is regarded to assign duties and obligations amongst which development would be delivered, a conception of formal rights and

freedoms within the development discourse is likely to remove the dynamism and the reciprocity of human beings that is usually engaged with when development takes place. Recognition and respect for human rights, though, provide a conducive environment for development to take place.

This section concludes that although in some cases gestures are made towards a maximalist conception of the relationship between democracy and development, to a large extent development is understood as something people have to be given and not as something they participate in through all its processes. This conception is more likely to cultivate non-engaging citizens in the processes of their development.

5.3 A knowledge or a practise-based approach to citizenship education in Malawi? A concluding remark.

The argument that has been defended above does not conclude that a knowledge-based approach to citizenship is wholly useless. On the other hand, effort has been paid to showing that an over-emphasis on knowledge is likely to contribute to develop passive citizens. Most of Malawi's citizenship education is pre-occupied with providing "general information on the rights of individuals in a democratic society and on how democracy works" (PACGEM Handbook, Foreword, p. 2). Knowledge of the constitution, government and functions of civil society groups become prominent. This approach tends to present civic education information in an apparently neutral manner thereby making the materials and consequent action non-controversial, not appealing for people's consequent civic action. Englund's analysis of the programmes and approaches of NICE indicates that at a time when other civic education groups in Malawi were engaged in heated debates about extending the presidential term of office to three from two, NICE became very non-

committal. This was done in order to make NICE appear a neutral organization (2004, pp11-13). But the idea that civic educators keep their political opinions to themselves in such controversial issues defeats the purpose of creating active citizens in a nation. It introduces dualistic forms in educating people for democratic participation. It makes them assume that democracy and democratic participation should not evoke the dilemmas and contradictions of public life.

What this chapter has tried to show is that education for democratic citizenship in Malawi needs to be understood within its political, historical, social and economic context. This consideration reveals that if a nation like Malawi wants to cultivate active citizens who meaningfully take part in the affairs of the nation then a strong citizenship education built on the values of deliberative democracy needs to be cultivated. The current citizenship education efforts in Malawi come in as an intervention to a long period of strong hegemonic culture that sought to train citizens as subjects of the ruling regime, where difference was heretical instead of being a resource and nothing other than the single party and its members existed. This exposition finally indicates that in so far as teaching for democracy is concerned, Malawi's approaches concentrate on imparting formal knowledge of democratic principles and structures and how these things are supposed to operate, and is very likely to promote passive citizenship.

While this exposition recognises the importance of teaching issues such as the electoral system and its associated citizen rights and duties, the electoral process alone is not sufficient for cultivating active citizenship although it can be a legitimate indicator. A young democracy like Malawi would need to be grounded on sound democratic principles and liberal democratic principles are required for this. Nevertheless, more is required to cultivate and sustain democratic citizenship than the aforementioned. The knowledge base or understanding that is built around democratic principles needs to be supported by

appropriate social and moral responsibility, and community involvement (Crick Report, 2.10, p.11). But these obligations cannot be fulfilled if learners are not prepared to accept substantive and intractable disagreements on basic questions as part of the whole deliberative process. Cultivating the required dispositions and skills for such democratic life requires that learners are led to engage in critical reflection on their own views so that they manage to consider what would count as good reasons from other people's perspectives (Enslin, Pendlebury & Tjiattas, 2001, p.124).

This approach seeks to include all perspectives in those concerned even if these are different. The form of citizenship education that can develop these capacities in learners is that where the common grounds for conversation are promoted, where learners are lead in practical terms to develop discussion, communication and teamwork skills (Crick Report, 3.11, p.16); where apart from learning to argue cogently and effectively, they are also enabled to think for themselves and apply the required democratic skills and aptitudes. Therefore the cultivation of active democratic citizenship requires that in school practices learners become involved in discussion and consultation on matters of school life that concern them and about which they can be expected to develop reasonable views. Whether in or out of school, this conception also provides for the involvement of people in identifying, planning, executing and evaluating projects in their societies.

The current approaches to citizenship education in Malawi are too dependent on a representative conception of democracy and a minimalist notion of citizenship. These approaches need to incorporate the practical cultivation of democratic skills of tolerance, respect for diversity and difference, co-operation, critical reflection and deliberation using diverse modes as basic necessities for the development of active democratic citizenship. Participatory forms of democracy coupled with republican conceptions of freedom and

rights, a re-orientation of the link between democracy and development provide suitable conditions for this goal.

