

The social organisation of experience in interaction: Hierarchies of entitlement in talk about
child deaths

University of the Witwatersrand

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Daniella Rafaely

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, whose believed in me so much that I became more than I was.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The financial assistance of the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, in collaboration with the South African Humanities Deans Association towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NIHSS and SAHUDA.

I would like to acknowledge Monash South Africa for supporting me throughout my studies. I would also like to thank all my colleagues in the department and faculty who supported me during this process.

I would like to thank Alastair Teeling-Smith at 702 for assisting me with procuring many of the data extracts that I have used in my analysis.

I have been privileged to have conducted this research under the supervision of Kevin Whitehead and Brett Bowman. Kevin's supervision of my MA thesis altered the course of my research and academic career. He spent countless hours discussing my research and helping me to refine my understanding of conversation analysis, instilling a passion for ethnomethodological research and teaching me how to ask the right questions. Kevin's unwavering support and confidence in my abilities gave me the courage to believe I could also write a PhD. Kevin, you have been more than a supervisor to me over the last seven years. You have been a mentor and a role model and a friend.

Although Brett was on sabbatical during my MA year, he generously dedicated his time to providing me with informal guidance, directing me toward important literature that substantially improved the quality of my MA dissertation. His mentorship role was

formalised when he agreed to supervise my PhD. Thus, Brett has spent extensive amounts of time, both before I was officially his student and as the co-supervisor of my PhD, providing guidance, support, advice and feedback. He has constantly challenged me to find the best way to fuse my two research interests – genealogy and interaction – and has provided massive amounts of feedback and guidance, both written and verbal, in order to help me get there. Brett, thank you for helping me to find a way to do research that I love, and thank you for believing in me this whole time, and being a friend, mentor and support throughout this process. To both of you, I really don't have words to thank you for everything you have invested in me. I hope that I can do the same for my own students one day and shape their lives as you have both shaped mine.

My academic journey has been a long one. It started in 2009 when I registered for my BA in psychology. Many people were a part of this journey and all of them helped me to get to where I am today. Thank you Hilton Goldberg, Avi and Kate Gershuni, Rinat, Gabi and Tanya and all my neighbours at Northdowns, and many other friends and family along the way.

To Maria Damianova, my mentor and my friend. Thank you for fighting to make my sabbatical possible, and for believing in me from the beginning.

To Paula, thank you for being a constant source of comfort, support and love.

To Catherine, my PhD buddy. There is apparently a light at the end of this long and torturous tunnel. Thank you for making this less lonely, and thank you for being such a good friend.

To Linda, thank you for a warm and safe space to come to every week, no matter what I brought with me.

To Breindy, thank you for always knowing who I am.

To Justine, thank you for being my (far away) friend who is available when everyone else is sleeping.

To Mayuri and Frans, thank you for the motivational Whatsapp messages and your friendship (and food).

To Ivy, thank you for raising my boys with me and for looking after them. I wouldn't have been able to do this without your help.

To my sister Yonit, thank you for the office and for not having a dressing table so I could have a desk. Thank you for the food and the coffee and the talks and the chocolate and the messages, phone calls and visits. Thank you for reading all my drafts and for being the person I emailed whenever I finished a chapter. Thank you for being there the whole time.

To my three favourite girls – Sara Navah, Aliya and Rosa – your smiles and hugs light up my day. And to Rafi, thank you for opening your house up to me and for your support and kindness during this time.

To my two beautiful boys, Benji and Yonatan. Benji, I started writing my PhD when you were nine years old. Over these five years you've become one of my favourite people to hang out with. You are sensitive, kind and thoughtful, and have an amazing sense of humour. Thank you for playing Guns 'n Roses in the car and thank you for the machine that keeps the coffee hot. Yonatan, you were five when I started. You've turned into another of my favourite people to spend time with. Thank you for your drawings, for being someone I can bake with, watch Brooklyn 99 with, go for walks with and listen to music with. Thanks for making me laugh and for being so unique. Thank you both for being so supportive, and so patient when I was stressed, exhausted, late for school and late to make supper. You two have been the reason I kept going. I'm so lucky to have you both.

To Ima, thank you for being a real mother. A mother who I can share my thoughts and feelings with, who loves me, supports me, believes in me, is proud of me and is happy for

me. Thank you for making me food every Shabbos and for your messages, phone calls and constant love and care.

To my father, who didn't get to see the end of this road, although he started it. Thank you Aba. Without you, I wouldn't be here.

Finally, to Meren. I kept on saying that you didn't understand how hard it was, but you did understand, the whole time. You believed I could do this even when I was certain that I couldn't, and you helped me in every tangible and intangible way possible in order to get me here. You've spent hours talking to me about my weird observations and helping me to develop my ideas. The hierarchy of entitlement started off as a random thought on a long drive, and ended up being all of this, and I wouldn't have gotten here without you. I am so grateful to you for your love and support. You see the best in me, always.

DECLARATION

I declare that:

The social organisation of experience in interaction: Hierarchies of entitlement in talk about child deaths

is my own, unaided work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated by means of complete references. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

Signed this 2nd day of December 2019



Daniella Rafaely

Contents

Chapter One: Introduction	1
The social organisation of experiences of child death	2
Why South Africa?	6
Research Questions	7
Chapter Outline	7
Chapter Two: A History of Childhood	9
Childhood.....	10
The economic child.....	12
The sexual child	14
The sentimental child: locus of the nuclear family	15
The public and private child	17
Who is a child?.....	21
The South African child.....	23
Child mortality.....	25
A history of child mortality.....	27
Public and private child death.....	30
Child mortality today	33
Child mortality in South Africa	35
Conclusions.....	36

Chapter Three: Experience in interaction	39
Knowledge and experience in interaction.....	39
Entitlement to knowledge	40
Epistemic status and epistemic stance	42
Entitlement to experience	44
Experiential status and experiential stance	45
Relative entitlements.....	49
Emotion as (a type of) experience	51
Conclusions.....	55
Chapter Four: Data and Method	57
Data corpus	57
Analytic Procedure.....	59
Claims of emotion.....	61
Ethnomethodology.....	62
Conversation analysis	67
Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and child death	74
Limitations of the data	76
Chapter Five: Data Analysis	78
Format for a claim of emotion	80
Subject component.....	82
Self-reference in interaction.....	82

Self-reference in claims of emotion	83
Simple self-reference: “I”	84
Non-standardised self-reference: self-categorisation.....	92
Absent self-categorisation: a deviant case	101
Object component	105
Person reference in interaction.....	105
Object reference in claims of emotion	107
Object reference: descriptive recognitionals.....	108
Object reference: proper names and descriptive recognitionals	112
Locally initial non-recognitional reference: two exceptions	117
Object reference: inclusion of the subject.....	123
Family categories	126
Object reference: generalised family categories	129
Demonstrating accountability in a complaint sequence: a deviant case	132
Affect component.....	135
Emotion in interaction.....	135
Affect in claims of emotion	138
Direct descriptions of emotions	139
Idiomatic and metaphorical descriptions of emotions	145
Downgraded affect as a resource in producing mitigated claims	160
Multiple concurrent practices	170

The ordering of relative entitlements	170
Entitlement as a resource for producing contestable actions	181
Conclusions.....	202
Chapter Six: Conclusions.....	203
Summary of findings.....	206
Subject component.....	206
Object component	210
Affect component.....	214
Multiple concurrent practices	216
Concluding remarks	217
Limitations and future directions for research	219
References.....	221

Chapter One: Introduction

The present research study investigates the social organisation of experience by analysing claims of emotion that are produced in interaction in response to child death. A large body of literature explores the effects of child deaths on those normatively understood to be impacted by the death of children: those in kinship relationships, for example, and often community members or other people in close physical proximity to the child that died (see, e.g., Bogensperger & Lueger-Schuster, 2014; Dawson & Riches, 1998; Hendrickson, 2009; Lindsay & Heliker, 2018; Nehari, Grebler, & Toren, 2007). Literature such as this typically treats the death of a child as commonsensically understood to be overwhelmingly tragic and analyses the grieving practices and perceptions of those mourning the child. An equally large body of literature analyses the causative schemes that produce such high numbers of deaths, in order to find ways of meaningfully intervening in and reducing these deaths (Hall, Richter, Mokomane, & Lake, 2018; UN, 2018; UNICEF, 2017). Such literature, specifically focused on the global South, explores the causes and effects of macro-socioeconomic concerns, with South Africa a particularly relevant site for their local manifestation; most specifically, poverty, gender inequality, race- and class-based inequality, the urban/rural divide, the structural lingering effects of apartheid and the migrant labour system on families, the spread of disease and the patriarchal systems governing most African communities (Bamford, McKerrow, Barron, & Aung, 2018; Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders, & McIntyre, 2009).

A separate body of research studies the social organisation of experience in interaction (see, e.g. Heritage, 2011; Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016; Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Sacks, 1984). Sacks' (1984) pioneering remarks on "entitlement to experience" have catalysed a large body of ethnomethodological and conversation-analytic research that examines experience as an interactional, rather than private or internal, phenomenon. This

field of research contends that, for participants, the domains of knowledge and experience are separate, with different interactional concerns that expose and make observable distinct moral orders. My research focuses specifically on the latter, that is, on the domain of experience in interaction. For participants, matters pertaining to claims of experience, relative entitlements to experience and limits on the scope of availability of experience are demonstrably relevant. Thus, my research seeks to investigate child mortality as a social and moral order continuously oriented to and reproduced by social actors, rather than a universally normative context within which participants interact.

Since childhood itself is a relatively recent historical construct, and child mortality rates even more so (see Armstrong, 1986), the death of children has evidently not always been seen as the undeniably problematic occurrence that it is today (Ariès, 1965; Zelizer, 1994). However, despite its range and scope, contemporary research on child death is underpinned by a powerful social and moral order that takes for granted fundamental assumptions about the phenomenon in question. Despite the demonstrable value of the former, I offer here an alternative way of studying this topic, which, as opposed to treating it as a starting point for other types of research, directly examines the social constitution of these sets of normative knowledges, thereby providing insight into the underlying social organisation of experience in interaction.

The social organisation of experiences of child death

It appears that the topic of child mortality has gained considerable traction over the past 150 years. While Armstrong (1986) notes that child mortality did not exist as a discrete conceptual or measurable category prior to the close of the 19th century, the political, financial, economic, civil and social focus that it has received since produces it as an object of continued and systematic attention (see, e.g. Lozano et al., 2011; Masquelier et al., 2018;

UN, 2018; UNICEF, 2017; Wang et al., 2017). Although the child him- or herself has emerged as an historically malleable figure that gained a substance and distinct identity through multiple structural reconfigurations (Ariès, 1965; Zelizer, 1994), child mortality as a discrete object of socio-medico-legal inquiry has garnered inter-sectoral and coordinated attention over the past century due to its status as an indicator of a country's economic and social well-being (UNICEF, 2017). Today, the death of a child is treated in two ways: quantitatively, as an instantiation of a larger set of aggregated concerns which themselves point to macro-level systemic inequalities; or qualitatively, as a singular occasion in which various parties impacted by the occurrence are studied for the specific effects incurred by the death. Due to the convergence of these multiple historical factors, underlying both approaches is the singular certainty that the occasion itself, the occurrence of a child's death, is a particularly problematic one, and one in which various interventions must be marshaled in order to attend to the infringement which has taken place.

However, if one considers that less than 200 years ago, the very concept of child mortality did not exist – in legal, medical and religious records, and for every other institutional purpose, including the social, the death of a child was treated simply as “a death”, with the age of the deceased person not identified as a relevant feature of the occurrence (Rusnock, 2002; Turmel, 2008) – then the enormously powerful consensus underlying this assumption can be viewed as a startling social accomplishment. Critical historiographies (Ariès, 1965; Kincaid, 1992; Zelizer, 1994) have certainly studied the transition from previous to current normative arrangements, and note that the emergence of child mortality as a distinct locus of analytic attention is crucially linked to other macro-level projects. While these studies provide a necessary “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p. 31), in which current taken-for-granted knowledge is problematised and relativised, they are nevertheless often lacking in their empirical and methodical analysis of the *locus* of this

profound sociopolitical transformation, what Schegloff (1996b, p. 54) terms “the primordial site of sociality”, or talk-in-interaction. For it is through interaction that institutional realities are made visible and are renewed (Drew & Heritage, 1992), and through interaction that normative knowledge is transmitted, refined, reproduced and contested. My own research begins here, where the juxtaposition of the historical and the taken-for-granted present converge to form a puzzle requiring analytical attention, whose answer lies in the things that people do and the ways in which they do them, or as Schegloff (1992, p. 1298) puts it, “the procedures by which common-sense knowledge is acquired, confirmed, [and] revised”.

Sacks’ (1992, p. 484) assertion of “order at all points” suggests that human interaction and its activities “are accomplished as the accountable products of common sets of procedures” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1). *That* social actions are always methodically produced, by participants, for one another (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) suggests that an analysis grounded in participant actions, and that privileges participants’ concerns, will yield concrete answers to questions about the taken-for-grantedness of apparently historically relative phenomena. The notion of child mortality as an historically malleable phenomenon is thus only the *beginning* of the inquiry: the methods by which it is maintained and organised as a distinct locus of social and moral action are the concern of this study.

This thesis investigates the social organisation of experiences of child death by analysing how claims of emotion in instances of child deaths are specific social actions that shed light on, and expose, one of the mechanisms by which child mortality is reflexively “acquired, confirmed, revised” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1298) and reproduced as a locus of social order. Further, the methodical analysis of this social action, embedded in a larger study of the organisation of experience in interaction, demonstrates how the child is constituted through accounts of its mortality, and how child death becomes the site for the negotiation of social and moral rights and responsibilities.

The ethnomethodological approach utilised in my study thus seeks to examine the common-sense reasoning by which certain individuals are understood to have heightened entitlement (or any entitlement at all) to claim an affective response to a child's death, and through the use of conversation analytic techniques, interrogates the mechanisms by which this is accomplished as an accountable social action. Thus, in contrast to an analysis that takes for granted certain categories of person (for example, relations of kin) as most affected by, and entitled to, such an experience, my research studies the very ways that these categories are produced as commonsensically hierarchically organised in relation to a child death, and the differential access to the range of possible responses to the death of a child. By making visible this hierarchy of affective rights, my study provides a window into how familial, non-familial, parental and other membership categories are constituted as legitimate and illegitimate claimants on a set of "self-evident" rights to grief, sadness, outrage and other affective claims.

Through studying talk about child death on this granular level, my study provides insight into larger discourses on the child, and the ways in which childhood and specifically child mortality are constituted within modern relations of kin and their respective custodial rights in social life. This outcome is aligned with Schegloff's (1996a, p. 171) assertion that interactions between individuals are the "mundane sites in which the grand, macrotheoretical themes about norms and values and cultural capital are played out", and my study certainly identifies how larger discourses of childhood and child death are reproduced in talk-in-interaction.

The turn to action, or to studying social action as a distinct locus of social order, is thus a useful approach in investigating a fundamental aspect of child mortality; not its causes, risks, implications or structural significances, but something rather more obvious: its very status as a problematic social and moral occurrence, and the methods by which this is

accomplished in talk-in-interaction. Therefore, my study examines the synchronous (re)production of normative orders of morality via interactionally constituted accounts of experiences, and in this sense investigates the mechanics of the social production of the present through a focus on how it is reproduced and contested in interaction.

Why South Africa?

The death of children is recognised as a largely preventable occurrence, and measures of child deaths, in the form of a national child mortality rate, have emerged as a significant indicator of a given country's political and socioeconomic well-being (Macfarlane & Mugford, 1984). South Africa, as a part of Sub-Saharan Africa, has been targeted as an area with pervasively high mortality rates and other indicators of ill-health and structural inequalities (Coovadia et al., 2009). In South Africa, the majority of child deaths occur from preventable causes, most notably communicable diseases due to poor nutrition and sanitation (Hall et al., 2018). Both instrument and effect of the child mortality rate, the high incidence of child death has become a central concern in modern South African life (Coovadia et al., 2009; Nannan, 2018; Pillay-van Wyk et al., 2016; Pillay-van Wyk et al., 2013). The death of a child is thus a particularly unsettling occurrence, and deaths that specifically seem to violate the vulnerability of children – through murder, assault or extreme neglect – are treated as the most problematic of all (Dawson & Riches, 1998; Lindsay & Heliker, 2018; Timmermans, 2005).

The high prevalence rate of child deaths in South Africa, itself an artefact of structural inequalities based on race and class (Coovadia et al., 2009; Darikwa & Dorrington, 2011), makes this context a particularly perspicuous site for the study of the social organisation of experiences of child death. My own analysis directly examines a specific aspect of child death as a broad interactional concern by situating the study in a place where the

phenomenon is highly prevalent and thus provides a South African context as a rich critical case for analysis.

Research Questions

My research investigates the social organisation of experiences of child death by asking the following questions:

1. How are claims of emotion interactionally produced in talk about child deaths?
2. How are these claims of emotion used as resources for larger interactional projects with respect to child deaths?
3. How are these actions, and the larger interactional projects of which they form a part, responded to and negotiated in talk about child deaths?

Chapter Outline

In Chapter Two, I trace the emergence of the child from its relative invisibility in and before the seventeenth century to the more widely recognised and sacralised figure that it occupies today. I offer a brief history of some of the economic, political, social and moral concerns which propelled the child into its current central position in society. This overview traces the transmutation of the child from absent, to cornerstone of the nuclear family, to sacralised figure in public policy-making and legislation, and examines the ways in which child health and its antithesis, child death, are produced as an ongoing social and moral public concern. The chapter offers a historical and “macro”-level context to frame the remainder of my study, in which I investigate the “micro”-level or local social actions that undergird and reproduce common-sense understandings of child death.

In Chapter Three I turn to a review of the seminal and current literature on the social organisation of experience. In conjunction with a close reading of Sacks’ (1984, 1992)

analysis of entitlement to experience, I focus specifically on the role of emotion in experience, and review literature on the actions and practices through which experience is demonstrated as a legitimate social action.

In Chapter Four I describe my data corpus, my method of selecting and analysing my data, and some of the strengths and limitations of using this data source. I also provide a detailed overview of the set of interrelated methodological approaches which inform my study, specifically ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and membership conversation analysis.

In Chapter Five I present an analysis of my data, using a detailed examination of a particular social action – claims of emotion – to demonstrate the complex and nuanced methods by which speakers position themselves along a hierarchy of experiential rights in talk about child death. My analysis thus traces the specific, local, moment-by-moment practices by which child death is produced as a social concern in which normative social arrangements regarding relative entitlement to child deaths are entrenched and reproduced.

My final chapter, Chapter Six, offers a summary and conclusion of my findings as well as a discussion of the implications of this study for further research. I note how my research provides an historical and interactional perspective that broadens the current context for studying child mortality, which in turn may allow for closer understandings of the social organisation of experiences of child death as a participant concern. I conclude by offering some further directions for research in this area and identify some important implications of extending this mode of study in this area.

Chapter Two: A History of Childhood

In this chapter, I offer an historical overview of conceptualisations of the child from the seventeenth century until today, followed by a history of infant and child mortality and the role it occupies in the South African present. This history provides a diachronic context for the analysis undertaken in this research project, which demonstrates the synchronic constitution of the child in social relations and interactions. An understanding of the ideological prominence that the child has gained in modern society allows for a deeper analysis of the ways that this has fueled and informed notions of childhood mortality and its relevance as an indicator of socioeconomic well-being today (Hall et al., 2018). Protection of the child, from death and harm, is directly linked to discourses of its preciousness and sacred citizenship, and high mortality rates indicate not just a failure of governance but a rupture in the very fabric of a moral society (Armstrong, 1986).

I begin this chapter by tracing the emergence of the child through two important policy reforms that redefined the economic and sexual role of children in society. These legislative decisions respecified the child as a figure conceptually and qualitatively distinct from the adult and paved the way for a new politics of childhood in which the nature of true childhood was reinvented and demarcated. Of course, history presents the future, backwards, so that what seemed rife with complexity and discontinuities can be retroactively patterned with meaning, systematicity and order. The history presented in this chapter traces, in part, the construction of the universality of the sacredness of the child, which is itself of course an ideological mechanism by which other forms of childhood are rendered invisible and outside the margins of normality (Burman, 1994). Despite the universalising practices that are recruited in the historicity of a dominant, rights-based version of childhood (a version that has found traction in policy documents around the world), the category of childhood familiar

in the Western world today is nevertheless but one (ideologically powerful) of multiple forms by which childhood is enacted and understood as a social category.

One of the consequences of the demarcation of childhood as a distinct and crucial life stage was the “invention of infant mortality”, in which Armstrong (1986) notes the introduction of a new system of vital registration, gradually introduced worldwide, that identified the death of infants and children as a relevant area of state surveillance and regulation. My own research in the remaining chapters focuses on the ways in which child deaths are produced as discursive objects, and the way that the child is positioned as both a private and public subject, whose well-being and care is the remit of his family, itself regulated and presided over by the State and other public actors. The State thus assumes a form of custodianship over all children, so that in incidents of child deaths, the categories of parents, members of the public, State actors and others are carefully negotiated with regard to the degree of entitlement each individual can legitimately claim when a child dies.

Childhood

“Childhood is the most intensely governed sector of personal existence”

(Rose, 1989, p. 123)

The category of the child, according to Kincaid (1992) is one free of any essential nature or meaning. Thus, it remains available to each epoch to endow childhood with the morality deemed to be relevant and reflective of normative values. The concept of childhood has undergone enormous changes, most specifically from its emergence as a discrete category of person between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries to the central position it occupies in modern society. Below, I trace one of the (ideologically prominent) historical emergences of the child and note its constitution in and through accounts of its mortality and vulnerability.

The Victorian child of the nineteenth century existed as an unseen (non-)member of society, redundant until it reached an age when it was capable of physical labour (Kincaid, 1992). High mortality rates ensured that families would birth seven or eight children in the hope that one or two would survive into adulthood. While relationships between parents and children were certainly present, their tones and contours differed from those we recognise today (Ariès, 1965). In order to understand the modern child, it is important to note that its historical emergence is crucially linked to the introduction of the nuclear family and its relationship with its parents as the significant caretakers and agents of socialisation (Rose, 1989). However, the scope of responsibility is vast, and ripples outward from the child to the social institutions that ensure its health and education, and further to its ultimate governance and custodianship by the state (Donzelot, 1979; Rose, 1989). More than belonging to his or her own parents, therefore, the child belongs to the state, whose job it is to ensure that the parents and other legal guardians are carefully regulating his or her well-being, and to take over if and when it emerges that they are not.

While the child of today is considered a taken-for-granted category and object, it is important to remember its constitution through history, time and discourse, and the elements of polity, economy and social life that shaped its realisation in the modern world (cf. Ariès, 1965; Cunningham, 2005; Kincaid, 1992). I begin by tracing the emergence of modern childhood to the turn of the previous century, that coincided with the industrialisation and secularisation of society. I continue by focusing on the role of the child in modern society and the relationships with various categories of persons through which it is reconstituted in daily life.

The economic child

“A laboring child is simply a producer, worth so much in dollars and cents, with no standard of value as a human being”

(National Child Labour Committee, 1929)

The child before the seventeenth century was an unrecognised figure in society, achieving its status as a conceptual and social entity only at the very beginnings of (pre-) modernity. Historical sociologists (Ariès, 1965; Cunningham, 2005; Kincaid, 1992; Rusnock, 2002; Turmel, 2008; Zelizer, 1994) note that, in previous centuries, the worth of children was based on their economic capacity, and that very often the ability of a child to contribute financially to the working-class family's income was extremely significant. The values of work, duty and discipline, believed to inhere in the notion of child labour, were carried over from early Protestant societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where children were expected to behave as “little adults” (Zelizer, 1994, p. 59) and enact the character traits of the idealised Puritanical worker. During this era, not only was child labour seen as a legitimate pursuit and a viable alternative to schooling or education: wealthier families who had no need for their children to work still perceived early entrance into the labour force as an admirable moral principle, concerned that their own non-working children were overindulged and idle.

The introduction of a new and competing ideology, in which child labour was no longer virtuous but a shameless exploitation of vulnerable citizens, was driven by the child labour reform movement which derived its own perspective from real economic, technological and structural changes of the Industrial Revolution (Kincaid, 1992). Three significant and interrelated catalysts were: an improvement in the general standard of living, which meant that most families could afford to keep their children in school; a corresponding need for a highly skilled and educated labour force, provided by adults who, as children, had completed their schooling; and, lastly, a (new) steady supply of unskilled labourers, apart

from children, in the form of immigrants entering the country. Thus, the reforms to child labour laws and the eventual legislation of compulsory schooling were, according to Osterman (1980), a result rather than a cause of changing economic needs. However, the ideological shift was a complex process, underpinned by a “profound cultural uncertainty and dissent over the proper economic roles for children” (Zelizer, 1994, p. 66). The majority of the population feared that a new generation of non-labouring children, bereft of discipline, duty and responsibility, would become a “nation of paupers and thieves” (Zelizer, 1994, p. 67). The culture of child labour, eventually dismantled in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was thus underpinned by powerful religious and economic discourses, borne of a bifurcated Puritanical approach that viewed labour as a virtue, and its opposite, idleness, as morally bankrupt and dangerous. Thus, the norm of child labour was positioned strategically against, and seen as morally and socially superior to, its purported antithesis: child-idleness.

The child labour reform movement was thus an intensely moral, as well as economic and legal, dispute whose culmination relocated the child as a sentimental rather than economic figure in society. In order to understand the child of the present, it is important to acknowledge the discursive and ideological transition from economic to sentimental childhood, such that the child was bestowed with “the moral value of an economically useless but emotionally priceless child” (Zelizer, 1994, p. 57).

This shift was also significant because it respecified the burden of obligation between parent and child: whereas previously, it had been a child’s duty to the family that was emphasised (in the form of financial contribution), it now became the parents who bore the main obligations of safety and care for their children. This transformation was paramount in reorganising the nuclear family and its assignation of values and roles, prioritising the well-being of children and locating its parents as those responsible for ensuring this. It also

functioned as a form of coercion by ensuring that children remained financially dependent on their parents (Bowman, 2010). At its culmination, the child was identified as sentimentally priceless, not despite, but because of, its economic valuelessness, its absence of any other productive value: a reflection of what Zelizer (1994) notes as the radical incompatibility of the child's economic and sentimental value. Kincaid (1992, p. 12) indeed argues that absence, in general, is a marked feature of the modern child, and that "[c]hildhood can be made a wonderfully hollow category, able to be filled up with anyone's overflowing emotions" (and moral leanings). The ability to thus project an invaluable preciousness onto children was precisely enabled by the absence that remained when its economic value was removed.

The sexual child

At the same time that the economic value of the child was being renegotiated, its taken-for-granted status as a (non)sexual being began to be cast into doubt. The child before the seventeenth century was considered completely asexual, possessing a sexual unawareness and indifference that created a natural protection from the often sexualised nature of adult gesture and allusion. Thus, Ariès (1965) notes a general lack of reserve regarding children and sexual matters before the eighteenth century due, not to an impropriety on the part of adults, but to an understanding that sexual information would not translate meaningfully to the child. Thus, at the same time that the child was endowed with a profound economic value, its sexual value was correspondingly absented.

Over time this morphed into a more contemporary understanding of the child as sexually innocent, rather than sexually indifferent. In other words, it potentiated the future possibility of sexuality in the world of the child while simultaneously creating the protections necessary to prevent it. The child became thus not an asexual being, but a pre-sexual being, one whose destiny was a sexuality from which it was sheltered until adulthood. Once

sexuality was potentiated in childhood it was not difficult to discursively produce the child as innately erotic: through Freud's (1905) concept of infantile sexuality, the child in an infant state was endowed with an inherently sexual nature whose expression would disrupt the social order, but whose repression could cause untold consequences. The solution came in the form of expertise, a new set of "psy" disciplines (Rose, 1998) that prescribed normality and offered the tools by which it could be recognised. The techniques for regulating and monitoring children and their development were thus ascribed an immense importance in ensuring healthy, normal development and socialisation, both for the good of the nation-state and for the child's own well-being during his growth (Burman, 1994).

As the child was stripped of its economic value, it was thus simultaneously provided with a sentimental pricelessness, an innocence that was powerfully threatened by the potentially ruinous effects of sexual knowledge or expression. Unsurveilled childhood became precarious, and protection of the child became of paramount importance, with its preclusion from the sexual world of adults a priority in maintaining its innocence and pricelessness. The child of the twentieth century was thus moved far away from economic concerns, and simultaneously removed from his or her own sexuality, and thus constituted as qualitatively different from the adult. Legally, ideologically, and culturally he was gradually separated from two crucial concerns of adulthood – sexuality and economy – demonstrating that the child could not be priceless without being economically redundant, and could not be innocent without being erotically prohibited.

The sentimental child: locus of the nuclear family

The transition to an economic system that did not rely on child labour was a long one, lasting over five decades and reaching completion in the early to mid-twentieth century. Today, policies regarding children and childhood are based on "the best interests of the child"

(Burman, 1994, p. 28) and countries that still practice child labour are viewed as morally corrupt and deviant. Tracing the ideological shift of child labour from moral virtue to moral deviance allows for the disruption of contemporary and singularising practices and understandings of childhood today, and resituates the child as an historical subject whose current status as a sacred citizen has emerged contingently over a long period of time.

After the child was precluded from labour and his sexual worth was redesignated, what remained was once again “a kind of purity, an absence” (Kincaid, 1992, p. 70) in which a new set of values could be established. The eradication of an economic value, and the simultaneous placing of a (forbidden) sexual value, on the child, were thus crucial aspects of redefining childhood: essentially bounding off the child from adulthood and its pleasures, as well as the financial cares and concerns that accompanied it. Children’s necessary preclusion from two key sites of adult life created a chasm between childhood and adulthood, an “erasure [which] ensures that the categories of ‘child’ and ‘adult’ are kept distinct and at a safe epistemological distance” (Angelides, 2004, p. 142). The process of sentimentalising childhood and imbuing all children with a value beyond price is what Zelizer (1994, p. 151) terms “the sacralisation of childhood”, the process of beginning to price the priceless child in terms of his or her social, moral and emotional value: a process catalysed by the emergence of the biopolitics of the nation-state, whose reforms cast the child as a distinct and legitimate category of person.

It is within and through this burden of care and protection for the child that the nuclear family was able to emerge. As Menzel (2014, p. 90) notes, “true babyhood reflected the new notion of the household as a private space of sentiment and noninstrumental relationships, walled off from the competitive amorality of commerce and public life”. This splitting off of the family’s economic activities from home life increased cohesion between family members, allowing mothers to care for and protect their children in the home, further

removing children and childhood from the economic activities of adults enacted elsewhere. As Kincaid (1992, p. 83) notes, “it is the family which defines the shape of the modern world, and the ‘child’ which has made possible this modern family”. The sentimental child offered a new focus for the family and revalued the role of the domesticated mother as ultimate protector of innocent childhood, while the child itself was recognised as a future citizen whose optimal economic value as an adult could only be realised through its sentimentalisation and protection during youth.

The child in this society became a symbol for the perpetuation of the population (Ariès, 1965; Foucault, 1978), and its health and welfare crucially linked to the “destiny of the nation” (Rose, 1989, p. 123), a rationale for the focus on its normative development and its protection from all kinds of danger, as well as on the intensification of certain projects that were seen to enhance its functioning. The threat of psychological damage or trauma in childhood became a threat to the fabric of the society, so that normality became “not an observation but a valuation... an injunction as a goal to be achieved” (Rose, 1989, p. 133). Within this paradigm, a continuum of care was established, with physical death its most extreme end point. Protection of the child was positioned as a moral duty; correspondingly, the death of a child represented the ultimate failure of an adult mandate of child wellness, and therefore the ultimate violation of all of the norms and values that had thus far been ascribed to the importance of the healthy child.

The public and private child

“An unhappy child was and is unnatural, an indictment of somebody: parent, institution, nation”
(Kincaid, 1992, p. 80)

The transition or divide between the public and private spheres of responsibility regarding the child have their origins in political and economic concerns that established the

family as a crucial mechanism of social control, reproducing a well-regulated labour force and socialising the forthcoming cohort of citizens. The family, discursively positioned as a private sphere motivated by self-realisation and mutual regard (Rose, 1989), was simultaneously operating to produce a capitalist workforce, and as such its status as a private domain was challenged, providing the central ideological mechanism through which the family, in many ways designed by the State, was actually playing a role in the maintenance of public institutions. Thus, “the language of privacy... obscured the extent to which the state actually shaped and controlled relations in the intimate sphere for public, political ends” (Rose, 1989, p. 126). Crucially, state-mandated protection of the child is a logical extension of its status as a sacred citizen, and allows for a plethora of institutional mechanisms to be put in place that contribute to, and reproduce, this construction of sacredness. Various social institutions, such as the educational, legal and health systems co-construct responsibilities regarding the regulation and improvement of the child (Donzelot, 1979), with the State positioned as ultimate protector, overseeing the competence and adequacy of parental tasks and responsibilities.

The legislation surrounding child labour was a significant moment of State interference that relocated the child of the twentieth century as a subject of the State. It was resisted by many who believed that the State did not have the right to interfere in family affairs, and that the decision to put a child to work belonged to his or her parents only. However, the role of the State in regulating childhood and the family was still relatively minor at that point, in contrast to the developments that took place in the decades that followed, in which organisations turned their gaze to the problems of childhood and development and began instituting legislation to protect those mandated as the most vulnerable members of society.

In 1924 the League of Nations adopted the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which formed the basis for the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, written in 1959, a document that offered moral guidance about the care and protection of children. However, formalised legislation stating the responsibilities and obligations of the State towards families and children was only instituted in 1989, with the international adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), a document which outlines the economic, legal, social, civil, health and cultural rights of children all over the world (United Nations, 1989). While it is a legally binding and internationally ratified document that plays a crucially important legislative role in ensuring that the rights of children are upheld, it can also be inspected for its discursive practices and the ways that these shape and reaffirm contemporary understandings of childhood. As Butler (2004, p. 43) notes, “[W]hen we say that every infant is surely vulnerable, that is clearly true; but it is true, in part, precisely because our utterance enacts the very recognition of vulnerability and so shows the importance of recognition itself for sustaining vulnerability”. In other words, it is not (only) that the child is recognised as a vulnerable member of society, but that this recognition is constitutive of its vulnerability at the same time that it is mandated to protect it. Documents such as the UNCRC demonstrate one of the methods by which the child is discursively produced as a sacred citizen in both the public and private domains.

In the preamble to the UNCRC, the rationale for the need for special legislation for children is affirmed through the twin assertions that, firstly, children are qualitatively distinct from adults and, secondly, that their well-being is the responsibility of both the private and public domain:

“the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance”

“the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924”

“the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection”

These statements situate the child as a being that is uniquely vulnerable and requires “special safeguards” and even “legal protection” due to the child’s “physical and mental immaturity”. “Childhood” itself is reproduced and asserted as a distinct life stage requiring “special care and assistance”, thus categorising children within a specific phase of “childhood” that is rendered sacred through its need for special care on behalf of those citizens who are unable to care for themselves.

The UNCRC continues by describing the State’s responsibility to protect the child from all forms of abuse and exploitation, in the hands of both parents or guardians (Article 34) or by others who would seek to harm him or her (Article 32). Crucially, the State is endowed with the right to remove a child from his or her parents if or when it emerges that the child’s rights are not being adequately realised. This places the child in the care of his private family, but simultaneously places the burden of responsibility for the realisation of his rights in the care of the public domain, and ultimately in the State. Today, a range of legal, civil and social organisations exist that continue to maintain and protect the rights of all children, to ensure that they are safeguarded from harm and to oversee the special care of our vulnerable future citizenry.

The intrusion of the State and public governance into the private life of the family has thus been a long and complex process, beginning with initial regulations surrounding child labour in the late nineteenth century and culminating in a comprehensive and internationally ratified piece of legislation adopted at the end of the twentieth century. The implications of the child as both private and public citizen are crucial in understanding the analysis that follows, where members of the public claim, contest and negotiate varying degrees of

entitlement to distress in cases where the vulnerability of the child has been violated and has culminated in death. This is accomplished through orientations to a hierarchy of entitlement in the occasion of a child's death, where participants simultaneously express their rights as members of the public sphere to grieve, mourn, evaluate or claim emotional involvement with the death of a child, while simultaneously orienting to the heightened or increased rights held by the parents and family of the deceased child, thereby affirming the child's place in the private sphere of his or her family. My analysis thus provides an interactional study of talk about child death, paralleling the genealogical analyses that have been undertaken by historians and laid out in the preceding section.

Who is a child?

Childhood today is the site of intense surveillance and measurement. Developmental psychology, a crucial modern discourse that shapes key legal, medical, educational and other practices, is continually segmenting the period of childhood into ever smaller fragments, differentiating between various micro-stages of infancy, early childhood, late childhood and adolescence (Burman, 1994). The practice of demarcating infancy into months, weeks and days produces it as an object of increasing surveillance and control; likewise the detailed delineation of all stages of childhood signals the consummate importance of the child in modern society (Armstrong, 1986). The production of the child as a vulnerable and cherished citizen – through these practices of segmentation, differentiation and inspection – legitimises these practices and disguises the possibility that they are the very mechanisms of surveillance and control that they claim to necessitate. Constituting the child as a temporally different subject to the adult, highlighting the notion that his or her development occurs on a different, intensified and potentially volatile timeline, allows for the necessity of protecting and managing this crucial time and hence for the increased monitoring and care of these citizens.

The correspondence of these practices to the increasing dominance of medical, legal and psychological discourses in society today demonstrates that these are socially produced categories that are noticeably absent in previous eras (but see Turmel, 2008, for a detailed discussion of different approaches to the construction of childhood). While the age delimiting the various stages of childhood are in flux and rely on the normative assumptions of a given society and era, vacuity and absence are the features by which the modern child can be identified, such that “at the center of the child [is] a kind of purity, an absence and an incapacity, an inability to do”. (Kincaid, 1992, p. 70).

Although the child as we know it today is absent from previous eras and has emerged, contingently, over time, at present there is still no uncontested definition of a child or any clear threshold for the beginning or end of childhood. Biological perspectives assume that childhood ends with the onset of puberty and reproductive capacity (Burman, 1994); however, legally, a child reaches adulthood only at the age of 18 (Hall et al., 2018). On the other end of the spectrum, Lorna Weir (2006) disrupts the threshold of the start of childhood, suggesting that the rights of the child apply even to the foetus as yet unborn. Legally, socially, biologically and otherwise, childhood remains apart from adulthood but without clear demarcations of its start and end. The scope of personhood itself is indefinite, and the boundaries that delimit personhood, citizenship, family, private life, public life and subjectivity are likewise blurred and complicated. The implications of this are vast: the scope of childhood is infinitely expanded, such that who can be considered a child remains contestable and reliant on context. Butler (2009, p. 19) acknowledges that these efforts to define the scope of personhood turn to “an ontology... that relies on an account of biological individuation”, without recognising the corresponding “social ontology” of life; that is, that the conditions of life are “pervasively social”. Ethnomethodological research thus finds important grounds for understanding the “social ontology” of personhood: research that

studies the interactional (re)production of childhood, and examines common-sense understandings of who is a child at any given moment, offers insight into the moment-by-moment ways that these historical and structural discourses are maintained and negotiated through talk-in-interaction.

The South African child

South Africa is a country recently emerged from apartheid, an oppressive nationalist regime that sought to maintain white minority rule over the majority black population (Beinart & Dubow, 1995; Posel, 1991; Wolpe, 1972). Over the past 25 years South Africa has struggled to redefine itself as a democratic country, priding itself on a progressive constitution that recognises and promotes the rights of all citizens, including and focusing specifically on children's well-being as a key developmental goal (September & Dinbabo, 2008).

Further to South Africa's ratification of the UNCRC is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), a document drafted in the early 1990s that sought to shape and affirm local policy agendas regarding the health and welfare of the child in modern South African society (Schmid, 2010). These legislative documents, termed "rights instruments" by Schmid and Patel (2016, p. 248), are some of the key technologies by which childhood is constituted in South Africa, and provide a structural framework for locating the role and significance of the child in its society. Most crucially, the incorporation of the State and civil society into custodianship of the child is legislated through such documents, and traces the emergence of the conceptual category of the child from an invisible pre-person (Butler, 2009) in earlier centuries to the highly surveilled and exceedingly monitored figure that it occupies today.

Schmid (2010) notes that, crucially, it is difficult to study the South African child and trends of its construction and protection without seeking to divide it into apartheid and post-apartheid epochs (and what this implies for the racialisation of children in and between these epochs). Indeed, many researchers have noted significant reforms undertaken by the newly democratic government of South Africa in the late 1990s. For example, the White Paper for Social Welfare, adopted in 1997, broke with apartheid's social welfare paradigm and signified a new focus on national reconstruction and development (Patel, 2008, p. 71). However, a careful reading of the discourses of child welfare suggests a deep and unyielding continuation between present and past practices, and demonstrates that despite reforms to the racialisation of welfare systems, the system itself remains largely unquestioned and based on international paradigms of welfare assistance (Schmid, 2010). For example, the Child Protection model utilised during apartheid still dominates current neoliberal policy and practice nowadays: legislation focuses on offering support to individual parents and families whose homes are dysfunctional, a promotion of individualistic discourses that render invisible the structural concerns of violence and unemployment that undergird much of the dysfunction in working-class homes.

The South African child is thus located as the responsibility of his or her parents, with the State occupying a more passive role in ensuring that parents meet their child-rearing responsibilities competently. The adoption of "first world" discourses in a developing country such as South Africa is potentially harmful, and Schmid (2010) argues that until legislation is refocused on a developmental model that acknowledges structural inequalities, the South African child will remain a less fortunate counterpart of its first world peers, rather than an entity requiring a totally different set of resources in order to thrive.

A very relevant feature of this discussion relates to the nature of the child in South African society. Dhliwayo (2007) notes that in South Africa, legal obligations to uphold the

rights of the child go beyond the State and include civil society organisations and corporations. This suggests that the child in South Africa is situated in both the private and public domains and thus is in the custody of the State and civil society (Patel, 2005, 2008), beyond (or in addition to) his custodianship by his parents. Common-sense knowledge of the public and private situatedness of children, and the responsibility assumed for them by the State and society, are thus informed by structural concerns such as policy implementation and legislative practices; however, they are maintained, reproduced, contested and affirmed in the local practices by which actors make sense of their everyday lives. My research demonstrates that the child is reproduced as both a public and private figure organised along a hierarchy of access and entitlement that is based on common-sense knowledge of children and their place in modern South African society.

