

## Chapter Three

### Zimbabwe's Experience of DDRRR

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on Zimbabwe's complex DDRRR account. The compromise Lancaster House Agreement of 1979- brought about by a convergence of competing interests- ended Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.<sup>111</sup> A Cease-fire Agreement was enshrined in the Agreement that was brokered by former colonial power Britain and the Commonwealth. Considering her colonial past, Britain was naturally an interested mediator.<sup>112</sup>

Britain played a prominent role and directed the institutional framework during the transitional period to independence. It reassumed direct colonial control and appointed Lord Arthur Christopher John Soames Governor, whilst maintaining Rhodesia's security and state apparatus during the transitional period. In accordance with the Agreement, Britain established and led the minimalist Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) that assessed and monitored the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the Rhodesian

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<sup>111</sup>See D. J. Anglin, "Zimbabwe Retrospect and Prospect", *International Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn 1980. The coincidence of interests was a result of several factors including: unsustainable and escalating costs of continued conflict for the fatigued and strained RSF; Cumulative impact of sanctions on the Rhodesian regime; the likelihood of military victory for the PF only at an enormous human and material cost; Mozambique and Zambia's ultimatums threatening to withdraw bases for the PF given savage punitive RSF raids on guerilla sanctuaries in neighbouring countries; the possibility of Britain legitimizing the incumbent Muzorewa-led coalition government and the PF's prediction of electoral victory.

<sup>112</sup> Britain was mandated by the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference of July-August 1979 to convene a constitutional conference and elections that would lead to genuine majority rule and independence. The Lusaka Conference agreed that Britain was the constitutionally responsible authority for decolonizing Rhodesia and bring it to legal independence.

Security Forces (RSF) and the Patriotic Forces (PF [ZANLA and ZIPRA]) forces. A multi-racial Commonwealth Observer Group observed the independence elections between 27 and 29 February 1980.

The post-independence government assisted by BMATT conducted “OPERATION MERGER”, an integration of the RSF, ZANLA and ZIPRA military personnel into a newly created, politically balanced Zimbabwe National Army. The government then formulated a DDR policy and established state institutions that implemented it. The UNHCR coordinated the voluntary repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees from neighbouring Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia in time for the national independence elections. It continued this assistance, in addition to coordinating a major resettlement programme for other war displaced persons, in the post-independence period. The UNHCR was partnered by the government and the church community.

The chapter departs from studies which focus exclusively on either the country’s DDR or refugee work. It deals with DDR of former combatants first and then the repatriation and resettlement process. By starting with an overview of the armed liberation struggle the chapter underscores those pertinent characteristics of the preceding conflict that needed to be identified in order to develop effective DDRRR strategies. This section will not discuss the details of the causes and history of Zimbabwe’s liberation war but only those factors that impacted on post-conflict DDRRR. The chapter then highlights the effects of the Lancaster House talks and agreement on post-conflict DDR. It then highlights how institutional, administrative and institutional insufficiencies, compounded by

unfavourable political and socio-economic frameworks, intriguingly militated against the DDR policy's most fundamental goal of turning ex-combatants into productive civilians. Instead, the country's DDR did not guarantee the post-war human security of ex-combatants, thus transforming them into war-veterans, an identity they then violently mobilized to achieve varied aims. This ran contrary to the promise of DDR's contribution to the broader peace building goal.

The chapter then deals with the repatriation and resettlement process. It emphasizes how the inclusion of issues of repatriation in the Lancaster House Agreement was crucial for the implementation of the programme. The chapter finds that DDR and repatriation and resettlement should not be viewed as processes with an array of competing security, social and economic demands. Instead, DDR and refugee work can be integrated and harmonized even though specific institutional bodies could be created to deal with the two.

### **3.2 Preceding conflict**

Zimbabwe's DDRRR was formulated and implemented after the end of a protracted, widespread and bitter liberation war or *Second Chimurenga* during the Cold War era. The 1960s-70s liberation war pitted the military wings of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)<sup>113</sup> - ZANLA and ZIPRA

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<sup>113</sup> ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, was established in 1961 as successor to the banned National Democratic Party. ZANU was formed as a splinter group from ZAPU in 1963 under the leadership of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. ZANU established ZANLA in 1964 and ZAPU established ZIPRA in 1965 as their

respectively- against the RSF. In October 1976, ZANU and ZAPU merged into the loose PF tactical alliance in a bid to wage a unified military strategy via the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA) against the RSF. However, just as a mutual inter-force hostility existed between the PF and RSF, intra-force hostility existed within the liberation armies' alliance.<sup>114</sup> ZANLA deployed more guerillas than ZIPRA and did most of the fighting. By 1979 the war covered ninety per cent of the country with the urban areas surrounded and often penetrated by the armed struggle.<sup>115</sup> According to Piero Scaruffi during the sustained struggle for majority rule (1972-1979) there were about 30 000 war-related deaths in and outside Rhodesia.<sup>116</sup> Given Zimbabwe's experience of a long and brutal armed liberation struggle in which two fully-fledged guerrilla armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA) actively engaged the RSF against a background of mutual hostility and suspicion it followed that a larger and more complex DDRRR process was subsequently required in post-liberation war Zimbabwe (See Tables below).

**Table 3.1: Rhodesian Force Levels, 1979**

Army regulars	6 000
Conscripts and Territorial Forces	4 000
Air Force	1 500

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military wings to wage liberation war against the Rhodesian government.

<sup>114</sup> Zimbabwe's liberation war movement had competing ethnic, ideological and strategic components. ZANLA was mainly Shona while ZIPRA was mainly Ndebele in composition. ZANLA's liberation war strategy was Chinese influenced and relied on mass mobilization to sustain a protracted liberation struggle. ZIPRA's strategy was Soviet oriented and placed emphasis on conventional warfare strategy.

<sup>115</sup> PF delegation's statement at the Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979

<sup>116</sup> P. Scaruffi, *Wars and Genocides of the 20th Century* , <<http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html>> Accessed on 4 July 2005

Guard Force	5 500
Security Force Auxiliaries	6 000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23 000</b>

Source: M. Rupiya, "Demobilisation and Integration: 'Operation Merger' and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987," pp.27-43, in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.31

**Table 3.2: Rhodesian Army Structure and Strength as at 31 December 1979**

	Whites/Asians/ Coloureds	African	TOTAL
Rhodesia Light Infantry (RLI)	1 000	-	1 000
Rhodesia African Rifles (RAR)			
Special Air Services (SAS)	100	4 000	5 000
Grey Scouts			
Selous Scouts	750		
Others (Parks, Internal Affairs, MID)	300	-	750
Security Force Auxiliaries	300	150	450
Guard Force		1 500	1 800
Conscripts			
Territorial Force	2 700		
	-	-	2 700
	500	20 000	20 000
	3 250	3 500	4 000
	58 000	-	58 000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>66 900</b>	<b>30 900</b>	<b>97 800</b>

Source: M. Rupiya, "Demobilisation and Integration: 'Operation Merger' and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987," pp.27-43, in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.31

**Table 3.3: ZANLA/ZIPRA Strength as at 31 December 1979**

Designation	No. In APs	Loose Elements	Total
ZANLA	16 000	5 500	21 500
ZIPRA	5 000	6000-8000	11 500-13 500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21 500</b>	<b>11 500-13 500</b>	<b>33 000-35 000</b>

Source: A. W. Tapfumaneyi, *Problems of Demobilization: A Comparative Study of Aspects of the Forces Demobilisation Carried Out by the Southern Rhodesian Government 1945-1947 and that Carried out by the Zimbabwean Government 1980-1985*, (Unpublished, BA. Hons Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1996), p44

**Table 3.4: Numbers Eligible for Demobilization**

ZANLA	21 500
ZIPRA	15 000
RSF	23 000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>59 500</b>

The liberation forces used mainly small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the execution of their guerilla-based strategy against the conventional RSF.<sup>117</sup> On account of their legendary and admired qualities- plentiful, ease and low cost of acquisition and maintenance, minimal training requirements, portability and the ability to conceal the weapon- SALW presented themselves as attractive tools in the execution of the liberation guerilla warfare. To this end, Clapperton C. Mavunga noted:

Heavy weapons were unnecessary in a war which demanded high mobility on foot over rough terrain, movement in small groups, as well as melting away in the face of a more well-equipped and numerically superior enemy.<sup>118</sup>

The former Soviet Union and China- inspired by obtaining Cold War politico-strategic imperatives- were the major supplier states of these arms. These included rifles, carbines, AK 47s, landmines, limpet mines, mortars, bazookas, anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades, pistols and appropriate ammunition.<sup>119</sup> SALW could be easily transported from the rear bases across borders and cached in the frontline operational zones.<sup>120</sup> The nature of SALW, in particular their easily concealable character, would have significant

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<sup>117</sup> ZIPRA gradually built up conventional fighting capacity that included heavy weaponry and air support. See J. Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, (Harare, SAPES, 2002); T.C. Nkiwane, 'Small Arms Flows in Zimbabwe', in ISS Monograph No. 34, 1999

<sup>118</sup> C.C. Mavhunga, "A Plundering Tiger with its Deadly Cubs"? *Soviet and Chinese weapons, Training and Advisers in the Evolution of ZIPRA and ZANLA Strategy During Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War, 1961-79*", MA Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, p.66

<sup>119</sup> See D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1981), pp.20, 21, 24. T.C. Nkiwane, 'Small Arms Flows in Zimbabwe', in ISS Monograph No. 34, 1999

<sup>120</sup> D. Martin and P Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, (Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1981), pp79, 85, 86.

implications for post-conflict disarmament. In addition to provision of war materials China and the former Soviet Union were the major trainer states of ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively. This also meant integration implications of the western-oriented British military doctrine on the formerly eastern-trained guerrilla armies.

Also noteworthy was the Rhodesian government's counter liberation war strategy. This included the employment of the "cordon sanitaire" concept that involved the planting of landmines in order to deter guerilla incursions from rear bases in Mozambique and Zambia into the battlefield inside Rhodesia.<sup>121</sup> The "cordon sanitaire" was a series of six border minefields totaling 766 kilometer. The minefields, fenced on both sides by a game fence of three strands of steel wire, consisted of a 25 metre wide strip of ground laid with three rows of antipersonnel mines at a density of around 5 500 per kilometer.<sup>122</sup> An intruder alarm system linked to control points that fed into patrol teams was attached to the fence. The existence of landmines would impact post-conflict reintegration and resettlement of ex-combatants and formerly uprooted people.

The Rhodesian government's anti-guerrilla strategy also involved the forcible removal of civilians from the rural areas and their concentration in protected villages (PVs) in order to deprive the PF forces of the human and social infrastructure on which guerrilla warfare thrived. The concept of PVs had been used by the British in their 1950s Malaya counter-insurgency campaign to effectively deprive guerillas of civilian support. Some Rhodesian

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<sup>121</sup> See J.K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London, Croom Helm, 1983)

<sup>122</sup> M. Rupiya, "Zimbabwe: Key developments since March 1999" ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Towards a Mine Free World*' (USA, Human Rights Watch, 2000), pp.123-124

troops were also veterans of the Malaya campaign whose success contrasted Rhodesia's own counter-insurgency operation.

The resettlement of people inside PVs started in 1973 in the Zambezi valley area where guerilla activities were pronounced. PVs were then established in other rural areas. At one time an estimated 750 000 people were forced into PVs consisting of mud and thatch houses surrounded by a chain-link fence, gun-bunkers and lookout towers.<sup>123</sup> A specially created Guard Force watched over the PVs. A significant proportion of the rural civilian population of 400 000<sup>124</sup> also escaped into urban exile from escalating warfare and political persecution in the countryside. In the towns, including Salisbury, Gwelo and Bulawayo, most of these lived in desperate conditions and were subject to municipal harassment.

In addition, many Africans sought sanctuary in regional war supporting nations including Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania. Initially this involved mainly young male recruits of the PF forces. Eventually the refugee population included "peasants, students, workers and even children"<sup>125</sup> who escaped from the oppressive, exploitative and repressive colonial system. By September 1979 there were about 250 000 people in

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<sup>123</sup> J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p140. H. Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*, (South Africa, New Africa Books, 2003), p.25. Dusk to dawn curfews where villagers worked in fields during daylight and returned to villages by sundown were implemented.

<sup>124</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.25

<sup>125</sup> S.T. Makanya, "The Desire to return: Effects of Experiences in Exiles on Refugees Repatriating to Zimbabwe in the Early 1980s," in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.109



refugee camps located in neighbouring countries.<sup>126</sup> According to the UNHCR Mozambique hosted 150 000 (including 30 000 children), Zambia 40 000-45 000 (including 20 000 children) and Botswana 26 000 (including 6 000 children) Zimbabwean refugees.<sup>127</sup> ZANU and ZAPU both established schools for refugees of school going age in Mozambique and Zambia respectively.<sup>128</sup> RSF took its war effort to these neighbouring countries and attacked refugee camps in operations such as the atrocious 9 August 1976 attack on Zimbabwe's Nyadzonya refugee camp in Mozambique. Many casualties were recorded and the horrifying scenes entailed psycho-social problems for survivors. The substantial uprooted population had to be repatriated and resettled after the war and in some instances in landmine infested areas.

Another significant dynamic of the liberation struggle was the close relationship between the churches and the nationalist movement.<sup>129</sup> This special relationship facilitated the productive involvement of the churches in the repatriation of refugees from camps in neighbouring counties that had been managed by the nationalist movements.

### **3.3 Lancaster House Agreement and DDR: Ending the war at the cost of long-term stability?**

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<sup>126</sup> Lord Peter Carrington's opening address at the Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979

<sup>127</sup> R.J. Southall, "Resettling the refugees", *Africa Report*, November/December 1980

<sup>128</sup> At war end in 1979 there were about 30 000 children in nine schools with more than 700 teachers in Mozambique alone.

<sup>129</sup> See for example N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds., *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe, 1996)

The Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 provided the political framework for the terms of an Independence Constitution and conduct of democratic elections under British Government authority. The Agreement, through a cease-fire agreement by the RSF and PF forces effective from 2400hours on 21 December 1979, provided for a demilitarization process.<sup>130</sup> The institutional framework for its implementation was provided by the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF). The 8 member CFC- consisting of equal numbers of senior commanders of the PF and RSF and headed by the Governor's Military Advisor- was tasked with<sup>131</sup>:

- a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The British led CMF- code named Operation Agila- was assigned<sup>132</sup>:

- a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian Forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;
- b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and

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<sup>130</sup> The cease-fire negotiation was greatly assisted by the inclusion of PF commanders including ZANLA's Josiah Tongogara and ZIPRA's Dumiso Dabengwa in the PF delegation to Lancaster. They undertook to try and ensure the cease-fire holds enabling it to be signed. This included assuring the Conference that they would try to speedily order the assembly of combatants and their adherence to the ceasefire despite considerable logistical difficulties.

<sup>131</sup> Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, A cease-fire agreement signed by the parties (Annex E)

<sup>132</sup> Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, A cease-fire agreement signed by the parties (Annex E)

- c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire

Notwithstanding this, the Lancaster House Agreement did not provide the legal framework for the integration of the formerly warring forces and a formal DDR programme. Integration and DDR were neither sticks nor carrots in the peace negotiations and agreement. Preoccupied with ending the war and winning the peace and ensuring a relatively short transitional period and involvement by the British/Commonwealth the mediators conveniently postponed discussion on the crucial integration and DDR process. Agreement on an independence constitution, transitional arrangements and conduct of “free and fair” elections in the aftermath of a cease-fire were accorded priority.

In its opening statement at the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference the PF had identified the question on “Whose army shall defend Zimbabwe and its people...” as one of the “real issues” requiring urgent resolution.<sup>133</sup> The representatives of the powerful Rhodesian military at Lancaster House, Ken Flower (Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization [CIO] head), Air-Vice Marshall Harold Hawkins and the Rhodesian representative in South Africa had prior to the talks “made clear that the breaking-point for the commanders would be any interference with the structure of their forces before

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<sup>133</sup> PF’s opening address at the Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979

the elections were held.”<sup>134</sup> The British sidestepped resolving the contradictory viewpoints on the issue of integration and DDR saying:

...it is not practical to think of any general integration of forces before the people of Rhodesia had been given a choice to make their own political choice in the election...The forces of both sides and their commanders will be required to give firm undertakings to accept the authority of whatever government is chosen by the people of Rhodesia.<sup>135</sup>

This played into the hands of the RSF. The British, however, volunteered to provide future military training and demobilization assistance upon request.<sup>136</sup> The Ceasefire Agreement stated:

The parties to this agreement renounce the use of force for political objectives. They undertake to accept the outcome of the elections, to comply with the directions of the Governor and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the future composition of the armed forces and the training and resettlement of military and civilian personnel<sup>137</sup>

Delegates to the Lancaster Conference elaborated:

Integration and DDR were partly discussed. What was discussed was the cease-fire arrangement. It was stated that there would be a need to carry out integration once a new government had come into force. The principle of integration was stated but was not discussed in detail. Disarmament and demobilization were not discussed. It was a non- issue because who was going to demobilize who? It was not possible. The Conference dwelt mainly with cease-fire arrangements which were virtually mechanisms calling for units to stop fighting and stay where they

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<sup>134</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.37

<sup>135</sup> H. Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*, (South Africa, New Africa Books, 2003), p.29

<sup>136</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, p.39

<sup>137</sup> Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, A cease-fire agreement signed by the parties (Annex E)

were and for Rhodesian forces to remain within barracks and the surrounding areas they were protecting.<sup>138</sup>

The way that integration was to be carried out was not discussed. Integration was later on implemented in practice after independence. The major concern was the cease-fire and that forces should move into the assembly points. What was agreed was that all the forces- ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF- were now legal forces who came under the newly appointed governor for Rhodesia Lord Soames. Disarmament was not discussed at the Lancaster House Talks. What was discussed was the disbandment of some units which the Patriotic Front did not want such as *Pfumo Revanhu*; the Selous Scouts. At Lancaster House the key issue was agreement on the constitution. The rest was administrative. Once we agreed on the constitution everything (integration, disarmament and demobilization) would be undertaken by the Ministry of Defence within the new (independent) government.<sup>139</sup>

Prioritizing integration and DDR would have been akin to putting the cart before the horse. What was necessary at that time was stopping the war and then agreeing where the conflicting forces would be situated. Elections would follow and the elected government would then take the responsibility for integrating the three forces- ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian forces. What was discussed at Lancaster House was, therefore, where liberation forces would be located and where Rhodesian forces would be located. There would be elections first and the elected government of the day would work out the integration and DDR modalities.<sup>140</sup>

I should emphasize that Lancaster was not about the crafting of a new constitution for Zimbabwe. Essentially, it was about transfer of power to Britain, through its surrogates here, (and then) to the majority. That was the main focus. People have misunderstood this. We were there to decide on the transfer of power. Once that had occurred what would be done in Zimbabwe was for Zimbabweans. The Constitution was never put to referendum. Its primary role was that of transfer of power. There was no DDR. After the ceasefire there would be a return to legality. There would be no recriminations and trials. There would be forgiveness. That would lead to integration and DDR. The outside world would come and back an independent and free country.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Interview with Minister Dumiso Dabengwa (Retd), Head of ZIPRA in the Cease-fire Arrangement, 2 April 2004, Harare. Dumiso Dabengwa represented the ZIPRA High Command at the Lancaster Conference's cease-fire negotiation.

<sup>139</sup> Interview with Chief Air Marshall Josiah Tungamirirai (Retd.), Minister of State for Indigenization and Empowerment in the Office of the President and Cabinet, 11 May 2004, Harare. Chief Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirirai (Retd) was advisor to the late ZANLA commander General Josiah Tongogara at Lancaster House

<sup>140</sup> Interview with Hon Emerson Mnangagwa, Speaker of Parliament and ZANU PF Secretary for Administration, 9 June 2004, Harare. Emerson Mnangagwa was Special Assistant to ZANU (PF) President Robert Mugabe at the time of the Lancaster House Talks

<sup>141</sup> Interview with Professor Walter Kamba, Herbert Chitepo UNESCO Chair, University of Zimbabwe, 23

While envisaging military victory, albeit at an enormous human and material cost, the PF were also pressured into signing the Lancaster Agreement – a “largely preconceived British settlement plan”<sup>142</sup> - that was not specific on integration and DDR. Mozambique and Zambia had issued ultimatums threatening to withdraw bases for the PF given savage punitive RSF raids on guerilla sanctuaries and general infrastructure in these neighbouring countries. The possibility of Britain legitimizing the incumbent Muzorewa-led Rhodesian coalition government –the “second-class solution”- in the event of a PF pull out from the negotiations also permanently hung over the peace conference. In addition the PF predicted electoral victory that would enable them to preside over the post-independence integration and DDR processes.

Some ex-combatants, however, felt neglected by their PF leaders who agreed to sign the Lancaster Agreement that did not address their post-independence employment and recompense. To them, the consent by PF politicians to the skirting of DDR appeared as a deliberate strategy to enable successful conclusion of the negotiation process. This would secure - for the PF leadership - political power and the rewards accruing via assured electoral victory: “When the politicians went to Lancaster we hoped that they would...recognize our role but this was not the case at all. We felt as if the politicians were ‘men on a mission.’ All they needed were the reigns of power. They were now driving the chariot. We as the horses were not being recognized. We had to resign

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June 2004, Harare. Professor Kamba was legal advisor to ZANU at Lancaster. He attended all the sessions.

<sup>142</sup> NAN A.636/2, E.S. Landis Accession S Graves, *Rhodesian Lessons for Namibia*

ourselves.”<sup>143</sup> These fighters probably misunderstood the rationale behind the conduct of war for the political purpose of seizing control of the government and consolidating power.