CHAPTER SIX

EDUCATING FOR ACTIVE DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: A

CONCLUSION

6.0 Introduction

The notion of citizenship is complex and heavily contested, and as a result citizenship education takes varied forms. For instance, proponents of (elite) representation, like Schumpeter, argue that representation is the only practicable way of conducting democracy while others, such as Budge, think that representation should never override direct citizen participation because of the merits of participation in the education for the democratic citizens. This dissertation has endeavoured to explore the tensions and ambiguities that exist between representative and participatory forms of democracy; between contestatory forms, and formal and abstract notions of freedom and rights; and the dichotomous relations frequently assumed between development and democratic participation and citizenship. This examination, of the shifts and tensions, has also used McLaughlin's (1992) maximal-minimal conceptual framework. Just as maximal and minimal forms of citizenship exist as discrete conceptions; it is not possible to exclude representative forms of democracy, and formal and abstract conceptions of freedom and human rights. But it is clear that efforts to cultivate a democratic active citizenship need to go beyond these formal conceptions and actively engage citizens. In other words, the dissertation contends that participatory forms of democracy along with republican forms of freedom and human rights are a pre-requisite for the education and development of such active citizenship. Malawi's citizenship education partially achieves this goal. However, the over-emphasis on what citizens need to know is at the expense of the virtues and dispositions that citizens

need to cultivate. The following is a summation of the case for democratic active citizenship in Malawi.

6.1 The preference for participatory models of democratic citizenship

The two competing approaches to democracy outlined above (chapter two), representative democracy and participatory democracy, can be understood within a continuum of citizen participation. Mention of both forms as in practice in Malawi is not surprising, though ambiguous because the maximal characterisations do not exist with the same impact as the minimal characterisations (see Chirwa, et. al. p.93-94). The practise of democracy in Malawi leans more towards the limited forms of representative democracy, which are also formal and legal. Citizenship education programmes focus more on formal meanings; constituents and principles of democracy (Teacher Development Unit; Cairns & Dambula, 1996; Chirwa, et. al., 2004) than on the virtues and dispositions that citizens require for effective participation. Participatory forms only exist as constituents of the mixed form of democracy and are given lip service; hence they are also minimal. This approach is more likely to create a favourable ground for the promotion of passive citizens at the expense of participative citizens.

Although some forms of representative democracy can be participatory in the sense of engaging citizens into multiple forms of social arrangements (see Section 2.2; Pitkin, 1996), an examination of Malawi's case indicates that elite forms of representation offer a more competitive form of democracy and are predominant. The periodic elections and issues of political leadership receive marked emphasis. Although elite democracy differentiates the education of leaders from that of the masses by specifying levels of knowledge expected for each group, such differentiation is not very explicit in Malawi. But

in general, circumstances relating to citizenship education are such that they favour representative democracy, hence they are likely to fail to prepare citizens adequately for democratic participation.

We argue that the pattern is Schumpeterian because by giving everyone formal knowledge, the cultivation of skills and democratic dispositions is withheld from the citizens. Some think that teaching citizens the different systems of government and their challenges, and also the system of human rights should consolidate democracy and legally defend it (Chirwa, et. al). This approach, while good at giving out the basic knowledge and information about democratic systems and expectations is not enough to foster active citizenship. It promotes a limited conception of democratic citizenship and only pays lip-service to participation as essential for democracy. For instance, the ideas that “...democracy is a way of life..” (Chirwa, et. al., p.20) and that people have a right to political participation are maximal, but prioritising knowledge alongside these ideas reduces them to minimal conceptions. Again, the ideas that democratic participation involves people’s participation through a parliament, juries and cabinet as Chirwa et al (2004, p.112) would have us believe are essentially minimal. Parliamentary consultations are rare, the practise of juries is confined to the three high courts in Malawi, and the cabinet posts are not fully representative of the people because of their limited numbers, selection and functions. Hence, the ways through which these people will participate are not extensive enough to allow for a wide citizenship engagement.