Child mortality

“The purposes of vital registration systems are often described as being juridical and statistical; however, underlying these is a range of essentially political concerns relating to a need to assert the authority of the State and control its subjects”

(Jewkes & Wood, 1998, p. 1044)

Practices of counting, collecting and recording the movements of populations are situated within larger political and technological systems termed “panoptic technology” (Foucault, 1977, 2003; Martin & Lynch, 2009), and their statistical manifestations are “quantitative constructions of social realities” (Posel, 2000, p. 119). The child mortality rate is part of a larger group of data termed “vital statistics” that derive from civil registration systems that citizens are required to update, specifically on the occasions of births, deaths and marriages. These statistics are crucial indicators of health status, and are necessary for population planning. Beyond this, however, they also provide an indicator of the general socioeconomic status of a community or country (Jewkes & Wood, 1998). Childhood

mortality statistics, as one of the components of vital registration, occupy a significant role in modern day discourses of health and politics of development: they are used specifically as sensitive measures of national and social well-being (Sarma & Choudhury, 2014; StatsSA, 2013). However, Foucault's (2003) discussion of biopolitics offers an alternative lens through which we can understand and examine the construction of child mortality in modern society. Biopolitics refers to the monitoring and surveillance mechanisms by which governments administrate and regulate populations, purportedly in order to optimise the well-being of its citizens; a legitimisation which justifies its intrusion into what are ostensibly some of the most intimate areas of personal existence (Rose, 1989).

Practices of recording the intricate details of the lives of a population (Prior, 1985) transform it into a governable entity, while simultaneously legitimising the governing of this population by pointing to the (ideologically invisible) seemingly necessary practices of its regulation and control. The child mortality rate may be analysed as one of the institutionalised mechanisms by which the State monitors and manages its citizenry. With the child identified as an essential component of nation-building (Foucault, 1978) it becomes useful to monitor how many children are being born, how well they are being cared for, and how, when and why they die (when they do). A critical discussion of child mortality must therefore include an analysis of its emergence as a discrete object of inquiry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the technologies by which it "emerged from beneath the threshold of description" (Armstrong, 1986, p. 214) and achieved the social, economic, ideological and moral value that it holds today.

Although a child is legally recognised as any person under the age of 18 years of age, the child mortality rate today is segmented into subsections: neonatal death (within the first 28 days), infant death (within the first year) and under-five mortality (MRC, 2014; WHO, 2009). While the deaths of children over five years of age are also considered a part of the

child mortality statistic, these three categories of child mortality specifically are considered to provide the most sensitive and relevant indicators of national health and well-being (WHO, 2009). However, it can also be argued that the very presence of these segmented categories by which child mortality is measured, and the absence of a single unified measurement – the very absence of a singular definition of childhood itself – is suggestive of the style of describing, categorising and organising, in miniscule detail, the period of life that we call childhood. An examination of child mortality which is sensitive to its historical construction and its function as a biopolitical technology necessarily traces its emergence as a discrete unit of measurement and the ways that this has evolved into its present, ever-segmented and largely undefinable form.

A history of child mortality

“Before the invention of the infant mortality rate, the infant had no existence as a social object”
(Armstrong, 1986)

While children have always died, and in fact childhood mortality rates have decreased substantially over the centuries (WHO, 2016), the actual practice of collecting mortality statistics differentiated by age is a fairly recent development (see Armstrong, 1986 for a detailed discussion). The collection of vital statistics had previously fallen within the purview of the church or parish, and such recording practices can be found in parish records in Great Britain as far back as 1538. In England, the passing of the Registration Act of 1834 revised the act of vital registration from a religious or community-based responsibility to a civic duty, so that although a range of recording, counting, quantifying and aggregating practices had been enacted for at least the previous two centuries, this was the first civil imperative, mandated by parliament, to begin recording the population (Rusnock, 2002). The mobilisation of these practices as a civic, rather than religious, duty duly became the site of a

powerful state-ideological surveillance mechanism (Posel, 2000). Significantly, as the collection of mortality statistics became more formalised, information was now required about the pathological cause of death (as opposed to the cause of “natural death” that has sufficed as an explanation until that time). Armstrong (1986) notes that soon afterwards, these causes of death began to be analysed according to age, and by 1877 the first infant mortality rate (IMR) was reported as an official and relevant statistic.

Following the formal recognition of the IMR (which accounts for all deaths from 28 days after birth until one year after birth) in 1877 (Armstrong, 1986), the neonatal mortality rate was recognised by the Registrar-General of Britain in 1938 as death occurring within the first four weeks after birth, further divided into the early neonatal period (the first seven days of life) and the late neonatal period (the second to fourth week of life) (Rusnock, 2002). However, the observation that the majority of early infant deaths occurred in the first week of life suggested the need for an independent indicator, the perinatal mortality rate, which specifically records the number of stillbirths or deaths of live births between seven months’ gestation until seven days after birth; it emerged as a category of infancy in 1948 (Armstrong, 1986) and is reflective of Weir’s (2006) interrogation of the threshold of personhood and the stage of life at which social and civil rights are acquired. Lastly, the child mortality rate describes the deaths between one and five years of age; all these categories together are collectively described as the under-five mortality rate, or overall childhood mortality rate (Macfarlane & Mugford, 1984; Nannan et al., 2012), and are used as the basis for a variety of social and political actions. For example, the under-five mortality rate is considered a crucial socioeconomic indicator by the World Health Organisation. Its reduction also represented the fourth Goal of the United Nations’ Millenium Development Plan (StatsSA, 2015). At the same time, the complex and comprehensive nature of this system of categorisation echoes the value of this practice as a sophisticated technology for the reproduction of the child as a

sacred and qualitatively distinct category of person. As Menzel (2014, p. 34) argues, these mortality statistics are “artifacts of the socially normative rather than biologically normal, reflecting the differential values, materialized as differential life circumstances, to which particular classes of subjects are assigned”, a reminder that these categories have a social ontology (Butler, 2009) that is inseparable from their discursive and socially constituted production.

The invention of infant mortality and its elaboration corresponds to (and is co-constitutive of) the very period of time during which childhood itself was being reinvented as a discrete life stage qualitatively different from adulthood (Ariès, 1965), implying a strong interdependence between their various socio-political and discursive emergences. The child’s recognition *as a child*, rather than as a pre-adult (Butler, 2009), is thus crucially linked to its status as a sacred citizen, the “destiny of the nation” (Rose, 1989, p. 123), a sentimentalised being in need of protection and care. This need provided a powerful rationale for the collection of detailed child mortality statistics, information by which children could most effectively be shielded from illness and death, and by which their protection and care could be bureaucratically managed and monitored. The infant mortality rate was thus made visible and measurable through a bureaucratic apparatus which collected and recorded information, as well as an ideological apparatus that prescribed how this information would be used, analysed and interpreted. While the data to compute infant mortality rates had long been present (Armstrong, 1986, pp. 212-213), the conceptualisation of an infant or child as a category of person qualitatively distinct from the adult, and the need to create a set of separate data by which to manage it, only emerged alongside modern childhood itself, with child and infant mortality both an outcome and an affirmation of this new category of childhood.

As the figure of the child emerged as a distinct and precious being, its death could only be understood as the fundamental rupture of a morally cohesive society. The management, prevention, regulation and monitoring of child death was thus a crucial aspect of safeguarding children. As Menzel (2014, p. 106) notes: “If true babyhood was adored and precious, it was also a figure of vulnerability, not only deserving of love from its caregivers but in need of special protections”. These special protections were necessary in order to ensure that the child survived and thrived and that its death was averted and avoided at all costs, both for its own sake and for the sake of those for whom it served as a symbol of futurity and hope.

Child mortality statistics are thus the outcome of a powerful rationale by which child sacredness is both instrument and effect of the institutional mechanisms that isolate and differentiate age cohorts in the process of counting, describing, aggregating and analysing shifting population patterns. The intense monitoring of childhood and its segmentation into relatively miniscule time-periods serves to constitute the child as sacred, while the very status of the child as a precious and vulnerable citizen demands that these monitoring practices be present. The childhood mortality rate may be considered one outcome of this set of discourses, constituting these figures as crucial to any type of legitimate government of a population through consistently reproducing the “health and welfare of [its] children” (Bowman, 2010, p. 447) as a symbol of its success.

Public and private child death

“Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order... we can argue against it, but we would be denying something fundamental about the social conditions of our very formation”

(Butler, 2004, p. 22)

The transition from routine occurrence to private tragedy that took place over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has given way to a politics of public bereavement with regard to the death of children in modern society. Since extremely high death rates had been common in children born in previous centuries, most families had a large number of children, with the hope that one or two would survive into adulthood. The intensification of surveillance of childhood death patterns resulted in interventions that dramatically decreased the mortality rates of infants and children from the start of twentieth century, its sudden relative infrequency provided as evidence of its unnecessariness and preventability. Zelizer (1994, p. 27) identifies the transition, noting that eventually, infant and child mortality, previously identified as the “domestic grief of all parents for their dead child”, was gradually defined as a public concern. Thus, while the death of children in previous centuries was an expected if unfortunate occurrence, today it is viewed as an “unjust and untimely bereavement” (Sørensen, 2011, p. 161), suggesting that the very meaning of child death itself has evolved over the centuries, from a sorrowful but routine occurrence in practically every family before the nineteenth century, to a “traumatic loss of a unique human futurity” in the present (Menzel, 2014, p. 102).

Dye and Smith (1986) examine the ways in which mothers were affected by high infant mortality during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their historical analysis demonstrates that the expectation of child death formed a “backdrop” (1986, p. 330) against which motherhood was set and experienced. However, these deaths were attributed to Divine Providence and the well-being of a child was believed to lie in the hands of God, rather than in parental or medical care. Deceased children were mourned by their parents, but perfunctorily: “Reflecting on the loss of eight out of eleven children born to her between 1717 and 1736, a New England mother observed, “[S]o it pleased God to take away one after another of my dear children, I hope, to himself”” (Dye & Smith, 1986, p. 322).

Dye and Smith suggest that this sparse reporting style during this period was due to mothers not wishing to invest emotionally in children until it was likely that they would survive into adulthood. A more critical analysis suggests that these deaths had not yet “emerged from beneath the threshold of description” (Armstrong, 1986, p. 214), and thus were not reportable in the way that they are today. The decrease of mortality rates, and the accompanying idea that child death was avoidable, catalysed a new conceptualisation of motherhood as a key site of responsibility for the child’s well-being: rather than a child’s death being seen as a Divine act ordained from above, it was now viewed as a failure of maternal agency and care. However, this private sphere of grief and responsibility was expanded even further in the following decades, when what was “once seen solely as a private tragedy [became] a major social and political issue” (Dye & Smith, 1986, p. 331), the start of a movement “away from the confined, privatised mother-child relationship... toward a more broadly based “social motherhood” in which mothers shared responsibility for child welfare with public health officials, the medical profession, and ultimately the state”. The rationale for this view of child death as unspeakable and overwhelming public tragedy is crucially linked to the role that the modern day child occupies in social life and the futurity and potential, as well as the inherent vulnerability, with which it is endowed.

The “revolution in feeling” (Ariès, 1965) has led to a “magnification of mourning” (Douglas, 1977) in instances when a child dies, ascribable to the assumption that the death of a young child is the worst loss of all (Ariès, 1965, 1975). As Menzel (2014, p. 102) notes, “as entirely unique individuals, infants were now fully-fledged ‘others’ whose loss left an irreparable rent in the fabric of the world”, suggesting that the scope of responsibility for the child’s well-being belonged to all, and that a failure of this responsibility was ultimately a moral failure and an indictment of society.

Child mortality today

“In the contemporary Western world, the death of a child is widely considered an unquestionable tragedy”

(Sørensen, 2011)

Today, infant mortality is itself only a small component of the larger construct of child mortality, which refers to deaths between birth and 14 years of age (UNICEF, 2017; WHO, 2016). As demonstrated, however, child mortality is subdivided into smaller periods of time culminating in a range of mortality statistics by which to interpret and problematise childhood. The segmentation of childhood locates the child as an increasing object of socio-medical analysis, a being whose conceptual identity is tied to its temporal-historical and social location; a practice that is reflective of the continuous renegotiation around the scope of childhood itself. Nevertheless, as Sørensen (2011, p. 170) notes, these medico-legal categories (neonate, infant, stillbirth, etc.) are not reflective of the mourning experiences of parents or others grieving the deaths of children, and in fact “the feeling of having lost may cut across these categories”, so that the organisation of these legislative and juridical categories often has little to do with the social meaning of a child’s death and the ways that it is treated by those it impacts. This suggests a rationale for studies such as mine, which investigate the methods by which these categories are deployed interactionally in order to display entitlement through claiming an emotional response to a child’s death. My research thus explores how participants demonstrate to one another their accountable grieving practices, which are ordered along (and simultaneously reproduce) a hierarchy of entitlement to emotionally experience the death of a child.

A range of contemporary literature explores the mourning practices of those understood to be impacted by the death of a child: for example, the parents (Dye & Smith, 1986; Lindsay & Heliker, 2018), grandparents (Nehari et al., 2007), relatives, siblings or

other kinship categories which may be affected by the death. Sorensen's (2011, p. 165) study of material grief practices suggests that many of these involve "dramatisations of the futurity of what could have been", suggesting that part of the loss of a child is a mourning for its unrealised future and potential. In other research, Dawson and Riches (1998) explore the "culture of parent bereavement" and the fundamental challenges faced by parents who have lost a child. The death of a child is purported to result in a loss of meaning and purpose and a necessary reconstruction of self and family identity in its wake; such research traces the practices by which the child is mourned by his or her family.

Contemporary literature on child death offers a useful overview of those discursively produced as being entitled to grieve for the dead child. The majority of literature speaks about maternal bereavement, with the rationale that mothers and their children enjoy a special bond that is stronger than any other relationship in the world (cf. Winnicott, 1957, 1960). Paternal bereavement, on the other hand, has not been researched in as much depth, attesting to cultural understandings of fathers as less bonded than mothers with their children (but see Flouri & Buchanan, 2003; Hendricks, Swartz, & Bhana, 2010; Langa, 2010; Ratele, Shefer, & Clowes, 2012; Richter & Morrell, 2006). Research has been done on family bereavement and the restructuring of sibling bonds after the death of a child, as well as the different types of bereavement experienced by those whose child has died suddenly, or violently (Dawson & Riches, 1998), and the various grieving strategies employed in different cultural contexts. Throughout, however, it is taken for granted that the death of a young child is qualitatively different, and far worse, than the death of a person at any other life stage, and (even critically oriented) research operates from within this assumption, seldom interrogating or tracing its historical emergence and ideological implications.

Child mortality in South Africa

“The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths”

(Butler, 2004, p. xvii)

Sub-Saharan Africa holds one of the highest infant and child mortality rates in the world, with South Africa reflecting a higher than average IMR that has nevertheless decreased substantially over the past two decades (Hall et al., 2018). For example, the current under-five mortality rate is 34 (per 1000 live births) (Nannan, 2018) significantly lower than the average rate for developing countries, which is 57, but still approximately seven times higher than the average statistic in the developed world, which is seven per 1000 live births (StatsSA, 2013). In addition, Jewkes and Wood (1998) have noted that the birth and death data deriving from civil registration systems in South Africa are largely incomplete and thus do not necessarily accurately reflect vital statistics of the population and may underestimate the child mortality statistics in the country.

In South Africa, only certain child deaths are treated as reportable or newsworthy items: the child mortality rate, relatively high in comparison to the rest of the world, describes at least 40 000 children per year who die; on the news, however, it is perhaps a fraction of these that are made visible. The deaths that are reported are typically those which seem to violate normative moral arrangements: children killed by parents, or by other children; children killed in particularly gruesome or cruel manners; children whose parental neglect is made spectacular through drowning or burning to death; children whose vulnerability is violated in sensational ways. It is these children who are produced as “grievable” (Butler, 2009), whose lives are made visible and whose deaths are presented as a task of mourning for all members of the public.

The task of mourning, previously perfunctorily performed by the mother of the deceased child, has expanded to include every person in society, however with strict regulations on the “entitlement to experience” (Sacks, 1984) that can be claimed by any single individual, and with people orienting to the relativised access and the limits imposed on the act of public mourning for a child. South Africa thus provides a useful platform from which to engage with the topic of child mortality, and from which to explore the possibility that the assumptions inherent in the statistical formulations with which we are presented reproduce the phenomenon of child mortality in exceedingly specific patterns that shape our moral understanding of the world and hold us accountable in different ways to different forms of child death.

My own research is located in the transitional space between private and public grieving for a deceased child. My approach focuses on media interactions in which members of the public (both civil and State) articulate personalised emotional responses to the death of a child in South Africa. While my analysis traces the ways that these are produced and accomplished interactionally, this historical analysis locates the conditions of possibility through which such discursive objects can be produced. Thus, a historicisation of childhood since the seventeenth century identifies the emergence of the child itself, its gradual claiming by the State through legislation and a broadening of the scope of responsibility of care, and the concept of child mortality itself as a biopolitical mechanism respecified as both a private and public concern.

Conclusions

This chapter examines the child as a central concern of modern life that is constituted in accounts of its mortality. Because of the value placed on child mortality as a reflection of a nation’s well-being, and as the symbol of successful and legitimate governance, many state

and social resources are devoted to maintaining these particular constructions of sacred childhood (United Nations, 1989). To this end, one of the most commonly shared knowledges in Western cultures is that children both require and deserve extra protection from harm and specifically from death. The sacredness of childhood is thus an ideological tool recast as a moral necessity, as the successful self-regulation of members of a society necessitates that ideological practices, as they acquire personal meaning for subjects, are rendered invisible as ideology and thus perpetuated voluntarily by the subject population (Althusser, Balibar, Establiet, Macherey, & Ranciere, 1970). In other words, the notion of the child as a precious citizen, and the corresponding significance of the health and welfare of children, has been taken up by members of society, infused with meaning and morality, and acquired as a set of personal values, their ideological contours as unseen as the surveillance mechanisms for which they act. As Heritage (1984, p. 232) points out, “These activities [of producing accountable everyday moralities] are acted out, and acted on, largely in that ‘seen but unnoticed’ fashion which itself undergirds the reproduction of institutions as the presuppositionally real orders of events which, from the actors’ point of view, they always have been”.

In a critical examination of child mortality and its production in South African society, I suggest that the burden of responsibility, and its corresponding burden of care, for the health and welfare of all South African children is demonstrated interactionally by members of the South African public, in instances when they claim emotional responses to incidents of the deaths of children with whom they are not personally affiliated. My own research, contextualised by a historicisation of the modern child as a figure made visible through policy reforms and protective legislations, argues that the South African child exists simultaneously as private and public figure, and that members of the public orient to a hierarchy of entitlement when claiming emotional responses to child deaths. Participants use

a range of reference and categorisation terms, demonstrating a reliance on taken-for-granted knowledge about the roles and statuses of children and adults in modern South African society, in locating themselves as differentially entitled to articulate claims of emotion about a child death. These claims are a specific kind of social action which, when analysed, demonstrates the normative knowledges shared by members of our society, and the degree of consensus by which they may be characterised, a consensus which relies on common-sense understandings of the role of children and childhood as they are constituted in relation to death in South Africa today.

Chapter Three: Experience in interaction

In this chapter, I review a range of literature on the social organisation of experience with a focus on the phenomenon of differential availability of entitlement to experiences. I begin by outlining Sacks' (1984, 1992) seminal work on this topic, following his assertion that "entitlement to experience is differentially available" (1992, p. 243) as well as distinct from entitlement to knowledge (Heritage, 2011; Sacks, 1984, 1992). I continue by reviewing a range of discursive and conversation-analytic literature on experience and the various contingent mechanisms by which it is produced and managed interactionally. I conclude with a summary of the implications of this literature on my own study and describe how my own work builds and expands on the literature that I have reviewed.

Knowledge and experience in interaction

That is to say, if I tell you something that you come to think is so, you are entitled to have it. And you take it that the stock of knowledge that you have is something that you can get wherever you get it, and it is yours to keep. But the stock of experiences is an altogether differently constructed thing. As I say, in order to see that that is so, we can just, for example, differentiate how we deal with a piece of knowledge and how we deal with someone else's experience, and then come to see that experiences then get isolated, rather than that they are themselves as productive as are pieces of knowledge

(Sacks, 1984, p. 425)

I begin this section with a direct quote from Harvey Sacks, in which he offers his pioneering remarks on the interactional distinction between knowledge and experience. My review below is catalysed by this crucial point whose foundational assumption is the bedrock upon which my subsequent research is based.

The domains of knowledge and experience as interactional resources, and as normative orders that become observable in and through interaction, were originally

differentiated by Sacks (1984) who delimited a hard distinction between the normative organisation of each. While knowledge refers, broadly, to things that people know about “mutually accessible” (Heritage, 2011, p. 183) objects in the world, experience involves a relational, subjective element; that is to say, it involves participation in, or observation of, an event, with a crucial yet subtle distinction being the inclusion of the subject or self through his or her relationship to the event.

Sacks’s (1984) analysis suggests not only that knowledge and experience are treated differently and have different normative constraints on their production, but that experience is viewed as a more privileged domain. As such, the interactional constraints upon experience are more tightly regulated than they are with regard to knowledge, with the practical distinction being that participants treat knowledge as something that can be shared, in contrast to experience, which is treated as belonging to the experiencer. An observable consequence of this difference is that participants distinguish between these domains in interaction, and more importantly may relevantly impose differing constraints on their interactional production, and on those producing them. The analysis that I provide in Chapter Five builds on Sacks’ observations about experience in interaction, and provides empirical evidence of some of the systematic actions and practices by which such entitlement is made visible as a social order.

Entitlement to knowledge

Recently, the topic of knowledge, and the interactional management of relative knowledge and of relative rights to knowledge, has been researched extensively under the domain of epistemics (Heritage, 2011, 2012a; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Raymond & Heritage, 2006).

As Heritage (2011, p. 183) notes, “If difficulties with the social organisation of knowledge concern the management of ownership and priority in relation to mutually accessible goods, difficulties in the social organisation of experience concern the construction of resources by which an interlocutor can reach towards moments of genuine singularity”. The basis for this differentiation between knowledge and experience is thus epistemological: while knowledge is “mutually” available and accessible, implying an object that is knowable in the same way by all its knowers, and thus (according to Sacks, 1984) more easily shareable, experience is singular, “concerned with respect for the personal experiential preserves of the individual on which coherent personhood itself ultimately depends” (Heritage, 2011, p. 183), and thus organised in such a way as to foreground the singularity and subjectivity of the experiencer in relation to the object. The status of knowledge as more accessible (Sacks, 1984) may be due to the fact that knowledge presupposes a shared reality and maintains social solidarity by organising consensus around objects in the world (Edwards & Potter, 2017), while experience, on the other hand, separates the speaker from others and implies a unique relationship with the event, emphasising subjectivity rather than consensus (Edwards & Potter, 2017).

Nevertheless, as my analysis will demonstrate, the sharing of experience, although it does not actively promote consensus, works to establish the normative assumptions upheld through such consensus through its explication of the relationship between individual subjects and objects in the world. As such, the establishment of these normative assumptions itself provides an underlying consensus and solidarity about the nature of experience *as singular*, so that the overall organisation of experience does not preclude, but rather tacitly reproduces, the formation of consensus and solidarity about the singularity of experience. The death of a child is thus produced as an (emotional) experience to which members of a society may demonstrate various degrees of entitlement, which in turn affirms the status of the child

as a sacred citizen in society and the normative custodianship assumed toward it by adult citizens. Further, such entitlement is the by-product of a range of (inter)actions which implicitly orient to (and simultaneously reproduce) a hierarchy of entitlement to experiences of child deaths.

Epistemic status and epistemic stance

An important contribution from studies of epistemics concerns the interactional management of relative epistemic rights. Heritage's (2012a) examination of epistemics in action offers a useful frame for understanding the interactional organisation of knowledge (a frame that I extend in the next section to my own study of experience).

Heritage (2012a, p. 4) suggests that knowledge is organised along an "epistemic gradient" in which relative access and entitlement to knowledge are distributed among participants. This epistemic gradient reflects and reproduces a normative order surrounding rights to knowledge, and depends in part on participants' degree of access to an objective referent. Participants make visible these orders of epistemic access through various interactional practices, such as assessments and complaints, and affiliation (or lack thereof) is provided by interlocutors based on their own knowledge (or lack thereof) of that referent. This approach provides an important conceptual tool for understanding the interactional organisation of knowledge as a relative and stratified phenomenon that is displayed in talk-in-interaction.

Heritage further distinguishes between the domains of epistemic status and epistemic stance. Epistemic status, according to Heritage (2012b, p. 6), is a relatively "enduring" state, in which the degree of access that a given participant has to certain knowledge and information comprises his "territory of information" (Kamio, 1997), or "epistemic domain" (Stivers & Rossano, 2010). This epistemic status is based on "participants' valuation of one

another's epistemic access and rights to specific domains of knowledge and information" (Heritage, 2012b, p. 7), and is treated as a consensually organised and real state of affairs. As Heritage notes, epistemic status is based on a person's position on the epistemic gradient with regard to a particular territory of information, and is "an inherently relative and relational concept concerning the relative access to some domain of two (or more) persons at some point in time" (Heritage, 2012a, p. 4), while the epistemic status that a participant holds may vary in different territories of knowledge and relative to other participants. Heritage notes that although the contingencies involved in epistemic status might make it seem difficult and complex, for participants it is largely an unproblematic and "settled matter", and the "thoughts, experiences, hopes, and expectations of individuals are treated as theirs to know and describe" (Heritage, 2012b, p. 6). Thus, although relative access may seem complex, in most interactions a person's epistemic status is treated as a taken-for-granted and enduring state of affairs, despite its contingent nature and management.

In contrast to status, epistemic "stance" (Heritage, 2012b, p. 6) is the moment-by-moment encoding of such access or status in turns at talk, and is thus an interactionally managed and contingently organised social action by which a person's position on the epistemic gradient is maintained or contested. Epistemic stance is articulated through a range of practices that typically rely on grammatical organisation of propositional content and, for analytic purposes, stance is treated as quite distinct from epistemic status. Nevertheless, Heritage (2012a, p. 7) notes the principle of an "epistemic congruency" in which the participant's status will typically converge with his or her epistemic stance in interaction; he cautions, however, that this is by no means a given. For example, in many instances a person will display an epistemic knowledge that he or she does not necessarily possess, in order to appear more knowledgeable than he or she really is, for various reasons. In other instances, a person may portray him- or herself as less knowledgeable than an interlocutor about a certain

topic, also for reasons that converge with various other interactional and social orders, which make relevant the relative access to knowledge held by different participants.

The research on epistemics discussed above has somewhat complicated the distinction that Sacks originally drew between knowledge and experience, since it shows how rights to knowledge are themselves interactionally regulated, with certain people having greater rights to know things than others. Although Sacks' pioneering research on the topic foreshadowed these potential intersections between the two domains, more recent research has empirically demonstrated the complexities, distinctions and intersections between them.

These complexities have, however, created some parallels between the study of epistemics and experience as interactional orders that are both underpinned by separate but similar apparatuses that are made visible in talk-in-interaction. Nevertheless, there remains a clear distinction about the normative regulation of epistemics versus experience in many of the basic senses noted by Sacks. Crucially, contemporary conversation-analytic literature on epistemics builds on and extends, rather than undermining, Sacks' original observations about orientations to rights to knowledge versus experience, most specifically with regard to the heightened regulations involved in demonstrating entitlement to experience and the interactional affordances offered by its provision. Furthermore, in my discussion below I demonstrate how research on epistemics can contribute in meaningful ways to a growing literature on experience in interaction.

Entitlement to experience

Experience itself can be broadly understood as participation in, or observation of, an event, while experience in interaction is an intrinsically relational domain where participants demonstrate varying degrees of access to particular events, based on a range of interactional contingencies (see Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016 for a detailed discussion). While the study of

epistemics provides a strong empirical basis for research on knowledge-in-interaction, it also provides conversation analysts with a potential vocabulary for beginning to tease out the intricacies of experience in interaction (see, for example, Davies & Davies, 2007; Kuroshima & Iwata, 2016; Peräkylä & Silverman, 1991; Pino, 2017). Therefore, I rely here on Heritage's (2012b, pp. 4-7) concept of the "epistemic gradient", and his discussion of epistemic status versus epistemic stance (detailed above) to frame my analysis of experience in interaction. My analysis of talk about child death reveals an "experiential gradient" through which individuals display to one another their rights and access to experiences, and demonstrates how these rights are interactionally organised and managed. By drawing on Heritage's (2012a) terms of "status" and "stance", I position my own research, which examines the "experiential" status and stance of participants in discussions of child death.

My study is grounded in the assumption (similar to Heritage's) that experiential status is a more enduring and thus presuppositionally real (for the participants) state of affairs, and I suggest that it closely corresponds with Sacks' (1984) conceptualisation of entitlement to experience: an inherently relational domain whose relative organisation may correspond to the participants' experiential stance, by which they signal their rights and access to a particular experience. In particular, I study claims of emotion as one of the actions by which such stance is articulated in interaction, and the various practices by which it is contingently produced, thereby offering insight into the organisation of entitlement to experience – the experiential status – that emerges as an implicit by-product of such actions.

Experiential status and experiential stance

Sacks' (1984) discussion of the constraints on entitlement to experience is a crucial element of my analysis of these claims. For example, he suggests that, in having an experience, a person would typically have the type of experience that any other person would

have of it. In other words, “you cannot make much more of it than what anybody would make of it” (1984, p. 426); you have to “form it up as the thing that it ordinarily is, and then mesh your experience with that” (1984, pp. 426-427). Practically and interactionally, then, speakers formulate their subjectivity in such a way that the experience can also be understood as “anybody’s” experience, and, thus, the constraints on the entitlement to the experience rest on showing that the “you” that is the subject of the experience is constructed in such a way to be eligible for the claims being made on its behalf. Secondly, the affective response being mobilised typically corresponds to normative knowledge, resulting in an affective stance that does not violate or qualify the taken-for-granted relationships between subjects and objects in the world, and in fact, serves to implicitly reproduce them. Lastly, the referent, event or object remains the “thing that it ordinarily is”, that is, maintains its status as an objective occurrence to which anybody could claim epistemic access, but with a speaker then “mesh[ing] your experience with that”, i.e. imposing the subjective and affective components upon it in order for it to be treated distinctly as an experience, and with the speaker’s accomplished formulations of subject, affect and object (i.e. the experiential stance) tacitly invoking the experiential status to which the stance may correspond.

The study of claims of emotion provides an entry-point into an analysis of the actions and practices by which this differential distribution is organised, the experiential stance that these actions display and the relative entitlements that are a by-product of their production. In his discussion, Sacks (1992, p. 424) sketches how people can and do consider themselves so entitled: by virtue of “encountering an event, and encountering it as a witness or someone who in part suffered by it”. In other words, in recounting an experience (and thereby implicitly mobilising an “experiential domain” or status), speakers foreground their relationship to the event, asserting specifically a relationship with (rather than a knowledge of) the object.

An important distinction made by Sacks (1984) and that must be kept in mind, however, is that knowledge and experience are inherently different domains for participants, with the former implying an object-in-common that can be known in the same way in varying degrees by various participants, and the latter implying a “singularity” (Heritage, 2011, p. 183) and an “isolating character” (Sacks, 1992, p. 245), an inherently personal relationship between an experiencing subject and an object in the world that cannot be shared or known in common. Subjectivity is thus a constitutive feature of experience, implying the impossibility of true commonality or knowability, constructing “personal experiential preserves” for individuals in the world that underpin “coherent personhood” (Heritage, 2011, p. 183).

Ultimately, however, experiences are as thoroughly interactional in their nature and production as any other phenomenon in the social world, and participants order and make sense of their experiences relative to those around them. This point of departure suggests, firstly, that self and identity are interactional matters and, secondly, that claims to experience are one of the crucial means by which to achieve them. Importantly, Sacks notes that the fundamentally interactional nature of identity itself (see, for example, Zimmerman, 1998), means that “there are ways, then, whereby the isolating character of experiences can nonetheless get undercut” (Sacks, 1992, p. 245). The “isolating character” of experience can then itself be analysed as a by-product of the social order in which subjectivity is respected and experiences belong to those who experience them. In the organisation of experiential status and the demonstration of experiential stance, experience is made visible and shareable *as an* “isolating” phenomenon: my analysis situates claims of emotion as a specific social action (achieved through a range of grammatical and interactional practices) by which speakers articulate their experiential stance and thereby mobilise or make visible their position on the experiential gradient and the entitlement they are afforded relative to others around them.

Thus, although the subjectivity that underlies our understanding of experience tempts us to consider experience as “uncontestable evidence”, as an “originary point of explanation” within the “experiencing subject” (Butler & Scott, 1992, p. 25), and, therefore, to conduct analysis by treating “experience to be something we can straightforwardly have and then make a transparent account of” (Davies & Davies, 2007, p. 1141), this essentialist reading of experience does not contest or expose the ideologies underlying it; it treats its object as self-evident and loses the chance to interrogate “the constructed nature of experience ... and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world” (Butler & Scott, 1992, pp. 24-25). As my previous chapter demonstrated, childhood is one of the social institutions so deeply intertwined with our social and moral identities that (even critical) studies of childhood tend to privilege their research with the assumptions of child sacredness, rather than treating this impenetrable consensus as a social accomplishment by examining the mechanisms by which it is maintained (but see, e.g., Burman, 1994; Menzel, 2014). A more fruitful way to approach the study of experience, then, is as a social action; to examine how and where participants situate themselves in so constructing the experience in a way that is recognisable and intelligible to its recipients as an experience and, more significantly, as one that the experiencer has normative rights to. An analysis centered on members’ concerns thus offers the opportunity to interrogate the articulation of a claim to experience itself as an accomplishment, one that describes entitlement to the experience of a child’s death as an interactionally managed phenomenon. More specifically, by studying the interactional construction of experience *as experience* through an analysis of a specific social action, my research provides insight into the ways that experiences are presented as belonging to the experiencer, and the degrees of entitlement that are made relevant and visible within and through talk.

Relative entitlements

The notion of relative, or differentially available, entitlements is crucial to my analysis that follows, and was also foreshadowed by Sacks in his discussion of “abstract status” (1992, p. 245) and the broadening of the scope of access to experience. The inherently relational nature of entitlement along a hierarchy (similar to the “gradient” of epistemic status described by Heritage [2012b, p. 4]) implies that participants interactionally orient to, and organise themselves and others along, this omnirelevant structure.

As I have demonstrated in detail above, entitlement to experience is a socially regulated phenomenon, “not intrinsic to the organisation of the world” (Sacks, 1984, p. 426) but rather a normative framework involving multiple interlocking principles that structures how we understand and experience our relationship with objects in the world. Sacks (1992) noted that there are occasional situations in which the scope of entitlement to an experience is relaxed or widened, creating the possibility of experiences where entitlement is more freely available in the sense that more people treat it as an experience. He described this phenomenon by referencing a famous rape case, and suggests that “Occasionally a situation is given a kind of abstract status” (Sacks, 1992, p. 245). He goes on to explain that there are times where a specific incident is “transformed into a general thing while preserving the power of its feeling in each family”, such that “it gets formulated as the rape of somebody’s daughter, and perhaps it can bode for other people’s daughters and maybe my daughter”, meaning that the scope of experiential access gets expanded to more people, not just those for whom it is concretely relevant but practically anyone for whom it could potentially imaginably be relevant. Sacks (1992, p. 245) concludes by asserting: “That’s rare, and enormously powerful when it works”.

My analysis below provides a more systematic account of how this expanded scope of access is managed interactionally, and thereby builds on Sacks' observations about the differential distribution of entitlement to experience. That is, in the case of a child death reported in the media, the presence of explicit claims of emotion produced by people not observably affiliated with the incident suggests a broadened scope of entitlement to such events, informed by the status of the child as a vulnerable and sacred citizen in modern society (Ariès, 1965; Bowman, 2010; Zelizer, 1994). Nevertheless, as I noted above, such entitlement is inherently relational, with differential rights being displayed and pursued by participants through various interactional practices. I identify cases in which these claims are produced in a basic format that includes a subject, an affective relationship and an object, as well as more complexly formulated claims which introduce systematic variations in (either or all of) the subject, affect and object components of the utterance. These variations are formulated in systematic ways over a range of cases, and their presence (and absence) identify what participants orient to as relevant features of entitlement. Examining these variations in their sequential and interactional contexts reveals the provision of very specific kinds of extra information that display a heightened experiential stance to produce their speakers as more relevant experiencing subjects, or subjects with a superordinate experiential access to/relationship with a particular object. The observation that some categories of people orient to heightened entitlement in such incidents demonstrates a pervasive organisation to even this expanded scope of access that is interactionally managed by participants.

As Garfinkel's (1967) work has shown, routinely participants do things "accountably" in the sense that they produce them recognisably for others, with the "account" inhering in the production of the action itself rather than requiring explicit or extraneous formulation. When relative entitlements are at stake, however, extra work may be done in

order to make recognisable the basis for doing something that may otherwise be seen as deviant in some way. The heightened entitlement provided by these variations provides a strengthened position from which participants enact a range of other social actions, some of which involve overtly contestable interactional projects in reference to child deaths, such as blaming, complaining, criticising and other actions that may be viewed as problematic. My analysis thus investigates the ways that claims of emotion are produced in discussions about child deaths, the entitlement to experience that is implied through the production of these claims, the hierarchy of entitlement to which participants orient (and which they reproduce) in these interactions, and the range of other actions which are legitimised by occupying heightened positions of experiential status.

Emotion as (a type of) experience

In discussing entitlement to experience, it is important to note that the experiences referred to (implicitly in Sacks' work, and explicitly in my own) are specifically *emotional experiences*. Although emotional experiences are by no means the only types of experiences available, they are nevertheless common, and constitute the type of experience referred to in this study. Due to the centrality of emotion as an aspect of experience in this study, I turn briefly to a review of the study of emotion, briefly contrasting traditional approaches to studies of emotion with more recent literature that focuses on its use as a discursive resource in interaction (see Wetherell, 2013 for a detailed analysis of these differing approaches). Traditionally, research on emotion has been informed by an approach that treats it as a biological and involuntary bodily process (Edwards, 1999), with its evolutionary function a "primordial impulse" to share experienced feelings and promote social solidarity through intersubjective understanding (Couper-Kuhlen, 2012, p. 114). In the social-scientific tradition, emotion has been studied as a "physiological, cognitive and expressive" process,

where objects or events in the external world that hold some kind of consequential relevance may evoke affective responses in us (Peräkylä, 2012, p. 279). The subjective experience, according to these theorists, is thus preceded by a physiological response to a relevant external stimulus that results in a particular emotional state. This approach views emotions as externalisations of an internal state of being (Goffman, 1981), leaking out or involuntarily being made visible, that, due to their spontaneity and incoherence, are not available for systematic analysis in the way that other discursive objects are.

This understanding of emotion establishes the physiological response as prior to, and a necessary precursor of, its interpretation as a cognitive and affective state, treating emotions as “natural bodily experiences and expressions, older than language, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate, genuine rather than artificial, feelings rather than thoughts” (Edwards, 1999, p. 273). According to Edwards (1999), however, analysing emotions in this way – as inhering in a subjective experience free of (antithetical, diametrically opposed to) cognition and rationality – lends them an enormous discursive power, and he suggests that a more fruitful approach might examine the methods by which emotion is displayed, and the interactional affordances that it provides to its producer (see, e.g., Edwards, 2005; Goffman, 1981; C. Goodwin, 2007; Harré, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012; Wetherell, 2013; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006). Critical approaches to emotion crucially reveal that, far from being an involuntary and spontaneous reaction, speakers work hard to manage the production of emotional experiences in interaction (Edwards, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). In a sense, then, participants actually rely on normative knowledge of emotions *as visceral and involuntary* in getting certain interactional tasks done.

Interactional research has been done on various (verbal and nonverbal) displays of emotion (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1998) such as of response cries (Goffman, 1981), emotion

as an embodied performance (M. Goodwin, Cekaite, & Goodwin, 2012; M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000), prosody and modality (Kaukomaa, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2013), gestures and facial expressions (Peräkylä & Ruusuvuori, 2012), laughter (Haakana, 2012), crying responses (Hepburn & Potter, 2012) and surprise tokens (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2006), among many others. More relevantly for my own analysis, a range of research exists on what Edwards (1999) terms “emotion discourse”: a range of interactional and linguistic practices for claiming an emotional response in interaction. For example, Ochs and Schieffelin’s (1989) assertion that affect permeates the entire linguistic system is refined by conversation-analytic research that demonstrates the indexicality of emotion and affect (Sorjonen & Peräkylä, 2012); that is, “the affective import of a verbal element is indexed in relation to, and inferrable from, its context of occurrence” (Sorjonen & Peräkylä, 2012, p. 5). This body of literature on emotions as interactional resources has grown substantially over the past three decades. For example, previous work has been done on first person assessments (Drew, 1998) and subject-side assessments (Edwards & Potter, 2017) in investigating the role of subjectivity in affective utterances. Edwards and Potter (2017) note that participants report on their experiences of particular events by using subjective statements that construct their relationship to the object, while affective relationships in particular provide “an embodied assessment of something [people] know in a relevant way” (M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000, p. 19) and the presence of emotional displays in interaction implies an affective relationship between the subject and the object in question, as well as its subject’s entitlement to such emotion. The use of idiomatic language (Drew & Holt, 1988), metaphors (Edwards, 2005) and extreme case formulations (ECFs) (Edwards, 2000; Pomerantz, 1986) as lexical resources in the production of emotion has been investigated for their roles in garnering affiliation to potentially disaffiliative actions. While the claims of emotion that I study are actions that incorporate a range of these practices – that is, they make use of first-person

pronouns, metaphors, idioms and ECFs – they are nonetheless post-hoc reports of claimed emotional responses, a domain of social actions that remains under-researched in its own right. My research examines claims which construct specifically an emotional relationship with the object; these claims are analysed as an articulation of experiential stance, and variations in their production demonstrate the interactional organisation of relative access to experiential status in the death of a child. That the object in these claims is the death of a child is crucially important to my analysis, since it is precisely because this particular object has been constituted as precious and essential that affective stances are arranged in ways that suggest an important intersection of the natural relations between affective responses and talk about childhood.

