

**CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN MULTIETHNIC  
SOCIETIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IVORIAN CRISIS.**

BY

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A Research Report submitted to the School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts.

Johannesburg, 2006

### **Declaration**

I declare that this thesis is my original and unaided intellectual work. It is being submitted for the award of a degree of Masters in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

To the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in other university here in South Africa or any where in the world.

Candidate

Supervisor

Date

Date

## **Dedication**

To my beloved Parents Mr. and Mrs. Fondem.

To Ate, Tumi, Baby, Nkeng, Mimi and Gab my beloved juniors.

To Cecile-Patricia, Dumisani, Kimaru and Ngonsong, selfless friends.

## Acknowledgements

To claim I bore this all alone would be dishonest. I am indebted to a number of people and institutions for their invaluable moral and material support through out the period of my Masters studies.

University of the Witwatersrand and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation provided inspiring environment for research. Professor Ajulu deserves special thanks and appreciation. He did not only double as my supervisor and mentor; he has gone beyond the call of duty to provide me with fatherly advice.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the University of the Witwatersrand and handouts from friends and relatives during desperate times. Again, I am grateful to CIVICUS for allowing me to use their resources in realising this project.

I would also like to thank Professor Rod Alence for his guidance and unwavering support. Dr. Lamin Abdul (Wits), Dr. Shrivastava of (Wits), Mr. David Kalete (CIVICUS), Izak Nkomo (Channel Africa) were all instrumental in helping me conceptualise this study. Finn Heinrich (CIVICUS) also deserves special thanks for helping me gain access to online libraries.

Of the people whose patience I have taxed, my family come first. My parents have always support and had confidence in me. My junior brothers and sisters have endured and tolerated my absence from home. Patricia Bassomo has been there when I needed someone to talk to. Ngosong Sixtus gave me the support of a big brother. Dumisani Mngadi, Julie Middleton and Thomas Kimaru provided me with friendly advice. Without them to pull and push me through, I am not sure I would have come this far. Again thanks for all.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ANAPROCI	Association Nationale des Producteurs de Café-Cacao de Cote d'Ivoire
ARCC	Autorite de Regulation du Café et du Cacao
AU	African Union
BCC	Bourse du Café et du Cacao
BSIE	Budget Special d'Investissement et Equipement
CFA	Communauté Financier Africaine
CFAO-CI	Groupe Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de Côte d'Ivoire
CIT	Cote d'Ivoire Telecom
CNE	Commission Nationale Electorale
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSPPA	Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DES	Deputy Executive Secretary (ECOWAS)
AFO	Afrique Francaise d'Ouest
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission to Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMOG	The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAFN	Forces Armées Force Nouvelles
FANCI	Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d'Ivoire
FLGO	Front pour la Libération du Grand Oust
FN	Force Nouvelle/ New Forces
FRC	Fund de Regulation et Controle
FRN	Forum de la Reconciliation Nationale
FPI	Ivorian Popular Front
FPTP	First Pass The Post
FSCP	Front pour la Sécurité de Central Oust
GDP	Gross Domestic Product



GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
LMA	Linas Marcoussis Accord
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MFA	Movement of the Forces of the Future
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MPCI	<i>Mouvement Patriotique de la Cote d'Ivoire</i> (Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire)
MPIGO	<i>Mouvement Populaire du Grand Ouest</i> (Greater West Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire)
MPJ	<i>Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix</i> (Movement for Justice and Peace)
PIT	Parti Ivoirienne de Travailleurs
PDCI	Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire
RDA	Rassemblement Democratique Africain
RDR	Rally of the Republicans
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAA	Syndicat Africain Agricole
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SECI	Société des Eaux de Côte d'Ivoire
SIR	Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage
SSA	sub-Sahara Africa
SYNAPROCI	Autonome des Producteurs de Cafe-Cacao de Cote d'Ivoire
UDPCI	Union for Peace and Democracy in Ivory Coast
UDCY	Democratic Civic Union
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's and Education Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UPRGO	Union Patriotique de Résistance du Grand Ouest

# MAP OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE



*We need to do away with the pretence that cessation of hostilities amount to peace. A firm foundation for sustainable peace cannot be laid unless and until full comprehension and mastery of the conflict has been realised. This requires more than mere conjectures or intelligent guesses as to their fundamental causes.*<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

The persistence of conflict in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, DRC and Ivory Coast has made Afro-pessimism fashionable. Moreover, it indicates Policy-makers, academia and the international community are still grappling how to prevent, manage and resolve African conflicts with little or no success. Consequently, a major enquiry facing Africa remains how to find a lasting solution to violent conflicts on the continent. Fundamentally, this challenge imposes an urgent need for a conceptual understanding of the origins, recurrence and persistence of African conflicts.

This study is a contribution to literature on the debate around the genealogy, conceptualisation and protractedness of African conflicts. Against this backdrop, the study is steeped around the following questions: What is the cause of conflicts in Africa? Why have some of these conflicts endured despite the perceived benefits of globalisation, Bretton Wood institutions and efforts to manage and resolve them?

I do not pretend to arrive at a sacrosanct conclusion on these questions because, any attempt at summation of issues in conflict resolution is an ambitious undertaking that warrants time, resources and the shifting contours of contemporary politics. Using Ivory Coast<sup>2</sup> as a case study, though the lessons might be suggestive rather than conclusive, I nevertheless challenge some stereotypes and accepted views of African conflicts. As a consequence, this study is an attempt to follow up, qualify and

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<sup>1</sup> Adedeji, A. (ed) 1999. *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. Zeb Books Ltd London 1999 pp9

<sup>2</sup> Ivory Coast and Cote d'Ivoire will be used interchangeably.

elaborate on the debate around African conflicts in an era of democratisation and globalisation against a backdrop of limited state capacity.<sup>3</sup>

Independence in Africa was supposed to bring peace and prosperity, a kind of *Seek ye first thy political kingdom and all things else shall be added unto you*. But almost four decades down the road, while many parts of the world have moved towards greater political and economic stability and co-operation, Africa has become the forgotten continent,<sup>4</sup> a metaphor for instability and economic deprivation.<sup>5</sup> Reminiscent of Chinua Achebe's *things fall apart the center cannot hold*<sup>6</sup>; albeit the fact that the end of Cold War was supposed to reduce tension, and pay out a "peace dividend"<sup>7</sup> amidst the third wave of democratisation,<sup>8</sup> hence insinuating Fukuyama's end of history.<sup>9</sup>

Between 1960 and 1990, there was 80 violent change of government in the continent. By the end of 1998, only 39% of 48 SSA countries enjoyed stable political conditions and good governance, 23% faced political crisis and turbulence while 38% were engaged in armed conflict or civil strife.<sup>10</sup> In the Horn of Africa, Sudan has spent 36 of its 45 years of independence fighting, which has generated some 4 million displaced people and 2 million deaths.<sup>11</sup> Somalia is effectively a failed state with no central government, Ethiopia and Eritrea are in the brink of resuming fighting after a 4 years break. In Central Africa, Africa's "First World War", the conflict in the

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<sup>3</sup> Ajulu, Rok. "Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a Globalising World Economy: The Struggle for the Soul of the Continent" *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol.28 No.87 (March 2001), pp27-42. For a succinct distinction between state capacity and strength, see Migdal, Joel. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988.

<sup>4</sup> Mkandawire, Thandika & Soludo, Charles, *Our Continent Our Future: African Perspective on Structural Adjustment*. New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc. 1999

<sup>5</sup> Any attempt at generalisation of African polity will surely miss the rich diversity of the continent and strengthen Afro-pessimism. This is not a generalisation of the situation in Africa because clearly Africa is on the right path I most stress, except for some pocket cases of economic and political instability. The World Bank report (2005) shows that African economies are growing at an average of 4%, while the economies of Europe and US are growing at a rate of 3%. In fact Walter Kansteiner former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs once declared that Africa will produce the next Asian Tigers.

<sup>6</sup> Achebe, Chinua. *Things Fall Apart*. Oxford: Heinemann 1986

<sup>7</sup> Ajulu, R. (2003) "African Security: Can Regional Organisations Play a Role?" In Field, S (ed) *Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*. Institute of Global Dialogue. Johannesburg 2004

<sup>8</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University Of Oklahoma Press, 1991

<sup>9</sup> Fukuyama, Francis. *The End Of History And The Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992

<sup>10</sup> Adedeji, A, op. cit. pp 4

<sup>11</sup> Lind, F. and Sturman, K. (ed) 2002. *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's conflict*. Institute of Security Studies. South Africa.2002. p187

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which intensified in 1996, still drags on today pitting old allies against each other. The Rwandan conflict which lasted for almost a decade, witnessed the death of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within a hundred days.<sup>12</sup> The jury is still out on the viability of the peace process that ended Burundi's close to a decade civil war. Congo Brazzaville is witnessing episodic skirmishes with the Ninja militia; Central Africa Republic and Chad have effectively lost the monopoly of legitimate violence over their territory. Cameroon and Nigeria are still trying to find a common ground over the disputed Bakassi peninsula.<sup>13</sup> In Southern Africa, It took three decades before the belligerents in Angola were brought to their senses thanks to the death of Savimbi. Mozambique is slowly recuperating from an excruciating two decades of civil war. South Africa has "effectively" turn the corner with the fall of apartheid. Zimbabwe is at a latent stage of conflict. Conflict was averted in Mauritius thanks to a popular uprising. In East Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) while flirting with peace proposal is still bent on pursuing a brutal bush war against Musevini's regime despite an international warrant for Joseph Kony and his henchmen. In Kenya, political elites are struggling over the spoils of the state. Zanzibar is proving to be a nightmare for Tanzania. In West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone are in the process of reconstruction; Guinea is teetering with internal strife; Mauritania and Togo escaped overt conflict; while the Casamance separatist in Senegal are flirting with a peace proposal. Surprisingly, most African conflicts are intrastate (civil wars, low intensity wars, new wars) but for few exceptions like the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute over Badme, Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute over Bakassi.

In spite of numerous multilateral and bilateral efforts to arrest these conflicts, peace is more apparent than real. Thirteen peace accords were signed by belligerents during the Liberian civil war, but failed to be implemented during a six years period.<sup>14</sup> Four peace accords were signed in Angola, eleven in Somalia and five in Sudan. These initiatives were dead letters once parties left the negotiating table. Kotze argues,

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<sup>12</sup> Adelman, Howard .2001. "The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire" *Refugee Studies Review* No 27 (1) 2001 pp9

<sup>13</sup> Ikome, Francis Nguendi. "The Inviolability of African Colonial Boundaries: Lessons from Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict." Institute for Global Dialogue. *Occasional Paper* No. 47. November 2004

<sup>14</sup> Adebayo, Adekeye. 2002. *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea-Bissau*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder and London



research posits that most peace agreements in Africa become dead after five years of their negotiation.<sup>15</sup> It seems then that once a conflict starts in Africa, it becomes a long drawn battle with incidental cessation of hostilities, negotiated ceasefire, peace agreement and national elections, which are in reality an adjournment of the conflict. In essence, while these accords have become canons for national reconciliation and government of national unity, they carried within them germs of conflict.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, signing peace agreements is just a polite way of ending meetings, and going back to the warfare business without wasting time. Ironically, most belligerents do negotiate a peace agreement before it falls apart. This seems to suggest that, the reasons might not necessarily be their irreconcilable differences but something else.

A number of studies have tried to explain why implementing a negotiated peace agreement is sometimes very difficult. Any attempt grounded in African conflicts as a unit is doom for failure. Every African conflict has its own dynamics and specifics. Basically, the theoretical and scholarly debate can be divided into three channels of causation: *Diplomacy scholars* ground their arguments around procedural and substantive elements of an agreement. For example, William Zartman argues that the timing/ripeness of negotiations is imperative.<sup>17</sup> *Development economists* look at the economic and social wellbeing of the society and belligerents. For example, Paul Collier using cost-benefit analysis argues that war itself is a means of accumulation so why stop it. *Political scientists* turn to analyse the power structure and balance between belligerents. For example, Adekeyo Adebayo argues that peace agreements in Liberia and Sierra Leone failed because of the proliferation of militias, weapons, ethnic rivalry and looting.<sup>18</sup> Horowitz and Stedman argue that in ethnic conflict not all leader want accommodation.<sup>19</sup> Arend Lijphart argues that some negotiations fail because of their exclusivist nature.<sup>20</sup> Professor Ajulu and Professor Adedeji argue that

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<sup>15</sup> Kotze, D. "Issues in Conflict Resolution." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 2, No.2, 2002, pp.77-100

<sup>16</sup> Nanga, Jean "A 'Civil War' that is French and Neo-Colonial" *International Viewpoint*. IV364 - February 2005

<sup>17</sup> Zartman, I. W. *Ripe For Resolution: Conflict And Intervention In Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989

<sup>18</sup> Adebayo, A. op cit

<sup>19</sup> Horowitz, D. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, University of California Press 1985; Stedman, S. J. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* Vol. 2. No 2 fall 1997 pp5-53

<sup>20</sup> Lijphart, Arend. 1991. "The Power Sharing Approach" In Montville, Joseph (ed) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Press 490-510; Arend, J. 1969 "Consociational Democracy." *World Politics* No 21, pp. 207- 225

it will be a futile exercise if a negotiated settlement does not take into consideration the causes of the conflict. Grounded in Ajulu and Adedeji's argument, this study seeks to ascertain failure to fully implement the Linas Marcoussis accord which has been acclaimed as the framework for peace in Ivory Coast.

## BACKGROUND OF IVORIAN CONFLICT

*If unity had not been in our heart, we should have discovered it in our head.*<sup>21</sup> Houphout Boigny

The war in Ivory Coast is one demonstration of the emptiness of the promises of a post Cold War peace dividend, globalisation and democratisation in Africa. It drew in factions and rebel groups from other African wars; the remnant armies of defunct neighboring regimes, the usual crowd of international profiteers, would-be peacemakers and humanitarians. It is closely connected with armed conflicts in several neighboring countries: Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea-Conakry.

Afro-pessimism seems to have been vindicated when Ivory Coast, a former French colony often describe as a beacon of hope amidst poverty and conflict prone West Africa descended into chaos in 2002. Post independent economic development grounded in liberal and outward looking economic policies vis a vis inward looking import substitution policies of other African countries-produced an annual growth rate of about 7%; until economic crisis engendered by fall in world prices of cocoa in the 1980s.<sup>22</sup> Economic prosperity translated into political stability within the context of a one party state based on Boigny's policy of inclusiveness and integration of non-Ivorian population.

Ivory Coast as the leading cocoa producer in the world and the second coffee producer on the continent relied heavily on foreigners (especially from Burkina Faso and Mali) to keep the economy alive. Boigny's administration granted land access to anybody willing to make something out of it irrespective of their origins, Ivorian and foreigners alike. Boigny argued that *la Terre appartient a' celui qui la met en*

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<sup>21</sup> Zolberg, Aristide. R *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. pp.74.

<sup>22</sup> Hecht, R. M "The Ivory Coast Economic Miracle: What Benefit for Peasant Farmers? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21 1, March 1983, pp. 25-53

*valeur*.<sup>23</sup> French firms given the long-standing Ivorian-French partnership injected huge funds in the economy.<sup>24</sup>

However it seems Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer and Samir Amir were proven right when Ivory Coast descended into economic chaos because of fall in world prices.<sup>25</sup> The economy was too dependent on primary production without much consideration on strengthening industrialisation through import substitution. Thus when the fall in commodity prices came, the economy could not withstand its vulnerability. The already dire situation was compounded by a huge external debt burden accumulated during the boom years and austerity measures *forced* on the government in the name of structural adjustment. Within this context, social unrest and agitation for political liberalisation intensified amidst the deteriorating health of *le veux* (Boigny).

Boigny responded to the crisis by instituting multiparty “democracy” in 1990 and nominated Ouattara a northern technocrat from IMF as his Prime Minister; with a mission of revamping the economy. Boigny defeated Gbagbo a self confessed socialist and leader of *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) in the 1990 presidential elections in which foreigners were allowed to vote. In a bid to finance the economy, Ouattara instituted resident permits for foreigners.

Following the death of Boigny on 7 December 1993, Ivory Coast was plunged into a protracted power struggle, which generated intense political instability and culminated in December 1999 in a coup d'état, led by General Robert Gueï, who overthrew President Henri Konan Bédié.

The post-Houphouët-Boigny power struggle was exacerbated by controversies over nationality laws and eligibility conditions for national elections, particularly presidential elections, which resulted in the disqualification of some prominent political leaders, including Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR). Ironically, Boigny’s children from his first marriage would have been barred from

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<sup>23</sup> Land belongs to those who put it into use. My translation

<sup>24</sup> Ajulu, C., “Côte d’Ivoire: A Regional Quandary” in *Global Insight*, Issue No.37, September 2004, pp.2.

<sup>25</sup> Amin, Samir. *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique Of The Theory Of Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. 2; Prebisch, Raúl 1950. *Economic Development in Latin America and its Principal Problems*. New York. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America



contesting such elections since their mother was from Senegal, let alone Laurent Fologo, long time Secretary General of the PDCI married to a French woman.

Bédié was overthrown in a bloodless military coup in 1999 and Gueï was called to lead the junta. He promised to clean Ivorian politics and organise new election. But sooner than later, he activated ivoirité to exclude Ouattara from contesting the 2000 presidential election. The heated dispute over the results of the election led to violent clashes between partisans of the two main contenders - General Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo. Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared Mr. Gbagbo the winner. Calls from RDR for Gbagbo to organise new election was refused and this led to clashes between partisans of RDR and FPI.

Despite an alleged coup attempt in January 2001, municipal elections were held in March 2001. The municipal elections marked an important turning point for Ivory Coast as all political parties were allowed to field candidates for the election.<sup>26</sup> Ouattara's RDR party won the largest number of communes/councils. Following the election, President Gbagbo pursued a policy of national reconciliation and sought to decentralise State authority by organising provincial elections.

In October 2001, the President organised a forum for national reconciliation to address the issues that had polarised Ivorians. The forum culminated in a summit meeting attended by President Gbagbo, Mr. Bédié, General Gueï and Mr. Ouattara on the 22 and 23 January 2002 to settle their differences and consider recommendations of the forum. The four leaders subsequently issued a final communiqué in which among other things; they agreed to oppose undemocratic avenues to power and to professionalise the security forces and improve their conditions of service. They also agreed to create a broad-based national electoral commission and a national body to address the question of land ownership and a government of national unity. Unfortunately, not all of the recommendations of the forum for national reconciliation were implemented.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> This move was not really meant at reconciliation because, though a decentralisation law exist in Ivory Coast, real power is exercised by the president and metropolitan councils are invariably controlled by government delegates appointed by the president.

<sup>27</sup> United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/index.html>

On the 19 of September 2001, around 800 discontented former exiled military personnel simultaneously led coordinated attacks on government and military facilities. The coup failed but left many dead including the Minister of Interior-Emile Douodo, General Gueï and his family.<sup>28</sup> Having failed to capture Abidjan the rebels fully established themselves in Bouake and Korhogo in the north and center of the country and called themselves *Movement Patriotique Cote d'Ivoire* (MPCI).<sup>29</sup> Government efforts to recapture these areas proved futile.

Around 600 French forces stationed in Ivory Coast quickly intervened and on 28 September the first of a series of peace negotiation was initiated by Togolese President Eyadema under the aegis of ECOWAS. Two other rebel groups, the *Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West* (MPIGO) and the *Movement for Peace and Justice* (MJP) emerged and controlled the western part of Ivory Coast. The three rebel groups merged and re-hat themselves as the *Forces Nouvelle* (FN).

In January 2003, after failed attempts in Lomé and Accra, the French brought all the parties to the negotiation table in France at Linas-Marcoussis. They reached a *consensus* and signed the French-brokered Linas-Marcoussis Accord. They agreed to a power-sharing and government of national unity. They also agreed to revisit issues of citizenship, nationality and land tenure laws. In July 2003, the *Forces Nouvelle* and government forces signed an end-to-the-war declaration, vowing to work along the lines of Linas Marcoussis and the implementation of the DDR program.<sup>30</sup>

Amidst claims of insecurity and sabotage by Gbagbo, FN walked out of the government of national unity in March 2004. On the 9<sup>th</sup> of November, government forces tried but failed to reunite the country. Their effort cost the lives of nine French peacekeepers. France reacted by wiping out the Ivorian air force, this intensified anti-French feeling in the country.

Amidst anti-French rhetoric, the French were no longer considered neutral in the crisis, and President Thabo Mbeki was mandated by the African Union (AU) to

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<sup>28</sup>Ellis, S., Grono, N., "Now it's happening in the Ivory Coast", [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org), April 2004, pp.1.

<sup>29</sup>Lamin, A., "The Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire: South Africa's Diplomacy, and Prospects for Peace." *Occasional Paper* No.49, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, August 2005

<sup>30</sup>"Armed Conflict Report-2004" in [www.ploughshares.ca](http://www.ploughshares.ca), January 2005, pp.6.

negotiate the implementation of the Linas Marcoussis accord. Mbeki submitted a five-point roadmap to the parties in December 2004 that included disarmament, the restoration of a power-sharing government and new legislation to eradicate rows over citizenship and ethnicity.<sup>31</sup> Parties to the Ivorian conflict convened in Pretoria in April 2005 to negotiate an end to the crisis within the framework of Linas Marcoussis. All parties to the conflict declared their commitment to the peace process. Squabbles over the composition of the independent electoral commission and eligibility laws meant that elections could not be held on the 30<sup>th</sup> of October. The rebels accused President Mbeki of impartiality and refused to acknowledge him as a mediator. For the time being the UN has extended Gbagbo's mandate for a year and a powerful Prime Minister appointed pending elections next year.

### **Aim/Objective**

An effective management and resolution of a conflict presupposes an understanding of its nature and causes. Conflicts can be frozen by UN and AU peacekeepers for instance, but a true and lasting resolution warrants a thorough understanding of how the conflict emerged, how it was perpetuated and sustained. Accordingly, the aim of this research is to debunk the perversity that surrounds the genealogy of Ivorian conflict and the problems around the implementation of Linas Marcoussis Accord.

Ivorian conflict like most African conflicts is conceived and conceptualised as ethnic, religious and factional; thus conflict management, resolution and peacebuilding initiatives have been steeped around this paradigm.<sup>32</sup> This study argues that, the slow implementation of the Linas Marcoussis accord is as a result of the fact that, the peace initiative did not deal with the structural causes and nature of the Ivorian conflict (it tackled the symptoms and not the disease).

Couched within the prism of political economy, this study further argues that, one cannot comprehend the roots and nature of Ivorian crisis thus a sustainable framework for peace; unless we examine the history and creation of the Ivorian state, its position in the commonwealth of states and the effects of post-Cold War neo-liberal policies or what is often referred to as globalisation, especially on state power and

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<sup>31</sup> Corwell, Richard. "Côte d'Ivoire: A Region at Stake" *African Security Review*. Vol. 14. No. 2, 2005

<sup>32</sup> See literature review

poverty/human security. The conflict in Ivory Coast was ignited by contestation over resources. In other words, the conflict has its roots in the scarcity of resources and the absence or failure of institutions that guarantee equitable distribution. Taking cognisance of the fact that the lack of indigenous capital means control of the state is control of economic resources.

The argument that the Ivorian conflict is rooted in ethnic animosity is seductive, but does not resist a closer look. This study views *ivoirite*<sup>33</sup>, which has been acclaimed as the root cause of the Ivorian conflict as a nationalistic rhetoric for political mobilisation in the absence of an economic alternative grounded in the contradictory nature of the Ivorian state. In essence, this study aspires to examine the political economy of Ivory Coast, how it has engendered conflict and how the conflict has generated its own dynamics that help sustain it, making peace and security a *mission impossible*.

### **Rationale**

An in-depth study of the nexus between causes of conflict and implementation of negotiated peace agreement is timely for various reasons. The choice of Ivory Coast as a case study is deliberate. How come a country that has been acclaimed as a model for development in Africa suddenly occupies the 1<sup>st</sup> position on Foreign Policy's Failed State Index Ranking?<sup>34</sup> In relative terms, Ivory Coast is definitely rich in natural resources; it is the world leading cocoa producer, it has abundant coffee and oil has just been discovered. Hence, is Ivory Coast another sad example of *the paradox of plenty* or what is popularly called *the resource curse*?

Literature on Ivorian conflict is still very limited. Two channels of causation have attempt explanation to the Ivorian crisis with no consensus. Sociologists and some journalists argue that the Ivorian crisis is an ethnic conflict grounded in relative deprivation between the north and south.<sup>35</sup> Political scientists argue that it is a power

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<sup>33</sup> Ethno-nationalistic rhetoric denoting who a true Ivorian should be

<sup>34</sup> Foreign Policy Failed State Index. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>

<sup>35</sup> Akindes, F. "Cote d' Ivoire Socio-Political Crisis: Ivoirité and the Course of History" *African Sociological Review* 7, 2, 2003. Akindes, F "The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire" *Research Report No.128* Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2004. Also available at Questia. [www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com) IRIN "Cote 'd'Ivoire: What's in a name? A fight for identity" IRIN 1<sup>st</sup> November 2005

struggle among elites over resources amidst economic collapse.<sup>36</sup> A major contribution this study brings to this literature is the fact that in a holistic manner, it tries to synthesis both arguments within the context of political economy stretching back to the dynamics of Ivorian colonial state. Any analysis of the Ivorian conflict that is not grounded in Ivorian colonial state and its transition to independence misses the most interesting phenomenon of half a century of Ivorian politics. Politics is a process grounded in cause and effect due to chain of events. Therefore, any attempt at unreasonable delineation will create a disjuncture. Methodologically, can the expected result from this work be different from others keeping in mind that the point of departure is a succinct analysis of Ivorian colonial state? Do we need to comprehend African colonial states in order to understand contemporary African politics?

It has become a sacrosanct rule within the realm of conflict management and resolution to think of negotiated settlements, cease fire agreements, government of national unity, national reconciliation and national elections as the sustainable way to deal with conflict. The conventional approach to 'early warning' and preventive diplomacy is premised on the assumption that conflict can be averted by reacting to its proximate rather than its structural causes.<sup>37</sup> This study is important because it sustains and highlights an alternative to conflict resolution grounded on addressing the structural causes of conflicts. Professor Ajulu and Adebayo argue that most of the literature on conflicts in Africa has been centered on conflict resolution, cessation of hostilities, negotiated ceasefire, peace agreements and national elections, which are no more than markers in the conflict resolution continuum.<sup>38</sup> Professor Adedeji opines that, we need urgently to move away from mere mouthing of peace-making platitude into the realm of proactive empirical research to understand the causes, mastering and comprehending conflicts.<sup>39</sup>

This study is significant and timely because, it affords us a lens through which to examine the sustainability of hybrid conflict management and resolution techniques in

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<sup>36</sup> Ajulu, C. op. cit; Lamin, A., "The Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire: South Africa's Diplomacy, and Prospects for Peace." *Occasional Paper* No.49, Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, August 2005 .

<sup>37</sup> Nathan Laurie "International Mediation in African Civil Wars" *Global Dialogue* Volume 4.1 April 1999

<sup>38</sup> Adedeji, op cit; Ajulu, R. op. cit

<sup>39</sup> Adedeji, op cit.

Africa. The presence of France, ECOWAS, AU and UN in Ivorian crisis is a classic example of how division of labour in conflict management and resolution can be engendered. This study thus affords us the opportunity to examine the challenges and prospect posed by such endeavors. Most importantly though AU forces are not in Ivory Coast, one can by inference assess the strength and capacity of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) to deal with conflicts in Africa.

When is intervention legal and legitimate? By analysing French intervention in Ivory Coast, the study promises not only to help francophone Africa conceptualise and rethink its relationship with France, it helps policy makers and scholars understand the dilemma faced by former colonial masters as they pursue their interest in their former colonies, especially countries in the Gulf of Guinea.

Since globalisation seems the dominant paradigm that negotiates inter-state intercourse, it is worth mentioning that it has created huge income (poverty) disparity between states and within states. Neo-liberal economic policies upon which globalisation is grounded does not only exposes African economies to shocks of the global markets, it engenders marginalisation which encompasses economic deprivation of citizens, transnational exploitation of weak states by Multinational Corporations (MNCs); the erosion of state capacity and legitimacy, traffic in arms and privatisation of security. This study is important because it extends and sustains the debate around the effects of neo-liberalism (Structural Adjustment Programs, Globalisation) on the economy and capacity of Africa states thus their vulnerability to conflict.

The revelation of Liberian, Burkinabe, and Angolan presence in the Ivorian conflict raises many interesting issues around the present regime of conflict prevention and management in Africa. When should a crisis be treated as a regional conflict? Should conflict prevention and resolution measures be engaged in a holistic manner encompassing the various states in the region?

Finally, this study is essential to post-conflict peacebuilding in Ivory Coast. The present political climate in the country offers a unique opportunity for leaders and citizens of the country and the international community, to critically reflect on the

country's political future and fundamentally address questions on the economy, contradictory nature of the state, the concept of ivoirite, its relations with France, global trade imbalances and durable peace. Questions of development and democracy must be taken seriously. If the country does not examine its past and cast an eye on the legacy left by Houphouët-Boigny, it risks endless strife and a serious identity crisis.

### **Research Questions**

Within the context of this research, three central questions will be addressed.

- Did religious and ethnic hatreds cause the crisis in Ivory Coast or has a politically motivated conflict assumed religio-ethnic tones?
- What have been the salient features of the conflict and how have parties to the conflict sustained their war effort?
- What have been the bases of international mediation and why have they failed so far?

### **Literature Review**

Research on Ivorian conflict is still in its infancy, taking into consideration the fact that the conflict is *young* and rages on. The review in question does not comprise a distinct stand-alone body of literature, but rather it is a review of an extensive multidisciplinary literature grounded in the causes of Ivorian crisis and African conflicts in general. Literature on the Ivorian crisis is invariably the outcome of workshops, country visits and press coverage.

The literature on Ivorian conflict is a repertoire of different but not necessarily diametrically opposed perspectives. There seems a general consensus that the Ivorian crisis is rooted in citizenship grounded around the concept of ivoirité. Authors have approached how citizenship has unravelled Ivorian society from two broad perspectives though most are steeped in qualitative research: political sociology and political economy.

Generally, political economists argue that the present crisis in Ivory Coast is as a result of contestation over declining resources and the absence of mechanism of equitable distribution in a society where state power is the only mode of

accumulation.<sup>40</sup> They argue that any analysis of the Ivorian crisis through ethnicity is a narrow construct of the crisis which will surely miss the political and conceptual understanding of *ivoirité*. In essence, *ivoirité* can best be understood from an instrumentalist perspective as opposed to an essentialist perspective grounded in nationalism. Issues of identity do not exist in a vacuum. Identity in its very nature is a political question, determining who gets what, how and when. Consequently, identity becomes imperative in situation where resources are scarce and access to them depends on state power.