While it is the case that “...education must involve knowledge and understanding...” (Peters, 1966, p.45), an education for democratic citizenship requires more than just information on constitutions, systems of government and the legal system and its operations. This would produce a certain form of ‘philosophic education’, which would commit itself to seeking the truth and promoting a rational inquiry (McLaughlin, 1992, p.

238); but this would not support the democratic political community we live in. Such philosophic education tends to produce "...unreflective socialisation into the political and social status quo..." (ibid) and cannot lead to active democratic participation. McLaughlin suggests that cultivation of active democratic citizens crucially depends on the cultivation of a more extensive range of dispositions and virtues in addition to the broad critical understanding (ibid). In other words, a citizenship education that over-concentrates on the knowledge base virtually becomes insufficient for the cultivation of active democratic citizenship, according to McLaughlin (1992).

Aggregational tendencies are at odds with the cultivation of an active, deliberative and democratic citizenship. Barber's (1984) understanding of the political as arising "when some action of public consequence becomes necessary and people make a public choice that is reasonable in the face of conflict despite the absence of an independent ground of judgement" (p.132) requires a deliberative and a participatory framework. Barber proposes an approach to democratic participation that refuses aggregational processes and settles for continuous deliberation in the public arena of all that concerns everyone. In other words, decisions that affect a group of people have to be the outcome of free and reasoned deliberation among equals, reached by the principles of equality and symmetry (Benhabib 1996, p.68-70). But it is also the case that such a process would need to recognise that all can initiate speech, interrogate and debate issues using forms of expression and language that would best enable individuals to do this (see also Young, 1996). The communicative and deliberative model is more likely to educate for active democratic citizenship, where "...citizenship becomes its own training ground and participation its own tutor..." (Barber, p. 152). By providing sufficient enabling conditions for participation, the enabling conditions for reciprocity and mutuality are also set. These conditions provide the necessary grounds for public action.

In view of the above-mentioned ideals, teaching for democratic citizenship in Malawi requires a fundamental turning-around in order to incorporate the development of skills and aptitudes. Learners need to be taught to embrace the democratic value of tolerating difference; i.e. that difference is at the very heart of democratic practice. Practically, this requirement implies that learners be encouraged to engage and discuss in and outside school such controversial issues as inter- and intra-party conflicts, why some people are banned from their parties or choose to leave the parties they joined, the multiplication of political parties; that talking politics no more becomes a taboo and becomes everyone's responsibility. Much more than this, learners should be given the skills to deliberate and dialogue with those regarded to hold beliefs and opinions different from their own.

The tendency to think representatives, by virtue of their office, know what is good for the represented is another limitation to active participation in Malawi. Schooling, therefore, needs to provide more enabling conditions for the active involvement of learners if they are to effectively have a say in all matter that concern them. One way of doing this is to allow class representatives to handle issues only after they have been thoroughly exhausted at class level by the participation of everyone. For instance, learners can deliberate on issues such as their disciplinary system, how justice should be administered in their school and how they would want disputes amongst themselves to be settled. If learners are led to the cultivation of these skills, it is very likely that they will also be empowered to initiate speech, interrogate and debate issues meaningfully. This democratic mandate means that learners should also be motivated to raise pertinent issues that affect their lives and the school even if the teachers and the parents association have not raised them.

There are many more things that learners in schools could do in order to acquire the skills to become active democracy citizens. Most of the skills suggested above require the capacity to listen to others even if their point may not be expressed in the most rational way

or even if they personally do not agree with the ideas. The cultivation of a deliberative democratic character is indispensable for Malawi. Gould (1990), who we have discussed in Chapter One, argues that the cultivation of democratic agency and democratic reciprocity are necessary pillars for active democratic citizenship. Learners and indeed all citizens in Malawi need to be encouraged to develop a sense of ownership of the democratic process. But for all this to be possible, no one position should be privileged as people deliberate.

The requirements for the cultivation of active citizenship put a number of demands on the school curriculum. If learners are expected to discuss and communicate their views fully; if they are to argue effectively on their positions, negotiate successfully across difference and cooperate with others, then it is not the duty of the subject of Social Studies alone. These skills and aptitudes can better developed if they are included in all school curricula; and that it becomes the duty of all people involved in the life of the school, learners, teachers, parents and government or proprietors, if the school is private.