Women were under-represented in both PF and Rhodesian delegations to Lancaster. The PF delegation consisted of 21 men and one woman, a Miss F. Siziba; the Rhodesian delegation had 22 men and the UK delegation 21 men and one woman, a Mrs A.J. Phillips.<sup>144</sup> Walter Kamba, who was legal advisor to ZANU at Lancaster, commented:

There was no woman in our (PF) negotiating delegation... even in the Rhodesian delegation. Maybe it was because of male chauvinism. I do not think that anybody ever raised it... Our secretaries were women. At the decision-making level it was a different proposition. She (Miss Siziba) was one of the senior secretaries in the ZAPU delegation. During the discussions questions that arose were, for example, those of citizenship for woman Zimbabweans married to foreigners or foreign women married to Zimbabweans. These issues were debated throughout the nights. In terms of our socialist approach and equality between men and women, the males would also become citizens. This was, however, politicking. Later, the whole provision was changed<sup>145</sup>

Their lack of representation meant that women ex-fighters were unable to communicate their concerns and make a case for a gender-aware demobilization and reintegration in the Lancaster House Agreement.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Ex-combatant Sibanda quoted in M. Rupiya, “Psychological Impact of the War in Zimbabwe”: *The genesis of the problem and the nature of persisting Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Towards a national recognition of PTSD amongst ex-combatants from the Liberation War and calls for mechanisms to address the problem*

<sup>144</sup> T. Lyons, *Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle*, Trenton, Africa World Press, 2004), p.104

<sup>145</sup> Interview with Professor Walter Kamba, Herbert Chitepo UNESCO Chair, University of Zimbabwe, 23 June 2004, Harare in G. A. Dzinesa with F. Sadomba, “Identity and Exclusion in the Post-War Era: Zimbabwe’s Women Former Freedom Fighters” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.55

<sup>146</sup> G. A. Dzinesa with F. Sadomba, “Identity and Exclusion in the Post-War Era: Zimbabwe’s Women

The compromise Lancaster House Agreement recognized the *de facto* equality of the three forces. Remarkably, it did not place emphasis on the integration of forces and DDR it was silent on the entitlements of ex-combatants in terms of pensions, demobilization payments and reintegration assistance. In retrospect, this failure to address the needs of ex-fighters adequately had negative repercussions for the subsequent integration and DDR processes along with post-conflict peace building.

### **3.4 Roll out of DDR**

#### *3.4.1 Commonwealth Monitoring Force and DDR*

There were two attempts at disarmament in the post-Lancaster House Agreement period under review: the first to facilitate peaceful and secure conditions for the conduct of the independence elections and the second in line with the obtaining security, economic and developmental objectives of the post-election period. In accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement Britain established and led the modest CMF that assessed and monitored the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the parties.

The CMF were essentially an observation force that implemented demilitarization of the hostile and militarily capable forces through separation and containment. It did this through monitoring the RSF in their own bases and PF combatants in the 23 transitional

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Former Freedom Fighters” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.55



rendezvous points (RVs) and then the more permanent 16 Assembly Points (APs). Besides APs Kilo and Juliet the rest of the APs separately accommodated ZANLA and ZIPRA. The minimalist CMF comprised 1 319 personnel from five countries namely Australia (159), Britain (1 010), Fiji (24), Kenya (51) and New Zealand (75).<sup>147</sup> The inclusion of black contingents from Kenya and Fiji was designed to depict the CMF as a racially balanced force.

There was no role for the erstwhile major liberation war backers, the former Soviet Union, China, Mozambique and Zambia. This is partly explained by the fact that the peace negotiation and transition process was considered a British/Commonwealth baby. The process also occurred at a time when the Cold War international relations made British, Soviet Union and Chinese cooperation unimaginable. It was clear that “the British had moved in with a governor and obviously would not allow any communist influence.”<sup>148</sup> The British prominence would forestall Soviet and Chinese influence in the country. In addition, the two eastern bloc countries had no peacekeeping tradition. In its discharge of its observatory duties the CMF was mandated to “carry weapons for their personnel protection only...”<sup>149</sup> Whilst there was no role for the UN the CMF would, however, adopt the UN peace operations’ hallmarks of consent, impartiality and non-use of force.

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<sup>147</sup> S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.70. The total was raised to 1 548 at the reconnaissance team’s recommendations.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Minister Dumiso Dabengwa (Retd), Head of ZIPRA in the Cease-fire Arrangement, 2 April 2004, Harare

<sup>149</sup> Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, A cease-fire

Jeremy Ginifer noted that the CMFs “methods were a response to a set of unique political and historical conditions in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia...”<sup>150</sup> Susan Rice elaborated that Britain settled for this “novel” peace keeping concept as it feared that the classical inter-positional peacekeeping and practical disarmament were inappropriate for the complex Rhodesian operational context where the forces were diversely located, hostile and distrustful and regarded continued military capacity as a security guarantee.<sup>151</sup> In line with the desired short-transitional period it was envisaged that a single-country led (British) CMF, contrasted to the bureaucratic UN system, and would assist efficient and faster planning and decision making.<sup>152</sup> This would enable the “fast-in, fast-out” approach that Britain desired<sup>153</sup> but would, however, mean that the CMF would have no post-independence peace building role.<sup>154</sup>

Furthermore, white Rhodesians, having endured UN sanctions, would not countenance the international body’s involvement.<sup>155</sup> This conflicted with the PF’s well grounded insistence on an impartial UN-led transitional authority. The PF feared that a British monitoring force would fall short of this critical requirement. Despite the eventual inclusion of forces from four other countries, Britain not only handpicked these but

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agreement signed by the parties (Annex E)

<sup>150</sup> J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, (New York, United Nations, 1995), (New York, United Nations, 1995), p.4

<sup>151</sup> S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), pp67-68. See also J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, (New York, United Nations, 1995), p.2

<sup>152</sup> S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, pp.67-68. See also J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p.2

<sup>153</sup> J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p.17

<sup>154</sup> J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, p.24

<sup>155</sup> J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, (New York, United Nations, 1995), p.17

would also “command and control the Force”.<sup>156</sup> This diluted the perceived impartiality of the CMF consequently engendering the PF’s mistrust throughout the transitional period.

The CMF framework had significant institutional deficiencies. Against the delicate and complex operational environment the composition and outlook of the CMF credibly aroused apprehension among the parties over the:

...capacity of the modest Commonwealth Monitoring Group of 1300 lightly armed troops -recruited from Australia, Britain, France, Kenya and New Zealand - to supervise effectively an inevitably shaky cease-fire involving 5 disparate armies with a combined strength in excess of 100,000 deployed over an area larger than the British Isles<sup>157</sup>

At Lancaster House the PF had managed to secure *de facto* equality of their forces with the RSF. Owing to the CMF’s personnel and military constraints deliberately imposed by the UK it had to rely on the Rhodesian security infrastructure. This further damaged its perceived neutrality and tilted the balance in favour of the RSF over the PF forces who were confined to APs during the transitional period. Susan Rice noted:

...the CMF teams at the RVs and APs depended almost entirely on the RSF and BSAP for their security. The Rhodesians assisted the CMF to locate and set up the RVs and APs and to establish communications. They also promised to provide rapid backup in the event of an attack, since the CMF could not defend itself indefinitely with the weapons at its disposal.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.70

<sup>157</sup> D. J. Anglin, “Zimbabwe Retrospect and Prospect”, *International Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn 1980, p.676

<sup>158</sup> S. E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.92

This had the effect of placing the RSF at a strategic advantage over the PF in the event of the breakdown of law and order.

The CMF were not a robust peacekeeping force and they evidently lacked the capacity to undertake practical disarmament of the forces against the above context. While facilitative of a quick British/Commonwealth exit the three-month transitional period did not allow for the integration of forces and practical disarmament and demining. It should be noted that wartime efforts to integrate the PF forces via ZIPA had collapsed pointing to the complexity of the task. Carrying out the integration process within a three month period was therefore unrealistic.

ZANU PF exploited the late deployment of CMF border monitors to violate the cease-fire arrangements. It illegally crossed into Zimbabwe perhaps as many as two-thirds of its 30 000 guerillas from Mozambique in order to promote its election campaigning and preserve its military power.<sup>159</sup> Between 9 000-10 000 (40 per cent) of all ZANLA forces did not assemble,<sup>160</sup> remaining safe from feared annihilation in the APs and ready to resume war. In their place ZANLA penetrated war collaborators (mujibas) into the APs. RSF's General Walls claimed that ZANLA moved into the APs:

A few old men and women...their mujibas...with a few ant-eaten old muskets  
and a few rusty old weapons that couldn't possibly have been the terrorists'

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<sup>159</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.46-47

<sup>160</sup> Emmerson Mnangagwa interview in S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.161

weapons...and meanwhile the terrorists mingled with the population and made damn certain which way they were going to vote.<sup>161</sup>

The unassembled ZANLA combatants conducted an illegal election campaign of violence and intimidation. ZIPRA was largely cooperative and complied with the with cease-fire arrangements.<sup>162</sup> The RSF's auxiliary arm engaged in limited acts of electoral violence and intimidation on behalf of Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC). A Ceasefire Commission comprising senior commanders of the RSF and PF and chaired by the CMF commander investigated the numerous cease-fire breaches.

Notwithstanding these challenges and limitations, the CMF successfully created a climate of peace and confidence for the conduct of the crucial independence elections between 27 and 29 February 1980. Robert Mugabe's ZANU PF won a majority 57 seats, Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU 20 seats and Abel Muzorewa's UANC 3 seats with Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front taking all the 20 reserved white seats. This outcome was acknowledged by all the parties. A multi-racial Commonwealth Observer Group observed these elections and certified them as having been "free and fair." Britain endorsed this verdict despite protestations by the Rhodesian military command for the British to nullify the election on account of alleged ZANU PF electoral malpractices. Britain's strategic interests mainly to rid itself of the Rhodesian problem seemingly took precedence. The British/Commonwealth plan created the political environment in which the sovereign government's state institutions directed the integration and DDR of former combatants.

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<sup>161</sup> Quoted in S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.161

<sup>162</sup> S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.161

While ZANU and ZAPU had negotiated as a unitary PF at the Lancaster House Conference, the two split in December 1979 and contested the elections separately. This was a result of the historic mutual tension and hostility among other motivations and contradictions. Dumiso Dabengwa noted:

This unity lasted only as long as the conference. Afterwards, the earlier fears and suspicions came to the fore again. The result was that in 1980 ZAPU and ZANU contested the Independence elections as independent organizations and not as the Patriotic Front. What happened after(wards) is another story.<sup>163</sup>

The division, however, had significant implications for the post-conflict politico-military framework in which DDR was supposed to be implemented.

### 3.4.2 *Pre-integration DDR*

The absence of a dedicated institutional framework and an integrated DDR mitigates the successful design and implementation of the process as Zimbabwe's pre-integration demobilization and reintegration demonstrates. Prior to force integration some units of the RSF including the Selous Scouts, Guard Force and Muzorewa's Auxiliary Forces were disbanded. These were ineligible for wholesale integration as they had been established for specific political purposes (for example the Guard Force to watch over the PVs) and were not intended to be permanent forces.<sup>164</sup> These units were associated with

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<sup>163</sup> D. Dabengwa, "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation" in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Vol. 1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), p.35

<sup>164</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 1, 1980 14th May to 26<sup>th</sup> June 1980 and 23<sup>rd</sup> July to 15<sup>th</sup> August 1980

atrocities during the war and had become totally political during the negotiations; this is reminiscent of the *Koevoet* in Namibia.

Those who qualified and were interested in joining the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) were considered on an individual basis. Many RSF members also withdrew from the forces prior to the integration process. RSF conscripts simply opted out and returned to their pre-enlisting employment. Regular RSF also took advantage of the Inducement Scheme that provided for the upgrading of officers one rank higher on retirement for pension purposes. The war-disabled ex-RSF could also claim compensation in terms of a Rhodesian Act of parliament.

In addition to the disbandment process PF combatants who were in the APs and fell under any of the following four categories were demobilized<sup>165</sup>:

- Those who were too young to remain in the army
- Those who were too old to remain in the army
- Those who were physically handicapped through injury or illness during the course of the liberation struggle
- Those who opted voluntarily out of the military forces

The rest remained in the APs waiting to be integrated into the ZNA. These PF forces were registered in the APs on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1980 to facilitate payment of a monthly

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<sup>165</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 2, 1980 19th August to 8<sup>th</sup> October 1980 and 20th January to 7<sup>th</sup> May 1981. Interview with Col. Tshinga J. Dube (Retd), Zimbabwe Defence Industries Managing Director, 1 April 2004, Harare. The details of this demobilization and reintegration programme including numbers demobilized and subsequently educated, trained or employed have not been documented.

allowance of Z\$100 by government through the Army Pays Corps that was established by the Ministry of Defence. This allowance corresponded with the salary of African privates in the former RSF. The funds derived from a supplementary vote of Z\$35 million authorized by Lord Soames in April 1980 of which Z\$10 million had been allocated for the ex-combatants.<sup>166</sup> Those outside the army continued to receive the allowance until their physical demobilization in August 1981.

A three member committee on demobilization, selection and integration comprising Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai (Retd) of ZANLA, Col. Tshinga J. Dube (Retd) of ZIPRA and Brig. Jacobs (Retd) of the RSF had been created to preside over the process, including instructing combatants who were in the APs on the procedural issues.<sup>167</sup> Given their tight schedule they did not have time for sufficient, coordinated advance planning and had restricted resources as their work was funded by government structures that still had “the former colonial masters who did not prioritize the welfare of former combatants.”<sup>168</sup> They also did not plan an integrated demobilization and reintegration process as their main task was to carry out demobilization and initiate selection and integration of eligible combatants.

Whilst the combatants were given questionnaires in the APs to compile their profiles including their preferred post-liberation war occupations an elaborate reintegration policy

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<sup>166</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.69

<sup>167</sup> Interview with Col. Tshinga J. Dube (Retd), Zimbabwe Defence Industries Managing Director, 1 April 2004, Harare

<sup>168</sup> Interview with Col. Tshinga J. Dube (Retd), Zimbabwe Defence Industries Managing Director, 1 April 2004, Harare



was not designed for those who opted for civilian careers in 1980. Likewise, there were no specific rehabilitation programmes to assist the war-disabled and their families. Reintegration assistance revolved around the provision of a demobilization grant of Z\$400 “to enable the persons being demobilized to buy themselves clothes, and to visit their homes and the parents before they submit themselves to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services for employment in any sector.”<sup>169</sup> The late parliamentarian, Ruth Chinamano, criticized these incomprehensive reintegration plans: “Our sons and daughters (ZANLA and ZIPRA forces) made great sacrifices to free their country. They met great difficulties. Now for them to be told that they can no longer be soldiers and be paid \$400 to be got rid of is great injustice.”<sup>170</sup> The chance to plan a comprehensive reintegration strategy at the earliest possible stage was therefore lost.

The early attempt at DDR was also undermined by that it was implemented during a phase that was still characterized by tension and conflict. It therefore did not benefit the strategic reserve forces that ZANLA and ZIPRA maintained in their external bases.

General Vitalis Zvinavashe (Retd) revealed:

I was the one in command of the ZANLA strategic force that remained outside the assembly points...Let’s say for instance you are playing a game of checkers. You do not attack with all your pieces. You leave some at the back to defend. The strategic force remained behind just in case the cease-fire failed to hold leading to reigniting of war. Even ZIPRA did that...Others (members of the strategic force) later went into the assembly points. Some suffered to enter the system because they had been left out.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 1, 1980 14th May to 26<sup>th</sup> June 1980 and 23<sup>rd</sup> July to 15<sup>th</sup> August 1980

<sup>170</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 1, 1980 14th May to 26<sup>th</sup> June 1980 and 23<sup>rd</sup> July to 15<sup>th</sup> August 1980

<sup>171</sup> Interview with General Vitalis Zvinavashe (Retd), Former Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence

ZANU also adopted the Clausewitzian strategy of buttressing its political victory through the maintenance of forces outside the designated APs.<sup>172</sup> Against this background many of the demobilized (and those who had not benefited) registered when the government created the Demobilization Directorate to run the institutionalized demobilization (and reintegration) programme of 1981-1983 following the successful integration exercise.

The Lancaster House Agreement had failed to provide for practical disarmament and confidence building measures. The Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Robert Mugabe later outlined the government's disarmament policy:

Those who are demobilized will naturally be disarmed as they get demobilized. But those who remain in the Army will be entitled to their weapons and cannot be demobilized. Any extra forces that we are standing down, literally leave their arms in armories, and are not entitled to go into civilian life with them. No difficulties have been encountered so far. All who have been demobilized have left their arms behind.<sup>173</sup>

The retention of weapons by the combatants awaiting integration in the APs later created security problems and undermined peace building. General Vitalis Zvinvashe (Retd) explained that:

Weapons during the war were not registered with serial numbers. A system was put in place to ensure that all weapons came under the national armory to facilitate their control. Fighting groups surrendered their weapons to the national

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Forces, 14 May 2004, Harare

<sup>172</sup> M. Rupiya, "Demobilisation and Integration: 'Operation Merger' and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987," in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.28

<sup>173</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 1, 1980 14th May to 26<sup>th</sup> June 1980 and 23<sup>rd</sup> July to 15<sup>th</sup> August 1980

armory and these were registered by their serial numbers. However, not every weapon was surrendered. Some fighters were uncertain of the ceasefire and feared the worst should the war restart. So, some hid weapons. This partly explains the presence of arms caches. In every (armed) revolution it is difficult to account for every weapon.<sup>174</sup>

The mutual and long-standing mistrust and insecurity between ZANU and ZAPU always hovered over the DDR process. This contributed to an uncertain and dangerous implementation period that made it difficult to achieve complete disarmament in the absence of efficient verification mechanisms.

### 3.4.3 *Integration of the three separate armies: A prelude to institutionalized DDR*

A legacy of the Lancaster House Agreement was that it left intact and legitimated three rival armies namely the RSF, ZANLA and ZIPRA. The government assisted by BMATT conducted “OPERATION MERGER”, an integration of the ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian Security Force military personnel into a newly created, politically balanced Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) initially targeted at between thirty and thirty-five thousand forces.<sup>175</sup> The CMF had during the transition period initiated some informal retraining of ZIPRA and then ZANLA combatants at Madlambuzi and Foxprot APs.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Interview with General Vitalis Zvinvashe (Retd), Former Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, 14 May 2004, Harare

<sup>175</sup> For a detailed analysis of the integration exercise see A. Alao, “The Metamorphosis of the ‘Unorthodox’ :The Integration and early development of the Zimbabwe National Army”, pp104-107, in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications,1995.); M. Rupiya, “Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987,” in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), pp.27-43.

<sup>176</sup> See A. Alao, “The Metamorphosis of the ‘Unorthodox’ :The Integration and early development of the Zimbabwe National Army”, in Bhebe N and T Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications,1995), pp.106-108, N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

This contravened the Lancaster House Agreement that made no provision for force integration.

The military integration during the transitional period aimed at retaining Rhodesian military control. This created problems. Norma Kriger noted:

The scheme's premise was that guerrillas required rigorous training according to Rhodesian regular army standards before they could join the army. Military integration would therefore proceed slowly, preserving and prolonging white control. Based on Rhodesian retention of control over the guerrillas, this scheme was a recipe for disaster.<sup>177</sup>

As we shall see later, the same strategy by the erstwhile national military prevailed in South Africa's case where the old SADF's military culture, structure and standards strongly influenced the establishment of the new SANDF.

Myriad factors worked against the success of the Rhodesian military's scheme. These included mistrust between the Rhodesians and guerilla armies, lack of barracks and instructors' use of Rhodesian military doctrine and standards as a template for the integration scheme, which violated the Lancaster House Agreement enshrined a *de facto* equality of the forces.<sup>178</sup> These problems resulted in the termination of the scheme and its replacement by the official BMATT/ Joint High Command (JHC) integration programme.

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2003), pp55-57, S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), p.171

<sup>177</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.105

<sup>178</sup> See S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), pp.171-176; N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.108; N. Kriger, "Zimbabwe's peace settlement: re-evaluating Lancaster House"

The representative JHC created by Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Robert Mugabe comprised senior officers of the three armies. Lieutenant General Peter Walls, former Commander of the Rhodesian Combined Operations, was commander of the JHC that also included Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshall F.W. Mussell, the Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General A.C. Maclean, the Commander of ZANLA, Solomon Mujuru, and the Commander of ZIPRA, Lookout Masuku.

Integration was a momentous task faced with significant challenges. First, the three highly politicized separate armies were mutually hostile and distrustful. Second, the three armies had distinct military philosophy and doctrines (ZANLA-Chinese; ZIPRA-Russian; and the RSF-British). Third, as shall be discussed later, internal and external security problems with the potential to scuttle integration and DDR had to be endured. Fourth, there was a restricted resource base partly for the reasons that the Lancaster House Agreement protected pre-independence socio-economic structures and the provision of limited international aid.<sup>179</sup> Fifth, there was no historical precedent of the integration of three separate armies into an inclusive national military force that Zimbabwe could draw lessons from.<sup>180</sup>

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in O. W. Furley and R. May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998), pp.91-95

<sup>179</sup> M. Rupiya, "Demobilisation and Integration: 'Operation Merger' and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987," in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.28

<sup>180</sup> H. Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*, (South Africa, New Africa Books, 2003), p.41

BMATT's invitation as partner to the JHC, in the integration architecture, was aimed at circumventing some of these challenges. Emerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security (Prime Minister's Office), observed that:

BMATT played a significant role as a neutral entity. ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian forces could not integrate themselves. BMATT was a neutral entity that assisted integration at the training level. As BMATT was a neutral entity all the three forces- ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian forces- would feel comfortable with it assisting the integration process. Integration was a Zimbabwean scheme led by the Joint High Command and BMATT assisted at the training level.<sup>181</sup>

Despite the challenges the JHC and BMATT, which provided professional assistance for integration and standardization of training, successfully created the unitary ZNA comprising four British trained battalions. The North Koreans later trained one battalion: "The North Koreans assisted well after the integration process. We decided that we needed a new brigade in addition to the four brigades that had been trained by BMATT. North Korea, an ally during the liberation war, offered to assist with setting up the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade and we accepted."<sup>182</sup> However, as shall be revealed later, the Brigade was specially created to crush the 'dissident' menace in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands.

The integration process incorporated formation of battalions and short staff training courses for selected officers. Pakistan rendered assistance in the reconstruction of the air

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<sup>181</sup> Interview with Hon E. Mnangagwa, Speaker of Parliament and ZANU PF Secretary for Administration, 9 June 2004, Harare

<sup>182</sup> Interview with Hon E. Mnangagwa, Speaker of Parliament and ZANU PF Secretary for Administration, 9 June 2004, Harare

force. Funding for the integration process was provided by Britain<sup>183</sup> and Zimbabwe independence government.<sup>184</sup> The independence government was determined that the exercise succeed as “the integration of the Army and the Air Force...was also the key to stability, enabling the government to proceed with reconstruction and resettlement.”<sup>185</sup> The government assumed direct control over this important process. Its unpredictable adoption of the policy of reconciliation assisted the integration exercise. The policy was demonstrated practically through the appointment of former Commander of the Rhodesian Combined Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, as commander of the JHC. This enhanced the confidence of some former RSF personnel and also initially served to defuse any potential of a coup attempt.<sup>186</sup> 1980 heralded a new army with a new ethos replacing the colonial status quo.