Despite the research done on emotion in interaction, Besnier (1990, p. 428) affirms that emotions are generally “alluded to”, and “overt avowals in the first person are likely to be associated with rather marked situations”. Emotions are more normatively displayed in interaction than explicitly described or claimed (Besnier, 1990; Edwards, 1999). In instances where people do not leave it to others to infer their emotional state, but opt rather to explicate it, these explicit claims are accountable actions. Thus, an overt or explicit verbally articulated claim of emotion is a departure from normative practices, and warrants closer examination.

Since my own data corpus provides numerous examples of individuals explicitly claiming emotional responses to child deaths, I demonstrate that the presence of these claims intersects with, and signals, a complex and significant social order, and that a detailed analysis of the production of these claims may yield a deeper understanding of the ways in which humans organise experiences of child deaths and their social and moral implications. More specifically, claims of emotion articulate a unique relationship between an experiencing subject and his or her emotional relationship to the object of a child’s death, in a way that

allows an examination of the intersection of the domains of experience, emotion and the category of child death.

My analysis below, of the explicit claiming of emotion regarding child deaths, is concerned with examining the “rhetorical affordances” (Edwards, 1999, p. 281) that these emotional actions offer participants. As Edwards (1999, p. 280) suggests, emotional utterances are (also) interactional choices and, as analysts, “we should consider the grounds for choosing one rather than another, and what kinds of discursive business such choices may perform”. Conversation analysis provides a useful analytic tool in this regard: in its treatment of (all) utterances as social actions, an emotional utterance can be examined for its constitution of the event that it claims to be responsive to, and the social and moral order that is implicitly reproduced in its performance.

Conclusions

This section has offered a review of the literature surrounding entitlement to experience and the range of practices and actions by which it may be asserted. In conclusion, one of the most crucial outcomes (for conversation analysts) of the distinction drawn by Sacks is the practical difference (for participants) between knowledge and experience, in his assertion that the “way we somehow come to perceive and feel about experience, or the way we were taught to do that, [which] is altogether different from the ways we think about knowledge” (Sacks, 1984, p. 424). The distinction between these domains is vital to my analysis, for the following reasons. Firstly, it allows me to identify subjectively and affectively formulated utterances as “experiences”, and designed to be heard as such. Secondly, it implies that the production of these claims, and their accompanying experiential status, is separable from a range of others social actions and should be analysed as such. Thirdly, it makes relevant an analysis that is grounded in participants’ understandings of

experience (as distinct from knowledge) and uses this distinction to demonstrate how relative entitlements to an experience are tacitly asserted through such utterances. Since entitlement to experience is a privileged interactional domain and one with constraints upon its availability, it is thus a rich site for analytic investigation. Intersecting the study of entitlement to experience with the topic of child mortality, itself a domain of social life infused with a powerful moral consensus that belies its relative recency, provides an even richer avenue for understanding how these two domains are co-constituted as social and moral orders. Investigating entitlement to experience in child death exposes the (re)production of these norms in a more complex social order, one in which the very status of the child in modern society is shaped and affirmed. Thus, the historicity of sacred childhood is evident through the large-order structural changes that have taken place over the centuries (Ariès, 1965) but the continuous reconstitution of the sacred child is enacted and accomplished in talk, the primordial site of sociality (Schegloff, 1996b).

Chapter Four: Data and Method

In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of my data collection process and my data corpus, followed by a description of my analytic procedure. I then discuss the relevance of an ethnomethodological approach to studying child mortality. I provide an overview of the roots of ethnomethodology (EM) and how it shaped (and was shaped by) the conversation-analytic method, focusing on the relevance of these two approaches for the analysis of my data.

Data corpus

The data corpus for this study consists of 203 audio recordings of shows broadcast on 702 Talk Radio between 2014-2017. 702 is an English-speaking, privately owned, radio talk station broadcasting in the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces of South Africa, as well as streaming online. This station was selected for its high degree of interactivity with the public, its reputation for tackling complex subject matter, and more practically, its presence as an English-speaking station (in a country with 11 official languages).

Talk radio provides a window into normative interactional practices that may be found in media talk in general (Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002; Hester & Fitzgerald, 1999; Hutchby, 1991; Whitehead, 2011), with speakers orienting their talk to an overhearing audience (Heritage, 1985). Since the data is available in the public domain, ethical clearance was not required and thus was not obtained for this study.

My data collection process occurred in three distinct phases. In the initial phase, which took place in 2014-2015, I compiled a list of 88 news reports of child deaths that had occurred within the previous 12 months. I did this by performing a search of a national web-based newspaper (News24) and utilising search terms such as “child death”, “child murder”,

“toddler death” and “infant death”. Since 702 is a 24-hour talk-based radio station, and I was searching for a very specific topic, this list of dates and times formed the basis of the targeted archive search that followed.

In 2016, during the second phase of the data collection process, I used the list of dates to direct my attention to specific areas of the archive. Since the archives were difficult to access (they required payment and often did not download completely) I emailed producers of various shows to request specific archived material on dates that child deaths had occurred. One producer assisted me by isolating these broadcasts, recording them onto compact discs, and allowing me access to them. Soon after this, in December 2016, the IT department responsible for the archives at 702 agreed to give me access to the previous 12 months of broadcasting material. At 24 hours of broadcasting per day, this amounted to nearly 9000 hours of data. I was able to perform a targeted search of this large body of material with my list of dates of incidents of child death, and note specific discussions on, or reports of, these deaths.

The data provided by the station, both the compact discs and the online archives, were in 30-minute sound-bites, so I isolated specific interactions about child death and re-recorded them for ease of access. Thus, my own data corpus consisted of audio clips that were re-recordings of the original audio clips provided by the station. The audio clips were recorded using QuickTime player and named using a format that incorporated the exact date, hour and start time of the interaction. From these two data sources, I formed a collection of 188 stretches of interaction which specifically dealt with an incident of child death. In order to have an organised and accessible database, I created an Excel spreadsheet that contained the name of the audio clip (year, month, date and start time) as well as a detailed written description of the incident. Many of these interactions concerned the same incident, so that

the data set was based on approximately 18 child deaths that had been treated as reportable on the radio over the previous (by then) 24 months.

My final phase of data collection took place in 2017, when 702 began providing podcasts alongside some of their written news articles. By performing a similar search on the 702 site that I had originally performed on News24, I was able to find new reports of child death, many of which came with an audio recording of a news report or an interview with a reporter, policeman, family member or community member. The inclusion of these 15 interactions over this year was important, since it added new stretches of interaction to my data set, specifically by providing new instances of child deaths that had taken place over the course of 2017. At the end of 2017, when I had completed my data collection, my database consisted of 203 stretches of data in which a child's death was explicitly discussed or mentioned.

Analytic Procedure

During an initial period of “unmotivated listening”, (Schegloff, 1996a, p. 172) to the audio recordings, I noticed an uncommon feature of the talk, in which a speaker claimed an emotional response to the death of a child. Although the speaker was demonstrably unrelated to the child that had died or to its family, the claiming of this type of emotional response was treated as a legitimate social action by other participants. The “entitlement to experience” suggested by this action demonstrated a domain of social life in which entitlement to experiences was regulated differently and perhaps less sharply than in others. This seemed to be related to the subject matter, child death, which was treated as a domain of heightened emotional and empathic communication. It is important to emphasise that in the majority of my data set, speakers did not claim emotional responses in conversations about child death,

establishing the practice itself as non-normative and thus as a set of special instances in the range of more general conversational practices in talk about child death.

The process of identifying what counted as a claim of emotion for participants was an iterative one. As Edwards (2005, p. 7) notes, the “contingencies of conversational turn-taking and indexicality” have complicated the process of defining a particular interactional phenomenon or claiming it as a formal instance of one or another social action (Levinson, 1979; Schegloff, 1988). The emergent nature of talk-in-interaction (Lerner, 1996) precludes the analyst from making definitive claims about participants’ actions prior to analysing those actions as they are oriented to by the participants. With this in mind, and based on Lindekilde’s (2013) description of a claim containing (at least) a subject, verb and object, I began by analysing as a “claim of emotion” any action that contained three consistently present components: a subject component, an object component and an affect component, and have built up to a formal definition grounded in participant concerns through the analysis of the data itself. Thus, although I initially pre-selected certain cases as instances of claims of emotion, this initiating activity was refined and organised throughout the analytic process, which consisted of collecting cases over-inclusively and in conjunction with ongoing analysis to allow the shape of the collection to emerge more iteratively (Schegloff, 1996a; Schegloff, 1997). Of the 203 audio records which formed my initial data collection of interactions about child death, 66 of these contained an explicit claim of an emotional response toward a child death. I formed a separate sub-collection of these instances, and isolated those cases that contained specifically first-person claims of emotional responses to these incidents, that is, claims in which the speaker and the subject of the claim were the same person, rather than a speaker reporting about another subject’s purported emotional state. There were 23 first-person claims of emotion in my data corpus, which formed my final collection of cases for analysis. These were carefully transcribed using the transcript conventions for conversation

analysis provided by Gail Jefferson (2004) and relied on by conversation analysts in providing detailed accompaniments to the voice recordings.

Claims of emotion

For the purposes of my analysis, a claim of emotion is a self-assessment of an emotional state about the death of a child. Participants' orientations and conduct provide empirical evidence that they treat claims of emotion as a distinct social action. That it is an action involving "emotion" is clearly evident in that participants systematically include direct mentions of emotions in these utterances. That it can be characterised as a claim can be seen in that such utterances are explicitly stated rather than being treated as self-evident, and in many cases this is further evident in the work speakers do to back them up, which would be unnecessary if they could be taken for granted. Finally, claims of emotion are systematically treated as the basis for other more contestable projects, which suggests that participants treat the demonstration of entitlement to experience as an important resource in accomplishing whatever actions follow.

Three lexical and/or prosodic elements of the propositional content by which experiential stance can be articulated are a subjective, relational and objective component. However, Franzosi (2004, as cited in Lindekilde, 2013, p. 1) asserts that that "variance in ... claims-making [occurs] in terms of the "semantic triplet" of subject (who), object (whom) and action verb (what)", i.e. that differences in the production of claims of emotion can be located at (each, any or all of) these three points in the claim. A claim of emotion follows this generic format, but includes specifically an affective description in place of an action verb.

In my analysis below, I show that many of the claims contain variations at any/some/all of these points in the utterance, and that these variations themselves are inspectable for the ways in which they articulate a speaker's experiential stance and,

implicitly, his or her entitlement to the experience being described. My analysis will demonstrate how these variations are systematically formulated and, further, are treated as recognisable practices by participants in demonstrating a superordinate experiential stance and a corresponding heightened entitlement to the experience of a child death. Due to the fact that experience in interaction is produced through relationships between subjects and objects, I term the utterances found in my data “claims of emotion”, since through the practices of articulating their subjective and affective responses to a child’s death, participants are effectively claiming an emotional response to, and implicitly an entitlement to the experience of, a child’s death. By articulating normative relationships between subjects and objects in the world, and thereby re-invoking shared norms through alignment between co-participants, these claims reassert and reproduce the tight moral consensus surrounding appropriate affective responses to child deaths in South Africa.

Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology’s project, which seeks to provide a methodical account for the nature and origins of social order (Garfinkel, 1967), is suitably placed as a backdrop for my own research, which studies the methods by which child death, as a distinct social and moral order, is produced and treated as an intersubjective phenomenon. Ethnomethodology has as its philosophical predecessor the work of Talcott Parsons (1937), who studied social action by establishing “the unit act” as the primary analytic site for human behaviour and its underlying motivation (Schegloff, 1987a). Parsons himself was influenced by Durkheim’s (1982) assertion of human action as organised around the internalisation of social norms, and by Weber’s (1968) exploration of the relationship between social structure and personality, and his theory of rational action assumes that individuals pursue the most ideal ends in any given situation by means that are most suitably adapted to the accomplishment of such ends,

while being bound by moral norms. At the time, the assumption of action as rational was unique due to its emphasis on subjectivity and its assertion of a form of agency within which individuals acted (a view which contrasted with sociological approaches that emphasised the role of social institutions in organising and determining human behaviour). However, the study of what those means and ends were, and how they were arrived at by participants as the most ideal or adaptive, was left unanalysed, treated as too obvious to require examination. The morality within which behaviour was enacted was similarly left unanalysed, with Parsons' work failing to provide an account of how this morality is achieved and maintained in human behaviour.

Contrastingly, Garfinkel, Parsons' graduate student and the founder of the ethnomethodological approach, viewed the "inherent intelligibility and accountability" of social knowledge that lay at the presumed heart of "rational action" itself as an "emergent achievement" (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 173), and it is to its study that he devoted his own work. In treating Parsons' account of human action as lacking an account of the actor's own knowledge and understanding, he focused analytic attention on the actor and his world and experience, and catalysed "the enduring ethnomethodological emphasis on the local, moment-by-moment determination of meaning in social contexts" (Heritage, 1984, p. 2). In effect, the actor's point of view became ethnomethodology's unit of analysis, with the joint production and maintenance of a world-in-common treated as an accomplishment that depended on "the use of mundane knowledge and reasoning procedures by ordinary members of the society" (Heritage, 1984, p. 4).

Garfinkel's interest in the mundane reasoning and practical activities of social actors was further facilitated by Schutz's (1970) study of phenomenology, which investigated the intersubjective nature of knowledge. Schutz sought to study the constitution of the social world as a product of actors' daily orientations to its existence, and his study of

phenomenology thus complemented Parsonian theory in its provision of an account for the omitted role of human cognition and understanding in rational social action.

Phenomenology is a deeply subjective orientation that, in contrast to mainstream social sciences which “take the intersubjectivity of thought and action for granted” (Schutz, 1970, p. 54), assumes a central and fundamental inability to achieve true intersubjectivity between subjects in the world. The separateness of human experience and the inability to truly have shared experiences has long been a conundrum for philosophers, who struggle to understand the achievement of a perceived intersubjectivity in human interaction that facilitates the possibility of coordinated activity between different subjects (Heritage, 1984). “Rather than treating intersubjectivity as an essentially philosophical problem”, however, phenomenology treats its “achievement and maintenance as a practical 'problem' which is routinely 'solved' by social actors in the course of their dealings with one another” (Heritage, 1984, p. 61). Intersubjectivity is routinely achieved through the “accomplished objectivity of the world” (Maynard & Clayman, 1991, p. 391), a perspective which holds common-sense to be a resource for participants in constructing a world-in-common. In effect, humans assume that their experiences of the world are commensurable with one another’s, so that the fact that true intersubjectivity is unattainable becomes irrelevant, and actors treat their experiences as “identical-for-all-practical-purposes”. Ultimately, then, while “these differences [in subjective reality] could, in principle, destroy any possibility of truly intersubjective knowledge [, i]n practice, this simply does not happen” (Heritage, 1984, p. 61).

Intersubjectivity, in the Schutzian sense, was thus based on a “general thesis of reciprocal perspectives” (Heritage, 1984, p. 55), in which individuals assume that their actions will be understood through the lens of a set of shared assumptions by which humans organise their behaviour. Although the assumption of a world as “identical-for-all-practical-purposes” was a key explanatory factor in Schutz’s analysis of the possibility of coordinated

action, he posited that the mechanisms by which it was accomplished resided within the individual, whose experience remained irremediably private, prompting Schutz to conclude that any systematic study of the methods and procedures by which individuals produced rational actions was, eventually, fruitless.

Ethnomethodology shares phenomenology's interest in the contingent production and maintenance of intersubjectivity and a shared social order, and both are informed by the Husserlian (1970) assumption that "all human reflection is grounded in... the mundane world of lived experience already existing as a product of the unreflecting cognitions of ordinary actors". However, ethnomethodology diverges from its predecessors in that Garfinkel (1964, p. 2) noted that the "real world" which actors confronted on a daily basis was constituted as a "product of activities *in* a real world", that members consistently reproduced the "real world" as the "eminently coherent and intelligible" reality that it was, for them, through treating it as a real world and acting as if it were a real world. The "real world", according to Garfinkel, is thus the product of the "unreflecting cognitions" of those who act within it, and the common sense which acts as a tacit resource by which it is accomplished is "not ordinarily an object of conscious reflection in its own right" (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 177).

Thus, although phenomenology provides a useful starting point for thinking about child mortality and its maintenance as a social and moral order, ethnomethodology provides the focus for my study by resituating child death as a participant (rather than analysts') concern, and providing some conceptual tools with which to begin this type of analysis. While phenomenology understands intersubjectivity to be a social accomplishment, ethnomethodology undertakes the task of identifying and explicating the resources used in its achievement, and the common-sense assumptions that make this possible, and indeed of "how men, isolated yet simultaneously in an odd communion, go about the business of

constructing, testing, maintaining, altering, validating, questioning, defining an order together” (Garfinkel, 1952, p. 114). My own research thus interrogates the foundational assumptions which are shared between members of a society about the nature and meaning of child death, and demonstrates how these are constituted as a product of the “unreflecting cognitions” of social actors who treat them as pre-existing realities rather than locally maintained sets of knowledge. By utilising an ethnomethodological approach to the study of child death, my research provides insight into one of the key social actions by which this moral order is maintained and reproduced in and as daily life.

Garfinkel’s approach has also provided an answer to the Parsonian question of morality and the mechanisms by which it binds and organises behaviour. In a penetrating interpretation of the results of a series of “breaching” experiments, Garfinkel (1967) stressed that the violation of the assumption of common-sense knowledge was treated as a *moral* violation, and concluded that the very fabric of intersubjectivity is a moral, rather than overwhelmingly cognitive, order. The assumption of reciprocal perspectives is therefore not *merely* an assumption that members hold, but a social imperative which integrates the “moral” with the “cognitive” (Heritage, 1984, p. 76) and ultimately suggests that the natural order of things is the moral order (Jayyusi, 1984). What this means for child mortality is that its status as a moral order is not (or not only) due to the historical changes that have situated childhood as a morally loaded domain of social life, but even more elementarily to the fact that its maintenance, like *any* domain of social life, is treated by members as a fundamentally moral enterprise.

EM thus has as its analytic focus the methods by which a social order is jointly achieved, which members treated as a mundane and practical (although morally accountable) aspect of their existence. In studying real rather than idealised human behaviour, Garfinkel (1967) was able to explicate the means by which intersubjectivity was treated as a mundane

and practical resource in producing and understanding joint social actions. The “problem of intersubjectivity”, according to Garfinkel, was thus not an analysts’ problem but an actor’s problem, and it was negotiated and reproduced on a local and moment-by-moment basis in daily life.

In finding a way to build on these two foundational sociological approaches and, more importantly, use their conclusions as the starting point for its own studies, Garfinkel’s (1967) approach assumes an inherent systematicity to human conduct and to the production of actions as account-able (observable-reportable). Garfinkel thus sought to “answer” the “question” posed by Schutz, within the constraints imposed by Parsons, of how humans could create a world in common, without truly knowing the other’s experience, and nevertheless continually orient to and act in accordance with normative social arrangements. This approach provides the conceptual tools for examining how participants produce themselves, and others, as differentially entitled to an experience of a child death, and how individuals organise this entitlement according to an underlying moral order which is both a structure, and reflection of, their own activities.

Conversation analysis

The analytic method that I have selected for my research project is conversation analysis (CA), a methodological approach grounded in the empirical and observable actions produced by participants to one another. While the fields of EM and CA are generally compatible (see, e.g. Heritage, 1984; Lynch, 2000, 2017; Maynard & Clayman, 2003) their congruence is nevertheless characterised by a necessary tension with regard to their larger projects and aims. While EM emerged through Garfinkel’s extensive critique of Parsonian and Schutzian theory, CA has its own robust intellectual history of which EM is but one (significant) contributor. CA employs Garfinkel’s foundational proposal that “both the

production of conduct and its interpretation are the accountable products of a common set of methods or procedures” (Heritage, 1984, p. 241), but diverges from EM in that it studies this through close and repeated examination of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. In my study, the ethnomethodological approach to studying child death as a locally reproduced social order is complemented by CA’s rigorous methodological tools for transcribing and analysing sequences of interaction, membership categories and other interactional orders intrinsic to the analysis of talk-in-interaction.

Although CA’s focus on concrete and empirically grounded data mirrors Garfinkel’s insistence on studying indexical utterances as social accomplishments, conversation-analytic research is directed specifically toward “finding the machinery, the rules, the structures that produce and constitute that orderliness” (Psathas, 1995, p. 2), and takes as its central task “the description and explication of the competences that ordinary speakers use and rely on in participating in intelligible, socially organised interaction” (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, p. 1).

Conversation analysis begins with the assumption that a meaningful social science must be grounded in a descriptive phenomenology of the mundane world (Psathas, 1995) – as opposed to the idealised or typicalised constructs that had been studied by linguists thus far (see Chomsky, 1957) – in order to provide empirical and falsifiable theoretical and methodological material. In noting, and writing about, the extraordinarily granular level of organisation and systematicity in social interaction (and specifically in talk-in-interaction) Sacks has provided an axiomatic approach that has been refined, expanded, developed and theorised over the past sixty years, informed by the use of naturally-occurring, and painstakingly transcribed, data. The use of naturally-occurring and taped records of interaction is foundational to CA (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984), since the repeated examination of data “might allow the analyst to shed, at least partially, the relentless interference of vernacular familiarity in the analytic depiction of actions” (Schegloff, 1996a,

p. 166). Since the object of inquiry is the common-sense procedures by which daily life is made achievable, and since the analyst is also a member of the social world he or she seeks to study, the ability to step back and see the familiar world as new is one of the challenges of this approach, necessarily corrected through being able to analyse repeatedly and in detail the interactions which on the surface seem to be beyond the need for explanation or explication. As Lynch (2000, p. 529) notes, “the repeated demonstration of how intersubjective order is achieved relentlessly at the surface of communicative actions remains conversation analysis's most important lesson for the social sciences”. Lynch’s suggestion is an important point of departure for my own study, which focuses an ethnomethodological lens on a topic that is deeply entrenched as a moral order in society, and thus relies on the ability to analyse *as a participant concern* this topic of child death which, on the surface, may seem to be one of the most taken-for-granted moral assumptions that modern society holds.

One of the methods by which CA has studied the accountable (observable-reportable) nature of utterances as social actions is by examining paired actions, which take the form of adjacency pairs in interaction (Schegloff, 2007a). Adjacency pairs are a key resource for participants (and analysts) to confirm and demonstrate understanding of a previous action. A foundational finding from early conversation-analytic research (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) suggests that conduct is produced, interactionally, as organised and categorised, for its receipt by others, and is treated in that way by recipients, who display a(n) (mis)understanding of a previous turn or action through a next action. Interaction unfolds in real time for participants, who, in their turns, display their understanding of the prior turn, and simultaneously or additionally display the relevance of their talk for the prior turn, as well as renewing the context through their turn for the subsequent turn’s talk (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). Participants are thus obliged to routinely display to one another the intelligibility and recognisability of the actions of previous utterances, which they do in their

own utterances. This is a powerful procedure for maintaining intersubjectivity, the “mundane reasoning” that is a function of the “idealisation of the congruency of the system of relevances” so crucial to the reproduction of a world-in-common (Heritage, 1984, p. 55).

In my analysis, I study claims of emotion as distinct social actions, but occurring within larger sequential contexts. These sequences of action demonstrate the utility of claims of emotion in the larger interaction as well as their consistent treatment as legitimate social actions. The study of claims of emotion as and in sequences of interaction is thus a powerful method for exploring its situated use in discussions about child death. This sequential analysis is also a useful resource, or “proof criterion” (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729) for ensuring the validity of the analysis, since it is demonstrably grounded in participant concerns and is based on what participants observably orient to as the relevant features of the preceding talk.

This moment-by-moment confirmation and renewal of intersubjective understanding thus provides a “solution” to the Schutzian problem of how it is that a world-in-common is continuously assumed and maintained by individuals, which itself derives from the Husserlian (1970) assumption that humans are continuously acting within a world which is a product of their own unreflecting cognitions. Conversation analysis provides a method for the analysis and explication of intersubjectivity as a local accomplishment, demonstrating how participants deploy common-sense knowledge in order to produce and interpret social actions and thereby sustain a world-in-common and accomplish coordinated activities.

The study of the social organisation of experiences of child death is thus fruitfully served by recruiting a conversation-analytic approach, which studies concrete and empirically observable sequences of action and analyses the methods by which this domain of social and moral life is continuously sustained by, and simultaneously reliant on, the assumption of intersubjectivity about the meaning of child death.

Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) focuses on membership categories as a distinct locus of interactional order (Schegloff, 2007b), occurring alongside others that are studied within CA. My own analysis studies the deployment of categories in the course of sequences of interaction and in the production of recurrently occurring actions, treating membership categories as intersecting with other various interactional orders and studying how these actions and practices all contribute to an overall understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, that is, the study of the social organisation of experiences of child death. The methods by which these experiences are claimed and relatively ordered are made visible by studying the various interactional orders undertaken by conversation analysis and provides a clear and empirically demonstrable analysis of this locus of social life.

The analysis of membership categories as common-sense procedures for producing and interpreting accountable actions is crucially linked to the larger intellectual project undertaken by Sacks, regarding the analysis of indexical expressions as self-explicating for participants. MCA “examines the practical methods of categorisation work in relation to the local accomplishment of social and moral organisation and order” (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2009, p. 346), and is thus an important site for the integration of the cognitive and the moral (Heritage, 1984), assuming as it does that the categorial aspect of cognition that is assumed to precede sociality is in fact an interactive accomplishment that is visibly oriented to by participants in producing and understanding social actions. Further, there is a “mutually constitutive and reflexive relationship between practical action and normativity” (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2009, p. 347) so that categorisation, as an activity of practical reasoning, asserts the normative relationships between category pairs (Jayyusi, 1984, 1991) and rearticulates the moral order implied by these. Thus, categorisation is essentially, and prominently, a moral affair, that serves to maintain and reproduce normative relationships or stances between different objects, or subjects and objects, in the world. My analysis demonstrates that

participants both produce and interpret (Garfinkel, 1967) membership categories as resources in the production of claims of emotion, and notes how these are commonsensically treated by participants as indexing heightened entitlement to experience in the cases being discussed.

There are a number of assumptions of MCA that are most important for my purposes in this analysis, and I will highlight them briefly below. Firstly, Sacks' economy rule (Sacks, 1972b, p. 333; Schegloff, 2007b, p. 471) states that "a single category from any membership categorisation device can be referentially adequate". It is sufficient to describe any given individual by a single categorial term, and terms are selected by describing the feature of the object that is most interactionally relevant. In addition to the fact that any category can be inspected for its selection over a range of other possibles, the use of more than one categorial reference is a violation of the economy rule: as Schegloff (2007b, p. 471) points out, "if one reference *can* be enough, why wasn't it?" This is a rule that analyses the *composition* of a given category term (or terms) in the interaction. The availability of various categories from various membership devices for describing and categorising individuals thus offers a powerful resource in understanding categorisation as a moral as well as normative affair, since interactants are orienting to the relevance of a particular category as contributing to the intelligibility of the action being produced, and assuming that co-participants have access to the same information about the category and understand its relevant invocation in that context. In my analysis that follows, I inspect the use of multiple referential forms in talk about child deaths, suggesting that the use of various category terms for subjects and objects in the talk maintains and reproduces the normative relationships between them, and that the use of multiple categorial references works to upgrade or heighten the nature of that relationship.

Secondly, the consistency rule states that if a first member has been categorised from a particular collection of categories (an MCD) then other categories of that same device *may*

be used to categorise further members. This rule of application describes the relevance of using a given category term via the prior deployment of others of the same MCD. Co-participants (and analysts) can understand and recognise the use of a membership category because of other membership categories of the same device that have been deployed previously in the interaction. In contrast to the economy rule, this rule is concerned with the *position* of the category term in the sequential organisation of the talk. In my analysis that follows, I note how membership categories are carried over (or not) from subjects to objects in claims of emotion, and the interactional purposes that might be served by (in)consistencies in their deployment.

Aside from these rules of application, Schegloff (2007b, p. 469) notes three further relevant features of membership categories. Firstly, they are inference-rich, a “storehouse” and “filing system” for the “common-sense knowledge” that people have about members. For example, the category of “child” or “parent” carries with it a storehouse of common-sense knowledge about the category, which is used in producing and interpreting claims of emotion as accountable actions. Secondly, they are protected against induction: confronting a member of the category who contravenes this store of knowledge does not require a revision of the store of knowledge, but rather locates that member as a deviant member of that category. Lastly, activities are category-bound, so that there are typical activities performed by different categories of persons, and by viewing a particular activity being performed, you would come to see that it is a member of the category routinely assumed to perform such activities that is performing them.

These three characteristics of membership categories, combined with their organisation into devices that have rules of application, provide analysts with tools to examine their deployment in a given interaction. As my own analysis will demonstrate, participants routinely rely on the common-sense knowledge of particular categories in

referring to themselves and others in conversations about child deaths. Furthermore, they use this common-sense reasoning to index relative experiential rights with regard to specific incidents of child death, which themselves are treated as the basis for accomplishing larger interactional projects. My study uses MCA as an analytic tool in my larger project of making visible the mechanisms by which experiential rights are organised in talk-in-interaction.

Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and child death

My own research thus fuses ethnomethodology's analysis of indexical language as an accountable phenomenon (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970), and conversation analysis' methods for demonstrating how such language is used, to index specifically an experiential gradient along which claims of emotion are organised. That is, in my research I study entitlement to experience and the affective or experiential rights which constitute it as a shared moral order. This is done by studying claims of emotion, whose components are necessarily indexical, accountable phenomena whose explication lays bare the omnirelevant organisation within which they are structured/they take place.

Since the bulk of contemporary research on child death and child mortality serves to entrench normative knowledge on the topic, it is difficult to examine what maintains this normative order that marks child deaths as special cases that are mourned differently and more powerfully than other deaths; and what underlies its mechanisms of generativity and sustainability. Through studying a particular social action found in talk about child death, my analysis provides insight into the powerful moral order that characterises contemporary conceptions of childhood and child mortality. Furthermore, it extends the research catalysed by Sacks (1984) on entitlement to experience, which studies the social organisation of experience through talk-in-interaction. My research demonstrates that, although the scope of entitlement is relaxed in talk about experiences of child deaths, participants nevertheless

orient to a hierarchy of experiential rights, and observably position themselves and others along this hierarchy in an orientation to maintaining normative relative entitlements in such exchanges.

In studying claims of emotion as a situated social action, I note firstly how, in talk about child deaths, claims of emotion stand out as a specific social action that demonstrates entitlement, not only to epistemic knowledge of the occurrence, but specifically an experiential entitlement that is made visible, I argue, through the presence of the first-person subject that is inserted into these utterances. *That* these claims are treated as social actions distinct from, for example, assessments, and *that* they are often recruited as the demonstrable basis for other, more contestable actions in the morally loaded subject of child death, are important initial findings. These suggest that child mortality as a moral concern is itself systematically produced by social actors “as a product of their own unreflecting cognitions”, and jointly treated as an accountable basis for other actions. Furthermore, claims of emotion are produced in a variety of ways, with each component indexically produced for, and understood by, other members. The analysis of these claims as indexical utterances offers profound insights into the social organisation of experiences of child death. A detailed examination of each of the three components of the claim and their variations in interaction provides a deeper understanding of how these components are indexically produced for, and by, participants, and the taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie them.

Finally, conversation analysis provides a strong theoretical base for my assertion that these indexed utterances are themselves organised along a gradient of relative experiential rights, and that they are heard and treated as such by members. This gradient of experiential rights thus provides insight into what Sacks (1984) termed “entitlement to experience”, laying bare the mechanisms by which entitlement to experience of a child death is displayed and understood in interaction.

The close inspection of these utterances thus suggests that not only are their components indexically organised, but that this organisation is constitutive, and reflective, of a tacit moral order in which rights to emotion about the death of a child are relatively organised, and that *this* organisation is itself constitutive, and reflective, of historically relative but nevertheless taken-for-granted knowledge about the social world.

Limitations of the data

Despite the fact that my data are not intended to be nationally or statistically representative, they do represent a range of possible actions and practices available to speakers. However, there are some limitations of the corpus that I would like to note. Firstly, the data that I have collected all originate from a single talk-radio station, arguably a nationally relevant broadcaster but nevertheless showcasing only a limited set of interactional orientations. Further, due to my own language limitations, I collected only English-based talk, which, in a country with 11 official languages, showcases a small minority of voices. Finally, only child deaths that were treated as reportable and made it into the media were discussed, meaning that the overwhelming majority of child deaths that occur in South Africa on a daily basis are not mentioned, and thus are not available for analysis, thereby entrenching their invisibility and contributing to the notion that only certain child deaths are newsworthy.

These limitations, however, overarchingly hinge on the absence of generalisable or distributional claims about research findings, which in turn is centered around the assumption that findings must be generalisable in order to be meaningful. Conversation analysis takes a different approach to the issue of generalisability in research, taking as its central analytic object the “possibilities of language use” (Peräkylä, 2004, p. 297) which are found in the data, even if these are not actualised similarly across various interactions and settings. Thus,

although these findings might not be generalisable, they are nevertheless meaningful in that they provide “social practices that are possible” (Peräkylä, 2004, p. 297); the fact that any of these actions and practices is something that participants *can* do is itself an important finding. Thus, although further research may be required to answer more “distributional” questions, or questions about variations in these utterances that have not surfaced in my data, this research provides an initial direction for further and more targeted inquiries into the quantification or range of possibilities demonstrated in my own analysis.

Chapter Five: Data Analysis

In this chapter, I investigate how participants make claims of emotion about specific incidents of child deaths, and the entitlement to experience tacitly invoked through such claims. I argue that these claims of emotion orient to, reproduce and (most importantly for my purposes) make visible a gradient of experiential entitlement that is an omnirelevant organising principle of talk about child deaths. I demonstrate how variations in the production of these claims are used to display a speaker's experiential stance with regard to the child death being discussed. These stances orient to, and reproduce, the experiential gradient, and signal speakers' relative rights to the experience being invoked.

Thus, the following analysis tracks the intricate range of mechanisms by which these relative experiential and affective stances, and the statuses that they reflect, are produced in interaction. Furthermore, I analyse how these relatively ordered experiential stances, signaled via claims of emotion that locate speakers differentially on the gradient, are themselves treated as important resources in the pursuit of larger interactional projects in these discussions. Finally, I note how the ways in which these interactional practices are calibrated and negotiated by participants in order to maintain a normative orientation to the hierarchy of entitlement that is an organising feature of talk about child deaths. This hierarchy of entitlement is itself a reflection of larger normative orders of childhood that have been described in previous chapters, as well as an interactional project that itself furnishes the apparatuses by which such normative orders are contingently sustained and/or challenged.

As Maynard and Freese (2012, p. 95) seminally note, “the concept of emotion work fits with what Sacks has suggested about ‘doing being ordinary,’ ‘entitlement to experience,’ and how one’s emotional perception of an event is conditioned by access to that event”. They note further that this entitlement is displayed through practices that alert recipients to what

type or degree of experience is being reported. My own research is thus an extension of this: I analyse the practices by which speakers display to themselves and others, through the production of claims of emotion, the experiential status and stance that they hold in relation to an incident of child death.

Keeping the foregoing in mind, my central analysis demonstrates the following: I show how child deaths are interactionally negotiated, with relative rights to the experience being displayed via particular grammatical and lexical choices. I show that these rights are produced in systematic places in the utterances that I analyse, and that these variations are themselves systematically organised to reflect degrees of entitlement. A central claim of my analysis is that entitlement to claim an emotional response to the experience of a child death is universally available, a claim which is supported by genealogical literature on the role of children in modern society, and supported empirically in the analysis below. Nevertheless, claims of emotion are produced in a range of ways, suggesting that variations in their production are analytically valuable. I demonstrate that particular forms of self-categorisation ground a speaker's entitlement to claim higher or lower experiential stance relative to (an) interlocutor(s), and that these stances are calibrated to converge with their, and others', experiential status in the interaction. I demonstrate further that, in referring to the object of the claim (the event of the child's death), speakers may refer in generic ways that simply do the job of fulfilling the requirement for a recognitional reference. Alternatively, they may utilise multiple reference forms that foreground various features of the event, further to a simple recognitional reference, and that these foregrounded features systematically refer to the child that has died, or to the family of the deceased child. This provides empirical support for the normative assigning of victimhood to children who have died and/or to their families. Finally, the affective component of these claims may be produced in a range of ways: as a direct description of an emotional state, or alternatively in an idiomatic form in which a

Together, my central findings demonstrate the negotiated experiential status and stance that participants orient to as an omnirelevant organising principle structuring the talk.

Claims-making is a routine element of everyday conversation, with a prototypical format comprising the three components of subject, action verb and object (see Lindekilde, 2013). My analysis demonstrates that there is similarly a specialised prototypical format for the production of claims of emotion, comprising the three core components of subject, affect and object. For example, a typical claim of emotion in the data appears in the format below:

In this example, the subject is self-referenced with the pronoun “I”, a standard format for self-reference in English conversation (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). The object is referred to as “this kid that died”, and the affective component is made up of an intensifier (“very”) as

well as a physiological description (“nauseous”) that connotes an emotional state. Studies of self-reference (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007b; Schegloff, 2007a) and person-reference (Enfield & Stivers, 2007; Hachohen & Schegloff, 2006), as well as studies on emotion in interaction (Sorjonen & Peräkylä, 2012), instruct us that there is a wide range of practices for the formulation of each of these components. Nevertheless, in line with Sacks’ (1992, p. 484) assertion of “order at all points” my analysis also shows that the deployment of these practices is extremely systematic, and calibrated in order to orient to the overarching organisational structure in which they are produced.

Below, I analyse each component of a claim of emotion: subject, affect and object. I begin by demonstrating that there is a generic format for each component of the utterance, through a systematic analysis of these cases. This generic availability is itself an important finding about the specialness of children in modern society, and the ability (and expectation) of any adult to grieve their deaths.

I then analyse the range of variations present in each of these components, and demonstrate how these variations on the generic format are interactionally relevant. My analysis demonstrates empirically that these variations are calibrated in order to produce their speakers as differentially locatable on the experiential gradient that structures the talk. In some instances, the variations produce their speakers as relatively higher on the experiential gradient (due to the degree of their affective response, their own relevant situated identities, or the object of their emotional response). In these instances, I refer to that component of the claim as being produced in an *upgraded* format, with upgraded referring to an experiential stance and/or status on the hierarchy. In other instances, the variations point to a minimised format for that particular component, in which case I refer to that component as being *downgraded*, again with reference specifically to the experiential status and/or stance of the speaker.

These matters of experiential status and stance are important, for they are a dynamic mechanism for reproducing normative social arrangements with regard to child death in modern society. They are important too because speakers treat their (or others') experiential status and stance as the basis from which to legitimately pursue other interactional projects. These larger projects, as I demonstrate in my analysis, cluster around issues of moral negotiation. In some instances, a child's death is treated as a morally straightforward affair, with the roles of victim and perpetrator clearly delineated by speakers. In other instances, a child's death occasions morally polarised positions, where issues of condemnation, exoneration and empathy are at stake. These interactions are one of the sites for the constitution of specific moral orders, which are otherwise taken for granted as universal rather than historically situated, and thus, of course, vulnerable to further change and contestation. Analysing talk about child death allows a focus on the negotiation, contestation and establishment of local moral orders, resituating the study of child death as an interactional set of concerns that form the basis for larger discourses and structures.

Subject component

Self-reference in interaction

A large body of conversation-analytic literature deals with the task of person-reference in interaction. While the majority of this literature focuses on other-person reference (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007a; Schegloff, 1996b; Schegloff, 2007a), analysts do attend to the problem of self-reference in interaction (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007a; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 2007a). Previous research demonstrates the presence of dedicated terms for both self- and other-reference in interaction, and it has been established that, for self-reference, the dedicated term is the first-person singular pronoun "I" (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007a; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1996b). The use of "I" as the

normative or dedicated format for self-reference also fulfils the twin principles identified in the organisation of preference for person reference (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979), that is, the principle of minimisation and the principle of recipient design. The principle of minimisation assumes that “massively in conversation, reference is done with a *single* form” (Schegloff, 2007b, p. 126, emphasis in original) and that the violation of the talk’s progressivity through the utilisation of additional self-reference terms means that “where more is used, it is accountable” (2007b, p. 127). The principle of recipient design suggests that “if it’s possible, use a recognitional” (Schegloff, 2007b, p. 132) and it is arguable that self-reference with a first person singular pronoun is a recognitional form if the person speaking is referring to him- or herself. A speaker’s use of additional self-reference formats can thus be considered an exception to the normative practice of simple pronoun usage and is thus analysable for its purpose in the interaction.

Self-reference in claims of emotion

An analysis of the claims in my data suggests that there are two predominant methods for referring to oneself in the production of a claim of emotion. The first, as demonstrated in (1) above, is the simple format for self-reference, the use of the pronoun “I” which is the standardised form for self-reference in the English language (Lerner & Kitinger, 2007a, 2007b) The second includes an expansion by way of (a) category membership(s) that invoke(s) situated identities (Zimmerman, 1998) treated as relevant to the interaction. Although the expansions and variations in self-reference provide a fascinating insight into the organisation of experience in interactions about child deaths, it is illuminating to first examine the standardised format for self-reference and the ways that it is deployed in claims of emotion. The standardised or normative format for self-reference in these claims may be considered as much of an accomplishment as the non-standardised

formats, a stance supported by Enfield's (2007, p. 97) assertion that norms themselves must be recognised as important social accomplishments, that "instantiate and stabilize" shared cultural beliefs and assumptions.

Simple self-reference: "I"

In this section I present four extracts in which the subject component is produced in its default format, that is, in which the pronoun "I" or its passive form "me" is used. The use of simple self-reference in these examples is consistent with the principles of both minimisation and recipient design (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979) and thus is treated as appropriate and sufficient in the production of claims of emotion. These examples provide empirical evidence for the availability of "anyone" to make these claims and the normativity that is an inherent part of their production. Crucially, the fact that a simple "I" fulfils the recipient design requirement suggests that these claims are available for any "I" to make, and that variations and expansions thus make relevant a range of self-categorisations in which this generic availability to the experience of a child death is upgraded or heightened.