6.2 Beyond a formal human rights education approach for democratic citizens

The programs for consolidating democracy in Malawi need to go beyond the present formal explanations of human rights involving among other things, definitions, sources, classifications, protection of rights and other human rights instruments, thereby confining democratic participation to a rights approach. Malawi's human rights approaches are also essentially knowledge based and give a broad spectrum of political ideas. Democracy is seen as "...a continuous process of promoting, respecting and upholding people's rights and freedoms, equality of persons..." (Chirwa, et. al, p.88-91); promoting the respect for law and order (p.40). In fact the whole question of strengthening governance institutions and promoting development is regarded to be founded and operating on the existence and

connection between civil and political rights (p.302). Similarly, the state-citizen relationship acquires 'clientele' marks. The teaching on human rights in Malawi formalises human rights to the extent that democratic diversity in human rights is submerged. Human rights are presented as neat and straightforward issues that have to be applied across the board without any consideration of the differences that exist between people and their life circumstances.

The above approach has several limitations. At the heart of this formalism is the assumption that what is important is merely the knowledge that democratic citizens need to acquire about human rights. In effect, this approach assumes practice to be an inevitable consequence of the knowledge base approach, which is not necessarily the case. In a formalistic and abstract manner, human rights are framed and taught through such items as the constitution, voter education, bill of rights and the operations of the legal system (see also Carrim, et.al, 2000, p.34). Such an approach removes the controversies, the steam and makes human rights issues apolitical. It turns them into ready-made products to be applied in all circumstances without even having a critical perspective on their applicability. This has become the comfort zone of many civic educators in Malawi such as NICE and the Democracy Consolidation programme, despite its negative effects of not educating citizens for democratic participation.

In order to promote active and strong citizenship, the human rights programmes and approaches to human freedom in Malawi need to go beyond the formal presentation, which is knowledge-based. The teaching for democratic citizenship is likely to produce active citizenship if issues surrounding human rights are understood and practised in full awareness of the dilemmas and the confrontations that arise from them. Human rights approaches that are likely to promote active citizenship are also expected to operate and work not only from their legal but also moral perspectives and implications (Enslin &

Pendlebury, op. cit.). For instance, the implementation of the right to equality needs to be understood and made to apply while at the same time acknowledging that certain sections of society require a stronger affirmation of their rights. In this regard, schools can effectively bring this into effect by requiring that boys and girls participate equally in the activities of the school, that there are equal numbers of boys and girls in positions; and that in practice the roles of the boys and the girls are given equal status. More than this, the roles of girls need to be supported strongly in order to defuse the cultural oppression of women. This practice is more likely to develop skills of active participation in all members of the school, and the commitment to make the object of right truly secure as they work for its political realization (see also Pogge, 2002). Of course it can be counter-argued to say: What is if the girls and other traditional minorities do not want to participate? While it is true that not all girls and other excluded groups would opt to participate, the practice of democratic inclusion, even by a small number at the beginning, has the capacity to motivate others to participate. Participation breeds knowledge and interest.

The teaching of human rights in schools is not a matter of one subject or learning area. School curriculum and ethos needs to be infused with human rights. In other words, the school needs officially to insist school members to manifest behaviour that respects and promotes human rights at school and in society. The limitations to some human rights approaches as discussed above can be overcome by a practical consideration and discussion of the responsibilities and duties that human rights place on members of society. There is a temptation here to go formal in order to avoid confrontation of different rights-claims. This approach, which is likely to avoid the central issues in human rights practice in the long run, can be refreshed so that it considers the dilemmas and confrontations and how they affect human rights practice. Some of the controversial issues in school include freedom of conscience and religion and the democratic requirement to consider others as

equals and their views as equally demanding respect even if they may go against what we believe in. The cultivation of these attitudes to the promotion of human rights has more benefit of striking a middle ground between the apparent divergent human rights claims of individuals and the value of diversity that democratic society should promote and protect.