Although ultimately successful, the integration exercise was not without its problems. These revolved around the need for balanced representation of the former belligerent armies and the desire to assert control over the new army. For instance, a former senior military commander observed:

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<sup>183</sup> A. W. Tapfumaneyi, *Problems of Demobilization: A Comparative Study of Aspects of the Forces Demobilisation Carried Out by the Southern Rhodesian Government 1945-1947 and that Carried out by the Zimbabwean Government 1980-1985*, (Unpublished, BA. Hons Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1996), pp.13 and 31

<sup>184</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, Vol. 1, 1980 14th May to 26<sup>th</sup> June 1980 and 23<sup>rd</sup> July to 15<sup>th</sup> August 1980, Interview with Minister Dumiso Dabengwa (Retd), Head of ZIPRA in the Cease-fire Arrangement, 2 April 2004, Harare

<sup>185</sup> Presidential speech, Zimbabwe debates: First session, first parliament, 14 May 1980, in M. Rupiya, “Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987,” in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.28

<sup>186</sup> M. Evans, “Making an African Army: the case of Zimbabwe 1980-87” in N. Etherington, ed., *Peace, Politics and Violence in the New South Africa*, (London, Hans Zell Publishers, 1992), p.236

ZIPRA combatants had undergone conventional and administrative training whereas ZANLA combatants had been trained on how to fight. ZANLA did much of the fighting while ZIPRA combatants underwent training to prepare them for administrative duties. So during the integration process it was easier for ZIPRA combatants to adapt while it naturally took longer for ZANLA combatants. This created problems. ZIPRA combatants would adapt and were poised to advance quickly than ZANLA combatants. Yet ZANLA would claim that they did much of the fighting.<sup>187</sup>

Competition based purely on merit might have led to ZIPRA's dominance in the new army.<sup>188</sup> It was therefore imperative to ensure balance between ZANLA and ZIPRA in the command structures and the new battalions.

Also, by 1979 ZAPU, as part of its military strategy, had developed the Zero Hour Operation for a planned invasion of Rhodesia. Under this plan ZIPRA would launch "a coordinated, all round offensive on several fronts simultaneously"<sup>189</sup> using five conventionally trained battalions, with air support in order to defeat both the RSF and ZANLA. While the plan was never implemented it nevertheless caused apprehension within ZANU and RSF during the integration process.

Integrated ex-combatants received lower salaries and benefits than their white counterparts. Black and white officers received the same salaries whereas black African privates earned Z\$4.24 a day compared to Z\$7.89 for white African privates.<sup>190</sup> These salary discrepancies were reconciled by the government in 1983.

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<sup>187</sup> Interview with Former Senior Military Commander, 22 April 2004, Harare

<sup>188</sup> N. Kriger, "Zimbabwe's peace settlement: re-evaluating Lancaster House" in O. W. Furley and R. May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998), p.93

<sup>189</sup> J. Brickhill, "Daring to storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 – 1979" in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), p.61

<sup>190</sup> *The Herald*, 17 May 1983 "Army needs \$39 million to end racist wages"



The integration process did not embrace the strategic reserve forces that ZANLA and ZIPRA reportedly maintained in their external bases and outside the designated APs. BMATT's deputy commander noted this: "There were people (guerillas) coming in at the end (of integration). We couldn't find slots for them. They'd been hidden from us. The guerillas didn't trust each other...[hiding their best people] was an insurance policy against the British, then the former Rhodesian army, and then each other."<sup>191</sup>

## **DDR and peace building**

### *3.4.4 The Policy Framework*

Fiscal, socio-economic and security objectives resulted in Government setting up the Demobilization Directorate in July 1981 under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Since its main task was to coordinate the demobilization of excess military personnel and their productive reintegration into civilian life with relevant government ministries the Demobilization Directorate was appropriately located. Kumbirai Kangai, then Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, reiterated this in parliament: "The new

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<sup>191</sup> Major-General Rupert Smith Interview in N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*:

department does not fall within the administration of the Ministry of Defence but within the Ministry of Labour and Social Services.”<sup>192</sup> The demobilization policy the Directorate was supposed to manage would follow a well-stated two-pronged approach:

The demobilization scheme represents a mixture of inducement and rehabilitation. The inducement is a payment of approximately (Z) \$185 per month to be made for a period of up to two years. The rehabilitation side of the scheme is an attempt to place an individual into productive employment or enable him to stand on his own feet, either in the business world or in agriculture, so that he can be re-absorbed into the economic fabric of the community.<sup>193</sup>

The demobilization programme was outlined in a government policy document titled “*Demobilisation within the Zimbabwe National Army*”. This document was simply a statement of intent that was not elaborate on the envisaged societal roles of the ex-combatants.<sup>194</sup> The demobilization policy also did not make specific provisions for the rehabilitation and reintegration of special categories such as the physically disabled and psychologically disturbed ex-fighters and female ex-combatants who had specific needs. The demobilization programme that the Demobilization Directorate presided over revolved upon the provision of<sup>195</sup>:

- Further education for the demobilized that had not finished their primary or secondary education and wished to continue;

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*Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.116

<sup>192</sup> Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, 21 July 1981

<sup>193</sup> The Minister of Labour and Social Services explaining the scheme to parliament in Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, 21 July 1981

<sup>194</sup> M. Musemwa, ‘The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilization of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and the Ordeal of Rehabilitation 1980-1983,’ in J. Cilliers, ed, *Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.55

<sup>195</sup> Department of Information, *Demobilisation within the Zimbabwe National Army*

- Technical training in motor mechanics, welding, agricultural courses, medical courses, local governance, customs and immigration;
- Expert guidance to ex-combatants interested in seeking employment, self-employment or forming co-operatives; and
- Demobilization allowance of a monthly stipend of Z\$185 spread over a two-year period or a lump sum of Z\$4 440

Employed former combatants were not eligible for the demobilization allowance.<sup>196</sup> Registered ex-combatants, mainly those who were still in the APs and those who were unemployed after the pre-integration demobilization exercise, qualified. Upon successful registration these ex-combatants were provided with Post Office Savings Bank account books and identification documents authorizing them to withdraw the demobilization allowance.

The size of the Zimbabwe National Army was supposed to be reduced from 65 000 to 41 000 by 1983. The demobilization exercise effectively reduced the army to the strength of 41 519.<sup>197</sup> By the completion of the Physical Demobilization exercise in June 1983 a total caseload of 35 763 combatants had been demobilized.<sup>198</sup> According to the government demobilization was not supposed to be based on past liberation-army affiliation and there was “certainly no wholesale demobilization of Zipra or ex-Zipra members. There has

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<sup>196</sup> *The Herald*, 5 January 1982 “Ex-guerillas on parade for demobilization”

<sup>197</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 11 August 1996 “Why ZNA being downsized”. Government later remobilized militarily to deal with internal and external security threats

<sup>198</sup> Zimbabwe, *Parliamentary Debates*, vl8, no.68, March 1992; See also *The Chronicle*, 26 July 1984.

been no verbal or written announcement to any ex-Zipra member or any insinuation to that effect.”<sup>199</sup>

Many combatants lacked formal qualifications. Less than 20 per cent of the ex-combatants had any secondary education, and the majority of the rest had less than primary education with nearly 50 per cent illiterate.<sup>200</sup> This was partly because of the discriminatory colonial education system and that they enlisted at a young age prior to obtaining relevant qualifications. 5 700 ex-combatants opted to complete their interrupted education and 2 900 pursued training. This was mainly under the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) training programmes for ex-fighters and refugees under which training centres such as Mupfure Self Help College<sup>201</sup> in the small town of Chegutu were later established.

5 041 ex-combatants were absorbed into paid employment with 2 179 being self-employed presumably having benefited from employment counselling and job search strategies. The development of co-operatives was expected to generate long-term self-employment for the ex-combatants. 6 383 ex-combatants subsequently ventured into co-operatives. Examples include the agricultural-oriented Batsiranai Development Cooperative Farm and Fambirai Mberi Cooperative Society and UJAMAA; a transport Cooperative Society. Of the 35 763, 13 500 remained unemployed mainly because most

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<sup>199</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 20 February 1983 “Denial on Zipra Demobilization”

<sup>200</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.158

<sup>201</sup> The College, specifically devoted to the education of ex-fighters, ran 2-year specialized in one of four fields: agriculture, carpentry, building and textile design in addition to basic academic subjects.

lacked the “magic entry ticket: O(rdinary)’ level certificate (educational)qualifications”<sup>202</sup>, relevant skills, experience and opportunities.

#### 3.4.5 *The Institutional Framework and Management*

The well-intentioned demobilization and reintegration programme would in addition to ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the ex-combatants and their dependants have meant an increased tax base for the state. Notwithstanding this and the existence of a dedicated implementing body, there were significant programmatic gaps in the demobilization and reintegration strategy. This militated against the tiding of ex-combatants from military to self-sustaining civilian life. Dumiso Dabengwa revealed:

We had recommended that some assembly points should remain as strategic training camps to train the demobilized and provide technical courses such as building, welding, and agriculture. The forces would be demobilized after receiving training, job placements, assistance to start enterprises, or land for agricultural projects. Instead of sending them away we had suggested that government should keep them in the assembly points, train them, continue the demobilization allowance and then send them off to jobs, give them land and set up a fund to assist them. At that time government thought of a two year demobilization allowance and to then wean them off...NITRAM (ZAPU’s holding company) was formed due to our fear that with the strategy of demobilization we would have many destitute ex-combatants in our midst.<sup>203</sup>

The implementation of demobilization and reintegration was supposed to be preceded by raising their awareness of the process and then a compilation of individual profiles of ex-

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<sup>202</sup> *Moto* June 1982, “Comrades return to a cold front”, p.16

<sup>203</sup> Interview with Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa (Retd), Head of ZIPRA in the Cease-fire Arrangement, 2 April 2004, Harare. NITRAM had 6 main properties comprising Caslam Motel in Bulawayo; a 16 000 ha Hampton farm near Gweru,; Woody Glen farm in the aquifer area of Nyamandlovu; Ascot farm near Solusi Mission; Nest Egg which produced poultry and piggery and a transport-removal company called Black Cat. The properties were confiscated by government following the discovery of controversial SALW cache at some of these properties and allegations of a ZAPU anti-government plot. The confiscation of NITRAM properties flew in the face of demobilization, reintegration

combatants. Kumbirai Kangai stated

Details and advantages of the scheme will be disseminated to all (force) members...Personal details and aspirations of all those who wish to take advantage of the scheme will be obtained by the directorate. The information concerning personal details and aspirations will be analysed to ensure that the requirements in regard to education, training and employment are accurately assessed.<sup>204</sup>

However, this was not broadly and consistently implemented. The long idle months that ex-combatants spent in the assembly points awaiting integration and demobilization were not productively used to compile a database of the ex-combatants as well as initiate pre-discharge orientation. Ex-combatants lamented the programme's lack of clarity and failure to compile their socio-economic profiles and career aspirations:

I do not understand any process about it (demobilization and reintegration). We were simply asked to fill in the forms and given \$500 and told to leave the camps for our homes. We then had to learn from others that there was some token money being given and we went back into the camps to get IDs and POSB books.<sup>205</sup>

There was no elaborate needs' assessment at Tango Assembly Point (Assembly place for ZANLA women) in Manyene where I was demobilized. I am not sure about other Assembly Points. We were just told that we were going to be given (demobilization) money. Some of us were not even sure what the money was for. We thought it was some leave-allowance to use during temporary stay at our homes and that we would remain in the military forces. We were therefore surprised when we were told that we had been demobilized and were no longer members of the army. We had not been asked our planned occupations and activities when we were given the (demobilization) money.<sup>206</sup>

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and peace building. All the properties except for Black Cat have since been given back.

<sup>204</sup> The Minister of Labour and Social Services explaining the scheme to parliament in Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, *House of Assembly*, 21 July 1981

<sup>205</sup> Interview with Former Combatant, Wilbert Z. Sadomba, 7 April 2004, Harare

<sup>206</sup> Interview with Former Combatant, Ellen Nomatter John-Masoka, 31 March 2004, Harare

When we went through the demobilization process it was a question of us getting Z\$185 and being told to go home. There were no programmes to find out whether the families that those demobilized would return to were still intact. The majority of those who returned to their rural areas found their families displaced. Some found out that their parents and relatives had been killed during the war. Some ended up homeless.<sup>207</sup>

Budgetary limitations also negatively impacted on the programme.<sup>208</sup> The government that financed the two-year demobilization and reintegration programme had budgeted Z\$116million for it.<sup>209</sup> This limited the government to settling for the Z\$185 monthly demobilization pay or equivalent lump-sum which was not sufficient to sustain the ex-combatants and their dependants. The demobilization allowance of Z\$185 (US\$259) per month for a two-year period or a lump sum of Z\$4 440 (US\$ 6216) was “merely to tide these men and women over from military to civilian life”<sup>210</sup> This was a paltry sum given the fact that some of the demobilized had to support extended families whose livelihoods had been devastated by the war in the rural areas. Support was needed in rebuilding homes since a large number of people were returning to their ancestral homes from protected villages. Some ex-combatants also needed to pay school fees for siblings who were going to school.

You're talking of people who'd come from poor families where maybe frustration that made you go and fight was because your poor dad was getting that little money. I come back. No clothes, I need a place to live, need to eat. Some people did not even get this. And some who'd gone much earlier had left families [who now needed to be cared for]. Z\$185 was simply not enough. To say ex-combatants used this money roughly is insulting.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Interview with Former Combatant Margaret Dongo, 30 April 2004, Harare

<sup>208</sup> Interview with Minister of Labour and Social Services Hon. Kumbirai Kangai (Retd), 22 April 2004, Harare

<sup>209</sup> *The Chronicle*, 4 September 1981 “Avoiding Scandal”

<sup>210</sup> *The Herald*, 12 January 1983 “State To Act On Jobs For Fighters”, *PARADE*, April 1990. Guerillas who were charged with dissident activities or who missed the 30 June 1983 registration deadline forfeited their demobilization benefits

<sup>211</sup> Keith Nyika, ZANLA ex-combatant, interview, August 22, 1992 in N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in*

Thus, as asserted by Muchaparara Musemwa, measuring the allowance of Z\$185 against the poverty datum line of Z\$128 in 1980 may be misleading because the poverty datum line assumed that the individual already had basic necessities which the demobilized did not have.<sup>212</sup> Destitution logically followed for most ex-combatants particularly as the demobilization and reintegration programme lacked a capacity-building direction. The Sunday Mail noted: “We think it would be far better to give an ex-combatant a small fish and a rod and skills so that he will be better equipped to catch more fish in his lifetime.”<sup>213</sup> The meagre demobilization allowances were not helped by the programmes’s skills and management component deficit. These unhinged prospects for the sustainable well-being of the ex-combatants.

The Demobilization Directorate also did not plan financial management or counselling programmes for the ex-combatants many of whom lacked experience in handling money. Oppah Muchinguri noted: “Imagine someone who spent most of his time in the bush not knowing what time or date it was, being given \$185 each and every month. The Government should have trained them and then given them the demobilization money.”<sup>214</sup> Wilfred Mhanda remarked: “The demobilization allowances were not accompanied by any counselling or career guidance such that they frittered away. It would have been

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*Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.212

<sup>212</sup> M. Musemwa, ‘The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilization of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and the Ordeal of Rehabilitation 1980-1983,’ in J. Cilliers, ed, *Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.47

<sup>213</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 27 March 1988, Comment

<sup>214</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 5 November 1989 “War Veterans Association: Does this mark the re-entry of ex-combatants into political life of the country”



more prudent to develop a well thought out concept to make the war veterans sustainable.”<sup>215</sup> The result, as Fay Chung noted, was that “[T]he money couldn’t last,” and “[G]iving money to the comrades merely bought time.”<sup>216</sup> Many ex-combatants extravagantly expended their allowances on luxurious items such as alcohol, radios and clothes.<sup>217</sup>

The Demobilization Directorate was manned by officials drawn from former senior comrades and commanders of the PF armies. Its first director was ex-ZANLA’s John Shoniwa with ex-ZIPRA’s Report Mphoko operating as his deputy. The appointment of former combatants “who actually knew who was involved” in the liberation struggle aimed at ensuring a foolproof vetting and registration process that could not be penetrated by fake combatants.<sup>218</sup> It was also “assumed that demobilization would work better if guerillas administered other guerillas.”<sup>219</sup> A high-level-inter-ministerial committee was established for liaison with the Directorate. Ministries represented on the committee were Agriculture, Labour, Finance, Education, Manpower Planning and Development.

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<sup>215</sup> Interview with W. Mhanda, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform Director, 8 June 2004, Harare

<sup>216</sup> Quoted in N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.100

<sup>217</sup> For more see N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.100-102

<sup>218</sup> Interview with Minister of Labour and Social Services Hon. Kumbirai Kangai (Retd), 22 April 2004, Harare

<sup>219</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.73

The establishment of the Directorate at least remedied the absence of a dedicated institutional framework apparent in the earlier attempts at pre-force integration, demobilization and reintegration within the APs.

The Demobilization Directorate, however, had its own institutionalized deficiencies. A significant limitation was that its staff component included mainly former combatants with the exception of a Nigerian-trained Zimbabwean who had an undergraduate degree in psychology. While they were conversant with the socio-economic situations of their compatriots these officers were not given any specific training besides basic orientation.<sup>220</sup> This meant that the Demobilization Directorate's staff lacked essential counselling, rehabilitation and administrative competencies that would have augmented the demobilization and reintegration programme.

The security imperatives of manning the Directorate with ex-combatants were not accompanied by a clear book-keeping, accounting and auditing system. The demobilization fund was abused as result. A senior official in the Social Welfare's Pension Office criticized the Demobilization Directorate's administration of the funds:

It was absolutely chaotic the way that the fund was run. It was run by ex-combatants alone. They had no experience in accounting or finance. People were getting twelve demob cards, money for girlfriends...A few in the directorate and also others took advantage of the weaknesses. Perhaps like all scandals there's a tendency to exaggerate what happened.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>220</sup> Interview with Minister of Labour and Social Services Hon. Kumbirai Kangai (Retd), 22 April 2004, Harare

<sup>221</sup> Mr. John Katsande, Pensions Office, interview, August 24, 1992, Harare Office in N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.90

On top of the initially budgeted Z\$116 million the government further paid out un-audited tranches of Z\$66 million in 1983-4, Z\$19 million in 1984-5 and Z\$1 million in 1985-6<sup>222</sup> to demobilized combatants. These included fake war veterans who had allegedly been sent by party and Directorate officials who, ironically, were supposed to identify imposters and have them arrested.

Some efforts were made to redress the fraudulent activities. For instance, the Demobilization Directorate conducted a ‘knowledge of weapons test’ to flush out or block bogus ex-combatants who had benefited from or intended to benefit from the demobilization scheme.<sup>223</sup> Some registered but bogus ex-combatants failed the test (to disassemble and reassemble a rifle or machine gun in a “reasonable time”) while “others, not wanting to take the risk, simply slipped away without waiting for their turn.”<sup>224</sup> The Directorate stopped payments to some 41 identified bogus ex-ZIPRA claimants. These efforts were undermined by the lack of a corresponding punitive regime for the impostors and any implicated officials.

#### 3.4.6 *The economic and social context*

In addition to the significant institutional and policy deficiencies apparent in the demobilization and reintegration programme the social and economic contexts then were

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<sup>222</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.90

<sup>223</sup> *The Herald*, 27 March 1982, “Gun Test Exposes Demob Pay Fraud”

<sup>224</sup> *The Herald*, 27 March 1982, “Gun Test Exposes Demob Pay Fraud”

not favourable for the strategy that government adopted. The previously exclusionary and discriminatory social and economic relations were not effectively transformed. This had serious effects on the demobilization and reintegration process' capacity to transform ex-combatants into self-sustaining non-fighters with their human security guaranteed. As shall be revealed the ex-combatants later mobilized around the "war veterans" identity with significant implications for national level human security and peace building.

The socialist path taken by government soon after independence was hostile to individual entrepreneurial activity and job creation.<sup>225</sup> This occurred when the Lancaster House Agreement protected the colonial legacy of "the Rhodesian controlled bureaucracy and white controlled private sector".<sup>226</sup> This meant, for instance, that by 1986 "The Anglo-American transnationals based in South Africa own nearly all the sugar industry, the mines and building firms, and have important holdings in the banks and financial companies. They are powerful enough to be able to pursue an unrestrained economic policy in their own interests, with no thought for the interest of Zimbabwe."<sup>227</sup> The whites who still commanded the business and private sectors were reluctant to employ the former combatants. This was despite pleas and threats by the government that "strong action will be taken against" these reluctant employers.<sup>228</sup>

For the economic reintegration of ex-combatants to progress it was essential for the

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<sup>225</sup> See G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.71

<sup>226</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.4

<sup>227</sup> CIMADE, INODEP, MINK, *Africa's refugee crisis: what's to be done?*, (London, Zed Books, 1986)p64

business community to be accommodative of them. Nevertheless, “many employers have (had) still not adjusted” and thus acted contrary “to the policy of reconciliation.”<sup>229</sup>

Wilfred Mhanda noted:

The private sector saw them as problematic people. War veterans were on the receiving end right through. The politicians were not comfortable with the war veterans. Industry was not comfortable with us. This further alienated the war veterans and made reintegration difficult.<sup>230</sup>

Some ex-combatants had to conceal their liberation-war identity and credentials in order to secure jobs. One female ex-combatant who lied to get employment in a bank said that: “If they knew I had been in the struggle, no-one would talk to me. They’d think I was sent by the government to spy on them.”<sup>231</sup> For demobilization and reintegration to achieve its long-term potential of making ex-combatants sustainable non-fighters, colonial practices and attitudes needed to be tackled.