Che Ajulu, Lamin Abdul, Jessica Kohler, Gberie Lansana, Addo Prosper, McPherson and International Crisis Group compellingly argue that, politics of exclusion is at the heart of the Ivorian crisis. They agree that, Boigny glued the country together because he was able to pacify different ethnic cleavages through patronage.<sup>41</sup> Ajulu and ICG point out that nationalistic sentiment against Boigny's immigration policy were insulated because people who lost out in the competition for arable land were compensated with government positions-*fonction publique*. The above authors argue that Boigny was able to maintain this model because of available resources. Once the country started to show economic strain during the 1980s, contradictions of the Boigny's model were exposed. Ajulu and Kohler argue that with the opening up of political space, ethnicity became the only mode of political mobilisation because of the absence of economic alternatives, though politicisation of ethnicity is far from unique to Ivory Coast.<sup>42</sup>

Eros Comfort and Temin Jonathan concur with the above mentioned authors but position their argument around the leadership qualities of Boigny. They observe that the rebellion in the country is an indication of a far more deep-seated national crisis in the country. The conflict in the country reflects the non-existence of a visionary leadership in Ivory Coast coupled with abuse of power. By providing a comparative analysis of Boigny's administration and his successors; they argue, despite the fact Boigny was not a democratic leader in the traditional sense, Ivory Coast was better off

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<sup>40</sup> Ajulu, C. op. cit; Lamin, Abdul op cit; Kohler, J., "From miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire." *Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN)*, Geneva, 2003; Addo Prosper, Gberie, L. op. cit

<sup>41</sup> Ajulu, C., op cit

<sup>42</sup> Ajulu, C, op cit; Kohler, J., op. cit



under Boigny because of his sensitivity to matters such as diversity and inclusion grounded by dispensation of rewards. On the contrary his successor hopped on exclusionary policies by constantly playing ethnic card which affected and disrupted social interactions between ethnic and religious groups.<sup>43</sup> But these authors seem not to appreciate the distinct socio-economic context within which these leaders operated. Definitely, the availability of resources did afford Boigny more manoeuvring space than his predecessors.

Though the above analysis of ivoirité through the prism of political economy might shape our understanding of the conflict and the strategy of the various belligerents, the literature is nevertheless littered with limitations. First, the literature fails to provide concrete analysis on how Ivorian colonial state affected post-colonial politics. How Ivorian colonial political economy created different social class, societal interest, indigenous accumulation and how these in turn affected governance. Is the present Ivorian state an extrapolation of the colonial state which was skewed in favour of the metropole through the consolidation of power on a dependent bourgeois? And most importantly, what informed macroeconomic policies in Ivory Coast?

Nanga and Lumumba have tried to explain how ivoirité unravelled Ivorian society through the prism of Structuralism which is an off shoot of Marxist neo-dependency.<sup>44</sup> Nanga argues that attempts to understand ivoirité in culturalism as has been the case in Rwanda and Burundi is misleading. He argues that ivoirité is a reactionary response to the structural crisis of neo-colonialism. He posits that a strong correlation exists between the development of neo-liberalism and the spread of xenophobia, chauvinism and hatred for those who are perceived different and other forms of exclusion. Nanga and Lumumba argue that in the case of ivoirité, the ingredients were produced by colonial system, then by the ascendant phase of neo-colonialism-indirect or reformed colonialis- of which Ivory Coast was really the "model."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Eros, C., Temin, J. "Sources of Conflict in West Africa", in Sriman, C., Nielsen, Z. (eds) *Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 2004, pp.99-102.

<sup>44</sup> Nanga, Jean op. cit. Lumumba, Assie and Lumumba-Kasongo. "Cote d'Ivoire in the French and Global Capitalist System". *African Update Newsletter*. Vol.X, issue 4 (Fall 2003)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

The principal limitation of Lumumba, Nanga's work and structuralism in trying to explain African conflict; is the fact that, the thesis does not seem to appreciate how internal dynamics have shape Ivorian polity. Though it is easy to criticise the west and colonialism/neo-colonialism for Africa's ills, such arguments should be grounded on an apprecial of the role of Africans or Ivorians in shaping their political destiny. The role of kleptocrats and big men in plundering the continent has merely facilitated exploitation by the metropole.

Two weeks after the rebellion broke out in September 2002, France's then Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, explained to the Senate in Paris: "The present crisis is the result of traditional tensions. Ivory Coast, with its north-south split, is an ethnic and religious patchwork that has been in crisis since the death of Houphouët-Boigny."<sup>46</sup> de Villepin's conceptualisation of the Ivorian conflict in primordialist terms means that, the crisis is a weird breakdown of social order, thus anarchy; reminiscent of the work of Kaplan. Kaplan in his works the "Coming Anarchy" and "The Ends of Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" argues that African conflicts are essentially a result of a hobbesian state of nature-nasty, brutish and short.<sup>47</sup> Hence, Conflicts in Africa are short of any moral underpinnings, but can be understood in terms of untamed natural forces. According to Kaplan, "physical aggression is part of being human, only when people attain a certain economic, educational and cultural standard is this trait tranquillised."<sup>48</sup> Kaplan further points out that, the lack of education and land hunger among the youth who have become "loose molecules in an unstable social fluid" is one of the principal causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict.<sup>49</sup> It is against this backdrop, Kaplan suggest that the only the west can help Africa is to stay clear of its business and close it borders. It thus seems the recents restrictions on migration in Europe and the racial violence against Africans specifically in France might have been informed by this pessimist view of Africa.

Francis Akindes, an Ivorian sociologist forcefully argues that the Ivorian crisis can best be understood through an analysis of state society relationship. He argues that the

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<sup>46</sup> Diop, Boubacar. Boris. "Colonial Adventure" *Le Monde Diplomatique*. April, 2005

<sup>47</sup> Kaplan, R "The Coming Anarchy" *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273 N0 2 1994. p44-76, see also Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York : Simon and Schuster, 1996

<sup>48</sup> Kaplan op cit., pp 72-73

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Ivorian crisis is a break down of *Houphetisme*. A compromise grounded around the legitimacy of Boigny because of his ability to negotiate a peaceful coexistence amongst the various ethnic groups in Ivory Coast.<sup>50</sup> Akindes argues that ivoirité has long historical roots in Ivory Coast. Boigny flirted with Ivorinisation but never to the exclusion of foreigners or compromise on efficiency. According to Akindes, Ivorinisation helped Boigny to co-opt political opponents and not exclude them. Akindes posit that ivoirité has in effect stratified Ivorian society not in relation to production but to societal and cultural construct. This in essence has engendered hatred and animosity thus conflict, because part of the population has been disenfranchised thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of the state.<sup>51</sup>

Using relative deprivation theory grounded in quantitative and qualitative analysis, Langer argues that the Ivorian crisis is the result of perceived or actual political, social and economic disparity between north and south. He argues that under Boigny, this disparity was ameliorated but aggravated under Bedie, Gueï and Gbagbo. He points out that, this disparity though glaring along north south lines; also exist among ethnic groups in the south. He traces ethnic equality through the various government in Ivory Coast and concludes that Gbagbo's government which witnessed arm insurgent was the most ethnically imbalance. He concludes that the conflict is thus a reaction to the Baulisation of Ivorian politics.<sup>52</sup>

What the above literature fails to tell us is why the politisation of ethnicity and why was Boigny's reign relatively peaceful though there was still horizontal ethnic inequality? Though ethnicity is important in group mobilisation in politics, political economy is important to understand the rationale behind the decisions of the elites considering the fact that they are the main drivers of politics.

In some instances, hegemonic leaders have acted in politically expedient manner by appointing ethnic intermediaries to high positions of state in order to balance representation as a way of insulating conflict. This strategy might be through power sharing (ministerial post) or encouraging private accumulation using state power

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<sup>50</sup> Akindes, F. 2004, op. cit.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Langer, Armin. "Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: the Case of Côte d'Ivoire." *Working Paper 13*: Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity.

(government parastatals). For example, in Cameroon under Ahidjo and Biya, Ivory Coast under Boigny, Kenya under Kenyatta, these leaders avoided adversarial politics by sharing the spoils of the state among influential ethnic groups and at the same time allowing the dominant elite to negotiate policy questions quietly among themselves.<sup>53</sup> Important to note here is that, this regime strategy can only subsist provided there is enough resources to sustain it. Hence in circumstance where resources are scarce, politics of exclusion might become the order of the day or in certain cases, outright repression.

Conflict has been averted in certain scarcity-prone societies because of distributional principles such as proportional representation-the distribution of state resources, political and administrative positions among ethnic peoples and regional units on the basis of their relative numbers. In such societies, a political culture is developed where leaders bargain and compromise to bridge the gap between the relatively advantaged and the disadvantaged on the basis of; sub regional need versus derivation (extraction) in allocative policies (oil in Nigeria), merit versus proportionality in recruitment policies (Cameroon), legislative representation (South Africa), or centralisation versus decentralisation of power, and power sharing (government of national unity).<sup>54</sup>

A major limitation of ethnicity as a cause of Ivorian conflict is its lack of consensus and clarity as to the exact make up of ethnic or tribal phenomenon. This is because ethnicity and tribalism is not simply a question of objective data such as languages, culture and religion. Ethnic identity is merely a question of perception than an absolute phenomenon and identity can be perceived by groups or family themselves or can be attributed by outsiders.<sup>55</sup> In fact, the ethnic breakdown of Ivory Coast was done by Maurice Dalefosse (French) and ethnic division in Ivorian colonial state was a response to administrative expediency and colonial needs.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Rothchild, D. *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983 ; Jua, Natang “Democracy and the Construction of Allogey/Autochthony in Postcolonial Cameroon” *African Issues* Vol. 29, No. 1/2, Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa (2001), pp. 37-42

<sup>54</sup> Rothchild, D, op cit.

<sup>55</sup> Prunier, Gérard. 1995. *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst, 1995.

<sup>56</sup> Maurice Delafosse, “*Vocabulaires comparatifs de plus de soixante langues et dialectes parlés en cote d’ivoire et dans les régions limitrophes* ( Paris: Editions Leroux, 1904) ; Bouton, Donald, M.

If the conflict in Ivory Coast is so much an ethnic conflict, why northerners are present in government? Therefore, it has been contended that civil wars may be fought on ethnic lines but ethnicity is not a cause of civil war. Hizkias Assefa aptly concludes that a conflict stated by elites ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy engulfing the entire ethnic group. He further argues that,

There is growing evidence to posit the view that elites in African societies particularly those of the political class, have shown no restraint in manipulating the people through feeding them with ethnic prejudice. Personal interests of such leaders are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally support even if at the risk of developing animosity against another group considered to be the enemy.<sup>57</sup>

This view corresponds with Amilcar Cabral's dictum that "there are no real conflicts between the people of Africa; there are only conflicts between their elites."<sup>58</sup> Thus, it seems ethnicity has been instrumentalised by Ivorian elites to control state power and cocoa rents. In essence, Ivorian conflict is ultimately a struggle for land and cocoa rents fought along north/south lines. I thus concur with the Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly conflict that:

The words ethnic, religious, tribal or factional-important they may be in intergroup conflict-do not, in most cases, adequately explain why people use massive violence to achieve their goals. These descriptions do not, in themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over differences. To label a conflict simply as an ethnic can lead to misguided choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural and religious differences inevitably result to violent conflict and that differences therefore must be suppressed. Time and again in this century, attempts at suppression have too often led to bloodshed, and in case after case, the accommodation of

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Irving Kaplan, Barbara Lent, T. D. Roberts, Charles Townsend, Neda A. *Area Handbook for Ivory Coast*. Questia. [www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com)

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, pp 9

<sup>58</sup> Furley, O. 1995. *Conflict in Africa*. Tauris Academic Studies.1995

diversity within appropriate constitutional forms has helped to prevent bloodshed.<sup>59</sup>

Social realities demand that a sounder approach to the problem of ethnicity in Africa is to accept the reality of pluralism rather than fly in the face of facts and attempt at achieving monolithic structure through repression and coercion. Ethnicity is a reality not only in Africa, thus rather than shying away from it, any meaningful development on the continent must be steeped around accommodation and enhancing our rich diversity

### **Methodology**

The methodology for this study will be qualitative; bearing in mind that qualitative analysis will be used to trace, process and establish a causal relationship between the variables (content analysis). Data collection is grounded around three interrelated pillars of analysis: economic, political and socio-economic.

#### 1) Economic Indicators

##### *Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines*

- Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status.
- Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels.
- Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities.

##### *Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline*

- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP and human development index.
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, and debt payments
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency.
- Extreme social hardship imposed by structural adjustment programmes.
- Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.

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<sup>59</sup> Adedeji. A. op. cit, pp. 9

## 2) Political Indicators

### *Criminalisation and/or Delegitimisation of the State*

- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites.
- Resistance of ruling elites to political representation.
- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience.
- Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.
- Politicisation of the army.

### *Rise of Factionalized Elites*

- Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines.
- Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g. ivoirité)

## 3) Social Indicator

- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to sustaining resources
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, ownership and occupancy of land,
- History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression
- Institutionalized political exclusion
- Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric

This study is based upon an assessment of existing secondary sources of empirical data and literature on Ivory Coast. Sources for this study are books from libraries in the Witwatersrand University, University of South Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, online libraries like *Questia*, and *L' Harmattan*, online scholarly articles and journals; speeches from conferences and published policy documents. Both Ivorian and international press will be perused to ascertain the course and nature of the conflict, while keeping in mind their polarised nature. At this point, it is important to point out that the bulk of the literature is in French, for example *Politique Africaine*. This would not pose a problem taking into consideration that I understand, speak and write French. The works of multilateral institutions and think tanks associated with conflict and the conflict in Ivory Coast in particular will be consulted. For example, International Development Research Centre: Ivory Coast Programme, International Crisis Group, Institute for Global Dialogue, African Human Security Initiative, Nordic Africa Institute, Institute for Security Studies, La Francophonie, ECOWAS, World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization.

### **Limitation of Study**

The fact that the Ivorian crisis still rages on, any conclusion at this point is tentative because time is an enormous constrain on the study. The time frame of this study is 1944 to 2005 (October). By the time of conclusion, new facts might be out which could have enhanced the comprehension of certain events. For example, information is needed to ascertain alliances between individuals and ethnic cleavages in order to understand why the rebellion occurred. At this stage, some conclusions will be drawn from frank speculation and intellectual guess.

Moreover, the dependence on secondary literature exposes the study to hidden biases, inclination and misinterpretation which might be embedded in the work of authors who have done field research in Ivory Coast. The absence of field work will also present difficulty in filling gaps in information and conflicting reports.

### **Roadmap**

The rest of the study follows thus: Chapter one, as my point of departure sets out a theoretical framework that will inform the rest of the study. The chapter conceptualises conflict, conflict management and resolution; it engages with the political economy debate around the initiation and protractedness of African conflict.



I move on in chapter two, to examine the historical background of Ivorian crisis. In this chapter, I begin by examining Ivorian colonial state, how it was integrated into the world economy, its power structure and elite interest at the dawn of independence. This chapter in examining the post-colonial political economy of Ivory Coast, it shows the contradictory nature of Ivorian economy, the role of the state and the effect of neoliberalism. The chapter also examines how Boigny dealt with the issue of ivoirite within the context of a buoyant economy and one party state.

In chapter three, I tease out the origin of the present crisis grounded in post-Boigny succession and the politicisation of ethnicity and how the crisis unfolded. The chapter shows that Political succession in Ivory Coast is a result of personal/elite ambitions and rivalries, a story of social cleavages and coalition building, political alignments, disalignments and realignments. The chapter also shows that succession battle in Ivory Coast is a struggle over power and the mode of distribution of resources as they became scares as a result of economic crisis, compounded by SAP. The chapter ends by examining how the conflict erupted and its regional dynamics.

In chapter four, I proceed to analyse the various attempts at conflict management and resolution. From Paris to Pretoria, I examine the basis and rationale of each accord.

Chapter five teases out why these accords have failed to be full implemented. The chapter looks at the substantive and technical failures of the peace accords. It also points out that the conflict has generated its own dynamics which is economically and politically beneficial to some of the belligerents as against ordinary Ivorians. I conclude by analysing some policy considerations and at the same time proposing recommendations

## CHAPTER ONE

### CONCEPTUAL AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

#### **The Political Economy of African Conflicts**

The aim of this chapter is to use the political economy of conflict as a framework to understand the cause and persistence of Ivorian conflict. Conflict management and resolution is almost entirely determined by our understanding of the concept conflict and not only by its symptoms. Thus, any plausible debate on the causes, nature and persistence of Ivorian conflict should be premise on a proper conceptualisation of conflict, conflict management and resolution.

#### **Section A: Concepts**

##### **What is Conflict?**

Politics by definition functions in a context of scarcity: scarcity of resources, scarcity of power, scarcity of identity and scarcity of status.<sup>60</sup> Competition is therefore inevitable whether between two or more individuals, groups or even states. Consequently, conflict is inevitable and a normal state of interaction between human beings and violent conflict is rather another form conflict expresses itself.<sup>61</sup> This position is empirically questionable and normatively ambiguous, since people are more apt to cooperate and harmonise their incompatible and confliction positions.<sup>62</sup> Conflict is in fact a crisis which signifies a breakdown in the normal pattern of behavior. It involves a collision of incompatible positions resulting from a failure to regulate, reconcile and harmonise differences.

Conflict here should be contrasted with peace. Peace is more than the absence of violence. The absence of direct violence in a relationship may mask a profound sense of latent conflict that may be brewing and waiting for a spark. The absence of conflict need not imply the lack of animosity among potential belligerents. Accordingly, conflict management and resolution should be more than arresting actual fighting but

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<sup>60</sup> Kotze, Dirk. op. cit

<sup>61</sup> Rugumamu, S.R. "Conflict Management in Africa: Diagnosis of Current Practises and Future Prospects" [www.unpant.un.org](http://www.unpant.un.org)

<sup>62</sup> Francis, M, Deng, and Zartman, I. W *Conflict resolution in Africa*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1991. op. cit. pp835

also addressing the structural causes of conflict. For this study, conflict is defined as every variety of force, coercion, militancy, destruction and aggression directed against persons, property or symbols of perceived discontent. This type of violence, because of its impact necessitates urgent recourse to conflict management and resolution.

### **Conflict Management**

Conflict management refers to the containment of a conflict that has already broken out in the form of addressing solutions that will reduce the level of violence and prevent its escalation. These include measures that address the mobilising factors thus creating space for long-term resolution. Principal among these is peacekeeping by neutral parties which provides for cessation of hostilities.<sup>63</sup>

### **Conflict Resolution**

Conflict resolution refers to a plethora of activities aimed at addressing the structural or root causes of a dispute that led to conflict. This includes initiatives such as mediation, arbitration and adjudication. Mediation is the thrust of this study. Since the causes of conflict are complex and drawn from different sources, conflict resolution calls for multi-faceted response.<sup>64</sup> Broadly, there are two theoretical approaches to conflict resolution: behaviorist and Structuralist /institutionalist.

Behavioralist approach to conflict resolution locates an individual as the unit of analysis both at the societal and national level. An individual's behavior is associated with conflict as a result of overreaction, overperception, and ethnocentrism. Within this context, concepts such as socialisation and cost/benefit calculation, the dissonance between expected rewards and actual rewards is important to understand conflict. Gurr's "relative deprivation"<sup>65</sup> and Davies "J-Curve"<sup>66</sup> are examples of such dissonance. Against this background, conflict resolution focuses on individuals and their roles in society in trying to change their perception and addressing their needs in order to establish social harmony.

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<sup>63</sup> Rugumamu, op cit.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Gurr, Ted. *Why Do Men Rebel?* Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1970.

<sup>66</sup> Davies, James C. 1962. "Towards a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXVII. pp. 5-18.

Structuralist/Institutionalist approach posits that conflict is a result of failure of the mechanism through which resources are distributed. Structuralists argue that restructuring of the political environment is the best way to manage and resolve conflicts. According to Burton, democracy is the most viable but not the only option.<sup>67</sup> SIDA argues that Structuralist approach should also include changes to the social, political and economic or systemic configuration of a society. For example, land redistribution and affirmative action such as Black Economic Empowerment.<sup>68</sup>

Institutionalists are less concern with distribution matters; rather they concentrate on the most appropriate democratic institution. Harris and Reilly focus their analysis on elections.<sup>69</sup> But Ohlson argues that elections can only work when politics is generally inclusive in nature.<sup>70</sup> Using South Africa as an example, Hart argues that constitution drafting should be part of peace negotiations. She argues that constitution making concludes a conflict and a settlement in order to ensure permanence and stability.<sup>71</sup>

These approaches seem to focus on democracy and democratic institutions much to the exclusion of the role of spoilers in the non implementation of peace agreements. Important to note here is the fact that despite their perceived short comings, these approaches are not mutually exclusive from each other especially in ascertaining the causes of conflict.

### **Section B: Argument: The Political Economy of Conflicts**

If one agrees with Gurr, Zartman and Rugumamu that conflict is inherent in human intercourse, then causes of conflict is a misnomer. But as aforementioned, the gist of this debate is violent conflict which is not normal in human behavior. To explain why conflict arises, some analysts have distinguished between structural causes and triggering or mobilising factors.

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<sup>67</sup> Burton, John W. 1987. *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*. University Press of America

<sup>68</sup> Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)1999. *Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace-Building*. Stockholm: SIDA (Division of Humanitarian Assistance)

<sup>69</sup> Harris, Peter & Reilly, Ben (eds) 1998. *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*. Stockholm: IDEA.

<sup>70</sup> Ohlson, Thomas. 1998. *Power Politics and Peace Politics: Intra-State Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

<sup>71</sup> Hart, Vivian 2003. "Democratic Constitution making." *Report No. 107* Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace.

Structural causes are deeply rooted, underlying causes of conflict that may not necessarily flare up into violent conflict. Structural factors include: state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance, the distribution of wealth, ethnic make up of the state and the history of inter-ethnic relations. Mobilising factors are more immediate to the conflict and often involve the actions of elites and/or masses. Mobilising factors include: discriminatory policies, repression of political groups. This distinction in some instances is purely academic and difficult to ascertain empirically.

The political economy theory of conflict holds that conflicts stems from scarcity and contestation over resources. Thus, the manner in which resources are distributed and managed fuels and sustains conflicts.<sup>72</sup> Lefwich argues that politics is principally the activities of conflict, cooperation; and negotiation involving the use, production and distribution of resources, whether materials or ideal, whether at local, national, or international level.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, politics of resources distribution is at the heart of contemporary conflicts in Africa taking cognisance of Laswell's definition of politics as a question of who gets what, how and when.<sup>74</sup>

David Keen argues that to understand conflicts thus negotiating a successful peace accord, one has to understand the economic dimensions of the conflicts. He points out that, "War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection."<sup>75</sup> Keen argues that in the context of civil wars, members of armed groups can benefit from looting and governments can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances ending civil wars becomes difficult, and defeating the enemy may not be desirable.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Ajulu, R. 2003. op cit

<sup>73</sup> Cf Ajulu, R 2003. pp. 267

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. pp. 267

<sup>75</sup> David Keen, 1998. "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars", Adelphi Paper 320, (London International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 15-17. An updated version of this publication is titled "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence" and appears in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

Keen distinguishes between two forms of economic violence, namely "top-down" and "bottom-up". Top-down violence is mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs, and can be influenced by factors such as a weak state, an economic crisis, a strong threat to a regime and competition for valuable resources. Bottom-up violence is violence employed by citizens and/or low-ranking soldiers. It is fuelled by social and economic exclusion, the absence of a strong revolutionary organisation or ideology, and the belief that violence will go unpunished.<sup>77</sup>

Mark Duffield, analysis the relationship between globalisation and protracted civil wars in developing countries. He argues that globalisation has not contributed to civil war in a significant way, but has led to increased disparity and instability in developing world, as well as the expansion and penetration of all forms of trans-border activity, particularly, highly criminalised war economies. As war economies are dependent on external markets, Duffield argues market regulation could potentially be a useful conflict resolution tool.<sup>78</sup>

William Reno, through an analysis of the political economy of violence in "shadow states" argues that in the context of civil war, economic interests of belligerent groups may seriously impede the termination of conflict. The reason for this is that war may be used to control land, commercial activities, labour, take advantage of emergency relief supplies, and ensure the financial well-being and status of elites. Hence, belligerent parties may have vested interests in the continuation of conflicts.<sup>79</sup>

Another rubric of this theory is focused on the activities of rebel movements. *African Guerrillas* 1998 edited by Christopher Clapham undertakes case study analysis of rebel movements in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo-Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, in analysing the initiation and persistence of conflict on the continent. In the case of Sudan, Douglas Johnson argues that, the Sudan People's Liberation Army diverted international relief supplies for military operations. With respect to Somalia, Daniel Compagnon points out the various militia groups

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Mark Duffield, 2000. "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 69-90.

<sup>79</sup> William Reno, 2000. "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 43-68

engaged in wide-scale looting, due to the collapse of the Somali state and formal economy. Within this context, Compagnon argues that a criminal economy has emerged in Somalia, characterised by theft, kidnapping and bribery which has perpetuated the war for the sake of economic benefits that it provides to the economically empowered.<sup>80</sup>

Using quantitative analysis, Collier and Hoeffler argue that civil war is heavily concentrated in countries with low income, in economic decline and dependent upon natural resources.<sup>81</sup> They distinguish between two possible motives behind civil wars; “justice-seeking” (grievance) and “loot-seeking” (greed). Anchored on utilitarian framework drawn from Grossman<sup>82</sup> and Azam<sup>83</sup>, Collier et al argue that, war occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to cost. Greed is the desire by parties of a conflict to loot for their private gains. Rebels have an incentive to challenge government because the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict is seen as offering opportunity for extortion which finances and sustain a war. They argue that greed rather than grievance is the root cause of conflicts and the factor sustaining it.

Collier et al main proxy for greed is the ratio of primary commodity export to gross domestic product and income per capital (natural resource dependence). Collier et al argue that the risk of war initiation and sustenance increases as the natural resource endowment of a country increases and decreases as the opportunity cost of rebellion increases. Five channels of causation are use to explain this scenario: The first channel of causation between natural resource dependence and conflict is the concept of the *rentier state*. Auty distinguishes between point and difuse resources; point resources includes resources such as minerals while difuse resources include

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<sup>80</sup> Daniel Compagnon, 1998. "Somali Armed Movements", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas*, (Oxford: James Currey), pp. 73-90; Stephen Ellis, 1998. "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), pp. 155-17; Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, 1998. "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpen proletariat", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), pp. 172-194

<sup>81</sup> Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., *On Economic Causes of Civil War*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Collier, P., "Doing Well Out of War", *World Bank Working Paper*, 1999.

<sup>82</sup> Grossman, H. I. 1995."Insurrections" in K. Hartley and T Sandler (eds) *Handbook of Defence Economics, Vol 1*

<sup>83</sup> Azam, J-P. 1995. "How to Pay for Peace? A Theoretical Framework with Reference to African Countries? *Public Choice*, 83, 173-84

agricultural produc.<sup>84</sup> Rents here mean profits that are much higher than the minimum level needed to keep an activity going.<sup>85</sup> This concept posits that, resource dependent states are most invariably authoritarian and conflict prone.<sup>86</sup>

Natural resource dependence leads to conflict because; natural resources are a ‘honey pot’ thus Politics becomes the contest for control of these revenues. This produces a spoil politics and politics of corruption – aided and abetted by foreign corporate behaviour – and sometimes directly a politics of violence. The stakes are highest in low-income countries because control of the state implies massive revenues relative to other income-earning opportunities grounded in the absence of a viable private sector.<sup>87</sup>

Another channel through which natural resource dependence causes conflict is through bad governance. Bratton argues that countries in Africa where democratic transition and consolidation have failed are endowed with natural resources. He points out that there was a significant decline in the level of democracy in several African countries in the post-third wave democratisation period (1995-1997). From the founding elections that took place in the period 1989-1994 to the second elections that took place in the period from 1995-1997, there was a decline in the rate of leadership alteration (37% to 6.6%); an increase in the rate of opposition boycotts (11% to 73%), and an increase in the mean of winner’s vote share (61.4% to 69.1%) for presidential elections and (62.7% to 72.0%) in parliamentary elections.<sup>88</sup> Bratton’s data reveals that election malpractices and opposition boycott took place in petro-states such as Cameroon and Gabon. In other countries such as Algeria and Republic of Congo, DRC and Sierra Leone, democratisation simply descended in to civil war. The

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<sup>84</sup> Auty, R. M. (ed) *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*” Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001

<sup>85</sup> Collier and Hoeffler op cit

<sup>86</sup> Ross, M. 2000. “Does Resource Wealth Cause Authoritarian rule? *Working Paper*, Washington DC: World Bank; Ross, M. 1999. Political Economy of Resource Curse. *World politics*, 51, 297-322.

Mahdavy, H. 1970. Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier State: The Case of Iran. In M. A. Cook (ed) *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*. pp428-468. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Wantchenkon, L. 1999. “Why Do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Government? *Yale University Leither Center Working Paper* 99. New Haven CT: Yale

<sup>87</sup> Collier and Hoeffler op cit

<sup>88</sup> Bratton, M and van de Walle, N. 1997. *Democratic Experiment in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.



argument here is that pseudo-democratisation liberalised the political space thus increasing the struggle over resources through capturing state power.

The reasons behind the lack of democratic transition and consolidation in resource rich countries are that: with huge profits from resource windfall, dictators are left with available resources to distribute to clients, co-opt political opponents, great façade opposition parties and bolster the repressive machinery of the state. Against this backdrop, top-down “good governance” and “democratisation” was easily shot down in these countries because “opposition” leaders were not challenging the system but simply vying to be part of it. Thus *democracy* and good *governance* that is engendered in a top-down process is unsustainable.<sup>89</sup>

Fiscal sociologists argue that the bond between the state and its citizens is established through taxes thus accountability-no taxation without representation. Therefore, in the process of the state extracting resources to meet its needs, it affords citizens a channel to hold government accountable. Thus the absence of social pressure through taxation entrenches authoritarianism.<sup>90</sup> In many resource-rich societies, resource rents are not seen as belonging to ordinary people in the same way as income taken from them in taxes – hence the detachment.<sup>91</sup> Consequently, why would an old man in a cocoa plantation care about holding the government accountable when the gendarmerie stop visiting him, knowing fully well that *la peur du gendarme est le debut de la segesse?*<sup>92</sup>

The third channel of causation between natural resources and conflict is due to the availability of resources to the rebels to launch an insurgent. Collier et al argue that since primary commodity export are heavily taxed, it provide ready income for belligerents to exploit; taking into consideration the fact that primary commodity production does not depend upon complex and delicate networks of information and transaction as in manufacturing. It becomes profitable to belligerents because profit is base on exploitation of idiosyncratic natural endowment rather than the more competitive level playing field of manufacturing. Moreover, this situation is

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<sup>89</sup> Ake, Claude. *Democracy and development*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1996.

<sup>90</sup> Ross op, cit

<sup>91</sup> Collier and Hoeffler op. cit

<sup>92</sup> Fear of the gendarme is the beginning of wisdom. (my own translation) Gaullic expression in francophone Africa which means, being afraid of the state is the beginning of wisdom as oppose to being afraid of the law.

compounded by the fact that natural resources in some instances are situated far from the capital city and within the reach of potential rebels taking into consideration the weak capacity of African states.<sup>93</sup>

Another channel of causation between resource dependent and conflict is the fact that, during resource boom, resource rents appreciate real exchange rate causing other sectors of the economy (mostly agriculture) to become uncompetitive thus the *Dutch disease*.<sup>94</sup> Since citizens of resource rich countries concentrate on agriculture, they face sharply declining income despite the influx of wealth into the economy. In cases where a country is dependent on agriculture, appreciation of the currency might mean other produce in the agricultural sector become uncompetitive thus poverty.