Below, I present an example of a claim of emotion made with a single self-referential pronoun. Although I have used this excerpt above (cf. [1]) as a prototypical example of a claim of emotion, I focus here on the subject component of the claim in line 3. Here, the caller has phoned to discuss an unrelated political matter with the presenter. However, after being explicitly told to keep his call brief (line 1) the caller observably deviates from whatever he is calling about ("just quickly" in line 3) to comment about a separate news story that had broken at the time. The news story involved Taegrin Morris, a four-year-old boy who was fatally dragged alongside a car by his seatbelt when the car was hijacked from his mother. The car was later abandoned, and the story captured media attention for the "senselessness" of the crime and the cruel death of the child. Although the reason for the call

is unclear at this point, and eventually turns out to be unrelated to the Taegrin Morris incident (not transcribed), the caller orients to the relevance of producing a claim of emotion about the child before moving on to the “reason for his call”.

(2) [20140721-0826-2414]

1 Pre: Short and sharp Pete=what you ↑got for u[s]
2 Cal: [H]i: John
3 uh=just ↑quickly u::m I feel very nauseous about this kid
4 that died um u[m]
5 Pre: [Y]a::::

The call begins with the presenter prefacing his greeting with a directive to his caller. He requests for the caller to make his comment “short and sharp”, and then greets him by name and asks what his comment is. The caller returns the greeting (line 2) and immediately after it is brought to possible completion (line 2) there is a hesitation marker (line 3) followed by a misplacement marker (“just quickly”) and a second hesitation marker. As I will demonstrate throughout my analysis, these hesitation markers (and other pauses, repetitions and repairs) are a systematic feature of claims of emotion, and can be found in many of the claims in my data, displaying a participant orientation to the claims of emotion themselves as complex and potentially difficult actions to perform. Here, the misplacement marker signals that the speaker is using the slot to produce an action that is not of the action type projected by the presenter (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). The hesitation and misplacement marker are followed by the claim itself, which is composed of the three components of subject, affect and object. The claim is composed of a simple self-reference in the subject component (“I”); a description of a physiological state that indexes a corresponding emotional state in the affect component (“feel very nauseous”); and finally in the object component a reference to “this

kid that died”. In the sections that follow, I examine each component in detail. In this section, I focus specifically on self-reference, and note that the speaker refers to himself in first person singular pronoun (“I” in line 3). While this abbreviated form may be an orientation to his limited time on air, it nevertheless displays the availability for “anyone” to claim entitlement to the experience.

Furthermore, it is instructive to note that, despite the presenter’s initial directive to keep the comment short, the caller uses his first turn, which (he has been notified) is his potentially only turn, to produce this claim, thereby treating it as an urgent matter to attend to, despite it not being what the caller is primarily trying to accomplish and despite the fact that he has very limited time on air. The placing of a claim of emotion in first position in a sequence of talk is a systematic practice that is carried through in many of the examples that follow, and alerts us to the central importance accorded this specific action, in instances both where it is *or* is not the stated reason for the call.

In the following extract, a presenter is introducing a news story about three children that perished in a shack fire. This type of story is common in South Africa during the winter months, where people with no access to electricity make fires in their shacks in order to stay warm. In this particular story, the parents were asleep in a separate shack to the children, and the children’s shack burned down during the night. The presenter introducing the story is directing her talk to a large radio audience and, in her introduction to the story, produces a claim of emotion with a default format for self-reference, but in the passive voice, i.e. “me”, instead of “I”.

(3) [20170117-412]

1 Pre: He-he:re’s a story that just (.) left me so: dejected:

2 uh=when I heard it on EWN .hh three children. ki:lled in
3 a shack fire in Snake Park

In line 1 the presenter refers to the “story” with the prospective indexical “here’s a story” (line 1), not describing it yet but, through the claim of emotion that follows, thereby positioning herself as legitimately emotionally affected by what she is going to reveal the story to be. The claim is made in the passive voice (“left me so dejected” [line 1]) but nevertheless still relies on a single self-referential pronoun, without the speaker prefacing herself in any way as particular privy to the event or related to the child. By relying on simple self-reference, the speaker demonstrates that “anyone” can make a claim of emotion about child deaths; further, that such a claim can be made even prior to describing or referring to the death itself, such that when the “story” is eventually described, the appropriateness of the claim, by whoever has made it, will be evident. The speaker recycles her turn-initial “Here’s” (line 1), and pauses immediately before producing the subject and affective components of the claim, orienting to a difficulty in producing it. This extract demonstrates the entitlement that is available to “anyone” to claim in the occurrence of a child death, and the normativity of producing a claim of emotion such as this even with a prospective indexical in place of the object: that is, even when the object itself is produced in a separate turn-constructual unit (TCU) (Sacks et al., 1974).

The following extract refers to a governmental feeding scheme at a public school in which two children died from food poisoning. The presenter has described the story and is introducing the MEC (Member of the Executive Committee; a government official) for Education who is on the line to comment and answer questions about the incident. It is important to note that, in this instance, the government (and thus its institutional representative, the MEC) may be considered accountable for their role in the deaths of these

children, which occurred on school property and with governmentally provided food. Here, the use of “I” is a notable deviation from the standard institutional self-reference format of “we” (Drew & Heritage, 1992) and displays the speaker’s wish to be heard as speaking on his own, rather than his institution’s, behalf.

(4) [20140926-829]

1 Pre: .hh well=the ↑Gauteng MEC for Education Panyaza
2 Lesufi eh joins us .h eh Panyaza Lesufi good ↑morning
3 what (.) a terrible sto:ry
4 Cal: Sad indeed um good morning John u:m I’m ↑saddened (.) and
5 my heart is bleeding .hhhh eh but I’ve worked overnight
6 just to ensure that everything is in place

The presenter begins by introducing the radio audience to his guest caller (lines 1-2) by his official title as well as his first and last name, thereby referring to his institutional capacity as well as his personal identity. He continues by greeting the caller directly by his full name (line 2) after which he produces an assessment about the incident that they are about to discuss (line 3), as a way of introducing the topic at hand. The MEC responds first to the assessment (“sad indeed”) and thereafter responds to the greeting itself (see Schegloff, 2007a for a discussion about ordering responses to multiple utterances). It is important to note that the MEC’s assessment is produced in downgraded format (“sad”, in contrast to the presenter’s “terrible”), a dispreferred action that he then seeks to repair immediately by producing two claims of emotion and treating these as upgrading his prior assessment into an affiliative response. The first claim (line 4), preceded by a stretched hesitation marker, uses the language from his prior assessment, but recycles it into a new format that is treated as upgraded due to the inclusion of the subjective component. The second claim is produced

after a response is withheld at a potentially transition-relevant pause (line 4), which the caller treats as evidence that his first claim of emotion is insufficient, and in response produces a second. The action of upgrading a hearably downgraded assessment suggests that projected disaffiliation in discussions of child deaths might situate its speaker as callous or otherwise morally problematic. Thus, this claim of emotion may be seen as a form of repair that resituates as morally appropriate a speaker who is vulnerable to being heard as uncaring; the claim is thus used as a resource to repair a second-pair-part that is potentially problematic.

Although “I” is the dedicated term for self-reference in interaction, institutional officials who are commenting in an institutional capacity have available to them a pluralised reference format (“we”) that implicates their institutional rather than personal identity (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007a). As noted above, the use here of a “I”, a singular first person pronoun for self-reference, is noteworthy as it demonstrates a departure from the position typically available to institutional officials. The speaker thus selects to be heard as speaking in a personal rather than institutional capacity and, in doing so, orients to the possibility that, as an institutional representative, he may be held accountable for the deaths and is thus not in a position to make a claim about their emotional impact. However, his claim demonstrates that as an individual, he is still within his rights to claim entitlement to the experience despite his institution’s implication in the incident. This reflects an expectation that one should first display a proper emotional reaction as a person in general (when a range of situated identities are relevantly available). This claiming demonstrates the MEC’s orientation to displaying an experiential stance that is at least calibrated to his interlocutor’s, and demonstrates also the interactional orientation to an overhearing audience that may be making moral judgements about the exchange.

The use of “I” here thus demonstrates three important principles. Firstly, it may be used to claim personal rather than institutional affiliation, in instances when the speaker’s

role is ambiguous. Secondly, it may be used to resist or neutralise potential accountability in the incident, and demonstrates the possibility of producing claims of emotion as one not implicated in the incident. Lastly, despite its standardised format, it can be used by a speaker in demonstrating his or her moral positioning in the interaction.

In (5) below, the presenter begins a conversation with a caller who is phoning in to initiate a discussion about child safety, catalysed by her own daughter's kidnapping and murder two years previously. As in (3) above, the speaker uses a prospective indexical to refer to the story, thereby making a claim of emotion with regard to something as yet unknown to the listeners. In addition, the presenter makes the claim before presenting his caller as someone who has suffered the loss of a child, orienting to his generic entitlement to the experience despite the upgraded entitlement claimable by his caller.

(5) [20170509-1059]

- 1 Pre: Hi: Zukiswa
- 2 (.)
- 3 Cal: ↑Hi:: how you
- 4 (.)
- 5 Pre: hh Goo:::d I know what you gonna talk about so I'm
- 6 n[ot that goo]d when we talk about these issues but we nee:d
- 7 Cal: [hh .hh ye:s]
- 8 Pre: to talk about it because it's ve:ry important
- 9 Cal: Ye::s it i:s you know I mean like u::m since like
- 10 this .hh is going on and on and on in Cape Town and it's
- 11 so unfortunate=I actually. .hhh I-u:h lost my daughter
- 12 twenty ten. .hh she was murdered. in::: Khayelitsha

The presenter begins by greeting the caller by name (line 1) and she responds (line 3) after a short pause (line 2), by returning the greeting and initiating a further “howareyou”

sequence (line 3) (see Schegloff, 1986). After another brief pause (line 4) the presenter provides a second-pair-part to her inquiry (line 5), stretching out the answer and thereby contrasting the positive response token with a prosodically negative delivery. He then begins a new TCU in which he refers to the subject of the discussion (line 5) with a prospective indexical, and thus without explicitly stating what it is going to be. The speaker continues his utterance with the conjunction “so” (line 5) followed by his emotional stance toward the as-yet-unstated topic (lines 5-6) by claiming that he is “not that good” at talking about such issues, but rationalising the need to discuss it despite the hardship because it is “very important” (line 8). Although “not that good” may (also) be analysable as a self-evaluation, it is hearable in this context as the presenter’s demonstration of his affective stance vis-à-vis the topic under discussion.

That the claim (lines 5-6) in this extract is produced by the presenter, to a woman whose child has died, demonstrates the generic availability of a claim of emotion as a possible utterance and social action in discussions about child deaths. However, the speaker’s use of a simple self-reference format (“I”) suggests that he is producing a basic claim, and nothing more, thereby orienting to his interlocutor’s relatively higher experiential status in her position as the mother of a dead child. By producing the claim without making visible a potentially relevant identity, the speaker tacitly shows that the category of “mother of deceased child” is the ultimate entitled category on the hierarchy, in which the provision of any other identity remains irrelevant and inferior. However, it is interesting to note the transition from a singular (“I”; line 5) to pluralised (“we”; line 6) pronoun, which denotes a collective responsibility on top of his claim of emotion as a way to move toward the upgraded entitlement on behalf of the mother.

These extracts demonstrate the normative format for self-reference in claims of emotion about child deaths. Nevertheless, a closer analysis shows that despite the use of a

standardised self-reference term, there is still a range of ways to do basic self-reference in these claims, and that these variations themselves offer insights into the underlying normativity surrounding entitlement to experience of child deaths. Most significantly, standardised self-reference asserts the universal availability of such entitlement, and the shared normativity of such an assumption.

Non-standardised self-reference: self-categorisation

In the following section, I inspect data extracts that contain variations or expansions in the subject component of the utterance. That is, in addition to/in place of the dedicated term for self-reference (“I”), the speaker makes his or her category membership(s) in relation to the object a relevant feature of the claim. My analysis demonstrates that there are various categories that participants can draw on in producing these claims. The choice of membership category is dependent on the categories available to any particular speaker, as well as the speaker’s evaluation of the most relevant category to deploy within the interaction. These self-categorisations detail the speaker’s categorial relationship to the object of the claim, and are therefore a very powerful method for strengthening the basis for the claim, and tacitly asserting and demonstrating an upgraded entitlement to the experience. The speaker thus invokes normative knowledges about the relationships between subjects and objects in the world, and uses these as the common-sense basis for producing claims that are hearably upgraded. In contrast to simple self-reference invoking “anybody’s” right to claim, the articulation of situated identities positions claims made by certain categories of people as upgraded or heightened relative to others, and thus provides analytic purchase for the examination of an experiential gradient in which affective rights are differentially available. These affective rights are themselves part of a normative hierarchy in relationships between subjects and objects in the world (specifically, speakers and deceased children) that is made

relevant by the participants in my data, a hierarchy whose nature and logic are made visible in my analysis.

In the following extract, the presenter is introducing a topic of discussion for his show, a news story that has recently broken about a teen who was stabbed to death at school. The presenter is speaking to his larger radio audience and, during his description of the incident, positions himself explicitly as being angry and upset, with a claim of emotion produced in lines 4-5.

(6) [20170315-1015]

1 Pre: ↑WH:Y IN THE WO:RLD DO OUR KIDS HAVE TO PUT UP WITH ↓THIS (0.5)
2 ↑wh::y is=it (3.4) that in the ↑very place where they're
3 supposed to be given a fu:ture (2.6) that very ↑fu:ture (0.6)
4 gets ↓taken away °from them ° (1.6) as a ↑pa:rent (1.0) my
5 hea:rt ↓breaks

Although the claim of emotion is only explicitly produced at the end of the turn, the speaker uses prosody and pitch to display his emotional response throughout his talk. He begins with a shouted complaint, produced as a rhetorical question, asking “why in the world do our kids have to put up with this” (line 1). His use of the word “this” is a prospective indexical, explicated in his next TCU (lines 2-4), with “this” being a general state of affairs in which a school, rather than giving a child a future (through education) is a place where his future gets taken away. His use of the term “our kids”, and then plural pronouns thereafter (e.g. “they”, “them”) immediately positions this as a generalised, rather than specific, assessment/complaint, in which he is using a story about a single incident to launch a broader discussion about the lack of safety in schools. His use of “our kids”, in addition to its

reference to a broader social ill, is also notably a self-categorisation as a person who, at the very least, feels a sense of responsibility for all school-going children; and demonstrates potential self-categorisation in the parent category. This is confirmed in lines 4-5, when the speaker produces an explicit self-categorisation (“as a parent”) immediately prior to the affective component of the claim (“my heart breaks”). Since the term “parent” refers to both male and female parent categories of children (i.e. both mothers and fathers) it encompasses these two groups and thus performs an inclusive function (Scheibman, 2007), offering a stronger bedrock of support for the claim being made, which is consistent with the generalised format of the complaint produced prior to the claim. Thus, the explicit self-categorisation as a parent is treated as a basis for an upgraded claim of emotion as a response to a situation which manifests a threat that all children (including the presenter’s children) face when going to school (ostensibly the basis for his heightened experiential status regarding this event). The self-categorisation is used to both account for, and produce, an upgraded claim.

In the following extract the presenter is referring to an incident where an 11-year-old boy was bound and hanged in a public train station, in an area called Bonteheuwel (in the Western Cape province) that is infamous for its gang-related high homicide rate.

(7) [20170327-947]

- 1 Pre: So .hh ↑whi::le they were stringing him up there were
- 2 people (.) standing b:y an-and see:ing ↓this
- 3 Cal: Very m- e-e-e ve-very possible=because .hhh like I say
- 4 it’s on the busy walkway=you’ve got ho:mes on the one
- 5 side and office blocks on the other side .hh and then as
- 6 well as people wa:lking across the sta:tion at-at the
- 7 very centre

8 (.)

9 Pre: °Ka:y ° it's at this point I wanna say something

10 unconstitutional but I ↑wo::n't

11 [becau::se I:: kno:]::w ↑he::[y?

12 Cal: [Really rather not ya] [.hh Ya it's best to

13 rather not [he]

14 Pre: [I']d rather not I:: I I I I I I I'm I'm a-

15 I'm a- I'm a- I'm a pa:rent. u::m I've got a l:o:t of

16 rage in- in- in- inside of me but. we cannot fall foul.

17 of our constitution

This extract is part of a long conversation in which a presenter is speaking to a police official who is giving details on the death of the child. In lines 1-7, the presenter and caller are establishing that the incident took place during the day in a busy walkway where lots of people were present. The presenter uses the category-relevant description of “people standing by and seeing this” (line 2), thereby treating them not as “witnesses” who could have useful information about the incident, but as “bystanders” who could have potentially intervened but did not. This fact is treated as problematic, signified in the pause (line 8) and then the presenter’s next comment (lines 9-10) about “wanting” to say something unconstitutional, presumably a strong criticism about the fact that nobody intervened in the murder of the child. The caller concurs (lines 12-13) with this decision, suggesting that it is best for the presenter to not say anything “unconstitutional”, but the presenter continues with a claim of emotion made up of three separate TCUs, the first containing a self-categorisation, the second detailing his affective response, and the third accounting for why he is not going to make the comment he would like to make. The speaker begins by explicitly self-categorising as a parent, and continues (lines 15-16) by indexing the emotion that he is feeling (“rage”) toward the fact that there was no intervention to this incident. My analysis here focuses on the use of

the self-categorisation as “parent” as a resource for producing an upgraded claim, with the inference that a “parent’s” heightened entitlement to claim an emotional response accounts for the claim that follows. As in the previous extract, “parent” is a broader category than a gendered category (like “mother” or “father”), and the speaker is hearably producing his claim as coming from “a parent”, suggesting that any parent’s heightened experiential status provides them with the right to experience strong emotions upon hearing this incident, thereby demonstrating an upgraded experiential stance. The speaker further notes, however, that his rage as a parent is in conflict with his responsibility as a citizen to not violate his constitutional obligations. The word “parent” is used both as an account for his anger and as a contrast to his other role, as a citizen with constitutional obligations, with the two roles being positioned as requiring contradictory moral responses. His use of the pronoun “we” (line 15) is a second self-categorisation, locating him as part of a larger group of people who have a responsibility to uphold their constitutional responsibilities. Thus, he uses the category of parent (and the rights implied by it) in contrast to the category of “we” as people (and the responsibilities implied by that) and describes the conflict that he faces (and that presumably many of his listeners face) as a member of both groups.

The use of this contrast, however, does more than just indexing dual and conflicting categories of self-identification. Both the presenter and the caller are demonstrating just how the event they are describing provides a license to even think about breaking the supreme law of the land. They reach a resolution in lines 16-17, but the lack of extreme sanction by the caller to the presenter’s claim (especially given that the caller is a policeman and therefore a direct representative of the law) provides some evidence that the caller hears the presenter’s need as understandable but not justifiable.

The following extract demonstrates a variation in self-categorising as a parent. In the extract above, the speaker explicated his “parent” status through a TCU dedicated to this self-

categorisation. Below, the speaker accomplishes a similar self-categorisation by referring to his child's age, rather than to his own status as a parent/father, thus providing a category-relevant description of himself rather than an explicit membership category. The extract is part of a text message that is being read out by the presenter, that refers to a story of a young child who drowned in a recreational dam over Mother's Day weekend in 2015. The story garnered media attention when it became known that the child had not been wearing a life jacket on the boat and had drowned when the boat capsized. This claim demonstrates another method by which membership in a "parent" category can be claimed, i.e. by categorising the child and displaying a relationship to that child ("I have" in line 1).

(8) [20150511-15-002156]

1 Pre: I have a †two year old and my heart goes out to the fa::mily
2 that's Dea:n eh who says so

In this extract, the speaker's self-categorisation as a parent is accomplished through a specific age description of his own child. Through this practice, the speaker foregrounds a relevant feature of his child while implicitly invoking his own membership category. In this case, the speaker treats the child's age as constitutive of his or her character (rather than gender or any other identifying feature) and treats it as the relevant basis for the claim that follows it. By bringing attention to the age of his child, the speaker orients to the age of his child as the most important feature in producing an upgraded claim. Thus, it is not his status as a parent that he treats as relevant; it is his status of being a parent of a child of a specific age that is treated as upgrading his entitlement to the experience. Schegloff (2007b, p. 467) discusses the relevance of using "cardinal numbers" in membership categorisation practices, rather than more subjective or relativised terminology. By using the former, the speaker

produces an “invariant” category type, i.e. an objective category term whose meaning is fixed. Since the age of the child that drowned was foregrounded in news reports about his death (he had been approximately two years old), the ability to claim parenthood to not just a child, but a child of almost exactly the same age, is treated by this speaker as granting him a unique entitlement not claimable by parents of children of other ages. Furthermore, the age specifier also draws attention to the intense vulnerability of this child, in that under no circumstances could this age of child have been expected to be able to put on his own life jacket. That this child is thus an extremely vulnerable member of the category being invoked suggests that his age heightens the possibility and valence of claims of emotion about his death.

In the following extract, a presenter and reporter are discussing the Taegrin Morris incident. I focus here on the reporter’s claim of emotion in lines 5-10, and specifically on her self-categorisation in lines 6-7. While above (cf. [8]) I noted that the age of the child may be treated as a relevant and constitutive feature of parental identity, and may even obviate the need for a speaker to explicitly state that he or she is a parent, below I note that the ages of one’s children can be provided in addition to self-categorisation as a mother, and that this additional categorising work reformulates the single kin category as two separate (and relevant) sub-groups of the “mother” membership category through the provision of the age of each child, producing the speaker explicitly as a “mother of two children”, with this categorisation treated as a basis for heightened entitlement.

(9) [20140722-0626-1055]

1 Pre: But I think (.) being able to ta:lk to people just
 2 kinda lifted my spirits and (.) as we continue =you know
 3 (.) ↑human interaction has ↓helped

4 (.)

5 Rep: ↑Ya: he- he- oka::y he- he I- s- I=think it's uh

6 very=as a mother of a: (.) .hh of a fi:ve year old and a

7 three year old↓ I jus:t when=I heard that mother's voice

8 yesterday in the ne:ws clip=just saying .hhh ↓you know

9 how he pleaded to her for help=I just .hhhh my ↑hea::rt

10 a:bsolutely breaks=it's ↑one of my biggest fea:rs .hhh

In this interaction, the reporter is producing a second claim of emotion in response to a first claim produced by the presenter in his previous turn. The claim itself is preceded by pauses, in-breaths, hesitation markers and a repaired turn beginning, systematic features of many of the claims in my data. The reporter begins her claim with an explicit self-categorisation in which she refers to herself as a “mother”, and then provides the ages of each of her children, i.e. specifically a “mother of” a child of one age and a child of another age. As in (8) above, the speaker foregrounds the ages of her children in her self-categorisation, treating this additional information as a constitutive feature of her membership category (i.e. specifically speaking as the mother of “young” children, both of whom are similar ages to the deceased child). The use of specific and multiple description forms contributes to the upgraded or heightened production of the claim, and makes relevant and visible her experiential status relative to her interlocutor's. Both this extract and the previous one demonstrate that the age of the child of which one is a parent/mother/father is a constitutive feature of his or her identity, and is hearable as being relevant to the organisation of relative entitlements in talk about child deaths.

The following interaction occurs between a presenter and a reporter who are going through the morning's news headlines. The story they are referencing is the hijacking in which Taegrin Morris died, with two claims taking place in lines 1, and 4-5, respectively.

While the first claim is produced with a simple self-categorisation, this is repaired (line 4) and replaced with two explicit self-categorisations in order to offset the possible disaffiliation projected by the reporter's pause (line 2) and negative turn-initial token (line 3).

(10) [20140721-0526-1350]
1 Pre: .hh I mean this story is just too depressing for me
2 (0.1)
3 Rep: N:[o:::]
4 Pre: [As a] father (.) and as a uncle. this is just too
5 depressing
6 (.)
7 Rep: No definitely

In this extract, the presenter has just read out the headline from that day's newspaper detailing the Taegrin Morris incident. After completing his reading out of the news headline, he produces an evaluation (in the form of a claim of emotion) about what he has just read. He begins by making a standard claim in line 1 that includes an object, an affective label and a default subject term (in the passive voice, i.e. "me"). The pause in line 2 is treated as transition-relevant by the reporter who begins her own turn with "no" (line 3). The word "no" marks the start of a disagreeing response, and the presenter orients to this potential disaffiliation by treating his pause as a within-turn pause and continuing his talk, which overlaps (line 4) with the reporter's turn-initial "No" (for discussion of overlap and recycled turn beginnings, see Schegloff, 1987b). He thus treats his previous utterance as inadequate and repairs it with two explicit self-categorisations: a father and an uncle. His provision of these self-categorisations as an increment to his claim, and his orientation to the claim on its own being treated as an incomplete or insufficient action, highlights the relevance for

speakers of using relevant membership categories to strengthen or upgrade their claims of emotion. Further, if the self-categorisations here are made in order to buttress the presenter's claim in the face of potential disagreement, then the fact that the reporter's next turn at talk in line 7 is a strong alignment displays the powerful utility that these self-categorisations may provide in demonstrating heightened entitlement to such incidents, and the affiliation that this entitlement may garner. The use of multiple self-categorisations (in contrast to a single one) can arguably be heard to further upgrade the entitlement to claim, by positioning its speaker as experiencing it as two distinct categories of person, both for whom it is demonstrably relevant.

The two membership categories are themselves inspectable for their orderly use in the speaker's utterance. By referring to himself first as a father (line 4), followed by an increment that identifies him as an uncle, the speaker orients explicitly to the priority that fathers have (as opposed to uncles) in making such claims, and exposes his reliance on common-sense knowledge in assuming that his interlocutor will understand it in this way. The reference to "uncle" is also interesting for a further reason. It suggests that it is not only a parent who is entitled to this kind of experience, but that any recognisable relationship with a child is a basis for invoking this upgraded entitlement, although at differential points of entitlement on the experiential gradient.

Absent self-categorisation: a deviant case

In the final extract for this section, I examine a deviant case: an occasion where a speaker is held accountable for not producing a claim of emotion when she is recognisably and relevantly able to do so, specifically due to her ability to claim membership in the "mother" category. This extract refers to the story from (6) above in which a teenager was fatally stabbed while at school. Here, however, the presenter is on the line with a government

official who has come on to the show to comment on the incident and provide information.

This extract occurs mid-way through the interaction, after the MEC has provided some relevant information about the nature and details of the incident.

(11) [20171017-801]

- 1 Pre: .hhh ↑Right no::w hhh eh- I=mean you a mother of kids
2 (0.6) [I']ll I over and above bei::ng (.)
3 MEC: [Mm]
4 Pre: the MEC (.) of Educa:tion (.) in the W:estern ↓Cape
5 and (.) it=it must drive you up the wall to dea::l .hh
6 with this type of situaa:tion .hhh whe:n you look at your
7 o::wn kids and you=go: you know (.) hhh this is not
8 happening to me but I could be that parent .hhh so::
9 [wha]t is being done MEC .hhh
10 MEC: [Mmm]
11 Pre: ↑O:::ver and above the resource ↓office::s: (.) what else
12 is being done to make su:re that our schools are actually
13 safe places for our kids to ↓go
14 MEC: Look (.) we do:ing everything possible

In this call, the MEC has been contacted in her institutional capacity: she is introduced in her institutional role and is invited on to the show to provide information and reassurance, as well as give the institutional or governmental official statement on what has happened and how it is being handled. After she has answered the presenter's questions about the incident and demonstrated the extent of her knowledge, the presenter produces an extended candidate claim of emotion on her behalf, thereby suggesting that there is a claim of emotion available to her, and expected of her, as a person and, even more specifically, as a mother. The claim that is made on the MEC's behalf thus demonstrates a normative

expectation (to mourn the death of a child) that the MEC has not (yet) lived up to, and the presenter's attempt to address this rupture. This extract reflects normative orientations to child death (i.e. a socially available and/or required response that displays a degree of affective stance relative to the incident). By making visible the MEC's omission, however, and by appending an additional membership category ("mother of kids" [line 1]) to his candidate claim, the presenter also signals that there is an additional basis for claiming a relatively higher position on the hierarchy of entitlement that is grounded in this relevant membership category.

That the candidate claim of emotion ("it must drive you up the wall") is provided *on her behalf* makes visible the un-claimed experiential rights to which she is entitled, and is potentially required to display, over and above her role as MEC. The claim is thus a demonstration of what is available to/expected of her as a mother, and simultaneously an orientation to making its absence accountable. The candidate claim is produced alongside an invocation of her institutional as well as her parental roles, treating them both as relevant categories to be deployed in this interaction. The claim is followed by "so" appended to his query "what is being done", with "so" used to articulate the upshot of the previous utterance (Raymond, 2004), thereby linking her identity as a mother to the institutional action required of her as an MEC, and simultaneously rendering her accountable as both MEC and mother.

The MEC offers two weak aligning responses (lines 3 and 10) to the presenter's categorisation of her as a mother of kids. While her response demonstrates an alignment with the factual accuracy of his assertion, its weakness is analysable as the MEC's reluctance to fully align with the presenter's stance: thus, a resistance to being categorised as a mother and having claims made on her behalf. The MEC's response thus suggests that she is treating her institutional comments as sufficient for the purposes of the interview, while the presenter's candidate claim demonstrates that he orients to an emotional response being relevantly

absent. Aside from the significance of the presenter's making the MEC's lack of self-categorisation observable and accountable, the extract also offers evidence that the MEC's knowledge or information about the event is treated as insufficient, and that she is accountable for an experiential position as well. Here, her epistemic status is treated as inadequate, with an expectation that she also display her experiential status. This provides empirical evidence for the distinction made between epistemic and affective rights and status, treating them as distinct and not-interchangeable domains of action.

In this section I have demonstrated various methods of self-categorisation by which speakers make visible and relevant their (or others') situated identities as parents in talk about child death; and noted that such self-categorisation is a practice for claiming (and thus reproducing) heightened experiential status, as a basis for the experiential stance being taken. These practices include the different formulations of parent categories, and I note how their deployment is used to demonstrate upgraded experiential entitlement through the claim of emotion being hearable as coming "from a parent". The final case in this collection demonstrates the accountability of not self-categorising when one is able to do so; which in turn suggests that not making visible one's status relative to the experiential gradient is sanctionable. At the same time, this deviant case demonstrates resistance to, and negotiation of, this accountability, where information dissemination is treated as adequate, and experiential status (even upgraded) is not relevant. All of these variations in the ways that speakers self-categorise as a means to implementing the action of making claims of emotion are available for analysis: they demonstrate the range of practices by which entitlement is negotiated, upgraded, downgraded, resisted and claimed in talk about child deaths.

Object component

Person reference in interaction

The ability to refer to something or someone not present in an interaction is what Hockett (1960) terms “displacement”, and is an important interactional accomplishment. The practices for referring to such a thing or person are varied, and a great deal of literature has been written on the subject (see Enfield & Stivers, 2007). Stivers, Enfield, and Levinson (2007, p. 2) note that “reference to persons is a fundamental phenomenon at the intersection between language and social structure”, where language, grammar, membership categories and other reference forms tacitly reproduce and re-establish normative social arrangements. However, “[t]here is always an indefinite number of ways by which a thing or person can be referred to” (Stivers et al., 2007, p. 6), such that any selected reference form can be analysed for the function it serves in the interaction, and the social organisations that are taken for granted, made visible and/or relied on in order to furnish the accountability of the action.

The two most prominent category types utilised in person reference are names and descriptions. Schegloff (1996b) notes that, in English, names are preferred to descriptive terms in references to third persons, and often constitute the default format for referring to a third party in interaction, arguably because a name provides an invariant or objective reference form, while a description is typically heard as a subjective or relativised term. Similar to the discussion above on cardinal numbers and age categories, a description may rely on the recipient having to categorise the categoriser (Sacks, 1992; Whitehead, 2009) in order to understand the descriptor. Although a range of category types [what Stivers (2007) terms “alternative recognitionals”] may achieve recognition from the recipient, names are useful for invoking a presumed person-or-thing-in-common, while descriptions are heard as selecting the most relevant feature(s) (to the speaker) of the referent being described.

Descriptions thus force the speaker to commit “to selecting some features and not others as constituting ‘the description’” (Stivers et al., 2007, p. 4) prompting Searle (1958, p. 591) to note that “(T)he uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object”. The selection of a name versus a descriptive term in doing person reference is thus a participant resource, and my analysis tracks the deployment of various reference forms in producing claims of emotion. A key finding from this analysis is the fact that in instances where the deceased child is being referred to, the reference form systematically includes a category-relevant description of the child’s age, signalling that its inclusion is evidently heightening or emphasising the claim of emotion, relative to what would be the case for a reference without an age descriptor.

The preference organisation for other-person reference in interaction mirrors that described above for self-reference in interaction; namely the preference for minimisation, i.e. that reference should, where possible, be done with one reference form; and the preference for recipient design, i.e. that there is an interactional preference for recognitional references, where possible (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979). Sacks et al. (1974) argue that, where the two preferences come into conflict, recipient design is prioritised over minimisation, due, as Heritage (2007, p. 260) notes, to the “more general preference for intersubjectivity and common ground”, whose accomplishment is more likely if a recognitional referent is provided. Heritage further notes that speakers may halt the progressivity of the turn, or even the entire sequence, in the pursuit of intersubjectivity.

Finally, a relevant set of practices for producing references in interaction concerns what Schegloff (1996b) differentiates as locally *initial* versus locally *subsequent* reference forms. Locally initial reference forms are designed to provide recognition of the referent,

while locally subsequent references are designed “merely” to re-refer to an already-referred-to referent. Due to the established preferences for minimisation and recipient design, initial reference should be done to establish recognition via the minimal number of descriptive forms. The use of multiple reference forms violates the preference for minimisation and, in my data, displays a pursuit and establishment of intersubjectivity in these instances as a shared basis for the claims of emotion that are being produced. As I demonstrate below, in some extracts multiple reference forms are used, demonstrating that the principle of recipient design (producing an utterance in such a way that it is understandable to its recipient) (Sacks et al., 1974) in such interactions is an especially important basis for the actions that follow or precede it. Due also to this organisation, instances where an initial reference is produced in non-recognitional format are treated as exceptions to the normative structure and are also available for analysis. I tackle both of these issues in the following section and demonstrate empirically that, while recipient design may (or typically does) refer to the production of a *recognitional* reference (Heritage, 2007), a key finding from this section is that it may also include producing an *accountable* reference, or a reference to an object or person that justifies the claim being made on its behalf.

Object reference in claims of emotion

One of the challenges oriented to by participants claiming entitlement to an experience is to form up an event as an experience, or as something that can be legitimately thought of as being contained in the repertoire of experiences to which they are entitled, which thereby tacitly displays entitlement to claiming an emotional response to it. In this section I examine object references in claims of emotion, that is, the way that speakers refer to an incident of a child death. The “object” of these claims is often, but not always, the person (i.e. the child) that has died; it may also be the family of the child, the manner of

death, and various other references to the event as a whole. In this section, therefore, I refer to, and extend on, previous literature on person reference in interaction to develop my analysis below of object reference in talk about child death.

The forthcoming analysis demonstrates how the use of various reference forms (to the child that died, his/her family, the manner or nature of the death and/or the geographic location of the death, among others) are produced, managed, negotiated and utilised in producing accountable entitlements to the experience of a child death. The reference to the event-as-an-experience, therefore, is a key resource in accountably producing a claim of emotion; so that not only, as Averill (1980, p. 310) asserts, “emotions have objects”, but the object itself is crucial in foregrounding the feature of the event/experience treated as most relevant to an emotional response. Even more significantly, the object is reflexively tied to the identity of the speaker producing the claim, so that although “emotions have objects”, those objects have subjects, and these two components (as well as the affective label itself) produce their speaker’s accountable entitlement to the experience being so referenced.

The use of multiple and/or categorial object references produces an increasingly specific recognitional reference form. My analysis demonstrates that this practice of increased specificity, and the intersubjective grounding afforded by the recognition that it pursues, demonstrates a speaker’s positioning of him- or herself vis-à-vis the incident and is a resource in signalling to others his or her experiential status and stance regarding the event.

Object reference: descriptive recognitionals

In the following section, I examine two instances of locally initial reference, in which speakers formulate a recognitional *and accountable* object for the claims of emotion that they are producing. In both extracts, the speakers produce category-relevant descriptions of the child that has died. Additionally, both of these descriptions are preceded by the definite

article “this”: suggesting a shared assumption of the knowability of the incident. Finally, in both, the fact of the death and the age category of deceased person (child) are treated as the bases for the claim; while in the second, the location of the occurrence is also provided as an additional descriptive recognitional.

While the following call was analysed in (2) above for the speaker's use of a default self-reference format to produce the claim, I focus here on lines 3-4, where the object of the claim is produced.

(12) [20140721-0826-2414]

1 Pre: Short and shar*p* Pete=what you ↑got for u[s]
2 Cal: [H]i: John
3 uh=just ↑quickly u::m I feel very nauseous about this kid
4 that died um u[m]
5 Pre: [Y)a:::::

In this extract, a caller claims an emotional response to the death of Taegrin Morris, referring to the object of the claim as “this kid that died” (lines 3-4). It is firstly notable that he uses the definite article “this” in locally initial position, thus presuming his recipient’s knowledge of the story and establishing the story as something that is recognisable. More significantly, the noun or object is formulated as “kid that died”, orienting to both the fact of the death and the age category of the deceased as recognisable bases for the claim being produced. When alignment is not immediately forthcoming, however, the caller produces a hesitation marker, demonstrating that what was taken for granted by him may be being treated as insufficient by his recipient. The presenter, however, immediately introduces an overlapping and emphasised alignment marker with a downward intonation, confirming the

recognisability of the action and the need for (and availability of) his alignment, before moving to the next topic of talk.

It is important to note that the speaker has been directed to be brief in his comment, and has used his first position to introduce a claim of emotion about the child that has died. It thus serves him to produce the claim in as brief a format as possible. His use of two descriptors (“this kid” and “that died”) demonstrates that establishing a recognitional reference is a priority for him, which further suggests that claiming emotion in response to a child’s death makes its speaker accountable for producing an adequate referent for the claim. In an instance where the claim itself is produced in a slot projected for another type of utterance, the onus of accounting for its insertion here rests with the caller, whose pursuit of recognition demonstrates its potential contestability if it is not recognisably produced.

The following extract concerns the child who drowned at Hartbeespoort Dam over Mother’s Day weekend, with the object of the claim produced in lines 6-7.

(13) [20150511-15-001-1848]

- 1 Pre: Let’s go to the lines eh let’s start with Gary in
2 Pretoria ↑hi: Gary
3 Cal: Uh good afternoon Xola:ni
4 Pre: Hi welcome Gary
5 Cal: Thank yo:u (.) uh Xolani I (.) just feel sick in the guts
6 hearing about this uh chi:ld that died in Hartbeespoort
7 Dam
8 Pre: Yea:::h=

Here, the claim is produced in lines 5-7, with the locally initial reference to the object being “this uh child that died in Hartbeespoort Dam”. There are three features that distinguish

this reference form from the previous. Firstly, the speaker uses the word “child” (rather than “kid”), a selection that follows a hesitation marker. “Child” may be seen as a more formalised membership category than “kid”, which is hearably informal. The use of the one category term versus the other suggests that the speaker of each is orienting to different interactional concerns, with the more formal category term demonstrating a distancing, or observable lack of familiarity, between the caller and the object of his claim. Secondly, the hesitation marker itself, formulated after the definite article “this”, is hearable as searching specifically for the appropriate or relevant object term, demonstrating that the speaker views the selection of a particular category term (child versus kid) as a relevant task, even if it violates the progressivity of the talk. Lastly, the additional increment of the location of the incident, after the reference to the incident as a “child” that “died”, demonstrates the speaker’s pursuit of recognition from his recipient, which is received in line 8. This extract in particular demonstrates that the age or age category of the child that has died is treated as the most relevant identifying feature (even more than the location of the incident), which in turn foregrounds the “youngness” of the child as an important resource in producing these claims. Finally, referring to the object of the claim in a recognitional format is treated as a priority by the speaker in order to receive alignment with his action.

These variations in formulating the object of the claim of emotion are an important participant resource in demonstrating their (and others’) entitlement to make such claims (and tacitly demonstrating their entitlement to the experience being referenced). Participants observably select among various possibilities in formulating the object of their claims, and orient as well to these selections as systematically calibrated to the entire utterance as well as its position in the larger sequence of talk.

Object reference: proper names and descriptive recognitionals

In this section, I analyse references in which both proper names and additional descriptive terms are used to refer to particular incidents of child deaths. Above, I demonstrated that recognitional (and accountable) object reference in a claim of emotion can be achieved without the use of a proper name, and with only a categorial reference to the child as the object. Here, the provision of a full name as well as a range of additional descriptors may be analysable as pursuing recognition of the referent as a ratification for heightened entitlement to the event. In these instances, although the full name may be adequate for recognitional purposes, the additional descriptors suggest that membership in the “child” category is nevertheless a relevant feature of such claims.

The extract below concerns the death of Courtney Peters, a girl who was kidnapped and whose body was found nine days after she was first declared missing. Here I analyse in particular the object component of the claim in lines 3-4 (“the body of young Courtney Peters”) and note some of the practices deployed in its production and their larger interactional import.

(14) [20170515-157]

1 Pre: ↑Donno about the rest of you but: hhh (.) Mother's Day had a
2 very bittersweet feel for me this ↓year=u::h=I mean I'm su:re
3 like many others I woke ↑up. to the news that the body of young
4 Courtney Peters had been fou:nd the day before

In this extract, the initial reference to the object is produced as “the body of young Courtney Peters” (lines 3-4). The newsworthiness of the item at this point rests with the fact that the body had been discovered, since the child had been missing for nine days by this time and while the story was treated as a national tragedy, her absence was no longer treated as

news. Thus, a further account for the claim being made at this particular juncture is the fact that the child who was being treated as missing is now confirmed as dead, and it is the death of the child specifically (rather than her absence, in this instance) which provides for the relevance of the emotional response being claimed.

In contrast to the previous extracts, the speaker uses the full name of the child as a reference form. However, despite the referential adequacy of a full name, it is prefaced by the descriptor “young” (line 3), an additional descriptive term which treats the age category of the deceased person as the most relevant feature by which recognition can be achieved (and by which the claim can be understood and heard). The use of an age category (“young”) treats the actual age of the child as not relevant for the purposes of this claim, demonstrating that even a subjective and non-specific assessment of the victim as “young” is sufficient here, and that exactly how young she is, is a peripheral matter. The absence of a specific age in referring here to the child, and the provision instead of a subjectively formulated age category, foregrounds and makes relevant the speaker’s subjectivity in relation to the claim. In other words, the increased specificity does not contradict the fact that this claim is formulated by its speaker to be heard *as subjective*.