6.3 Education for active democratic citizenship and development

Citizenship education programmes in Malawi reflect a dichotomy in the relationship between civic duties and national development. Among other things, the thinking that ‘all people’ need to be involved in a development partnership between government and civil society is not specific enough on the roles citizens will play since the system basically operates within a representative conception of democracy (see Chirwa, et al, 2004). Despite having maximal overtones, the above perspective has inbuilt limitations that make the approach not as maximalist as it appears. The involvement of all stakeholders in development requires such involvement to be concurrent with people’s political participation. Development and democratic participation need to be understood as two sides of the same coin. People’s participation is not only a right but it is also a responsibility and a democratic obligation.

The current forms of citizenship education in Malawi are likely to produce minimalist virtues by making people concentrate on loyalties and responsibilities that are local and immediate. The invitation for people to participate in developing local areas where individuals live needs to be made alongside the invitation to participate in the way politics and democracy operate. The idea that people should not bring politics into development work because the former retards the latter is at odds with the demands for active democratic participation. On the other hand, development and democratisation need to go

hand in hand. Engagement in public matters should no more take the form of voluntary work, because this approach creates weaker social obligations and also conditions the promotion of passive citizenship. The maximal approach offers an extended sense of the loyalties and responsibilities beyond the immediate and local concerns, where individual citizens become more concerned with issues of justice extending to a wider horizon. The ideal being advocated here finds the ideals of 'advocacy' and 'lobbying' present in Malawi's citizenship education (Chirwa, et. al, p.113) inadequate to help cultivate active democratic citizenship because of their limitations in promoting extended citizen democratic involvement.

The sense of direct participation of people in development programmes in Malawi is equally dubious. Chirwa, et. al. (2004) assume that citizens participate in developing policies of programmes such as MASAF, Vision 2020 and MPRS (ibid). But the sense of direct and participatory democracy assumed here does not have any strong semblance with the essence of direct and participatory democracy as explained by Budge (1993), Barber (1984) and others. The MASAF Project promotes doubt on the extent to which active citizenship would be engaged except for the fact that it creates a huge labour demand, which in turn provides employment to the villagers. Hence participation in MASAF projects does not have the conditions to cultivate active democratic citizenship. For citizen participation in MASAF to acquire democratic significance the orientation of the whole programme would need to change so that the citizens are involved in all the stages of the programme. In this regard, citizens would need to be engaged in the conception of the programme, planning (which includes, among other things, agreeing on how to source and resource the programme), implementation, and evaluation. In so far as MASAF I is concerned, citizens were contracted as labourers, an ideal far apart from participatory requirements in democracy. On the other hand, Vision 2020 is a project aimed at finding

people's aspirations and attempts to map what the nation needs to achieve by the year 2020. The people's participation involved providing a vision, but only a small representative sample was contacted. The limitations on consultation in the sense of seeking specialist knowledge puts doubt on the extent to which we can claim Vision 2020 to be participatory. Vision 2020 needed greater involvement of all citizens at community. This would also help create a sense of ownership for the goals and implementation of the vision. The MPRS is primarily a requirement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it aims to "achieve sustainable poverty reduction through socio-economic and political empowerment of the poor" (p.239). Within this programme, the pillar of good governance is meant to "ensure that public and civil society institutions and programmes protect and benefit the poor" (ibid). By treating the poor as an object, these programmes lead to minimalist conceptions of democracy.

While the above the above programmes only begin to set the pace for the link between development and democracy, they fall short of adequate citizen involvement. The programmes do not meet the favourable conditions for the creation of participative and deliberative citizens in a democracy. For these programmes to assist in the cultivation of active democratic citizenship, the recognition and engagement of urgency of the citizens is irrevocable. Sen (1999) and Ake (1996) provide us with important tools of engaging democracy and development simultaneous and as two sides of the same process. By engaging with the people's sense of freedom as the major goal of development, it would be possible to take the citizens "...as the agents, means as well as the ends of (their) development..." (Ake, 140-1). This would enable the people to participate and become part of the development and democratisation process. Hence development and democracy would both engage in promoting the capacities and the faculties people have in order to live better lives. Such an approach seeks to broaden the way freedom, let alone

development, are conceived (Sen, 1999) and the extent to which citizens participate in matters relating to their society.