The prices of natural resources are usually extremely volatile. As a result, the economy becomes subject to booms and busts and this is compounded by the fact that bust last longer than boom.<sup>95</sup> This pattern typically depresses the long term growth rate and it also implies periods of severe contraction bearing in mind that economic decline is itself a risk factor for civil war. Collier et al conclude that a country dependent on natural resources have a 27% risk of descending in to civil conflict.<sup>96</sup>

Indra de Soysa argues concurs by arguing that, the abundance of renewable resources among poor countries is more likely to lead to violence and to lower economic, human, and institutional development. De Soysa further claims that the abundance of non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Le Billon, Philippe. "The political Ecology of wWar: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 561-84.

<sup>94</sup> Sach and Warner 1995 "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Development" *NBER Working Paper* 5398, 1997; Auty, R. M. 2001. (ed) *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*" Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001; Rod Alence, "Evading the 'Resource Curse' in Africa: Economics, Governance, and Natural Resources," unabridged version of *IGD Policy Brief*. 2005

<sup>95</sup> Angus Deaton, "Commodity Prices and Growth in Africa," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13, no. 3 (summer 1999): Angus Deaton and Ron Miller, "International Commodity Prices, Macroeconomic Performance, and Politics in sub-Saharan Africa," *Princeton Studies in International Finance* 79 (October 1995).

<sup>96</sup> Collier et al. op. cit; Fearon, James. D "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 275-301 (2004)

<sup>97</sup> Indra de Soysa, 2000. "The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?" in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 113-136.

Collier et al argue that, higher per capita income reduces the initiation and duration of war. They argue that the probability of a country descending into war is 0.63 if the country has half mean income, but only 0.15 if the country has double mean income. This is the case because conflict provides people with an opportunity to earn income rather than sitting at home, after all a *hungry man is an angry man*. They strengthen this point by pointing out that a society with a majority of the population being young men from 14 to 24 is vulnerable to conflict.<sup>98</sup>

Collier et al argue that a society that is largely fragmented is not very vulnerable to conflict as compared to a society which is composed of two main tribal groups. Their argument is that, in societies where there are two main ethnic groups, it is easier to form rebellion based on ethnic cleavage.

Collier et al also blame the lack of political rights as one of the lesser causes of civil wars. They argue that if the government is autocratic and repressive, people will have a natural and justifiable desire to overthrow it in the pursuit of change. For example, the uprising in Romania is seen as a quest for democracy.<sup>99</sup>

Collier et al argue that if a government is seen to inflict sufficient economic misery on its population, it may face an uprising. This is proxied by growth in gross domestic product. Collier et al argue that other things being equal, an economy that has experienced rapid decline might be more prone to rebellion than one that has experienced rapid growth.<sup>100</sup> President Obasanjo concurs and argues that there is a link between the level of poverty in Africa and incidence of violence and conflict on the continent.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Collier et al. op. cit.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Cited in Deng, F. and Zartman, W. *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Brookings Institute. Washington DC 1991

**Table 1: Growth in real per capita GDP 1960-94 in Conflict Countries**

<b>Conflict countries</b>	<b>1960-75</b>	<b>1975-85</b>	<b>1985-1994</b>	<b>1960-1994</b>
Angola	-10	-0.42	-4.06	-1.64
Burundi	2.37	1.65	-1.32	-0.94
CAR	-0.30	0.97	-2.12	-0.98
R. of Congo	2.79	4.95	-3.94	1.76
DRC	-	1.46	-3.65	-
Eritrea	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	1.16	-0.20	0.68	0.64
Guinea Bissau	2.85	-1.690	0.47	0.88
Kenya	1.83	-0.39	1.80	1.12
Lesotho	5.91	2.49	1.44	3.72
Liberia	1.77	1.00	-	-
Rwanda	1.44	1.74	-11.34	-1.98
Senegal	0.14	0.33	-1.01	.023
Sierra Leon	0.62	-2.82	.214	-1.29
Somalia	-0.48	-1.98	-	-
Sudan	-	-0.15	0.85	-
Chad	-1.63	-3.71	-0.5	-1.94
Uganda	0.23	-1.35	0.91	0-05

Source: Dani Rodrik, Trade Policies and Economic Performance in SSA. Working Paper No 6562 (May 1998).<sup>102</sup>

Table I tease out the relationship between per capita GDP and conflict from 1960-1995 in some African countries that have witnessed conflict. 8 of the 13 countries had overall negative growth in real per capita GDP from 1960-94 and there are significant variations from one decade to another. Whereas from 1960-1975, only 5 countries had negative growth, from 1975-85, the number double to 11. During 1985-94, 10 countries were witnessing growth deficit. What is important to read from this table is the fact that countries which have witnessed high negative growth for example Angola, Rwanda and DRC, have all witnessed protracted and intense conflict and the ones that witnessed positive growth are fairly stable. Despite the time limitation of this table, it ascertains that a strong and robust correlation exists between economic decline and conflict. The World Bank argues...

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<sup>102</sup> Cf. Adedeji, op cit. pp.13

Countries with low, stagnant, unequally distributed per capital income that have remained dependent on primary commodities for export face dangerously high risk of prolonged conflict. In the absence of economic development, neither good political institution, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defence against large scale violence.<sup>103</sup>

The link between economic development and democracy have been debated by many scholars notably Seymour Martin Lipset within the framework of the modernisation theory. Democracy and development often work in tandem reinforcing each another in preventing and managing conflict. Bangura argues

although underdevelopment per se should not constitute a fundamental obstacle to democratisation, the establishment of stable and sustainable democracy requires substantial changes in the forms of accumulation; the promotion of an acceptable level of welfare that will allow the majority of the people to have confidence in the capacity of democratic institutions to manage, economic, social and political conflict.<sup>104</sup>

The debate around democratisation and conflict still rages on.<sup>105</sup> Though it is not the thrust of this study, it is worth mentioning that democracy seems to have a negative impact on violence depending on state capacity and the political elites. Alence argues that democracy will lead to conflict if it is not fully implemented.<sup>106</sup> Olukoshi and Laakso argue that democratisation has led to the resurgence of ethno-political conflict in Africa.<sup>107</sup> They argue that deep-seated economic crisis undermined the legitimacy

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<sup>103</sup>World Bank. "Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy V 1" World Bank, June 2003. <http://econ.worldbank.org>

<sup>104</sup> Bangura, Y. "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa. A Theoretical Discourse". In Gibson, p. Bangura, Y. *Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment. The Politics of Economic Reform*. Pp39

<sup>105</sup> See generally the publications of Center for the Study of Civil War. [http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW/PRIO\\_menu\\_buttons/9195/9220](http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW/PRIO_menu_buttons/9195/9220).

<sup>106</sup> Alence, R. "Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 2 (June 2004).

<sup>107</sup> Olukoshi, A. and Laakso, L. *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*. Uppsala. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 1996; Olukoshi, A. "Economic Crisis, Multipartyism and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa in Olukoshi, A (ed) *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*. Uppsala Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

and capacity of the state whilst entrenching institutional authoritarianism. Thus authoritarianism was in certain circumstances capable of keeping ethnicity in check. But with the advent of democratisation, due to economic crisis and weak state capacity, the fight for economic resources became intense and politicians had to resort to ethnic rhetoric to mobilise political support. Consequently, the crisis of the nation-state in Africa is much a problem of governance capacity and state capacity/economic crisis. The collapse of Ivory Coast seems to validate this hypothesis taking into consideration the country's changing political and economic

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IVORIAN CRISIS

This chapter intends looking back in time retrospect to understand the root causes of the Ivorian crisis. In doing this, the chapter examines the organisation of power and authority grounded in the relationship between the Ivorian colonial and post-colonial state and economy. Against this backdrop, the section engages questions such as: how was Ivorian colonial economy integrated into the world economy? How did this integration influence political competition and conflict prevention?

The chapter argues that contemporary forms of accumulation, ethnicity and socio-economic dominance along ethnic lines can be explained by the legacy of colonisation. Ivory Coast was integrated into the world economy as a mercantilist economy with the state playing a principal role in primitive accumulation due to the absence of a local bourgeoisie. I do not contend that colonialism created ethnicity in Ivory Coast. But rather a once slow evolving and fluid ethnic self-consciousness was transformed by colonial policies into a new harder tribal structure to the extent that ethnicity was stronger and more politically relevant with the advent of democratisation.

#### **Section One: Colonial State, Colonial Economy and Transition to Independence**

France made its initial contact with Ivory Coast in 1637, when missionaries landed at Assinee near the Gold Coast (now Ghana) border. Early contacts were limited to a few missionaries because of the inhospitable coastline and settlers' fear of the inhabitants. In the 18th century, the country was invaded from present-day Ghana by two related Akan groups-the Agnis, who occupied the southeast, and the Baoules, who settled in the central section.<sup>108</sup> In 1843-44, Admiral Bouet-Williaumez signed treaties with the kings of the Grand Bassam and Assinie regions, placing their territories under a French protectorate. French explorers, missionaries, trading companies and soldiers gradually extended the area under French control inland from the lagoon region. However, complete pacification was not accomplished until 1915.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> US Library of Congress. <http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/3.htm>

<sup>109</sup> <http://www.nationbynation.com/Ivory%20Coast/History2.html>

Ivory Coast officially became a French colony in 1893. Captain Binger, who had explored the Gold Coast frontier, was named the first governor. He negotiated boundary treaties with Liberia and the United Kingdom (for the Gold Coast) and later started the campaign against Almany Samory, a Malinke chief who fought against the French until 1898. From 1904 to 1958, Ivory Coast was a constituent unit of the Federation of French West Africa. French policy in West Africa was reflected mainly in its philosophy of "association," meaning that all Africans in Ivory Coast were officially French "subjects"-*indignant*-without rights to citizenship or representation in Africa or France.<sup>110</sup>

During World War II, France's Vichy regime remained in control until 1943, when members of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's provisional government assumed control of all French West Africa. The Brazzaville Conference in 1944; the first Constituent Assembly of the French Fourth Republic in 1946 and France's *gratitude* for African's loyalty during World War II led to far-reaching governmental reforms in 1946. French citizenship was granted to all African "subjects," the right to organise politically was recognised, and various forms of forced labour were abolished. Elections to French constituent assembly was organised and Boigny won. This victory provided Boigny the chance to hold various ministerial portfolios in France.

A turning point in France/Africa relations was reached with the enactment of Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) in 1956. The law transferred a number of powers from Paris to elected territorial governments in French West Africa. It also removed remaining voting inequalities. In 1958, Ivory Coast became an autonomous region within the French West Africa (Afrique Francaise d'Ouest AFO) and later gained independence on 7 august 1960.

The French instituted the policy of assimilation in Ivory Coast., though at times it is very difficult to differentiate between assimilation and indirect rule. The French entered into indirect association with pre-colonial structures when it served their interest. For example, local chiefs such as Gbon Coulibaly of Krohogo, Moro-Naba

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<sup>110</sup> US Library of Congress, op. cit



Sagha 11 and Gyamanhere Kouadio were made *Chef de Caton* and *Chef de Circle*<sup>111</sup> respectively and close collaborators of French colonial administration.

Nationalism in Ivory Coast as in most African countries took a momentous turn after World War Two. Ivorian nationalism rose from agitation from grievances connected with the war and its effect on the economy. Cocoa was introduced in Ivory Coast by the early 1900s and by the 1940s its production had become wide scale. The introduction and development of cash crop agriculture under colonisation in Ivory Coast was a critical juncture in Ivorian politics, it provided a watershed for ethnic, political cleavages and nationalism. Plantation economy shaped different ethnic roles, created different class interest and regional development as the commercialisation of agriculture determined the political development of Europe.<sup>112</sup>

Cocoa, coffee and forestry became the main economic activities of French colonial administration. Plantation agriculture was intensified between 1910-1930 mostly in the southern part of the country specifically south east and center because of good climatic conditions and its proximity to Atlantic Ocean. By the end of 1930s production shifted to the Center and West. While the northerners were engaged in trading and agriculture, the westerners were forced to march along with foreign exploitation of their land considering their late entering into agriculture.<sup>113</sup>

In order to strengthen the colonial economy, contradictions of the colonial economy produce huge regional disparity in development between the north and south. Cohen argues that the colonial plantation economy influenced urban policy planning which was considered a strategic instrument for determining the political economy of Ivory Coast.<sup>114</sup> The southern region of Ivory Coast was developed relatively to the north.<sup>115</sup> The only meaningful economic development in the north was a rail way transporting migrant labour to the plantations in the south.<sup>116</sup> Jean-Pierre Dozon argues that

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<sup>111</sup> Administrative officers

<sup>112</sup> Moore, Barrington . *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 413-14.

<sup>113</sup> Dozon, J-P "Economie Marchande et Structures Sociales: Le cas des Bété de Côte d'Ivoire," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Vol. 68, No. 17 (1977), pp. 463-84;

<sup>114</sup> Cohen, M. A. "Urban Policy and Development Strategy" in Zartman, W. I and Delgado, C. 1984. *The Political Economy of Côte-d'Ivoire*. New York Praeger

<sup>115</sup> Zartman, W. I and Delgado, C. 1984. *The Political Economy of Côte-d'Ivoire*. New York Praeger.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

“ethnic significance became really operational, overloaded with the sense of that unequal structuring of Ivorian society, manipulated by the colonial state...”<sup>117</sup>

World War Two instigated colossal economic strain on the economy of the metropole. Thus, enormous pressure was exerted on the colonies to increase their *l'effort de guerre* (war effort). In the case of Ivory Coast, by 1944 there was no industrial activity and even though trade unions were legalised in 1944, it was only in areas where it was of immense importance to the colonial economy.<sup>118</sup> This meant increase production of cocoa and coffee to meet *l'effort de guerre*. This increase production came as a result of increase exploitation of labour and land and not capital.

It is against this backdrop, force labour was intensified in Ivory Coast. In 1943 alone, 4,537,520 working days were devoted to meeting food and labour requirement for the south. An equivalent of one year's labour for 15,381 out of a male population of 72,000.<sup>119</sup> In 1944, Korhogo was forced to double its rice production which led to famine in subsequent years.<sup>120</sup> For Africans to meet their quotas demanded from them by the colonial administration, they had to buy at higher prices and resell to the government at a lower price. For example, in one village, villagers had to buy rubber at 25 Franc per kilo and resell it to the government at 11 Franc.<sup>121</sup> Consequently, African farmers did not only make a loss of 14 Franc, they had to forgo their traditional economic activities. Economic activities around the trading of kola were destroyed because it was of no benefit to the colonial economy despite the fact that it was the principal mode of accumulation, interaction and cohesion for Africans.<sup>122</sup> This situation was compounded by the fact that Africans were not allowed to sell to any person other than people designated by the colonial administration. Africans were

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<sup>117</sup> Dozon, J-P. *La Société Bété: Histoires d'une "ethnie" de Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris: Edition de l'OSTROM, 1985) ; Lawler, Nancy “Reform and Repression Under the Free French: Economic and Political Transformation in Côte d'Ivoire from 1942-1945” : *Journal of the International African Institute* Vol. 60, No. 1 (1990), pp. 88-110; Chauveau, J-P. and Dozon, J-P “Ethnies et Etat en Côte d'Ivoire,” *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 38, No. 5 (1988), pp. 732-47.

<sup>118</sup> Lawler, N. 1990. op. cit.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Chauveau and Dozon, “Colonisation, Économie de Plantation et Société Civile,” *Cahiers de l'OSTROM, série Sciences Humaines*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1985) ; Chauveau, J-P. “Économie de Plantation et Nouveaux Milieux Sociaux: Essai d'analyse Comparative et Historique à Partir d'observations en Pays Gban et Baoulé,” *Cahiers de l'OSTROM, Série Sciences Humaines*, Vol. 16, No. 1-2 (1979) pp. 59-82

bound to sell their produce below market prices because the colonial administration fixed buying prices in a bid to protect price fluctuation which might affect the economy of the metropole. This colonial practice did not only expose neo-slavery perpetuated by colonialism, it also affected the economic viability of African farmers because their produce were constantly taxed and which they received practically nothing in return either in development or accountability.

In 1944, at the Brazzaville conference, as a show of reward to francophone African for the liberation of France, Africans were allowed to grow their own crops but were bound to supply quotas to the administration. The shortage of labour because of forced labour meant that African small holders could not compete with their *colons* counterparts. This formed the genesis of the Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA) in July 1944. Though SAA was not a political party per se, it prepared the path for the formation of the first political party in Ivory Coast, Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) which had ties with Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA).

The SAA enhanced the economic capabilities of African planters in many ways: African planters were able to recruit labour easily from the north. For example, Boigny build an alliance with Gbon Coulibaly of Krohogo for the supply of labour. Important to note here is the fact that, the creation of SAA also stimulated the influence of migrant from the north to the south because they could now earn wages.<sup>123</sup>

The creation of SAA had two important political significances: first, it indicated political consciousness by Africans; second it reflected the emergence of an economic group whose interest *conflicted* with colonial administration. The economic interest of African planters did not only engender nationalism in Ivory Coast, but the protection of their interest dominated Ivorian politics since independence. In fact, most of the literature on Ivorian politics argues that the planter class dominated SAA and

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<sup>123</sup> Lawler, op cit.

PDCI.<sup>124</sup> For example, Boigny and Philippe Yacé President and Secretary General respectively of the PDCI were both planters.

Since a coalition between Baoule and north formed the strength of the PDCI and their subsequent alliance with RDA and French Communist Party, the colonial administration tried to destroy PDCI by instrumentalising ethnicity. The colonial administration created and funded other political parties.<sup>125</sup> But since these parties were purely grounded on ethnic cleavages, they could not muster the same support as the PDCI. The PDCI subsequent break from the French communist party in 1952 meant that it had the full support of the French, conditioned on the party's policy towards France.

Though Boigny was a nationalist, he was not a radical calling for the total withdrawal of French interest in Ivory Coast as Sakou Toure in Guinea.<sup>126</sup> This rapprochement between the colonial administration and the PDCI pushed other political parties to engender mobilisation through ethnicity and anti-colonialism which further alienated France. It is within this context; France manipulated the 1957 legislative elections in which the PDCI won all seats, thus effectively killing “democracy and multiparty politics in Ivory Coast at the eve of independence.”<sup>127</sup>

Three important conclusions can be drawn from Ivory Coast metamorphosis from a colonial to an independent state. First, Ivorian economy was integrated into the world economy as a mercantilist, plantation economy, primary producer of cocoa and coffee to satisfy the needs of the metropole and more important as a junior partner perpetually at the mercy of price fluctuation.<sup>128</sup> Amin, Wallerstein and Prebish argue that economies that are very dependent on primary commodities are very vulnerable

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<sup>124</sup> Amin, Samir. *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* ( Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967) ; Woods, D. “State Action and Class Interests in the Ivory Coast.” *African Studies Review*. Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr., 1988), pp. 93-116

<sup>125</sup> Faure, Yves “Fauré, Y. 1993: 'Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the case of Côte d'Ivoire', *Africa Affairs* 63, 3: 313-330.

<sup>126</sup> Toungara, Jean Maddox. 1990. “The apotheosis of Côte d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouet-Boigny.” *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 28/1, pp. 23-54

<sup>127</sup> Tiemoko, Coulibaly. 1995. “Démocratie et Surenchères Identitaires en Côte-d'Ivoire. *Politique Africaine* 58, pp.143-150.

<sup>128</sup> Amin, S. 1965, op cit

to economic crisis because of their inability to withstand fluctuations in world prices.<sup>129</sup>

Second, contradictions of Ivorian colonial economy led to huge development discrepancy between south and north regions of the country. Catherin Aubertin points out that until the late 1930s when the French settlers pressured the colonial regime to intensify its policy of forced labour for plantations in the south, economic and social development between the north and south was on par.<sup>130</sup> But on the eve of independence, the disparity between the north and south was large and growing. Eddy Lee estimated a seven-to-one ratio for average income difference between the two regions in 1981.<sup>131</sup>

Third, the political economy of Ivorian colonial state produced a bourgeoisie class, which benefited from the economic trajectory espoused by the colonial administration. Bakary argues that the development of a plantation economy led to a consensus on economic policy, which is the main source of conservative politics in the country.<sup>132</sup>

Ethnic cleavages, mobilisation and access to resources, was also heightened by the degree of interaction between the various groups in Ivory Coast with the colonial master- France. At the top of the list were Akans, specifically Baoules because of their early encounters with Europeans and their ability to accept and propagate the *civilising mission*. As the first region to be colonised by the French, the first schools were opened in the southeast and center because of the concentration of colonial economic activities.<sup>133</sup> Next were Dioulas and the Senoufo from the northern part of the country, mainly because most of them are Muslim and France had experience with Islamic people in North Africa. At the bottom of the classification were the Bété,

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<sup>129</sup> Amin, 1974 Op.Cit ; Prebish, 1950. Op. Cit; see also Rodney Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, D.C. : Howard University Press, 1982.

<sup>130</sup> Aubertin, C. "Histoire et Création d'un Région sous Développe: Le North Ivorian" *Cahier ORSTOM*. 1983. Vol. 19. No.1: 23-57

<sup>131</sup> Lee, E 1983. "Export-led Rural Development in the Ivory Coast" in D. Ghai and S. Rawdan (eds) *Agrarian Policies and Rural Development in Africa* Geneva: International Labor Organisation

<sup>132</sup> Bakary, T "Political Polarization over Governance in Cote d'Ivoire in Zartman, I. W (ed) *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*. The Brookings Institution, 1997.

<sup>133</sup> Bakary, T. 1997. op. cit.

because of their late colonisation and the very difficult military pacification of their territory, negative traits were ascribed to its inhabitants.<sup>134</sup> Houphouët-Boigny's victory in 1945 and again in 1946 can be described as the political translation of the social hegemony of an ethnic group.<sup>135</sup> Lemarchand argues that the area of colonial penetration and the manner in which colonial rule spread, influenced the character of social stratification in African states.<sup>136</sup>

Fourth, ethnicity was engendered by French colonial administration as a tool to destroy the PDCI as a formidable political force in Ivory Coast. The parties' strong regional roots (Ivory Coast Progressive Party-PPCI in the Southeast, PDCI-RDA in the center, and African Socialist Movement-MSA in the West) were the political expression of the internal socioeconomic divisions of the Ivorian population.

On the eve of independent, Ivory Coast largely inherited a colonial state with boundaries drawn devoid of any reference to the interest of local population. Administrative expediency demanded the colonial regime to elevate small entities into ethnic groupings. Until 1947, the colony of Ivory Coast included the largest portion of current Upper Volta.<sup>137</sup> The present stratification of Ivory Coast into 60 ethnic groups is the work Delafosse-French-devoid of any first hand knowledge of Ivorian ethnology.<sup>138</sup> His identification of ethnic groups was strongly influence by administrative expediency and murky parameters such as culture/language which as have been argued are constructive.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Dozon, J-P "Economie Marchande et Structures Sociales: Le cas des Bété de Côte d'Ivoire," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Vol. 68, No. 17 (1977), pp. 463-84; and Chauveau , "Agricultural Production and Social Formation: The Baule Region of Toumodiko Kumbo in Historical Perspective," in Martin A. Klein, (ed) *Peasants in Africa* ( Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 143-76.

<sup>135</sup> Bakery, T. 1997. *Op. Cit*; Meme-Fote, Harris. *Un Myth Politique des Akans de Cote d'Ivoire: Le Sens de L'Etat* in Valsecchi et Viti. F (eds) *Mondes Akan identité et pouvoir en Afrique Occidentale*. Pris L'Harmattan 1999, pp.21-42

<sup>136</sup> Lemarchand, R. 1983. "The State and Society in Africa: Ethnic Stratification and Restratification in Historical Perspective," pp. 44-67 in Rothchild. D. S and Olorunsola, V. A. (eds) *States Versus Ethnic claims: African Policy Dilemmas*. Boulder Westview Press

<sup>137</sup> Amin, S. 1965: pp. 12

<sup>138</sup> Maurice, Delafosse, *Vocabulaires Comparatifs de plus de Soixante Langues et Dialectes Parlés en Côte d'Ivoire et dans les Régions Limitrophes*. (Paris: Editions Leroux, 1904);

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

It is within this background that official speeches and academic writings of many disciplines perpetuate the idea of sixty tribes in Ivory Coast as a "human puzzle"<sup>140</sup> or "racial dustbin".<sup>141</sup> Indeed, Ivorians do not fit so well into the social attire more or less designed for them by the coloniser, because they themselves did not provide the fabric, the political economy of the colonial state shaped it.

## Section Two: Post-Colonial Political Economy

"If you don't want to vegetate in bamboo huts, concentrate your efforts on growing good cocoa and good coffee. They will fetch a good price and you will become rich."<sup>142</sup>

Cocoa is Côte d'Ivoire, it has built this country and it has also helped ruin it.<sup>143</sup> Daniel Abo

A World Bank report on Ivory Coast entitled "the challenge of success"<sup>144</sup> underscored the development success of Ivory Coast almost twenty years after independence. While the economies of other African countries grew at an annual rate of 3.7% Niger, Senegal 2.5% and Ghana -0.1%,<sup>145</sup> Ivory Coast grew at a rate of 7.5%<sup>146</sup> making it the fastest in Africa and 15<sup>th</sup> in the world.<sup>147</sup> Though Ivory Coast witnessed economic boom for 20 years, by 1980 due mainly to fall in world prices, the country descended into economic chaos and has really never recovered since then. In short, most of the progress achieved by Ivory Coast between 1960 and 1979 was lost in the 1980s and 1990s making the 1980s a lost decade for the country. Within this context, it is important to note that cocoa and coffee form almost 40% of the country export and

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<sup>140</sup> Bakary, T. 1997. op. cit

<sup>141</sup> Essy N'Gatta, " Le Phénomène Ethnique dans la vie Politique en Côte d'Ivoire Mémoire," *DES de Science Politique* (Strasbourg, 1970), pp. 4. Cf. Bakary, T. op. cit

<sup>142</sup> Bakary, T. 1997, op. cit. pp6

<sup>143</sup> Daniel Abo is a lawmaker and Vice President of the National Cocoa and Coffee Board. Cited in Pitman, Todd "Cocoa Industry is Booming in Ivory Coast" Associated Press. December, 6 2005

<sup>144</sup> den Tuinder, B. A. Ivory Coast: *The Challenge of Success*. World Bank: Washington D.C 1978

<sup>145</sup> World Bank *Development Report* 1981

<sup>146</sup> Ridler, Neil B. 1985. Comparative Advantage as a Development Model: the Ivory Coast. *Journal Modern African Studies* 23/3, pp. 407-417.

<sup>147</sup> Gilles, M and Noel, M. "The Ivorian Economy and Alternative Trade Regimes" in Zartman and Delgado. op. cit

20% of government revenue and almost 80% of the working population is engaged in this sector.<sup>148</sup>

The economic success of Ivory Coast has been credited to its development trajectory and comparative advantage.<sup>149</sup> While many developing African countries instituted import substitution policies; Ivory Coast adopted an export oriented development trajectory grounded in liberal migration and land tenure policy greased with a liberal tax regime to attract foreign investment.

At constant prices, the value of cocoa and coffee production more than double between 1960 and 1981, from 188, 800 million to 493,200 C.F.A francs.<sup>150</sup> Agriculture grew at 5% annually while industrial sector was weak due to lack of indigenous capital.<sup>151</sup> Increase productivity was achieved by increasing the cultivation of arable land which meant increase labour force which was made affordable by cheap migrant labour from up north and neighboring countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea.<sup>152</sup>

Having achieved a real GDP level of \$1,379 per capita in 1978, real output fell to \$867 in 1990<sup>153</sup> and under \$776 per capita in 2002, which is lower than the \$849 achieved in 1964,<sup>154</sup> hence by 2002 Ivorians were poorer than they were at eve of independence. To sum up Ivory Coast economic malaise, it is the most indebted sub-Saharan Africa African country in relation to debt per capital ratio thus a HIPC.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> World Bank Country Profile

<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/AFR/afr.nsf/23cdc5b1332c2598852567cf004d8610/79e3d7ef81d22a6c852567d1004b5356?OpenDocument>

<sup>149</sup> Tuinder Op. Cit, Ridler, N. B Comparative Advantage as a Development Model: The Ivory Coast *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 407-417

<sup>150</sup> Hecht, "The Ivory Coast Economic Miracle: What Benefit for Peasant Farmers? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21 1, March 1983, pp. 25-53

<sup>151</sup> Koudio A. "Debt of Cote d'Ivoire and challenges of poverty reduction" Ivorian Center of Economic and Social Research." (CIRES) 2004

<sup>152</sup> Hecht, R. M op. cit

<sup>153</sup> World Bank Development Indicators 1990

<sup>154</sup> Zeljko Bogetic and Issa Sanogo "Infrastructure, Productivity and Urban Dynamics in Côte d'Ivoire: An Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications" *Africa Region Working Paper Series* No. 86 June 2005. World Bank, Washington D.C.

<sup>155</sup> World Bank Development Indicators 2005



According to United Nations Development Programme, Ivory Coast is the 14<sup>th</sup> poorest country on earth ranking 163 out of 177 countries.<sup>156</sup>

**Table 2: Economic Growth in Ivory Coast, 1961-2004**

Year	GDP/growth %	Year	GDP/growth %	Year	GDP/growth %	Year	GDP/growth %	Year	GDP/growth %
1961	9.93	1971	9.46	1981	3.50	1991	0.04	2001	-2.6
1962	1.23	1972	4.24	1982	0.20	1992	-0.24	2002	-2.9
1963	14.49	1973	5.94	1983	-3.90	1993	-0.19	2003	-2.1
1964	17.61	1974	4.33	1984	-2.70	1994	0.81	2004	-2.3
1965	-3.11	1975	8.25	1985	4.50	1995	7.13		
1966	11.58	1976	12.92	1986	3.26	1996	7.73		
1967	4.60	1977	7.31	1987	-0.35	1997	5.72		
1968	12.55	1978	10.91	1988	1.14	1998	4.75		
1969	9.54	1979	2.39	1989	2.95	1999	1.58		
1970	10.38	1980	-10.96	1990	-1.10	2000	-2.3		

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WDI)

**Table 3: Human Development/human security in Ivory Coast 1973-2003**

Year	HDI/human security
1975	0.409
1980	0.441
1985	0.448
1990	0.442
1995	0.427
2000	0.428
2003	0.420

Source: UNDP Human Development Report

The mechanism through which agricultural production translated into macroeconomic growth was through government intervention in the marketing of cocoa and coffee. This was done through the *Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits*

<sup>156</sup> Human Development Report 2005  
<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=17&y=1&z=1>

*Agricoles*, CSSPPA or marketing boards.<sup>157</sup> The stabilisation fund-Caisse- was the heart of Ivorian economy.<sup>158</sup> The role of the Caisse included setting an official export price, releasing export negotiated by private exporters, selling a proportion of the crop, setting farm-gate price (price that farmers get) and ensuring quality and transportation.<sup>159</sup>

The management of cocoa was clouded with secrecy.<sup>160</sup> At the national level the Caisse worked closely with the Presidency and other ministries. The Caisse was responsible for issuing quotas, licenses to exporters and transporters. Among the 30-40 French Lebanese and Ivorian big companies involved in the exportation of cocoa and coffee, the big six who export around 55% of the crops were mainly French. At the local level the viability of the Caisse is ensured by *Prefets* (divisional officer) and police officers in consonant with the *Service de Controle de la Commercialisation des Produits Agricole* and the *Service de Controle du Conditionnement des Produits Agricoles a l'Explortation* by ensuring unscrupulous practices and quality.<sup>161</sup>

The Caisse offered sufficiently high payments for cocoa and coffee to maintain their output, albeit well below world prices thus allowing the government to channel the difference into its coffers through *Budget Special d'Investissement et Equipement* (B.S.I.E).<sup>162</sup> For example, between 1975 and 1977, farmers received only 18% of the world prices despite the fact that world prices doubled and tripled during this period.<sup>163</sup> Transfer to B.S.I.E rose from 24,000 million Francs C.F.A in 1975 to 179,000 million in 1978, 93,000 million in 1982 and 116,000 in 1983.<sup>164</sup> Between one-half and two third of all public-sector investment originated from the Caisse.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Ridler, N. B. "The Caisse de Stabilisation in the Coffee Sector of the Ivory Coast" *World Development* (Oxford), 16, 12, 1988, pp.1521-6

<sup>158</sup> Gbetibouo, M and Delgado, C "lessons and Constraints of Export crop-Led Growth" in Zartman and Delgado. op. cit.