This can be contrasted to the following extract, in which the speaker also uses a claim of emotion to introduce the same news story, but formulates the object of the claim differently (lines 2-3), most specifically through the inclusion of an additional descriptor as well as a specific cardinal age in place of an age category.

(15) [20170515-849]

1 Pre: I say this with a heavy heart and there’s a lot of anger
2 in me as well when I say this=the body .hh of missing
3 three year old Courtney Peters was found in a shallow

In contrast to the previous extract, where the speaker was hearably working to be heard as speaking from a subjective place, here the presenter, engaged in a similar task (of presenting a news story) works to produce the news item *as fact*, despite the subjective investment (Edwards, 2005) that he has made visible in the claim of emotion with which he has started his turn.

Here, as in the previous extract, the object is formulated with the child's full name, providing an initial recognitional reference for the object of the claim. However, preceding the name are the child's exact age ("three year old") and the additional descriptor "missing". Further, the speaker provides extra information about where the body was found ("a shallow grave in Epping", lines 3-4). The provision of this extra information makes this utterance hearable as "reporting the news", where, ostensibly, the pursuit of objective facts is prioritised. In this context, a cardinal number is provided in lieu of a subjectively formulated age category. Although the format follows that of the previous extract, with the appendage of the child's age (category) to her name, the age is provided in its invariant and objective format, rather than as an evaluation or assessment of her age category, thereby foregrounding the facts of the incident rather than the speaker's subjectivity in relation to it. This is further supported by the subject reference provided in each extract: in (14) above, the presenter's membership in the "mother" category makes her subjectivity a relevant feature of the claim, as well as providing her with the authority to provide an evaluation of "youngness" in this instance by invoking a standard relational pair that makes relevant a "locus for a set of rights and obligations" (Sacks, 1972a, p. 37). Contrastingly, in (15) the presenter uses a minimal self-reference format ("I"), thereby minimising the relevance of his own set of rights and obligations in relation to the claim, and instead foregrounding its objective properties.

In the example below, a presenter and reporter are discussing the Taegrin Morris incident. The presenter produces a claim of emotion, with the subject component produced in its default format. While referring to the object of the claim, however, the provision of the child's surname is treated as insufficient for the purposes at hand, and is followed by an increment detailing his age category, thereby reversing the order of the two referents (i.e. name and descriptor) from the two previous examples (descriptor and name).

- (16) [20140722-0626-1055]
- 1 Pre: ↑Goo:d morning Cindy Paluta
- 2 (0.2)
- 3 Rep: .hhh goo::d morning=Koketso ↑ho:w are you today↓
- 4 (0.2)
- 5 Pre: .hh ↑I'm aright hey .hh (0.2) °I'm okay°
- 6 Rep: he- he- he .hh ↑that's good (0.2) It's [Tue::sday]
- 7 Pre: [Well I me]an
- 8 it's getting better (.) it's getting better=I think I
- 9 ↑think .hh I=I sta:rted off (.) at four o clock (.) being
- 10 very=very e↓motional around this um .hh um um a:h th- th
- 11 Ma:rtins=um ↑Morris sto:ry the little boy↑ .hh
- 12 Rep: Mm [mmm]

In this claim (lines 9-11) the object is “this um um ah th- th Martins um Morris story the little boy”. The word “this” (line 10) and “story” (line 11) are separated by numerous hesitation markers and two attempts to formulate the surname correctly, demonstrating the speaker's orientation to providing the surname as a way of ensuring recognition of his referent and thus heightening the probability that his claim will be treated as relevant. The surname, formulated incorrectly and then immediately self-repaired, is nevertheless still

treated as inadequate, and the speaker follows the production of the correct name and the referent “story” with an increment containing a further descriptor (“the little boy”), thereby demonstrating that an accountable basis for the claim is the age category of the child, and that an accountable object is relevant (beyond the relevance of a recognitional object) to his claim. The age category and gender of the deceased child are both provided by the speaker, who treats the achievement of recognition of the referent by his interlocutor as important in receiving alignment with his claim: these two descriptive categories, in addition to the proper name, are oriented to as the most effective means by which to achieve such alignment, which he receives in line 12. It is noteworthy that in this extract, the proper name is provided first, with the age and gender categories treated as part of the repair of an inadequate name reference. In contrast, the previous two extracts demonstrate the provision of an age or age category as qualifiers to, and properly placed prior to, the provision of the proper name. Thus, this speaker treats the proper name on its own as insufficient for the purposes of a claim of emotion, and orients to the after-the-fact provision of the age category (as well as a gender category) as relevant to repairing this inadequacy. The repair is thus treated as a method for increasing the legitimacy of the claim, with the repaired utterance serving to ground the claim of emotion as a recognisable and accountable action.

That recipient design in the form of a recognitional reference is prioritised over the principle of minimisation is noted in the literature (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979); here, I note that production of an accountable referent is routinely pursued in the production of a claim of emotion, which is achieved through either a description of the child’s age or age category, or an age (category) plus a surname or full name. While extra details (the location of the incident) are sometimes provided to ensure recognition, the feature overwhelmingly oriented to in buttressing the formulation of these claims, is the child’s age or age category as the most recognisable feature of the incident. This points to the shared normativity surrounding a

“child’s” death as a specific, distinct, differentiated kind of death, and one in which claims of emotional impact are oriented to as relevant social actions. Furthermore, it suggests that the deployment of various categories of child are relevant in producing accountable claims, demonstrating that the segmentation of age categories discussed in the literature is treated here as a participant’s resource in producing claims of experiential entitlement to a child’s death.

Locally initial non-recognitional reference: two exceptions

The following two extracts are examples of locally initial reference forms that are produced specifically in non-recognitional format. These violate the preference for recognition established in the data that I have presented in the previous section. I argue that these deviations are linked to the larger interactional projects being pursued in each instance, where diminished experiential status is an important resource in producing the claims.

In the following extract, I demonstrate how the use of a non-specific reference form can be used to produce a speaker as having inferior experiential status relative to his interlocutor. Below, a presenter is introducing a caller who has phoned in to discuss the murder of her child two years previously. Above (cf. [5]), I noted how the default format for self-reference was used, and argued that simple self-reference was used to accomplish a hearably downgraded claim in order to orient to the caller’s superordinate experiential rights and status. Here, it is the locally initial reference of the object produced in locally subsequent form (“these issues”, line 6) that I examine, and argue that a generally formulated object orients to the same interactional concern.

(17) [20170509-1059]

1 Pre: Hi: Zukiswa

2 (.)

3 Cal: ↑Hi:: how you
 4 (.)
 5 Pre: hh Goo:::d I know what you gonna talk about so I'm
 6 n[ot that goo]d when we talk about these issues but we nee:d
 7 Cal: [hh .hh ye:s]
 8 Pre: to talk about it because it's ↓ve:ry important
 9 Cal: Ye::s it i:s you know I mean like u::m since like
 10 this .hh is going on and on and on in Cape Town and it's
 11 so unfortunate=I actually. .hhh I-u:h lost my daughter
 12 twenty ten. .hh she was murdered. in:::: Khayelitsha

Following the greeting sequence (lines 1-4), the presenter of the show produces a claim of emotion in response to an as-yet-unformulated object (a prospective indexical, whose own significance I have discussed above in [3]). Here, the object reference is locally initial, meaning that the establishment of a recognitional reference is relevant. However, the presenter selects to produce this initial formulation in locally subsequent form, using non-recognitional and general terms (“these issues”), and append a claim of emotion to it. In doing so, he allows his caller to produce the recognitional referent (lines 11-12) and thereby make visible her own (relatively higher) experiential status regarding the murder of her child. Importantly here, the speaker manages the production of a (albeit downgraded) claim of emotion using a non-recognitional reference form in the initial reference to the object. He observably does this so that when the speaker “tells her story”, she (rather than he) is providing the initial recognitional reference form for the story, and thus, as the “teller” of the story, demonstrating that the rights associated with telling the story are hers rather than anyone else’s.

It is also interesting that the presenter formulates the object using the generalised reference term “these issues”. The speaker refers to a generalised noun (“issues”) prefaced by

the definite article “these” to denote a specific category of “issues” and claims that he finds them difficult. Most notable here is the plural formulation of the object in locally initial position; that is, not only providing a non-recognitional reference where one is relevant, but generalising even further by referencing a class of incidents rather than a specific event. The specific object in this instance would be the death of the caller’s own child, and by invoking this referent, the presenter would be violating the hierarchy of entitlement, in which the mother has superior rights to the story, its telling and all the emotions associated with it. By producing his claim about a general class of incidents, of which the death of this woman’s child is a particular instance, the presenter demonstrates that he has “anybody’s” right to make a generic claim about the occurrence of child deaths in general, but that he has very minimised rights to make a claim about the death of her child (i.e. that the ultimate right to claim rests with her). In this way, the presenter manages to both convey empathy with the caller, while ensuring that he is not heard as locating himself in a superordinate position on the hierarchy of entitlement to which he is not actually entitled, relative to the recipient of his talk. Furthermore, his use of the word “it” (line 8) demonstrates his transition from a general object (that he claims entitlement to) to a specific object (whose entitlement ultimately belongs to the mother).

The selection of reference forms for the object of the claim is thus an important resource in signaling its speaker’s experiential status regarding the event, with non-recognitional reference being used specifically to articulate an experiential stance that is relatively lower to the other speaker’s.

The story being referenced in the extract below involves a teenage girl who committed suicide, with this particular speaker calling in to criticise her actions. In the previous section, I showed that the age, or age category of the child, is an important resource in object reference in claims of emotion, either in addition to a proper name, or on its own.

Below, the absence of a proper name or any alternative recognitional descriptor is crucially linked to the larger project being undertaken by the speaker.

(18) [20150813-01-001-2343]

1 Pre: Sipho from Katlehong hi you wanna talk about the Marikana issue
2 (.) yes?

3 Cal: Hi u:h just as an aside I think the whole thing of suicide to
4 me is essentially (.) murder so. I. fail to have any kind of
5 sympathy for [someo]ne who kills themselves

6 Pre: [Sorry] sorry you wanna talk about Marikana or the
7 suicide are you saying on the side [not]e

8 Cal: [Yes] no I'm just saying
9 [as an aside]

10 Pre: [Oh ya ya]

11 Cal: That's not my main point

12 Pre: Oh oka[y]

13 Cal: [F]or me it's essentially murder so I don't have much
14 sympathy for a person who kills themselves[(.) (you got me?)]

15 Pre: [I don- I don- I do-]

16 I don't think that's fair but I'll talk about it after you've
17 raised your second issue

In this interaction, the caller has phoned in to discuss an issue entirely separate from the teen suicide that he raises in his first turn at talk. As in (2) above, the speaker observably deviates from the “reason for his call” in order to place his talk about the child death in first position – that is, he treats it as a task to prioritise (see “just as an aside”, lines 3 and 9) even at the expense of his “main point”. This time, however, this is done in order to produce a claim that he specifically does not have an emotional response to the incident of a child death

(lines 4-5). It is worth beginning with a consideration of the fact that this action tacitly displays an entitlement to an “absence of” experience (“I fail to have any kind of sympathy”) that mirrors the entitlement to experience implied by claims of emotion. Furthermore, the speaker treats this claim of no emotion as an announceable topic, and places it in first position, shows its relevance as a social action despite the extra accounting work that goes into its production (“the whole thing of suicide is to me essentially murder, so”, lines 3-4, an account for the upshot of his comment, which follows “so”).

As demonstrated above, the object of a claim of emotion is systematically produced with a recognitional format that foregrounds the age or age category of the child as its most relevant feature. Lin (2015) notes that the use of non-recognitional forms (where recognitionals are available and/or expected) can be employed in producing disaffiliative actions, a suggestion demonstrated empirically in this interaction [see also Jackson (2013)].

In the speaker’s first claim, in which he “fail[s] to have any kind of sympathy”, the referent is “someone who kills themselves” (line 5), with “someone” being a canonical non-recognitional reference form (Land & Kitzinger, 2007; Sacks & Schegloff, 1979); as well as a reference format deployed in disaffiliative actions. The use of “someone” works to distance the speaker from the referent, which, as Lin (2015) notes, is a format often relied on in complaints and other sequences where disapproval is indexed. Due to the preference for recognitional reference forms (where they are available), and due to the presence of recognitional forms, and the pursuit of recognition, in all the other claims that I have analysed, the selection of a non-recognitional reference here, and the marked lack of pursuit of recognition, are noticeable and important. By using a non-recognitional reference form, the speaker observably distances himself from the experience that he is claiming by demonstrating his low experiential status through the articulation of a stance that connects him as weakly as possible to his referent. In addition, by formulating this incident as part of a

general class of cases of suicide (“someone who kills themselves”, line 5), the speaker converts his claim to refer to a general type of incident through which he can claim this as a principled position with respect to all suicides, rather than just a callous response to a specific case of (a school-age child’s) suicide.

This utterance is met by the presenter with confusion, indicated by the overlap and repetition, and request for clarification of the position of this utterance (“are you saying on the side note”; line 7). The caller is already oriented to potential disaffiliation, and although he perseveres by producing his utterance again, in its second incarnation it is mitigated even further. His second claim (whose affective component will be analysed in the next section) refers to “a person” (line 14), which is a similar non-recognitional format to “someone”, but foregrounds even more clearly the absence of a membership category to refer to this person. By referring to the object of his claim of no emotion in a manner inverse to all the other claims analysed thus far, that is, in a non-recognitional format, and absenting the pursuit of recognition through the provision of a name, membership category or age, the caller observably produces his claim in an increasingly downgraded or mitigated format, demonstrating his relatively low experiential status as an account for the content of his experience, an empirical demonstration of Sacks’ (1984) assertion that the *type* of experience that a person is entitled to is as subject to regulation as the *degree* of experience being claimed. The speaker’s claim of an emotional response that is not of the appropriate type relative to the referent is treated as a contestable and problematic social action, and his use of non-recognitional reference forms is analysable as specifically orienting to this concern. In contrast, then, to the systematic prioritisation of producing recognitional references (and therefore seeking to establish intersubjectivity) when formulating claims of emotion, and often halting the progressivity of the talk and violating the preference for minimisation in order to accomplish this, the speaker in this extract, in what he himself treats as an

accountable and potentially problematic action, produces a claim of no emotional response, and rather than using a full name, surname, definite article, age or age category by which to categorise and thus make recognisable the object of his claim, he orients to producing the object in a specifically non-recognitional form, two separate times, when making his contestable claim about the incident.

Nevertheless, the explicit lack of alignment from his interlocutor (lines 16-17), after the production (and reproduction) of this problematic claim, is noteworthy. An overt display of disagreement or disaffiliation is generally a dispreferred social action, and its presence in response to what is hearably a claim designed to minimise the potential for trouble signifies the profound, though tacit, moral order within which such interactions occur, demonstrating that while the claiming of an emotional response to a child's death is treated as a normative social action, the production of its antithesis is treated as a violation of this tacit order, even when the child is made invisible as the referent of the claim.

Object reference: inclusion of the subject

The final extract in this section examines the use of a pluralised or generalised form of reference for the child who has died. Below, a radio presenter introduces the news story about a teenager who was stabbed to death at school. I have analysed in the previous section (cf. [6]) the use of “as a parent” (line 13) to self-categorise when producing a claim of emotion. Here, I briefly examine the object of the claim, produced in locally initial form (line 1) as a “grade eleven pupil” (line 1) and then in subsequent form as part of the category “our kids” (line 10).

(19) [20170315-1015]

1 Pre: A gra:de eleven pupil ↑woke up (0.2) like ↑every other

2 grade eleven ↓pupil (0.1) got dressed (.) ↑probably had
 3 breakfast=↑probably kissed his mom good↓by::e (2.2)
 4 little did ↑a:ny(0.2)body=↓kno:w (1.8) that ↑come the
 5 afternoon: (0.9) he'd be ↓dead (2.8) he=was u::h
 6 .hhh a=pupil at Ee:steriver secondary ↑school one who
 7 was sta::bbed to death=grade eleven pupil di:ed .hh
 8 following being sta:bbed in the ne:ck and the a::rm
 9 several times=my question is .hhh ↑WH:Y IN THE WO:RLD DO
 10 OUR KIDS HAVE TO PUT UP WITH ↓THIS (0.5) ↑wh::y is=it
 11 (3.4) that in the ↑very place where they're supposed to be
 12 given a fu:ture (2.6) that very ↑fu:ture (0.6) gets
 13 ↓taken away °from them ° (1.6) as a ↑pa:rent (1.0) my
 14 hea:rt ↓breaks

Although most of the formalised components of the claim are articulated in lines 13-14 (“as a parent my heart breaks”), this entire stretch of talk is analysable as setting up the object of the claim with which it concludes. The initial reference to a “grade eleven child” is a good example of Schegloff’s (2007b) discussion of how membership categories are bound to relevant activities. Here, since the speaker is describing the typical morning routine of a school-going child (getting dressed, eating breakfast, kissing mom goodbye) and since the incident took place at the school he was attending (a piece of information that the speaker provides in line 6), the categorisation of his age or age category (established as a relevant feature of the object component of these claims) is accomplished via his grade level and his description as a “pupil”. Another very interesting point to note is the speaker’s increment “like every other grade eleven pupil” (lines 1-2), an additional practice for establishing the routineness and normativity of the daily routine, in stark contrast to what happens afterwards, i.e. the non-normative occurrence of the stabbing. By referring to the child as an incumbent

of a larger membership group, the presenter also makes visible the upgraded experiential status of anybody who is normatively bound to such a category (e.g. parents of any grade-eleven pupil, or ostensibly any school-going pupil of any other age). Thus, the presenter widens the scope of (upgraded) entitlement by respecifying the incident as having occurred to “one of” a membership group to which he, and presumably other listeners, may have a vested interest.

The speaker’s second object reference is “our kids” (line 10), a progression from a single grade eleven pupil at a particular secondary school to a member of a larger membership group defined only by the plural pronoun “our” and plural noun “kids”, presumably speaking here to all parents on behalf of all children who have to put up with “this type” of danger, or even more broadly, to “society’s” kids in general, with the category of “parent” representing an upgrade on the general entitlement to claims of emotion. The object of the claim is thus once again expanded and generalised, from singular to plural, from one person’s, or one family’s, to “our” problem, with “our” referring to the largest possible collective. This pluralisation also echoes the “every other grade eleven child” that was referred to in lines 1-2, denoting a group of children and a corresponding group of parents who all have to put up with something that actually only happened to a specific person and family.

This type of abstraction is a participant resource that can be used as a catalyst for action (see Sacks, 1992, p. 245). Here, however, its proximity to the claim that it precedes suggests that it is linked to the self-categorisation in line 13. By claiming to be a member of the group (“as a parent”) that has just been identified as collectively having a problem with school safety, the speaker effectively upgrades his claim (“my heart breaks”) to be heard not merely as just another “somebody” who is making this claim, but as a “specific somebody” for whom these circumstances have very real, disturbing and problematic implications. Thus

the use of a plural/general/abstract object (“our kids”), in contrast to the specificity of the initial object reference (“a grade eleven pupil”), can be seen as buttressing, complementing or reaffirming the expanded self-categorisation and the claim that follows.

Family categories

In the following section I examine the deployment of categories other than “child” in the object component of the claim, and note how these object categories reaffirm the normative categories of person who are affected by a child’s death. In the following example, the presenter of a show is reading out messages that audience members have sent in. In the extract below, someone has sent in a message in reference to the child that drowned at Hartbeespoort Dam over Mother’s Day weekend. Many of the news reports detailed the age of the child as twenty-three months old (just under two years), and in the following extract, examined above in (8), I have discussed the significance of the self-categorisation produced by the writer of the message.

(20) [20150511-15-002156]

1 Pre: I have a †two year old and my heart goes out to the fa::mily
2 that’s Dea:n eh who says so

Here, I focus on the object of the claim, which is the “family” (line 1) of the child that has died. In contrast to producing the deceased child him- or herself as the object of the claim, this practice focuses on situating the family or kin relations of the child as those most impacted by his or her death. This practice foregrounds the normativity of treating both categories as victims of the incident, although the reasons for their victimisation are very different. In this particular incident, the child’s drowning was a contentious issue in the public since many people blamed the parents for the child’s death, as he had not been

wearing a life jacket. Others did their best to empathise with the parents and family, suggesting that they were suffering enough knowing that their son/family member was dead and they were at fault, and it was compassionate to empathise rather than blame. Here, then, the claim (with the family of the child situated as the object) is an accountable action, which is evidenced by the particular self-categorisation at the beginning. By demonstrating that he is a parent of a same-aged child, this person claims a position of upgraded entitlement and effectively exonerates the family from blame, by modelling a response that is empathic and compassionate. He thus uses his self-reference, specifically calibrated for him to be hearable as speaking as a parent of a two-year-old child, as an account for the potentially problematic action of claiming compassion on behalf of the parents. The relationship between the subject and the object of this claim, and the interactional benefits that it serves, demonstrate the importance of analysing the various components of these claims in relation to one another, a matter that I take up in a later section of this analysis.

The extract below has been analysed in (14) above for its initial claim (lines 1-4) whose object is “the body of young Courtney Peters”; I have noted the use of multiple reference forms in the production of this claim of emotion.

Here, I would like to focus on the second claim (produced in lines 4-10), which has as its object “those mothers” (line 7).

(21) [20170515-157]

1 Pre: ↑Donno about the rest of you but: hhh (.) Mother's Day had a
2 very bittersweet feel for me this ↓year=u::h=I mean I'm su:re
3 like many others I woke ↑up. to the news that the body of young
4 Courtney Peters had been fou:nd the day before .hhh and and as
5 I sat there spending time with ↑my kids receiving hugs
6 receiving homemade ca:rds .hhh which I ↑love so much (0.2) I

7 couldn't help but imagine what kind of day. tho:se mothers
 8 were having yesterday .hhh and it made me feel ti:red=it made
 9 me feel so tired. and so hopeless (0.2) and ↑chilled. to my
 10 marrow (.) you know?

This extract, an introduction to a news story about a child death, demonstrates powerfully the hierarchy of entitlement that participants orient to in talk about child death. Here, the speaker self-categorises as a mother, first implicitly (through her reference to Mother's Day having a bittersweet feel for her; line 2) and then more explicitly (through her reference to "my kids"; line 5). Before this self-categorisation, however, she twice acknowledges the potential for her listeners to be affected by the breaking of this story. In so doing, she demonstrates the generic entitlement available for anyone to claim an emotional response to a story about the death of a young child, but nevertheless orients to the relevance of her belonging in the "mother" category for producing an intensifier of this generic claim.

In lines 4-10, the presenter introduces her second claim, whose subject is "I... with my kids" and whose object is "those mothers". Through her initial self-categorisations as a mother, she initially claims a heightened entitlement to the generic entitlement evinced by "the rest of you" (line 1) and "like many others" (line 3). Nevertheless, she treats her status as a mother whose children are alive and well as a contrast to "those mothers" who are having a Mother's Day bereft of this experience. The use of the category "mothers" is relevant in the context of a conversation about Mother's Day, foregrounding a specific category of person who should be most fulfilled on such a day, and, who in the case where a child should be there and isn't, is demonstrably unfulfilled; in fact, has been "robbed" of her "motherhood". The pronoun "those" is used to refer to a specific group of other mothers, understood to be those mothers who have lost their children and who are thus experiencing a day of sadness rather than happiness. The speaker demonstrates that, in contrast to her upgraded status as a

mother, she is nevertheless less entitled than “those mothers” to an upgraded claim of emotion. She can at best feel the feelings she claims only through imagining what those mothers are going through, despite the fact that she is also more entitled to do so than non-mothers.

Further, I have discussed above the move from a singular to plural object reference as a method for demonstrating differential degrees of claim to an emotion. Here, although the story is about Courtney Peters and presumably her mother, the speaker transitions to a generalised object, making Courtney’s mother part of a larger category of mothers who have lost children and who cannot celebrate Mother’s Day happily any longer. By doing this, she highlights that the problem of the loss of a child is not an isolated incident, but rather a more general phenomenon, and also that those mothers (or even more generally, any mother whose child has died) have an upgraded entitlement to claim, one that she may only partake of if she “imagines” what they are going through.

Object reference: generalised family categories

Below, a caller is phoning in to comment on the Taegrin Morris incident. The caller produces a claim of emotion in lines 2-3, providing an object that is generalised even further than in the previous extract.

(22) [20140722-0726-2140]

1 Cal: ↑We are supposed to protect them and we’re not protecting
2 them=and-and I(.) I blee:d I absolutely bleed for the
3 pa:rents (.) and for other people that have had the same
4 situation that (.) did not necessarily make the media

In this extract, the speaker produces a claim containing a minimal subject reference (“I”, line 2), but an object component that refers to “the parents” and then “other people that have had the same situation” (lines 2-4). Effectively the speaker positions the parents of the deceased child as those most impacted by the tragedy, making a claim of emotion on their behalf rather than his own, thereby orienting to the hierarchy of entitlement that places them as more entitled than him to such a claim. Further, the speaker orients to placing in this same category as these parents literally any “other people” who have had the “same situation”; thereby locating himself in this hierarchy as less entitled than the parents of this child, or of any other “people” having had the “same situation”. This formulation provides further evidence for the gradient of experiential rights that organises the experience of child death in interaction: that while anybody can claim, some people have greater claims to emotions than others; and it is the very ordering of these rights that is being attended to in this talk.

Lastly, by orienting to not only these parents, but any people in the same situation, the speaker manages to convey that his claim is based on a broader moral logic that goes beyond his momentary subjective investment (Edwards, 2005) in this particular media story. He demonstrates that while he is cognisant that these parents are suffering the loss of their child, there are also many other families whose dead children go unreported, and demonstrates that those people have just as much right to claim as the parents in this incident.

In the next incident, an emotional component is produced with similar wording; but with the word “mother” replacing the word “parents”. In this extract, the discussion concerns the mother of a deceased child who was unable to locate her daughter’s body due to a strike at the mortuary where the body was held. Here, it is not so much the death of the child that is treated as the issue, but the inability of the mother to acquire the body for burial. A member of the audience has sent through a message that is being read out by the presenter:

(23) [20170614-435-001]

1 Pre: Uh Marietta in Randburg says what is the matter with this
2 country that a mother has to beg the authorities for the body
3 of her child .hh how tragic I'm in tears for her and others in
4 her position

This writer of this message produces the object of her claim (“a mother”) before the claim itself. The object of the claim is produced during the course of an assessment about the incident (lines 1-3). A further assessment (“how tragic”, line 3) precedes the claim itself (lines 3-4), which contains a simple self-reference, followed by a locally subsequent reference to the initial object produced in line 2. The object of the claim (“her”, line 3) is produced in the singular form and then respecified to include the general plural (“others in her position”). This case demonstrates again the orientation to placing oneself below another category of person by claiming on behalf of another, more entitled, person. Here, it is the category of mother that is being deployed, with not only this specific mother the “beneficiary” of the claim, but all others who are in “her position”. The deployment of the “mother” category (in contrast to “parents” above) explicitly produces “mothers” as a distinct object on whose behalf a claim can be legitimately made, because mothers are normatively understood as the category that would be most affected by the death of their child (cf. Winnicott, 1960). That is, a mother is treated as a member of a category with upgraded entitlement to a claim of emotion, beyond the entitlement claimable by the speaker or by others who are not part of the “mother” category.

In addition, the category of other people in “her position” is termed ambiguously (see Stokoe, 2012a; 2012b for a detailed discussion on ambiguity as a participant resource), so that her “position” could be interpreted by any listener, and could potentially refer to anyone who has lost a child, anyone who cannot bury their child, anyone who cannot access their

child's body, or any other iteration of the incident that foregrounds any relevant feature. This ambiguity produces an object where the "situation" that the mother is in is determined by the recipient of the talk, who is thus positioned to categorise all such people as entitled to upgraded entitlement to claims of emotion.

Demonstrating accountability in a complaint sequence: a deviant case

In the following extract, I demonstrate the use of the "parent category" as the object of the claim when the claim itself is used as a preface for a blaming or complaining action about the parents. This examples demonstrate the complexity of this organisation, in which even a parent who has potentially caused or contributed to their own child's death is still treated as having heightened entitlement to the experience; with the complaint activity produced as accountable through its prefacing with a claim of emotion on the parents' behalf. Here, the caller is phoning in about the child who died at Hartbeespoort Dam. Her call is largely a "complaining" sequence about the neglectful behaviour of the parents, a stance of moral condemnation toward those potentially (superordinately) entitled to the experience of the child's death. The production of the object component in a generic, non-child-specific format allows its speaker to display a condemnatory stance for which she is accountable. I focus here specifically on the structure of the claim made on behalf of the parents (line 3-4) as a preface to the complaint sequence that follows.

(24) [20150511-15]

- 1 Cal: H₁i Xola:ni
2 Pre: Hi:: thank you for calling
3 Cal: Um (.) what I (.) um=look as desperately sorry as I feel
4 for those pa:rents .h (.) they're not being
5 very=responsible by allowing a:nybody (.) adult or child

The claim of emotion (lines 3-4) is produced as part of a multi-unit turn, of which the first part is an acknowledgement of the parents' heightened entitlement to claims of emotion in relation to the death of their child, and the second part is a complaint about their lack of responsibility. The caller begins her turn with a hesitation marker ("Um"), a pause, a self-repaired initial utterance ("What I-"), another pause, and a further hesitation marker ("um look"), before producing the claim. The presence of these hesitations and false starts is systematic in my data; here it demonstrates the speaker's orientation to the task being one requiring delicacy and careful formulation.

The word "look" is often used to launch an action into a context which is prepared for an alternative action-type, and thus "'Look'-prefaced turns can thus be seen to 'intercede' into an already established order of relevances" (Sidnell, 2007, p. 387). In this interaction, the speaker treats her initial turn position as a place in which a complaint, negative assessment or other disaffiliative action is relevant. However, she then prefaces this action with a claim of an emotional response (on behalf of the parents), thereby demonstrating the prioritisation of this action, as well as treating what follows as accountable and requiring some prefacing work. By "interceding" into her initial turn with this emotion work, the caller minimises the potential troubling of the normative order by her next (dispreferred) action, thereby orienting to the profound moral order invoked by this discussion, and managing the complexity of her coming action by inviting social solidarity through the inclusion of an initial preferred action type.

The claim itself is produced as the first part of a multi-unit turn, hearable as incomplete on its own and thus designed to be heard as prefacing what comes after. By positioning the object of the claim as "those parents" (rather than, for example, the child that

died) the speaker situates the parents as those most impacted by this tragedy, entitled to an upgraded emotional response to their child's death. After this, the negative assessment of those same parents is hearable as an empathic but necessary reinvocation of the moral obligations of any parent, rather than a crude victim-blaming in which the speaker might end up being held morally accountable. The combination of these two utterances produced in a single turn positions the speaker, rather than someone who is insensitively blaming those most entitled to the experience, as someone who acknowledges their position on the hierarchy of entitlement and thereafter accountably also positions them as potentially irresponsible for their behaviour. This analysis is supported by the assessment that follows, which notes that they are not being very responsible by allowing "anybody, adult or child" onto a boat without a life jacket. As I noted in (18) above, the use of a non-recognitional form such as "someone" or "anybody" can be employed in the production of complex or potentially disaffiliative social actions. The further increment detailing the possible membership categories invoked by "anybody" – "adult or child" – displays even further the wish to produce a generalisable *class of incident*, rather than a specific occurrence, by referring in non-recognitional format to the child that died, going so far as to explicitly state that it is demonstrably *not* the child's status "as a child" which has motivated this assessment, but rather that the assessment would hold for any victim of a drowning. The overt work being done to not categorise the child as a child, and not blame the parents *for the death of their child*, is understandable in light of the analysis thus far, in which recognitional reference (via variations in reference to the child) is pursued in the formulation of upgraded or experientially heightened claims, while non-recognitional reference is used in the accomplishment of downgraded claims which are themselves part of complex and potentially disaffiliative actions that are treated as accountable in the context of the moral order oriented to in talk about child deaths.

As my analysis shows, variations and expansions in the object component of the claim are systematically recruited to produce upgraded claims of emotion and thereby assert their speakers as possessing heightened entitlement to the experience being referenced. In claims of emotion, participants routinely attend to recipient design by providing multiple categorisation and description forms whose increased specificity, and corresponding increased recognitional relevance, also make them hearable as asserting heightened experiential entitlement to the incident, and seeking alignment for this. These reference forms for the object of the claim may refer to the deceased child, identified by his or her age (category) and in some instances further alternative recognitionals. The object can also reference (one of) the parents or the family of the deceased child, while the identity of the speaker is reflexively tied to the object of his or her claim through relevant self-categorisations in the subject component. Since recognitional references are demonstrably preferred in claims of emotion, the use of non-recognitional references may also be analysed for the functions that they may serve in aiding potentially disaffiliative courses of action, or in instances where it is useful for a speaker to display his or her lower experiential status in the interaction.

Affect component

Emotion in interaction

Although the topic of emotion has been studied at length in the human sciences, interactional studies approach it from a different angle: as one of the types of things that people do, and the ways in which they do them (cf. Chapter Three). Although emotions are designed to be heard as *happening to* an individual (see Edwards, 1999), interactional perspectives see them as performative in nature and interactionally organised (Sorjonen &

Peräkylä, 2012), with their seeming inevitability a part of the way that they are designed for others (Wetherell, 2013).

Conversation-analytic literature expounds on verbal, gestural, vocal and nonvocal resources for the display of emotion in interaction, as well as the role of emotion in a variety of interactional settings. Emotion is analysed both in terms of its expression (its composition; the words and phrases used) and its sequential location in the talk (its position; as initiating or subsequent action) and the ways that these two components together produce talk that can be recognised as emotional.

The terms “affect” and “emotion” both have long traditions in the literature and are used to refer in ways that are relevant to the analysis being performed. For example, “affect” is considered the preferred term in social scientific research as it “refers to expressed emotional dispositions or ‘the experiential part of emotion’” (Ochs, Schegloff, & Thompson, 1996, p. 1; Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989). Wilce (2009, p. 28) notes that “affect” is also a preferred scientific terminology, evoking the “universal, evolutionary grounds” of emotion, its naturalisation and in many ways then its inevitability. “Emotion”, on the other hand, is used to describe rather the culturally or socially constructed range of “feelings” which people express and experience (Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012). The use of either term thus reinforces the distinction between the biological on the one hand and the social on the other, and since my analysis interrogates this very differentiation, noting *how* an utterance is produced as scientific, embodied, biological on the one hand *or* experiential, cultural, evocative on the other, it would be counterproductive to reify either term. Rather, my analysis seeks to investigate the very means by which emotion is produced in one form versus another, and the functions that this might perform interactionally. In my own analysis I use the two terms interchangeably in order to not impose any one set of ideological assumptions on my analysis. “Affect” and “emotion”, in my analysis, are both used to refer to what participants

commonsensically treat as such in their talk with one another, in order to allow for the participants' concerns to be made relevant in my analysis.

In Chapter Three, I noted that Heritage (2012a) uses the terms “status” and “stance” to refer to a participant’s epistemic position in the talk, both as an ongoing interactional concern and as a framework for the interaction itself, with “status” encompassing the larger epistemic position occupied by a speaker and “stance” referring to the practices by which this is made visible. Similarly, I have argued that there exists a parallel order in the organisation of experience – what I have termed an “experiential gradient” – in which a speaker’s emotional or affective “stance” denotes a “positioning accomplished through conduct and thereby made publicly accessible” (Sorjonen & Peräkylä, 2012, p. 5), while an affective “status” refers to the speaker’s overall orientation to his or her entitlement to the experience, relative to the entitlement of other participants in the interaction. The concept of emotional or affective stance is useful for understanding the claims that I analyse below: the action of producing a claim of emotion displays the speaker’s affective/emotional stance toward the object under discussion, while entitlement to the experience is a function of the status occupied by the speaker on the experiential gradient (the gradient of affective or emotional experiences), which is in turn made visible as an interactional concern via the articulation of affective stance. My own analysis below shows how, in displaying emotional stance to one another, participants make relevant their experiential status relative to one another in discussions of child deaths.

Peräkylä and Sorjonen (2012) note that action and emotion are closely intertwined, and that specifically many social actions inherently involve an affective component [for example, complaints (Heinemann & Traverso, 2009) and assessments (Lindström & Mondada, 2009), among others]. I argue that a claim of emotion is a distinct social action, although it shares many of the features of other actions such as subjective assessments and

complaints (see, e.g. Edwards, 2005), which also have emotion as an inherent feature. More specifically, “[p]erhaps the most intimate relation between emotion and action is to be found in displays of emotion that, at least in some contexts, can in themselves be considered actions” (Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012, p. 9). Claims of emotion occupy just such a position in my data, in which emotion talk itself, articulated in relation to a subject and an object of a child death, becomes a social action that simultaneously orders and exposes the underlying entitlement hierarchy along which participants’ position themselves and others. As such, claims of emotion are a specific type of social action that tacitly affirms the relative entitlements accorded to participants in discussions of child deaths, while variations at each point in their composition contribute to their being produced and heard as either “anybody’s” entitlement to claim, or alternatively as a particularly upgraded (or downgraded) form of entitlement.

Affect in claims of emotion

When producing a claim of emotion, speakers select between a range of alternatives to formulate the affective component of the utterance. In this section I examine the various ways that emotion or affect is articulated in talk, and the interactional consequences of each set of practices. Arguably the most obvious way to refer to an inner emotional state is to simply describe the emotion being experienced. However, my data demonstrate that this is not the case, and that in many instances speakers will work hard to index an emotional label without directly describing or referring to that emotion, relying on other practices in order to communicate affect to one another. The affective component of a claim is where a speaker explicates the degree of his or her claimed emotional response, which is “affectively congruent” (to borrow another of Heritage’s terms) to various degrees in relation to the utterance as a whole. This section investigates the various practices by which emotions can

be claimed in interactions about child deaths, and I note the potential interactional benefits of these selections. In addition, my analysis suggests that the use of multiple formulations in the affective component of the claim works to produce a speaker as positioning him- or herself higher on the experiential gradient.

Direct descriptions of emotions

I begin with three claims in which an emotional adjective is used in the affective component of the claim. As stated above, this might seem to be the most straightforward way to go about producing a claim of emotion; however, my data demonstrate that in fact it is only one of a range of practices by which participants accomplish such claims, and in particular the demonstration of heightened entitlement to experiences of child death relies on other formats, which I present in the following section.

Although the convergence of minimised self-reference forms in the subject component, and downgraded or generic formulations at the object or affect components, is not systematic (i.e. it is not the case that all minimised self-reference forms also contain minimised affective descriptions), the section below demonstrates three extracts in which these intersections are clearly visible. Thus, it is instructive to note that the following three extracts all contain minimal or default self-reference forms in the subject component of the utterance, a format, I have argued above, that claims a generic rather than heightened form of entitlement. This is carried through to the affect component, which includes a direct description of an emotional state, itself treated as a relatively generic form of claiming.

This extract, analysed in (3) above, refers to an incident in which three children died in a shack fire. Below, I examine the affective component of the claim (line 1).

(25) [20170117-412]

1 Pre: He-he:re's a story that just (.) left me so: dejected:
2 uh=when I heard it on EWN .hh three children. ki:lled in
3 a shack fire in Snake Park

The presenter uses a claim of emotion to introduce the news story, and produces it in the passive voice (i.e. “left me so dejected”). The utterance begins with a false start that is quickly repaired (line 1), as well as a pause immediately before the claim and a hesitation marker immediately after the affective component of the claim (I have noted earlier that claims of emotion are systematically produced alongside such hesitations and false starts; an orientation to their complexity as social actions). The actual description of the speaker’s emotional state is “so dejected” (line 1); with the affective component accomplished through an adjective that denotes sadness or despair, preceded by a qualifier that describes the degree of the emotion she is currently claiming to experience.

Although the extract above serves as the most basic form for indexing affect in my data, it is notable that it is nevertheless preceded by a stretched qualifier that emphasises the quality or degree of emotion being claimed. This points to the likelihood that claiming at least some degree of heightened emotion is appropriate in claims of emotion, and that the production of such a claim with no qualifier may be treated as inadequate for the type of action being produced.

The next extract refers to the Taegrin Morris incident. Here the speaker produces a claim of emotion (lines 1-2) with the affective component containing the description “emotional”.

(26) [20140722-0626-1055]

1 Pre: I sta:rted off (.) at four o clock (.) being very=very

2 e↓motional around this um .hh um um a:h th- th Ma:rtins=um
 3 ↑Morris sto:ry the little boy↑ .hh
 4 Rep: Mmmmm

The utterance begins with the presenter's response to a greeting by the reporter in which she inquires about his well-being (not transcribed here). The presenter replies by claiming that he has started off being "very very emotional". Similar to the previous extract, he relies on minimal self-categorisation to produce this claim; further, there is a pause immediately prior to the affective component of the claim, and an extended "word search" and ensuing self-repair in the object component of the claim.

The intensifier "very" is repeated (line 1) to emphasise the degree of the affective response, which is claimed as being "emotional" (line 2). Rather than specifying a particular emotion or set of emotions, the speaker selects the term "emotional" which is a broad term that does not commit to one particular emotional experience but rather connotes a range of feelings. The object component contains multiple attempts to adequately reference the story, and the entire utterance receives weak affiliation from the reporter in line 4.

Finally, the extract below (also referring to the Taegrin Morris incident) takes place between a caller and presenter. The claim of emotion (lines 5-7) is produced in a similar fashion to the two previous examples, but with some notable differences too.

(27) [20140722-0526-4418]

1 Pre: We are dealing with serious issues you want me to be smiling
 2 ↑no:: baba. [s]-
 3 Cal: [H]a [ha: ha ha]
 4 Pre: [Ahe: he h]e he
 5 Cal: ↑Ey man Koketso ndzuman ei you know e::h (0.3) I really w- I'm
 6 relly really sad u- about this four year old boy (0.2) who::

7 pas*s*e*d* o*n* s*o* crue:l baba y*ou* [kn]ow
8 Pre:*y* [Ya]

In this extract, the claim of emotion can be analysed as a response to the previous utterance, in which the presenter refers to this incident being part of the membership category of “serious issues” (note that the full transcript is provided in the final section of this chapter), and thus not something for which humour would be appropriate. The caller’s response is calibrated to be heard as affiliating with the speaker’s assessment. Thus, he begins his own utterance with an affiliative assessment (“Ey man Koketso”, line 5), after which he seems poised to begin his next turn (presumably the reason for his call). However, after a hesitation marker and pause, he selects a new utterance which itself is repaired to a claim of emotion (lines 5-6), suggesting that the production of this claim is evaluated by the caller as being a priority to attend to in his first available position in the talk.