Where employment opportunities arose many ex-combatants who had acquired qualifications from the liberation war backers such as Eastern European countries were not immediately recognized as preference was accorded to British and American-trained candidates and the many young educated products of the independent government’s mass education programme. These jobs were mainly low level and poorly remunerating. Some of the private sector including Harare based NATBREW, Chibuku and CAPS Holdings and Bulawayo based Continental Fashions and Tregers responded positively to the

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<sup>228</sup> *The Herald*, 12 January 1983 “State To Act On Jobs For Fighters”

<sup>229</sup> *The Herald*, 12 January 1983 “State To Act On Jobs For Fighters”

<sup>230</sup> Interview with W. Mhanda, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform Director, 8 June 2004, Harare

<sup>231</sup> *Moto* June 1982, “Comrades return to a cold front”, p.16

Demobilization Directorate's calls and hired ex-combatants as unskilled workers.<sup>232</sup>

The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Demobilization Directorate encouraged government ministries and institutions to accord priority employment to ex-combatants in appropriate areas resulting in the impressive absorption of ex-combatants.<sup>233</sup> However, as most ex-combatants lacked the necessary qualifications to be absorbed under the Civil Service priority employment scheme additional posts had to be created. For instance the Ministry of Health employed ex-combatants with no qualifications and who had failed aptitude tests to work as medical assistants on the basis of their war-time medical experience. This enabled the productive employ of talent and skills identified and nurtured during the war for post-independence development while providing for the welfare of the beneficiary ex-combatants. Notwithstanding this, the priority employment scheme did not absorb the substantial ex-combatant population that was outside formal employment.

Government also expended restricted effort to equip the ex-combatant entrepreneurs with the requisite business acumen; a factor on which the competitiveness and success of co-operatives largely hinged. Elaborate and workable support mechanisms to bolster the co-operatives were absent. The Financial Gazette put it succinctly:

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<sup>232</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.159-160

<sup>233</sup> Harare City Council security unit employed 500 ex-combatants. Bulawayo City Council recruited 200 ex-combatants in various capacities. Marondera Council took on board 23 former combatants. The Ministry of Local Government and Housing, with LOHNRO's financial assistance, sponsored 220 women combatants to undergo secretarial training courses prior to emplacement at various district councils. Ministries such as Rural and Urban Development, Health, Labour and Social Services, Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Presidents Office also offered employment to some ex-combatants

As well as the sheer will to ensure that these co-operatives took off ground, these co-operatives especially needed managerial skills, technical know how and viable marketing strategies for them to survive. This meant having to invest in education and training. But because these co-operatives did not have any of these skills they inevitably crumbled.<sup>234</sup>

The majority of the ex-combatants, with their education having been interrupted by war, lacked skills beyond bush survival and warfare. It should also be noted that not every ex-combatant who embarked on business ventures or cooperatives was necessarily enterprising or had the business acumen. The ex-combatants were “thrown into a sophisticated world without adequate preparation”<sup>235</sup> and many were excited at being independent with cash in hand resulting in the collapse of the majority of the co-operatives.<sup>236</sup> The competencies of specialized agencies - such as the Institute of Business Development, the Zimbabwe Industrial Advisory Board, Development Finance Committee and the Finance Trust for Emergent Businessmen Company- were largely not mobilized to provide the advisory services and technical assistance necessary for the viability of these cooperatives.

In an isolated move in 1984, the government organized a seminar at Kushinga Phikelela Agricultural Institute designed to help existing ex-combatant co-operatives with managerial services and training. At this time, however, the casualty rate of ex-combatant co-operatives was already high as most had been established at the start of the demobilization scheme in 1981. The Demobilization Directorate asserted that its advice

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<sup>234</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 4 September 1997 (Comment)

<sup>235</sup> *PARADE*, April 1990

<sup>236</sup> Interview with Mr S Mhlanga, Former Information and Publicity Secretary of the ZNLWVA, 3 August

and that of other consultants was generally spurned as “no one would listen to that professional language. Once they wanted something, they wanted it.”<sup>237</sup> This antipathy to professional advice could be explained by the ex-combatants low educational levels and poor appreciation of prudent fiscal management. Furthermore, a number of the co-operatives did not meet the lending criteria of banks as they lacked collateral security while the agro-based ones such as Ruponeso and Vukuzenzele suffered the devastating impact of the 1982 drought.<sup>238</sup> These factors combined to mitigate the sustainability of the reintegration initiatives.

As the Lancaster House Agreement did not cater specifically for their reintegration and socio-economic securities many ex-combatants, exposed by the inadequate demobilization packages, found themselves in a quagmire in the absence of further governmental assistance. Government had stressed that “Those (ex-combatants) who had not furthered their education or gained some skills or training, or were unemployed, would be on their own after the (demobilization) payments expired.”<sup>239</sup> This was despite the fact that unemployment of these ex-combatants owed much to the general institutional deficiencies of the demobilization and reintegration programme and the lack of institutionalized feedback and monitoring mechanisms in particular.

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1999, Harare

<sup>237</sup> Mr Makonde, interview, August 25, 1992, Harare office in N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.145

<sup>238</sup> M Musemwa, “The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993”, in J. Cilliers, ed, *Demobilization and Reintegration of former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.49

<sup>239</sup> *The Herald*, 30 June 1983 “No extended demob pay”



A major weakness of the programme had been that there was no structure which followed up to ascertain whether the ex-combatants were leading comfortable and sustainable post-demobilization civilian livelihoods. Kumbirai Kangai noted that:

When they (ex-combatants) left for military operations they had different backgrounds. Some were teachers. Some were students etc. They were given a choice. One would say I want to join the police, the army, and diplomatic field...We (Government) placed ex-combatants into various posts but no one made a follow up to find out whether they were happy or sustainable. It was more or less like we have demobilized the combatants, we have finished and that was the end. There was no structure which followed up to find out how the combatants were faring in their specific fields. As a result there were dropouts and these were not accounted for. This necessitated the current programme (war Veterans' Pension and Benefit Scheme that was launched in 1997).<sup>240</sup>

Endy Mhlanga concurred in criticizing the absence of monitoring mechanisms:

There were not enough monitoring mechanisms. Once ex-combatants passed through the demobilization phase there was no follow up on their occupations. Many were idle and as they were militarily trained this was dangerous for the security of the country. Solutions had to be found. There were no checks and balances and the government was not coming forth.<sup>241</sup>

An elaborate inspection system would have facilitated the evaluation of the demobilization and reintegration programme and the implementation of appropriate corrective measures to guarantee its sustainability. This could have been implemented by the Demobilization Directorate that remained operational until its amalgamation into the Employment Offices of the restructured Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare in 1987.

#### 3.4.6 *DDR of Special Categories: A double jeopardy?*

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<sup>240</sup> Interview with Minister of Labour and Social Services Hon. Kumbirai Kangai (Retd), 22 April 2004, Harare

To compound the human security situation, particularly for special groups such as disabled ex-combatants and female ex-combatants, a sustainable “physical, mental and spiritual” rehabilitation policy was absent in post-independence Zimbabwe<sup>242</sup> as was any recognition of gender. Zimbabwe had tragically inherited the liberation war’s legacy of “Men and women hideously burned by napalm, paralysed by bullets and mutilated by bombs”.<sup>243</sup> For instance, in 1980 about 5 000 disabled ex-combatants were in need of rehabilitation assistance.

In the post-independence period a team of development and medical experts including Chris Underhill, Roger King and Dr. Sanders was sanctioned by government to visit several APs. Disabled ex-combatants revealed their need for paramedical treatment and orthopaedic services as well as formal education. In response, the government via the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare set up the Ruwa National Rehabilitation Centre in 1981 to offer a six-month rehabilitation programme for disabled ex-combatants comprising four elements<sup>244</sup>:

- Physiotherapy and medical rehabilitation
- Sport and recreational activities
- Pre-vocational training, educational assessments and preparation (tailoring, art and painting, carving, accounts, electronics, agriculture and typing)
- Counselling and placement.

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<sup>241</sup> Interview with Endy Mhlanga, Former Secretary General of the ZNLWVA, 5 May 2004, Harare

<sup>242</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

<sup>243</sup> Zimbabwe Project, *News Bulletin*, No 12, November/December 1981, p.19

This programme, ostensibly, aimed at empowering beneficiaries with skills that they would sell to become self-reliant. The National Rehabilitation Centre accommodated disabled ex-combatants up to 1985. Disabled combatants also ran private projects such as the ex-ZIPRA fighters Vukuzenzela Co-operative in Zvishavane.

The Rehabilitation Centre provided a basis for a proactive rehabilitation, economic and social reintegration programme. The programme would have firmly made ex-combatants at the Centre self-sufficient, enabling them to actively participate in the economic development of the country and thus positively contribute to peace building. Lack of a coherent implementation plan undermined the good intentions behind the establishment of the National Rehabilitation Centre. An inmate at the Centre revealed:

We [the ex-combatants at the centre] used to call some of these top people to ask them questions, because we wanted to know our future. We were very curious, I should say. The administration in the centre did not have an answer to our questions. We knew we were there, but for what purpose?...The government had no straightforward plan about us being there. They did not plan to train us in any vocational field. Those of us who went to school, it was our own initiative.<sup>245</sup>

The government also attempted to implement a two-dimensional counselling programme comprising social and clinical aspects partly aimed at addressing ex-combatants' psychosocial problems resulting from exposure to horrific wartime incidents.<sup>246</sup> This attempt appeared to have been undermined by other factors. These rehabilitation efforts were dented by the frustration of plans to compile a "proper register of genuine ex-

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<sup>244</sup> Zimbabwe Project, *News Bulletin*, No. 2, January 1981, p.3

<sup>245</sup> Interview with Ex-combatant CM in T. A. Barnes, "The Heroes' Struggle: Life After the Liberation War for Four Ex-Combatants in Zimbabwe" in Bhebe N and T Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), pp.131-132

combatants, disabled ex-combatants, refugees and displaced persons that would have refined the process of reintegration and ensured the intensified focus of the available resources and expertise on these identified groups.”<sup>247</sup>

Against the background of the failed government rehabilitation programme Major Agrippa Gava (Retd), former Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) Director, pointed out that:

In war there are number of devastating experiences, which require rehabilitation in the post war situation. People need to be rehabilitated mentally, spiritually and physically in some instance. But there were no such programmes undertaken in post independent Zimbabwe. This is why you may find out that there are war veterans in the street, mental health institutions with mental problems. It is due to what they have seen or experienced in their lives. The most torturous period does not appear to have been the war period itself but the post war period when they realized that they had been forgotten and sidelined. This was more torturous than the war and it worsened the plight of the combatants who had no source of income, who were now being taunted by the people about what they had gone into the bush for yet they were now suffering whilst a Rhodesian soldier was getting pension. But the behaviour differs with individuals.<sup>248</sup>

A distressed ex-combatant, with poor qualifications due to interrupted education, and who thus got a low-paying job wrote:

You can imagine how low and embarrassed we feel whenever our friends whom we left at school before leaving for the struggle show us how much they reaped in our absence and are still reaping. I am even ashamed to reveal to my colleagues that I am an ex-combatant.<sup>249</sup>

Another disgruntled ex-combatant said:

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<sup>246</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

<sup>247</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

<sup>248</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

It pains us to see our schoolmates who remained behind to finish their education. They now have good jobs, big houses and cars while we have nothing. Everywhere we go to apply for a job we are reminded that we do not have the necessary qualifications. . Our school mates make fun of us and sarcastically thank us for making their good lives possible while we remain empty-handed.<sup>250</sup>

This should not discount the fact that some former fighters managed to secure cabinet, government, parastatal and diplomatic postings.

The lack of psychosocial interventions, however, meant many ex-combatants who were traumatized did not receive psychological counselling and had to endure post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Ex-combatants recounted their PTSD ordeals:

I worked as a Medical Assistant at Parirenyatwa the (ZANLA's hospital in Mozambique) Main Headquarters' hospital. I was very young, 15 years going on to 16. That was a very young age to handle corpses. I experience flashbacks that affect my day to day life...I was in the United Kingdom's House of Commons when they debated the Iraqi War. I got sick as it was like a rewind of my experiences in the liberation struggle. A friend of mine who is a member of the House remarked: 'Margaret, you need to go through counselling because your war experiences affect you'<sup>251</sup>

The nightmares of what happened during the war usually come up in my dreams frequently. I actually relive the air raids. It is terrible. They appear exactly the same even nineteen years after the event. The heavy sounds of a helicopter if they fly above I get agitated. When I drink alcohol it is worse and I end up shouting at people for no apparent reason. I find refuge in alcohol to relieve my stress at times. When I wake up I will be sweating as though I have actually been involved in the battlefield.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> *The Herald*, 31 March 1988 "How wrong I was" (Letter to the Editor)

<sup>250</sup> *Moto* June 1982, "Comrades return to a cold front", p.16

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Former Combatant Margaret Dongo, 30 April 2004, Harare

<sup>252</sup> Ex-combatant J. Kuenda quoted in M. Rupiya, "Psychological Impact of the War in Zimbabwe": *The genesis of the problem and the nature of persisting Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Towards a national recognition of PTSD amongst ex-combatants from the Liberation War and calls for mechanisms*

Disillusionment among the desperate ex-combatants, some of whom had spent lengthy periods and greater parts of their adolescent and early adult life in military combat in the bush, was bound to worsen their psychological status.

The society in which ex-combatants had to reintegrate was excluded from programmes devised by the government. A former Director of Social Welfare noted:

When we say reintegration we did not talk to the people were these ex-combatants and refugees were going to resettle. When we talk of reintegration two sides must meet. Reintegration is a complex matter yet society was not even aware of it until the land reform programme. Being disabled meant anger on both the family and the ex-combatant. For example would parents easily accept disabled ex-combatant sons and daughters? Can both parents and the disabled ex-combatants cope with their new situations? In all this there arose expectation from the government (from both the parents and disabled ex-combatants)<sup>253</sup>

The wider community was not primed to be adaptive and accommodative of the ex-combatants. This made the reintegration process- particularly that of disabled ex-combatants- difficult. Conscientizing the community would also have enabled it to appreciate the security, politico-military and socio-economic imperatives of successfully reintegrating the former combatants. The lack of sensitizing the wider society might explain the continuing antagonistic relationship that exists between the ex-combatants and the society as a whole in Zimbabwe.

The demobilization and reintegration process was not gender-aware. While the inadequacies of the “impetuously designed” demobilisation and civil reintegration

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*to address the problem*

<sup>253</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

programme resulted in the suffering of the generality of ex-combatants some female ex-combatants faced additional reintegration constraints by virtue of being seen to have played unwomanly liberation war roles.<sup>254</sup> Participating in the war had a culturally modernizing and liberating influence on female combatants. Women combatants had learnt to be respected within military ranks, to speak their minds and put on trousers instead of the established dresses and skirts. They returned when few women wore trousers; they were outspoken and aggressive. This shocked the local culture. They were given the tag of loose women because the only recognition of women who were outspoken, aggressive and wore trousers was a prostitute. Civilian men broadly stigmatized female ex-combatants as being “too independent, rough, ill educated and unfeminine to be good wives.”<sup>255</sup>

Women ex-combatants had problems relating to “stigma” and needed counselling on “how to walk, dress, relate to their peers and the importance of acquiring education and staying with their parents.”<sup>256</sup> It was difficult for women ex-combatants to revert to the old fashioned type of women. A former Director of Social Welfare knew of “one young female ex-combatant (who) shunned all her female former combatant friends so that it would appear as if she was here all along”<sup>257</sup> in order to brighten her chances of getting married. Major. Agrippa Gava (ret.), a former director of the ZNLWVA, disputed this

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<sup>254</sup> M. Musemwa, “The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993”, in J. Cilliers, ed, *Demobilization and Reintegration of former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.50

<sup>255</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 22 November 1981 “Are men fighting shy of marrying the guerilla girls?”

<sup>256</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

<sup>257</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

account “because female liberation war veterans have families like any other civilian woman, marital problems and divorces like any other civilian women.”<sup>258</sup>

The situation was exacerbated for those female ex-combatants who had to return to their homes with “fatherless” children, some allegedly fathered by high ranking officers. This was perceived as uncustomary in the African tradition. Where the community rejoiced at the safe return of male ex-combatants it, simultaneously, frowned upon female ex-combatants. Instead of getting sympathy they were reviled despite the fact that some of the putative fathers and husbands had been killed in the liberation war and that civilian girls produced many illegitimate children.<sup>259</sup> The status of some female ex-combatants as single mothers also “thwarted their possibilities of being re-educated, retrained or rehabilitated after the war. In many cases where the father either perished during the war, or denied parental status, women ex-combatants faced a difficult time at independence because of the responsibilities of child care.”<sup>260</sup> Most female ex-combatants who returned with illegitimate children were disowned by their own families and lived as misfits seeking solace in drug and alcohol abuse as government did not offer them specific assistance.<sup>261</sup>

The struggle between patriarchy and matrilineal imperatives manifested itself in the largely conventional patriarchal Zimbabwe society. The latter prevailed against the

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<sup>258</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd.), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare in G. A. Dzinesa with F. Sadomba, “Identity and Exclusion in the Post-War Era: Zimbabwe’s Women Former Freedom Fighters” *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.57

<sup>259</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 29 November 1981 “Liberation the real reward, says Nhongo”

<sup>260</sup> T. Lyons, *Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle*, Trenton, Africa World Press, 2004), p.271



establishment of egalitarian partnerships and full empowerment of women. Major. Agrippa Gava (Retd) noted: “Our (Zimbabwean) society is backward and not educated in as far as war is concerned. It thinks that going to war is a preserve for men.”<sup>262</sup> While during the liberation struggle some women ex-combatants enjoyed relaxed dress codes it was markedly different in the post-independence era. During the war female combatants may have advocated gender equality and, having fought side by side, saw themselves as equals of their male comrades but after the war they were expected to slip back into traditional dress codes, roles and patriarchal conceptions obtaining then.

In the post-independence period the conservative stereotyping of gender-appropriate labour resulted in the downgrading of women combatants’ liberation war contribution to that of “wives and mothers”.<sup>263</sup> Women combatants were marginalized and the DDR process neglected their specific needs according to gender, class, geographic location and physical or mental disabilities. For instance, pregnant female fighters who returned under the UN-repatriation operation were excluded from the demobilization and reintegration programme altogether.<sup>264</sup>

Remarkably, many female ex-combatants left the assembly camps without being officially demobilized thereby forfeiting their entitlement to the two-year allowances and the chance of vocational training.<sup>265</sup> Delays in integrating female ex-combatants into the

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<sup>261</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 28 August 1997 “Ex-combatants cry foul as inquiry unfolds”

<sup>262</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

<sup>263</sup> V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), p.7

<sup>264</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.91

<sup>265</sup> ZIANA, “Demob benefits unclaimed.” 7 November 1981

army dejected some of them into departing prior to formal demobilization.<sup>266</sup> The Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Veterans Compensation Fund set up in 1997 attributed general reluctance among female ex-combatants to seek recompense under the fund as a means of avoiding opening of old wounds and reliving traumatic experiences suffered during the liberation struggle by virtue of them being women. It would, therefore, appear that female ex-combatants self-demobilized in the 1980s in an effort to expedite their severance of ties with a traumatizing military past. Spontaneous demobilization, however, entailed the burden of self-reintegration under difficult socio-economic contexts. The plight of female ex-combatants raises the importance of initiating reintegration programmes that target the ex-combatants themselves in addition to wider societal reorientation that readies the community to accommodate the former combatants.<sup>267</sup> This was not done in Zimbabwe.

In addition to these special categories there were groups that could not be reintegrated. This was a result of the wartime tensions and differences among combatants and politicians mainly in ZANU/ZANLA. Wilfred Mhanda noted that:

While I had registered for demobilization I left in 1981 for further studies in Germany. I returned in 1988 after graduating with a Masters degree. The future was bleak for most of us (former ZIPA commanders). We had been blacklisted and there were no opportunities for us. Those of us who joined the military were dismissed unceremoniously. The political leadership was not comfortable with us. A week after independence 18 of us were arrested. I was only released without charge after going on hunger-strike. The political leadership wanted to settle imagined scores with us. In 1980, people like Godwin Matatu, Rex

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<sup>266</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.91

<sup>267</sup> G. A. Dzinesa with F. Sadomba, "Identity and Exclusion in the Post-War Era: Zimbabwe's Women Former Freedom Fighters" *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p.58

Nhongo, Chiwenga and Shiri tried to mediate so that we rejoin ZANU and the army. Unfortunately the political leadership was against this and nothing materialized. Since I had not obtained my University qualification when I left the University of Rhodesia to join the struggle I chose to go back to school, develop myself and equip myself for life.<sup>268</sup>

These ex-combatants were ostracized and excluded from the formal integration and DDR process. They had to face the prospects of self-reintegration. Ex-ZIPRA combatants who were charged with dissident activities, that shall be discussed later, forfeited their demobilization benefits.<sup>269</sup> Likewise, ex-fighters incarcerated for various convictions, and missed the 30 June 1983 deadline for registration, disqualified themselves from demobilization and reintegration assistance.

#### 3.4.8 *The political context*

Zimbabwe's political landscape did not make possible an uncomplicated DDR. The integration and DDR exercise was also affected by the collapse of the ZANU-ZAPU coalition government, subsequent withdrawal of former ZIPRA forces and apartheid South Africa's destabilization strategy.<sup>270</sup> Assis Malaquias notes that ethno-national identities that predate colonialism remained intact and acted as powerful centrifugal forces that constantly threaten to disintegrate post-colonial states.<sup>271</sup> This was evident in Zimbabwe when ZANU-ZAPU ethnic-based tensions spilled over from the liberation war

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<sup>268</sup> Interview with W. Mhanda, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform Director, 8 June 2004, Harare

<sup>269</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 3 November 1985 "Demob drive winding up"

<sup>270</sup> See G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," in *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.72

<sup>271</sup> A Malaquias, 'Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?' in *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2002, vol. 55, no.2, p.147

era to scamp post-war integration and disarmament. This was partly because the reconciliation policy was not comprehensive. It was limited in focus to black-white racial relations and did not place similar emphasis on the critical Ndebele-Shona relations. The passage of time did not heal the wounds, distrust and tension between ZANU and ZAPU. Apartheid South Africa- the major economic, political and military force in the region- exploited these mutual hostilities to further widen the wedge between the two parties.

The Lancaster House Agreement did not provide for practical disarmament and ZANLA and ZIPRA strategically cached mainly contingency SALW as a security guarantor. The ex-combatants consequently retained their weapons during their lengthy cantonment in the APs. This augmented the likelihood of future instability and violence in the fledgling post-independent state. Armed clashes eventually occurred in the APs between the ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants. The government then disarmed the guerillas following the pronounced Entumbane clash of 9th to 11th November 1980.<sup>272</sup> This was, however, in violation of earlier agreement that the JHC would be responsible for making military decisions.<sup>273</sup> Perceiving disarmament as disparate and designed to buttress the political and military power of the Shona “many ZIPRA guerillas left the armed forces and the camps, joining the ranks of those armed members of the lumpen elements who could be a reservoir of future destabilisation.”<sup>274</sup> These mutinies were spontaneous and were not part

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<sup>272</sup> According to M. Rupiya, “Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 – 1987,” in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.37; additional disarmament strategies included the granting by government on 26 February 1981 of an arms amnesty to civilians and soldiers to hand over weapons to national armories as well as agreement with the government of Zambia for the hand over of all ZIPRA weaponry in that country to the Zimbabwe government.