<sup>159</sup> Ridler, N. B. 1988. op. cit

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> Crook, Richard. C. 1990. Politics, the Cocoa Crisis and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol28, No.4 pp. 649-669.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

Mindful of the dangers of specialisation, Ivorian government tried to diversify its economy. This was made possible by surpluses acquired through the Caisse. The government embarked on import substitution industries and other industries that were vital to the economy such as transportation and food processing; for example, fruit, beverages, rice mostly in the south and sugar and cotton in the north.<sup>166</sup> According to the Ministry of Finance, government total investment was 26% in 1981 and 22% of GDP in 1982.<sup>167</sup> By 1980, Ivory Coast had more than a two hundred state own enterprises.<sup>168</sup> The government also invested heavily in education and health facilities. Daddieh argues that by 1980, school enrollment in Ivory Coast had more than double thanks to the government drive to improve its education facilities.<sup>169</sup>

Gilles et al points out that investment in Ivory Coast were carried out not only through the surplus of cocoa boom. Investments accounted for 35-40% of external debt acquired through the strength of cocoa boom and Ivory Coast geopolitical situation during the Cold War.<sup>170</sup> During 1970-1980, Ivory Coast external debts doubled from 7% to 14% of GDP. In nominal terms, the stock of Ivorian debt moved from 136, 4 billion CFAF in 1971 to 2, 525, 5 billion CFAF in 1990. In 1985, the ratio of debt/GDP stood at 151.7% and debt/GNP stood at 35%. By 1987, Boigny ceased paying Ivory Coast external debt. In total, from 1970-2004 Ivorian external debt rose from 58.8% to 190% of GDP,<sup>171</sup> while debt services rose from 1.75% in 1971 to 8.52 in 1980 to 37% of GDP in 1999<sup>172</sup> and 74.8% of GDP in 2004.<sup>173</sup> It is against this backdrop that structural adjustment was initiated in Ivory Coast.

From 1981 to 2005 Ivory Coast has been on structural adjustment. It was one of the first African countries to solicit SAP in 1981 though it abandoned it in 1987/88. In 1981-86 SAP called for macroeconomic reforms. From 1989-1999, IMF fiscal adjustment requirements were introduced in an effort to reduce the government

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<sup>166</sup> Chappell, David A. 1989. "The Nation as Frontier: Ethnicity and Clientelism in Ivorian History." *International Journal of African History and Studies* 22/4, pp 671-696

<sup>167</sup> Gilles et al. op. cit

<sup>168</sup> Crook, R 1990. op. cit

<sup>169</sup> Daddieh, Cyril Kofie "Universities and Political Protest in Africa: The Case of Cote d'Ivoire" *A Journal of Opinion* . Vol. 24, No. 1, Issues in African Higher Education (Winter, 1996), pp17-42

<sup>170</sup> Kouadio, A. op. cit

<sup>171</sup> Kouadio, A. op. cit

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> CIA. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#Econ>

budget deficit. These included substantial reductions in current government expenditures (-30%) and capital expenditures (-15%), privatisations and some financial reforms.<sup>174</sup> In order to reach the budget surplus target, the IMF required labour market deregulation, price decontrol, trade reform, reductions in civil service employment and faster privatisation.<sup>175</sup> The IMF also advocated devaluation of the currency. The Caisse was completely privatised in November 1999 and divided into three private branches: *Autorite de Regulation du Café et du Cacao* (ARCC), *Bourse du Café et du Cacao* (BCC) and *Fund de Regulation et Controle* (FRC).<sup>176</sup>

Under the new privitised system, the price risk has been transferred to farmers specifically under an auction system thus exposing them to world price shocks. Amidst incremental benefits, the liberalisation of cocoa has worsened the plight of Ivorian farmers. They were exposed not only to shocks of world prices, but also to unscrupulous activities of buyers.<sup>177</sup> This situation was compounded by the fact that farmers were not prepared for liberilisation as 57% of the population is illiterate.<sup>178</sup> Devaluation of the CFAF in 1994 by 50% increased poverty levels of Ivorians because their purchasing power decreased due to inflation despite 10-15% increased in salaries.<sup>179</sup>

There is a strong positive correlation between SAP and poverty in Ivory Coast. During 1988-1995, the incidence and intensity of poverty doubled, with the number of people earning less than \$1/day increasing from 17.8% of the population to 36.8%. By 1999, 47% of Ivorians in urban areas were living below poverty line as compared to 50.4 in rural areas. In Abidjan, Ivory Coast's largest city, the rate of urban poverty rose from 5% to 20% between 1993 and 1995.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Naiman, Robert and Watkins, Neil. "A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa. [http://www.cepr.net/publications/debt\\_1999\\_04.htm#Cote%20d'Ivoire](http://www.cepr.net/publications/debt_1999_04.htm#Cote%20d'Ivoire)

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> International Labour Rights Fund. "The World Bank and IMF Policies in Cote d'Ivoire: Impact on Child Labour in the Cocoa Industry" [www.laborrights.org/projects/childlab/WBIMFcocoa.pdf](http://www.laborrights.org/projects/childlab/WBIMFcocoa.pdf) - 13 Feb 2006

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Naiman et al, op cit.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

The National Institute of Statistics measuring poverty using human development index posits that during 1990-1995 almost 43% of the population was affected by different form of poverty.<sup>181</sup> By 2000, about one third of rural population had to walk for more than 5 km to reach a health center.<sup>182</sup> Income disparity increases, by 1998; the richest 10% of Ivorians accumulated a total income level 12.4 times superior to that of the poorest 10% as against 9.1 in 1993 and 8.8 in 1995.<sup>183</sup> in 1995, the GINI Index was 36.7 but by 1998, it was 45.2.<sup>184</sup>

As part of the policy reforms required by the Fund, user fees were introduced into the public health care system in 1991. The devaluation of the franc CFA made it difficult for the urban poor to pay for health care services, and as a result there was a shift towards traditional medicine as health problems worsened. For example, the incidence of stunted growth in children increased from 20% in 1988 to 35% in 1995. As access became more expensive, health issues became a more pressing concern. A survey by UNICEF and the Government of Ivory Coast found that when women were asked to identify their problems, health ranked first<sup>185</sup>

In the educational sector, Data from a UNICEF study of Ivory Coast shows that there was a consistent decline in per capita spending on education. From 1990 to 1995 there was a drop of more than 35%,<sup>186</sup> from CFAF 20,000 per year to approximately 13,000.<sup>187</sup> In 1991 the wages of teaches where slashed by half, students could no longer afford food because subsidies were withdrawn, subsidised houses for teachers were also withdrawn. This sparked a series of demonstration of university students and teachers in Ivory Coast especially in the early 1980s and 1990s. Despite an improvement in gross enrolment in primary schools over the period 1986-1995, educational indicators overall showed poor results. By 1995, only 45% of girls from the poorest quintile of households were receiving primary education. At the secondary

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<sup>181</sup> International Labour Rights Fund, op cit

<sup>182</sup> Kouadio, A. op cit.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> CIA "The World Factbook: Cote d'Ivoire" [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/iv.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/iv.html) - 61k

<sup>185</sup> International Labour Rights Fund, op cit

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> UNICEF. Financement des Secteurs Sociaux de base: Suivi de l'initiative 20-20 en Cote d'Ivoire August 1997

level, the gross enrolment rate declined from 34% to 31% between 1986 and 1995.<sup>188</sup> Attempts by the government to reduce the salary of the army and police were received by mutinies in 1990.

Politically, SAP reconfigured political cleavage in Ivory Coast. Crook argues that SAP is one of the principal triggering events for political liberalisation in Ivory Coast. He points out that “it was the measures forced upon the government by the crisis of 1989 which led directly to the change to multi-partyism and the uncertainties of [Houphouët-Boigny’s] final three years in office, rather than the carefully graduated ‘democratisation’ process of the 1980s.”<sup>189</sup> According to Crook, cuts in civil service spending and increases in taxation strengthened Laurent Gbagbo’s opposition Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) which gained the support of the disgruntled teachers’ and lecturers’ unions.

Three important inferences can be drawn from the effect of structural adjustment on the vulnerability of Ivory Coast to conflict. The reduction of public expenditure and liberalisation of the Caisse meant that the Ivorian state did not only run short of revenue, it could not meet up with its functions especially in relations to health care and education. This was compounded by the fact that in raising taxes to service its debt, the state had to tax farmers who were left at the mercy of market prices. Consequently, the disengagement of the state from the economy meant that safety nets that had hitherto protected citizens were removed thus exposing them to the hard realities of demand and supply. This in turn had a ripple effect on the vulnerability of Ivorian society to ethnic rhetoric.

Moreover, in trying to release resources from the state, structural adjustment engendered a parallel economy in Ivory Coast which escaped the control of the government. This did not only create corruption and criminalisation of business, other centers of power were created which were not within the purview of the state. Most importantly, avenues for rewards to placate political opponents became restricted. Against this backdrop, demand-bearing groups whose interest could not be protected

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<sup>188</sup> Crook, Richard C. 1995. Côte d’Ivoire: Multi-Party Democracy and Political Change: Surviving the Crisis.” in: Wiseman, John A. (ed). *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Routledge, pp. 11-44

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. pp. 15-16.

withdrew their support from the government mostly students and teachers as evidence by teachers, student strikes and military mutinies in the early 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, it became difficult for the state to maintain development projects and regional balance.

Important to note is the fact that, Ivorian development drive was mostly concentrated around cocoa producing areas of the south. Agglomeration economies and economies of scale favoured a highly concentrated pattern of local development. The southern region represents more than 80% of total employment in the formal sector of Ivory Coast. In the period 1980-1996, the region registered an average annual growth in labour productivity of about 67% higher than in the rest of the country. The main losers were the regions in the north (Denguélé, Savannahs, Worodougou and Zanzan).<sup>190</sup> In 1974, the income per capita of the four northern departments: Boundiali (CFAF 28,480), Ferkessedougou (CFAF 49,554), Korhogo (CFAF 45,041) and Odiene (CFAF 29,034) were far below national average of CFAF 67,679.<sup>191</sup>

The disparity is very glaring in terms of socio economic indicators. In the table below, Indicators of social infrastructure are proxied by education: the rates of primary (ELEM) and secondary (SECON) enrolment or by access indicators measured by the number of classes per square kilometer (CLASSElem and CLASSsecon). As for health services, indicators used are demographic pressure (DEMO) measured by the number of inhabitants per health center, and spatial access (ACCESS) estimated by the distance (in Km) travelled to the nearest health center.

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<sup>190</sup> World Bank “Infrastructure, Productivity and Urban Dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire” [www-wds.worldbank.org/.../16/000090341\\_20051116161155/Rendered/PDF/342470PAPER0CI0Urban0dynamics0AFRwp86.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/.../16/000090341_20051116161155/Rendered/PDF/342470PAPER0CI0Urban0dynamics0AFRwp86.pdf)

<sup>191</sup> den Tuinder 1978 op. cit. pp. 380-381, see also Botau, Adrienne Blay INTÉGRATION ET AUTONOMIE DES MINORITÉS EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE. [www.unhchr.ch/minorities/documents/2004-WP8fr.doc](http://www.unhchr.ch/minorities/documents/2004-WP8fr.doc)

**Table 4: Levels of Economic and Social Infrastructure Endowments by Region, 1995**

	ROAD	POST	WATER	CLASS	CLASS	ELEM	SECON	DEMO	ACCESS
				elem	secon				
Agnéby (Agboville)	0.41	182	61	-	0.04	-	0.57	12,430	1.25
Bas-Sassandra (San Pedro)	0.15	246	167	0.07	0.01	0.69	0.46	21,058	1.39
Lacs (Yamoussoukro)	0.27	83	32	0.40	0.09	0.81	0.62	8,591	1.03
Lagunes (Abidjan)	0.30	55	20	1.09	0.32	0.72	0.51	24,859	0.43
Montagnes (Man)	0.20	153	146	0.13	0.02	0.94	0.49	10,960	0.90
Denguélé (Odienné)	0.15	93	73	0.07	0.01	0.57	0.34	5,540	2.29
Marahoué (Bouaflé)	0.17	202	140	-	0.02	-	0.46	14,348	1.20
Moyen-Comoé (Abengourou)	0.30	171	59	0.15	0.04	0.72	0.60	11,554	1.29
N'Zi-Comoé (Dimbokro)	0.26	83	47	-	0.02	-	0.53	5,962	1.08
Savanes (Korhogo)	0.21	162	75	0.05	0.01	0.63	0.45	7,661	0.92
Sud-Bandama (Divo)	0.18	223	180	-	0.02	-	0.56	14,225	1.12
Vallée du Bandama (Bouaké)	0.20	105	38	0.13	0.38	0.72	0.67	10,556	0.96
Worodougou (Séguéla)	0.17	206	128	-	0.00	-	0.38	7,183	1.57
Zanzan (Bondoukou)	0.21	237	111	0.04	0.01	0.53	0.31	6,768	1.22
Sud-Comoé (Aboisso)	0.28	168	35	-	0.02	-	0.56	7,488	1.11
Haut-Sassandra (Daloa)	0.24	200	127	0.26	0.05	0.78	0.66	14,379	0.77
National average	0.23	161	90	0.15	0.07	0.71	0.51	11,473	1.16
Standard deviation	0.07	58	51	0.27	0.11	0.11	0.10	5,257	0.39

Source : Urbandata (BDUR) of BNETD. Sanogo (2001) and authors' estimates.<sup>192</sup>

From the table above, a cursory review will reveal that northern areas like Odienné, Zanzan and Worodougou fared far below center areas like Yamoussoukro, southern areas like Abidjan and national average. This disparity is even more glaring across ethnic groups.

<sup>192</sup> World Bank "Infrastructure, Productivity and Urban Dynamics in Côte d'Ivoire", op cit



**Table 5: Comparison of socio-economic inequalities across ethnic groups between 1994 and 1998**

	Socio-economic prosperity index						Education and literacy index					
	1994			1998			1994			1998		
	N	U	R	N	U	R	N	U	R	N	U	R
Akan	1.40	1.44	1.52	1.45	1.34	2.03	1.33	1.35	1.36	1.38	1.28	1.69
Kru	1.12	1.41	0.79	1.18	1.11	1.10	1.62	1.68	1.79	1.67	1.53	1.97
N. Mandé	1.19	0.87	1.62	0.93	0.90	0.57	0.74	0.69	0.44	0.57	0.59	0.26
S. Mandé	0.61	0.76	0.33	0.64	0.92	0.32	0.99	1.16	0.83	0.92	1.10	1.0
Voltaic	0.65	0.70	1.05	0.79	0.96	0.68	0.71	0.88	0.59	0.80	0.99	0.53
Foreigners	0.59	0.57	0.30	0.60	0.57	0.54	0.50	0.51	0.40	0.54	0.56	0.43
ELIM <sup>a</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.39	0.44	0.56	0.45	0.39	0.71
SEIM <sup>b</sup>	0.35	0.38	0.52	0.30	0.23	0.57	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Langer, Armin

- a) Education-Literacy Inequality Measure
- b) Socio-Economic Inequality Measure

Table 6 shows socio-economic prosperity and education-literacy indices for the different ethnic groups. The indices refer to the relative positions of the different ethnic groups with respect to the average within particular group in relation to urban/rural setting. Socio-Economic Inequality Measure (SEIM), measures variables such as availability of drinking water access to electricity, toilet facilities and housing. Education-Literacy Inequality Measure (ELIM), measures variables such as educational level at least primary school and ability to read. From the table, one would realise that generally, the three southern ethnic groups (Akan, Kru and Southern Mandé) were better off in socio-economic prosperity and education and literacy in urban areas than the two northern tribes (N. Mandé and Voltaic) in 1994. But by 1998, though the inequality was still very glaring, northern ethnic groups were improving their status while that of southern ethnic groups was deteriorating. This might be explained by the fact that northerners were mostly farmers and traders vis a vis southern tribes who depended on government jobs which had become scares because of SAP.

A cursory review of post colonial Ivorian political economy will reveal many structural failures of the Ivorian model. The economy was too dependent on the production and exploitation of cocoa and coffee which made the economy vulnerable to prices shocks thus economic crisis. Ivory Coast witnessed negative growth during the early 1980s mainly due to fall in world prices. There is a strong correlation between structural adjustment and poverty in Ivory Coast. The intensification of structural adjustment in the 1990s and the fall in human development or human security is important to note.<sup>193</sup> Though there was an improvement in growth rates in the late 1990s, there was a fall in human development. Structural adjustment alone cannot explain this paradox; income inequality during this period might also be a reason though income inequality might have been caused by SAP. Corruption which at this point was endemic in Ivorian life might be a reason. Moreover, increase in growth rates might have been increase in production which does not necessarily translate to improvement in quality of life taking into consideration the effect of inflation and devaluation on the purchasing power of Ivorians. Keeping to the thesis of Collier and World Bank, Ivory Coast descended into chaos at a point when the country had four consecutive years of sustained economic decline (1999-2002)

Post Ivorian political economy did not only create economic and social disparity between regions and ethnic groups, it induced a huge debt burden. A local bourgeoisie class was created and who benefited from the economic trajectory of the country. This elite class included *fonctionnaires*/civil servant and absentee landlords. Thus when structural adjustment came, it was this elite class that was the first to withdraw their support from the state keeping in mind that they have been well taken care of under Boigny.

### **Section Three: How Boigny Dealt with Ethnicity**

Félix Houphouët-Boigny as head of state until his death in 1993 was able to manage political demands and political conflicts since the beginning of autonomous political life in 1945, albeit the fact that ethnic groups are said to be at the core of the state and Ivorian politics.<sup>194</sup> The bedrock of politics in an ethnically diverse society is the ability to build coalitions amongst various demand-bearing groups, the ability to

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<sup>193</sup> See table on Human Development Index

<sup>194</sup> Chauveau and Dozon. 1988. op cit.

sustain inclusive politics most invariably through the distribution of rewards. The question then is; how did Boigny managed a harmonious co-existence between the various ethnic groups thus ensuring relative political stability?

I argue that Sustained economic growth helped transformed the political landscape, eroding ideological outcroppings, shifting commitments and reducing or removing conflicts. The buoyant Ivorian economy during 1960-1979 afforded Boigny manoeuvring space to engender the *politics of inclusion and distribution, le modele houphetiste or le compromise houphoutiste*.<sup>195</sup> Available supply of resources meant that he met the demands of demand-bearing groups, co-opted political adversaries, buy off the military, appease potential enemies and kept ethnic animosity in check through regional development.

Thus in the absence of democratic institutions in negotiating the distribution of resources, Boigny became, the mediator and adjudicator on who gets what when and how. Though inclusive and distributive politics were the hallmarks of Ivorian politics under Boigny, he episodically used *dialogues* and repression to ensure societal cohesion and political stability grounded in his paternalistic style of leadership.<sup>196</sup>

Understanding how Boigny managed to preserve relative political stability in Ivory Coast can be divided into two time frames: taking over of power and the management of power. Within these two time frames, I will analyse the actors or demand-bearing groups involved (the social basis/elite), the issues (demands) at stake, the values and the modes of action (strategies, political action repertoires), and the outcomes.<sup>197</sup>

During the heydays of political activism in Ivory Coast in 1945, Boigny understood the importance of building political coalitions across different professional, associational and ethnic groups. SAA which later transformed itself into a political party (PDCI) served an as organisation to harmonise the various interest of demand-bearing groups in the fight for political power in the advent of independence. Boigny

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<sup>195</sup> Akindes, F. 2004, op cit.

<sup>196</sup> Toungara, J. M. "The Apotheosis of Cote d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouet-Boigny" *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 23-54

<sup>197</sup> On managing crisis see Ekkart Zimmerman, "Crises and Crises Outcomes: Towards a new Synthetic Approach," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1 ( 1979), pp. 67-115

was able to win the 1945 legislative election because he was able to tap into the evils of colonisation and use it as political capital to garner support. For example, the end of forced labour meant African farmers could have easy access to labour; the northerners could work in plantations on their own terms and even earn wages. It is against this background that Boigny built a powerful coalition with Gbon Koulibaly in the north.

Unlike the colonial administration which was paying 6 CFAF for a days work, Boigny offered 20 CFAF. From a political perspective, this guaranteed him the support of the farmers who by this time numbered 40,000 in 1944, 120,000 in 1956, and around 200,000 in 1959.<sup>198</sup> Boigny perfectly understood French electoral politics, which was grounded in winner takes all. Thus since most of the constituency was concentrated around Abidjan he knew that building coalitions could afford him a simple majority.

After World War II, the political and economic transformations induced by French colonial system produced three politically active set of players: traditional elites-old chieftaincies or new creations of French administration; economic elites-planters, traders, and educated elites--"evolués" or "lettrés."<sup>199</sup> Boigny did not only build a coalition around planters and traders/north center, educated elites where promised political advancement through the machinery of the party. As it has been argued, the PDCI was merely representing the interest of various professional organisations in Ivory Coast for example, teachers association, and student union.<sup>200</sup>

Boigny understood that grasping state power does not only warrant building national coalition, but also having external leverage to negotiate with colonial administration. The alliance between PDCI and RDA with Boigny as the President meant that Boigny had leverage in dealing with France grounded in the notion that if he could be co-opted by the colonial administration all other parties in francophone Africa who were members of RDA would follow suit.

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<sup>198</sup> Toungara 1990 op cit; Lawler, op cit.

<sup>199</sup> Tessa D. Bakary, "Elite Transformation and Political Succession," in I. William Zartman and Christopher Delgado. 1984, pp. 21-57, op. cit

<sup>200</sup> Woods, D. "State Action and Class Interests in the Ivory Coast." *African Studies Review*. Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr., 1988), pp. 93-116

Boigny was able to establish cohesion in Ivorian politics through state intervention in the economy due to the lack of indigenous capital and investors. In spite of its liberal and capitalist preference and the existence of a private sector, the Ivorian state was a major economic actor through the development of a more dynamic and important public sector and the establishment of a welfare system.<sup>201</sup> Since the Ivorian state represented a resource in itself, its control was equivalent to the control of the economy. Political competition became competition for economic resources, just as economic allocation was used to manage political corruption. The modest origins of Ivorian leaders made conflicts over the control of political position the only door to economic resources.<sup>202</sup>

Patrimonialism was one of the hallmarks of Boigny's regime.<sup>203</sup> Co-optation was frequently used by Boigny to appease individuals and regions he considered as threat. Zartman and Delgado point that until 1980s "all former opposition leaders have found a place in the Ivorian economy, and there are no opposition leaders either in jail or exile".<sup>204</sup> An over expanded *service publique* (public service) meant that Boigny was able to distribute political rewards to clients through their absorption into the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Civil servant salaries accounted for about 60% of state budget.<sup>205</sup> By 1980, the state was the highest employer in the formal sector employing around 40%.<sup>206</sup> Increase economic growth translated into increase salaries for civil servants. Political institutions of the state were also increased to accommodate clients. For example, Boigny divided the Ministry of Education into four ministries and the Ministry of Agriculture into three.<sup>207</sup> The expanded ministerial portfolios served as rewards for potential enemies and clients. Boigny also expanded the Economic and Social Council from 85- 120 persons. PDCI's political bureau was enlarged from 100-208 to accommodate demand-bearing groups notably

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<sup>201</sup> Bakary, T. 1997, op. cit

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Sandbrook, R. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge University Press 1985; Jackson, R. H and Rosberg, C. G. *Personal rule in black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet Tyrant*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1982

<sup>204</sup> Zartman and Delgado. 1984. op cit. pp. 10

<sup>205</sup> Widner, Jennifer "The 1990 elections in Cote d'Ivoire" *Journal of Opinion*. Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1991), pp. 31-40

<sup>206</sup> Crook, R. "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Cote d'Ivoire." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 649-669; Widner, A. J. "The 1990 Elections in Côte d'Ivoire," *Journal of Opinion*. Vol. 20, No. 1 ( 1991-92)

<sup>207</sup> Bakary. T. 1997, op cit.

the young and educated class.<sup>208</sup> Deputies were given special privilege as parliament became a place for reward.<sup>209</sup> The administrative apparatus of the state was increased, 64 new *communes des plein exercice* were created down from 34,<sup>210</sup> and the military was used for administrative purposes.<sup>211</sup> Public parastatals also served as rewards for clients. State-owned enterprises grew to 266 in 1979, employing 43,000 people.<sup>212</sup>

By late 1970s, Boigny instituted ivoirisation because of increase in demand-bearing groups. This meant that he was able to place his cronies in important foreign companies. For example, Charles Donwahi, the president of CFAO-Cote d'Ivoire from 1975-1991 served as parliamentarian, Minister of Agriculture, and member of PDCI political bureau. Though such Ivorians were paid on par as Europeans, they were beneficial to foreign companies because of their political clout.<sup>213</sup> Also ivoirisation meant Ivorian clients could hold shares in important foreign companies. For example: all the Ivorian shares in a leading exporter Dafci, were held by Gbon Coulibaly, political baron of Korhogo and long time deputy and member of political bureau of PDCI. Boigny's son Françoise presided over *Etablissements Jean Abile-Gal*, nerve center of JAG group.<sup>214</sup>

The ivoirisation of trade was another instrument of distributing rewards.<sup>215</sup> For example, *Programme d'Action Commercial* was created in 1970 to ivoirise commerce and was placed under Henri Konan Bédié then Minister of Economy and Finance. This programme was meant to serve as a financing mechanism to potential traders/retailers. But it turned out to be an instrument to dispense rewards.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Crook, R. Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Cote d'Ivoire. *African Affairs*. Vol. 88, No. 351

<sup>209</sup> US Library, op cit.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Kieffer, G-A "Armée Ivoirienne: Le Refus de déclassement. *Politique Africain*. No 78. pp. 26-44

<sup>212</sup> Crook, R. 1988. op. cit.

<sup>213</sup> Boone, Catherine. "Commerce in Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorisation without Ivorian Traders. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 31, 1 1993, pp 67-92

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> Oussou, K. Pegatienan Jacques and Bamba Ngaladjo. "Côte D'Ivoire: Policy Making and Implementation: Examples of Selective Trade and Strategic Industrial Policies" in Soludo, C. Osita Ogbu, and Ha-Joon Chang. *The Politics of trade and Industrial Policy in Africa:: Forced Consensus?* IDRC Books Free online [http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-52168-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-52168-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)

<sup>216</sup> Boone, C., 1993, op cit.

Boigny was also able to sustained patrimonialism through the *liberalisation* of the marketing of cocoa. Through the quota system, licenses were awarded to certain designated person to buy and export cocoa. This meant making money/rent seeking which amounted to about CFAF 37 million in 1990s and \$3-6 million in the late 1980s.<sup>217</sup> These quotas were more or less politically motivated and most of the political elites benefited. For example: SAIE was linked to the Ouegnin family and Mr.Ouegnin Georges, in 1982 was *Chef de Protocole* at the *Presidence de la Republic* and *Directeur du Protocole* in 1977 at Ministry of Foreign Affairs while Mme.<sup>218</sup> Goergette Ouegnin was member of the Economic and Social Council. SOCIMEXY, was linked to the Mayor of Yamoussoukro; HACCANDY, linked to M. Haccandy, Mayor of Tiebissou; SIDEXCA, directed by Blaise N'Dia Koffi, former deputy, member of politburo and Minister of State in charge with tourism; EMIMAT, owned by Emmanuel Dioulo mayor of Abidjan.<sup>219</sup>

The expansion of the welfare system also meant clients were kept happy. The National Fund for Social Benefits provided fund for health care. An important part of conflict management through redistribution of income under Boigny was the proliferation of special statuses. Following recommendations from the General Status of the Civil Service, higher salaries were awarded to specific categories of civil servants such as university and secondary school professors, magistrates, police and doctors. For example, education as the "priority of priorities," took 40% of the total budget.<sup>220</sup> Education was subsidised, housing, transport and boarding facilities were almost free for students and teachers. Scholarships were easy to get. When the economic crisis came in 1980, attempts by Boigny to curb these benefits met stiff resistance as in 1990.<sup>221</sup>

Like most African countries, Boigny understood that urban areas were the most politically threatening.<sup>222</sup> Consequently, he instituted certain policies in a bid to placate urban dwellers; for example, by staying within the franc zone. Ivory Coast and

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Bakary, T.1997. op cit

<sup>221</sup> Daddieh, Cyril Kofie "Universities and Political Protest in Africa: The Case of Cote d'Ivoire"

*A Journal of Opinion* . Vol. 24, No. 1, Issues in African Higher Education (Winter, 1996), pp. 57-60

<sup>222</sup> Bates, Robert. H. *Markets and States in tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1981 (1984 Printing)

13 other countries mostly former French colonies (12) form the Communauté Financière Africaine. The CFAF is pegged to the French franc at a fixed exchange rate. As a result, the value of the CFAF was determined by the French franc. Politically, this arrangement was good for France and Boigny. Domestically, the appreciation of CFAF due to depreciation of US dollar vis a vis French franc meant that, the urban population in Ivory Coast could afford expensive consumer goods from abroad. Consequently, Boigny could have decided to remain in CFA zone and resist devaluation because it protected his political constituency.<sup>223</sup> Boigny also pacified urban dwellers by subsidising housing in major cities. Cohen argues that by subsidising housing up to 50% in the mid-1970s Boigny was able to garner the support of the middle class in the cities though it had huge repercussions on the economy.<sup>224</sup>

Boigny was effective in controlling the patronage system in Ivory Coast thanks to the adoption of de facto single party system. With the PDCI as the only political party in Ivory Coast, Boigny was able to manipulate and control the various demand-bearing groups. Since membership in the party meant access to state resources, the PDCI became a mechanism for political elites to negotiate the spoils of the state within themselves. Against this backdrop, movement within the party structures was tantamount to resource mobilisation. With this framework in place, Boigny was not only able to control resources at his disposal, other centres of power were within his control.