The affective component of this claim contains the phrase “really really sad”, composed of a repeated intensifier (“really”) followed by an emotional descriptor “sad” to index a specific affective response to the incident. The claim itself is produced after a hesitation marker and a pause, followed by a false start and self-initiated self-repair (further evidence of the speaker’s orientation to the complexity of the action). Immediately after the affective component of the claim, and before the object is identified, there is another word that is started and then repaired, followed by a long pause and a further increment detailing the “cruel” manner of the child’s death. The claim is followed by a tag question that seems designed to seek affiliation from the presenter (see Heritage, 2012b, p. 14 for a detailed discussion on tag questions). The adjective “sad”, and the claim in which it resides, are treated as a normative emotional response to the death of a child, and the presenter demonstrates his affiliation with this stance by providing an aligning response in overlap with

the caller's tag question. Thus, the claim itself is positioned as a response to the presenter's assessment that they are discussing "serious issues" (line 1), with the emotional descriptor "really really sad" being treated as an upgrade from the presenter's generalised assessment about "serious issues" to a personal claim to having been emotionally impacted by a specific incident of child death. The pauses, false starts and repairs, as well as the additional increment detailing the manner of the death, all provide evidence of the speaker's orientation to the production of this claim as delicate, while the tag question appended to the utterance is further evidence of the caller's explicit request for affiliation, as a way of establishing the legitimacy of this action.

In this final extract for the section, I note a slight deviation in the production of a claim of emotion with a simple emotional adjective in the affective component. The previous three extracts all have in common the presence of a single, simply formatted self-reference in the subject component, free of the invocation of relevant identities through the use of membership categories. They also all seem to display a systematic difficulty in producing the claim, evidenced by the number of false starts, pauses, hesitation markers and repairs both immediately prior to and after the claim is produced. Below, however, a conversation takes place about Taegrin Morris, and I note a claim of emotion that is produced differently and the interactional troubles oriented to by the speaker.

(28) [20140721-0526-1350]

1 Pre: .hh I mean this story is just too depressing for me
2 (0.1)
3 Rep: N:[o:::]
4 Pre: [As a] father (.) and as a uncle. this is just too
5 depressing
6 (.)

The interaction is touched off by the reading out of the morning's newspaper headlines. The first claim is produced by the presenter in line 1, and other than a short in-breath before the utterance, the utterance is produced smoothly and with no pauses or other difficulties. The speaker's description of his emotional state is "depressing" (line 5), with the subjective component "for me" repositioning it as a claim of emotion rather than an assessment. The adjective "depressing" denotes an emotional experience beyond mere sadness, since it also suggests despair and gloom. The intensifier "too", prior to the adjective, describes that the intensity of the experience is beyond what the speaker can manage. The claim is thus accomplished through the use of a single affective adjective, with an intensifier, to index an emotional experience.

However, after its production, there is a short pause, ostensibly provided for the reporter to demonstrate affiliation with the affective stance claimed by the presenter. Since the presence of a pause signals potential disaffiliation, the reporter's utterance starting off as a "No" (line 4) is treated by the presenter as a potentially disaligning response. In response, the presenter begins to speak almost as soon as the beginning of the word "No" is produced, thereby treating the pause as occurring within his turn, and thus orienting to his turn as incomplete, rather than treating it as the potential end of his turn being responded to disaffiliatively. He thus "continues" his utterance with an increment, in which he recycles the subject component of his turn (previously, at the end of the utterance ["for me"], treated as somewhat incomplete) to include two distinct self-categorisations ("father and "uncle"). This extract demonstrates the preference for affiliation in claims of emotion, and demonstrates further that this affiliation can be understood specifically "as the display of support and endorsement for a conveyed affective stance" (Couper-Kuhlen, 2012, p. 113). A lack of

affiliation, treated as a dispreferred response, can be displayed through the withholding of a reaction, when a recipient response is made possibly relevant. The practice of invoking relevant identities upgrades the experiential entitlement of the claimant and thus makes affiliation a more likely outcome. Although the extract demonstrates that expansions in the subject component of the claim may increase the securing of an affiliative response (analysed in [10] above), my analysis here focuses on the affective component of the claim. I note specifically that a direct description of the speaker's affective stance (intensified through its expression as an extreme case formulation) is initially treated as a potentially problematic action, and that repairs in the subject component serve to upgrade the claim so that the speaker's heightened entitlement is made visible, and affiliation is a more likely outcome. This suggests that direct descriptions of emotional states may be subject to disaffiliative responses, and that extra accounting work may be done in other components of the claim in order to buttress against this possibility.

These four extracts demonstrate that claims of emotion may be accomplished with an emotional descriptor placed in the affective component of the utterance. However, my data show that this is not the only (or even the most normative) practice for indexing an affective state in such claims.

Idiomatic and metaphorical descriptions of emotions

Sacks (1992) originally commented on the use of idiomatic language as a powerful discursive tool whose generality and vagueness make it hard to undercut. Idioms are “formulaic, colloquial constructions” that index “stereotypical knowledge” (Drew & Holt, 1988, p. 399), and their rhetorical formulation encapsulates social norms (Kitzinger, 2000). Idioms and metaphors are “recognizably figurative” (Drew & Holt, 1988, p. 405) and are designed to not be taken literally; in fact, Edwards (1999, p. 280) notes that emotion

metaphors “can be considered conceptual resources” that, where they occur in any language, whatever the metaphorical base, “are available for discursive deployment”. As with all talk-in-interaction, however, a speaker selects one way of producing the talk out of a virtual infinity of options, or one type of idiom out of a vast array of available possibilities. And, as Lakoff (1987) indicates in his extensive analysis of emotion metaphors, the selection of one type of metaphorical phrase over another is telling in directing our focus toward a particular feature of that emotional response. For example, although anger metaphors typically cluster around heat or rising temperature, there is still a difference in saying that one is “hot under the collar” rather than “losing his cool” (see Edwards, 1999, p. 280). Similarly, although the sadness idioms in my data are typically organised around the body (see Kövecses, 2003), there is still value in analysing the selection of a particular idiom or metaphor over any others in the production of such claims. My analysis will focus on the deployment of idiomatic or metaphorical phrases in the production of claims of emotion, but will also examine the phrasing and language for what they accomplish interactionally.

As I noted in my literature review above, the use of physiological markers to denote an emotional state can be considered an alternative practice of indexing affect, and throws into sharp relief that the reference to an emotional state with an emotional term is only one, fairly simple, way of referring to or claiming one’s emotional experience. Below, I offer examples in which emotional adjectives are replaced in favour of non-literal descriptors that reference the body. I begin with an analysis of two extracts in which a reference is made to a state of physical unwellness, designed to be heard as indexing an underlying emotional state that has resulted in a physiological symptom.

In the following extract I note the deployment of a physiological symptom that is hearably designed to index an underlying emotional state or experience.

1 Pre: Short and sharp Pete=what you ↑got for u[s]
2 Cal: [H]i: John
3 uh=just ↑qickly u::m I feel very nauseous about this kid
4 that died um u[m]
5 Pre: [Y]a:::::

The physical symptom here is used to stand in for its implied emotional correlate, which is commonsensically treated as evident by both participants after the object component

has been included. Most basically, this demonstrates that a dead child (referenced as “this kid that died”) is sufficient grounds for such a claim, even one that is upgraded to a physical complaint (see Kövecses, 2003), and that it is hearable as such.

The following extract refers to the child that drowned in Hartbeespoort Dam over Mother’s Day weekend. It is produced in a similar fashion to the prior, in that it relies on a simple self-reference, a similarly formulated object (to the previous extract), and an idiomatic reference to a physiological feeling of unwellness. I note the deployment of a more graphic physical complaint and its contribution to the production of a more upgraded claim of emotion.

(30) [20150511-15-001-1848]

- 1 Pre: Let’s go to the lines eh let’s start with Gary in
2 Pretoria ↑hi: Gary
3 Cal: Uh good afternoon Xola:ni
4 Pre: Hi welcome Gary
5 Cal: Thank yo:u (.) uh Xolani I (.) just feel sick in the guts
6 hearing about this uh chi:ld that died in Hartbeespoort
7 Dam
8 Pre: Yea:::h=

I have noted that the typical slot for claims of emotion is in first position after the greeting sequence, demonstrating that they are treated as priority tasks (see Sacks, 1992) to accomplish before the “reason for the call”, whether the reason for the call is related to the incident or not. Here too, the caller produces his claim in the first position after the greeting sequence is completed, demonstrating its priority status in the interaction. The claim contains the affective label of “just feel sick in the guts” (line 5) which is a description of a physical

symptom (similar to the previous), but here containing the idiomatic and graphic reference to a visceral area of the body within the stomach where nausea, sickness, revulsion and unwellness can be experienced (see Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011 for a discussion on the relationship between disgust and moral violations). The caller thus makes an idiomatic reference to the profound physical effect that this story has had on him, choosing to provide this reference with a description that indirectly indexes his experience. As in the previous example, the physiological description, followed by an object reference to a deceased child, is sufficient for the presenter to hear this as indexing an emotional state rather than constituting a literally physical complaint, and he provides alignment in line 8, in the form of an extended agreement token. This agreement token is explicitly aligning and, similar to the previous extract, demonstrates the utility of indirect claims of affective states in securing increased affiliation with these actions.

These two extracts offer the first piece of evidence that indirectly claiming emotion is a viable alternative to directly claiming it, in the production of claims of emotion in my data. This aligns well with the literature on emotion and affective stance which suggest that indirect expressions of emotion are more normative than direct ones, and that baldly or directly claiming to have an emotional experience is not the most effective practice for conveying this (Besnier, 1990).

Below, I examine six further extracts that contain explicitly idiomatic phrases, and comment on some of the interactional benefits of these practices. The following extract also deals with the child in Hartbeespoort Dam. It is a message sent through to the radio station by a listener, and read out on his behalf by the presenter.

(31) [20150511-15-002156]

1 Pre: I have a ↑two year old and my heart goes out to the fa::mily

The author of this message produces a claim of emotion whose object is the family of the child that drowned. As I noted in (20) above, this incident sparked controversy in the media, such that sending messages of empathy that focused on the parents of this child was treated as a contentious action, since their status as victim and/or perpetrator was ambiguous. While failing to empathise could potentially have been treated as victim-blaming, offering empathy had the potential to be evidence for siding with a person whose negligence resulted in the death of a child. Nevertheless, this listener sent a message through in which he claimed an emotional response, but positioned the family as the objects of his claim. The claim itself is composed of an explicit self-categorisation, a single idiomatic description of an emotional state, and a reference to the family as those on whose behalf the claim is produced. The claim is produced through the use of a multi-unit phrase, in which the first part is the self-categorisation, appended to the second by the conjunction “and”, and the second containing the idiomatically formulated affective component and the object of the claim. Effectively, the author treats his explicit self-categorisation as the basis for the emotional response claimed directly after it, which he phrases as a logical extension of it.

Like the recruitment of a physiological symptom to index affect, an idiom is indirect and may be a more effective way to communicate emotion. Nevertheless, an idiom is necessarily a figurative statement that cannot be taken literally, and the phrase “my heart goes out” (line 1) implies an empathic feeling toward the object, a feeling of sadness on behalf of another. The heart, as a visceral organ, belongs inside one’s own body, and the image of one’s heart “going out” of one’s body toward another is a powerful way of describing a true empathy or communion with a suffering other.

By using this affective phrase, the author of the message claims an emotional response to the death of this child, while simultaneously attributing the emotion to another category of person, one treated as more entitled to the emotion than the person producing it. This type of orientation to a hierarchy of entitlement, in which the affective stance itself is produced on behalf of or for the benefit of the family of the child, demonstrates the adherence to a gradient of experiential rights in which the parents of a deceased child are treated as having superior entitlement, even in instances where their status as victims is contestable.

The following extract demonstrates the use of two emotional descriptions provided in the affective component of the utterance. While the first is provided in idiomatic language, the second is a direct description of an emotional state, and I analyse how these two formats function together to produce a heightened claim of emotion.

(32) [20170515-849]

1 Pre: I say this with a heavy heart and there's a lot of anger
2 in me as well when I say this=the body .hh of missing
3 three year old Courtney Peters was found in a shallow
4 grave in Epping

While the default format is utilised for self-reference here, there are expansions at the object component of the claim (multiple reference forms) and an expanded affective component containing two separate affective labels. The turn itself is produced as a multi-unit turn, with the first part containing the self-reference and the affective components, and the second containing the expanded object component referencing the child who has died. The first emotional description is produced in idiomatic form, that references the “heart” as the visceral organ which is affected, and the adjective “heavy” to figuratively describe the sensation of sadness and despair that the speaker wishes to convey (line 1). The second

description is designedly literal rather than figurative, and utilises an emotional word – “anger” (line 1) – prefaced by the qualifier “a lot”, followed by the added increment “as well”. The speaker thus treats it as important that he be heard as being angry as well as sad, and thereby orients to a moral order in which the (circumstances of the) death of this child is treated as a matter in which anger is relevantly producible in addition to sadness.

Interestingly, the prosodic elements of anger are absent in his talk – the utterance is produced without the rising pitch that is indicative of anger. That is, while the speaker claims to be angry, his prosodic presentation is aligned more with his initial claim of “heavy heart”, i.e. sadness or despair. Thus, the hierarchical ordering of his emotional responses is evident in the placing of “heavy heart” before “anger”, the prosody of the utterance being hearable as more aligned with sadness than anger and finally the use of idiomatic language contrasting with descriptive language in producing the former and the latter respectively.

The extract below deals with the teen who was stabbed to death at school. In contrast to the previous extract, the prosody here suggests a display of anger (evidenced in the rising intonation of the pitch in lines 1-2), and the use of a rhetorical question in the absence of a second speaker (or potential answerer). When the affective component is produced, however, it is composed of a single idiomatic description and does not overtly claim anger, as the previous one did.

(33) [20170315-1015]

1 Pre: ↑WH:Y IN THE WO:RLD DO OUR KIDS HAVE TO PUT UP WITH ↓THIS (0.5)
 2 ↑wh::y is=it (3.4) that in the ↑very place where they're
 3 supposed to be given a fu:ture (2.6) that very ↑fu:ture (0.6)
 4 gets ↓taken away °from them ° (1.6) as a ↑pa:rent (1.0) my
 5 hea:rt ↓breaks

The speaker produces a negative assessment of the situation through the provision of two rhetorical questions: the first in line 1, and the second in lines 2-4. The negative assessment references a child's right to be safe at school (ostensibly the place where they are meant to be "given a future", i.e. a metaphorical reference to their being educated and filled with potential), and uses contrastive language to then describe how that "future" (in both the literal and figurative sense) is taken away.

The affective component here is produced once again in idiomatic form, referencing the "heart" as the visceral organ experiencing the emotional response, and the verb "breaks", referencing a non-literal feeling of breakage or a lack of wholeness, an unnatural state for an internal organ to be in. There is also a notable pause before the self-categorisation, and another before the affective component in the claim, which orient once again to the delicacy and complexity in producing this claim. In this extract the speaker implicitly displays anger through his use of language and his prosody, rather than explicitly claiming it as in (32) above. However, his explicit emotional response in lines 4-5, prefaced by a self-categorisation, indexes sadness, despite the fact that his display of emotion in lines 1-4 is aligned more closely with anger. Extracts (32) and (33) together demonstrate the way that "anger" is deployed as a resource, both as a prosodic demonstration of stance (32) that contextualises the explicit claim of sadness, and as a second explicit claim itself, in an instance where "sadness" is treated as prominent through its deployment as "first claim" and the speaker's prosodic matching with sadness rather than anger.

Below I analyse the continuation of an interaction that I began analysing in (27) above for its initial direct description of an affective response to the incident referenced ("I'm really really sad"). I noted that a normative and literal term was used, along with a repeated intensifier ("really really") in the affective component of the claim. Below I analyse a second claim, here taking place further along in the interaction. This affective component of the

claim is produced in idiomatic language (lines 2-3), and its position near the end of the interaction suggests that it is an upgraded claim whose basis is the accounting work that has preceded it.

(34) [20140722-0526-4418]

- 1 Cal: Koketso I- that's exactly my- I've got the two and a half year
2 old (.) .hh when I look at him ye:sterday. ↓yoo:: (.) you know
3 I a emotion just fell on me. ↑big ti:me (.) [an]d I I don't
4 Pre: [Ya]
5 Cal: Know ho:w what those parents are going through. no one knows
6 the the the the pain (.) cos I never lost a child like that you
7 ↑know? no one will-will will say how they g- what pain they are
8 going through
9 Pre: Ya=
10 Cal: =We don't have the-the mea:sure. of: of measuring thei:r pain
11 .hh so: so=I'm (.) ↑saying we really need to deal with this
12 ↑thing!

The claim is produced in lines 1-3, and consists of an explicit self-categorisation as a parent of a small child, and a treatment of this self-categorisation as the basis for the affective description that follows. While the previous claim in this extract (cf. [27]) had as its object the child that died, this claim does not have an explicit object but rather treats the similarity between the speaker's own child and the deceased child referenced above as the basis for the emotional response ("when I look at him yesterday", line 2). The affective component is preceded by the phrase "you know" and two false starts, and contains a figure of speech – "emotion just fell on me" – an explicitly non-literal statement that implies a sense of passivity and being crushed by a heavy object. It is followed by an increment that intensifies the affect

– “big time” – which is then followed by a pause. The pause is not immediately treated as transition relevant by the presenter, and so the caller continues with his turn, resulting in an overlap between the speaker’s next TCU and the presenter’s delayed alignment token, suggesting that participants demonstrate a heightened sensitivity and vulnerability to a potential lack of affiliation with these claims. The caller’s next utterance refers to the parents of the deceased child and an assertion that he does not know what they are going through. Here he displays that one of the warrants for increased entitlement to this experience is not just having a child, but actually having gone through the experience of losing a child. Thus, someone who has lost a child would be considered to occupy a position relatively higher up on the experiential gradient and therefore more entitled to display an emotional response to this death.

The production of a claim of emotion, especially one that is heightened through the use of idiomatic language, and that does not have an explicit object, is treated by the caller as potentially being heard as claiming too much entitlement, and the absence of immediate affiliation by the presenter in a potentially relevant place occasions the caller’s next utterance in which he explicitly downgrades his entitlement to the emotion claimed, relative to the parents of the child who has died, in order to repair his utterance and thereby garner affiliation from the presenter. This downgrading of entitlement itself provides further evidence for the assertion that the non-literal affect is an upgraded form of claiming, since it is this very upgrading that is treated as potentially disaffiliative and thus is repaired in the following utterance.

Below, I inspect a claim in which the affective component is produced in idiomatic form, and then repeated and produced with the addition of an intensifier.

(35) [20140722-0726-2140]

1 Cal: ↑We are supposed to protect them and we're not protecting
2 them=and-and I(.) I blee:d I absolutely bleed for the
3 pa:rents (.) and for other people that have had the same
4 situation that (.) did not necessarily make the media

Here, the speaker refers to the Taegrin Morris incident and produces a claim of emotion on behalf of the parents (and other parents in the same situation). His claim begins with an implicit self-categorisation in which he produces himself as an incumbent of the group of people (ostensibly parents) tasked with protecting another group of people (ostensibly children; a generalised group of which this specific child is a member). He thus produces this claim from a position of responsibility for the incident. His claim itself is produced with a default self-categorisation (“I”), which is followed by a pause and then a repetition of the self-reference. He then produces his affective component “bleed” (line 2), which is an idiomatic description of sadness or pain. Unlike a reference to the “heart”, a visceral organ, the reference here is to “blood”, a life-giving force that is lost when there is a wound or other damage done to the body, demonstrating another practice for referencing the body in idiomatic affective descriptions. The speaker then repeats this claim, and includes an intensifier (“absolutely”) which heightens or upgrades the valence of the claim, which is itself already heightened through the use of non-literal phrasing. He continues by positioning the object of his claim as “for the parents”, thereby orienting to their superior position on the hierarchy, adding also that this position is available to anyone who has had the “same situation”.

Nevertheless, this claim is also prefaced by a complaint, in which the caller treats the parents as directly responsible for their child’s well-being. His self-inclusion in the category of parent is a resource typically relied on in producing “safe complaints” (see Sacks, 1992;

Whitehead, in press) that are more likely to garner affiliation. However, despite their (and his) potential accountability for the incident, he claims the emotional response on behalf of those in the group of parents who have been directly affected by this death, and thereby positions them as victims of the tragedy, treating even a complained-about group of people as objects of a claim of emotion, whose upgraded entitlement is made visible despite their implied accountability.

Below I examine an instance of two claims of emotion that are produced one after another. Here, a discussion takes place about a group of school-children who died of food poisoning. The presenter is speaking to a government official who, in charge of the feeding scheme under which the incident took place, may be seen as potentially accountable or responsible for the incident (cf. [4]). The claims of emotion take place in lines 4-5, in response to an assessment by the presenter in line 3.

(36) [20140926-829]

1 Pre: .hh well=the ↑Gauteng MEC for Education Panyaza
2 Lesufi eh joins us .h eh Panyaza Lesufi good ↑morning
3 what (.) a terrible sto:ry
4 Cal: Sad indeed um good morning John u:m I'm ↑saddened (.) and
5 my heart is bleeding .hhhh eh but I've worked overnight
6 just to ensure that everything is in place

The presenter introduces the caller to his audience by both his name and his institutional affiliation, and then greets the caller directly and refers to him by his first and last name, after which he provides a negative assessment of the incident that they are about to discuss (line 3). The caller responds with a second assessment (see Pomerantz, 1984) in the first position of his utterance, followed by a return greeting, and then two claims, the first

preceded by a hesitation marker and the second by a pause. The use of a singular self-referential pronoun has been noted as unusual in light of the speaker's institutional affiliation, and may be understandable in light of the action that follows it – a claim of an emotional response, which is an action that displays entitlement to experience, not easily available to those viewed as potentially accountable for the situation (see [35] above for the extra accounting work performed in claims of emotion made by someone potentially accountable for the incident).

As noted above, the presenter begins with a greeting followed by an assessment ("What a terrible story", line 3), to which the caller produces a second assessment, that is hearably downgraded in its valence ("Sad indeed", line 4). Since second assessments are typically produced in upgraded format in order to be heard as affiliative (see Pomerantz, 1984), this second assessment is treated as inadequate by the caller, who then goes on to produce a claim of emotion in order to hearably upgrade what is potentially a disaffiliative previous action, providing evidence that claims of emotion are oriented to by participants as being upgraded actions relative to assessments. The first claim, while containing a designedly literal affective description of the caller's emotional state ("I'm saddened"), is nevertheless analysable as upgrading, through its inclusion of a subject component, an inadequate prior assessment. The caller, however, treats this first claim as insufficient as well, and after a brief pause, produces a continuer ("and") followed by a second, even more upgraded, claim of emotional response. The upgradedness of his second claim is accomplished by his selection of idiomatic language to index his emotional state, and upgrade a claim of "sadness" to a non-literal reference to a physical rupture in a visceral organ ("my heart is bleeding"). This provides further evidence as well for my analytic observation that idiomatic formulations of emotion are treated by participants as indexing heightened emotional experiences relative to direct descriptions of emotional states.

The speaker then produces an in-breath at a potential transition-relevance place, followed by another hesitation marker, and when his interlocutor does not begin a turn at talk, he continues with another conjunction (“but”), that contrasts his previous statement with what follows: “I’ve worked overnight”. In other words, after he has been heard as claiming two separate and increasingly graded emotional responses, and does not immediately receive affiliation, the caller then orients to the fact that he is required to produce something additional, which he does in the form of an institutionally relevant account or update of his own conduct. The contrast between the claims of emotion and the update is stark, suggesting that although he has had a personal experience of pain in response to the incident, he has not allowed it to interfere with his institutional duties. That is, although in a personal capacity he claims “anybody’s” right to an emotional experience, he orients simultaneously to his institutional role and its own obligations. In doing so, he demonstrates that claims of emotion are available even to those in potentially accountable positions in regard to the death, but that significant extra accounting work must be done in order for the claim to be treated as appropriate.

Above, I have demonstrated the methods by which claims of emotion may be upgraded at the affective component. Although a claim can be produced with a designedly literal description of an emotional state, I note that this format is often discarded in favour of an alternative. The alternatives explored are the various idiomatic references to a physiological state of unwellness. In addition, I note the deployment of multiple and varying practices for referencing emotion in service of producing claims that position a speaker as relatively higher on the experiential gradient. The deployment of an idiomatic formulation of an emotional state allows a speaker to be heard as doing something more than just describing an internal emotional state. It conveys, through the use of metaphor, a physical correlate of the

emotional experience, which produces an intensified version of that emotional state and emphasises its viscosity.

Below, I note that mitigated claims, or those that are hearably downgraded (for whatever purposes) utilise a range of practices in the affect component inverse to those discussed above.

Downgraded affect as a resource in producing mitigated claims

In the following extract the presenter is referring to an incident where an 11-year-old boy was bound and hanged in a public train station, in an area called Bonteheuwel in the Western Cape that is infamous for its gang-related high homicide rate.

(37) [20170327-947]

- 1 Pre: So .hh ↑whi::le they were stringing him up there were
2 people (.) standing b:y an-and see:ing ↓this
3 Cal: Very m- e-e-e ve-very possible=because .hhh like I say
4 it's on the busy walkway=you've got ho:mes on the one
5 side and office blocks on the other side .hh and then as
6 well as people wa:lking across the sta:tion at-at the
7 very centre
8 (.)
9 Pre: °Ka:y ° it's at this point I wanna say something
10 unconstitutional but I ↑wo::n't
11 [becau::se I:: kno:]::w ↑he::[y?
12 Cal: [Really rather not ya] [.hh Ya it's best to
13 rather not [he]
14 Pre: [I']d rather not I:: I I I I I I I'm I'm a-
15 I'm a- I'm a- I'm a pa:rent. u::m I've got a l:o:t of
16 rage in- in- in- inside of me but. we cannot fall foul.

This extract has been analysed in detail in (7) above. Here, I focus specifically on the affective component produced in lines 15-16. Like in the previous extracts, this claim contains false starts, repetitions and hesitation markers, demonstrating a systematic orientation to the difficulty in producing it. Here, however, the qualifier “a lot of” is followed by the emotional description of “rage”, a single, literal descriptive format for describing an emotional response, and therefore a practice available as “anybody’s” right to claim. However, the explicit self-categorisation that precedes this relatively downgraded claim is peculiar: self-categorisations are a way of heightening claims, so here an upgraded emotional descriptor is possibly relevant. The relative downgrading of the affective component (its formulation as a direct rather than indirect description) is understandable, however, in light of what comes after it – a contrastive conjunction (“but”) that situates what follows it as contradictory to what preceded it. In other words, if experiencing “rage” is something that might cause one to lose control and act out of the bounds of appropriateness, then a downgrading of the affective response, and corresponding turn to a pluralised pronoun (“we”, line 16) in the production of a contradictory assessment is a relevant reorientation to the necessary rules and their inviolability. The need to not fall foul of the constitution (through vigilante justice or some other illegal means) is thus realised through a suppressing or tamping down of “rage” into a modified rather than extreme emotional response to the incident, via the use of a qualifier (“a lot of”, line 15), rather than an intensifier preceding “rage”.

This example suggests that even in interactions where upgraded entitlement is made possibly relevant through explicit self-categorisations, a downgraded affective component may be utilised in order to orient to simultaneous organisational structures which may at

times be more relevant than the organisation of (emotional) experience. Thus, although this emotional experience is produced and treated as singular (evident in the singular self-referential pronoun in the subject component), in this instance the collective epistemic consensus about the supreme law of the land (demonstrated in the pluralised pronoun “we” in the assessment that follows the claim) is demonstrated to be a more important consideration. This is one of the places where the singular-experiential and the collective-epistemic intersect, and demonstrates some of the interactional practices by which it is negotiated. Most specifically, experience is produced with a singular pronoun and with an affective response, while knowledge is contrasted against it (“but”) with a pluralised pronoun and a collective assessment regarding shared epistemic knowledge.

The following extract takes place between a presenter and a caller. While the presenter knows that the caller is a lady whose child was murdered a few years previously, and that this is the basis for her call, the audience does not, and only find out as the call unfolds. The presenter makes his claim before presenting his caller as someone who has suffered the loss of a child, orienting to his generic entitlement to the experience (cf. [5]) despite the upgraded entitlement claimable by his caller. However, he produces a hearably downgraded object component (cf. [17]) as well as a downgraded affective component (lines 5-6), which I analyse below.

(38) [20170509-1059]

1 Pre: Hi: Zukiswa

2 (.)

3 Cal: ↑Hi:: how you

4 (.)

5 Pre: hh Goo:::d I know what you gonna talk about so I'm

6 n[ot that goo]d when we talk about these issues but we nee:d

7 Cal: [hh .hh ye:s]
 8 Pre: to talk about it because it's v:ry important
 9 Cal: Ye::s it i:s you know I mean like u::m since like
 10 this .hh is going on and on and on in Cape Town and it's
 11 so unfortunate=I actually. .hhh I-u:h lost my daughter
 12 twenty ten. .hh she was murdered. in:::: Khayelitsha

I noted above in (5) the downgrading of the claim through the use of default self-categorisation. Here I focus on the affective component of the claim (“not that good”, line 6) and note the methods by which it is produced in downgraded format, to accommodate the presenter’s wish to be heard as speaking from a position of inferior experiential entitlement relative to his interlocutor.

Like in (37) above, the claim is the first part of a contrastive utterance; however, whereas before, the speaker was noting that his “rage” did not preclude him from following the basic norms and laws of the country, here the speaker suggests that his emotional state cannot preclude him from being part of conversations about child death. Thus, in both instances the claim of emotion is positioned against a second, more relevant (for the participants), social and moral matter.

The affective component of this claim is produced in a negative format (“not that good”), a phrasing which can be seen as mitigated through its provision of a “normative” position (“good”) that is negated, with a qualifier (“not that good”) in order to describe a state of being that is less than optimal, rather than explicitly negative.

While in (37) above, the qualified amount of “rage” of the speaker is claimed and then positioned contrastively against a potentially inappropriate behaviour, here the claim of emotion and resulting difficulty in speaking about the topic are contrasted against the appropriate behaviour (“we must talk about”) produced once again as a collective and

pluralised requirement which is itself accounted for by the assessment that follows (“it’s important”). Once again, the singular-experiential is produced in the claim of emotion, and is contrasted with the collective-epistemic produced in the directive/assessment, providing further evidence for participants’ orientations to the domains of experience and epistemic as distinct and requiring differing interactional practices. In both instances, the claim of emotion is treated as a relevant fact that is nevertheless insufficient to account for not following the appropriate course of action. In other words, it highlights the limits of entitlement itself: by foregrounding the normative expectations surrounding a child death, it suggests that even a claim of emotion, as an upgraded sort of social action, cannot provide entitlement enough to violate the basic social norms that underlie this moral order. The limits on entitlement suggest, paradoxically, that these claims, the hierarchy of entitlement that they describe, and the moral order that underpins it all, are all available only as long as the fabric is maintained. It suggests, therefore, that entitlement has limits which keep the hierarchy in place, and that without the limits, entitlement could not be relative, and relatively ordered. Thus, the presence of downgraded claims provides insight into the outer limits of entitlement to experience of child death, through which all entitlement is achieved as a relatively and interactionally ordered phenomenon.

In the following extract, a candidate claim is produced on behalf of a participant whose lack of self-categorisation as a parent has been made relevant during the interaction (cf. [11]). Below I examine the affective component of the candidate claim (line 5) and note how it too is produced in mitigated form, suggesting that the task of producing a candidate claim is a complex action that requires delicate formulation in order to not be heard as claiming something beyond what is “anybody’s” due.

(39) [20171017-801]

- 1 Pre: .hhh ↑Right no::w hhh eh- I=mean you a mother of kids
2 (0.6) [I']ll I over and above bei::ng (.)
3 MEC: [Mm]
4 Pre: the MEC (.) of Educa:tion (.) in the W:estern ↓Cape
5 and (.) it=it must drive you up the wall to dea::l .hh
6 with this type of situation .hhh whe:n you look at your
7 o::wn kids and you=go: you know (.) hhh this is not
8 happening to me but I could be that parent .hhh so::
9 [wha]t is being done MEC .hhh
10 MEC: [Mmm]
11 Pre: ↑O:::ver and above the resource ↓office::s: (.) what else
12 is being done to make su:re that our schools are actually
13 safe places for our kids to ↓go
14 MEC: Look (.) we do:ing everything possible

Here, an interaction takes place between a presenter and a speaker who has come on in an institutional capacity as an MEC in order to provide information on a child death. As noted in (11) before, the presenter makes relevant his radio guest's identity as a "mother of kids" as well as identifying her as the "MEC of Education", to which he receives weak alignment from his interlocutor in line 3. The presenter then continues with his candidate claim, referring in the object component to "this type of situation" and noting that "it must drive you up the wall". In keeping with my earlier analysis, it is interesting to note that there is a pause and a repetition immediately before the affective component is produced, as well as an in-breath immediately after, consistent with the previous analyses, in which participants (in general) orient to the delicacy of producing these actions, and this speaker (in particular) treats this candidate claim as an action particularly vulnerable to a disaffiliative response.

The composition of the affective component of this claim is unusual in that it suggests that the candidate emotion is frustration, rather than anger or sadness. The frustration, or irritation, implied in “must drive you up the wall” is not the normative response to a child death (as my analysis has shown thus far, emotions tend toward anger and sadness), and so may be understood more in relation to her institutional role – i.e. that it is a difficult situation to handle as an MEC. If, indeed, the candidate claim is related to her primary categorisation as MEC, it seems redundant to produce the added categorisation of “mother of kids”, a category not commonsensically associated with the affective claim provided. The presence of hesitation markers and similar orientations to complexity suggest that, in fact, a candidate claim (even claiming frustration as the predominant affective stance) faces the same difficulties present in producing a more routinely formatted claim of emotional response, and is vulnerable to the same interactional contingencies. I argue that the presence of even this type of claim – of a toll taken at work, or of a work-related stressor – is nevertheless still complicated to produce, and that the added presence of a relevant situated identity (such as “mother”) produces it as an action more easily affiliated with. Thus, despite its notable differences, this candidate claim of frustration is vulnerable to the same range of contingencies oriented to in the other claims that I have analysed.

Finally, I examine once again a deviant case (cf. [18]) of a caller claiming a non-sympathetic position toward a dead child. This analysis strengthens my assertion that demonstrating entitlement to experience is an important part of reproducing the moral order with regard to child death in society, and that claiming to not have such emotional experiences requires additional accounting and mitigating work.

(40) [20150813-01-001-2343]

1 Pre: Sipho from Katlehong hi you wanna talk about the Marikana issue

2 (.) yes?

3 Cal: Hi u:h just as an aside I think the whole thing of suicide to

4 me is essentially (.) murder so. I. fail to have any kind of

5 sympathy for [someo]ne who kills themselves

6 Pre: [Sorry] sorry you wanna talk about Marikana or the

7 suicide are you saying on the side [not]e

8 Cal: [Yes] no I'm just saying

9 [as an as]ide

10 Pre: [Oh ya ya]

11 Cal: That's not my main point

12 Pre: Oh oka[y]

13 Cal: [F]or me it's essentially murder so I don't have much

14 sympathy for a person who kills themselves[(.) (you got me?)]

15 Pre: [I don- I don- I do-]

16 I don't think that's fair but I'll talk about it after you've

17 raised your second issue

While the caller has phoned in about an entirely separate matter, he uses his first turn to explicitly claim a non-sympathetic position toward a dead child. Claims of emotion (and here, a claim of no emotion) are systematically located in first position (even when these are not the reason for the call) demonstrating their priority status in the interaction. In this extract, the claim is prefaced by a misplacement marker (“just as an aside”) and a brief hesitation, followed by a subjectively formulated assessment (Drew, 1998) that is treated as an account for the disaffiliative affective stance that follows. I have noted above that these claims are generically available to “anybody”, and that in some cases speakers will explicitly claim a specific emotion about an incident that they produce as a prospective indexical, producing a description of the incident only after the claim itself. This demonstrates a kind of

expectable normativity around these claims, that they are robust enough to produce with no immediately prior account, with the assumption that the account that is eventually produced will sufficiently account for the claim. In this extract, the presence of an account prior to each claim (lines 3-4 and lines 13-14) serves as further evidence of the non-normativity of this stance in contrast to normatively graded emotional responses.

Most relevantly, the affective component is produced contrastively, a practice that I have noted above (cf. [38]) mitigates the valence of the claim in its production of a normative standard, followed by a violation of that standard based on the object that is referred to and the implicit account it offers. Here, interestingly, the normative emotional experience is produced as “sympathy” (a single emotional label that is commonsensically associated with an object toward whom the emotion is extended), with the caller claiming a non-sympathetic position as a non-normative action. Thus, in “failing to have any kind of sympathy”, the caller provides a negatively formulated affective label (“fail to have... sympathy”) that is preceded by a qualifier (“any kind of”).

The presenter’s initial response interrogates not the content of his statement but its position in the interaction, to which the caller responds by clarifying that it is just an aside and not his main point. However, the caller treats this response as potentially projecting disaffiliation, and thus produces an even more mitigated claim when he repeats himself in lines 13-14. In his second claim, he once again produces “sympathy” as the normative response to such an incident, and contrastively produces himself as lacking it, but this time claiming not that he fails to have *any* kind of sympathy, but rather that he doesn’t have *much* sympathy, a downgraded qualifier for his affective stance in contrast to his previous one. He also repeats the account (“suicide is essentially murder”) thus demonstrating that his account, and its position prior to the claim, is an important part of producing this action. Nevertheless, his orientation to this claim as a potentially disaffiliative course of action is borne out, with

the presenter still explicitly disaligning from his stance (lines 15-16) despite its gradually downgraded production. This extract thus demonstrates two important points: firstly, that claiming an explicitly non-sympathetic position toward a dead child is accountable and, secondly, that even in downgraded or mitigated form, it is still a potentially disaffiliative course of action. This in turn reinforces the presence of a strong moral order in which speakers with normative responses to child death are entitled to their experience, while those who claim a non-normative position are not.

In the analysis performed above, I have demonstrated a number of important features of claims of emotional responses to child deaths. Firstly, I have noted that these are systematically oriented to as complex or delicate actions, through the presence of hesitation markers, pauses, false starts and recycled turn beginnings preceding each instance of a claim of emotion. Secondly, each claim that I analyse has at least one (if not more) component(s) which is expanded or elaborated, so that in my data set there is no instance of a claim of emotion produced in which all the components are simultaneously produced in a single or generic form. Third, the presence of variations and expansions serves to increase the specificity of the claim, such that claims with increased specificity are treated as heightened. Fourth, the presence of multiple terms in any component of the claim (multiple self-categorisations or object references, or multiple emotional terms) also serves to demonstrate a heightened entitlement on the part of the claimant. Lastly, the very practices that contribute to upgraded entitlement can be used inversely in order to produce markedly downgraded claims, in instances where relative entitlements are at stake. Despite these complexities, I have used the preceding section to outline the variations present at each point in a claim of emotion, and the purposes that these can serve. The range of practices that I have identified and described constitutes at least a portion of the range of possible social practices available in talk about child death. These practices demonstrate a systematicity that is a result of a fine-grained

underlying interaction order (Goffman, 1983), through which individuals display their entitlement to an experience of a child's death relative to one another, and relative to those non-present members who might, by virtue of their place in a particular relational category, be more or less so entitled. The hierarchy of entitlement that grounds (and is grounded by) these interactions is thus a complex, diffuse and dynamic order governing an aspect of the organisation of experience in interaction.

Multiple concurrent practices

In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of five extracts in which variations are present in each component of the claim, and note the ways in which the employment of multiple and concurrent practices makes visible the experiential gradient of entitlement that is an omnirelevant organising principle in talk about child death. This gradient of affective rights is oriented to and simultaneously reproduced, with speakers taking great care to ensure that their claims are positioned appropriately in the moral order in which they occur. Upgraded and downgraded experiential status and stance are treated as valuable resources in accomplishing actions whose moral ambiguity may otherwise disrupt or destabilise the powerful moral order surrounding child death.

The ordering of relative entitlements

Below, I analyse two extracts in which multiple and concurrent practices are used in the subject, affect and object components of the claims, and note how these concurrent practices are simultaneously deployed to organise speakers along an experiential gradient in which relative entitlements are at stake.

The following stretch of talk is produced by a presenter who is introducing the news item of the death of Courtney Peters. Although analysed in (14) and (21) for its subject and object components, this interaction is now examined in detail for the two claims produced

(the first at the beginning of the extract in lines 1-2, and the second in the end of the extract in lines 8-10), and how each component of each of the claims makes sharply visible the relative ordering of entitlements in talk about child death.

(41) [20170515-157]

1 Pre: ↑Donno about the rest of you but: hhh (.) Mother's Day had a
2 very bittersweet feel for me this ↓year=u::h=I mean I'm su:re
3 like many others I woke ↑up. to the news that the body of young
4 Courtney Peters had been fou:nd the day before .hhh and and as
5 I sat there spending time with ↑my kids receiving hugs
6 receiving homemade ca:rds .hhh which I ↑love _so much (0.2) I
7 couldn't help but imagine what kind of day. tho:se _mothers
8 were having ↓yesterday .hhh and it made me feel ti:red=it _made
9 me feel so tired. and so hopeless (0.2) and ↑chilled. to my
10 marrow (.) you know?

The speaker's first self-reference is preceded by a reference to all the other potential people who could be claiming similar entitlement (line 1), thereby demonstrating an orientation to "just anyone" as potentially entitled to this generic entitlement to the emotional experience of this child's death. This claim is then produced in contrast to the superordinate experience claimable by those who can demonstrate that they belong to relevant membership categories (and claimed by the speaker in her category-relevant description in line 5).