<sup>273</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.77

<sup>274</sup> H. Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*, (South Africa, New Africa Books, 2003), p51

of ZAPU policy.<sup>275</sup> Zimbabwe later experienced armed dissident activity in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands from 1981 to 1987 during which some former ZIPRA combatants took up arms against the government.

The government responded to this internal security problem by deploying the integrated army units<sup>276</sup> and the specially created North Korean trained 5th Brigade also known as *Gukurahundi* (Shona for “the rain that washes away the chaff from the last harvest, before the spring rains”<sup>277</sup>) to counter the “dissident” menace. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo publicly criticized the intended formation of the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade saying it was aimed at the forcible creation of a one-party state<sup>278</sup> and that “Weapons for Zimbabwe are for all brigades...The entire national army is our *gukurahundi*.”<sup>279</sup> Emerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security (Prime Minister’s Office), contradicted:

The formation of the fifth Brigade was not for imposing the Government’s plans for a one party state...the Government had no programme for a one party state...Being a non-aligned country we have relations with countries in the West and in the East...we have the British training four brigades and the Koreans training the fifth.”<sup>280</sup>

Posterity has revealed that Nkomo’s assertion was not far from the truth. An estimated 10 000 civilians lost their lives and thousands more were harmed during the 5th Brigade’s

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<sup>275</sup> Interview with Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa (Retd), Head of ZIPRA in the Cease-fire Arrangement, 2 April 2004, Harare. Interview with Col. Tshinga J. Dube (Retd), Zimbabwe Defence Industries Managing Director, 1 April 2004, Harare

<sup>276</sup> These included the ZNA’s four brigades, Police Support Unit, Central Intelligence organization and Paratroopers

<sup>277</sup> R. Werbner, *Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family*, (Harare, Baobab, 1992), p.159

<sup>278</sup> *The Herald*, 26 August 1981 “The 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade” (Comment)

<sup>279</sup> *The Chronicle*, 14 September 1981 “Don’t train pupils for military”

<sup>280</sup> Zimbabwe Project, *News Bulletin*, No. 11, October 1981, p.18

campaign as violence and insecurity rocked Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands until the signing of the historic Unity Accord of 1987 by ZANU and ZAPU. This dealt a major blow to post-independence peace and nation building and reconstruction.

Zimbabwe also had to strengthen its defences against apartheid South Africa's "Total National Strategy" against southern African states that were inclined to Marxism and supportive of African liberation and ANC operatives. This strategy, in part, prescribed the military equipping of the RENAMO surrogate forces as well as some dissident elements that launched incursions into Zimbabwe. Information that came out of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed the South African Defence Force's involvement in Zimbabwe.<sup>281</sup> Official procurement of arms largely continued in the post-independence era in order to safeguard newly won independence by ensuring efficient well-equipped defence forces. Gerald Mazarire and Martin R. Rupiya noted:

The overarching framework for demilitarization was abandoned as the threatened state and people undertook rapid militarization in order to deploy forces on two fronts barely two years into independence. This was on the external front in Mozambique along the Beira, Limpopo and Nyamapanda Corridors and inside the country. In the latter case, troop deployment was concentrated in and around Matabeleland.<sup>282</sup>

Against this shift in the security policy framework DDR took a back seat as force expansion took precedence. These security imperatives saw the army being increased by

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<sup>281</sup> For more see D. Dabengwa, "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation" in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), p28. D Martin and P Johnson, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report*, (James Currey, London, 1989), pp51-76.

<sup>282</sup> G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.72

10 000 to 51 519.<sup>283</sup> An accompaniment was an increase in defence expenditure. In 1983 the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development explained:

At present, the vote for Defence is just under 20 per cent. It is conceivable that as demobilization proceeds and nears its completion, the Vote could be cut to just above 10 per cent. As it is, the process of demobilization is not yet complete, and in the present circumstances in which the nation faces security difficulties and problems, it would be imprudent to (de)mobilize as speedily as we had hoped. Hence, therefore, there was never really any question that the Vote would be cut immediately to half its present size.<sup>284</sup>

The relegation of DDR meant that the peace dividend, characterized by the release of resources for social and economically productive projects, envisaged from the process remained elusive in the short-term.

The above internal and external threat perception resulted in the independence government continuing the colonial era state of emergency until July 1990. The Emergency Powers Regulations empowered the government “to curtail personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from arbitrary search or entry.”<sup>285</sup> This violated essential personal freedoms that most people anticipated in independent Zimbabwe and impacted on post-war democratization.

#### 3.4.9 Taking stock of DDR

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<sup>283</sup> *The Sunday Mail*, 11 August 1996 “Why ZNA being downsized”

<sup>284</sup> Zimbabwe, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly*, Vol, 7, No 4, Wednesday 29 June 1983

<sup>285</sup> N. Kriger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.30

Demobilization and reintegration failed to live up to its promise of ensuring the human security of ex-fighters and their dependants. There were immaterial and material benefits, beyond the demobilization package, given by the government. These were notable for their politicized selectivity as a chosen few benefited to the detriment of the common ex-combatant. For instance, the government created the glamorous National Heroes Acre, a burial place for the civilian-political elite and selectively created national heroes whose dependants benefited from the government funded welfare benefits; all at the expense of official oblivion for most of the deceased ordinary liberation war guerrillas.<sup>286</sup> Likewise, the living liberation war heroes were sidelined as their welfare concerns remained unaddressed by the government's failed DDR. An ex-combatant lamented the neglect of living liberation war heroes and absence of remedial action to their human insecurity:

Now that heroes' holiday is here, all we think of is those who died. What about the living? Where will they end? If those who died were alive today they would not be honoured. This is true, Comrades, because we the living are still suffering. The only difference now is that we walk on pavements, not along bush tracks.<sup>287</sup>

A result of the unsuccessful DDR was the desperate existence of many ex-combatants. By the late 1980s poverty was the outstanding fact in the lives of many ex-combatants. This contrasted to the optimistic hope for a prosperous post-war life that they harboured having supped the wartime "land of milk and honey" idyll. The political orientation that the former combatants had received made them believe that attainment of independence was tantamount to the creation of a paradisiacal state.

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<sup>286</sup> R Werbner, Werbner R, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe," in Werbner R, ed., *Memory and the post colony: African anthropology and the critique of power*, (London, Zed Books, 1998), p.76

<sup>287</sup> *The Chronicle*, 12 August 1988, "We Have Been Forgotten" (Letter to the Editor)



After financing the burial of ex-combatant Phineal Takaindisa (Mukoma Musa) to avert a pauper's burial in 1997, Brigadier Gibson Mashingaidze criticized government's insensitivity towards the plight of ex-combatants:

Everyone suffered during the war on the understanding that we would be rewarded with a better life when we won independence. But some people now have 10 farms to their names, luxury yachts and have developed fat stomachs when ex-combatants like Musa lived in abject poverty.<sup>288</sup>

Indicators of human insecurity were evident among the ex-combatant population. "Ex-combatants could not afford the land they fought for; they did not qualify for the schools they fought to improve; the industry they fought to change could not absorb them; they had no capital for self-employment; and co-operative ventures lacking financing."<sup>289</sup> S. Chidawanyika remarked:

The (demobilization and reintegration) process was in fact nearly non-existent. It did not take cognisance of the fact that the Freedom Fighter...needed to be looked after so that the dignity of Zimbabwe, Africa and indeed the black race is maintained. Africa cannot maintain its dignity when the very children that rid it of rape, plunder, torture and humiliation moved around barely clothed, fed and loved.<sup>290</sup>

Up to 25 000 ex-combatants were unemployed yet the state maintained gross silence over the issue<sup>291</sup> and made no attempt to address their plight.

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<sup>288</sup> *Masvingo Provincial Star*, 18 April 1997 "Fate of 4 Brigade Boss Unknown"

<sup>289</sup> *The Herald*, 21 March 1988 "25 000 ex-combatants still face misery of unemployment"

<sup>290</sup> Interview with S. Chidawanyika, ZANU PF Director for Information and Publicity, 9 June 2004, Harare

<sup>291</sup> *PARADE*, April 1990

The failed DDR policy and perceived Government's indifference towards their dilemma resulted in some ex-combatants viewing the demobilization and reintegration programme as having been deliberately structured to prevent their economic empowerment and thus ensure the government's control over them. Former combatants were not impressed:

demobilization and reintegration was not only carelessly done but the leadership deliberately wanted to create a poor and starving ex-combatant who would come back to them with a begging bowl for food. The demob(ilization programme) was designed to dump the ex-combatant and monitor him<sup>292</sup>

The (demobilization and reintegration) programme was designed to ensure that ex-combatants would not become self-sufficient and economically independent. This would enable the politicians to control the ex-combatants.<sup>293</sup>

There was no interest in developing a sound conceptual reintegration concept for ex-combatants. What the government did to ex-combatants was like saying: "Thank you for fighting. You have lost opportunities to further your education so go back to school." That is not reintegration. It is alienation....and neglecting.<sup>294</sup>

Against an attempt to make ex-combatants self-sufficient demobilization and reintegration did not foster their economic independence. It made them dependent on the government and vulnerable to its leverage. The government seemed content with this situation. It is not surprising that official silence over the plight of ex-combatants was only broken in March 1988 when Sean Hundermark, a white-non-constituency MP, moved the motion in parliament.<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> Interview with Former Combatant, Wilbert Z. Sadomba, 7 April 2004, Harare

<sup>293</sup> Interview with Endy Mhlanga, Former Secretary General of the ZNLWVA, 5 May 2004, Harare

<sup>294</sup> Interview with W. Mhanda, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform Director, 8 June 2004, Harare

<sup>295</sup> Zimbabwe, *Parliamentary Debates, March 1988, p 3036*. In July 1983 in a contribution to parliament Mr. J. Chinamano had commented: "Very little has been done along these lines (ex-combatant reintegration), for some of the cadres (ex-combatants), the period of getting this (demobilization) allowance has expired, and many more will be on the streets. This is going to be a problem to us, and indeed these are the people who will claim that they did fight for the liberation of this country...the demobilized cadres...are skilled in using the gun. They could use it to obtain food" Zimbabwe, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, Vol, 7, No 16, Thursday 21 July 1983*. These comments did not arouse sustained debate on the plight of ex-combatants then as Sean Hundermark's contribution did in

#### 3.4.10 *The ZNLWVA*

The Unity Accord of 1987 between ZANU and ZAPU ended ZANU PF's use of state machinery in the traditional ethnic conflict. This facilitated the establishment of the ZNLWVA that transcended political, regional and ethnic affiliations in 1989 by the ex-combatants.<sup>296</sup> In addition to the ethnic polarization the government had attempted to officially suppress the establishment of such an association by the politically significant ex-combatants. The fact that efforts to establish the Association intensified at a time when the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement was formed by expelled former ZANU PF Secretary General Edgar Tekere deepened the apprehension of the ruling party and government. Former Minister of Education, Fay Chung, commented:

Many steps had already been taken in the 1980s to lessen the influence and power of the war veterans. War veterans who had not been absorbed into the security forces and the civil service were dispersed through the demobilization process...Those who were demobilized were encouraged to move into civilian life as individuals, with the Government demobilization programme being organized in such a way that war veterans outside of governmental institutions would not be encouraged to remain together. In this way it was hoped that the war veterans would not be able to become independent political players.<sup>297</sup>

Margaret Dongo, an ex-combatant and both pioneer and founder member of the ZNLWVA, noted that “The powers that be, saw the idea of bringing war veterans

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<sup>296</sup> Hitherto, the ethnic polarisation had limited war veterans to the creation of regional and provincial groupings such as the Mashonaland West War Veterans Association.

<sup>297</sup> J. McLaughlin with V. Nhundu, P. Mlambo and F. Chung, *The story of ZIMFEP*, (Harare, ZIMFEP, 2002), p.87

together as a threat to them.”<sup>298</sup> Ironically, as shall be discussed later, the government or ruling party would rely on this same constituency for its future election campaign strategies.

The formation of the ZNLWVA offered ex-combatants the chance to speak with a single voice in pursuit of gaining recognition for their liberation war roles and safeguarding their socio-economic future in Zimbabwe. The aims of the association pointedly reflect the inadequacies of the DDR programme; some of their aims include desires “to influence or petition any public or private authority, organisation or person to provide assistance and special recognition to veterans and their families.”<sup>299</sup> Major. Agrippa Gava (Retd) elaborated:

The main aim has got to do with the situation of the war veterans after independence, that is, their economic situation having lost so many years in the bush. While others were going to school (and) were improving their lives they were outside there but only to find (that) all the promises of independence (were not going to be fulfilled). The suffering, the economic deprivation that they endured actually made the war veterans come together. They had actually been sidelined and forgotten about and therefore you can say the main objective for which the association was formed was to solve the economic plight of the war veterans; to address the livelihood of the war veterans.<sup>300</sup>

This assertion, however, downplays the visible attempts by the government at implementing DDR. The insufficiencies in the demobilization and reintegration process meant the majority of the demobilized were unskilled, unemployed and impoverished.

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<sup>298</sup> Interview with Former Combatant Margaret Dongo, 30 April 2004, Harare

<sup>299</sup> Constitution of the ZNLWVA

<sup>300</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

Zimbabwe's DDR had failed in its fundamental goal of transforming ex-combatants into productive and self-sustaining civilians. The founding of the ZNLWVA provided the ex-combatants with an institutionalized structure and a platform to lobby for government's recognition, welfare support and to become relevant. Consequently the identity of ex-combatants as "war veterans" became entrenched. This was accompanied by the gradual evolution of certain militancy as the ZNLWVA not only sought the recognition and glorification of the liberation roles of its membership. The ex-fighters would mobilize their "war veterans" identity to achieve - at times via violent means and strategic alliance with the ruling ZANU PF party - their economic and political aims.

The Chenjerai Hunzi-led<sup>301</sup> ZNLWVA executive sensitized war veterans about the provisions of the War Victims Compensation Fund (WVCF) established by government in 1980 to cater for all war-injured persons (both ex-combatants and civilians) that they could have recourse to.<sup>302</sup> A sudden rise in the rate of claims for compensation in 1997 and imprudence in the assessment of claimants' degrees of disability resulted.<sup>303</sup> Another shortcoming of the demobilization and reintegration programme was lack of critical government run information and referral centres. This meant that some of the war-injured demobilized were unaware of this fund. A whopping Z\$450 million was released in the

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<sup>301</sup> ZNLWVA Chairman Chenjerai Hunzvi, now late, himself a beneficiary of the fund, was popular among war veterans because he was among the doctors who examined many ex-combatants and recommended them for hefty compensation.

<sup>302</sup> According to the *War Victims Compensation Act (1980)* beneficiaries of the fund include everyone injured during the liberation war before 1<sup>st</sup> March, 1980. Injury must have been caused directly or indirectly by the war and such persons must have been citizens of Zimbabwe at the time they sustained the injuries. In addition to assisting the rehabilitation of the war injured the fund would mitigate the inequalities between the disabled ex-combatants and the disabled ex-RSF who could claim compensation in terms of a Rhodesian Act of Parliament.

<sup>303</sup> Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Administration of the War Victims Compensation Act, p.30

last 8 months of the 1996/97 financial year alone<sup>304</sup> to mostly undeserving, comfortably employed and well provided-for beneficiaries including government ministers, serving police and military officers. It also emerged that there were no specific guidelines for medical doctors who examined the claimants- particularly those with invisible and subjective injuries such as stress, poor hearing and nightmares- and that other doctors were unprofessional and this had undermined and compromised the exercise.<sup>305</sup>

The government temporarily suspended the WVCF in March 1997 and President Mugabe appointed a judiciary commission to inquire and report on the fund's administration between 14th November 1980 and 30th April 1997. The suspension aimed to stop further abuse of the fund by re-vetting each application before it was approved for payment and by reviewing procedures in the processing of new files to ensure the acceptance of genuine claims.<sup>306</sup> Notwithstanding this, many war veterans were logically infuriated as the fund had become their most important escape route from destitution following problematic reintegration. This created an explosive situation and the government soon found itself at loggerheads with disgruntled ex-combatants who held rolling protests against perceived bureaucratic bungling and mistreatment.<sup>307</sup> As one disaffected war veteran put it:

We have waited for 16 years for the dust to settle and we can no longer wait. These guys (government) are just a bunch of crooks. What we want is our money so we can live normal lives like them. If they don't give us, we will go

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<sup>304</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 10 July 1997 "Gvt bows to war veterans"

<sup>305</sup> Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Administration of the War Victims Compensation Act, p.31

<sup>306</sup> Press Statement by the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, The Honourable Florence Chitauro, M.P. on the War Victims Compensation Fund: 3rd July, 1997

<sup>307</sup> R. Werbner, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post-wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe," in R. Werbner, ed., *Memory and the Post-Colony*, (London, Zed Books, 1998), p.81

down fighting until the end.<sup>308</sup>

The suspension of the Fund was the last straw for the unemployed and disillusioned war veterans. In effect, it became the launching pad for the ZNLWVA to seek redress from the state. The war veterans dramatized this through nation-wide demonstrations. The ZNLWVA explained:

...The association was trying to use diplomacy to try and convince the leadership (government) that there was need for their (war vets) recognition. It appears that the leadership continued to resist and it escaped by arguing that everybody had fought the war and if they were going to give to war veterans they would have set a wrong precedent. But it was a false argument because even during World War One and World War Two countries turned to war planning economically and industrially and women began to be employed in factories manufacturing goods for the war. We are not saying that people did not play a role but the most absurd and most painful situation in post independent Zimbabwe for a war veteran was that the government, which had been brought to power by the suffering of a liberation war veteran was paying pensions to the Rhodesian soldier for having killed war veterans during the war, for having bombed them at Chimoio, at Nyadzonya, raped our mothers and all the atrocities that were committed by the Rhodesian soldier. Such a situation was unacceptable to the war veterans but they were patient for a very long time and their patience was maybe misconstrued to be cowardice. But they had all the hope that government would do something but the government resisted. This is why war veterans went into the streets to demonstrate.<sup>309</sup>

In the capital the protests included stopping by the gates of the presidential residency (State House and Zimbabwe House), demonstration outside the presidential offices (Munhumutapa Building) during the course of a cabinet meeting, demonstrating at the African-African American Summit and disruption of Heroes Day commemorations at the National Heroes Acre.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 25 July, 1997 “Demos: War veterans fire warning shots”

<sup>309</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

<sup>310</sup> *The Herald* (Comment), 13 August, 1997

The militarily capable war veterans derived their legitimacy from having participated in the liberation struggle and remain a politically significant constituency. Norma J. Kriger pointed out that with the war veterans “Representing themselves as the conscience of the nation and an embodiment of the ideals of the liberation struggle, they pose a potential threat to the legitimacy of a government that itself relies on its war credentials for legitimacy.”<sup>311</sup> Their security sensitivities also came to the fore when one considered that the country’s defence and security arms were under the command of fellow ex-combatants. This would make it difficult for the government of the day to order the security forces to suppress the justified protests of their erstwhile war veterans. Against a background of a violent land reform programme and 2000 parliamentary election campaign political analyst, Admore Kambudzi, however, later argued:

Any sane government can deal with them (war veterans) without the slightest problem. The police will simply arrest them, and if they resist, then there will always be the army to subdue them. They do not have the military capacity to resist. All they are doing is to take advantage of the chaotic situation so they get everything within the shortest possible time.<sup>312</sup>

This adds another dimension to the debate. Notwithstanding this, the war veterans (and party youth) had by then become the ruling ZANU PF party’s political campaign vanguard and election agents. The ruling party mobilized these groups and conveniently used them as tools to safeguard its political survival. The partisan police would still maintain their distance.

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<sup>311</sup> N.J. Kriger, “The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity” in N. Bhebe and T Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), p.162



Through its failure to guarantee the human security of ex-combatants, Zimbabwe's DDR had failed to realize its promise of positively contributing to political stability and peace building. The President- out of political expediency and to ensure and prolong his regime's survival rather than economic considerations -awarded the riotous war veterans grants and pensions to defuse a potentially explosive situation. This eventually entailed granting over 52 000 war veterans one-off Z\$50 000 gratuities and Z\$2 000 (revisable and tax-free) monthly pensions each at an estimated cost of over Z\$4.5 billion.<sup>313</sup> Coincidentally, the President is also patron of the ZNLWVA.

While mollifying the war veterans the award of gratuities and pensions negatively impacted the economy and national stability. The shrinking economy that registered an average growth of 1.5% had not created a surplus that could cater for these unbudgeted funds.<sup>314</sup> Efforts by government to raise the amount through special taxation on incomes, fuel, electricity and other commodities ignited nationwide demonstrations in December 1997. These protests forced the government to withdraw most of the taxes except sales tax. The ultimate payment by government of the pensions resulted in the Zimbabwe dollar collapsing against the world's major currencies, shedding more than 73 per cent of its value.

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<sup>312</sup> *The Daily News*, 23 November 2000 "Unruly fighters putting fingers in every pie"

<sup>313</sup> G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," in *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.75. They refer to this as "The Second Policy on Demobilization and Reintegration". According to *The Herald*, 9 April 2004, "Senior Police Officer Arrested" the monthly pensions have been increased to Z\$252 855 as we write.

<sup>314</sup> G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and*

These events were long-term ramifications of the programmatic gaps inherent in the 1980s demobilization and reintegration programme. Paul Themba Nyathi commented:

One of the weakest elements within that programme was failure to carry out a comprehensive Needs Survey and evaluation. We ended up with a piecemeal attempt at reintegration. This piecemeal attempt ended in ex-combatants being angry, concluding that they were being neglected. This led to the 1997 payouts, which led to the economic collapse from which our economy has never recovered.<sup>315</sup>

Contradictions are manifest in this “second policy on demobilization and reintegration”. In announcing the scheme President Mugabe expressed that he wished the lives of war veterans would transform from “that of dire-circumstances of poverty and begging that characterised the lives of many an ex-combatant.”<sup>316</sup> In spite of ensuring regime security by buying the peace of the violent war veterans and its attempt to alleviate their plight by providing them with economic securities the implementation of the 1997 demobilization and reintegration scheme negatively impacted the broader human security.