Boigny did not only establish clients within Ivory Coast, he maintained a very cordial relationship with France. This relationship allowed French interest specifically business to grow while Boigny benefited from France through security agreement and the stationing of Régiment Inter-Armée d'Outre-mer (4<sup>ème</sup> RIAOM – *4th Overseas Inter-Army Regiment*) which later became the Bataillon d'Infanterie Marine Aéroporté (43<sup>ème</sup> BIMA – *43th Airborne Naval Infantry Battalion*) and acted as a deterrent for any possible coup.<sup>225</sup> France leveraged Ivory Coast position in the World Bank and IMF and at one point rescued Ivory Coast from economic collapse by buying all its cocoa

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<sup>223</sup> van de Walle, Nicolas. "The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa" *African Affairs*. Vol. 90, No. 360 (Jul., 1991), pp. 383-405

<sup>224</sup> Cohen, M. A. "Urban Policy and Development Strategy" in Zartman and Delgado. op. cit

<sup>225</sup> Nanga, op cit.



stock.<sup>226</sup> This mutual relationship was cemented by the fact that Ivory Coast is a member of the CFA thus making financial dealings both countries very easy.

In a bid to established regional and ethnic balance, Boigny used two strategies. Politically, Boigny tried his hand on inclusive politics through ethnic quotas in an attempt to establish a balance between ethnic groups within state institution.<sup>227</sup> The table below shows how Boigny tried to balance ethnic representation in political institutions.

**Table 6: Elite representation in political institution from 1959-1980**

Ethnic group	Total political elite		Ministers		Deputy		Economic and social council		PDCI politburo		Total population
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	%
Akan	163	50.9	39	53.4	100	50.0	50	56.1	43	55.1	41.4
Kru	33	19.6	15	20.5	41	20.5	13	14.6	10	12.8	16.7
N.Mandé	33	10.3	7	9.5	19	9.0	10	11.2	8	10.25	14.8
S.Mandé	17	9.06	2	2.7	13	6.5	4	4.4	4	5.1	10.2
Voltaic	29	9.06	6	8.2	9	4.5	4	4.4	7	8.9	15.7
Others	13	4.06	4	5.4	6	3.0	7	7.8	5	6.4	1.2
Unknown	1	0.3	-	-	1	0.5	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Bakary, T. 1984: 36<sup>228</sup>

From the table it is clear that a skilful system of ethnic “quotas” allowed all major ethnic groups to be represented in post-independent political institutions from 1959-80, though the Akans dominated. The Akans represented half the leaders in 1980 (50.9) though they formed about two fifths of the population in 1977. Voltaic and south Mandé had representation about half their numerical importance. Kru and Malinke had representation roughly equal to their size.

<sup>226</sup> van de Walle, Nicolas, op cit.

<sup>227</sup> Bakary, T. 1984, op cit

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

**Table 7: Ethnic representation in political institutions under Boigny 1980-93**

Ethnic groups	Government <sup>a</sup>								National Assembly						Economic and Social Council			
	Nov.80		Jun.86		Oct.89		Nov.91		Nov.80		Nov.85		Nov.90		Feb.86		Feb92	
	%	RR <sup>b</sup>	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.49	1.16	0.41	0.99	0.47	1.12	0.61	1.46	0.46	1.09	0.45	1.07	0.47	1.12	0.55	1.32	0.58	1.38
Baoule	0.22	1.29	0.24	1.46	0.20	1.20	0.17	1.04	0.19	1.14	0.21	1.23	0.21	1.27	0.28	1.70	0.33	1.95
Kru	0.19	1.30	0.20	1.34	0.20	1.37	0.17	1.19	0.20	1.40	0.19	1.33	0.17	1.17	0.19	1.31	0.23	1.54
S.Mandé	0.05	0.51	0.10	0.91	0.13	1.25	0.04	0.41	0.11	1.02	0.10	0.91	0.10	.91	0.03	0.31	0.03	0.31
N.Mandé	0.08	0.51	0.17	1.07	0.13	0.84	0.09	0.55	0.10	0.60	0.14	0.90	0.16	1.01	0.14	0.89	0.12	0.73
Voltaic	0.14	0.83	0.10	0.60	0.03	0.20	0.09	0.53	0.14	0.63	0.12	0.74	0.10	0.63	0.04	0.26	0.02	0.10
No.	N=37		N=41		N=30		N=23		N=147		N=175		N=175		N=120		N=120	
PIM <sup>c</sup>	0.36		0.27		0.46		0.47		0.30		0.22		0.21		0.52		0.63	

Source: Armin Langer

- a) The following government positions were taken into account: President, Ministers of State and Regular Ministers. Deputies were not included in the calculations
- b) *Relative Representation* (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group's relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population
- c) *Political inequality Measure* (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative representation of the different ethnic groups

From the table above, one can deduce that Boigny maintained relative ethnic balance though the Akans still maintained their dominance. The Krus were relatively over-represented in all three political institutions during the entire period. This might be due to increase social and economic violence that erupted in the region and the eventual appearance of FPI as a political opponent in the region. Also the National Assembly seems to be the political institution where equality was ensured. This might be the outcome of semi-competition introduced in 1980. But one must bear in mind that ethnic balancing does not necessarily reflect in numbers because of the different levels of decision making and the political weight of certain ministerial portfolios.

Economically, Boigny engendered development projects in the north specifically in the 1970s. In 1970, the government launched a very ambitious regional development programme worth CFAF 21 billion. From this initiative, towns like Korhogo in the

north benefited a lot in relation to infrastructure. But this programme was abandoned to the economic crisis in the 1980s.<sup>229</sup>

**Table 8: Public investment per region 1971-1977 (CFAF)**

Region	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <sup>a</sup>	1976 <sup>a</sup>	1977 <sup>a</sup>	1971-1977	1973 population <sup>b</sup>
North	1.3	10.8	21.3	18.4	27.0	28.8	29.4	137.0	554.6
East	5.3	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.5	1.1	1.5	11.3	266.5
South	6.5	7.7	6.3	8.2	12.3	13.2	13.6	67.9	1,193,6
West	0.3	3.4	2.3	3.7	4.6	2.8	3.1	20.2	701.9
Center West	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.7	2.5	3.2	0.6	7.6	712.0
Center	10.8	11.5	9.2	11.0	13.5	10.4	4.3	70.7	1,490.4
Southwest	49.4	17.9	13.5	33.3	60.3	75.0	102.6	351.9	156.0
Abidjan	11.7	14.5	23.0	31.1	41.4	33.0	22.4	177.0	840.0
Non-allocated	2.3	2.8	3.0	4.2	6.2	6.8	6.9	32.2	NA <sup>c</sup>
Total	9.6	11.0	12.4	16.1	22.9	22.1	19.8	113.8	5,910.0

Source: den Tuinder 1978: 151

a) Projected

b) In thousands. The 1973 population was used for all years. Thus, figures for the later years are biased upward in comparison with earlier years.

c) Not applicable

From the table above, one would realise that despite its relatively small population, development budget of the north increase substantially and by 1973 it was third to Abidjan and southwest as compared to center and south. This discrepancy seems to suggest that Boigny understood and valued a coalition with the north while at the same time trying to keep his enemies-southwest (Bétés) closer.

Boigny sparingly resorted to repression to manage conflict in Ivory Coast. One illuminating example is his high handedness in the Guebie crisis in 1970. The crisis emerged after Kragbe Gnagbe from the village of Guebie demanded the right to create

<sup>229</sup> Botau, Adrienne Blay "Intégration et Autonomie de Minorités en cote d'Ivoire. Université d'Abidjan. [www.unhchr.ch/minorities/documents/2004-WP8fr.doc](http://www.unhchr.ch/minorities/documents/2004-WP8fr.doc)

a political party. Government forces killed about 4000-6000 people.<sup>230</sup> Also in 1963, after an alleged plot Boigny terminated most of his political opponent and jailed others, though he later pardon and co-opted them.<sup>231</sup>

Boigny also used dialogue as a conflict management mechanism. In an event of national crisis, Boigny would invite every facet of Ivorian life for a national discuss where he would listen to grievances and decide on solutions. In this manner he did not only get close to people to understand their quarrels, but it provided him a strategy to test the waters of what policy option he had in mind. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s when he had to institute austerity measures, he convened a national dialogue to explain the reasons.<sup>232</sup> Unquestionably, how effective Boigny's other strategies at conflict management were feasible depended ultimately on his ability to rewards demands. This was clearly visible after the 1989 National Dialogue. Boigny convened a national dialogue to explain reasons for austerity measures, though delegates agreed, once the measures were instituted and their full impact realised, the nation almost slipped to civil war because of civil disobedience.

Though economic growth and political stability were interactive, political and economic ills were also interactive creating a vicious circle reinforcing each other. Pork barrel politics led to the creation of parastatals which were clearly uncompetitive. For example, the rice complex in the west and sugar complex in the north were running at a loss though the state maintained them. Corruption became rampant in state companies; for example the demise of the rice complex in 1970s which led to the dismissal of Bédié as Minister of Economy and Finance. Political rationalities forced Boigny to accommodate corruption grounded in his famous proverb *do not look too closely at a peanut-roaster's mouth*.<sup>233</sup>

## Conclusion

This section set out looking back in time retrospect to understand the root causes of the Ivorian crisis. The section is premised on the notion that a thorough understanding

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<sup>230</sup> Coulibaly, T. Lente décomposition en cote d'ivoire. *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Novembre 2002. pp. 24-25

<sup>231</sup> Toungara, J. M. « Generational Tensions in the 'Parti Démocratique de Côte-d'Ivoire. » *African Studies Review*. Vol. 38, No. 2 (Sep., 1995), pp. 11-38

<sup>232</sup> Crook, R. 1988. op cit.

<sup>233</sup> Akindes, 2004, op cit.

of the Ivorian crisis must be ground on understanding the creation of the Ivorian state and its position in the global market.

Some silent issues have been teased out. First, Ivory Coast was integrated into the world economy as a junior partner, to satisfy the economic wants of the metropole. Thus validating Wallenstein and Samir's argument that such an economy is a recipe for disaster and this was not long before they were proven right with the eventual economic collapse in the 1980s. Second, French colonial policies did not only create ethnic awareness and animosity among ethnic cleavages, it created regional economic and social disparity between the north and south. Moreover, the traditional African trading systems were destroyed thus destroying the social glue that bounded different ethnic groups. Third, colonialism created and empowered a bourgeoisie class that strengthened their position by exploiting and entrenching the colonial system put in place. Within this context, Boigny was able to maintain relative political stability in Ivory Coast because the buoyant economy meant that clients could feed off the spoils of the state. This was made possible by state intervention in the economy. As demand bearing groups increased, so was state intervention most invariably because of the lack of indigenous capital. Thus as the spoils of the state were in decline because of economic crisis and SAP which aimed at snatching resources from the state, political mobilisation had to be engendered through different means. The mode and mechanism of distribution was a challenge in favor of democracy; keeping in mind that democracy is a mode of contesting of resource.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ORIGINS OF IVORIAN CRISIS: POST-BOIGNY SUCCESSION AND THE POLITICISATION OF IVIORITE

Political succession in Ivory Coast is a result of personal/elite ambitions and rivalries. It is also the story of social cleavages and coalition building, political alignments, disalignments and realignments that occurred with the rise and fall of successive potential heirs or *présidentiabiles*.<sup>234</sup> As this section will show, the succession battle in Ivory Coast was a struggle over power and the mode of distribution of resources as they became scares as a result of economic crisis, compounded by SAP. As resources became scares to sustained political mobilisation and support, politicians turned to ethnic rhetoric for political mobilisation mindful of Ivorian electoral politics which is grounded in a winner takes all system (FPTP)

#### Section One: Departure of Boigny/Succession Battles

No one may know the identity (of a successor) while the chief is still alive. Ivory Coast has its own tradition and the West should take us for what we are-not what you would have us.<sup>235</sup>

Bakary points out that many Ivorians stressed the need for a consensus succession to Boigny. Ivorians argued that a “bad ethnic choice” would bring tribal war since political power means access to economic resources. Thus the ethnic group which obtains supreme power will also obtain the means to enrich itself.<sup>236</sup> Succession struggle dates back to the day Boigny was elected to the first French Constituent Assembly in 1946. It remained a hidden issue during the 1959 crisis, resignation of Jean Baptiste Mockey and during the "plots" of 1963-64.<sup>237</sup> The issue was raised by Boigny himself during the first congress of the PDCI and from then on, it gained

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<sup>234</sup> Bakary, T. 1997, op cit

<sup>235</sup> African Report Jan-Feb. 1986 35; *African Report*. May - June 1988, 54

<sup>236</sup> Bakary, T., 1984, op. cit.

<sup>237</sup> Bakary, T. 1997, op cit.

momentum which reached its apogee following the 9<sup>th</sup> conference of the PDCI in 1990 entitled *renovation and continuity*.<sup>238</sup>

The three principal contestants in the late 1950s and late 1970s were: Jean-Baptiste Mockey (Apollo, died 1981), Auguste Denise (Baoule, died 1991), and Philippe Grégoire Yacé (Alladian). A "hero and martyr of the RDA," Mockey by 1959 was vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, he later became Political Secretary of the PDCI de facto President when Boigny was out of the country.<sup>239</sup> In 1959 Mockey was forced to resign because he was perceived of being too radical and close to the young intellectuals who challenged the government. After Mockey's resignation, Philippe Yacé was next in line. He became Party Secretary and President of the National Assembly. In 1966, Bédié emerged as heir apparent though his position weakened when he was dismissed as Minister of Economy and Finance and became Ambassador to the US. Auguste Denise was Secretary General of PDCI and Minister of state but lost in favour of Bédié. The political reforms that were introduced in 1980 specifically the elimination of Party Secretary weakened Yacé's position while at the same consolidate Bédié's, due to his election as President of the National Assembly in 1980, 1985 and 1990. Couple with amendments of article 11 of the constitution which allowed the President of the national assembly to finish the mandate of his predecessor.

Toungara argues that succession battle in Ivory Coast was grounded around generational and policy orientation issues. *Les anciens* were made up of the old guards or cadres of the party who were very conservative; *les renovateurs* were the party cohorts around the mid 1970s and 1980s who wanted a graduate change and the radicals or *jeune loups/young Turks* wanted total change.<sup>240</sup>

In accordance with article 11 of the constitution, Bédié succeeded Boigny on the 7<sup>th</sup> of December 1994. Ouattara who was Prime Minister and Gbagbo leader of FPI objected arguing that a transitional government should be formed and elections conducted because the succession was illegitimate and hereditary. Within months of Bédié's

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<sup>238</sup> Toungara, J. M., 1995, op. cit.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

accession to power, RDR was formed by Djeny Kobina, as a pro Ouattara reformist party and accused the PDCI of corruption and betraying the memory of Boigny.

RDR was accused by Bédié of being a northern regionalist party with sinister Moslem agenda.<sup>241</sup> This argument was grounded in the fact that the party was allied to Ouattara and his reform programmes though, Kobina was an appollo from the east. Conscious of the electoral strength of the north during its coalition with PDCI under Boigny and the 26% garnered by Lancine Gbon Coulibaly when he defected to FPI in the 1990s elections, Bédié tried to co-opt certain northern politician notably Gbon Coulibaly. In other to entrench his power, Bédié purged the civil servants of all suspected sympathisers of Ouattara for example, Ali Coulibaly (head Ivorian TV), Kone Moussa (Editor Ivoire Soir) Yacouba Kebe (managing director fraternité Martin).<sup>242</sup>

The accession of Gueï to power is also a continuation of the succession battle in Ivory Coast. In fact Gueï alleged that while he believes in *Hophuetisme*, the mantle of power must change hands from its “traditional” holders the Baoules.<sup>243</sup> Gbagbo, since the legalisation of FPI have always criticised the political status quo of the country lamenting it for its inequality. The above scenario begs the questions, why was political succession in Ivory Coast intense? What informed the position of the various parties?

## **Section Two: Contestation of Power and Resource**

As mentioned above, despite the adoption of a neo-liberal economic policy, the Ivorian state intervened extremely in the economy. The absence of viable indigenous capital meant that control of the state was control of the economy thus the only viable mode of accumulation. Against this backdrop, the succession battle in Ivory Coast was contestation over the mechanism of distribution of resources; a battle between reformists and conservatives. Any attempt to interpret the succession battles as a contest between Ouattara and Bédié; Ouattara and Gbagbo is simplistic and reductionist. These respective contestants represented the interest of particular groups

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<sup>241</sup> Crook, R. C. “Wining Coalition and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Cote d’Ivoire.” *African Affairs* 1997, 96, 215-242

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Akindes, 2004, op. cit.



which cuts across generational lines depending on their positions in the machinery of the state and their experience. Reformists rallied around Ouattara while conservatives rallied around Bédié. This dichotomy was not grounded around ethnic cleavages but around the experience of each group and how they perceived democratic and economic change. Moreover the divide was not constant, its' fluidity was grounded in perceived benefits and the probability of victory.

The first generation of political cohorts in Ivory Coast were those involved in the liberation struggle, planters and chiefs or descended or chiefs. Upon independence, they control practically all the levers of power. The second generation are mostly politicians who during the struggle, where learning and got integrated into the system in the 1960s. They also benefited from the spoils of the state through their appointment as directors of public cooperation. The third generation comprise those who were recruited into the political system in the 1970s and depended on patron client relationship for their upward mobility in the political system. These groups constituted the old guards and were generally conservative. The fourth generation constituted those who were integrated into the political system in the 1980s amidst the dawn of economic crisis. They witnessed little opportunity in terms of patron client relationships and their mobility in the political arena depended on contesting "democratic elections", which was partially instituted in 1980. The fifth generation was initiated into the political arena from the 1990s amidst calls for political reforms. They constituted political elites who believed the future of the PDCI depended on its ability to contest democratic elections.<sup>244</sup>

Empirically, this distinction is purely cosmetic because people from different generations supported different sections of the succession battle. This nuance can be explained by the fact that generational interest depended on personal benefit in relations to distribution and contestation of resources and power.

The basis of succession conflict was the increasingly serious threat posed by neoliberal policies (SAP) introduced by Ouattara and supported by the World Bank and IMF, which would have witnessed resources being taking away from the old

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<sup>244</sup> Toungara, J. M. 1995, op. cit.

guards and people who have made their career in the public service.<sup>245</sup> Ouattara, World Bank and IMF reform programmes attempted to destroy the patronage system that had held the state together much to the benefit of the old guard and career politicians in the public service. For example, the dissolution of leading parastatals meant the main supply channels of resources to sustained patrimonialism were to be cut off. Against this backdrop, Ouattara was painted unpatriotic because of his privatisation programme, since a true Ivorian would not sell what he built. This is in fact reminiscent of a similar situation to that of Kengo Wa Dondo, Mobutu's Prime Minister in Zaire, whose zeal in implementing structural adjustment resulted in people remembering his Polish and Tutsi origins thus he was not a citizen because a "genuine Zairean" wouldn't have done that.<sup>246</sup>

In fact, Nanga argues that attempts at theorisation of 'Ivorite' by the organic intelligentsia of the Bédié faction, after his victory over Ouattara in the battle to succeed Houphouët-Boigny, was not only an operation aimed at legitimising the patrimonialist-capitalist hegemony of this faction of the PDCI, but also a legitimisation of Houphouëtist Francfrican tradition, threatened by orthodox and self-serving neo-liberalism of Ouattara. The point here is that, patrimonialism has always been part of Ivorian polity. Thus any attempt at dislodging it will definitely invite resistance. Because any new modus operandi will redefine power, influence and modes of accumulation which might be detrimental to certain interest.

This is why holders of transport licenses and quotas strongly objected to the privatisation of the Caisse. Also the dissolution of many state para-statal meant economy opportunities for career politicians was under threat.<sup>247</sup> Consequently, under Bédié's regime, Ivory Coast became one of the most corrupt countries on earth with a corruption index of 3.1 out of 10 in 1998. For example, in 1999, there was a major scandal over the embezzlement of 20 billion CFA francs of European Union aid by top Ivorian government officials.<sup>248</sup> For the time being corruption has effectively

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<sup>245</sup> Crook, 1997., op. cit

<sup>246</sup> Nanga, op cit.

<sup>247</sup> Crook, 1997. op cit.

<sup>248</sup> Gisselquist, Rachel M. Economic Adjustment and Regime Change in Africa: Côte d'Ivoire in Comparative Perspective. *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*. 21 March 2001

become a mode of accumulation sanctioned by government, seemingly because of its lack of legitimacy.<sup>249</sup>

On the other hand, Ouattara's support came from technocrats-those who had benefited and hope to benefit from SAP through a learner and fitter public services.<sup>250</sup> The first anti-Ouattara offensive, conducted by Bédié before the death of Houphouët-Boigny, was the obstruction that he organised, as President of the National Assembly, to the privatisation of Ivory Coast Telecom (CIT). Bouygues (French company) was ready to acquire CIT, after having inherited the Société des Eaux de Côte d'Ivoire and Energie Electrique de Côte d'Ivoire under scandalously undervalued shady deal orchestrated by Alassane Ouattara.<sup>251</sup> This might have strengthened Ouattara's hand politically because; he would have been seen as capable of preserving French interest in a face of liberalisation. Also, with liberalisation, he would have been able to dispense rewards to his clients through government equity in privatised companies. Ouattara also instrumentalised privatisation to dislodge his political opponent from their rentier fiefs thus denying them opportunity to mobilise support through rewards.<sup>252</sup>

Succession battle in Ivory Coast can also be examine from the institutional devolution of power in the country. Like most Gaullist state, Ivory Coast adopted co-habitation as a political system. This means that the day to day running of the state was left to the Prime Minister who heads the government much to the dislike of old party barons who used to dispense control through party structures. Accordingly the appointment of Ouattara, a novice with no political base was a great disappointment to the old cadre of the party.<sup>253</sup> Quattara also doubled as Minister of Economy and Finance. This effectively meant that, he was not only given a carte blanche to run things as he sees fit taking into consideration Boigny's ill health; concentration of power on him

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<sup>249</sup> According to transparency international, Ivory Coast is the 3<sup>rd</sup> most corrupt country on the planet with a corruption index of 1.9: "The Coup in Côte d'Ivoire," *Tempo* (Lagos), January 28, 2000, <http://www.allafrica.com> [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_and\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2005](http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005)

<sup>250</sup> Crook, 1997, op. cit

<sup>251</sup> Nanga, J., op. cit; Lumumba, Assie and Lumumba-Kasongo. Cote d'Ivoire in the French and Global Capitalist System. African Update Newsletter. Vol.X, issue 4 (Fall 2003)

<sup>252</sup> Daddieh, C. K "Elections and Ethnic Violence in Cote d'Ivoire: The Unfinished Business of Succession and Democratic Transition. *African Issues* Vol. 29, No. 1/2, Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa (2001), pp. 14-19

<sup>253</sup> Crook, 1997., op. cit

effectively curtailed the influence of old cadre of the PDCI and their economic interest. Crook argues the *carte blanche* given to Ouattara enabled him to slowly build a political base for an eminent attack on article 11 and the succession of Bédié.<sup>254</sup> It therefore seems Ouattara's attempt at co-opting Gbagbo was grounded in his desire to build a coalition for an eventual fight against Bédié's succession. It seems to me, as much as Boigny wanted economic renewal of the country grounded on his acceptance of painful austerity measures, he also wanted to preserve the interest of the old cadre by effectively positioning Bédié as his successor with the reactivation of article 11. Thus Boigny in trying to play his hand on balancing the interest of various political cleavages unwittingly positioned Ivory Coast on the path of a costly succession battle.

Political and economic contestation in Ivory Coast was very much enmeshed in the international political economy. Any change to Ivorian political economy would definitely affect not only the political base of local politicians but also the interest of their international clients. Economic policies are a reflection of a leader's political security no matter his public rhetoric. Therefore, one is tempted to ask the question: does Ivory Coast have an independent bourgeois class capable of making their own decision based on moving the country forward? What informs the macroeconomic policies of such leaders? Why did Gbagbo a confessed socialist suddenly pursue the same neoliberal policies he had objected in the early 1990s? Taking cognisance of the absence of viable indigenous capital, the liberalisation of Ivorian economy definitely led to economic and geopolitical contestation from western powers specifically in the privatisation business.

Shortly after the proclamation of independence, talks were opened between France and Ivory Coast, resulting in cooperative arrangements, a new concept to describe the "new" relationships between the "former mother country" and her "former colony". This cooperation is multifaceted and all-inclusive: military, political, diplomatic, economic, financial and cultural. Specifically, the defence agreement between France and Ivory Coast was in reality legitimising neo-colonialism. In fact, according to article 2 of the agreement, "the French Republic regularly informs the Republic of Ivory Coast of the policy that it intends to follow concerning strategic raw materials

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<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

and products, taking into account the general needs of defence, the evolution of resources and the situation of the world market.” According to article 3, "the Republic of Ivory Coast would inform the French Republic of the policy they intend to follow concerning strategic raw materials and products and the measures that they propose to take to implement this policy.” And to conclude, article 5 stipulates that: "Concerning these same products, the Republic of Ivory Coast for defence needs, reserve them in priority for sale to the French Republic, after having satisfied the needs of internal consumption, and they will import what they need in priority from France.”<sup>255</sup> Clearly reciprocity could not and have never been maintained because of the position of dominance France had at the eve of independence. It is within this framework that France has emerged as Ivory Coast biggest trading partner.

Ivory coast principal export partners are US 11.6%, Netherlands 10.3%, France 9.5%, Italy 5.5%, Belgium 4.7%, Germany 4.7% (2004); while its principal import partners are France 24.3%, Nigeria 19.2%, UK 4% (2004). Consequently, the trade deficit in France’s favour is 14.8%.<sup>256</sup> Ivory Coast is home to around 20000 French, by 2001, there were around 210 subsidiaries of French companies, primarily around land transport, communication, electricity and water sectors of Ivorian economy; which together chipped in more than €2.2 billion into French economy in 1999.<sup>257</sup>

By examining the interest of the following French companies in Ivory Coast, Nanga succinctly establish that France had an inherent interest in who ever rules Ivory Coast. Bolloré (leader in French maritime transport in 2003), is the principal operator of maritime transport along with Saga, SDV and Delmas practically controls the port of Abidjan, the leading transit port in the West African region and the second container port in Africa, whose main container terminal at Vridi was recently acquired by Bolloré in a scandalous fashion.<sup>258</sup> Bolloré also controls the Ivorian-Burkinabe railway.

Bouygues through privatisation, controls water distribution (Société des Eaux de Côte d’Ivoire-SECI), production and distribution of electricity through the Compagnie

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<sup>255</sup> Nanga, J., op cit.

<sup>256</sup> CIA <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#Econ>

<sup>257</sup> “Le économie contrôle par la France.” *Courier International*. N0.637.16 January 2003

<sup>258</sup> Nanja, op. cit

Ivoirienne d'Electricité and the Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d'Electricité. It has also been involved in the recent exploitation of Ivorian oil.<sup>259</sup> Total (the biggest French oil company) holds a quarter of the shares of the Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR) and owns 160 petrol stations.<sup>260</sup>

France Telecom (seventh in rank among companies in France and leader in the telecommunications sector) is the main shareholder of Côte d'Ivoire Telecom and of the Société Ivoirienne des Mobiles (it holds about 85 per cent of the capital), since concessions were granted in this sector, in the context of the privatisation of public enterprises.

In the banking and insurance sector, there is the Société Générale (sixth bank in France -the Société Générale des Banques de Côte d'Ivoire has 55 branches) the Credit Lyonnais, BNP-Paribas, AXA (the second largest company in France and leader of the insurance sector, which has been present in Ivory Coast since the colonial period).

The most long-established of French companies is the Groupe Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de Côte d'Ivoire (CFAO-CI) which operates in many sectors (cars, pharmaceuticals, new technologies) after having for a long time monopolised exports and the retail trade) and whose profitability (not a single year of loss, from its creation in 1887 until 2003) led to it being recently taken over the Pinault-Printemps-La Redoute group. It occupies the ninth rank among companies in Ivory Coast, after having ceding its interests the logging industry, in which it had been very much present for decades.<sup>261</sup> To sum it all, France is the highest exporter to and the third largest import from Ivory Coast.<sup>262</sup>

Another sector of the Ivorian economy which has witnessed stiff international contestation is the energy sector. Increased economic and political cost of importing oil from the Middle East due to the fragile political situation there means the Gulf of Guinea has suddenly become very important. In fact US expect to import 25% of its

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

<sup>262</sup> <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#Econ>

oil from Africa.<sup>263</sup> Consequently, the discovery of oil in Ivory Coast has invited the normal crowd of oil vultures with little penchant for governance: US based chevron Texaco, Vanco; France Totalfinaelf, China Sinopec, India (ONGC) have all been posturing for oil licenses.<sup>264</sup>

Realism, greed and national chauvinism thus demands that any political economy transition that seems to threaten France's interest will necessitate indirect or direct intervention. Empirical evidence suggests that there is strong positive correlation between regime change and French interest in francophone Africa. For example: Ahidjo was catapulted into the presidency in Cameroon after nationalist leaders termed terrorist were killed by the help of French intelligence. Eyadema replaced Sylvanus Olympio with the help of French when the latter sought to revise contracts for the exploitation of Togolese phosphate which he considered as giving the lion's share to French capital. Hamani Diori, was overthrown when he wanted to liberalised Niger's uranium thus making them accessible to other nations in the height of the Cold War and oil crisis;<sup>265</sup> Marien Ngouabi (Congo-Brazzaville) was assassinated in 1977, a few hours before a Franco-Congolese meeting in Paris to discuss the revision of the oil contract which benefited ELF,<sup>266</sup> Pascal Lisomba was overthrown when he invited US companies to prospect for oil in Congo Brazzaville.<sup>267</sup> France illegally intervened in Gabon to crush a popular uprising and installed Leon Mba in order to preserve their oil and uranium rights.<sup>268</sup>

It is within this context, Nanga argues that the privatisation process in Ivory Coast threatened French interest and by extension a critical player in the succession drama. He uses competition between Bolloré and ADM Carghill to picture the competing US and French interest. Bolloré was very close to Quattara while Bédié owns 12% of SIFCOM also co-owned by ADM and Carghill (US). Nanga points out that the

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<sup>263</sup> Gary, I.; Karl, T. L "Bottom of the barrel: Africa's oil boom and the poor" Catholic Relief Services [www.crs.org/](http://www.crs.org/)

<sup>264</sup> Energy Information Administration. Country Profile: Cote d'Ivoire. [www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/cdivoire.pdf](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/cdivoire.pdf)

<sup>265</sup> Nanga, op. cit

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Clark, John. F Foreign Intervention in the Civil War of the Congo Republic *Journal of Opinion* . Vol. 26, No. 1, Central Africa in Crisis (1998), pp. 31-36

<sup>268</sup> Reed, M. "Gabon: A Neo-Colonial Enclave of Enduring French Interest" *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), pp. 283-320

eventual take over of the cocoa sector by ADM and Cargill (US) has driven Bolloré to shed its subsidiary to the annoyance of the French. Bedie invited Vanco (USA Oil Company) in 1994 to prospect for oil against the established tradition that ELF (French Oil Company) is the natural explorer of oil in francophone Africa. Nanga further argues that it is plausible to make a French connection with the coup that overthrown Bédié based on the basis that most of the soldiers that took part were mutinous soldiers who had served in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic under the command of French Army, coupled with the fact Gueï upon his accession to power immediately visited France.<sup>269</sup>

Nanga further points out that, the continuation of neoliberal policies which benefited the US much to the liking of Gbagbo informed his abandonment of socialist rhetoric, grounded in his attempt to diversify his international clients.<sup>270</sup> Sharing the proceeds of privatisation has been the rationale behind successive governments in Ivory Coast even during the war. For example the award of contract in 2004 to Bouygues for the construction of Abidjan seaport under mysterious circumstances angered the PDCI because it was not done through parliament, where have two seats less of FPI (ruling party). This of course would have necessitated a deal between the two largest parties in parliament.<sup>271</sup>

Against this backdrop, Ivory Coast clearly lacks an independent bourgeoisie with a vision to stare the country towards development. From the creation of SAA, PDCI to the accession to power of FPI, macroeconomic policies have almost invariably been dictated by political rationalities skewed in the narrow interest of the comprador bourgeoisie during colonialism and strengthened by neoliberal policies in an era of economic and political liberalisation. Thus the advent of political and economic liberalisation in Ivory Coast was skewed in *recapitalising patrimonialism* in an effort to preserve elite interest and those of their international clients.