This dissertation considers that by reconceptualising development and democracy in this way, more enabling conditions for the cultivation of active citizens would be created. The school's mandate in this regard is to encourage and lead learners to engage in development as involving the expansion and exercise of their freedoms, and not merely to consider development as technological advancement. The cultivation of values, skills and dispositions that we have discussed earlier would be promoted by requiring community involvement of learners; in as far as this is practicable. Community involvement is likely to provide learners with first-hand experience of their civic responsibilities as well as create in them a capacity for joint problem solving skills. In addition, learners should also be encouraged to take care of school facilities and consider these facilities as their own. In this regard, it can improve the way learners see their environment if they are made to contribute toward the renovation of the facilities and not only when one has damaged part of these facilities. This approach has better chances of slowing the rate of property breakage in most schools which is mostly blamed on democracy and its freedoms.

6.4 Final Remarks

This dissertation has argued that Malawi requires cultivating active democratic citizenship virtues and skills both for the life of democracy itself and the building of a proper relationship between development and democracy. As such, it has also laboured to show that participatory democracy along with republican and contestatory forms of freedoms and human rights create more conditions for the cultivation of active democratic citizenship. This argument has been made through a number of ways. In the first place, an exposition of

Malawi's historical and traditional context indicates that concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship are required if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. The cultivation of a democratic character that is marked by democratic reciprocity and agency is also central to this project in order to offset the effects of negative traditional forms of leadership and the political culture that was instilled by the single party regime after independence.

In order to build a strong democracy, it has been shown that a maximal, participatory conception of democracy is more appropriate than a minimal, representative one. Current approaches to citizenship education in Malawi are too dependent on a representative conception of democracy and a minimalist notion of citizenship. Representative forms of democracy provide formal and abstract conceptions of rights and freedoms, the basic knowledge system for democratic culture to be built on, but they do not go far enough in developing democratic skills and aptitudes that would enable the cultivation of active citizenship. Hence the long tradition of political hegemony, illiteracy and others makes the adoption and promotion of representative models of democracy and citizen participation in Malawi risks the nation's own democratic goal. Democratic values and dispositions, skills and aptitudes, demand more than just knowledge. They demand participative public action by a democratic character.

Malawi's democratic citizenship education requires the cultivation of a republican conception of freedom because such a conception is more suited to citizenship education for participatory democracy than a negative, liberal one. Here again, this dissertation does not claim that all liberal conceptions are at odds with the development of active citizenship. A positive conception provides the ground for democratic agency. Education for democratic citizenship in Malawi needs to enable the citizens to find meaning and discover their freedom in the public sphere where activity becomes the mark of one's civic duties.

This approach is more likely to stimulate people's interest in public affairs and educate them about this public domain. On the other hand, a formal conception of human rights that focuses mainly on the constitution does not encourage citizens to become involved in public affairs.

Education for democratic citizenship requires schools to promote a healthy engagement of the dilemmas, tensions and contradictions that issues of human rights and freedoms pose for democratic life in society. In this case, the distinction between maximal and minimal conceptions of citizenship education will lie on the extent to which human rights issues are taken as matters of practice and not merely knowledge. The effectiveness of any human rights approach is tested in people's application of the said bodies of knowledge and their capacity to demand participation in the protection and enhancement of these rights and freedoms. With this process, citizens are likely to broaden their critical awareness of how differences of social, economic and political position affect their overall social conditions and the freedom to live the lives they have reason to.

The discussion of the major themes in democratic citizenship has also led to an examination of the dominant approach to development in Malawi. It concludes that the dominant approach creates an erroneous dichotomy between development and democracy. In order to promote active democratic citizenship, the dissertation argues, in line with Sen (1999) and Ake (1996) that a broader concept of the meaning and implications of development be embraced.

In conclusion, I have argued that while an exposure-based approach is not wholly inappropriate, it is not sufficient for the education of active democratic citizenship. It does not provide substantive ways of cultivating civic action. Instead, it minimizes people's chances of participating in their democratic processes since such approaches "...lack of

engagement with what they would mean in particular cases with specific people in actual circumstances” (Carrim, 2000, p.36; see also McLaughlin, 1992. pp.237-238). With particular reference to Malawi, this dissertation defends a participatory mode of democracy because of its stronger merits in developing and educating citizens for active democratic participation as well as striking a healthy conception of the link between politics and development. Only such an effort can create the conditions to offset the limited conception found in her initiatives for democracy and democratic citizenship.

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