After the initial phrase in which she acknowledges any other listeners who might have had a similar experience, the speaker produces her first claim, that "Mother's Day had a very bittersweet feel for me". The speaker uses a default self-categorisation format in the passive tense, although her reference to Mother's Day is an implicit reference to her incumbency in a category of persons to whom this is a relevant occasion, i.e. mothers. The affective

component is made up of the words “very bittersweet”, an oxymoronic word preceded by an intensifier. Here, the speaker alludes to the “sweet” nature of the typical Mother’s Day, and the “bitter” feel that it had this year due to the news on the radio, orienting to the irony of this news story breaking on this particular day. After a hesitation marker, the speaker continues with an object component that is preceded by a second phrase (“I’m sure like many others I woke up to the news that”) that explicitly instructs listeners to *not* hear her as claiming upgraded or heightened entitlement, but rather that her experience of hearing the news was ostensibly similar to the experience of “many others” and therefore not unique or different. This initial claim thus demonstrates another variation in the practice of self-categorising as a parent: the presenter makes it available as hearing that she is “speaking as a parent” without explicitly claiming to be doing so, thereby producing this as a story which affected her, rather than as a direct claim of being affected *by virtue of* being a parent. Nevertheless, her status as a mother is implicitly present throughout her talk, and made explicit in line 5. This explication of her status as a mother is positioned directly before her conjecture about the day that “those mothers”, i.e. the ones who have recently lost children, are having. Her use of the term “those mothers” (line 7) with the emphasis on “those” is another implicit reference to her own co-membership in the category of “mother”, and the final indirect self-categorisation that scaffolds the claims that have preceded and follow it. Most significantly, through the presenter’s belonging in the “mother” category, she is hearable as claiming heightened entitlement to the story (relative to non-mothers), but simultaneously orienting to her diminished entitlement to the incident relative to “those mothers” (the specific mothers who have lost their children). Her own position of upgraded entitlement is produced relative to her initial comment (line 1) about “the rest of you” implying that anyone could have been negatively impacted by the news, but is attenuated by her description of her own day surrounded by her kids, in contrast to “those mothers” who have lost children, suggesting that

she orients to her diminished entitlement relative to them. She thus uses her own status as a way of negotiating her position of entitlement to an experience of the child's death relative to both any person listening to the news and to the mothers of actual children who have died. The speaker then describes the imagined day that mothers of deceased children must be experiencing, using this as the basis for her second claim. Here, the affective component contains both previously noted methods for indexing emotion in interaction, namely, designedly literal and non-literal phrases that describe her emotional state. The first affective description is an indirect description of an emotional state that references the body ("tired") that is repeated with an intensifier. The second is a designedly literal, direct description of an emotional label ("hopeless"). Finally, the third description is a second indirect description of an affective state, this time formulated as an idiomatic phrase that also references the body ("chilled to my marrow"). The phrase "chilled to my marrow" indexes a feeling of horror, with "marrow" depicting a person's very essence (deeper than the bones), thus denoting a profound experience, and the word "chilled" referencing a type of horror or coldness that would be experienced in the case of a trauma.

This heightening of the second claim (via the mechanisms of an explicit self-categorisation and the use of multiple affective terms) is nevertheless attributed to "those mothers" and their imagined experience, rather than on the speaker's own behalf. The speaker thus consistently displays an orientation to the hierarchy of entitlement, placing her own experience "as a mother" relative first to the "rest of" her listeners, followed by an assertion that her own experience was similar to "many others", in contrast to "those mothers" who have lost children. She then uses their purported experience as the basis for her second, upgraded claim, and positions herself as a mother who, by virtue of being able to celebrate Mother's Day with her own children, is in a clearly inferior position relative to

“those mothers” when it comes to claiming an emotional response and its ensuing entitlement to the experience.

Finally, it is interesting to note the inclusion of an additional practice: the use of a tag question (line 16). Tag questions typically function to seek alignment with a just-prior action (see Heritage, 2012a). Although in this instance, the speaker’s talk is directed at her listening audience (who cannot immediately respond) she nevertheless demonstrates this orientation to her audience by displaying a quest for alignment (see Heritage, 2012b) (and affiliation) with the extended action that she has just produced.

I argue that, in this extract, the use of the claim to superordinate experience via motherhood is tensioned against a downgrade of this claim relative to mothers that have lost children in a way that demonstrates exactly how one can be positioned along the experiential gradient. The concurrency and convergence of these practices in this extended claim of emotion provides detailed insight into the speaker’s organisation of relative experiential entitlement. The presenter’s initial reference to herself is as an “I” for who Mother’s Day was a significant occurrence. She then positions herself as one of many other people who had access to the information about the discovery of Courtney Peters’ body, and continues by making it explicit that she is a mother and thus a relevantly different category of person; although as a mother with children she is contrasted with mothers that have lost children, all of which serves to clearly diagram a hierarchy of visible relative entitlements. Secondly, her multiple object references that refer to the child’s age category and full name, and the multiplicity of emotion terms used to describe her response, display the degree of the affective response to which she claims experience in relation to the story. The complexity of the self-reference formats specifically, as well as the descriptions of the object and the range of practices for articulating her emotional response, concurrently accomplish a demonstrable claim of emotion that visibly orders various categories of person relative to the incident.

In the following extract, a presenter and reporter find themselves engaged in a discussion about Taegrin Morris's death. I demonstrate below how the presence and deployment of multiple concurrent practices mobilises and makes visible the gradient of experiential access which tacitly orders the talk.

(42) [20140722-0626-1055]

- 1 Pre: ↑Goo:d morning Cindy Paluta
 2 (0.2)
 3 Rep: .hhh goo::d morning=Koketso ↑ho:w are you today↓
 4 (0.2)
 5 Pre: .hh ↑I'm aright hey .hh (0.2) °I'm okay°
 6 Rep: he- he- he .hh ↑that's good (0.2) It's [Tue::sday]
 7 Pre: [Well I me]an
 8 it's getting better (.) it's getting better=I think I
 9 ↑think .hh I=I sta:rted off (.) at four o clock (.) being
 10 very=very e↓motional around this um .hh um um a:h th- th
 11 Ma:rtins=um ↑Morris sto:ry the little boy↑ .hh
 12 Rep: Mm[mmm]
 13 Pre: [But]I think (.) being able to ta:lk to people just
 14 kinda lifted my spirits and (.) as we continue =you know
 15 (.) ↑human interaction has ↓helped
 16 (.)
 17 Rep: ↑Ya: ((laughs)) oka::y ((laughs)) I- s- I=think it's uh
 18 very=as a mother of a: (.) .hh of a fi:ve year old and a
 19 three year old↓ I jus:t when=I heard that mother's voice
 20 yesterday in the ne:ws clip=just saying .hhh ↓you know
 21 how he pleaded to her for help=I just .hhhh my ↑hea::rt
 22 a:bsolutely breaks=it's ↑one of my biggest fea:rs .hhh
 23 and it's sa:d that we live in a country that that ↑is my

24 biggest fear=that one day I get ↑hi::jacked and I can't
25 get my children out the ↑ca::.hh[h co]s
26 Pre: [°Y:a°]

The extract begins with a greeting sequence, of which the second-pair-part (line 3) is also the first pair part of a further “howareyou” sequence (see Schegloff, 1986) initiated by the reporter. Schegloff (1986) notes that while neutral responses are closure-relevant, “positive or negative” responses make relevant a sequence expansion containing an account of the state just displayed or announced. The presenter’s response to “howareyou” initially seems neutral (“I’m aright”), but this assessment is then repeated in downgraded form (“I’m okay” – less good than all right) and in a significantly quieter pitch, implying that his response is to be heard as negative, and retrospectively suggesting that the previous assessment “I’m aright” was in fact to be heard as demonstrating resilience in the face of difficulty, rather than a straightforward assessment of his own state. This in itself is evidence for the importance of what utterances are *doing*, since the content of an utterance and its intended action in many cases are non-corresponding. Indeed, when the reporter responds with laughter and a sequence-closing assessment of his state as being neutral, he hearably overlaps with what seems to be the beginning of a new sequence that projects a turn toward the “business” side of the interaction. The overlap occurs as he realises that the initiation of the sports bulletin means that his slot for talking about something else is closing. Thus, as the reporter begins a projectably new sequence (“It’s Tuesday”) he interjects with a second repaired “answer” to her previous “howareyou” question, this time with the phrase “getting better” implying a change of state from a previous one to a new and improving one. By initiating this repair, the presenter attends to a problem in his interlocutor’s understanding of his prior utterance (Schegloff, 1992). His explication of his state of being, including the

qualifier “getting” better, clarifies that while he might be “aright” now, this was in fact not the case earlier on in the day, and should also be heard as a request for sequence expansion.

The repeated phrase “it’s getting better” can be seen as a claim of emotion “after the fact” – a claim about a prior emotional state, which is then provided explicitly in lines 10-11. I have analysed above (cf. 9/16) the presenter’s use of a default form of self-reference, combined with a description of an emotional state preceded by a repeated intensifier, as evidence for “anybody’s” right to make such a claim in response to a child death. I have also noted that the presenter’s search for an accountable referent for his claim of emotion is preceded by a number of hesitation markers, as well as a self-initiated self-repair in his provision of a name descriptor. This search for the correct name demonstrates his pursuit of a recognitional referent, a preferred format for locally initial reference. Nevertheless, his recognitional format is oriented to as insufficient, and is followed as well by an additional set of descriptive features detailing the age category and gender of the deceased child, to which the reporter provides an aligning continuer.

The presenter continues with an account for his improved state, suggesting that an experience of shared mourning and grieving has helped him to overcome a difficult experience, which is further evidence for the expanded affective rights that are a feature of child death.

The reporter’s next turn is directly responsive to this utterance. She begins with an agreement token in response to his prior utterance, followed by laughter (line 17). The sports reporter’s laughter, both in line 6 and in line 17, is a potentially disaffiliative response to a troubles-telling (see Jefferson, 1984) and may be taken by the presenter to demonstrate a lack of receptiveness to his troubles-talk. Since “troubles-recipients routinely provide reassurances” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 363), the occasioning of laughter by the recipient and a lack of corresponding laughter by the speaker, as well as a notable (initial) absence of

reassurance, suggests a potentially disaffiliative response to his troubles-telling and positions the recipient as possibly troubles-resistant. The possibility of her response being heard as troubles-resistant is oriented to by the reporter's next utterance in line 17, which begins as an assessment utterance ("I think") but is immediately repaired to an extended claim of emotion, treating an assessment as an inadequate response to the prior utterance, and as inadequate "reassurance" for the troubles-telling just prior.

This claim of emotion is thus positioned as a more appropriate response to the presenter's own claim in lines 7-11. A "second claim of emotion" displays close similarities to "second assessments" (see C. Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984), in which two parties are required to assess a single referent. C. Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) note that participants make visible and relevant their differential access to a referent, which further acts as an organising feature of concurrent assessments. I argue that it is similarly a feature of concurrent claims of emotion, in which two consecutive claims about a single referent require independent demonstrations of experiential access to the referent. This is borne out in the extract above, in which the reporter produces the object of her claim as "when I heard that mother's voice" (line 19), demonstrating an independent epistemic and experiential access to the incident of the child's death. Furthermore, she foregrounds a different feature of the incident as the object of her own claim: while the presenter spoke about the "little boy" (line 11), she refers to the mother's experience as the basis for her own claim of emotion. This differential access is directly related to Heritage's (2012a) discussion of epistemic status and participants' orientations to displaying independent epistemic access to assessables in order for assessments to be heard as independently produced, and thus originating within the assessor and not merely as (potentially disingenuous) "agreement with" a prior. Here, differential access, displayed by the reporter via articulation of a distinct object of her claim, is treated as an adequate basis for the grounding of her own, upgraded, claim of emotion

which is itself formulated as a repair to what could potentially have been heard as a resistance to another's trouble-talk.

That an initial assessment is repaired to a claim of emotion provides further evidence for my assertion elsewhere that these claims are treated as superior to assessments in demonstrating entitlement to experience, presumably since they make visible the subject in relation to his or her utterance. However, the reporter's upgraded claim of emotion (and tacit display of upgraded entitlement to experience) can also be seen as an orientation to her prior action (going ahead with the sports talk and not responding to the presenter's negative self-assessment) potentially being heard as an indictment on her own moral standing. She thus produces a claim of emotion that is hearable as originating from her *own experience of the story* in order to counter its being heard as merely a preferred response to her interlocutor's similar claim (see Pomerantz, 1984 for a discussion on the preferred form for second assessments).

The claim itself is produced in lines 18-26, and is preceded by false starts, hesitation markers and pauses immediately before the reporter's self-categorisation. The self-categorisation is accomplished through the speaker's description of herself as a "mother" of two differently aged children, ordered from oldest to youngest, and specifically produced as two separate categories of person, thus providing a multiple categorisation in the subject component of the claim. The object of the claim is "that mother" and includes a description of her own experience. Thus, in contrast to the presenter's (relatively generic) claim, it is not the child but rather the mother's experience of the incident that has evoked the reporter's response (as a mother), and further provides evidence for her independent epistemic, affective and thus experiential access to the incident ("when I heard..."), i.e. that she had heard about it separately and had an emotional response to the incident, and that it is a different referent to the presenter's which evoked her response.

The reporter then continues with the affective component of the claim, preceded by a misplacement marker (“I just”) followed by an in-breath, both practices serving as evidence for the systematic orientation to these claims as complex actions. The affective component is produced in lines 22-23, with accompanying in-breath and false start and self-initiated self-repair, before the affective description itself is produced as “my heart absolutely breaks”. The affective component is composed of an idiomatic phrase containing an intensifier, established in the previous section as a hearably upgraded form of emotion talk. By formulating her claim this way, the reporter observably orients to the relevance of producing a claim that is evidentially catalysed by independent epistemic and experiential authority, in order to repair her previous misalignment which is vulnerable to being heard as uncaring or insensitive in a domain demonstrably vulnerable to disaffiliation, or any displays of a lack of moral consensus. Finally, the affective component is produced in present tense, in contrast to the presenter’s claim in past tense (“I was very emotional” in contrast to “my heart absolutely breaks”), further evidence for her own emotional response to the incident as current and thus more experientially relevant, providing further affirmation of her own legitimate, and arguably superordinate position in local organisations of morality underpinning the death of a child.

The reporter’s use of explicit self-categorisation in relevant membership categories, idiomatic descriptions of her emotional state, and provision of an alternate referent in the object component, are all resources that I have shown to be systematically recruited in producing upgraded claims of emotion that tacitly display a heightened position on the gradient of experiential entitlement. Here, I demonstrate how this upgraded entitlement is also an interactional resource to reassert the speaker’s moral position in a discussion where contestation and disaffiliation are treated as problematic social actions.

Entitlement as a resource for producing contestable actions

Below, I argue that participants treat upgraded entitlement as a valuable resource in instances where a larger project is at stake whose legitimacy and/or success may rely on the speaker's being seen as entitled to perform potentially contestable actions by virtue of his or her superior position on the hierarchy of entitlement to the experience of a child death.

In the following two extracts I analyse interactions that concern the drowning of a child in Hartbeespoort Dam over Mother's Day weekend in 2015. The contestation in this story revolved around the parents' culpability and their questionable status as victims and/or perpetrators in the death. The complexity of this story, and the ambiguous status of the parents and family of the deceased child, make it difficult for participants to reflect a normative relationship between the subject and the object of the experience. The parents are at once victims and offenders, and deserve simultaneously to be blamed for the death and comforted for it. Participants observably struggle to position the parents in relation to this story, and use the claim of emotion as an affiliative resource that prefaces what they treat as a potentially contentious action.

Below, a potentially disaffiliative course of action is managed through the production of a downgraded claim of emotion. I note how this claim is treated as an important action prior to a complaint sequence, and how it is produced in order to demonstrate the speaker's (albeit minimised) affective rights to subsequently produce the complaint.

(43) [20150511-15]

- 1 Cal: H↑i Xola:ni
2 Pre: Hi:: thank you for calling
3 Cal: Um (.) what I (.) um=look as desperately sorry as I feel
4 for those pa:rents .h (.) they're not being
5 very=responsible by allowing ↑a:nybody (.) adult or child

6 .hh onto a dam (.) without a ↓life jacket (0.2) You're
7 asking for trouble >and I mean< so often in these (.)
8 boats .hh there's alcohol involved and people become (.)
9 .hh um (.) >you know< (.) they throw the boat around as
10 is (.) being said with this one [and]
11 Pre: [Y:a]
12 Cal: it dug in and- and accidents ↑happen .hh and if people
13 are not wearing life jackets they are looking for
14 trou[ble]
15 Pre: [Mmm]m .hh

The call begins with a greeting sequence, after which the caller initiates the reason for her call in line 3. While the call itself unfolds as a complaint sequence about the conduct of the parents, the caller begins the complaint with a claim of an emotional response on behalf of the parents, orienting to this as important prefacing work to producing a complaint about people who might be seen as vulnerable and deserving of empathy. The hesitation marker, turn-initial repair and multiple pauses are all systematic components of these claims in general. Here, however, the caller initiates the reason for her call in line 3, projecting a potentially disaffiliative course of action through the use of hesitation markers and repair. After the first “um”, she begins to formulate a sentence beginning with “what I” (presumably, “what I wanted to say”, or “what I want to discuss”) and then pauses and repairs this by restarting with another “um” and then producing a claim of emotion made on behalf of the parents of the child (lines 3-4) as a preface to the action undertaken in lines 4-6, and in the remainder of the call. In doing so, the caller orients to the need to acknowledge the affective rights of the parents before she can proceed with her complaint against their practical (and morally accountable) negligence in not keeping the child safe. The embedding of the child

reference within a larger membership category including adults and children (or anyone who happens to be on a boat), as opposed to foregrounding that it is specifically a child that is being spoken about here, is part of the speaker's work of conveying a critical position towards the parents. By minimising the reference to the child, the speaker suggests that it is not the fact that it is a child specifically that has evoked this critical stance, but rather that this is a general orientation to boat safety on the part of the caller.

The claim is produced as the first part of a conditionally formulated utterance which cannot be heard to be possibly complete at its end ("as desperately sorry as I feel for those parents", [lines 3-4]), and is treated as being incomplete by the presenter, who doesn't provide any indication of undertaking his own turn at talk at that point (line 4). The second part of the utterance takes the form of an assessment which seeks to hold the parents accountable for the death of the child. And so this assessment is analysably treated by the speaker as requiring a prefacing, contrasting claim (evidenced in her abandoned start and subsequent self-repair), which demonstrates an observable orientation to the complexity of the task she has undertaken. The upgradedness of her claim is demonstrated through the extreme formulation of the emotional response ("desperately sorry") and the introduction of the parents as the objects of the claim (established as a non-normative object in such actions). As my analyses in (31) and (32) have demonstrated, the ability to display upgraded entitlement is treated as a valuable participant resource in these interactions, a strengthened basis from which to produce problematic or contestable actions.

There are some other practices that signal the undertaking of a potentially disaffiliative course of action. For example, the single mention of the child (i.e. another potential object of the story/claim) is mitigated as well, with the caller suggesting that her criticism is pointed at the parents for allowing the drowning of "anyone, adult or child". In other words, the age or age category of the child is hearably not being used as an account for

the criticism that is taking place, and the caller takes pains to be heard as specifically not berating them for the death of the child in particular. Further evidence for this analysis can be found in the remainder of the interaction. After her assessment is possibly complete in line 6, the caller orients to the relevance of the presenter stepping in at this point to display his stance toward her assessment. When he is not forthcoming, she treats this as a potential misalignment with what she has so far said, and subtly shifts from these personalised and recognitional reference forms before the transition space, to generic and non-recognitional reference forms after it. Thus, from the end of line 6 all subsequent assessments and descriptions are produced in generic format, suggesting that she is referring to, and relying upon, taken-for-granted knowledge about objects and subjects in the world in general, and using these to facilitate alignment with her stance. Thus, her reformulation of a specific complaint (which is potentially contestable) to a more general complaint (which is difficult to argue with) suggests that she orients to her talk being potentially vulnerable to a disaffiliative response. The shift from a specific incident to a general “type of incident” does secure alignment from the presenter in lines 11 and 15, and also indicates an orientation by the caller to the complexity of her assessment and to the potential dangers associated with what might be seen as “victim-blaming” in this case. The movement to generic reference forms transforms this incident into a specific instance of a larger type of phenomenon, and moves the focus of the assessment from these parents (who may be being oriented to as victims by other listeners or by the presenter) to any person who is irresponsible with regard to any other person (a stance that is more difficult to argue with). Thus, this example shows the value of emotion-claiming as prefacing work for a disaffiliative projected action.

In the extract below, a claim of emotion is used as a preface to a completely inverse, but equally contestable, course of action; that is, the exoneration of these same two parents whose child has drowned and who are possible members of a perpetrator category. The

caller's use of multiple forms in each component of his claim suggests an orientation to the increased complexity of this action, and of the value of being heard as having upgraded entitlement in order to facilitate the receipt of an action (that he treats as being) difficult to align with.

(44) [20150511-15-001-1848]

- 1 Pre: Let's go to the lines eh let's start with Gary in
2 Pretoria ↑hi: Gary
3 Cal: Uh good afternoon Xola:ni
4 Pre: Hi welcome Gary
5 Cal: Thank yo:u (.) uh Xolani I (.) just feel sick in the guts
6 hearing about this uh chi:ld that died in Hartbeespoort
7 Dam
8 Pre: Yea:::h=
9 Cal: =You know I:'m a:: (.) I'm a father of four (0.4) and u:h
10 (0.2) my youngest i:s is about that a:ge (.) an::d um
11 (0.6) you=know (.) agh na:: just it was ↑devastating to
12 hear that=
13 Pre: =Mmmmm
14 Cal: An:d uh ↑su:re it was irresponsible of the parents doing
15 that (0.2) and I'm sure they feel terrible (0.5) and
16 (0.3) you know=hi:ndsight is:=uh perfect sight (0.8)
17 but:: u:h I can't say that I::'ve been perfectly: (.)
18 ↑risk free: with uh=raising my kids (1.0) I don't think
19 I've taken a risk to that exte:nt
20 Pre: Mm:=
21 Cal: =But: u::h (0.7) I think at this time we really should
22 just grieve with this family (0.3) cause there must be a
23 lot=of hea:rtache=and extend (0.2) ↑some grace (.) and I

24 I'm ↑sure they have learnt the lesson out of (0.2) out of
 25 this
 26 Pre: Ya[:: that's
 27 Cal: [And we don't have to (.) lambast them with wo::rds
 28 (1.5) judging them in ↑any way=
 29 Pre: =Mm:: ↑okay Gary (.) look I think the point is (.) the::y
 30 learning out of this=but also we (.) learning out of it
 31 a:s-as a:: society we must lea::rn out of ↓this that it's
 32 just you ca::n't [you can't] take
 33 Cal: [Definitely]
 34 Pre: that risk you can't take that risk that's eh Gary in
 35 Pretoria

After the initial greeting sequence (lines 1-4) the caller immediately produces a claim of emotion, with a default self-reference form, and an idiomatically formulated affective component. The object is referred to as “this uh child that died” (line 4), with the word “child” normatively referring to the age category as a relevant basis for the claim, and “died” being a neutral descriptor that implies no agency or fault (as opposed to, e.g., “drowned”). This object is followed by an increment detailing the location of the incident (“Hartbeespoort Dam”, [lines 6-7]), demonstrating the pursuit of a recognitional reference. However, the object contains a hesitation marker (“uh”, [line 6]) before the selection of an age category to describe the child. The placement of a hesitation marker suggests that the word immediately afterwards (i.e., “child”) has been carefully selected (cf. [13] above). As in the previous extract, the object is referred to with the reference marker “this” that implies recognition; however, the increment that follows acknowledges the relevance of including another identifying feature in order to ensure that object recognition, and thus intersubjectivity, is achieved. The hesitation markers and pauses prior to, and during, the production of the claim

are a systematic feature of the claims in my data and demonstrate the speaker's orientation to this as a potentially problematic action. However, this type of claim is demonstrably available to "anybody" in the case of a child death (as I have demonstrated above) and even claims of intense emotional response are systematically aligned with. In line 8 the presenter aligns strongly with the caller's claim, producing an extended agreement token with a downward intonation that signifies an intense empathic response.

However, despite securing this affiliation, the caller reformulates his claim in lines 9-12, suggesting that his previous formulation was insufficient in some way. In his reformulated claim, he includes an explicit self-categorisation in the subject component of his claim, hearably upgrading this part of the claim, while downgrading the two other components by directly describing his emotional response as "devastating" and referring to the object merely as "that", thus directing his audience to specifically hear his claim as being produced by "a father of four" rather than just "anybody". In addition to self-categorising, he provides as well the age of his youngest child in direct reference to the age of the deceased child ("about that age") treating this as an important detail of his membership group, i.e. not only a father but a father of four children, and one of whom is of a similar age to the deceased child, with this additional practice doing the work of creating superordinate affective rights within the father category. Immediately before each progressive self-categorisation, the caller pauses, and the presence of multiple pauses and hesitation markers orient to this specific part of his talk being treated as significant. The presenter, who treated the previous claim as a legitimate and completed action, now treats this revised claim as projecting a next turn and provides a continuer in line 13, treated as appropriate by the caller who links to his previous turn with a continuer (line 14). The relevance of the caller's self-categorisation and of his claim in general becomes visible here, when he begins a complaint sequence about the

parents of the deceased child. Complaints are interactionally fraught with potential problems (see Drew & Holt, 1988), and the accomplishment of a complaint is typically facilitated by or preceded by affiliative actions; what Sacks (1992, p. 599) terms “safe complaints”. For example, as Whitehead (in press) notes, speakers display a preference for demonstrating co-membership in a complained-about category; furthermore, complaints that might be heard as problematic may be repaired by demonstration of co-incumbency in the complained-about category, through the use of inclusive pronouns such as “we” and “us” rather than “them” or “they”. The complaint that the caller is producing about the parents’ conduct in this instance is oriented to as potentially problematic, with the possibility of being heard as “victim-blaming” evident in the caller’s formulation of his complaint. Most specifically, the presence of a claim of emotion, and its production in his first available slot for talk, establishes his status as morally appropriate; his subsequent reformulated claim, in which he self-categorises as a co-incumbent of the category to be complained about, demonstrates his orientation to a task that is especially vulnerable to disaffiliation.

Thus the complaint, when it is eventually produced (lines 14-19), is diffused by the caller’s co-membership in the parent category. It also includes an assessment of the parents’ behaviour as “irresponsible”, rather than, for example, malicious or cruel, followed by a candidate claim of emotion on the parents’ behalf (line 15), reaffirming their moral character by attributing to them feelings of “terrible”ness for their “irresponsible” behavior, with the phrase “I’m sure that” (line 15) positioned as a preliminary concession to their likely normative response to the incident. He then continues by sharing his own “irresponsibility”, following this with an assertion that he, however, has never taken a risk “to that extent”. Thus far, he has demonstrated anybody’s right to a claim of emotion, followed by upgraded rights by virtue of his co-incumbency in the parent category. This is itself followed by a complaint

directed toward the parents for their behaviour, which is facilitated by his demonstrable inclusion in the complained-about category as well as an admission of his own parental failings. Having completed this complaint sequence (responded to with an aligning continuer by the presenter) the caller continues with the second, potentially problematic, part of his project: the call for empathy or mercy for these same parents. While the caller displays an orientation to the dangers of blaming the victims of a tragedy, he simultaneously orients to the potential problems of empathising with people who have inadvertently caused their child's death. In his next turn at talk, he thus demonstrates that both the claim and the complaint that it facilitated were designed to preface the call for empathy for the parents. In other words, he has demonstrated the potential trouble associated with this course of action, and has attended to it so that he is heard as someone who is aware of "both sides" but nevertheless selects to empathise with the parents. He thus treats this as an exercise in bounding the accountability of the parents, which he follows by calling for people to "grieve with" the family (line 22), as well as "extend some grace" (line 23), thereby suggesting that they be treated as victims of a difficult loss, now that they have been defined as irresponsible, rather than perpetrators of an unforgivable crime. This analysis demonstrates that it is not only deceased children, but also their parents, who are legitimate objects of sympathy in these instances. In occurrences of child death, some form of moral condemnation is relevant; this moral position may be straightforward and easily shareable, or it may occasion polarised positions, as in this incident. These moral considerations interact with the matter of expressions of emotion, where on certain occasions an expression of sympathy might be treated as a sign of exoneration of a problematic action (on behalf of the parents). If this claim is not qualified, it may be treated as an accountable action in instances where the victim or their parents could be held responsible for the death. It is precisely this negotiation of moral positions via the use of claims of emotion that is at stake: in talk about child death,

speakers locate themselves and others along a continuum of experiential entitlement, with entitlement used as a basis, and account, for potentially controversial moral positions.

It is important to note that the caller treats the production of these claims of emotion as important matters to attend to before proceeding to his next action, and pursues alignment from the presenter in this regard, before continuing with the interaction. The larger project being a delicate one, the caller observably works to be heard as someone speaking with upgraded entitlement based on co-identification as a parent, whose co-membership in the category of parent gives him permission to criticise co-members of that category, in terms of the shared knowledge which such membership categorisation implies (Schegloff, 2007b). Thus, the claim is a prefatory action that garners affiliation, a resource which undergirds the actions that follow that are less obviously affiliative.

In line 26, the presenter begins his own turn, beginning with an alignment token (line 26) and then projecting the continuation of his turn. However, the caller does not treat his own previous utterance as possibly complete, and continues in lines 27-28 to call for their exoneration. The presenter latches his turn to the end of the caller's prior utterance (line 29) and produces another two alignment tokens to display affiliation with the caller's stance. The caller thus demonstrates the mechanisms by which relative accesses are produced, displayed and privileged in this story, and treats the deployment of upgraded entitlement (based on membership in the parent category) as a relevant basis for performing these distributions of access.

The call ends off with the presenter performing a dispreferred second pair part, in which he projects disagreement with the caller's stance (displayed through the prefacing of his action with the term "look"), but manages this disagreement by reformulating the story as an instance of a more generalisable phenomenon, claiming that a general lesson should be learned, while simultaneously implying a failure of (prior) learning in this particular case.

The presenter's use of "we" serves to include him in the category that he is indicting, a further example of the preference for co-incumbency in a complained-about group and thus a pursuit of alignment in the case of a problematic action. The reformulation of a specific incident as an example of a larger social problem ("we learning out of it as a society") is thus designed to make the presenter's disagreement as not directly related to the caller's assertion of empathy for the parents, but rather a more general disagreement with, and indictment of, parents in general who take "risks" with their children.

The caller's use of a claim of emotion is thus prefaced to what he correctly projects may be a disaffiliative larger project. He treats the claim as a method for establishing his entitlement to the experience as well as explicitly highlighting his relevant co-membership in a particular membership category, in order to then do the complaining/negative evaluation which is itself a precursor to an overwhelmingly contestable project: that of displaying empathy, and requesting forgiveness, for parents who are described as responsible for the death of their young child. Upgraded entitlement in the form of explicit self-categorisation is therefore also used as a way to include himself in the complained-about category and is thus treated as the basis for accomplishing a progressively complex set of social actions.

Thus, in (43) the claim of (the parents') emotion is used as a prefatory action to assigning blame to those same parents (i.e. potentially "victim-blaming" the parents who have just lost a child). However, in (44) the claim of emotion is used as a preface to exonerate these same parents (i.e. potential exoneration of perpetrator of a child death, a morally incontestable field of action). I analyse how the presence of a (downgraded or upgraded) claim of emotion, and tacit ordering of entitlement to experience, in each interaction is treated by participants as an affiliative action that seeks to facilitate the contestability of what follows.

Below, I analyse a conversation about the Taegrin Morris incident, between a presenter and caller on the radio. In the preceding section (see [27]) I analysed the two claims produced by the caller. Here, I analyse the entire interaction, and note how the claims of emotion produced by both parties contribute to their larger projects throughout the talk.

(45) [20140722-0526-4418]

- 1 Pre: Tebogo in Roo:depoort good ↓morning
- 2 (.)
- 3 Cal: ↑Ey Koketso=
- 4 Pre: =Ey↑ta::
- 5 (.)
- 6 Cal: Ey ho:wzit my man=
- 7 Pre: =I'm a↑right where've you-have you been on ↑hu:nger str:ike (.)
- 8 we haven't spoken [t-you in awhi:le what's wrong]
- 9 Cal: [He he ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha] ha ha
- 10 [ha ha ha]
- 11 Pre: [He he he] h[e he]
- 12 Cal: [I- I] I I I saw your picture on the newspaper you
- 13 no ↑smi:le my man when you look at the people [for]
- 14 Pre: [Whi]ch
- 15 ne:wspaper are you talking about I'm ↑not in any newspaper
- 16 Cal: No no no no not on the newspaper on the: on the: on the:: what
- 17 do you call it say Twitter and things. I saw your picture
- 18 the::re
- 19 (0.3)
- 20 Pre: Ai no sa- a- no:: why must I smile. for what
- 21 Cal: Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha [ha ha ha ha ha ha]
- 22 Pre: [We are dealing wi]th serious issues you
- 23 want me to be smiling ↑no:: baba. [s]-

24 Cal: [H]a [ha: ha ha]

25 Pre: [Ahe: he h]e he

26 Cal: ↑Ey man Koketso ndzuman ei you know e::h (0.3) I really w- I'm

27 r=llly really sad u- about this four year old boy (0.2) who::

28 passed on so crue:l baba you [kn]ow

29 Pre: [Ya]

30 Cal: And what ↑pains me is they going to be=apprehended (.)

31 whate::ver I don't know what to ↑call them (.) a:nd they gonna

32 get ↑bail (1.0) you know?

33 Pre: Ye::a

34 Cal: And they a-a and two hundred rand bail nogal (.) for their

35 pleasur[e]

36 Pre: [M]m:::

37 Cal: Just to r:ub it into ou:r wounds no-and rea::lly these people

38 must be cast↑rated (.) my man (.) that's ↑it (1.0) just because

39 they must just be given to the community and let the community

40 must sort them ↑out

41 (1.0)

42 Pre: Yeah bu[t you know Tebogo. Tebogo]

43 Cal: [So it's the only thing th]at thing is saving us

44 Pre: But we kno::w we kno::w that (.) you know. vigilantism and

45 that what you're proposing we kno::w that that won't happen

46 (1.0)

47 Cal: But [no::w::: Ko]ketso

48 Pre: [We=know that]

49 Cal: We are sugarcoating things that are really=are rea:l (.) you

50 know=what I'm saying? ↑if e:ver it was a a-a-a-a-a one of the

51 politician's children .hh I mean intelligence and everything

52 should have been out there an::d looking for these (0.2)

53 whate:ver t-to call them you know? .h and uh it ↑pains me that

54 these people (.) .h are not going to get (.) fai:r (.)

55 treatment from the po_lice

56 Pre: Mm::

57 Cal: The pa:rents I mean to ↓say

58 Pre: Ye[s]

59 Cal: [S]o what's the point of them being appre_hended? (.) for me

60 I don't see any point (1.0) honestly

61 Pre: Ai[ght

62 Cal: [They rea:lly have to get ↑punished

63 Pre: .hhhh

64 Cal: And the only way is to be given to the co_mmunity (0.4) I: wish

65 I will I was there a community member of that place (.) I-I'd

66 swear

67 Pre: Yea:

68 Cal: Yes

69 Pre: I [thi]nk I think Tebogo you know (.) for me: this is aht hh

70 Cal: [and]

71 Pre: (.) this is why it was a struggle for me to deal with this

72 matter ye:sterday (0.3) .hhh because ↑I reme:mber when I when

73 I=started working in the- in a ne::ws room as a journo °in the

74 day in d-what two thou::sand° (.) somewhere .hhh um at a:::

75 nother radio sta_{ti}on (.) .hhh I ↑found myself dealing

76 with=there was a ti::me in Cape Town where there was a .hh a

77 spa:te of (.) of=incidents where young=↑little girls! (0.3)

78 little girls were being raped .hh (0.3) and killed (1.2) .h and

79 then at the same ti:me (.) I was I was=I had a ↑ba::by on the

80 ↓way (1.0) and ↑then .h dealing with this situation where on

81 the one hand as a journalist you are reporting on these.

82 repeated incidents of you:ng kids being ki:lled being raped .hh

83 and then at the same ti:me you asking yourself (.) what if this

84 was my ↑child? and I ↑I have so[me very] radical radical i↑deas

85 Cal: [Exactly]

86 Pre: As to what I would ↑do

87 (1.0)

88 Cal: Keketso I- that's exactly my- I've got the two and a half year

89 old (.) .hh when I look at him ye:sterday. ↓yoo:: (.) you know

90 I a emotion just fell on me. ↑big ti:me (.) [an]d I I don't

91 Pre: [Ya]

92 Cal: Know ho:w what those parents are going through. no one knows

93 the the the the pain (.) cos I never lost a child like that you

94 ↑know? no one will-will will say how they g- what pain they are

95 going through

96 Pre: Ya=

97 Cal: =We don't have the-the mea:sure. of: of measuring thei:r pain

98 .hh so: so=I'm (.) ↑saying we really need to deal with this

99 ↑thing!

100 Pre: Ya but we gotta do it legally

After a lengthy greeting sequence, the presenter begins by framing the forthcoming discussion as a “serious issue”, and not something that he should be “smiling” about (line 2). This assessment establishes the “representational field” (Heritage & Raymond, 2005, p. 16) within which all second actions must position themselves. The caller responds with an explicit claim of emotion, which I have analysed above for how its speaker produces the subject (in default form), the affect (a direct description of an emotional state with a repeated intensifier) and finally the (initial) object of the claim (a description of the age and gender of the child followed by an assessment of his death as “so cruel”). The claim itself is preceded by a hesitation marker and pause, and a false start that is self-repaired (from “I” to “I’m”, in order to accommodate the claim that follows). Immediately after the affect component, the

first syllable of a word is produced and then abandoned in favour of an alternative, which turns out to be two membership categories (“four year old” and “boy”) that detail relevant features of the referent: that he is a “boy” details both his gender and his age category (i.e. not an adult), while also including his exact age (that is, the speaker attends to producing both “subjectively” and “objectively” formulated age categories). Finally, this (repaired) object reference is treated as insufficient by the caller who, after a brief pause, produces an increment that assesses the “cruel” nature of the death. This entire initial claim is then followed by a tag question, in which the caller pursues alignment from his interlocutor about his utterance thus far. Alignment (in the form of tag questions) is pursued numerous times during the caller’s turns (lines 28, 32, 49-50 and 53) and is treated by the caller as an important resource in what turns out to be a problematic sequence of talk. As the talk unfolds here, however, the pursuit of alignment is analysed by the presenter as a request for affirming the appropriateness of the claim just produced, and he demonstrates affiliation with a positive token produced in overlap with the caller’s tag question.

The presenter and caller thus establish their independent epistemic and experiential statuses with regard to this story, through the provision of an assessment and a claim of emotion, respectively. The caller then produces a second claim (line 30), but here in regard not to the death itself but rather to the absence of punishment that will be meted out to the perpetrators. In this claim, the speaker describes his affective response as “pain”, suggesting that he is personally impacted by the purported lack of future justice, and follows this claim with a second tag question to secure alignment when his transition-relevant pause is not met with an affiliative response by the presenter. The presenter’s second alignment token (line 33) is weaker than his first, presented in his next turn at talk rather than in overlap, and suggesting possible uncertainty and decreased affiliation. As the caller pursues this topic in his next turn (lines 34-35), the presenter’s alignment token deteriorates even further to a

noncommittal and extended “Mm”, in contrast to the previous explicit agreement tokens.

Thus far, in what emerges as a potentially fraught interaction, the initial claim is analysable as establishing the independent experiential status of the caller in order to fortify the claims that follow and thereby secure alignment.

The interaction continues with the caller producing a third claim in line 37, this time using the pluralised pronoun “our”, and an idiomatic phrase that denotes the exacerbation of an already painful situation. The use of a pluralised subject here can be seen as an attempt to include the presenter (and potentially the listeners) in the caller’s affective and experiential domain in order to garner affiliation with what follows.

In line 42, the presenter follows a transition-relevant pause by producing an explicit disaffiliation with the caller’s previous utterance that calls for the perpetrators to be “castrated”. This is accomplished through the use of a turn-initial agreement token, followed by a contrastive conjunction that projects disaffiliation with the prior utterance. The caller overlaps the presenter’s talk with an account for his previous utterance, thereby displaying an orientation to the projected disaffiliation and seeking to neutralise it. However, the presenter continues with his disaffiliative stance, mitigated through his own use of a pluralised pronoun (“we know”) in order to include the caller in his own epistemic and affective domain and thereby garner affiliation himself.

In lines 49-55 the caller provides a further account for his stance, for the first time invoking the parents as potential victims of the situation. His shift of focus to the parents (rather than himself) as those wronged by the system may be seen as an alternative practice designed to garner the affiliation that he pursues. His account suggests that the parents of the child are those who will be short-changed by the corruption of the police system. His initial reference to them is implicit (“these people” in line 54) and garners weak affiliation from the presenter; he repairs this to an explicit reference to “the parents” and demonstrates that he is

attending to the presenter's possible misunderstanding ("I mean to say"). This is followed by a strong affiliation from the presenter, which is treated by the caller as an alignment with his larger project, but may have been produced by the speaker to demonstrate mere understanding of the item of talk that has been repaired. The caller's treatment of the agreement token as implicitly legitimising his call for castration is displayed in his following three utterances in which he suggests that apprehending the perpetrators will not result in their getting "punished", and that the only way to ensure justice is served is through a form of vigilante justice by an affronted community (of which he would like to be a part). Each of the first two utterances is treated by the presenter as possibly transition-relevant (indicated by his sequence-completing token in 61 and his in-breath in line 63), while the third (line 67) is provided with an explicit although mitigated alignment token, to which the caller responds with "Yes", subsequently treated by the presenter as a completion of the sequence due to his provision of an aligner.

Thus far, what the interaction demonstrates is the caller's initial use of a claim of emotion to outline his affective rights as a basis for the following actions that he orients to as being potentially disaffiliative. The explicit pursuit of alignment through the use of tag questions can be seen as further evidence of the caller's attempt to establish his entitlement to the experience and his associated rights to assess and comment on it. The caller's second claim (line 30) is produced as a gradual heightening of this affective entitlement, this time with the object of the claim being the lack of justice that the perpetrators will receive. The third claim (line 37), with a pluralised subject, works to include the presenter and audience into the caller's affective domain, a method for securing affiliation for a project oriented to as being dependent on strong entitlement to experience, and in which upgraded entitlement is treated as the basis for accomplishing contestable actions. The fourth claim (line 53) recycles the terminology of the second ("pains me"), but here, the objects of the claim, in contrast to

the speaker-subject, are the parents of the deceased child. The ambiguous affiliation provided by the presenter is treated by the caller as a “green light” for his larger project, which he brings to completion after he treats the presenter as explicitly aligning with his utterance.