The above analysis seems to validate Rogowski's argument that neo-liberal economic policies affects political cleavages in a country depending on the supply and demand

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<sup>269</sup> Nanga, J., op. cit

<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

<sup>271</sup> Takwa, Z. and Suifon, E., "Breaking the Ivorian Cycle of Violence: An Urgent Imperative", WARN Policy Briefs. www.wanep.org, November 2004, pp.2-3



of factors of production.<sup>272</sup> Clearly Ivory Coast adopted liberal economic policies because it benefited the political elites at the dawn of independence cognisance of the fact that they were planters and their revenue depended on export. Increase revenue from the heydays of economic boom meant the supply of revenue could easily meet the demand-bearing groups through the creation of import substitution industries. But when the country witnessed economic crisis in the early 1980s, the supply of revenue was restricted while demand bearings groups increased. Thus political elites who benefited from the old system resented change knowing fully well that it will not benefit them since competition will not favour them. While educated technocrat who had never fully benefited from the system saw liberalisation as a chance for political mobilisation. At this point, the state was at a critical junction, disequilibrium was created because demand could not meet supply.

From the above analysis, Presidential succession in Ivory Coast to me is the modality through which conflict of interest groups (local and international) are playing themselves out – a conflict about the terms of transition, nature of macro-economic policy and distribution of resources. The Ouattara/Bédié; Ouattara/Gbagbo contests were merely a modality, instrument and mechanism through which such conflicts played themselves out against a backdrop of foreign interest. Within this context, lack of resources to garner political support meant ethnic rhetoric became an instrument of political mobilisation for such interest groups taking cognisance of Ivorian electoral politics.

### **Section Three: Politicisation of Ethnicity**

African states as is the case with Ivory Coast are a mosaic of ethnic groupings. Ethnicity has and will also be at the core of African politics let alone Ivory Coast taking into consideration the advent of liberal political contestation. Ivory Coast is made up 60 ethnic groups within 5 major ethnic groupings. The Akans (6 967 272, 42,1 % of the population) occupy the south, south east and center, they comprise the following groups Abron, Agni, Alladjan, Attié, Abbey, Abidji, Abouré, Adjoukrou, Ahizi, Appollo, Attié, Avikam, Baoulé, Ébrié, Essouma, Éhotilé, Éga, Mbato. Akans

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<sup>272</sup> Ronald Rogowski, "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," *American Political Science Review* 81, No. 4 (1987), pp. 1121-37.

belong to the branch of the Niger-Congo language family and most of them in Ivory Coast are descendents of eighteenth century migrants from the Ashante Kingdom.<sup>273</sup>

The Mandé (4 385 575, 26, 5 % of the population) situated in the north and West. Northern Mandé: Bambara, Dioula, Djimini, Gbin, Kamara, Koyaka, Malinké, Nigbi, Siaka. Dioula is the largest of the northern Mandé ethnic group. Southern Mandés : Bêrê, Gagou, Gouin, Gouro, Mahou, Moua, N'Gain, Ouan, Toonie, Toura, Yacouba, Yaouré. Yacouba is the largest of the southern Mandé ethnic group.

The Gur or Voltaïques (2 912 684, 17, 6 % of the population) are situated in the north and comprise of the Birifor, Béré, Dégha, Samogho, Siti, Sénoufo, Tagbana, Djimini, Lobi, Lohron, Komona, Koulango et Nafana. Sénoufo is of the Voltaïques ethnic group

The Krou (1 820 427, 11 % of the population) situated in wouth west and west and include the following group: Ahizi, Bakwé, Bété, Dida, Gnaboua, Godié, Gouja, Guéré, Kodia, Krabou, Kouya, Kouzié, Kroumen, Néyo, Nianbwa, Niébiboua, Nigbi, Oubi, Wané, Wobbé. Kru are the oldest ethnic group in Ivory Coast and Bété is the largest Kru population.<sup>274</sup>

Specifically, group configuration of Ivorian population is as follows Baoulé: 26 %; Dioula: 15 %; Agni: 12 %; Bété: 15 %; Guéré: 12 %; Ébrié: 8 %; Yacouba: 7 %; Appolo: 5 %. Religiously, Moslems comprise 38, 6 %, Catholics 9, 4 %, protestants 6, 6 % and animist 11, 9 %. The various ethnic groups are spread across the country's regions as thus

**Table1 8: Ethnic groups are their respective regions**

<i>Régions</i>	<i>Ethnies</i>
1. Agnébi	Abbey, Abidji, Attié
2. Bafing	Yacouba, Moua, Ngain, Ouan, Mahou

<sup>273</sup> Konate, A. Siedou. "The Politics of Identity and Violence in Cote d'Ivoire. *West Africa Review*.

ISSN: 1525-4488. [www.westafricareview.com/issue5konate.htm](http://www.westafricareview.com/issue5konate.htm)

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

3. Bas-Sassandra	Baoulé, Bakoué, Kroumen, Néyo
4. Denguélé	Malinké, Gbin, Kamara, Koyaka, Nigbi, Siaka
5. Fromagers	Bété, Bakoué, Gouro, Dioula
6. Haut-Sassandra	Dida, Bété, Gouro, Gagou, Godié
7. Lacs	Baoulé, Yaouré
8. Lagunes	Ébrié, Alladjan, Adjoukou, Abidji, Ahizi, Attié, Appollo, Avikam, Essouma, Mbato, Nzima
9. Marahoué	Gouro, Dida
10. Montagnes	Guéré, Oubi, Wané, Wobbé
11. Moyen-Cavalé	Guéré, Wobbé
12. Moyen-Comoé	Agni, Éga
13. Nzi-Comoé	Baoulé, Dioula
14. Savanes	Dioula, Sénoufo
15. Sud-Bandama	Dida, Godié
16. Sud-Comoé	Agni, Appollo, Abouré, Éhotilé
17. Vallée du Bandama	Baoulé, Tagbanan, Dioula, Gouro
18. Zanzan	Abron, Birifor, Bêré, Dégha, Komona, Koulango, Lobi, Lohron, Nafana, Samogho, Siti
19. Worodougou	Malinké, Bambara, Djimini, Gbin, Nigbi, Yakouba

*Source:* Commission Nationale de coordination de Côte d'Ivoire. « Les ethnies de Côte d'Ivoire » Enquête Entreprise sur le Terrain, 1992-1997.<sup>275</sup>

Cognisance of the fact that no ethnic group commands an absolute majority in Ivory Coast, electoral politics demands that he who can negotiate a strong coalition which can last till the eve of an election will definitely snatch state power. This situation was compounded in Ivory Coast because the electoral system is grounded in FPTP. In presidential elections, where a candidate fails to get more than 50% on the first round, the first two candidates will go head to head and the result is based on a simple majority. In parliamentary elections, the electoral system is grounded in simple list

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<sup>275</sup> Botau, Adrienne Blay, op cit

majority without preference.<sup>276</sup> Since power is mostly concentrated on the president, politics in Ivory Coast is a zero-sum game.<sup>277</sup>

Ethnicity has always been a backup plan for Ivorian politicians in desperate times. Tiemoko Coulibaly argues that Houphouët-Boigny was a proponent of tribalism, though he never admitted it. He effectively used ultra-nationalist campaign against a French Federal Union of former colonies in 1958 and elections of the national assembly. His argument was that the Ivory Coast, as it then was, had no wish to be a milk cow for French West Africa fuelled violent attacks against Dahomeyans that year, orchestrated by Pepe Paul, a henchman of Houphouët-Boigny. The pretext was that Dahomeyans held the best teaching posts.<sup>278</sup>

The strength of the PDCI was built on a coalition between the northerners and south. With the death Boigny, northerners were expecting to be compensated considerably for their unwavering support. Clearly, they were dissatisfied with their situation in the alliance. This was evidenced by the notorious *Le Charte du Grand Nord* in 1992, which called for fuller recognition of Moslem religion, regional development in the north, increase political representation, access to public jobs and the de-baoulelisation/tribalisation of the state.<sup>279</sup> The electoral strength of the north and the political ramification of ethnic allegiance were clearly seen in the 1990s presidential and parliamentary elections. Though the PDCI won the elections, FIP which is mostly seen as a Bété bulwark to Baoule dominance, performed relatively well in Bété region specifically southwest. Also the fact that FPI got 29% of northern vote because of the defection of Gbon Coulibaly meant that an effective walk away by the north from the PDCI will greatly reduce its political support.<sup>280</sup>

Electoral politics is not only about demography but also about the system in place. On the eve of the 1990 elections Ivory Coast adopted a single constituency simple

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<sup>276</sup> Ivorian Electoral code 2000. Chapitre Premier De l'élection du président de la République, article 44. Ethno-Net Data Base [http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/ivoir/codel2000.htm#ProjCodElect2000\(TitreIIChapI\)](http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/ivoir/codel2000.htm#ProjCodElect2000(TitreIIChapI))

<sup>277</sup> Ethno-Net Data Base. "Ivory Coast Constitution 2000: Chapter three" [http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/ivoir/const2000.htm#ProjConst2000\(titreIII\)](http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/ivoir/const2000.htm#ProjConst2000(titreIII))

<sup>278</sup> Coulibaly, T. "Cult of a Dead Dictator: Ivory Coast Democracy Deferred." *Le Monde Diplomatique*. 8 octobre 2000. <http://mondediplo.com/2000/10/08ivorycoast>

<sup>279</sup> Crook, 1997., op. cit

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

majority system and foreigners were allowed to vote much to the annoyance of the opposition.<sup>281</sup> This effectively forced the opposition to adopt a nationalistic stand grounded in identity politics. This had a ripple effect because the opposition was seen in this case as an ethnic party design to foster the narrow interest of the Bété people. This gave Boigny an easy win over his mean rivals in the elections though they performed well.

By 1995, Bédié was faced with a difficult situation with regard to the October presidential election. Ephemeral benefits of 1994 devaluation were gone, economic crisis was having a severe repercussion on social cohesion of the country and RDR and FPI has formed a coalition to contest the elections. Against this backdrop, Bédié had no option but to strengthen his political base-Akan/Baoule-by doing what many student of politics would suggest, play the ethnic card. Thus Bédié effectively took on the opposition platform in 1990. Bédié instituted the notorious concept of ivoirité into Ivorian legal parlance. According to a 1995 amendment of the electoral code, only candidates born to both Ivorian parents could vote or contest. This effectively disenfranchised and excluded a majority of northerners from any decision on who get what, how and when considering their generational roots in Burkina Faso Guinea and Mali.

Before the inception of ivoirité, ethnic differences were grounded in culture and history. Northerners were labelled *gros boubou et long chapeau* by southerners. While northerners called southerners *bousmani* or *bushman*. These derogatory epithets did not flare up into conflict until the inception of ivoirité. From thereon, Gros boubou et long chapeau were viewed as *boyorojang*-somebody coming from afar, *allogenes* or *foreigners* while bushmani were viewed as *natives or autochtones*.<sup>282</sup>

The concept of ivoirité was defined by Bédié as

Le projet culturel qui fera l'homme nouveau, un home ivoirien pétri de toute la substance de nos diverses cultures ethniques, porteur d'une

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<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> Konate, op. cit.

culture nationale qui fonde son ivoirien mais en même temps le tienne ouvert a tout les souffles des cultures du monde.<sup>283</sup>

Ivoirité is a cultural project, which will construct the new man, an Ivorian full with all the ingredients of our ethnic culture, a man who will bear the national culture that shapes his ivorianness but at the same time keeps him receptive to other cultures of the world. My translation

Bédié further argues that

Ivoirité ce n'est pas une loi, c'est une nature, une qualité au Coeur de la fraternité et de l'humanisme, un comportement, une attitude pour le rayonnement de notre identité collective et l'affirmation de notre indépendance parmi les souverainetés nationales et internationales.<sup>284</sup>

Ivoirité is not a law; it is a state of nature and value at the heart of brotherhood and humanism; a behavior and an attitude, which aims at projecting of our collective identity and affirming our sovereignty amongst independent nations. My translation

Clearly Bédié wanted a new social order that will ensure his moves to keep political power in his grip. Bédié's definition of ivoirité was championed by Akan intellectuals, in order to give it theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. According to Prof Niamey Koffi, in constructing an Ivorian nationality a distinction between *them* and *us* is imperative.

Pour construire un NOUS, Il faut le distinguer d'un EUX. Il faut parvenir a établir la discrimination NOUS/EUX d'une manière qui soit compatible avec le pluralisme des nationales.

In constructing an US, it has to be distinguished from THEM. One has to establish the discrimination between US and THEM in a way that to compatible to ethnic pluralism. My translation.

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<sup>283</sup>Curdiophe. L'Ivoirité, ou l'esprit du nouveau contrat social du président H.K. Bédié" : extraits. In Cote d'Ivoire la Tentation Ethnonationalisme. *Politique Africain. Numéros Parus* No 78 June 2000-Trimistriuel

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

The Economic and Social Council also justified ivoirité arguing that,

Une exigence de souveraineté, d'identité, de créativité. Le peuple ivoirien doit affermir sa souveraineté, son autorité face aux menaces de dépossession et d'assujettissement : qu'il s'agisse de l'immigration ou du pouvoir économique et politique.<sup>285</sup>

For the purpose of creativity, identity and sovereignty, the people of Ivory Coast must reaffirm their sovereignty and authority in the face of threats of dispossession and subjugation whether in immigration, politics or economic. My translation

This new concept of who an Ivorian *ought* or *should* be replaced what *is* an Ivorian enshrined in article 6 of Nationality Code Law No 61-December 14, 1961 modified by Law No 72-852 of December 21, 1972. This law was strongly grounded in *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. A clear reading of ivoirité will reveal that, its difference from nationality under Boigny was its use of coordinate conjunctions *or* and *and*. Nationality laws under Boigny was inclusive vis a vis Bédié, Gueï and Gbagbo. Though ivoirité can be defended on grounds that every country needs some kind of particularity to identify itself as a state or nation-state within the Commonwealth of Nations, it was a horrible law grounded in political rationalities. At what point can we conceptualise the existence of an Ivorian state? Should it be at the dawn of independence or Berlin conference? These are difficult conceptual questions, but what is clear in the Ivorian case is that: by refusing nationality to somebody who lived all his life in Ivory Coast even before independence is purely churlish. Also, the law seemed to have targeted a particular ethnic groups-Voltaïques and northern Mandé, fiefdom of opposition leader Ouattara. What about Akans who migrated from Ghana? It thus seems ivoirité was twisted nationalism in a succession battle between Bédié and Ouattara.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> Jean-Noel Loukou. "De l'ivoirité" in Bédié, H. K L" *ivoirité du Nouveau Contrat Social du Président Henri Konan Bédié*. Abidjan : Presse Universitaire de Cote d'Ivoire

<sup>286</sup> Fanon warned against petty nationalism arguing that it is neither a political doctrine nor a programme. If a nation wants to halt regression, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness. Fanon Frantz. *Wretched of the Earth*. London : Penguin, 1967 pp 203

Even within religious circles, religious leaders did not distance themselves from the rhetoric of politicians. Religion became politicised with the advent of ivoirité as a political discourse. For example Imam Boubabar Fofana, the spokesperson of the Superior Council of Imams of Ivory Coast spoke of martyrdom of Moslem killed by Gbagbo. He argued that

Nous n'avons aucun complexe pour dire que la communauté musulmane soutient Alassane. Si la communauté pense qu'il est le meilleur candidat, qu'il elle le soutienne. Tout comme on ne reprochera pas du tout aux Baoule d'avoir soutenu Bédié. Tout comme on ne reprochera pas non plus a majorité des Bété de soutenir Gbagbo.<sup>287</sup>

We Muslims should have no reservations giving our support to Ouattara. If the community deems him the best candidate, there is no problem that we support him. People should not punish us for our support because it is as legitimate as the support that Baoules give to Bédié and majority of Bétés to Gbagbo. My translation

Some Christians on their part argue that

Aux yeux du peuple, certaines candidatures soulèvent plus des problèmes qu'elles n'en résolvent. Pour l'amour de notre pays, pour la paix a laquelle aspirant ardemment tous les ivoiriennes d'origine et d'adoption, nous souhaitons que ces leaders aient le courage- un grand courage alors- et la sagesse nécessaire de reconsidérer leur position pour se retirer. Il n'est jamais trop tard pour bien faire.<sup>288</sup>

In the eyes of Ivorians, some candidacies raise problems rather than solutions. For the love of our country and peace aspired by all, naturalised or native, we pray for these leaders to withdraw from the political race. It is never too late to do and be good. My translation

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<sup>287</sup> *Le Patriote* November 28 2000

<sup>288</sup> Statement made by the Episcopal conference of Cote d'Ivoire Le Lour, September 28, 2000



Ivoirité was clearly a calculated move by Bédié to exclude Ouattara from the political process conscious of Ivorian electoral politics. Though Gbagbo had earlier played the ethnic card, he quickly learned that he could not win an election in Ivory Coast in so far as his political base is grounded around the Bété region mindful of their demographic inferiority. Within this context, Gbagbo joint forces with Ouattara knowing fully well that this was the best chance for any mobilisation of political support, thus abandoning his previous stand. Against this backdrop one can conclude that, it has dawn on Ivorian politicians from Boigny, Bédié and Gbagbo that a grand coalition with the north is very imperative. This might be the rationale for the proposed coalition between Ouattara and Bédié in the up coming elections in case none of them gets an outright majority.

Unsurprisingly, Bédié won the 1995 presidential and parliamentary elections because of boycott by RDR and FPI. In trying to consolidate his position, Bédié abandoned ethnic balancing in favour of Baoulisation or trabilisation of Ivorian politics.

**Table 9: Ethnic representation under Bédié**

Ethnic group	Government								Inner circle of political power								National assembly		Social and economic council	
	Nov.91 <sup>a</sup>		Dec.93		Jan.96		Aug.98		Nov.91 <sup>a</sup>		Dec.93		Jan.96		Aug.98		Nov.95		Mar-98	
	%	RR <sup>b</sup>	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.61	1.46	0.52	1.24	0.52	1.23	0.59	1.41	0.73	1.74	0.67	1.58	0.67	1.58	0.75	1.78	0.46	1.10	0.58	1.39
Baoule	0.17	1.04	0.24	1.43	0.28	1.64	0.31	1.86	0.36	2.18	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.42	2.48	0.22	1.29	0.33	1.98
kru	0.17	1.19	0.24	1.89	0.21	1.63	0.16	1.23	0.09	0.62	0.17	1.31	0.17	1.31	0.08	0.66	0.19	1.52	0.23	1.84
S.Mandé	0.04	0.41	0.04	0.40	0.10	1.03	0.06	0.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.94	0.03	0.25
N.Mandé	0.09	0.55	0.08	0.48	0.07	0.42	0.03	0.19	0.09	0.57	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.08	0.51	0.12	0.74	0.13	0.76
Voltaic	0.09	0.53	0.12	0.68	0.10	0.59	0.13	0.71	0.09	0.56	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.12	0.70	0.02	0.09
No.	N=23		N=25		N=29		N=32		N=11		N12		N=12		N=12		N=171		N=120	
PIM <sup>c</sup>	0.47		0.62		0.49		0.49		0.64		0.65		0.65		0.66		0.33		0.74	

Source: Armin Langer

- a) The November 1991 government was formed under Boigny
- b) *Relative representation* (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group's relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population
- c) *Political Inequality Measure* (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative representation of the different ethnic groups.

From the table above, one would notice that under Bédié, relative representation of Baoules increased from 1.04 under Boigny to 1.86 in the August 1998 government. Relative to Boigny's government, the big losers in Bédié's government appeared to be Kru and northern Mandé, the fiefdom of Gbagbo and Ouattara. Bédié also increased the relative representation of Baoules from 2.18 in November 1991 to 2.48 in December 1993 in the inner circle of political power at the expense of northern and southern Mandé. By 1998, Baoules represented almost 40% of the key political positions in Ivory Coast.<sup>289</sup>

Ethnicity did not only play itself out in Ivorian political institutions. The once docile Ivorian military became extremely politicised through ethnic sensitisation. Contamin, Losch<sup>290</sup> and Kieffer<sup>291</sup> argue that Bédié progressively destroyed internal imbalances in the military and started a process of Baoulisation regarding the higher command positions. For example: the dismissal of General Gueï, Lansana Palenfo and Abdoulaye Coulibaly, who came from the west and north respectively. The ethnicisation/trabilisation of the military was also grounded in financial difficulties engendered by economic crisis. For example, Bédié could not adjust the salaries of the army to compensate for devaluation in 1994.<sup>292</sup> It is within this context that the military overthrew Bédié and entered Gueï with a changing concept of ivoirité.

Gueï in line with *Le Compromis Houphouëtiste*, promoted national integration and reconciliation and openly castigated ivoirité.<sup>293</sup> Langer argues that Gueï's government was the most ethnic balance in Ivory Coast from 1980-2003, though he also

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<sup>289</sup> Langer, A., op. cit

<sup>290</sup> Contamin, Bernard and Losch, Bruno "Cote d'Ivoire: La Voie Etrange." *Politique Africaine*. No 77 March 2000. pp. 117-128

<sup>291</sup> Kieffer 2000., op. cit

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>293</sup> Akindes, F. op. cit

debaoulised the military.<sup>294</sup> But once Gueï harboured presidential aspirations, he exploited ethnicity for political mobilisation. On 24<sup>th</sup> July 2000, a new constitution was adopted in a referendum with the support of 86.5% of the vote in a 55% turnout.<sup>295</sup> As per article 35, a presidential candidate should be an Ivorian by birth and his/her parents should be Ivorian by birth and he should never have acquired another nationality. It was generally conceived that these eligibility criteria were aimed at eliminating Ouattara from the presidential race, considering the fact that his farther was not only rumoured to be Burkinabe, he once worked as President of the Central Bank of West African states while he possessed a Burkinabe passport.

**Table 10: Ethnic representation in government under Gueï, 2000**

Ethnic group	Government						Inner Circle of Political Power					
	Aug-98 <sup>a</sup>		Jan-00		May-98		Aug-98		Jan-00		May-00	
	%	RR <sup>b</sup>	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.59	1.41	0.50	1.19	0.30	0.72	0.75	1.78	0.38	0.89	0.11	0.26
Baoule	0.31	1.86	0.13	0.74	0.04	0.26	0.42	2.48	0.13	0.74	0.00	0.00
Kru	0.16	1.23	0.13	0.98	0.22	1.71	0.08	0.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
S.Mandé	0.06	0.63	0.08	0.83	0.17	1.73	0.00	0.00	0.13	1.25	0.22	2.22
N.Mandé	0.03	0.19	0.17	1.01	0.17	1.05	0.08	0.51	0.13	0.76	0.44	2.69
Voltaic	0.13	0.71	0.13	0.71	0.08	0.47	0.08	0.47	0.25	1.42	0.11	0.63
No.	N=32		N=24		N=23		N=12		N=8		N=9	
PIM <sup>c</sup>	0.49		0.18		0.57		0.66		0.55		1.22	

Source: Langer, A., op cit.

From the table above, the relative representation of Akans in government decreased from 1.19 in January 2000 to 0.72, in the inner circle of political power from 0.89 in January 2000 to 0.26 in May. The relative representation of voltaic in government reduced from 0.71 to 0.47 and in the inner circle of political power from 1.42 to 0.63. The relative representation of the northern Mandé in the government increased from 1.01 in January 2000 to 1.05 in May 2000. The second government of Gueï confirms the role of ivoirité in his political calculations once he decided to stand for presidential elections. Consequently, he more than doubled the relative representation

<sup>294</sup> Langer, A. op. cit

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

of southern Mandé and increased that of Krus. This can be explained by the de facto coalition between Gbagbo and Gueï against their common political enemy-Ouattara. Important to note here is the fact that even though northerners: Seydou Diarra (no party affiliation), Mamadou Koulibaly (FPI), Ahmed Timite' (PDCI) and Moussa Toure (PDCI) were included; they belonged to parties that fervently opposed Ouattara.<sup>296</sup> Gueï expanded the concept of ivoirité in the sense that his exclusionary policies also targeted Akan.

Apart from changing electoral laws, Gueï also purged the army. Soldiers from the north were harassed, general Palenfo and Coulibaly were dismissed for an alleged attempt on Gueï's life. Chief Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly went to exile. In fact northern soldiers dismissed were instrumental in the September 2002 insurgent.<sup>297</sup>

On October 6, 2000, a controversial Supreme Court decision disqualified fourteen of the nineteen presidential candidates, including Ouattara, on citizenship grounds, and former President Bédié for not submitting a proper medical certificate. The Supreme Court, headed by General Gueï's then legal adviser, was widely believed to have been hand picked by Gueï himself.<sup>298</sup> The October 2000 presidential election was effectively a two horse race between Gueï against Gbagbo. Against a backdrop of low turnout (35%) due to boycott because of the exclusion of Ouattara for *nationalité douteuse*, preliminary results put Gbagbo on the lead and this propelled Gueï to disband the Commission nationale électorale (CNE-national electoral commission) on grounds of electoral fraud and declared himself winner.

This sparked popular protest from Ivorians and official results stated that Gbagbo won with 59.36%. The RDR on the other hand called for fresh elections due to lack of legitimacy. Gbagbo vehemently refused and the stage was set for large scale street protest in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo which resulted in clashes between FPI and RDR supporters and the eventual discovery of *Charnier de Yopougon* (mass grave of

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<sup>296</sup> Langer, A., op. cit

<sup>297</sup> Dembele, Ousmane. "Cote d'ivoire: la fracture Communautaire. *Politique Africaine*. No. 89. pp. 34-48

<sup>298</sup> HRW. "The New Racism: The Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire" *HRW Publication*. Vol. 13, No.6 (A) August 2001

Yopougon) on 27 October 2000 which contained the body of around 57 RDR-supporters with a northern background.<sup>299</sup>

Ethnic tensions were exacerbated when Ouattara was barred from contesting parliamentary election in December 2000 which resulted in FPI wining with only 33.12% turnout due to boycott by RDR.<sup>300</sup> Gbagbo like his predecessors was bent on entrenching his power through ethnic politicisation.

**Table 11: Ethnic representation in political institutions under Gbagbo, 2000-2003**

Ethnic Group	Government						Inner Circle of Political Power						National Assembly	
	Jan.01		Aug.02		Sep.03		Jan.01		Aug.02		Sep.03		Dec.00	
	%	RR <sup>a</sup>	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR	%	RR
Akan	0.4	1.1	0.5	1.2	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.9
Baoule	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	.05	0.1	0.9
Kru	0.2	2.2	0.1	1.5	0.2	1.8	0.4	3.5	0.5	4.2	0.1	1.3	0.2	1.9
S.Mandé	0.1	1.7	0.1	1.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.1
N.Mandé	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.1	1.1	0.1	1.1	0.1	1.1	0.3	2.0	0.1	0.8
Voltaic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.9	0.0	0.4
No.	N=28		N=31		N=43		N=11		N=11		N=12		N=223	
PIM <sup>b</sup>	0.93		0.66		0.48		1.30		1.74		0.74		0.55	

Source: Armin Langer

- a) relative Representation (RR) is calculated by dividing an ethnic group's relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire population
- b) political Inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative representation of the different ethnic groups

From the table above one would realise that Gbagbo favoured his ethnic group Kru by increasing their relative representation in government and inner political circles. The ethnic composition of Gbagbo January government was the most ethnically imbalanced in Ivorian political history much to the disadvantage of the voltaic and Northern Mandé.<sup>301</sup>

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Le Pape 2002

<sup>301</sup> Langer, A., op. cit.

The outcome of the *Forum de la Reconciliation Nationale*-FRN-let to the inclusion of PDCI and FPI members in the government and the eventual increase in ethnic representation of Akan, Baoules and northerners in government during Gbagbo's august 2002 government. Though none was from the voltaic ethnic group between January 2001 and august 2002 despite the fact they form almost 18% of the population.<sup>302</sup>

Ivorian land tenure laws under Gbagbo are a clear example of laws aimed at strengthening his political base by fuelling ethnicity. As shown above, Ivory Coast liberal land tenure laws under Boigny helped fuelled economic development because of easy access to land. This framework benefited Ivoirians from the north, centre and southeast as against west and south westerners because of their late entry into farming due to the late introduction of cash crop by colonial administration because of land scarcity in the south east and center. Most of the farmers in the west and south east (Bété region) came from the north and south east after independence and were generally perceived as foreigners merely because of their names.

In the height of economic decline, Ivorian youth who could not find jobs in the city returned to rural areas only to find that what they perceived as their land was in fact being occupied and exploited by *strangers*. Most invariably, *strangers* occupied these lands after working for the original owner for some time or through share cropping. As one Bété farmer puts it "When they came, they behaved as if they had nothing ... so we gave them everything." Now, he says, the "foreigners" are not giving their "masters" anything in return. "Right now, they don't care about anyone."<sup>303</sup>

Gbagbo supports traditional land rights wherein indigenous groups can claim land along centuries-old ancestral lines. Such land rights were recognised in a 1998 law but were never implemented until Gbagbo accession to power. The law marked a U-turn from *le Compromise Houphouetiste* grounded in actual exploitation and occupation. Land tenure law that is not firmly grounded in equitable principles such as restitutio in

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<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Kurti, Daniel Balint "Cocoa's Bitter Tale: A Violent Feud Pits Indigenous Tribes and Newer Settlers for Rights to Land in Ivory Coast." *Newsday*. December 4, 2005

intergrum is unsustainable. Clearly I doubt if the Ivorian state can live up to this considering the difficult economic situation the government is facing. To my mind, the new land tenure law is mainly design as a mechanism for rewards and redistribution of resources.

Another familiar genre of African politics depicted by Gbagbo is the politics of violence or the instrumentalisation of violence for political purpose. HRW has documented consistent and sustained use of state security apparatus by government to destroy the political base of opposition parties mostly RDR; by extrajudicial killings and intimidation of people perceived of being sympathetic to the party. Gbagbo has been accused of financing militia groups such young patriots notorious for vandalism and hooliganism; though one must bear in mind the rebels are also guilty.<sup>304</sup>

Gbagbo like Gueï and Bédié also tried to establish a more favourable ethnic composition in the military. He tried to achieve this through the planned demobilisation of two contingents called *Zinzins* and *Bahefoue* that consisted predominantly of soldiers during Gueï's reign.<sup>305</sup> In response to their planned demobilisation, these soldiers started a mutiny which eventual turned into an insurgent perpetrated mostly by soldiers who went into exile during Gueï's purge.

#### **Section Four: How the Conflict Erupted.**<sup>306</sup>

On the night of September 18-19, 2002, as many as 800 disgruntled soldiers took up arms against the government. It was the sixth coup or attempted coup in the space of less than three years. The uprising began before dawn after it was learned that hundreds of soldiers would be demobilized against their will. The city of Abidjan Bouake and Korhogo were attacked simultaneously. After the coup d'état failed, the rebels retreated to the Muslim dominated north; control of Abidjan was secured by loyalist forces with at least 270 people killed including Gueï, his entire family and Emile Doudou Minister of Interior.