The effects on the fragile economy of hyperinflation and skyrocketing prices occasioned sudden and hurtful disruptions to the lives of the country’s general population. This resulted in a fresh wave of popular urban unrest and instability. The violent food riots of January 1998 cost eight people their lives and left a trail of destruction of property estimated at tens of millions of dollars. Because of the spontaneous nature of the riots, the Zimbabwe Republic Police alone could not cope. The army was invited to help in the

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*Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, pp.75-76

<sup>315</sup> Interview with Hon. P.T. Nyathi, M.P., Former Zimbabwe Project Director, 1 June 2004, Harare. The Zimbabwe Project (ZP) was established in 1978 by the Bethlehem fathers and the Catholic Institute for International Relations to provide relief assistance to Zimbabwe’s refugee population in camps in neighbouring Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. After independence, ZP acceded to the Zimbabwe government requests to render assistance in general but mainly training and education aid to the returning ex-combatants in particular.

<sup>316</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 28 August 1997 “Huge payouts for ex-fighters”

quelling of the riots. Since they are not trained for civic duties, it is not surprising that in some instances the army's operations were high-handed and flagrantly abused the civil rights of Zimbabweans.

The growing food insecurity created social pressures which aggravated the already precarious political and economic situation, thus producing an extremely volatile situation. The price hikes of basic commodities (staple maize meal by 45 per cent) partly induced by the war veterans' payouts and collapse of the dollar would also affect the same constituency just like the ordinary civilians.

The War Veterans "Pensions and Benefit Scheme" was later well documented and legally enshrined in the Statutory Instruments 280 and 281 of 1997 and expanded to entitle registered war veterans to gratuity, settlement, loan, education, funeral and medical benefits at the state's expense.<sup>317</sup> According to the statutes, an eligible veteran is broadly defined as someone who;

underwent military training and participated, consistently and persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between the 1st January, 1962 and the 29th February, 1980, in connection with the bringing about of Zimbabwe's independence on 18th April, 1980.

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<sup>317</sup> In addition to the one-off gratuity and monthly pensions, war veterans on application, were to be entitled to free land. The loan benefit was supposed to see veterans intent on establishing income generating projects acquire interest free loans upon applying to the government funded War Veterans Board. The education benefit facility would provide for the provision of full tuition fees and levies, prescribed texts and stationary, full boarding fees and other reasonable incidental expenses in the circumstances of a government school to applicant veterans and their dependants. Under the Regulations, free medical and dental treatment at a government medical institution should be provided to a war veteran and his/her dependants. Lastly, by virtue of being declared liberation war heroes, all deceased war veterans would be entitled to a funeral grant at the same rate as the funeral benefit payable to civil servants.

and registered in terms of the War Veterans Regulations of 1997.<sup>318</sup> The official definition, with its classification of ‘legitimate’ war veterans as people who participated in the struggle “which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries”, appears to have been tailor-made to incorporate the ruling party and government hierarchy. Most of these had been stationed at the guerilla bases in neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia, which, albeit crucial to the execution of the liberation struggle, were far removed from the battlefield.

The definition, with no provision for class differences among the war veterans, entailed that the ‘chefs,’ -some of whom had been implicated in the WVCF saga and the comfortably employed veterans were to enjoy similar compensation as their destitute compatriots. In stressing that one needed have undergone training the definition resulted in the systematic exclusion of civilian claimants to the title of “war veteran” such as ex-political detainees and war collaborators. It also appears the definition, by emphasizing “participated, consistently and persistently”, was carefully constructed to exclude some opposition veteran nationalists like ZANU’s first president, later turned arch-rival, Ndabaningi Sithole.

The government established the Ministry of State in the President's Office responsible for War Veterans Affairs in 1997 to implement specific provisions of the War Veterans (Pensions and Benefits Scheme) Regulations. The department argued that it proactively and efficiently carried out its mandate including the War Veterans Registration exercise

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<sup>318</sup> *Statutory Instrument 280 of 1997*

and administration of the War Veterans Benefit Scheme.<sup>319</sup> However, the ZNLWVA condemned the department as being “non-functional and a ministry of officials who are there to get their pay during the month end and have not been able to solve the problems of war veterans before war veterans approached them.”<sup>320</sup>

Despite this, the scheme reignited debate on whether war veterans were a special group and if the fight for freedom should be rewarded in financial terms. Masipula Sithole, a political analyst, concisely advanced this viewpoint: “You cannot reward a freedom fighter, you can reward mercenaries, the fight for freedom is priceless, the reward to a freedom fighter is freedom itself.”<sup>321</sup> The ZNLWVA, however, argued:

They say the fight for freedom has no price and it is a true case there is no price at all. What we are saying to that person (critic) is while another person [war vet] was fighting for his/her liberation he/she (critic) was going to school and the fact is that the liberation fighter missed the appropriate time that he should have gone to school. While that critic bought goods and a (residential) stand in Rhodesia that fighter who went to war in 1965 or 1970 or thereabout had no opportunity to do that. That critic has led a normal healthy life, and has not experienced the pain and hard conditions of the bush - disease, rain down pours- that liberation fighters went through. It is only people who are shortsighted and short-minded who think that reinstating war veterans in civilian life is equated to a price. There is no price at all. We are saying somebody has lost time and that social justice must prevail.<sup>322</sup>

S. Chidawanyika commented:

A Freedom Fighter or Liberator is a person who should be regarded a priceless aspect by society. Since this generation came through the choice of destiny and deity, it needs to be recognized for the importance that they deserve. Much more

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<sup>319</sup> Interview with Brigadier R. Ruwodo, Director of War Veterans, 4 October 1999, Harare

<sup>320</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

<sup>321</sup> *The Financial Gazette*, 27 November 1997, “The Fight For Freedom Has no Price”

<sup>322</sup> Interview with Maj. Agrippa Gava (Retd), then ZNLWVA Director, 29 February 2000, Harare

systematic planning needs to have been done to ensure that this rare species of Africa's best retained its dignity.<sup>323</sup>

Government's DDR programme had failed to reintegrate the ex-combatants as part of the broader post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes that would have also benefited the community at large.

However, no specific initiatives were made by the government to appraise the broader society of the negative security effects of a botched demobilization and reintegration process. The War Veterans "Pensions and Benefit Scheme" elevated war veterans to a level where the wider community saw them as a special clique; this perception would mean alienation and hostility from the broader society that bore the brunt of the subsequent economic meltdown. Another domino effect of the implementation of the Scheme was agitation by the Zimbabwe Ex-Political Prisoner, Detainees and Restrictes Association (ZEPPDRA) and the war collaborators association for similar benefits. While initially maintaining that there will be no specific compensation for these classes outside of the provisions of the War Victims Compensation Act in March 2005 the government gave in and authorized monthly pensions for the self-same. Coming in the run-up to the March 2005 parliamentary elections it has been easy for analysts to label this as a populist move driven by political objectives against an already pressured public fiscus.<sup>324</sup>

The government has managed to implement specific provisions of the War Veterans (Pensions and Benefits Scheme) Regulations through the Ministry of State in the

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<sup>323</sup> Interview with S. Chidawanyika, ZANU PF Director for Information and Publicity, 9 June 2004, Harare

President's Office responsible for War Veterans Affairs established in 1997. Following a vetting exercise, “all registered war veterans were in December 1997 paid the lump sum gratuities of Z\$50 000 and have since then been receiving their monthly Z\$2 000 pensions.”<sup>325</sup> Press reports have revealed that some bogus ex-combatants exploited the loopholes in the vetting and registration process and received the gratuities, continued pensions and benefits. Numerous court cases have since confirmed this. Some authentic ex-combatants “failed” the vetting and registration exercise or were not even vetted due to various factors.

A notable development was the establishment of the Zimbabwe National Association of Liberation War Veteran Cadres (ZNALWVC), by disgruntled people who were denied the status of war veterans. The ZNALWVC argued that its membership of about 3 000 underwent military training including drills, bush craft, weapon handling, guerrilla tactics and intelligence gathering and carried out war duties as couriers, sentries, security personnel and medical assistants. In 2001 it won a High Court order for the ministry of defence to vet and register its membership and recognise them as war veterans to enable them to qualify for war veteran benefits.

The year 2000 saw war veterans becoming militant around the land redistribution issue. The government’s snail-paced and ambiguous land settlement policy had not satisfied the war veterans who were demanding a fast-track land settlement programme, especially as land was central to the liberation war. Tapera Knox Chitiyo made a salient point: “The

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<sup>324</sup> See *The Financial Gazette*, 3 March 2005 “Payout binge”; *The Standard*, 26 September 2004 “Mujibhas win battle for compensation - Economists warn of economic disaster”

land question is both a cause and consequence of Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation, the Second Chimurenga (1966-1980)."<sup>326</sup> Myriad impediments including legal constraints, drought, lack of technical support, restricted inputs, bureaucracy, unintended beneficiaries, and under utilization variously undermined the progression and productivity of land reform. The war veterans united with civilians in protest against the land policy which did not benefit the mainstream rural poor, including many war veterans.

War veterans viewed government's failure to resettle them as typifying the inadequate demobilization and reintegration programme.

One of the main causes of going to war was the land issue. We should have been given land when we were demobilized after independence and houses to stay in - even small two roomed ones.<sup>327</sup>

I expected to enjoy a good standard of living, having my own house and a piece of land for agricultural purposes.<sup>328</sup>

In the run up to the 2000 parliamentary elections the war veterans seemingly established a strategic partnership with the ruling ZANU PF party against opposition organizations.

A section of ex-combatants chose to dissociate themselves from the ZNLWVA and unscrupulous use of the identity of "war veteran" following the violent 2000

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<sup>325</sup> Interview with Brigadier R. Ruwodo, Then Director of War Veterans, 4 October 1999, Harare

<sup>326</sup> T.K. Chitiyo, *Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and war Veterans Debate* , Occasional Paper, *Track Two*, Vol. 9, No 1, 2000, p.2

<sup>327</sup> Interview with Former Combatant, Ellen Nomatter John-Masoka, 31 March 2004, Harare

<sup>328</sup> Interview with Former Combatant, Alice Masenguridza, 10 March 2004, Harare



parliamentary campaign and “Fast Track” land resettlement exercise. These war veterans formed the *Zimbabwe Liberators Platform* (ZLP) in protest at the anarchy that attended the farm invasions, especially the manipulative use of so-called “war veterans”. The ZLP’s Wilfred Mhanda explained the origins of the organization of which he is the head:

It was officially launched in May 2000 in response to the wave of anarchy, lawlessness and violence in the name of war veterans since the “No” Vote in the February 2000 Referendum. After the resultant betrayal of aspirations of the liberation struggle and erosion of liberation values- freedom, democracy, human dignity, social justice and peace- we felt that it was necessary to restore the image of war veterans. Its membership is predominantly former liberation fighters- about 75%. As its name implies it does not subscribe that only those who carried guns are liberation fighters. Everyone who contributed in one form or another including people in the rural areas, trade unions, churches, war collaborators are all liberators. Without their support it would have been impossible to wage the war. Beyond all these everyone who subscribes to the original ideals of the liberation struggle- freedom, democracy, human dignity, social justice and peace- is free to join.<sup>329</sup>

The ZLP protested that most of those who identified themselves as war veterans and participated in the violent farm invasions and 2000 parliamentary campaign were government agents and were far too young to have fought in the liberation struggle. Likewise it dismissed the war veterans involved in the farm seizures as cowards for attacking unarmed civilians during peacetime, claiming they had turned from liberators to oppressors.

The Daily News commented on how ZNLWVA members became perceived as a threat to the general population’s human security: “Such is the reputation of terror Hunzvi and war veterans have garnered for themselves (that) just a hint of their presence in any area

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<sup>329</sup> Interview with W. Mhanda, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform Director, 8 June 2004, Harare

strikes the fear of God in the hearts of the ordinary people.”<sup>330</sup> This contradicted the liberation ideology and objectives of achieving democracy with its endorsement of personal security as well as freedoms of political choice and affiliation. A citizen lamented how some ZNLWVA members reversed the ostensible gains of liberation:

We no longer have the freedom they fought for because they have taken it away from us – we have no freedom of expression and association. More than 30 people died at the hands of the so-called war veterans and Zanu PF supporters just because they supported the MDC.<sup>331</sup>

The manipulative use of ZNLWVA members as the ruling party’s vanguard can be traced back to the failed reintegration process that did not comprehensively address the land issue and also created a destitute war veteran population which was dependent on the state. Having belatedly secured some financial recompense the war veterans might also have feared that an opposition government would reverse these gains. Chenjerai Hunzvi, conveniently mobilized some war veterans to save the desperate ruling ZANU PF from parliamentary electoral defeat as well as a security guarantee against pending litigation for his alleged defrauding of the WVCF. The ruling party’s unpopularity had been demonstrated by the rejection of the government sponsored draft constitution.

The aggregate effect was the alienation of the war veterans from the ordinary people and international community. The intense local and international publicity under which the war veterans participated in the violent land reform programme damaged the reputation of the ZNLWVA. This undermined prospects of donor assistance for its projects.

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<sup>330</sup> *The Daily News*, 29 November 2000 (Comment)

<sup>331</sup> *The Daily News*, 29 August 2000 (Letter to the Editor)

### 3.5 Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The way in which the repatriation and resettlement of refugees was conducted in Zimbabwe demonstrated the connections between the process and DDR. Zimbabwe's liberation war displaced people internally and internationally across the country's borders. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the cessation of hostilities Zimbabwe's repatriation and resettlement programme broadened the classic "concept" of refugee to include about 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>332</sup> This was in addition to the classical refugees who had to be repatriated from Mozambique (150 000), Zambia (40 000-45 000) and Botswana (26 000). Resettlement assistance was essential given that the refugees' "Family ties are broken, property is lost, one's means of survival are abandoned, and the whole social fabric is threatened with disintegration."<sup>333</sup> The conflict-terminating Lancaster House Agreement restricted cross-border military activity and movement of troops. It, however, provided for the return of refugees of voting age to Rhodesia in order to vote in the independence elections and of civilian ZANU and ZAPU personnel to engage in peaceful political activity. A comprehensive strategy embracing the repatriation and resettlement elements was subsequently implemented in order to achieve a durable solution. From the onset, Non-State Actors such as UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Christian Care played a significant

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<sup>332</sup> J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *Introduction: When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.134; *The Sunday Mail*, 24 May 1981

<sup>333</sup> S.T. Makanya, "The Desire to return: Effects of Experiences in Exile on Refugees Repatriating to Zimbabwe in the Early 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.114

role in heightening human security through the provision of assistance to uprooted people alongside the government.

### *3.5.1 Lancaster House Agreement: Facilitating or Impeding Repatriation and Resettlement?*

The Lancaster House Agreement elaborated the repatriation operation. Operative Paragraph 19 of Annex D stated:

Many thousands of Rhodesian citizens are at present living outside the country. Most of them wish to return and it will be desirable that as many people as possible should do so in order to vote in the election. The return of all refugees will be a task requiring careful organization. But a start should be made in enabling the refugees to return to their homes as soon as possible; and the British Government will be ready to assist with the process. The task of effecting the return of all refugees will need to be completed by the independence government in co-operation with the governments of the neighbouring countries.<sup>334</sup>

The Agreement, therefore, essentially provided for the first phase of the repatriation and resettlement process, that is, the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries. This was in resonance with the UNCHR mandate of assisting typical refugees defined as those persons who are outside their home countries as a result of varied circumstances including feared persecution, armed conflict, violence and foreign aggression.

Zimbabwe's post-independence UNHCR repatriation operation followed the principle of recognizable positive changes in the country of origin:

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<sup>334</sup> Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, Paragraph 19 of Annex D (The Pre-Independence Arrangements)

Recent developments in Zimbabwe, followed by the accession to independence of that country on 18 April 1980, may duly be considered as events which make the above-mentioned cessation clauses (to refugees) applicable to Zimbabweans abroad. These clauses are contained in paragraph 6 A(e) of the UNHCR Statute, and Article 1.C(5) of the 1941 Convention.<sup>335</sup>

The following section will deal with the institutional framework that was established to develop and implement the repatriation and resettlement programmes.

### *3.5.2 Institutional Framework*

At the British government's request the UNHCR provided the overarching institutional framework for the formal repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees from Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana between January 1980 and June 1981. It also coordinated, but did not finance, the integrated programme that embraced IDPs. The UNHCR, as the UN's agency mandated to address refugee situations, had experience and competence in the repatriation of refugees. It also had impartiality credentials that created the trust and confidence of the parties and the refugees. The High Commissioner had, earlier on, revealed UNHCR's preparedness to carry out Zimbabwe's repatriation: "During 1979, refugees, in large numbers, returned to Burma, to Nicaragua, to Zaire, to Angola. Refugees are returning to Uganda, movements back to Equatorial Guinea are just starting and UNHCR stands ready to assist with the return of Zimbabweans."<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> UNHCR Memorandum on Status of Zimbabweans abroad, January 14, 1981 in M. Zieck, *UNHCR and voluntary repatriation of refugees: a legal analysis*, (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1997) p.37

<sup>336</sup> UNHCR, High Commissioner's Address to Staff, Delivered at Headquarters on Wednesday, 19th December 1979

On 15 January 1980, the UNHCR held a meeting in Salisbury for all Heads of Christian Denominations (HOD) to seek the cooperation of the church in the repatriation programme, in particular, the resettlement operation which was beyond UNHCR's ambits. In a separate meeting the HOD, upon agreeing that the church had the experience, manpower as well as the organizational wherewithal to become involved, agreed that<sup>337</sup>:

- The HOD should be the coordinating body of the churches' involvement
- An Advisory Council consisting of experienced workers in the field of Refugee Resettlement- small in number- be appointed by the HOD
- Christian Care should hold the funds allocated by the UNHCR for the process

A contract was subsequently signed between UNHCR and Christian Care that outlined the process- UNHCR would bring people across the borders to the reception camps and Christian Care would handle the movement of returnees from the reception and transit centres to their homes and resettlement sites.<sup>338</sup> The UNHCR endorsed the HOD decision and appointed Christian Care to be responsible for funds it allocated to the refugee repatriation programme.

Christian Care thus became one of the UNHCR's main invited implementing partners- particularly in the resettlement programme as this was outside the UNHCR's mandate. A special Christian Care Refugee Office (CCRO) was set up at the Presbyterian Church Centre from 21 January 1980. The Presbyterian Church Centre was bombed on 15 February 1980 resulting in the relocation of the CCRO to the Salvation Army

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<sup>337</sup> Minutes of a Meeting of Head of Christian Denominations Held at the School of Social Work on Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> January 1980 following the Meeting with United Nations High Commission for Refugees Representatives at 3PM. Christian Care Files

headquarters. The nature of the CCRO's tasks resulted in the HODs approving the appointment of a full time refugee officer for Christian Care. The Salvation Army supplied a book-keeper while two accountants volunteered their professional services. The CCRO was manned mornings only during weekdays and fulltime during weekends by voluntary church workers who assisted the refugee officer with programme coordination.

UNHCR settled for church assistance due the delicate nature of the political situation; although the country was then being run by supposedly impartial British governor, the refugees would still be wary of the internal colonial authorities who still staffed the entire civil service and from whom they had fled. This would undermine the credibility of the entire operation.<sup>339</sup> It was crucial that the process "be overseen by someone who was acceptable to the different parties. The UNHCR therefore preferred that the church do it."<sup>340</sup> Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera, however, noted:

Unfortunately the church found itself between the horns of two bulls. The involvement of clerics like Muzorewa in politics made the church vulnerable to ex-combatants. There was a love-hate-relationship. The World Council of Churches (had) sponsored the Patriotic Front. So the church was in a state of hesitation.<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Interview with Father Edward Rogers, Former Christian Care Chairman, 6 April 2004, Harare

<sup>339</sup> R. J. Southall, "Resettling the Refugees," *Africa Report*, November/December 1980, Vol. 25, No. 6, p.48

<sup>340</sup> Interview with Reverend Shirley De Wolfe, Institute for Peace, Leadership and Governance, Africa University Lecturer, 25 May 2004, Harare

<sup>341</sup> Interview with Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera, United Church of Christ in Zimbabwe President, Former Zimbabwe Council of Churches General Secretary, 21 April 2004, Harare

Christian Care's involvement was thus not without its own problems. Notwithstanding this, Christian Care critically supported the resettlement programme and assisted the IDPs who were outside the UNHCR's mandate. Its long-standing tradition of providing humanitarian assistance, network of intelligence and support critically enhanced the institutional arrangements and chances of the programme's success. Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera also noted that:

Churches were part of the struggle. They were also in London during the Lancaster House negotiations. I was part of the church lobby group at Lancaster that met Nkomo, Muzorewa and Mugabe- the leaders of the three teams- to lobby the politicians to reach an agreement...Repatriation was discussed at Lancaster. They knew about the impending repatriation of refugees. There was adequate time. There was, however, fear of what they were to do.<sup>342</sup>

Shirley De Wolfe also pointed out that:

The Church had provided support to victims of war and the refugee camps in neighbouring countries in which liberation forces had also been. The Lancaster House Agreement was signed in December 1979. There was a very short time for repatriation to start. The Heads of Christian Denominations was mobilized. It made use of different church-based organizations such as Christian Care and individual missions closer to the border areas. The Church also provided their personnel. I worked for the Methodist Church and we set up a Reception Centre at Old Umtali, Africa University's current site.<sup>343</sup>

Repatriation was conducted under the tripartite agreement framework between the UNHCR, Christian Care and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs negotiated from 15-20 January 1980. This enabled the creation of a conducive relationship and close cooperation between government, humanitarian agencies and civil society. An Operation

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<sup>342</sup> Interview with Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera, United Church of Christ in Zimbabwe President, Former Zimbabwe Council of Churches General Secretary, 21 April 2004, Harare

<sup>343</sup> Interview with Reverend Shirley De Wolfe, Institute for Peace, Leadership and Governance, Africa



Refugee Committee that included the UNHCR, CCRO, Ministry of Home Affairs and Social Affairs Department was subsequently set up and it facilitated coordination among the various stakeholders.<sup>344</sup>

As parties to the Lancaster House Agreement that was specific on the repatriation operation the Patriotic Front (PF) had a legitimate interest in the formulation and implementation of the programme. Their incorporation was also critical considering that ZANU and ZAPU powerfully controlled the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries. PF involvement was assured by PF liaison officers who worked with the UNHCR.<sup>345</sup>

Reception centres were set up at the borders. These were the places of first arrival of refugees from outside the country. Upon arrival at the reception centres every returnee was given a “Welcome Home” leaflet that was prepared by the UNHCR and CCRO in three languages - English, Shona and Ndebele - that informed the refugees on the repatriation operation and the nature of UNHCR, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Christian Care assistance. The arrival formalities involved a customs search and identity and medical checks. After completing these formalities the returnees were transported to their home destinations or transit centres.