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<sup>304</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Côte d'Ivoire: Ivorian Government Must Rein in Militias" <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/cotedi12468.htm>

<sup>305</sup> Banegas, R. and losch, B "La Cote d'Ivoire au Bord de l'implosion" *Politique Africaine*. Octobre 2002. No.87. pp. 136-161

<sup>306</sup> This section draws strong impetus from *Global Security* coverage of the conflict. For more visit <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast.htm>

On September 23, gunfire was exchanged in Bouake and the rebels took control of the town of Tebissou, located about 70 kilometres south of Bouake, near the political capital of Yamoussoukro. On September 24, 2002 heavy fighting broke out in Bouake. On September 27, French forces rescued more than 100 American children and staff at the International Christian Academy. Clearly this move was calculated to deter any possible US intervention in the crisis.

On September 31st, a team of diplomats from several West African nations (ministers from Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau) arrived in Abidjan to meet with Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, in an effort to negotiate an end to the crisis against a backdrop of heavy fighting in Tiebissou, about 40-kilometers north of Yamoussoukro.

By October 2, 2002, reports emerged that government security forces and supporters had been attacking and setting fire to Abidjan's many shantytowns, home to members of the country's large population of immigrant workers from other West African countries. The government argued that the move was aimed at smoking out rebels in their hide out.

On October 5, West African ministers left Yamoussoukro empty handed after a fail attempt at negotiations. French peacekeepers had provided security for the events but government representation failed to secure a power of attorney authorising him to sign any deal on behave of the government.

On October 12, Senegal's Foreign Minister Cheik Tidiane Gadio met with rebel commanders to put forth new proposals to advance the negotiations rebels attacked the city of Daloa, about 400-kilometers northwest of Abidjan. The fall of Daloa represented both a strategic and symbolic victory for the rebels. It did not only mean defeat for Gbagbo in his own turf but also Daloa formed part of the cocoa belt.

While negotiations were going on in Togo, new rebel groups (MPIGO and MJP) emerged and took control of Man and Danane. MPIGO attacked Danane while MJP attacked Man. Man is in the heart of Ivory Coast's coffee-growing region, Danane lies just 20km from the Liberian border, and is home to thousands of Liberian



refugees who had escaped conflicts. Man also served as a base for RUF and NPFL fighters.<sup>307</sup> The rebels claimed to be fighting against Gbagbo's government to avenge the assassination of former military ruler General Robert Gueï. Strategically the emergence of MPIGO and MPJ meant that the rebels could now get around the ceasefire put in place by the French. The ceasefire agreement proved difficult to the rebels but beneficial to Gbagbo because the north was relatively poor, thus seizing the port at San Pedro would have been commercially strategic. Moreover capturing the port would definitely have bolstered rebel's position before the January peace talks.<sup>308</sup>

On December 20, MPIGO had taken control of the town of Bangolo in the west of the country, which is just 40 kilometers south of the strategic city of Man. Residents were reported as saying many of the fighters patrolling in Man were English-speaking and believed to be Liberian. French troops set up base in the town of Duekoue, another 40 kilometers south of Bangolo. On December 21, the two forces met and clashes erupted just north of the town of Duekoue. This effectively prevented a southward drive by the rebels.

On December 23, the three rebel groups met in Bouake to discuss increased involvement of French troops in blocking their attempt to overthrow the Ivorian government. They announced they would consider any future French attacks on their fighters to be an act of war. France had declared that it would not take sides in the conflict and that its presence was to protect its national and attempt to maintain the stability of the fragile cease-fire.

Negotiations began in Paris on January 15 and Linas Marcoussis accord was signed on the 24 January 2003. The accord called for government of national unity, reconciliation, preservation of sovereignty, change on land tenure laws and electoral code. As soon as the accord was signed, protests erupted in the main city of Abidjan, denouncing the deal for being too conciliatory to rebel demands.

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<sup>307</sup>Global Witness. "The Usual Suspect: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Sierra Leon and Cote d'Ivoire. What is Still Possible, How it Works and How to Break the Trend." *Global Witness Report*. March 2003. [www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00068.pdf](http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00068.pdf)

<sup>308</sup>International Crisis Group. Côte d'Ivoire: "The War Is Not Yet Over", *Africa Report* N°72, 28 November 2003

To help protect the fragile integration process on February 27, 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1528 which established United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI was designed to last an initial period of 12 months starting from April 4 2004, with a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel. Its stated objective was to establish a presence in the Ivory Coast to supervise the disarmament of rebel forces and monitor the presidential elections due in October 2005. The council voted unanimously in favour of creating the new peacekeeping force after the United States dropped its earlier opposition to the proposal. While the US did not pledge to send any troops it did agree to pay for nearly a fourth of the \$303 million dollar cost. UNOCI replaced the existing UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire, known by its French acronym MINUCI.

The new timetable for DDR, disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of the rebel armed forces set by Prime Minister Seydou Diarra was set to begin on March 8, 2004. However, the New Forces, led by Soro said that they would only disarm in phases in conjunction with the specific implementation of important clauses from the French negotiated agreement. The disarmament was planned to occur in three stages, first demilitarizing the center area of the country, especially the rebel held city of Bouake, followed by a disarmament of the rebels in the east and west, and finally of those in the far north of the country.

Armed conflict broke out again on June 8, 2004 pushing the country even closer to the resumption of full-fledged civil war. Helicopter gunships were used to attack rebel positions, killing 20 people, and marked the first time in nearly a year that government helicopters were used to attack positions on the frontline

Later in June fighting occurred in the rebel held North in an apparent power struggle for leadership within the New Forces. Rebels claimed that many assassination attempts failed, and that the government was responsible for instigating the rift and planning to use mercenaries from Guinea to attack the rebel positions.

On July 31 2004 the Accra Agreement was signed with the goal of getting the peace-process back on track. On November 4 2004, the war resumed as military planes, namely Russian-made Sukhoi jets, carried out raids on rebel held positions in the

north. As airplane attacks and troop advancement continued, the United Nations suspended its humanitarian efforts and Mr. Soro declared that diplomacy was no longer an option.

On November 6, 2004, aircraft from the Ivorian Government struck a French military base, resulting in the deaths of nine French troops, an American aid worker and the wounding of an additional 31. In retaliation, the French military destroyed two Sukhoi-25 aircraft, in addition to three helicopters and an Ivorian army weapons cache, effectively destroying the Ivory Coast Air Force. The order to retaliate was reported to have come directly from French President Jacques Chirac.

The U.N. Security Council held an emergency session to discuss the situation in the country and called for an end to all military operations by Ivory Coast forces. In Abidjan, thousands of protestors supporting Gbagbo attacked and burned French owned property as the president called the resumed fighting, not only a war against the rebels who had refused to disarm, but also a war against colonialism. Loyal militants burned down French homes, schools, and businesses. On November 15, the U.N. Security Council took action by imposing an immediate arms embargo on Ivory Coast. By November 23, French peacekeepers had begun to withdraw from certain sites, including the airport at Abidjan in an attempt to restore the situation to a manageable level.

The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was sent to the Ivory Coast at the behest of the African Union and ECOWAS. Even as the president arrived, French troops fired on protestors to disperse a crowd, killing at least 20 people on the streets of Abidjan. President Mbeki traveled to the Ivory Coast on December 2, 2004 to meet with the leaders of the warring parties individually in an attempt to renew the foundations of a peace process. Through these meetings, Mbeki was able to obtain pledges to commit to the peace process by all parties.

Mbeki brought the warring parties together for the first time in 8 months in Pretoria. The negotiations in Pretoria, South Africa began on April 2 and yielded an agreement between the leaders to immediately and finally cease all hostilities. On August 25 after a series of missed disarmament deadlines and a lack of electoral commission

readiness, Soro declared that the New Forces would not participate in election planned for October 30. After this failure, South Africa said it was ending its mediation of the Ivory Coast crisis and blamed the rebel and opposition parties. On September 9, Kofi Annan also conceded that the elections could not take place due to the leaders of the parties involved. In the absence of an election plan, the leaders of the Africa Union declared that Gbagbo should remain in office for another year to avoid a constitutional crisis. The U.N. Security Council supported the motion to set the elections back a year at the latest. Clearly, one aspect that cut across African conflicts and the Ivorian conflict inclusive, is their regional dynamics which is enmeshed in ethnic, economic and political rationalities

### **Section Five: Regional Dynamics**

An examination of Ivorian history will reveal that the country was an epicentre from where France meddled in the affairs of African states grounded in the formidable partnership of Boigny and Jacque Foccart. By association, Ivory Coast has been guilty of meddling in the internal affairs of many African states for example, Nigeria, Liberia, Angola and Gabon. Regional interference in Ivorian crisis is not that surprising cognisance of limited state capacity and the fact that the country is situated in volatile West Africa. The crisis in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone affected the trajectory of Ivorian conflict reminiscent of most African conflicts. How and why did Ivorian conflict become a regional quagmire deserve a thorough examination.

### **Liberian Connection**

It is not startling that Liberia and Ivory Coast found themselves enmeshed in each others conflict considering the history of their intercourse. ICG, HRW and Global Witness have established that MPIGO and MJP in the west of Ivory Coast were funded and aided by Liberian government troops including former RUF soldiers from Sierra Leone. Gbagbo armed former LURD-MODEL forces in their effort to dislodge Taylor; a number of veterans of the Mano River Union conflict effectively moved into the Ivorian crisis.

The genesis of Liberia's involvement in Ivorian conflict can be traced back to the warm and clandestine relations between Boigny and Taylor. Western Ivory Coast from which Taylor launched his insurgence on 24 December 1989 served as transit

route during Liberia's first civil war for both arms and commercial links for Taylor; while at the same time hosted refugees from Liberia and anti-Taylor forces, mainly of ethnic Krahn from Grand Gedeh County.<sup>309</sup> ICG argues that Boigny's decision to support Taylor was very much informed by the murder of William Tolbert a close friend to Boigny and Tolbert's son Aldophus, who was married to Boigny's granddaughter Desiree Delafosse.<sup>310</sup>

The close relationship between Boigny and Taylor transpired into a close relationship between Gueï who was then Chief of Staff of the Ivorian army. The alliance between Gueï and Taylor might explain the former's success in the 1999 coup exactly 10 years after Taylor's success.<sup>311</sup> In fact, ICG points out that a "pact was reportedly agreed whereby Taylor would support a coup if Gueï lost the October 2000 presidential elections. This seems to be plausible because soldiers loyal to Gueï were trained by Taylor's able commander Kuku Dennis.<sup>312</sup> ICG states that, based on the location of the rebels and their initial success, none could have launched their attacks without the financial or military support of Taylor or Compaore.<sup>313</sup>

Taylor was very much interested in the outcome of the Ivorian crisis on various counts: first, MPIGO and MJP control of western Ivory Coast meant that Taylor would be assured of safe transit routes for the supply of arms and export of timber through the port of San Pedro. Important to note here is that San Pedro has the second largest sea port in SSA after Durban. This would have provided Taylor a viable means of sustaining his war effort.<sup>314</sup> Also the control of western Ivory Coast from a strategic point of view would have prevented Taylor fighting a war on two fronts mindful of LURD's presence in Guinea and Ivory Coast.

ICG report points out that at the beginning of the war, Taylor was not directly involved in Ivorian crisis until Gbagbo effectively got involved in Liberia. Gbagbo's earlier contact with Liberia came with the accession of Samuel Doe to power in

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<sup>309</sup> International Crisis Group. "Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm" *Africa Report* N°62  
30 April 2003

<sup>310</sup> Adebayo, Adekeye., op. cit. pp. 48

<sup>311</sup> ICG November 2003, op. cit.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid. pp18

<sup>314</sup> Global Witness., op. cit

Liberia. Relations between Doe and Boigny deteriorated and Gbagbo was able to capitalise on this to finance his party.<sup>315</sup> The aiding of LURD-MODEL by Gbagbo pushed Taylor to get involved directly knowing fully well that the enemy of his enemy is his friend. Gbagbo on his part funded LURD-MODEL in order for it to act as a bulwark against Taylor's incursion into Ivory Coast. ICG report posits that in a meeting in early January in Abidjan, Krahn and Guéré leaders agreed that "Liberian Krahn would give Gbagbo manpower for his war. In return, Gbagbo and FANCI would give free passage and military support to remove President Taylor."<sup>316</sup>

This cross border support was facilitated by the ethnic makeup of the belligerents. While the bulk of MPIGO and MJP are from the Kru ethnic group, the bulk of Taylor's NPFL are Gios, and the Gios and Krus are ethnic cousin. LURD-MODEL is made up principally of Krahn as opposed to Mandingos of LURD based in Guinea. The Krahn are ethnic cousins of Guéré in the west of Ivory Coast who happened to be amongst the fervent supporters of Gbagbo.<sup>317</sup>

### **The Burkinabé Connection**

Compaore's involvement in Ivory Coast was conditioned by his alliance with Taylor and Ouattara. Compaore met Taylor in the early 1980s while both men were training under Gadhaffi. Ouattara spoke of Compaore as a close friend and both men met when Ouattara was serving as director of the African department of the IMF. In fact Ouattara argues that he acquired a Burkinabe passport because, Burkina Faso had to fill the post of President of BEAO and Compaore turned to Boigny who proposed Ouattara.

ICG argue that though it might be difficult to establish a tacit agreement between Taylor and Compaore in their involvement in Ivory Coast, "there are many indicators of a degree of coordination before the coup but it appears that the initial military action came from the North, with the support of Burkina Faso."<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> ICG, Nov. 2003, op. cit.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid. pp 24

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> ICG, April 2003. pp 18

Burkina Faso harboured and trained most of the deserters of FANCI following Gueï's purge and the attempted January coup of 2001. They were lodge by Burkinabè government in Ouagadougou's Samgande neighbourhood.<sup>319</sup> Important MPCCI commanders were training in Burkinabé cognisance of the country's prowess in military intelligence, communication and clandestine operation.<sup>320</sup> Guillame Soro and Louis Dacoury Tabley prominent leaders of MPCCI visited Burkinabe and stayed with Compaore's brother François Compaore. This in fact establishes the fact that a close relationship existed between the rebels and Compaore. More over ICG points out that there is a high possibility; the rebels were funded by Burkinabe government and businessmen close to the government. The fact that the World Bank in February 2003 discovered that \$25 million mysteriously disappeared from Burkinabe's budget might inform any intellectual guess as to how the rebellion was funded.<sup>321</sup>

Compaore had many reasons to see the back of Gbagbo: first from 1989-1999, he had been funding Gbagbo cognisance of the unstable alliance between the north and south within the PDCI. Gbagbo's stand on nationality issue would definitely have been a personal embracement to Compaore. Moreover, there are over two million Burkinabes in Ivory Coast and their remittance is of immense help to the burkinabé economy. Thus any attempt at stopping this might prove politically dangerous.<sup>322</sup>

### **Guinea-Bissau Connection**

It is an open secret that the government in Guinea was supporting LURD which was based in Guinea in the town of Macenta near the Liberian border. By allowing LURD to operate along the Guinea border, President Conte indirectly intensified the war in Liberia. The presence of LURD along the Guinea-Liberia border has provided Conte a cheap means of protecting his flank from possible attack by dissidents based in Liberia.<sup>323</sup> Since the US supports the Guinean government, it is indirectly supporting LURD. Guinea is very rich in gold, diamond and bauxite. Thus while this might serve as reason for Taylor to attack guinea, it is reason for US support for Conte and the bad blood between Taylor and the US is an open affair.

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<sup>319</sup> ICG. "Côte d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight." *Africa Report* N°82. 12 July 2004

<sup>320</sup> Ibid.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> This might be a good area of research. How has remittance affect governance in Africa taking consideration that they relief economic and societal pressures from governments?

<sup>323</sup> ICG, Nov 2003. op. cit.

LURD-MODEL which is competitor of LURD emerged in March 2003 in Ivory Coast with the backing of Gbagbo. Against this backdrop, the following question is important. Could the US have aided LURD-MODEL had they succeeded in positioning themselves in Ivory Coast?

On 15 July, Guinean authorities reported exchange of fire between their troops and FN elements around Noumoudjila near Ivory Coast-Guinea border. This incident was pursuant to attempts by faction loyal to Ibrahim Coulibaly to recruit people from Guinea at the Sinko market.<sup>324</sup> Moreover, ICG report states that helicopters used during the November 2004 raids on northern areas and French army were Guinean's.<sup>325</sup> Though the Gbagbo argues that the helicopters are in Guinea for repairs, this argument is weak since I do not think Guinea has the expertise for that. It thus seems this argument is to disguise Gbagbo's drive for rearmament.

### **Conclusion**

This section set out to show that the root of Ivorian crisis can be found in the succession battle after Boigny's death. This battle was grounded in contestation of resources and their mode of distribution. The old guards who supported Bédié resisted change, while Ouattara neoliberal economic policies won him the support of technocrats. The political divided in Ivory Coast was also accentuated by alignment with international interest groups and in the process creating a dependent bourgeois class devoid of any vision for the country. Sharing the spoils of privatisation dictated alignment in Ivorian politics. Faced with dwindling resources and threat to their mode of distribution, Ivorian politicians have been guilty of trying to exclude their foes by instrumentalising ethnicity even if it meant engulfing the society in a violent conflict. What matters most to them is accessibility and preservation of the mode of accumulation.

In examining the course of the conflict, one would realise that strategies employed by both sides of the conflict was highly influenced by commercial reasons. Battles for more economically viable zones were heated and protracted. This situation was

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<sup>324</sup> United Nations Organisation. "Report of the Panel of Experts on Cote d'Ivoire (November 7, 2005)" <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ivorindex.htm>

<sup>325</sup> ICG. "Stopping Guinea's Slide." *Africa Report* N°94, 14 June 2005



compounded by the regional dimension the crisis grounded in security and economic rationalities.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: FROM PARIS TO PRETORIA

If people who made these plans think they will work then they are in for a surprise as our war is mystical and we will come back stronger than before.<sup>326</sup> Denis Maho Glofiehi (General of FLGO)

Like most African conflicts, the Ivorian crisis has witnessed a plethora of international and internal negotiation processes aimed at arresting the conflict and shepherding peace. This study will concentrate on international accords which started in Paris and ended up Pretoria. The Linas Marcoussis accord is basically the framework upon which other negotiations attempt are contingent upon.

#### **Section One: Linas Marcoussis Accord (Pax Marcoussis)**

French policy in Africa took a different turn after *Operation Turquoise*. While very willing to regard francophone Africa as its fiefdom, France very much wanted to publicly distance itself from Africa. Thus French intervention in Ivory Coast was very much a complete turn in its foreign policy trajectory in Africa since Rwanda. At the beginning of Ivorian crisis, France encouraged ECOWAS to search for a solution to the crisis. Cognisance of its economic interest in Ivory Coast and ECOWAS's failure to find a solution, France and ECOWAS initiated ceasefire on 13 January leading to peace talks in Paris

Linas Marcoussis stated on 15 January in Linas-Marcoussis, just outside Paris, and ended on 24 January 2003 with an Agreement that was signed by all the parties. France, cognisance of urgency to reach an agreement and most probably learning from Lord Carrington's management of the Lancaster House Conference, practically imposed the agenda and restricted participation to political parties and rebels. The major parties-RDR, FPI, PDCI-RDA and UDPCI-had five representatives; the smaller parties-MFA, PIT, and UDCY-had one representative each. Rebels: MPCCI had 5,

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<sup>326</sup> IRIN. "Cote d'Ivoire: Will the Pretoria Accord be Just Words, or Action?" *IRIN*. Thursday 7 April 2005. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/04/mil-050407-irin04.htm>

MPIGO 1, MJP 1. Also present were delegates from AU and UN. Important decisions during the negotiations were made behind close doors.

Linus Marcoussis was grounded in four main issues: preserving territorial sovereignty, Power-sharing, political exclusion and disarmament. The Agreement called for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation with wide executive powers; composed of ministers from the main political parties and rebel groups on a roughly equal basis but with Gbagbo as President; despite the appointment of a Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers.<sup>327</sup> The accord also addressed the issue of identity or nationality. The Agreement stated that...

foreign nationals...have made a major contribution to national wealth and have helped bestow on Ivory Coast its special position and responsibility within the sub-region,” noting that “the petty annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and which often affect foreigners, can be caused by using willful misapplication of identification laws.” The new government, therefore, “will immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement...for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not subject fraudulent misuse...”

The Agreement also called for changes to land ownership laws, in order to grant immigrants access to land.

The accord called for disarmament of rebels and militias, the re-organisation of the army, the granting of amnesty - only slightly qualified - to the army mutineers and other militia forces which constituted the insurgent forces.<sup>328</sup> Also, appropriate measures were to be taken to ensure the freedom of the media. The agreement condemned “the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.” Measures were also to be put in place to facilitate the liberation of prisoners of war.

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<sup>327</sup> Gberie and Addo, *op. cit.*

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid*

While the rebels welcomed the accord and described it as a victory, Mamadou Koulibaly described it as a *constitutional coup*.<sup>329</sup> Implementation of the Agreement has been slow and at best tenuous. Gbagbo, with a reputation of “publicly endorsing agreements while privately ensuring that they are undermined”<sup>330</sup> has been accused of bad faith. With respect to the Agreement, Gbagbo is said to have found “a way to resist the peace pact and stay in power without actually saying no, artfully flicking a switch on when he wants a protest and off when it is time to appear cooperative.”<sup>331</sup> The rebels on their part are steadfast on elections before disarmament, realising that it is their only guarantee.

### **Accra Accords: An African Solution to an African Problem.**<sup>332</sup>

The Accra 11 accord was born out of difficulties in implementing Linas Marcoussis specifically around the contentious issue of forming a reconciliation government and the appointment of defence and interior ministers. Accra II took place in Accra from 6-7 march, barely 42 days after the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords in France. All parties who attended Linas Marcoussis were present, including representatives of AU and ECOWAS and leaders of other African states.

The accord called for total adherence to Marcoussis; the implementation by 14 March 2003 provisions of the accord relating to the delegation of power to the Reconciliation government and the setup of a government of national unity. Accra II made recommendations on the setting up of a National Council of Security made up of 15 members charged with management and monitoring of Defense and Interior ministries. The President was also tasked with the appointment of the defense and interior ministers after consultations with the National Council of Security. This was a positive point because Accra II did not grant the defense and interior ministries to the rebels as it was the case in the LMA. The Accords also reiterates the LMA recommendations on the safety of the belligerents and government’s members by ECOWAS and the French.

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<sup>329</sup> ICG, 12 July 2004, op. cit.

<sup>330</sup> Emily Wax, “Pledge peace, creating chaos; Ivory Coast leader said to be behind anti-French protests,” *Washington Post*, 16 February 2003; page A17.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

<sup>332</sup> Full text of the accord can be found at [http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accra\\_agreement.php](http://businessafrica.net/africabiz/ezine/wa/accra_agreement.php)

Accra III signed a year later in July 2004 was an attempt to save Linas Marcoussis. Anchored on LMA, Accra tried to retrace the roadmap for peace in Ivory Coast grounded in pragmatic as opposed to the emotionally induced process at Paris. The summit was termed the last chance to right the wrongs of Marcoussis, a chance to uphold reality as against rhetoric and also grounded in the realisation that the crisis was also a regional crisis. Most importantly, Accra was a forum to honestly accept that, in the words of Michel de Bonnecorse-President Chirac's adviser on African affairs- "African crisis is an African problem."<sup>333</sup>

Accra 111 had two components: political and security. The political element focused on eligibility issue, legal powers of the Prime Minister government of national unity and reconciliation. On eligibility issue, the accord stressed the necessity to revise criteria of eligibility based on Gbagbo's discretionary powers and through the adoption by parliament legal reforms surrounding the issue. On government of national reconciliation, Accra III emphasised the need for all parties to commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement as a way forward in the conflict resolution process.

On the security level, the DDR process was seen as an impediment. Armed factions were expected to disarm by 15<sup>th</sup> of October 2004. That was certainly not the case. No recommendation was made as to how to deal with their failure to disarm on time.<sup>334</sup>

**Pretoria Accords (Pax Pretoriana): Understanding the Ivorian Mind.**<sup>335</sup>

After three days of closed-door meetings and intense negotiations in Pretoria, belligerents to Ivorian crisis signed a peace deal on April 7 2005. Pretoria accord like its predecessors was grounded in Marcoussis. Under the Pretoria accord, President Mbeki was given powers to decide on the infamous article 35 after consultation with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and African Union Chairman Olusegun Obasanjo. It might seem plausible to speculate that a deal was already in place but the delay was to give Gbagbo a face-saving week to prepare his troops on the ground for the bad news that his rival is ready to bounce back on the political scene. Under the Pretoria

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<sup>333</sup> Takwa, Z., Suifon, E., "Breaking the Ivorian cycle of violence: an urgent imperative", WARN Policy Briefs, in [www.wanep.org](http://www.wanep.org), November 2004, pp.2-3

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> Full text can be found at [http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/pretoria\\_agreement\\_french.pdf](http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/pretoria_agreement_french.pdf)

agreement, the UN will be responsible for *organising* elections scheduled for October. Rebels and militias were to be disarm demobilise and reintegrated.

Pretoria was supposed to usher presidential elections on the 31<sup>st</sup> of October, thereby ending a conflict resolution process that stated more than two years ago. But like earlier accords, the deal crumbled and everyone from Gbagbo, rebels and the UN acknowledged the impossibility to hold elections. Rebels in the north refused to disarm, pro-Gbagbo militia in the south failed to hand in weapons, electoral registers have not been updated and the country is still divided. South Africa's Minister of Defense Mr. Lekota accused the rebels of torpedoing the accord arguing that Gbagbo had kept his own side of the bargain. In response, rebels declared South African *persona non grata*.

The AU met in Nigeria in September to discuss a new proposal within the framework of the previous initiatives. Though Gbagbo did not attend arguing that negotiation processes had been exhausted and he keep his own side of the bargain, AU proposed to the UN that a powerful Prime Minister should be nominated and Gbagbo should stay in power for a year. President Mbeki, Obasanjo and Mamadou Tadjan were charged with finding a Prime Minister acceptable to all. Charles Konan Banny was appointed. It remains to be seen if he will be allowed to carry out his job. The international working group in Ivory Coast has called for the dissolution of parliament since its mandate is coming to an end; cognisance of the fact that it is very loyal to Gbagbo. This move is a calculate manoeuvre to neutralise Gbagbo's last power base thus strengthening Prime Minister Banny hands in implementing LM

### **Conclusion**

Attempts at conflicts resolution in Ivory Coast is a process that started with LMA and culminated into failure after Pretoria. Four things cuts across these initiatives: power sharing, eligibility, elections and disarmament. Participants to these initiatives were very eager to participate and sign them just to return home for political dilly dallying. The move from Pretoria to Accra was clearly engendered because France was deemed part of the problem. Accra definitely had good intentions but it seems ECOWAS because of its past history with Ivory Coast lack the moral standing and leverage to carry the process through. On all account, Pretoria was again an African initiative

grounded in South Africa's experience with politics of inclusion. These initiatives by tackling issues of electoral eligibility and land tenure steeped around the concept of *ivoirité* can best be describe as trying to solve the mobilising factors of the Ivorian crisis rather than structural causes. Can this explain why despite the fact that most clauses of these initiatives have been implemented there is still no peace in Ivory Coast?

## CHAPTER FIVE

### FAILURES OF ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

Like most conflicts on the continent, the Ivorian crisis has teetered between cessation of hostility and peace. At best, the Ivorian conflict can be described as a situation of no peace no war. From Paris to Pretoria, the signatories of these initiatives committed themselves to peace. They agreed that peace was the best thing for the Ivorian people and it was incumbent on them to ensure it. Not to the surprise of the international community, once these parties left for their respective fiefdom, it became increasingly clear that diplomacy has once again received a bashing from reality. Each side of the political divide played the game of standing by these peace accords while at the same repudiating it and blaming other for its demise. At one point, President Gbagbo pointed out that there is no need for further negotiations because they have reached their natural terminus.<sup>336</sup> Why are these accords very difficult to be fully implemented? What informed the decisions of the belligerents not to fully commit?

This section argues that lack of political will is at the heart of failure to fully implement LMA. Parties to LMA are faced with a prisoner's dilemma skewed in the nature of the Ivorian state and political economy generated by the war. The Ivorian state is still grounded in politics as a zero sum game. In essence, any political negotiation that means losing power is doom for failure. On the other hand, the war has generated a political economy that provides opportunities to certain parties of the conflict.

#### **Section One: Substantive and Technical Failures**

From a substantive standpoint, the LMA was very much concern about arresting the conflict/fighting and preparing parties for election. Issues of nationality, electoral eligibility, land reforms and ethnic hatred are not specific to Ivory Coast. As the study has attempt to show, ethnic animosity in Ivory Coast is the residue of economic decline and the failure of equitable distribution of resources skewed in the politics of patrimonialism and enforced democratisation. Of course, nationality determines who gets what and how, but by not taking a radical approach on a substantive diagnosis of

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<sup>336</sup> SOIR INFO. "Crise ivoirienne: Gbagbo interpelle l' Onu." *Soir Info*. 28 September 2005. [www.soirinfo.com](http://www.soirinfo.com)



Ivorian state, the accord was addressing the symptoms of political decay in Ivory Coast rather than the causes.

Elections have been seen as a sustainable way to usher peace in conflict societies. The outcome of an election is the will of the people as to who will govern them and how. But in Ivory Coast, the electoral system is almost invariably skewed in favour of political mobilisation without consideration of what is good for the people.

Ivory Coast is made up of 60 ethnic groups spread all over the country. Thus any mechanism in the distribution of resources in Ivory Coast must be grounded in a system that protects the interest of every ethnic group. Against this backdrop, proportional representation is best suited in Ivory Coast rather than the present system-simple majority in parliamentary elections.<sup>337</sup> A simple majority means that some ethnic group will definitely find themselves in a minority thus loosing out in the decision making process of the country. While should an ethnic group be part of a political system where its interest will not be reflected taking into cognisance the fact that voting patterns in Ivory Coast as in most African countries is along ethnic lines?

As shown above, electoral manoeuvring has been at the heart of Ivorian polity since the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. Boigny manipulated the electoral system in favour of a simple majority cognisance that a coalition between Dioulas and Buoales will ensure him a simple majority because of their demographic superiority. In such circumstance, the Bétés will clearly loose out. This situation is compounded by the fact that, power in Ivory Coast is centred on the President. Thus he who controls *la présidence* controls both the economic and political life of Ivorians. Moreover, the organisation of elections in the country has not helped the situation.

Despite the creation of an independent electoral commission, election outcome can easily be determined by who controls state power. Voter's registration is in the hands of the national statistics agency, created and control by the state. Against this backdrop, why would a party to LMA fully accept the accord knowing that it will eventually loose power in an election that is skewed in favour of who controls state

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<sup>337</sup> Electoral Code, op. cit

power? LMA should have been radical in bestowing the organisation of elections in the hands of UN like the case of East Timor. Within this context it is safe to say LMA was very exclusivist in its thinking.

The exclusivist nature of LMA was also pictured by restriction imposed on participation. Only political parties and rebels were allowed to participate much to the chagrin of civil society organisations (CSOs). The Ivorian crisis was viewed as an elite struggle and not an explosion of Ivorian society. Any sustainable peace agreement and its implementation thereof depend on ownership and the active participation of the citizenry. By not including civil society, LMA denied Ivorians an opportunity to engage with the rejuvenation process of their country and a chance to vet their political leaders and hold them responsible. LMA's exclusivist nature denied Ivorian the same rights there have been denied by various regimes (political participation). Consequently I agree with Lijphart that any exclusivist peace agreement is doom for failure.<sup>338</sup>

René Lemarchand argues, in "exclusionary" political calculus/zero-sum in which accession to power by one group is automatically considered by the losers as the precursor to their own destruction, there is no room for compromise; "the preservation of ethnic hegemony is perceived as a condition for physical survival" by the incumbents, with "the elimination of rival claimants as the only means by which survival can be assured."<sup>339</sup>

LMA was also exclusivist in nature for its failure to recognise the regional nature of the Ivorian crisis. In an era of interconnectedness against a backdrop of weak state capacity in Africa, politics is a two level game; national and international. At the national level for example; though Gbagbo accepted LMA, he realised that he could not implement it because it was politically dangerous to a majority of his cronies. The appointment of a powerful Prime Minister mindful that Ivory Coast operates a cohabitation system meant Gbagbo's powers were weakened and his control over parliament reduced. Political influence of Gbagbo's cronies was reduced, for

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<sup>338</sup> Lijphart, A., op. cit

<sup>339</sup> Lemarchand, R. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.17-33

example, Affi N'Guessan lost out as Prime Minister, Mamadou Koulibaly and Simone Gbagbo, President and Vice President of National Assembly respectively lost their political clout since the government was now responsible to the Prime Minister. This might explain why they have been the most vocal against LMA.

On the international plane, by leaving out representatives from Guinea, Liberia and Burkina Faso, LMA in essence left out major stakeholders in Ivorian conflict. Though bringing these parties on board would have strengthened the hand of the rebels, their presence and subsequent adherence to the accord would have strengthened the position of the international community to act against Compaore' and Charles Taylor.

Mutual distrust has had a negative impact on the implementation of LMA. We would disarm until all texts are voted into law: no vote on laws until state authority is restored in national territory, these are the arguments put forward by rebels and government. LMA by calling on all parties to disarm without a credible third party to enforce the peace is viewed as suicidal by the rebels. The rebels' military strength is their priciest bargaining chip. Calling on them to disarm and become vulnerable demand much more than words. Concrete guarantees that they will not lose their existence and military strength which translates into political gains is imperative. Soro's recent outburst that rebel's control of over 60% of Ivory Coast should guarantee them the post of Prime Minister demonstrates the importance of rebel's military strength in political discusses. Why should rebels give up their military strength if there are no guarantees of their existence and military gains? Government attack on their position in November 2004 might have strengthened their stand on disarmament. This situation has been compounded by the fact that both belligerents in the crisis have been guilty of stock piling weapons despite a UN embargo of arms sale to Ivory Coast.<sup>340</sup>

Mutual distrust in Ivorian conflict has also been fuelled by an irresponsible and bias press. Ivorian press is guilty of fuelling distrust amongst parties to the conflict by circulating speculative articles alleging massive violation of arms embargo and bad faith by each party. The following headline illustrates this point: "Mbeki arms sale to

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<sup>340</sup> UN, 2005., op. cit

Gbagbo: New revelations” (*Soir Info*, 16 august 2005), “Gbagbo wants return to war: 300 mercenaries trained at Akouedo military camp” (*Le Patriote*, 14 July 2005), “balance sheet of Gbagbo trip to west: 500 million and distribution of weapons to militia” (*le Front*, 21 June 2005).<sup>341</sup> These allegation and others that one of the helicopters destroyed by French was from Guinea are false.<sup>342</sup> All they help to do is harden the position and galvanise support for of the belligerent.

Distrust between the belligerents has also been compounded by the lack of a credible power broker in the Ivorian crisis. France seems the only party that has leverage over the belligerents. But as shown above, enormous French interest in the country has made France a problem rather than a solution. French implicit support swung from rebels to government. It thus seems that the destruction of the Ivorian air force and the harmonious relationship between France and the rebels is meant to pressurise Gbagbo to make economic concession to France. The award of a contract for the construction of Abidjan seaport to French company under suspicious circumstance in December 2004 is illustrative.<sup>343</sup> Gbagbo on his part has been using anti-French rhetoric as a mechanism to solicit French cooperation. The military strength of the rebels puts France in a very tricky position. Any military success by government demands French overt involvement, something Champ d’Elise does not want. On the other hand by not supporting the government, France is sending wrong signals to his other clients like Bongo and Biya. Thus I concur with Azam and posit that the persistence of the crisis in Ivory Coast might be as result of the fact that there is no credible winner for the international community to back as was the case in Liberia;<sup>344</sup> mindful that natural resource exploitation is financing the war.

## **Section Two: War Economy (war is more lucrative than peace)**

War is not a bad thing in itself depending on one’s position in the political ladder. While ordinary Ivorians have been lamenting under the excruciating effect of the present crisis, it has become a means of accumulation to others.<sup>345</sup> A UN panel of expert report document the exploitation of natural resources to fund and sustain the

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<sup>341</sup> Cited in Ibid

<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> cite

<sup>344</sup> Azam, July 2005., op. cit

<sup>345</sup> IRIN. “Cote d’Ivoire: Profiting from the War in the Wild West at the Expense of Immigrants. *IRIN*, 2 November 2005; IRIN “Cote d’Ivoire: Too Much to Gain to Give up the Gun.” *IRIN*, 4 November 2005

war in Ivory Coast.<sup>346</sup> Both the government and the rebels have been guilty of exploiting the war for their benefits. Resources such as cocoa, coffee and diamond have been the most exploited.

### **Cocoa**

Cocoa accounted for \$3.5 billion of Ivory Coast budget of \$3.5 billion in 2003. With the suspension of loans and the tax system in disarray, Ivorian government have been able to stay solvent thanks to rents from cocoa. The state has been able to collect rents through organisation such as: l'Autorité de Regulation du Café et du Cacao, Fond de Développement et de Promotion des Activités des Production de Café et Cacao, Fond de Regulation et de Contrôle (FRC). These organisations are involved in cocoa business especially exportation. Though they are privately run, their owners are political backers of Gbagbo and have powerful links with producers' organisation such as Association Nationale des Producteurs de Café-Cacao de Cote d'Ivoire (ANAPROCI) and Syndicat Autonome des Producteurs de Cafe-Cacao de Cote d'Ivoire (SYNAPROCI). These organisations have been able to extract rents and channel them to the state for its war effort. This seems plausible because by August 2004, farmers were rioting arguing that though FRC have taxed their produce, they have not stabilised the price of cocoa.

The Ivorian crisis has witnessed the usual crowd of arms dealers profiting from deregulation and increased military expenditure. According to CIA, government defense expenditure by 2004 increased by \$180.2 million representing 1.2% of GDP though the World Bank puts it at \$150.<sup>347</sup> Off the budget expenditure more than doubled during this period. Almost 60% of military expenditure (1.1% of GDP) was for the purchase and supply of military hardware, wages, allowances, food, medical care and bonus for mostly new recruits.<sup>348</sup> According to the African Development Bank, government expenditures as a share of GDP increased less in 2003 (0.2 percentage point to 19.7 percent) than they did in 2002 (2.9 percentage points). This evidence can be corroborated by the fact that the government consumed 8.2 percent of

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<sup>346</sup> UN, 2005., op. cit

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

GDP in 2003, down from the 11.4 percent reported in the 2005 Index.<sup>349</sup> 20% (0.2% of GDP) of all military expenditures came from cocoa sector.<sup>350</sup>

**Table: 12: Ivorian Government Military Expenditure**

	Sept-Dec.2002.	Jan-Dec. 2003	Total 2002-03	GDP%
Millions of CFA francs				
other	3.3	13.1	16.4	0.2
Financing	57.5	88.8	146.3	1.8
Treasury	44.8	78.5	123.3	1.5
Cocoa institutions	10.0	10.0	20.0	0.3
Private institutions	2.7	0.3	3.0	0.0

Source: Ivorian Authorities and IMF<sup>351</sup>

Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, UK and South Africa have been guilty of selling weapons ranging from 82mm, BM-37 mortars, 122mm and 120mm mortars to the government. Metalika AB Ltd in Bulgaria, Belspetsvneshtekhnika (BSVT) in Belarus and Darwood in Togo<sup>352</sup> are the fore runners of military supplies to Ivory Coast.<sup>353</sup> An AK47 in the north of Ivory Coast cost just \$70.<sup>354</sup>

Both rebels and government militias have benefited from anarchy in the country. The 2006 Economic Freedom shows that informal economy in Ivory Coast have blossom from a 4.5 score this year—0.5 point worse than last year.<sup>355</sup> Militias, rebels and junior army officers have enriched themselves through roadblocks or *cash point*. ICG and UN have documented the extraction of rents from pedestrians and trucks transporting cocoa.<sup>356</sup> Along the Abidjan-Daloa highway, Korhogo-Bouake highway, rebels and government militias are making large sums of money. Between Daloa and Abidjan, the cost of a roadblock ranges from CFAF 500 (\$0.90) to CFAF 3000 (\$15.40), generally in rebel held areas, the cost ranges from \$1.80 to \$3.6 and in

<sup>349</sup> 2006 Index of Economic Freedom.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=IvoryCoast>

<sup>350</sup> UN Report, op cit.

<sup>351</sup> Cited in UN Report, op. cit

<sup>352</sup> Ibid; BBC “Frenchman 'had Togo War Planes” *BBC News* 16 January 2006

<sup>353</sup> UN, 2005, op. cit.

<sup>354</sup> ICG, 12 July 2004, op. cit.

<sup>355</sup> 2006 Index of Economic Freedom.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/country.cfm?id=IvoryCoast>

<sup>356</sup> UN, 2005, op. cit.

government held areas from \$180 to \$270.<sup>357</sup> This business is flourishing well taking cognisance of the fact that the prices of cocoa in Ghana is 15% higher than those in Ivory Coast. Thus most Ivorian cocoa is been transported to Ghana were they fetch a higher price. International cocoa organisation reports that 150,000 tons of cocoa is been smuggled to Ghana every year.<sup>358</sup>

Roadblocks in government held areas are manned by militia groups who consider it legal self-help. These groups include: Jeune Patriotes (FESCI/UPLTCI), Front pour la Libération du Grand Oust (FLGO), Front pour la Sécurité de Central Oust (FSCO), Lima/Model, Union Patriotique de Résistance du Grand Ouest (UPRGO). These groups are being paid CFAF 10000 to fight and CFAF 1000-1500 to participate in protest marches. Rebels on their part are paid CFAF5000 (\$9.68) a month to fight.<sup>359</sup>

Looting and robbery has also become a viable mode of accumulation for rebels and military. On the 27 of august 2002 in Abidjan, MPCCI seized more than CFA 2 billion (\$3.87) from local branch of Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO). Also in September 2003, CFAF 20 billion (\$3.87) was stolen from a local bank.<sup>360</sup>

From a logical point of view, considering that upon demobilisation, each militia will receive \$950, 25% upon demobilisation, 25% after 45 days and 50% after 90 days, it does not make economic sense for them to drop their weapons. On the government side, there are reports of mutiny by soldiers for increase pay and better working conditions.<sup>361</sup>

## **Cotton**

Cotton is mostly produced in rebel held areas. 55 % of Ivorian cotton is been diverted to Mali and Burkina Faso were prices are CFAF 210 per kilogram compared to CFAF 160-180 in Ivory Coast. The rebels are able to extract rents from these activities by

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid; ICG, 12 July 2004., op. cit.

<sup>358</sup> UN, 2005., op. Cit.

<sup>359</sup> ECOWAS. "Armed Grups and Small Arms in ECOWAS member states 1998-2004" SAS ECOWAS PART 2 DEF 26.4.2005 13:01 Page 237

hei.unige.ch/sas/Books/A&A%20pdfs/Part%20II%20Cote%20d'Ivoire.pdf

<sup>360</sup> ICG Nov 2003 pp. 10

<sup>361</sup> ICG, 12 July 2004., op. cit.

taxing transportation and a profit from Ivorian textile industry.<sup>362</sup> Cognisance of the ripple effect transportation of cotton might have on the war effort in the south; the rebels have stopped transporting cotton through the south.<sup>363</sup>

Diamond is another resource that has kept the rebels afloat. Ivory Coast is a small producer of rough diamond. Though a member of the Kimberly Process (KP), it has never issued a KP certificate though all export of diamonds were banned per ministerial order No 0070 issued 19 November 2002.<sup>364</sup>

Diamonds are located in Seguela, Bobi and Diarabala in the north. Production is estimated at 300,000 carats and it is been exported through Mali and Guinea where it is then transported to Antwerp Dubai and Tel- Aviv.<sup>365</sup> Locals working for the mines are paid CFAF 20,000 a week and the industry is control by Groupement Vocation Cooperative (GVC). This industry created in 1986 now pays its taxes to the rebels. The rebels have been able to extract rents from this industry through imposing taxes on vehicles in exchange for number plates. The security of the diamond mines is within the purview of rebels.

Interestingly, no matter the unavailability of data on Ivorian petrol industry, it would be naïve to run out the influence of oil on the present crisis. The importance of oil in international political economy and local politics has seen some conflicts flaring up and sustaining themselves because of struggle over its control. Angolan government was able to pursue its war with UNITA thanks to its control of oil, the crisis in Sudan, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon is mainly because of oil. Against this backdrop, though speculative it sounds reasonable to argue that, cognisance of the role of oil in world politics and increase difficulty in Persian gulf, oil deposits in Ivory Coast though very small has been an important asset to the government in the present crisis.

From a political standpoint, power structures and how one acquires it changes in times of war. It is very clear that the present crisis has in some ways legitimise the hand of Gbagbo to come down extremely hard on his political foes in the name of security

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<sup>362</sup> UN Report, op cit.

<sup>363</sup> Abdoul Kader "Ivory Coast Rebels Say Cotton Funds War, Will Halt" *Reuters* January 26, 2005

<sup>364</sup> UN Report, op cit.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.



national sovereignty. Gbagbo has not hesitated in using extraordinary powers vested on him during emergency crisis.<sup>366</sup> Laws have been instituted in the course of the crisis, for example media laws and curfews which clearly limit the manoeuvring space of his political opponents. More importantly, Gbagbo term of office has been extended for another year without a popular mandate. For the time being deputies are also seeking their own extension despite the absence of election. Clearly anarchy has been very beneficial to Gbagbo.

The rebels have also benefited from anarchy. A few months before the crisis, Soro political head of the rebels was an employed young man who had fallen out of favour with Gbagbo after heading the Ivorian student union, which was a stooge supporter of Gbagbo. But as head of the rebels, he commands almost the same respect and influence as Gbagbo. Though Gbagbo's legitimacy has also been in doubt, achieving political prominence through bullets rather ballots at a time the continent is in a renewal process is something we must be cautious about. As for Ouattara, the crisis has drawn international sympathy and support to his cause cognisance of international attention on the crisis. But this should also be taken with a bit of salt because the prominence of Soro in the north might overshadow Ouattara as the flag bearer of the north. As for Bédié the architect of ivoirité, the present crisis have given him space to reshuffle his cards as position himself as victim of a situation which not of his making but due to political greed of Gueï and Gbagbo. Since in politics interest never changes but allies do change, the crisis have provided a platform on with Bédié and Ouattara can join forces professing *Houphisme* in their quest to oust Gbagbo. Against this backdrop, it seems the crisis in Ivory Coast has become a political cheese board where political elites negotiate and compromise the management and control of political power.

## **Conclusion**

From the paragraphs above, one would realise that difficulties in implementing LMA stems from technical and substantive defects of the accord. From a technical part, the accord was exclusivist in nature by restricting representation. Thus every facet of Ivorian life was not represented. On the contrary representation was grounded in the

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<sup>366</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Côte d'Ivoire: Ivorian Government Must Rein in Militias", op cit

view that Ivorian crisis is an elite struggle. Moreover, by not dealing with issues around the nature of Ivorian politics such as electoral system, politics in Ivory Coast is still a zero sum game. Thus, since implementation of the agreement will alter power and influence of the belligerents, there is no incentive for them to give up their positions.

The crisis has generated in its own dynamics which have witnessed winners and losers. The crisis have become of accumulation for the belligerents depending on their location, availability of natural resources and access to world market. From a political perspective, the crisis seems to legitimate the positions of warring parties. Against this backdrop, there is little incentive to fight unless defeating the enemy is assured.

## CONCLUSION

### POLICY IMPELICATION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study set out to examine why implementing Linas Marcoussis accord, the framework for peace in Ivory Coast has been tenuous. The study argued that the accord did not deal with the structural causes of Ivorian crisis. It dealt with symptoms of the crisis and not the disease. The study has attempted to show that the Ivorian crisis is a conflict grounded in scarcity of resources and attempts to control mechanism of resource distribution. As resources became scares, politicians exploited political grievances and instrumentalise ethnicity in order to capture state power.

Using the Ivorian colonial state as a point of departure, the study attempted to show that colonialism did not only harden ethnic rivalries where none existed, it created a dependent bourgeoisie that used state power for primitive accumulation. Moreover, colonialism integrated Ivory Coast into the global political economy as a plantation economy perpetually at the mercy of price fluctuation and international bailiffs.

Boigny was able to maintain relative peace in Ivory Coast because he used surplus from economic boom (cocoa and coffee rents), to compensate, co-opt and appease demand-bearing groups. This was made possible not only because of economic boom but also by the fact that he had control over political and economic space within the context of a single party system. He engendered pork-barrel and inclusive politics to appease the Krus and northerners. At the dawn of *imposed* democratisation, economic decline and decline in human security compounded by SAP; Ivorian politicians exploited the weakness of unguarded democracy to strengthen their political position. Mindful of electoral politics and the absence of economic rewards for political mobilisation, ethnicity became politicised in the run up to the succession of Boigny.

The instrumentalisation of ethnicity has produced violent conflict in Ivory Coast because, politics in the country under Bédié, Gueï and Gbagbo has been a zero-sum game cognisance of the fact that control of the state is control of the economy due to the absence of indigenous capital. Against this background, the present electoral

system has not help matters since it is grounded in a winner takes all system (FPTP), thus he who lost out in a political contest will surely starve to death.

The Linas Marcoussis agreement and subsequent peace initiatives, in happing on land tenure, citizenship and nationality laws and not the nature of Ivorian state, dealt with symptoms of decay in Ivorian polity rather than with the disease. Thus as long as politics is still a zero sum game in Ivory Coast, the existence of weak political institution, limited state capacity, dependent bourgeoisie and an unscrupulous political leadership, Linas Marcoussis carries gems of conflict.

I am not being a pessimist here, but my reasoning is firmly grounded in the facts before me. I must confess the absence of fieldwork and the fact that the crisis still drags on affords me no authority to make a sacrosanct conclusion. Thus, research is still needed to explain certain gaps in the conflict. For example: the nature and extent of war economies relative to diamond and oil needs futher research. The deals and compromises that were made behind close doors at various time of the conflict. Nevertheless, with the facts presented in this study, I conclude that the groundwork for peace in Ivory Coast as elsewhere in Africa must be grounded, not merely through the silencing of AK47s and mortars, but through the making of an atmosphere where development, justice, equality and respect are treasured and respect. As Haile Selassie once said

...until the philosophy which holds one race superior and another inferior is finally and permanently discredited and abandoned; that until there is no longer any first-class and second-class citizens of any nation; that until the colour of a man's skin is of no more significance than the colour of his eyes; that until the basic human rights are equally guaranteed to all, without regard to race -- until that day, the dreams of lasting peace and world citizenship and the rule of international morality will remain but a fleeting illusion, to be pursued but never attained. ...until bigotry and prejudice and malicious and inhuman self-interest have been replaced by understanding, tolerance and good-will; until all Africans stand and speak as free beings, equal in the eyes of all men as they are in Heaven -- until that day the African continent will not know peace. We

Africans will fight, if necessary and we know that we shall win, as we are confident in the victory of good over evil.<sup>367</sup>

The above ingredients are still present in Ivory Coast for an explosive cocktail. However, for a sustainable framework that might bring peace to Ivory Coast, the following points might be helpful.

First and foremost, from a contextual and theoretical perspective, the general focus of conflict management and resolution debate has become pre-occupied with armed conflict. Though warranted because of its excruciating impact on human lives-poverty and development (human security)-they tend to overlook the low profile and simmering conflict over resources and exclusion. As a consequence, conflict resolution should be addressing the structural causes of conflict rather than immediate causes which are merely a result of structural decay in the society; after all prevention is better than cure. On a policy level this calls for greater attention to early warning signals rather than waiting for conflict to explode.

Conflict prevention and management tend to focus on global and systemic strategies of change steeped around neo-liberal approaches to “governance” and economic reforms. Democratisation in the early 1990s was simply interested in the outward trappings of democracy; for example, elections and new constitutions. But without due regard to the distributive side of democracy and the socio-economic realities of African polity. Democracy is a process and not a one size-fit-all event extrapolated from the west. Thus democracy in Africa needs to be contextualised taking note of African realities both socio-economic and cultural.

Neo-liberal economic policies imposed on Africa was grounded in the belief that African states were: “neo-patrimonial,” “unsteady,” “omnipresent but hardly omnipotent,” “a lame leviathan,” “soft,” “sultanic,” “prebendal,” “hemmed in,” “kloptocratic,” “predatory,” “parasitic,” “crony,” “humpty dumpty”<sup>368</sup> and in the

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<sup>367</sup> Haile Selassie. Speech delivered in California on February 28<sup>th</sup> 1968.  
<http://people.zeelandnet.nl/adamr/War%20speech%20by%20H%20I%20M%20Selassie,Colliifornia%2028,1968.htm>

<sup>368</sup> See the following literature on patrimonialism in Africa: Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, “Neo-patrimonial Regimes and Political Transition in Africa” *World Politics* 46 July 453-89; Allen C,

process becoming a nuisance to market and in *la vie quotidienne* of its citizens as a result unfriendly to democracy and development.<sup>369</sup> Per the *Berg Report*, they were asked to delink themselves and leave the markets alone. The de-linking of the state in Africa has clearly compounded the lack of capacity faced by many African states in the discharge of their duties. Can we totally delink the state from the market? Does the state have a role to play in the accumulation and distribution of resource in the absence of indigenous capital? The strength of the Asian tigers was grounded in the strength of the developmental state. Definitely, the state in Africa despite its perceived lack of capacity has a big role to play (democratic developmental state) in the development process of the continent cognisance of the lack of a constructive bourgeois class and international vultures in the name of multinational corporations. The above recommendations can go along way to strengthen the following specific recommendations

**To the African Union (AU):**

- The AU must take a more decisive role in the peace process. If possible adopt a confrontation trajectory.
- The AU mindful of limited resources should increase its appearance in Ivory Coast in terms of peacekeepers and administrative personnel.
- Request the UN Security Council of targeted sanctions against those who constitute a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in as specified in Security Council Resolution 1572.
- The AU should negotiate a single approach to the crisis and should not be seen as pushing the agenda of certain countries.

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“Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy* NO 81, p367-384; Jackson, R and Rosberg, C. G. *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1982; Reno, W. *Corruption and Politics in Sierra Leon*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Sandbrook, R. *The Politics of African Economic Stagnation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986; Lemarchand, R. “The State, Parallel Economy, and the Changing Nature of Patronage System” in Rothschild, D and Chazan, N (eds) *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998; Bayart, J. F. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman, 1993; *l’Etat au Cameroun*. Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politique, 1985; Zartman, W. *State Collapse: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 1995; Callaghy, T. M “The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa,” in *The African state in Transition*, ed. Zaki Ergas (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), 87-116. For a rebuttal on patrimonialism as a the sole cause of Africa’s malaise see

<sup>369</sup> Mkandawire, T “Thinking About Developmental States in Africa.” *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 2001, Issue 3, pp289-313

**To the United Nations Security Council:**

- Apply targeted sanctions, as specified in Resolution 1572.
- UN should increase its troops and a rapid reaction unit that can effectively replace departing Licorne troops;
- Play a constructive role in organising and holding elections; organising and undertaking DDR in collaboration with the AU;
- Orders immediate publication of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Allegations of Serious Violations of Human Rights and of International Humanitarian Law in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Keep the peace in Liberia and Sierra Leon.
- Organised consented effort to fund Ivorian demobilisation and reintegration reconstruction project

**To France:**

- Keep a low profile but should remain engaged with and continue to contribute to the Ivorian peace process and the UN peacekeeping mission in the accomplishment of its new tasks.
- Do not begin withdrawing Licorne forces before they can be replaced by a credible, strengthened UN force with a rapid reaction unit.
- Persecute military personnel that have been guilty of human rights abuse
- Forgive Ivorian debts, initiate constructive cooperate governance in Ivory Coast and urge the EU to increase development aid to Ivory Coast.

**To the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI):**

- Cease support for armed "patriotic" militias and use the Forces Armées Nationales de la Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) to stop all breaches of the ceasefire between those militias and the Forces Nouvelles.
- Ensure discipline and cohesion in the military
- Negotiate unity and consented policy that the party should pursue.

**To the Forces Nouvelles:**

- Guarantee freedom of movement and access to all AU and UN staff working on elections and DDR.
- Maintain unity within its rank
- Respect of human rights
- Accept the result of free and fair election

**To the international community at large**

What Africa needs is not handouts but fair trade deals. The international community should keep their pledges at Monterey mindful of the defects of Uruguay up till Hong Kong

Immigration out of the continent to an extent is the making of the west. Rather than strengthening immigration control, increase the capacity of African states.

The international community should exercise restraint over the activities of MNCs

Democracy is not a one-size-fit all prescription. It is a process that is engendered from within and not an event imposed from above.

**To all other political parties in Ivory Coast**

They should accept the diversity of their country and strive to realise that it is actually a blessing in disguise. Participate in different elections organised by the AU and the UN. Most of all they should try to duplicate and capitalise on the exploits and achievement of their national football team. A consensus around sport might just be the mobilising factor that could make Ivorians realise what virtue lies in unity.



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## Appendices

### A Chronology of Key Events:<sup>370</sup>

**1842** - France imposes protectorate over coastal zone.

**1893** - Ivory Coast made into a colony.

**1904** - Ivory Coast becomes part of the French Federation of West Africa.

**1944** - Felix Houphouët-Boigny and other nationalist leaders in French West Africa form RDA.

**1946** SAA is formed which later changed into PDCI

**1958** - Ivory Coast becomes a republic within the French Community.

### Independence

**1960** - France grants independence under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. He holds power until he dies in 1993.

**1963**- Alleged plot to topple Boigny

**1970**-Gueberri massacre

**1980**- Semi-competitive election is introduced. Post of party secretary scrapped and article 11 of the constitution amended to allow President of the National Assembly to succeed the President

**1987**-Ivory Coast suspends payment of external debt and stop SAP

**1990** – Multi-partism is introduced; Houphouët-Boigny wins presidential election, beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).

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<sup>370</sup> This chronology of events draws much impetus from coverage by British Broadcasting Corporation. [www.bbcnews.co.uk](http://www.bbcnews.co.uk)

**1993** - Henri Konan Bédié becomes President following the death of Houphouët-Boigny.

**1995** - October - Bedie re-elected in a ballot that is boycotted by opposition parties in protest at restrictions imposed on their candidates.

**1998** – One of the biggest corruption scandals in Ivory Coast. BWI cease lending money to Ivory Coast

**1999** - July - Alassane Quattara, a Muslim, leaves job at International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president in 2000; his plan to challenge Bédié splits country along ethnic and religious lines. Opponents say he is national of Burkina Faso, not Ivory Coast.

### **Coup**

**1999** - Bédié is overthrown in a military coup.

**2000** October - Gueï proclaims himself President after announcing he has won presidential elections, but is forced to flee in the wake of a popular uprising against his perceived rigging of the poll.

**2000** October - Laurent Gbagbo, believed to be the real winner in the presidential election, is proclaimed president. Opposition leader Alassane Quattara, excluded from running in the poll, calls for a fresh election.

**2000** October - Fighting erupts between Gbagbo's mainly southern Christian supporters and followers of Quattara, who are mostly Muslims from the north.

**2000** December - President Gbagbo's Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) emerges as the biggest single party in parliamentary elections.

**2001** January - Attempted coup fails.

**2001** March - President Gbagbo and opposition leader Quattara meet for the first time since violence erupted between their supporters in October 2000 and agree to work towards reconciliation.

**2001** March - Calls for fresh presidential and legislative elections after Alassane Quattara's party gains majority at local polls.

**2001** October - President Gbagbo sets up National Reconciliation Forum. General Gueï refuses to attend in protest against the arrest of his close aide Captain Fabien Coulibaly.

**2001** November - Opposition leader Alassane Quattara returns, ending year-long exile in France and Gabon.

**2002** August - Quattara's RDR opposition party is given four ministerial posts in new government.

### **Rebellion**

**2002** 19 September - Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilised grows into full-scale rebellion, with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement rebels seizing control of the north.

**2002** October-December - Short-lived ceasefire in October gives way to further clashes and battle for key cocoa-industry town of Daloa. Previously unknown rebel groups seize towns in west.

**2003** January - President Gbagbo accepts peace deal at talks in Paris. Deal proposes power-sharing government.

### **Power-sharing**

**2003** March - Political parties, rebels agree on new government to include nine members from rebel ranks. "Consensus" Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, tasked with forming cabinet.

**2003** May - Armed forces sign "full" ceasefire with rebel groups to end almost eight months of rebellion.

**2003** July - At presidential palace ceremony military chiefs and rebels declare war is over.

**2003 August** - Group of suspected mercenaries and their backers detained in France; said to have planned to assassinate President Gbagbo.

**2003 September** - Rebels accuse President Gbagbo of failing to honour peace agreement and pull out of unity government.

**2004 March** - Deadly clashes during crackdown on opposition rally against President Gbagbo in Abidjan. The former ruling party - the Ivory Coast Democratic Party (PDCI) pulls out of the government, accusing President Gbagbo of "destabilising the peace process". First contingent of UN peacekeeping force deployed.

**2004 May** - UN report says March's opposition rally was used as pretext for planned operation by security forces. Report says more than 120 people were killed and alleges summary executions, torture.

**2004 November** - Outbreak of hostilities: Ivorian air force attacks rebels; French forces enter the fray after nine of their soldiers are killed in an air strike. Violent anti-French protests ensue. UN imposes arms embargo.

**2004 December** - Parliament passes key reforms envisaged under 2003 peace accord, including abolishing need for president to have Ivorian mother and father.

**2005 April** - Government, rebels declare an "immediate and final end" to hostilities. The move follows talks in South Africa.

**2005 June** - Massacres in western town of Duekoue.

**2005 October** - Planned elections are shelved as President Gbagbo invokes a law which he says allows him to stay in power.

**2005 December** - Economist Charles Konan Banny is nominated as Prime Minister by peace mediators. He is expected to disarm militias, rebels and organise elections.

**2006 January** - Supporters of President Gbagbo take to the streets in Abidjan to protest against what they see as UN interference in the internal affairs of Ivory Coast. Ruling party (FPI) says it is pulling out of transitional government and peace process.

Map of Cote d'Ivoire showing ethnic location