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University Lecturer, 25 May 2004, Harare

<sup>344</sup> Interview with Father Edward Rogers, Former Christian Care Chairman, 6 April 2004, Harare

<sup>345</sup> Notes on a meeting with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 10/01/80 at the Monomotapa Hotel 6.00pm. Christian Care Files

Transit centres were established further inland to facilitate transfer of repatriates whose homes were not accessible directly from the reception centres or those who were uncertain of the location of their families and conditions in home areas. Transit centres also provided temporary shelter to those whose homes had been destroyed. The returnees were assisted with postage-free correspondence materials. The expertise of the ICRC was invaluable in returnees locating their family members. Christian Care units dispatched refugees from reception centres to transit centres. Voting facilities were provided at the church-supervised transit centres to enable the inhabitants to participate in the election. The environment in the Transit Centres was relaxed as there were no heavy security restrictions.

Where necessary, Mission Centres were also established by leading denominational churches in specific localities to decentralize the concentration of refugees at Transit Centres. Mission Centres critically provided relief accommodation for refugees who were reconstructing their destroyed homes. Food and other supplies were provided at these centres that remained operational for close to a year after independence.

The Governor had overall responsibility over the repatriation and resettlement process. A British monitoring team assessed the progression of the whole programme. A typical reception centre set-up comprised teams in the following table:

**Table 3.5: Repatriation Teams and Tasks**

<b>TEAM</b>	<b>TASK(S)</b>
UNHCR (Two representatives in each of the main camps-Tegwani and Umtaliu and one at the other centres)	In charge of each camp
Department of Social Affairs	Physical needs of the refugees such as food and Travel Allowances
Ministry of Home Affairs	Registration of refugees, Immigration and Customs procedures
Ministry of Health	Medical needs of the refugees
ICRC	Tracing of the refugees relatives as well as medical facilities
Christian Care	Dispatching refugees to their destinations

The UNHCR financed the following:

- to the Department of Social Affairs,; the running costs for running the reception centres (food and other supplies), transport costs of refugees from reception centres
- to Christian Care: the necessary costs after leaving the reception centres (shelter, food, basic care and transportation to other mission centres or home destinations, running dispatch units in the reception centres)

An elaborate book-keeping and accounting system was put in place to ensure efficient and transparent management of the funds. For instance, each transit centre was supplied with payment vouchers in which all local disbursements were to be recorded. The vouchers were supposed to be signed by recipients or receipted invoices obtained by the transit centres in the event of cash payments. The payment vouchers were supposed to detail the goods bought and state the amounts and taxes paid. All transit centres were

required to register incoming and outgoing returnees and submit the numbers to the Refugee Office on a weekly basis as this formed the basis of funding.

The repatriation and resettlement programme was conducted in three stages. The first phase- dubbed “repatriation of refugees” - was implemented from January 1980 to election time. The resettlement component was hastily cobbled up as the UNHCR gave Christian Care “only just over a week” to start implementing the programme.<sup>346</sup> The second phase ran from April 1980 to November 1980. It began after six weeks of preparation and “was slower, better planned and involved much more consultation with the government...”<sup>347</sup> Phase III focused on the reintegration and rehabilitation of the returnees.

### *3.5.3 Roll out of Repatriation and Resettlement*

#### *Phase 1*

The first phase of the programme concentrated on the repatriation of refugees in the pre-election period. During this period the UNHCR coordinated the voluntary repatriation of between 34 000 and 36 000 Zimbabwean refugees from camps in neighbouring

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<sup>346</sup> Notes for a meeting of Heads of Denominations and Voluntary Agencies with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) at the School of Social Work, Salisbury, 15/01/80. Christian Care Files

<sup>347</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.145

Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia in time for the national independence elections.<sup>348</sup> 20 000-25 000 of these were estimated to be of voting age.<sup>349</sup> This was a small percentage of the total electorate of 2.8 million. Many refugees self-repatriated in advance of the election as shall be discussed in later paragraphs. Repatriation of refugees from Botswana was accomplished during this first phase. Between 21 January and 24 February (two days before the elections) 19 908 refugees were officially repatriated by the UNHCR from Botswana. During the same period the UNHCR also officially repatriated 10 395 and 4 290 refugees from Mozambique and Zambia respectively.

The UNHCR worked in partnership with *Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados em Mocambique* (Nucleo) and Zambian Refugee Council to organize the transportation of refugees from Mozambique and Zambia. Special categories of refugees – the sick, disabled, orphans and school-children - remained behind in Mozambique and Zambia. Their repatriation was to be carried out under the post-election phases of the programme. For school children, this would give parents a head start in resettling and the Ministry of Education a chance to prepare as adequately as possible.<sup>350</sup> This would also not gravely disturb the school children's studies.

Return took place largely on a voluntary basis. The refugees' signed documents stating that they were returning to their country of origin on their own volition. This provided

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<sup>348</sup> J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.144. The numbers of refugees and IDPs has not been determined with exactitude.

<sup>349</sup> J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.144

<sup>350</sup> S. De Wolf, "The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area" *Issue*, Vol XI, No.

refugees with the chance to resume their livelihoods in familiar settings under the protection and care of the independence government. The option to return was made possible by the end of the armed liberation struggle and desire to participate in the independence elections. The refugees had, through the radio, kept abreast of the Lancaster House talks and agreement that provided for voluntary repatriation. Refugees were flush with excitement over the prospect of peace, repatriation and independence elections:

I returned voluntarily since the independent Zimbabwe that we yearned for was materializing. I was not forced to return. Most of the refugees returned voluntarily as they all wanted to live in independent Zimbabwe. I was offered transport and therefore did not encounter any transport problems.<sup>351</sup>

I returned in 1980 because Zimbabwe had become independent. Our return was well-planned and we were provided transport to the reception camps.<sup>352</sup>

I returned in 1980 because our country was getting independent. I was able to vote in the 1980 elections because I was aged 18 and had a valid identification document.<sup>353</sup>

The refugees were transported to 6 reception centres located along Zimbabwe's border areas. These reception centres were established by the Department of Social Affairs in collaboration with relevant health, documentation and assimilation authorities. At these centres repatriates had medical check-ups, were given food, overnight boarding, assistance in the tracing of relatives by the ICRC and registration by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Registration facilitated the returnees to vote in the elections. Church

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<sup>351</sup> ¾, Fall/Winter 1981, p.28

<sup>351</sup> Interview with Former Refugee R. Mutondo, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>352</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Themba Nechako, 5 May 2004, Bromley

representatives welcomed, counseled and briefed the repatriates on the situation in the country. There was, however, no elaborate needs assessment and compilation of the refugees' socioeconomic profiles prior to their dispatch. Father Edgar Rogers commented:

It was difficult to do needs assessment. Repatriation was an emergency operation and there was not sufficient time to go across borders and carry out surveys in the camps. People had to return quickly in time for the elections. Others self-repatriated and did not follow the normal route. Another problem was that there were no accurate statistics. The liberation movements inflated the numbers of refugees.<sup>354</sup>

Shirley de Wolfe noted:

Some sorting out was done but it was not sophisticated. It was very general and was not individually based. For instance it involved finding out how many people in a group had left before completing basic schooling and the nature of training that they would require. Most of the returnees were rural people and it was expected that they would go back to their rural homes. They would then receive UNHCR seed packs with the backing of the government.<sup>355</sup>

Repatriates whose homes were not accessible directly from the reception centres or those whose homes had been destroyed were accommodated and supplied at transit centres.

Christian Care dispatch units sent refugees from reception centres to transit centres and where appropriate to mission centres. Voting facilities were provided at the transit centres to enable the refugees to participate in the election. From the reception and transit centres the repatriates were dispatched to their homes by bus or via individual travel

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<sup>353</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Tafirenyika Soke, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>354</sup> Interview with Father Edward Rogers, Former Christian Care Chairman, 6 April 2004, Harare

warrants. Provision of transport was crucial since the refugees had no access to financial resources during their stay in the refugee camps. The churches' comprehensive intelligence network facilitated the successful linking of refugees with their destination communities. The UNHCR successfully appealed for US\$22 million to implement this phase.<sup>356</sup> It provided the funds for returnees' assistance via Christian Care.

Parallel to UNHCR's formal repatriation programme the refugees created their own informal networks. Greater numbers self-repatriated, without direct UNHCR assistance, compared to the formal repatriation process. This spontaneous return was inspired by the imperatives of evading the screening process operated by Rhodesian security forces and voting in the independence elections. According to the Lancaster House Agreement all returnees were to be screened at the entry points to establish their authenticity. The essence of this provision was to prevent ZANU and ZAPU from infiltrating "guerillas into the country as refugees under the cover of the ceasefire, either to influence unduly or intimidate voters the election or to gain politico-military advantage in the event of a Muzorewa electoral victory."<sup>357</sup> The manpower-constrained CMF would use Rhodesian security officials for the screening. This naturally caused problems.

As the vast majority of returnees were reckoned to be supporters of either ZANU or ZAPU the Rhodesian administration that backed Muzorewa's UANC "was concerned to

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<sup>355</sup> Interview with Reverend Shirley De Wolfe, Institute for Peace, Leadership and Governance, Africa University Lecturer, 25 May 2004, Harare

<sup>356</sup>J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.135

<sup>357</sup> R. J. Southall, "Resettling the Refugees," *Africa Report*, November/December 1980, Vol. 25, No. 6, p48



slow down the repatriation in order to inhibit the anti-Muzorewa vote.”<sup>358</sup> The Rhodesian authorities therefore implemented “a thorough administrative obstruction with the explicit aim of deterring potential voters from returning before the elections.”<sup>359</sup> Given that those who remained outside the country would not take part in the crucial elections “Plans to vote probably precede plans to be repatriated. Those wishing to vote simply *had* to get back within a matter of weeks.”<sup>360</sup> Some refugees who spontaneously returned faced not only the wrath of the Rhodesian security officers but also that of Muzorewa’s auxiliaries who had not been confined to barracks and freely roamed the countryside terrorizing the rural population.<sup>361</sup> While returnees should have had an unimpeded right of return, the Rhodesian bureaucracies infringed upon the smooth return of the refugees in safety and dignity.

The desire to vote in the crucial independence elections was a powerful pull factor that made refugees easily amenable to repatriation once the war had ended. Stella Makanya observed that:

...the high level of political control which the parties that were waging the liberation war had over the refugee camps, and the low level of direct interference by international aid agencies in organizing the activities of refugees in the countries of asylum, made it possible for a strong liberation ideology to be inculcated into the refugee population. This factor, coupled with the limited social and economic assimilation into the economies of the host countries, made

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<sup>358</sup> R. J. Southall, “Resettling the Refugees,” *Africa Report*, November/December 1980, Vol. 25, No. 6, p48

<sup>359</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.144

<sup>360</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” p.144

<sup>361</sup> S.T. Makanya, “The Desire to return: Effects of Experiences in Exile on Refugees Repatriating to Zimbabwe in the Early 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.121

it easier for the collective decision to return home to be made once the political situation that caused the exodus had changed.<sup>362</sup>

Self-repatriation meant that while the conflict that had stimulated flight had ended most refugees returned before the receiving environment had been prepared to accommodate them.

Spontaneous return partly explains why the UNHCR, having officially repatriated 47 000 during the first phase, estimated that only between 50 000-60 000 of the initial total of 250 000 refugees remained outside the country. The PF, who ran the refugee camps in Mozambique and Zambia, could also have inflated the numbers in order to make a stronger case for external aid.<sup>363</sup> The above factors explain the officially unaccounted balance of 100 000 refugees. This meant that the UNHCR was faced with a small refugee population to officially repatriate in the post-independence Phase II.

In addition to the slow start of the repatriation programme that was partly occasioned by deliberate Rhodesian administration red-tape, institutional problems were encountered during Phase I. Repatriation from Mozambique was slow because of restriction imposed by the authorities at Toronto reception centre. They required that a heavy security fence be erected around the site in line with the requirements for the repatriation exercise.<sup>364</sup> In addition a large police contingent manned the camp. This meant that the first several

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<sup>362</sup> S.T. Makanya, "The Desire to return: Effects of Experiences in Exile on Refugees Repatriating to Zimbabwe in the Early 1980s" in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.106

<sup>363</sup> R. J. Southall, "Resettling the Refugees," *Africa Report*, November/December 1980, Vol. 25, No. 6, p.49

<sup>364</sup> Report from Refugee Office to Heads of Denominations. Christian Care Files

thousand returnees faced similar difficulties they had escaped from several years earlier.<sup>365</sup>

In addition the authorities advised that they would only be able to cope with 650 refugees a day and not 1 000 as the UNHCR had anticipated. Only 3 out of the 6 originally planned reception centres were operational. The result was that “the exercise was delayed and hence many people could not come through before the election.”<sup>366</sup> Some of those who managed to come through via the official channel had their ages falsified on the new documents issued by police and immigration officials in an attempt to reduce the number of people eligible in the 1980 elections.<sup>367</sup>

Problems were also encountered in the institutional arrangements. Initially role confusion reigned at the reception centres between the Department of Social Affairs, Home Affairs and Christian Care’s dispatch units. For instance, Social Affairs and Home Affairs dispatched and directed people to go to their districts of origin without directing them to the transit centres. This resulted in many returnees being stranded at the District Commissioners’ offices with no transport to take them to their homes or transit centres. Role confusion was rectified through coordination of the Department of Social Affairs and Christian Care’s dispatch units. Likewise misunderstanding arose between ZANU and ZAPU political parties who wanted to feed and accommodate returnees on Christian Care’s behalf. This was resolved peacefully and instructions were issued preventing

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<sup>365</sup> S. De Wolf, “The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area” *Issue*, Vol XI, No.3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.27

<sup>366</sup> Report from Refugee Office to Heads of Denominations. Christian Care Files

<sup>367</sup> S. De Wolf, “The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area” *Issue*, Vol XI,

political parties from incurring expenses on behalf of Christian Care. The elaborate accounting and book-keeping system was undermined by the failure by some transit centres to submit incoming and outgoing statistics as required.

Phase I was mainly a repatriation exercise and was much easier done than the subsequent phases that also encompassed resettlement. Shirley De Wolf noted: “Repatriation was a comparatively simple process and took place rapidly. Resettlement to permanent living quarters, on the other hand, was a much more complex and time consuming task...”<sup>368</sup>

The Refugee Office advised:

The problem after the whole repatriation exercise is that of reconstruction and rehabilitation as many homes have been destroyed and many people will need the reestablishment of a livelihood. It is therefore hoped that the UNHCR will be invited by the incoming Government for assistance...<sup>369</sup>

This meant that the institutional framework for implementing the post independent phases of repatriation and resettlement would include the UNHCR, church and other voluntary organizations alongside the independence government.

## *Phase II*

The second phase started after the independence government had “formulated its policies on the repatriation, reinstallation and the related question of the internally displaced. These policies would determine the role of the UNHCR in the second phase and

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No.3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.27

<sup>368</sup> S. De Wolf, “The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area” *Issue*, Vol XI, No. 3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.28

<sup>369</sup> Report from Refugee Office to Heads of Denominations. Christian Care Files

assistance required by Government from International and non Government Organizations.”<sup>370</sup> The government’s refugee programme that was strategically linked to the reconstruction of war-damaged rural infrastructure had the following components<sup>371</sup>:

**Table 3.6: Repatriation and Resettlement Programme Components**

	<b>Component</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
1	Transport of refugees and displaced people to their home areas	Temporary/in- transit assistance
2	Aid in rebuilding homes	Assist long-term integration
3	Assistance in growing crops	Assist medium-long-term self sufficiency
4	Provision of emergency food until harvest of first crops	Short-term relief assistance
5	Social services	Rehabilitation and educational assistance for long-term integration

The components shown in the table above aimed to facilitate both provision of short-term relief assistance and long-term sustainable reintegration of the beneficiaries.

As part of this programme, the UNHCR assisted the return of 51 000 refugees by July 1980. These included the special categories of refugees mainly refugee school children, orphans and the disabled. The independent government considerably relaxed the restrictive conditions that impeded Phase I. Former UNHCR representative in Zimbabwe,

<sup>370</sup> Notes on a meeting held on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1980 at the Salvation Army Headquarters. Christian Care Files

<sup>371</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.25

Mr. D. Chefeke, noted, “The work of the UNHCR was much facilitated by the new government and we were happy to complete the repatriation of refugees under better conditions than before the elections.”<sup>372</sup>

The UNHCR appealed for US\$110million for this second phase that encompassed an initial rehabilitation programme and ran from April to July 1980. The World Food Programme pledged US\$30million worth of food to tide the rural population over until maturation of the next season’s crop. The European Economic Community (EEC), Holland, United States of America and Nigeria responded to the appeals for funds. UNHCR funding was supplemented by Christian Care and local evangelical community finances.<sup>373</sup>

The fate of PVs was not deliberated at Lancaster House. In the post-election period most IDPs spontaneously returned to their homes. Between May and September 1980 about 48 000 IDPs returned to their home locations from 29 PVs and various urban squatter camps.<sup>374</sup> Most of their original homes had been destroyed by the Rhodesian regime. Some therefore sought temporary accommodation at the Mission Centres. The majority of the IDPs returned to their homes without official aid. They rebuilt their home structures using locally available pole, thatch and mud building materials. Dawson Sanyangore observed that: “It was easier to reintegrate IDPs because most moved as

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<sup>372</sup> P. Ehrenpreis, *From Rhodesia back to Zimbabwe: all my hopes were to go home one day*, Refugee Stories, (SIDA and UNHCR, Vamamo, 1983), p.88

<sup>373</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.135

<sup>374</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.25

family units to PVs and returned as family units.”<sup>375</sup> Rapid social and economic reintegration ensued.

At the Prime Minister’s request to the UN Secretary General, the UNHCR coordinated a major resettlement and rehabilitation programme for over 600 000 returnees and displaced persons.<sup>376</sup> This along with other parallel repatriation and assisted internal resettlement was backed by the provision of shelter, equipment, food, medical care, transport and cash grants, among other relief needs.<sup>377</sup> 70 000 vegetable packs- each containing 12 small envelopes of vegetable seeds, 5 tins of pesticide, 40 kg of fertilizer, garden implements and growing instructions in 3 languages- were distributed in wet areas.<sup>378</sup> The packs’ contents were sufficient to allow a family to reap a kilogramme of vegetables per day six weeks after planting for a 6-month period. In addition 235 000 families received summer crops packs of maize, sorghum, ground nuts and cotton enough for a 0.5 hectare.<sup>379</sup> Each of the packs’ recipients was given a hoe head while extension assistants were provided with the appropriate pool agriculture equipment accessible to all in the villages. This gave formerly uprooted people a head-start on the planting season and ensured that they speedily attain self-sufficiency.

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<sup>375</sup> Interview with Mr. Dawson D. Sanyangore, Former Director of Social Welfare, 20 April 2004, Harare

<sup>376</sup> Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Third Committee of the General Assembly., 10 November 1980

<sup>377</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.135

<sup>378</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.26

<sup>379</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.26

A massive agricultural drive involving 1 500 agricultural staff was augmented by a wet 1980-81 agricultural season and resulted in a bumper harvest.<sup>380</sup> The returnees' reintegration was assisted by Christian Care's reconstruction of missions and facilities programme that was coordinated by the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC). This programme provided assistance to the homeless and it revitalized health and education facilities. By November 1982 the ZCC Reconstruction Committee strategically shifted focus from relief oriented programmes to development assistance programmes. As part of its exit strategy the UNHCR conducted a needs assessment programme to prepare the way for other UN-specialized agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These strategies prevented the creation of a dependency syndrome and facilitated the long term sustainability and self-reliance of the beneficiaries.

#### *3.5.4 Special Categories*

Like the ex-combatants there were special categories of refugees – the sick, disabled, orphans, school-children and women who returned with illegitimate children. A significant population of ex-refugee school children had to relocate from the refugee camp schools in Mozambique and Zambia in the post-independence period. Despite this, the refugee schools and their pupils in Mozambique and Zambia were transplanted to Zimbabwe by the UNHCR in July and August 1980 before appropriate reception arrangements had been made. This was partly due to unrelenting parental and political pressures. Janice McLaughlin noted that:

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<sup>380</sup> J. Jackson, "Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s" in T. Allen and H.



ZANU and ZAPU had each decided independently that the children and their teachers would remain behind in the camps until new schools could be prepared for them inside the country. However, anxious parents visited the Party offices in Harare and Bulwayo on a daily basis, wanting to know if their children were dead or alive. In the camps, teachers and students found it difficult to concentrate on lessons, eager to return home to an independent country...The political pressures on ZANU and ZAPU to repatriate the children, even before adequate preparations had been made for their arrival, were tremendous.<sup>381</sup>

Another reason for the premature return was lack of coordination and communication between the sending country and the receiving country. Mozambican authorities, notably, attributed the premature repatriation of school children to their being (mis)informed that the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Lands and Resettlement had already put in place appropriate arrangements to accommodate the school children in Salisbury.<sup>382</sup>

The results of repatriation before adequate preparations were dire:

At the Old Umtali transit centre they [school children] spent four months waiting to be resettled, continuing their classes with the same volunteer teachers they had been with in Mozambique. They borrowed black boards, chalk and footballs from the neighbouring mission schools and held their classes outdoors as they had been accustomed to doing all along, sharing a small handful of tattered text books among them, faithfully copying notes from the blackboard into their exercise books. They studied the intricacies of chemistry and biology without any laboratory equipment and from teachers who for the most part had only a Form 2 background. It did not take these children long to notice how inadequate their own situation was in comparison with the children of established schools. Their volunteer teachers grew uneasy about their lack of opportunity to make an adequate living for themselves.<sup>383</sup>

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Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), pp.135-136

<sup>381</sup> J. McLaughlin with V. Nhundu, P. Mlambo and F. Chung, *The story of ZIMFEP*, Harare, ZIMFEP, 2002), p.7

<sup>382</sup> Meeting of the Operation Refugee Committee Held on the 24<sup>th</sup> June, 1980 at the Department of Social Services. Christian Care Files

<sup>383</sup> S. De Wolf, "The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area" *Issue*, Vol XI, No. 3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.29

The buildings at Dombodema are in very poor condition; the walls and roofs still standing, but windows broken. There are about 1,200 boys there. At Tegwani there are about 2,000 boys, but the buildings are in much better condition...But in both places there is overcrowding; the boys use the same rooms for sleeping in at night and for lessons during the day. There are no desks, so written work is done sitting on the floor and writing on their knees or on the floor...They are all, including the teachers, very disappointed with the conditions under which they are living. And they attribute this to the fact that ZAPU lost the elections and the ZANU government is discriminating against them. (There is no evidence for this interpretation...)<sup>384</sup>

Notwithstanding the disruptive impact of poorly coordinated return on the refugee school children's education the offer by local established schools of educational aids and materials was integrative and assisted the initial resettlement of the refugee children. Dedication to the ultimate goals of the revolution and the refugee school children's political orientation partly explain their perseverance in the face of a desperate situation.

Sr. Janice McLaughlin commented:

The education and ideological training that they received in the camps was not just Marxist but the best of Marxism, Christianity and African tradition rolled into one. They had worked tirelessly without getting paid and they believed in what they were doing. Their stay in the camps influenced their attitude and behaviour when they came back. Refugees saw themselves as the vanguard of the new Zimbabwe. They had a very high sense of mission and commitment. They had pride, self-confidence and vision. They saw themselves as heroes. They had dedication and the willingness to sacrifice. They put up with the hardships that they encountered upon their return. They overcame the difficulties as it had been inculcated in them that they were doing this for a purpose to achieve a goal.<sup>385</sup>

The government subsequently encouraged the establishment of the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) to cater for refugee school children. ZIMFEP was set up in January 1981 to help devise and implement appropriate ways of linking learning with production. This derived from the war-time educational

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<sup>384</sup> Fr. Nigel Johnson quoted in J. McLaughlin with V. Nhundu, P. Mlambo and F. Chung, *The story of ZIMFEP*, Harare, ZIMFEP, 2002), p.10

programmes for refugees. It assisted the establishing of 8 model schools for former refugee children. International aid from the Swedish International Development Agency, Lutheran World Foundation, Christian Peace Movement of Switzerland, Danish Development Aid from People to People and OXFAM backed the ex-refugee children's educational programme. This meant that resettlement of refugee school children was not the sole responsibility of the government. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education administered a scholarship programme for ex-refugee students in secondary schools. In addition to financing the exam fees for ZIMFEP students scholarship funds were provided for both tuition and exam fees for ex-refugees and ex-combatants who had to be absorbed by non-ZIMFEP schools.

The 8 ZIMFEP schools admitted about 8 000 former refugee children and their instructors

**Table 3.7: Enrolment at ZIMFEP schools**

<b>School</b>	<b>Student Population</b>
Chindunduma Secondary School	1 100
J Z Moyo Secondary School	991
Chindunduma Primary School	1 600
Mavhudzi Secondary School	
Rusununguko Secondary School	850
Mbongolo Farm School	800
Nkululeko Government Primary and Secondary School	800

The ZIMFEP project thus afforded opportunities for refugee children with no homes to return to, or those with no possibilities for schooling in their home destinations to

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<sup>385</sup> Interview with Sr. Janice McLaughlin, Ex-ZIMFEP staff-member, 18 June 2004, , Acturus

continue with formal education. This complied with the liberation ideology of an open and inclusive educational system.

Refugees also suffered horrific war-time episodes and disabilities. These included the RSF raids on the Nyadzonya (9 August 1976) and Chimoio (23 November 1977) refugee camps in Mozambique and Mkushi (October 1978) and J. Moyo camps in Zambia. For instance, more than a thousand refugees were killed in the Nyadzonya attack alone. Many others were injured and disabled as a result of the attacks. The survivors of these attacks witnessed grueling occurrences like crushing of corpses by RSF armored cars. After harrowing experiences like these, Zimbabwe's refugees suffered from war traumas as a result of their continued stay in refugee camps. UNHCR assessments revealed that the most severe problems experienced by the refugees related to psychological rather than physical disorders.<sup>386</sup> This necessitated the need for both psychosocial counselling and physical rehabilitation.

Another vulnerable group comprised a large number of "very young parentless children who were not claimed or accepted by the refugee women and who would have no permanent home to go to on their return."<sup>387</sup> Rehabilitation programmes and care facilities needed to be arranged for these unaccompanied minors.

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<sup>386</sup> Health Problems of Refugees to be Repatriated in Phase II - Some Preliminary Observations, 5 February 1980. Christian Care Files

<sup>387</sup> Health Problems of Refugees to be Repatriated in Phase II - Some Preliminary Observations, 5 February 1980. Christian Care Files

There were significant inhibiting factors to the planning of assistance programmes for these special cases. Preliminary investigations indicated very little information was available on the number of the disabled and ill refugees who would require special medical attention upon repatriation.<sup>388</sup> Whereas documentation of disabled refugees coming from Zambia was good, “documentation of school children and disabled from Mozambique was still a problem.”<sup>389</sup> Determining the exact figure of orphans was also problematic. The general lack of accurate statistics was one of the major problems encountered during Phase II and made forward planning for assistance programmes and facilities difficult.<sup>390</sup>

Notwithstanding these difficulties, efforts were made at assisting the special groups. The sick and disabled were screened at major hospitals namely Harare Central and Mpilo Central. Many returnees were treated for parasite-borne diseases such as bilharzias, roundworm, malaria as well as asthma and other psychosomatic manifestations of tension. Centres were also created with “inevitable difficulty” to hold them on a short term basis.<sup>391</sup> For instance, disabled returnees were accommodated at the government’s repatriation centre in Salisbury and Luveve Training Centre in Bulawayo. A special camp for war-disabled refugees was also created at Ntabazinduna and was manned by the Presbyterian Church, supported by Christian Care and the government.

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<sup>388</sup> Health Problems of Refugees to be Repatriated in Phase II - Some Preliminary Observations, 5 February 1980. Christian Care Files

<sup>389</sup> Meeting of the Operation Refugee Committee Held on the 24<sup>th</sup> June, 1980 at the Department of Social Services. Christian Care Files

<sup>390</sup> Notes on a meeting held on January 16<sup>th</sup> 1980 at Salvation Army Headquarters Moffat Street, Salisbury. Christian Care Files

<sup>391</sup> Final General Report from Christian Care Refugee Office to Heads of Denominations. Christian Care Files

The rehabilitation exercise was affected by a lack of resources. Shirley De Wolfe observed: “Wounded returnees, many of whom were in need of orthopedic and other forms of surgery often waited several months for treatment due to a shortage of hospital bed space and an even more serious shortage of surgeons.”<sup>392</sup> Many medical cases stayed on for long periods at the transit centres before receiving medical assistance.

The Department of Social Services took over responsibility for the rehabilitation of the war-disabled. It planned the set up of three rehabilitation centres at<sup>393</sup>:

- Boulder farm, where the disabled’s needs would be assessed
- Enslinsdeel, where vocational training would be given
- Umtali, where the severely disabled would be lodged

War-disabled refugees were eligible for compensation under the War Victims Compensation Fund established by the government in 1980. Beneficiaries of the fund included every Zimbabwean citizen (combatant or civilian) injured directly or indirectly by the liberation war before 1<sup>st</sup> March, 1980. Refugees were also given free medical care at Government hospitals. Mission Hospitals charged a fee but Christian Care met the medical costs. The provision of free medical treatment for anyone earning less than Z\$150 a month doubled the use of existing health facilities in the rural areas. Returnees benefited from the same scheme.

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<sup>392</sup> S. De Wolf, “The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area” *Issue*, Vol XI, No. 3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p28

<sup>393</sup> Meeting of the Operation Refugee Committee Held on the 4<sup>th</sup> November, 1980 at the Department of Social Services. Christian Care Files

Children confirmed as orphans were taken into care. Dormitories were set aside at Percy Ibbotson Hostel in Bulawayo and at Umtali Probation Hostel for anticipated orphans. About 30 orphans from Mozambique were housed at a new centre in Hatfield, Harare that had room for 40 to 70 inmates run by the Salvation Army. This number was, however, small given that ZANU's orphanage at Nampula, Mozambique alone had been home to about 500 orphans.

Single-mother returnees also constituted a special category. They were apprehensive of the reception by their families who they thought would reject them and their children. Christian Care offered assistance to women refugees in this predicament by initiating dialogue with their families and mediating whenever possible. Shirley De Wolfe revealed:

There was one situation of a young woman who had a strict father. I personally knew her family. Her family was anxious to find out if she had returned. She had in fact come among the busloads of refugees who were received at Old Umtali Transit Centre with her baby. She could not go home as she was scared of her father. I went to her house and told her family that "Your daughter is here." They were very excited and said "We want to go with you right now." I had not told them that she had her baby but her father suggested that they carry a baby's blanket in case their daughter had come back with a baby. They accepted and accommodated their daughter and her baby. There were a general welcoming people back and this made reintegration easier.<sup>394</sup>

The response, however, differed with individual families as some single women parents found it difficult to be embraced by their families.

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<sup>394</sup> Interview with Reverend Shirley De Wolfe, Institute for Peace, Leadership and Governance, Africa University Lecturer, 25 May 2004, Harare

### 3.5.5 Resettlement and reintegration problems

#### *Landmines*

The independent Zimbabwe government had to cope with a legacy of seven minefields along its borders with Zambia and Mozambique (See Table below).

**Table 3.8: The state of the minefields in Zimbabwe**

<b>MINEFIELD</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b>	<b>ORIGINAL LENGTH</b>	<b>AREA CLEARED</b>	<b>REMAINING AREA</b>
Victoria Falls	1	243km	230km <sup>395</sup>	13km
Musengezi-Nyamapanda	2	335km	130km	205km
Sango-Crooks Corners	3	50km	Nil	50km
Junction Gate-Jersey Tea	4	75km	Nil	75km
Stappleford-Leakon Hill	5	50km	6 600sqm	50km
Burma Valley	6	3km	Nil	3km
Kariba	7	1km	500m	500m

**Source: F. Sadomba, “Zimbabwe: Key developments since March 2003” ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Towards a Mine Free World* (USA, Human Rights Watch, 2004)**

In some of these landmines infested areas such as Mukumbura and Malipati IDPs failed to move back to their original homes because of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs). The Dumisa minority group in the Sengwe Communal areas in southeast Zimbabwe has largely been marginalized due to the lack of demining and other development projects in the area. 24 years into independence, the Dumisa community still awaited the removal of landmines. Frederick Sadomba, ICBL Landmine Country



Reporter for Zimbabwe, said he knew of a Sengwe-based ex-fighter who lamented that the liberation war had not liberated his community psychologically and economically. Although the PV fences had been removed, people remained confined to PV areas as their original homelands remained veritable minefields.<sup>396</sup>

The continued existence and impact of landmines and UXOs were a human in-security indicator and a powerful constraint on development plans. Some of the post-independence landmine victims are people who have tried to invest their labour in mined areas, areas known to be historically fertile despite the present inherent dangers. *The Herald* noted that:

Vast tracts of prime land which could have been used for viable agricultural production or alternatively to generate millions of dollars under Campfire projects have since been lying idle as minefields continuously restricted movements in the area (Mukumbura-Chidodo-Rwenya stretch) where hundreds of people, livestock and wild animals have fallen prey.<sup>397</sup>

The consequential denial of access to land diminished the affected communities' trust and belief in the post-conflict socio-economic and peace building process.

Mine action was crucial for the reconstruction of social and economic infrastructures and successful resettlement of returnees. This mine action should have encompassed assistance and rehabilitation of victims, mine awareness and education on risk reduction and marking of effective areas. The government, however, did not devise and implement

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<sup>395</sup> By December 2000 80km had been cleared.

<sup>396</sup> Interview with Frederick Sadomba, ICBL Country Reporter for Zimbabwe, 25 May 2004, Harare

<sup>397</sup> *The Herald*, 8 February 1999 "\$250 million mine clearing exercise begins"

a comprehensive strategy to address the landmine problem in the immediate post-independence period. The UN Mine Action Service and UNDP's Resident Representative's Joint Assessment Mission Report of February 2000 noted that:

Although the country possesses a credible local capacity for mine clearance, there is not a national mine clearance plan, and it lacks a body with a mandate to articulate and manage mine action. Consequently, current clearance activity is a result of ad-hoc and sometimes donor-driven initiatives without consultations with the affected people or groups otherwise associated with the mine problem.<sup>398</sup>

This coupled with the general snail-paced nature of the broader land resettlement programme militated against the sustainable productivity of the returnees. Shirley De Wolfe stated: "the new government, bound by the Lancaster House agreement to give financial compensation for land acquired for resettlement, had difficulty in finding the necessary funds; hence, those returnees who had been deprived off their land had nowhere to settle."<sup>399</sup>

The government could have harmonized the DDR programme with the resettlement of returnees had it elaborated on a post-independent landmine clearance strategy. For instance, while facilitating the return of displaced persons landmine clearance programmes could have created employment opportunities for the militarily trained demobilized ex-combatants. This would also have strengthened the bond and built mutual confidence between the local communities and the former combatants. The aggregate of

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<sup>398</sup> M. Rupiya, "Zimbabwe: Key developments since March 1999" ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Towards a Mine Free World* (USA, Human Rights Watch, 2000),p124

<sup>399</sup> S. De Wolf, "The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area" *Issue*, Vol XI, No. 3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.28

the harmonized reintegration programmes would have been positive impacts on the post-conflict peace building process.

*Political context: Matabeleland Disturbances*

In Matabeleland the negative effects of the post-independence political context were manifest. The collapse of the coalition government and the fallout between ZANU PF and ZAPU also affected the resettlement of returnees in Matabeleland. The Matabeleland and Midlands disturbances hindered post-war resettlement. They instead induced a new exodus. Jeremy Jackson noted:

The political, economic and social effects of the ‘Gukurahundi’ on the civilian populations of parts of Matabeleland resulted in a second (but post-independence) wave of refugees who largely moved to Botswana and South Africa. The blame was largely put on the tactics and methods of the security forces. Dissidents were also responsible for many deaths, atrocities and destruction of property. An aura of fear and insecurity gripped the community.<sup>400</sup>

Post-conflict reconciliation and stability were not comprehensive enough to facilitate successful repatriation and resettlement as the Matabeleland dissidents and insecurity episode attests.

*Conflicts with those who remained behind*

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<sup>400</sup> J. Jackson, “Repatriation and Reconstruction in Zimbabwe during the 1980s” in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994), p.155

There appears to have been mixed reactions from the stay-at-homes. The negative perceptions were partly due to the lack of programmes to raise the awareness of the wider community. “The community was not well prepared to receive these people and rejection and intolerance resulted from this factor. This caused a lot of psychological problems for the Returnees.”<sup>401</sup> R.J. Southall also stated:

Many have lost their homes, families and close relatives, some are now returning to the rural areas to face financial demands from those who remained behind, for many of the latter feel that in having materially supported the guerillas to the end they bore an unfair share of the cost of victory and are now entitled to some financial recompense from those who fled to safety.<sup>402</sup>

Mentioning, Khaya Moyo, Zimbabwe’s current ambassador to South Africa former ZNLWVA Secretary General Endy Mhlanga noted concerns among some ex-fighters over the granting of important positions such as ambassadorial posts to highly educated returnees who could not be matched with the ex-combatants.<sup>403</sup> It should be noted that this category of returnees was different from the majority that had spent their time in ZANU and ZAPU refugee camps. In any case, there has not been deep-seated disharmony and tensions between ex-fighters and politician-elite-returnees, many of whom were studying in Europe and the United States of America, who managed to secure high-income government jobs. The repatriation and resettlement operation was generally without incidence of violence and bloodletting. The elitist-returnees should, however, not be bundled with the mainstream refugees that remained in the refugee camps until the repatriation operation.

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<sup>401</sup> “Zimbabwe” Appendix C, 14 March 1990, SACC/NCCR File AC623 12.8

<sup>402</sup> R. J. Southall, “Resettling the Refugees,” *Africa Report*, November/December 1980, Vol. 25, No. 6, p51

<sup>403</sup> Interview with Endy Mhlanga, Former Secretary General of the ZNLWVA, 5 May 2004, Harare

### *Housing and land rights*

A significant refugee population returned to find their houses razed as a direct result of the war. This was a common refrain: “I encountered difficulties because my home had been destroyed as a result of the liberation war”<sup>404</sup> and “I faced accommodation problems as my home had been destroyed during the war. With time we managed to reconstruct our dwellings.”<sup>405</sup>

Official reports state that “Requests for construction materials to rebuild damaged homes were far fewer than anticipated. People returning from ‘protected villages’ brought their building materials with them”<sup>406</sup> There appears also to have been limited confrontations that could have arisen, for example, when returnees found their homes occupied by others.

### *Economic contexts: Employment*

Some of the returnees of employable ages, but with minimal professional skills, had to readjust their high expectations for comfortable employment in independent and socialist-oriented Zimbabwe. For instance, the more enterprising ones started small

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<sup>404</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Themba Nechako, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>405</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Tafirenyika Soke, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>406</sup> Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference Documentation, Salisbury, p.25

competitive businesses while others had to settle for lowly paying jobs such as the Z\$30 a month tea-picking employment on capitalist owned estates.<sup>407</sup> Returnees revealed:

On my return I expected to live comfortably like what whites had freely done in our country. I settled for farming as I love to farm and also because we had waged the liberation struggle to regain our land. I would also contribute positively to the development of independent Zimbabwe through farming.<sup>408</sup>

I expected to continue my education since I had been restricted by the colonial education system. I eventually opted for vocational training at a women training centre in order to acquire handiwork skills.<sup>409</sup>

I did not have adequate academic qualifications and could not secure a job. I had no option but to continue (with) my education.<sup>410</sup>

Just like the ex-combatants, some returnees also faced reintegration problems. The absence of an organized ex-refugee representative body did not help matters much:

Many returnees faced financial problems because they did not immediately secure employment after returning. Maybe the establishment of a returnees' representative association like the War Veterans Association could have helped since we could have been given pensions and other assistance.<sup>411</sup>

Given the bond established during their stay in refugee camps, returnees were potentially well-placed to establish self-help or representative associations to advocate their cause. In the absence of such a national association we can only speculate how this could have panned out. It is possible, though, that the same political, ethnic and regional

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<sup>407</sup> S. De Wolf, "The Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Umtali Area" *Issue*, Vol XI, No. 3/4, Fall/Winter 1981, p.28

<sup>408</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Tafirenyika Soke, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>409</sup> Interview with Former Refugee Themba Nechako, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>410</sup> Interview with Former Refugee R. Mutondo, 5 May 2004, Bromley

<sup>411</sup> Interview with Former Refugee R. Mutondo, 5 May 2004, Bromley

impediments that delayed the establishment of a national and inclusive ex-combatant body would have stood in the way of such initiatives in a similar way.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

The chapter has analyzed the pre-implementation, implementation and results of Zimbabwe's DDRRR process. It dealt with DDR first and then the RR repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs. It is clear that certain dynamics of the liberation war such as inter-force and intra-force relations, war strategies employed by the parties and the Lancaster House peace agreement that did not provide an appropriate bedrock for DDR continued to affect the implementation and outcome of the process. This was not helped by the subsequent minimalist UK/Commonwealth-led intervention and diminished participation by communist China and the Soviet Union, the erstwhile main backers of the liberation movements ZANU and ZAPU, during the Cold War era. The conflict terminating agreement and transitional process did not place emphasis on the crucial issues of practical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, besides repatriation, in pursuit of the major goal of facilitating Zimbabwe's independence through credible elections. The failure to address key issues of disarmament manifested in the post-independence skirmishes between factions of ZANLA and ZIPRA who retained their arms during long lay-periods in assembly points. The generally tenuous political and security framework of the 1980s and resultant remilitarization and mobilization by the threatened state meant that the financial 'peace dividend' of DDR was absent.

The independence government's normative DDR policy was unhinged by institutional incapacity and unfavourable socio-economic and politico-military contexts. The result was that the DDR process failed to place many demobilized combatants into productive and sustainable civilian roles. Ineffectively reintegrated and disgruntled ex-fighters rallied around the powerful war veteran identity, and engaged in widespread protests to claim a prominent position in, and economic benefits from the state. This exemplified the post-conflict instability posed by unsuccessfully reintegrated demobilized soldiers. In response to the demonstrations, the government implemented the 'second policy on demobilization and reintegration'. The costs of this programme –including an initial outlay of more than Z\$4.5 billion on gratuities and lifetime pensions- and the negative impact on the country's broader economy meant that the government did not experience the financial dividend of DDR.

The UNHCR provided the overarching international framework for the repatriation of refugees who opted for the official channel. The agency was later invited by the independence government to coordinate the immediate post-return resettlement process. A well coordinated and comprehensive repatriation and resettlement action plan was implemented. High Commissioner Paul Hartling branded the repatriation and resettlement operation a success: "The majority of the programme's objectives have been attained. The most important of these is of course, the self-sufficiency of the many



thousands of refugees and displaced persons we assisted. By so doing, we have been pleased and proud to contribute to the future of Zimbabwe.”<sup>412</sup>

Notwithstanding the documented operational obstacles, including attempts by the Rhodesian bureaucracy to impede the smooth return of refugees in order to inhibit the liberation movements’ vote, notable factors worked to the advantage of the programme. The relative success of the repatriation and resettlement process was “due to the generosity of the international community, the understanding and efficiency of the involved ministries in Zimbabwe, the motivation of the refugees and the displaced persons.”<sup>413</sup>

Zimbabwe’s DDRRR had local and international ramifications. Its outcome had a bearing on the effective and sustainable full-citizenry of target populations and the nascent state’s stability and development. Within the regional context the shortcomings of the DDR strategy meant that Zimbabwe would not be an ideal model for prospective similar processes in post-conflict Namibia and South Africa. These countries would, however, draw lessons from the relatively successful repatriation operation. Internationally the UN had no role in the UK/Commonwealth managed transitional process. It, however, provided the global institutional framework for implementing Namibia’s Settlement Plan. The next chapter focuses on the UNTAG managed DDRRR process in Namibia under similar headings.

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<sup>412</sup> P. Ehrenpreis, *From Rhodesia back to Zimbabwe: all my hopes were to go home one day*, Refugee Stories, (SIDA and UNHCR, Vamamo, 1983), p.4

<sup>413</sup> P. Ehrenpreis, *From Rhodesia back to Zimbabwe: all my hopes were to go home one day*, Refugee Stories, (SIDA and UNHCR, Vamamo, 1983), p.87