The presenter, who orients to potentially being heard as someone who is exonerating perpetrators of child murder, uses his next turn to repair this by providing evidence for an independent domain of affective rights to the experience, which works to ensure that he is not heard as “uncaring” or “insensitive”, and thus resituates his own moral appropriateness. By producing his own claim of emotion, based on independent experiential access (“it was a struggle for me to deal with this matter”; lines 71-72), he demonstrates his own entitlement to the experience. His entitlement, however, is produced in downgraded form, so that he is not heard as claiming as strong a position as his interlocutor, and thus will not be heard to be aligning with the caller’s stance thus far. This mitigation is visible in all three components of his claim: firstly, his use of a passively formulated default self-reference; secondly, the affective description of “a struggle” which is arguably less challenging than more extreme affective responses; and finally, an unspecified object (“this matter”), all of which works to produce a hearably downgraded, but nevertheless legitimate, claim of his own. While the claim serves to re-establish the presenter’s moral stance with regard to the incident, and also highlights an independent domain of experiential rights, its downgrading ensures that it cannot be misconstrued as encouraging the caller’s claims for community justice. After producing this claim, the presenter provides an account for his status by using membership categories to describe his joint and conflicting roles as “journno” and father-to-be, demonstrating the need to remain professional contrasted against the need to be protective of children, when reporting on specific instances of child rape and murder in the past. The presenter continues by saying that during that time (narrated in the present tense) he had “some very radical radical ideas”, ostensibly alluding to his own calls for inappropriate

measures of justice. By juxtaposing these two membership categories that bear the need for conflicting actions, the presenter makes evident his own possibly heightened entitlement to experience (as a father-to-be) while simultaneously pragmatically downgrading this very entitlement (as a journalist/institutional representative); thereby establishing that the basis for his disaffiliation is not a flawed moral compass but rather a “struggle” between conflicting categorial orientations.

The caller produces a strong affiliation, an explicit agreement token overlapping with the presenter’s utterance. After ascertaining that the presenter’s talk has come to possible completion (line 86) the caller produces yet another claim of emotion (lines 88-90). This claim is prefaced as well by a recycled turn beginning and self-initiated self-repair, typical of many of the claims analysed above. Here, the caller provides an expansion in the subject component, providing a parallel but implicit self-categorisation as a father while also providing the age of his child in cardinal numbers (a format similar to that used in his object reference to the child that died in lines 27-28), orienting to the young age of his child as a relevant component of his self-categorisation. He then continues with an affective label produced in idiomatic form: of emotion as a tangible object that “fell” on him, with the word “fell” denoting his passivity and a crushing weight. He continues with an increment (“big time”), an intensifier of the already heightened emotional response, followed by a transition-relevant pause during which the presenter produces a strong alignment token with the claim just made.

However, the caller’s turn has not come to possible completion and he continues (with the result that the alignment is produced in overlap), significantly here treating his own entitlement (heavily upgraded) as nevertheless downgraded relative to the entitlement of the parents of the child (lines 90-97). By doing so, he observably orients to an organisational structure in which entitlement is relatively distributed, with his entitlement negotiated relative

to others (more) impacted by the incident. More importantly, he situates the parents (of this deceased child) as having ultimate affective rights, with his own downgraded because of his lack of direct experiential access to such an event. He also explicitly categorises them not only as parents, but as parents who “lost a child like that”, and asserts that furthermore, “no one” has similar experiential access to the incident. The caller thus makes explicit the gradient along which such entitlement is organised, situating his own entitlement as upgraded relative to “anybody’s” claim, but downgraded relative to those more intimately impacted by the incident.

The caller’s final, extended claim of emotion is produced on the parents’ behalf (lines 90-97), in which he even more explicitly states that the degree of “their pain” is not accessible or understandable to others; that “we” – anybody lower down on the hierarchy – do not even have the tools by which to conceptualise their experience and thus their rights to emotion. In doing so, this speaker reproduces, affirms and makes visible the privileged experiential status of parents who have lost a child, and the relative downgrading of others’ claims as a function of this moral order.

The final claim itself (with the parents as the subject), received affiliatively by the presenter, is then itself treated as the basis for a final call for community justice, displaying a final attempt to use a superior claimed entitlement (on another’s behalf) as a proper account for a contestable action. The presenter, however, treats even this superior claim as an insufficient account for a contestable action. By doing so, he demonstrates that even entitlement to experience is bounded by superseding social structures and that these boundaries are in fact what allow the gradient to be made visible and possible in the first place.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that a claim of emotion is a distinct social action in interactions about child death, and that variations in its composition offer insight into a complex moral order. I argue that while these claims can be produced as a display of “just anybody’s” entitlement to an experience of child death, speakers can demonstrate heightened entitlement based on the practices by which they construct these claims. While there are three core components of each claim of emotion (subject, affect and object), each component has simple and gradually more complex forms, and expansions at each/all point/s signal an upgraded position on the experiential gradient that is itself an omnirelevant organising principle of the talk. Since upgraded entitlement is itself treated as a resource for securing affiliation in contestable projects, these displays of relative experiential stance and status are an important participant concern. Furthermore, downgraded entitlement is treated as an equally valuable resource in interactions where relative entitlements are at stake and the very methods that produce upgraded entitlement are inverted in order to accomplish downgraded claims.

An analysis of the variations present in each component, as well as of the multiple practices employed in longer interactions, provides empirical evidence for the gradient of experiential and affective rights oriented to by participants, and illuminates the powerful moral order underpinning these organisational structures.

Chapter Six: Conclusions

In this final chapter, I provide a summary of my findings and reflect on the ways in which they confirm and extend current ethnomethodological research on the social organisation of experience. I note as well the implications of my own contribution, an alternative perspective for the study of childhood as a social category, and child mortality as a specific interactional concern by studying how these are constituted by (and simultaneously reproduce) a larger, profound moral order.

My research study begins with the following questions:

1. How are claims of emotion interactionally produced in talk about child deaths?
2. How are these claims of emotion used as resources for larger interactional projects with respect to child death?
3. How are these actions, and the larger interactional projects of which they form a part, responded to and negotiated in talk about child deaths?

These questions are posed as a response to dominant contemporary literature and international legislation which position the child as a sacred citizen in modern society, and treat its death as a social and moral rupture, without acknowledging the historical intersections which form the basis of these assumptions, or the interactional practices by which they are maintained as a shared norm in society. My research thus uses an ethnomethodological approach to foreground the taken-for-grantedness of this discourse as a starting point for my own analysis, which focuses on describing how normative discourses on childhood and child death are (re)produced in everyday interactions.

Using Armstrong's (1986) historical account of the "invention of infant mortality" I examine the social, political and economic conditions through which the child emerged as a prominent figure within and through accounts of its mortality; providing an important

perspective on the historical malleability of normative knowledge surrounding child mortality in the modern era. Most crucially, the absence of “child mortality” as a distinct conceptual category only two centuries ago demonstrates the relative recency of what is an important part of moral consensus in modern society, namely the unquestioned tragedy that undoubtedly attaches moral value to the child’s (lost) life. This move to historicise the present phenomenon of child death offers an account of the macro-level social forces that have culminated in the child becoming a special sort of modern subject, with his or her care a greater moral concern for a broader range of stakeholders. That the accountability for child death has been broadened in this way suggests that, by implication, its abstracted status allows a broadening and/or heightening of the rights to the experience beyond what might be the case for other sorts of deaths, a matter that I take up analytically in Chapter Five.

The taken-for-granted knowledge of the *meaning* of a child’s death is, however, necessarily the product of talk-in-interaction, the moment-by-moment and turn-by-turn social occasions through which “institutions are ultimately and accountably talked into being” (Heritage, 1984, p. 290). Rather than viewing the individual as shaped by endogenous social structures, my analysis demonstrates that (and how) it is in local sequences of talk that participants consistently renew and maintain these institutional realities, so that it is “ultimately through such means that ‘institutions’ exist as accountable organisations of social actions” (Heritage, 1984, p. 290).

A critical history of the evolution of childhood and child death as social categories provides a diachronic context for the interactional analysis undertaken, in which I have demonstrated exactly how claims of emotion are actions that reproduce the child as a special type of subject in modern orders of morality. This historical focus thus offers a useful starting point for my analysis of child death as a particularly rich site for the study of “entitlement to experience”, a powerful conceptual tool for analysing the expanded scope of experiential

access to a child's death, and providing an account of its systematic production and maintenance as a social order. Thus, although the relationship between epochal institutional discourses and locally maintained knowledges is complex (see, e.g. Heritage, 1984), child mortality provides one example of what Garfinkel (1967, p. 35) terms a "moral fact" whose examination *as a social order* lays bare some of our most unquestioned beliefs. By counterposing normative understandings alongside historical evidence of the relative nature of the phenomenon of child death, I use this literature to pose a social puzzle and mobilise a context within which my research questions may be answered and the domains of knowledge to which my findings will contribute.

I continue by providing a detailed description and explanation of my data collection method and my final data corpus, and note the value of an ethnomethodological, conversation-analytic approach to engaging with my research questions. I explore in detail how the epistemological assumptions of these methods are paradigmatically appropriate for conducting an analysis that provides answers to my own questions, as well as providing the epistemological context within which my questions are raised.

Chapter Five contains my analysis, which identifies a particular social action – claims of emotion – and uses conversation-analytic methods to conduct a detailed analysis of this social action, as a way of providing an answer to the questions posed above. Claims of emotion both tacitly assert their producer's entitlement to the experience of a child death and simultaneously display the interactional methods by which this is accomplished. I discuss my findings in more detail in the section below and demonstrate their relevance with regard to the literature presented in Chapters Two and Three.

Summary of findings

A significant contribution from my analysis is that it builds on Sacks' (1984, 1992) pioneering work on the organisation of experience in interaction, most specifically by systematically developing his concept of "entitlement to experience" as a domain interactionally distinct from the study and organisation of epistemics-in-interaction. The study of experience in interaction, and more specifically of an experiential gradient along which emotional experiences are ordered, provides empirical evidence that participants treat experience as a domain "on which coherent personhood itself ultimately depends" (Heritage, 2011, p. 25). Although Sacks (1984, 1992) notes that entitlement to experience is "differentially available", my analysis provides an explicit and empirical demonstration of the methods and practices by which this differential availability, and its corresponding experiential status and stance, are displayed and utilised in interaction. Below, I use my analytic findings to answer the questions posed in the introduction to my thesis.

Subject component

The subject component provides a term of self-reference for the claim that follows it. This initial observation suggests that a claim of emotion requires a visible subject on behalf of whom the emotion is being claimed, an important point that provides an initial distinction between "knowledge talk", in which the shared object is the topic and focus of the talk, and "experience talk" which foregrounds the relationship of the subject to the invoked object. Furthermore, conversation-analytic literature on self-reference in interaction notes that departures from basic self-reference forms, such as "I", are interactionally (and analytically) relevant in how they make evident normative moral configurations between subjects and objects in the world. More specifically, in claims of emotion, basic self-reference forms produce a generic claim of emotion which displays "anybody's" entitlement to the experience

of a child death – itself a powerful social accomplishment in light of the historically malleable role of the child and the (fairly recent) shift to a consensus about his or her sacred position in modern society. What this tells us is that despite the recency of this normative knowledge, children and their deaths already provide an abstracted entitlement to experience, a broader base from which to assert such entitlement, in an interactional domain characterised by intense regulation and sanctions. Fascinatingly, basic self-reference is not by any means the only available format for self-reference in these claims: in fact, the presence of expanded forms of self-reference is a regular feature in my data corpus.

These expansions take the form of additional phrases or membership categories that are provided in addition to/in place of the basic self-reference “I”, in which the speaker treats a particular foregrounded identity as a relevant component of the claim. A closer inspection of these expansions demonstrates their ordered and organised usage that orients to an underlying hierarchy of entitlement. This underlying hierarchy is conceptually similar to what Heritage (2012b, p. 4) terms an “epistemic gradient” in which participants display their epistemic status to one another interactionally through the production of particular epistemic stance, with epistemic stance formulated as the indexical manifestation of the participant’s knowledge statuses vis-a-vis one another. Heritage’s analysis reasserts the primacy of the participant’s concern as the unit of analysis, and thus treats the assumed objectivity of knowable objects as something which members can display to one another. Because of the relational nature of knowledge in interaction, or the way in which knowledge is produced as action, knowledge itself is a relativised phenomenon for participants, who demonstrate relative epistemic statuses and stances to one another and thus negotiate, challenge and confirm their various epistemic access.

When it comes to experience, however, the “singularity” of experience and the “personal preserves” on which it depends (Heritage, 2011, p. 25) suggest that it is not equally

amenable to such an analysis, primarily because the “object” being invoked is exactly not an objective thing in the world with consistent properties that are knowable. Rather, the unit of analysis here is an experience, necessarily thus an object-in-relation-to-a-self, whose formal analysis (as a relative and subjective phenomenon) seems a daunting and improbable task. Its repositioning, however, as a members’ concern, provides the same analytical purchase by which all social life can be analysed: in terms of how it is produced as an accountable social action. Thus, my own analysis provides evidence of an “experiential gradient” (to repurpose Heritage’s term), a gradient by which experiential, rather than epistemic, rights or access are negotiated; a hierarchy treated by members as an orderly organising structure for their claims of emotion about child deaths. This gradient of experiential access, this hierarchy of entitlement to experience, thus extends on Sacks’ original observations about this interactional domain, and demonstrates the specific methods by which such entitlement is displayed.

Furthermore, my own analysis suggests that there is a templated or generic availability of experience in relation to children that is certainly not the case with regard to other sorts of claims, which require some evidence of oriented knowledge (in the case of epistemics) or some observable participation in an event (in the case of experience). The gradient of entitlement to experience which organises talk about child death seems not to require any entrance-level entitlement, or rather it seems that entitlement to an experience of a child death is the default stance for members, while the display of heightened or superordinate rights is accountably expected of those who can legitimately claim them. This finding, in turn, suggests that entitlement to experience is perhaps not as clear-cut as the entitlement to knowledge, although the entitlement available as “anybody’s” right to claim can be finely and systematically upgraded (or downgraded) in calibration with interactional contingencies.

The study of self-reference in claims of emotion suggests that participants accountably produce claims of emotion that contain even basic self-reference forms, thus ratifying the shared moral order to which these claims refer. However, participants treat their own status as members of a parent category as a basis from which to produce claims of emotion that assert an upgraded or heightened entitlement to the experience of the child death, above the templated availability of “anybody’s” claim.

The invocation of the parent category in the subject component (and often the child category in the object component) demonstrates the use of the standard relational pair (Sacks, 1972a) as an interactional practice that mobilises the set of rights and obligations associated with that categorial pair. Specifically, in my data, the standard relational pair of parent and child positions the parent as possessing ultimate obligations to protect, and the child with corresponding ultimate rights to be protected. This use of category terms is treated as a common-sense method for referencing shared knowledge about parents and children and their various roles in society, though its invocation simultaneously reproduces it as such.

There are, however, a range of practices by which membership in a parent category can be articulated in conversation, which is aligned with the functions that these various identity forms serve in any particular interaction. My analysis demonstrates that parent categories can be expressed in gendered or non-gendered terms, and that the use of gendered nouns such as “mother” and “father” explicitly refer to normative knowledges associated with these categories and relay a specificity to the claim that make it hearable as the unique claim available “to mothers” or “to fathers”. Non-gendered parent categories are a more general format for claiming, and assert a heightened entitlement available to “any parent” while masking the relevance of any particular gender category in the assertion.

In some instances, it is not (only) the gender of the parent that is treated as relevant, but also specific characteristics of the child to which they are a parent: most specifically,

these speakers provide category-relevant descriptions of their own child's age and/or gender as important features of their subject reference. These types of specifications provide even more detail about the subject category of the speaker as a method for bringing off a heightened entitlement to experience. This is also made apparent in the analysis of deviant cases, in which the absence of relevant membership categories (where they are available) is treated as a problematic action. Moreover, displaying (only) an epistemic stance, when an experiential status/stance is also available, is treated as a problematic action. My analysis thus identifies specific interactions where the domains of epistemics and experience intersect, and inspects how the relative values of each are made visible as (and in) an interactional order.

Object component

While subject reference is differentially articulated in order to display various relevant membership categories, the object of the claim in these instances is always, in a most general way, the occasion of the death of a child. Literature on object-reference, or more specifically third-person reference, in interaction suggests that it is the most salient features of a given object that are indexed in interaction. The object of the claim is also more complex than the subject and affect components, since it is the component most in common with epistemic claims. In other words, if epistemic claims are based on knowable objects, and the difference between experiential and epistemic claims (as I have shown above) is the subjective and affective components, then the object component is a key point of intersection that experience shares with knowledge. However, my analysis demonstrates that the object too is produced in a format which highlights the experiential aspect of the object in relation to the subject, and that despite the many various formats that can be used to refer to an instance of child death, these formats are consistently utilised to orient to the experiential nature of the utterance.

That is to say, the reference to the incident of child death is calibrated to, and indexed by, the subject component, so that demonstrably upgraded claims that rely on expanded subject references are supported and scaffolded by the provision of recognitional references in the object section.

My analysis suggests that the object of these claims is typically instantiated by a specific instance of a child death (as opposed to being a general claim in response to non-specific mortality rates or some other non-specific phenomenon). Thus, an initial observation about claims of emotion in child death is that they consistently (initially) refer to a *specific* death, and treat it as an emotional experience to which their speakers are entitled. Although in some instances in my data these specific deaths are then treated as the basis for discussions about larger social issues of child protection and care, these are nevertheless systematically grounded in discussions of specific incidents that are (sometimes) also produced as instantiations of more general phenomena, with entitlement treated as a tacit account for having rights to raise these larger issues. Thus, the claims are always indexed by a specific incident of a child death which may be referred to in a number of ways.

My analysis suggests that there are two prominent ways of referring to an incident of child death: by referring either to the child that has died, or alternatively to the family (or specific family members) of that child. These are both membership categories that follow a profound organisation that orients to the hierarchy of entitlement, or that demonstrates the speaker's experiential rights relative to his or her interlocutor by detailing various aspects of the object being discussed. Thus, although the object in epistemic terms is treated as an objective phenomenon, knowable to various degrees but possessing inherent and unchanging properties, the object in experiential terms is a relational object, an object indexed by its subject, an object made an experience by the presence of a subject, and thus understandable only in terms of experiential (specifically affective) rights. The selection (of how) to refer to

the deceased child or alternatively to his or her family or parents makes visible the features of the object that are relevant for the speaker, and thus makes visible two parallel norms about child death: the first of these concerning the normative responses to the death of an especially important category of person; and the second concerning normative knowledge about the categories of person entitled to the experience of the death, and the hierarchy of entitlement to which these knowledges orient.

The reference to the deceased child creates a direct experiential relationship between the person claiming entitlement to the experience and the object of the claim. In other words, the subject of the claim asserts an emotional response to the fact that it is a child that has died. This is accomplished by referring to the child in terms of an age or age category, as well as by providing additional recognitional descriptors to facilitate intersubjectivity, and using this intersubjectivity as the basis for the heightened entitlement. Recognitional descriptions typically provide extra information about the child, such as the gender; or about the incident, such as the manner of death and/or location of the incident. These extra references are all appended to the overarching object of the deceased child and work to entrench normative knowledge about shared moral norms and values about child death and its various manifestations. The presence of multiple reference terms, and the resulting increased specificity of the description, is treated as a form of upgrading the claim of emotion by making visible the extent or nature of the experience, and thus serves as a tacit method by which entitlement to experience is produced as a relativised phenomenon. On the other hand, the reference to the parents or family of the deceased child is illuminating in that it provides the most explicit evidence for the hierarchy of entitlement that is an organising feature of the talk. That is, by referring to the parents of the deceased child, the speaker demonstrates an indirect relationship with the incident, an entitlement to experience that is secondary to another's. The speaker's reference to the parents of the child makes visible that the death of

the child is being treated as an experience (specifically an experience of negative affect) and that that experience is more accessible to the parents than the speaker. The speaker is thus not claiming a direct entitlement to the experience, but something more akin to an empathy with the parents' entitlement to the experience, an acknowledgement of the parents' entitlement or a reiteration of the primacy of the parents' entitlement to the experience. By commenting on their own affective state, however, speakers make visible their own experience (one of negative affect) that is, however, tacitly produced as "less than" the experience of those "more" entitled to it.

Thus, the object component of the claim is analytically valuable in the following ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the legitimacy of an "experience of child death" as one for which anyone can claim entitlement, and recognisably so, via a claim of emotion. Secondly, it can be articulated to directly establish the experiential relationship between the subject and the object of the claim, by making relevant the child as the relevant membership category of the object, as well as even more specific information about age, gender, manner and location of death. In these instances, the speaker/subject is demonstrating entitlement to the experience, with the claim of emotion the explicit action by which this entitlement is produced and displayed as a relational phenomenon. Lastly, the object can be articulated to demonstrate most explicitly the hierarchical nature of entitlement to experience, by displaying an indirect form of entitlement with those deemed more entitled to the experience, specifically parents and, in a lesser sense, other kin relations or close social relations. In these claims, the speaker's use of a subject and affect component produces this as an experiential utterance (i.e. making visible an affective relationship between a subject and object in the world). However, the object is itself an object of entitlement to experience, so this is at best a secondary claim of empathy with that object, and thus indirectly an entitlement to that experience on a lesser valence than that claimable by the parents. This form of object-

reference most clearly highlights the relativity of experiential access, and its gradient along which participants position themselves in talk.

Affect component

The final component of a claim of emotion is the affect component, or the component which provides an affective description for the relationship between the stated subject and object. A large body of conversation-analytic literature studies emotion talk, or the different ways that affect is accomplished as an interactional phenomenon. My analysis of claims of emotion suggests some important findings that extend the literature on emotion in interaction and also display its importance as a (potentially under-researched) feature of the organisation of experience in interaction. My analysis suggests that there are two general methods for displaying emotion in interaction: the use of direct, designedly literal descriptors of emotional states (e.g. “I am sad”), or alternatively the use of indirect descriptive terms that idiomatically refer to a physiological state understood to index an underlying emotional state (e.g. “I am heartbroken”). My analysis suggests that direct descriptions of emotional states, although available, are treated as demonstrating a less intense affective state than indirect or idiomatic descriptions, which index heightened intensity of affective response. Thus, in much the same way that we find a default format for self-reference and object-reference in these claims of emotion, I argue that a default format for the affect component of the claim is a direct description of the speaker’s emotional state. This practice for displaying affect is treated as indexing a relatively weak affective response and is thus analysable as demonstrating a basic and normative, generically available, affective response to a child death that reproduces the established relationship between these particular subjects and objects in the world. In other words, it provides the evidence for the very foundations upon which this study is based, that is, that child deaths occupy a powerful social and moral order where entitlement to

experience is made more broadly available, and the status of child death as a moral rupture is treated as an a priori assumption that hardly bears acknowledgement. In reiterating this normative response to child death, we are provided with insight into the micro-level interactional mechanisms by which macro-level and institutional discourses are entrenched and maintained in daily life, or in other words, the ways that institutional realities are made visible as participant concerns. More importantly, this finding confirms Sacks' (1992, p. 248) assertion that "the experience you're entitled to have on an occasion you're entitled to have one is further carefully regulated"; or that the *type of* experience claimable is just as carefully regulated as being able to claim it in the first place.

Even more notably, these designedly literal descriptions of appropriate emotional states that are affiliated with (and inappropriate emotional states that are explicitly disaffiliated with), are only one, fairly basic, way of doing emotion in interaction. The seemingly preferred method, by which a heightened emotional state is displayed interactionally, is the use of indirect, nonliteral descriptive terminology whose indexing of a corresponding but unspoken underlying affect is treated as a more effective way of displaying the heightened intensity of an emotional response. Thus, my analysis focuses on the use of idiomatic affective descriptions as one of the variants by which a heightened emotional response (and a corresponding heightened entitlement to experience) is tacitly asserted by speakers.

These idiomatic descriptions typically reference the body, and are normatively understood to index an inner emotional state that is itself identified as an appropriate response to a child death (e.g. "I feel sick" or "My heart is breaking"). Idiomatic affective descriptions situate their speaker as claiming a heightened emotional response to the experience of the child death, and thus are observably calibrated as particular affective stances that display the speaker's status along a gradient of experiential rights. Evidence for this is found in the ways

in which speakers observably mitigate or heighten their affective stance in order to orient to the contingencies of the interactional context, using various interactional practices as a way to display the depth or intensity of their affective response which in itself, firstly, is a tacit assertion of the entitlement to the experience being so referenced and, secondly, an indication of the degree of entitlement being so claimed.

Multiple concurrent practices

All of the practices identified above – in establishing degrees of entitlement through subject, object and affect – are the components of claims of emotion, which are themselves a single action in a larger sequential and interactional context. My analysis thus concludes by noting how entitlement to experience is itself treated as the basis for accomplishing larger and often potentially contestable social actions which, in the morally loaded domain of child death, is often a difficult task to accomplish. While a child death (and in fact any death) is treated as an accountable occurrence (Jayyusi, 2007), contestation about the apportioning of blame, fault or responsibility is a complex and perilous undertaking, especially so in child death. In instances where it is the parents of the child (those demonstrably most entitled to the experience) who are being potentially or partially placed at fault, the potential for disaffiliation, disalignment and disagreement is high: treating parent-victims as perpetrators is morally repugnant for participants, but treating parent-perpetrators as victims equally so. In a context where a ruptured moral order requires stabilisation, garnering affiliation and achieving consensus about blame and responsibility is treated as an important task to undertake. In order to re-establish this shared order, participants negotiate the domains of responsibility and blame, and use their relative entitlement to the experience, or their position on the experiential gradient, as a powerful basis from which to secure sufficient affiliation for their potentially disaffiliative projects. Thus, the presence of multiple claims of emotion,

characterised by a range of variations in practices of subject, object and affect formulations, provides insight into the methods by which such entitlement is negotiated as an ongoing concern for members in reasserting a moral order, together.

Concluding remarks

This study is the first to tackle the topic of child death as an interactional matter. It thus provides an original contribution to conversation-analytic literature on experience in interaction by examining evidence for participants' orientations to an experiential gradient of entitlement to experience that conceptually mirrors the epistemic gradient proposed by Heritage (2012a). Participants position themselves and others along the experiential gradient in terms of their statuses vis-à-vis one another, and in terms of their stances in regard to the experience being referenced. My analysis provides empirical support for this, demonstrating how participants defer to those with (normatively assigned) superordinate experiential status in the matter of a child's death, by minimising their own experiential stance vis-à-vis the incident. Similarly, participants may demonstrate heightened (what I term "upgraded") stance in instances where increased entitlement may be an important resource in pursuing other, potentially disaffiliative, projects. The findings about entitlement to experience and its organisation in interaction offer empirical evidence for some of the ways that the formations of knowledge identified by my genealogical analysis are (re)produced and contested in interaction. Specifically, I have shown *how* historical norms are sedimented by local and contingent practices that, over time, can become the normative bedrock upon which members enact their social lives. Thus, I expose the mechanisms by which children are (re)produced as the sacred citizens that they are normatively understood to be, and provide the detail that forms the basis of the historical formations presented in my literature review.

My analysis is, in this sense, a demonstration of the ways that knowledge orders discernible in history are in fact (re)produced and/or contested in the everyday interactions of ordinary life. While genealogical approaches serve a similar function to ethnomethodological studies – both have the same type of denaturalising function – the analytic approach that I have used is rigorous, and provides systematic and empirical evidence to answer the questions posed in my introduction. Thus, as a parallel to the historical studies that destabilise the category of childhood (reviewed in my literature), I offer insight into the interactional accomplishment of childhood as a common-sense and taken-for-granted category, looking at how it is produced at the primordial, rather than historical, site of sociality. My analysis and findings thus build on, and extend, important conversation-analytic literature in the domain of experience in interaction, by providing a systematic demonstration and description of an apparatus constructed by participants in order to demonstrate relative entitlements to one another, and to use these as the basis for larger interactional projects, concerning child deaths. The apparatus referred to here is conceptually parallel to Heritage's (2012a) epistemic gradient, what I term an experiential gradient, by which members establish and demonstrate their experiential status and stance relative to one another. Despite the fact that my analysis is conducted on experience in a particular domain, this apparatus is not (necessarily) only used in talk about child death, but rather can potentially be viewed as an ordering structure for the social organisation of experience more generally.

While the role of the child, and of child death, in modern society cannot be taken for granted, my analysis demonstrates how this comes to be as a matter of interactional practices and fine-grained social organisation. My study demonstrates that the taken-for-granted knowledge about childhood is in fact an interactional accomplishment that is maintained by talk-in-interaction, and demonstrates one of the mechanisms by which this knowledge is consistently reproduced as (and in) a social order.

Limitations and future directions for research

This research builds on foundational conversation-analytic work on experience in interaction, with a specific focus on the interactional organisation of experiences of child death. My findings foreground some distinctions and convergences between the rights to experience and knowledge, and suggest some potential avenues for further research on this topic, including in, but not restricted to, the domain of child deaths. I have, however, not attempted to make any distributional claims in this research project, focusing rather on identifying a range of possible practices that can be researched in more detail in future studies. Having identified these, it would be instructive to examine how (and if) these practices occur in other languages or cultures, or in relation to other types of death, or even to other types of experiences. Most specifically, I believe it would be fruitful to explore whether the “experiential gradient” that I have identified is unique to experiences of child death, or whether it is robust enough to withstand an analysis across different domains of experience in interaction.

My focus on a single social action – claims of emotion – as an entry-point into studying the organisation of experiences of child death is thus merely the beginning of a potentially larger field of study in which a range of social actions in talk about child death (or other deeply entrenched social and moral orders) may be analysed for how they reproduce these interactional and social orders.

I have noted (in Chapter Four) some of the limitations of my data corpus, referring most specifically to the nature of this research enterprise and the resultant absence of distributional claims about the practices that I have analysed. In line with the conversation-analytic approach, my study takes as its object of inquiry the “possibilities of language use” (Peräkylä, 2004, p. 297), by describing some practices that are possible in relation to my domain of study, rather than considering whether/how they are differentially distributed

across a society, or the categories of people within the society. Thus, my research findings are “generalisable” in the sense that they provide empirical evidence on what is possible for people who have “the same array of interactional competencies”, and thus offer insight into “social practices that are possible”, by providing a description of child death as an “interaction order and the social action taking place within that order” (Peräkylä, 2004, p. 289).

Finally, this study provides a starting point for the possibility of locating larger discourses of child death in micro-level interactions that provide local and moment-by-moment interactional occurrences which both orient to and reproduce the institutional and discursive realities that shape our lives. However, a more thorough “history of the present” that combines a detailed genealogy of the phenomenon of child death, in parallel to a systematic study of talk-in-interaction that examines a range of interactional actions and practices about the death of children, will certainly extend these initial findings and confirm the value of providing historical or genealogical accounts to frame micro-level interactional concerns, which ultimately would allow for a broader perspective on the way that the overarching social orders of modern life are created, sustained and challenged through interaction, the primordial site of human sociality.

References

- Althusser, L., Balibar, E., Establet, R., Macherey, P., & Ranciere, J. (1970). *Reading Capital* (B. Brewster & D. Fernbach, Trans.). London: Francois Maspero, New Left Books.
- Angelides, S. (2004). Feminism, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Erasure of Child Sexuality. *GLQ A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, 10/2(2), 141-177.
doi:10.1215/10642684-10-2-141
- Ariès, P. (1965). *Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life*. Oxford, England: Vintage Books.
- Ariès, P. (1975). *Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present*. USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Armstrong, D. (1986). The invention of infant mortality. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 8(3), 211-232. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9566.1986.tb00298.x
- Atkinson, J. M., & Heritage, J. (1984). *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Averill, J. R. (1980). A Constructivist View of Emotion. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), *Theories of Emotion* (pp. 305-339). New York: Academic Press.
- Bamford, L. J., McKerrow, N. H., Barron, P., & Aung, Y. (2018). Child mortality in South Africa: Fewer deaths, but better data are needed. *South African Medical Journal*, 108(3), 25-32. Retrieved from <http://www.samj.org.za/index.php/samj/article/view/12238>
- Beinart, W., & Dubow, S. (1995). *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa*. London: Routledge.
- Besnier, N. (1990). Language and Affect. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 19(1), 419-451.
doi:10.1146/annurev.an.19.100190.002223

- Bogensperger, J., & Lueger-Schuster, B. (2014). Losing a child: finding meaning in bereavement. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology*, 5(1), 22910.
doi:10.3402/ejpt.v5.22910
- Bowman, B. (2010). Children, Pathology and Politics: A Genealogy of the Paedophile in South Africa between 1944 and 2004. *South African Journal of Psychology*, 40(4), 443-464. doi:10.1177/008124631004000407
- Burman, E. (1994). *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (2004). *Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence*. London and New York: Verso.
- Butler, J. (2009). *Frames of war: When is life grievable?* London and New York: Verso.
- Butler, J., & Scott, J. W. (1992). *Feminists Theorize the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Chomsky, N. (1957). *Syntactic Structures*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Committee, N. C. L. (1929). *Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the National Child Labor Committee, 1904-1929*. New York: National Child Labor Committee, 1929.
- Coovadia, H., Jewkes, R., Barron, P., Sanders, D., & McIntyre, D. (2009). The health and health system of South Africa: historical roots of current public health challenges. *The Lancet*, 374(9692), 817-834. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(09\)60951-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60951-X)
- Couper-Kuhlen, E. (2012). Exploring affiliation in the reception of conversational complaint stories. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 113-146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cunningham, H. (2005). *Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500*. London: Routledge.

- Darikwa, T. B., & Dorrington, R. (2011). The level and trends of child mortality in South Africa, 1996-2006. *African Population Studies*, 25(1), 159-172. doi:10.11564/25-1-262
- Davies, B., & Davies, C. (2007). Having, and Being Had By, "Experience": Or, "Experience" in the Social Sciences After the Discursive/ Poststructuralist Turn. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 13(8), 1139-1159. doi:10.1177/1077800407308228
- Dawson, G., & Riches, P. (1998). Lost children, living memories: the role of photographs in processes of grief and adjustment among bereaved parents. *Death Studies*, 22(2), 121-140. doi:10.1080/074811898201632
- Dhliwayo, R. (2007). Understanding the obligations of non-state actors in the realisation of children's rights. Retrieved from <https://eldis.org/document/A31310>
- Donzelot, J. (1979). *The Policing of Families* (R. Hurley, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Douglas, A. (1977). *The Feminization of American Culture*. USA: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Drew, P. (1998). Complaints About Transgressions and Misconduct. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 31(3-4), 295-325. doi:10.1080/08351813.1998.9683595
- Drew, P., & Heritage, J. (1992). *Talk at work: Interaction in institutional settings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, P., & Holt, E. (1988). Complainable Matters: The Use of Idiomatic Expressions in Making Complaints. *Social Problems*, 35(4), 398-417. doi:10.1525/sp.1988.35.4.03a00060
- Durkheim, E. (1982). *The Rules of Sociological Method* (W. D. Halls, Trans.). London: Macmillan.
- Dye, N. S., & Smith, D. B. (1986). Mother Love and Infant Death, 1750-1920. *The Journal of American History*, 73(2), 329-353. doi:10.2307/1908225

- Edwards, D. (1999). Emotion Discourse. *Culture & Psychology*, 5(3), 271-291.
doi:10.1177/1354067x9953001
- Edwards, D. (2000). Extreme Case Formulations: Softeners, Investment, and Doing Nonliteral. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 33(4), 347-373.
doi:10.1207/S15327973RLSI3304_01
- Edwards, D. (2005). Moaning, whinging and laughing: the subjective side of complaints. *Discourse Studies*, 7(1), 5-29. doi:10.1177/1461445605048765
- Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (2017). Some uses of subject-side assessments. *Discourse Studies*, 19(5), 497-514. doi:10.1177/1461445617715171
- Enfield, N. J. (2007). Meanings of the unmarked: how 'default' person reference does more than just refer. In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Perspectives* (pp. 97-120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Enfield, N. J., & Stivers, T. (2007). *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fitzgerald, R., & Housley, W. (2002). Identity, categorization and sequential organization: the sequential and categorial flow of identity in a radio phone-in. *Discourse & Society*, 13(5), 579-602. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42888521>
- Flouri, E., & Buchanan, A. (2003). The role of father involvement in children's later mental health. *Journal of Adolescence*, 26(1), 63-78. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-1971\(02\)00116-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-1971(02)00116-1)
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (2003). *The birth of the clinic*. London: Routledge.

- Franzosi, R. (2004). *From words to numbers: Narrative, data, and social science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Freud, S. (1905). *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (J. Strachey, Trans.). Oxford, England: Imago Publishing.
- Garfinkel, H. (1952). *The Perception of the Other: A Study in Social Order*. (Ph.D.). Harvard University,
- Garfinkel, H. (1964). Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities. *Social Problems*, 11(3), 225-250. doi:10.2307/798722
- Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Garfinkel, H., & Sacks, H. (1970). On formal structures of practical actions. In J. C. McKinney & E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), *Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments* (pp. 338-366). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Goffman, E. (1981). *Forms of Talk*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Goffman, E. (1983). The Interaction Order: American Sociological Association, 1982 Presidential Address. *American Sociological Review*, 48(1), 1-17.
doi:10.2307/2095141
- Goodwin, C. (2007). Participation, stance and affect in the organization of activities. *Discourse & Society*, 18(1), 53-73. doi:10.1177/0957926507069457
- Goodwin, C., & Goodwin, M. (1987). Concurrent Operations on Talk: Notes on the Interactive Organization of Assessments. *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics*, 1(1), 1-54.
doi:10.1075/iprapip.1.1.01goo
- Goodwin, M., Cekaite, A., & Goodwin, C. (2012). Emotion as Stance. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 16-40). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Goodwin, M., & Goodwin, C. (2000). Emotion within Situated Activity. In A. Duranti (Ed.), *Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader* (pp. 239-257). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Haakana, M. (2012). Laughter in conversation: The case of "fake" laughter. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 174-194). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hacohen, G., & Schegloff, E. A. (2006). On the preference for minimization in referring to persons: Evidence from Hebrew conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 38(8), 1305-1312. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2006.04.004
- Hall, K., Richter, L., Mokomane, Z., & Lake, L. (2018). *South African Child Gauge 2018*. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.
- Harré, R. (1986). Selves in talk. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 25(3), 271-272. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00737.x
- Heinemann, T., & Traverso, V. (2009). Complaining in interaction. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 41(12), 2381-2384. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2008.10.006
- Hendricks, L., Swartz, S., & Bhana, A. (2010). Why Young Men in South Africa Plan to Become Teenage Fathers: Implications for the Development of Masculinities within Contexts of Poverty. *Journal of Psychology in Africa*, 20(4), 527-536. doi:10.1080/14330237.2010.10820411
- Hendrickson, K. C. (2009). Morbidity, mortality, and parental grief: A review of the literature on the relationship between the death of a child and the subsequent health of parents. *Palliative and Supportive Care*, 7(1), 109-119. doi:10.1017/S1478951509000133
- Hepburn, A., & Potter, J. (2012). Crying and Crying Responses. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 195-211). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heritage, J. (1984). *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Heritage, J. (1985). Analyzing news interviews: aspects of the production of talk for an overhearing audience. In T. Van Dijk (Ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (Vol. 3, pp. 95-117). London: Academic Press.
- Heritage, J. (2007). Intersubjectivity and progressivity in references to persons (and places). In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Perspectives*. (pp. 255-280). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, J. (2011). Territories of knowledge, territories of experience: Empathic moments in interaction. In T. Stivers, L. Mondada, & J. Steensig (Eds.), *The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation* (pp. 159-183). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, J. (2012a). The Epistemic Engine: Sequence Organization and Territories of Knowledge. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 45(1), 30-52.
doi:10.1080/08351813.2012.646685
- Heritage, J. (2012b). Epistemics in Action: Action Formation and Territories of Knowledge. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 45(1), 1-29.
doi:10.1080/08351813.2012.646684
- Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68(1), 15-38.
doi:10.1177/019027250506800103
- Hester, S., & Fitzgerald, R. (1999). Category, predicate and contrast: Some organizational features in a radio talk show. *Media studies: Ethnomethodological approaches*, 5, 171-193.
- Hockett, C. F. (1960). The origin of speech. *Scientific American*, 203(3), 88-96.
- Housley, W., & Fitzgerald, R. (2009). Membership categorization, culture and norms in action. *Discourse & Society*, 20(3), 345-362. doi:10.1177/0957926509102405

- Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- Hutchby, I. (1991). The organization of talk on talk radio. In P. Scannell (Ed.), *Broadcast Talk*. London: Sage.
- Jackson, C. (2013). 'Why do these people's opinions matter?' Positioning known referents as unnameable others. *Discourse Studies*, 15(3), 299-317.
- Jayyusi, L. (1984). *Categorization and the Moral Order*. London: Routledge.
- Jayyusi, L. (1991). Values and moral judgement: communicative praxis as moral order. In G. Button (Ed.), *Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences* (pp. 227-251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jayyusi, L. (2007). Between saying and showing: Making and contesting truth claims in the media. *Ethnographic Studies*, 9, 19-43.
- Jefferson, G. (1984). On the organization of laughter in talk about troubles. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of Social Action* (pp. 346-369). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jefferson, G. (2004). Glossary of Transcript Symbols with an Introduction. In G. H. Lerner (Ed.), *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation* (pp. 13-23). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Jewkes, R., & Wood, K. (1998). Competing Discourses of Vital Registration and Personhood: Perspectives from Rural South Africa. *Social Science and Medicine*, 46(8), 1043-1056. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(97)10036-3
- Kamio, A. (1997). *Territory of information*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.

- Kaukomaa, T., Peräkylä, A., & Ruusuvuori, J. (2013). Turn-opening smiles: Facial expression constructing emotional transition in conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 55, 21-42. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.006>
- Kincaid, J. R. (1992). *Child-loving : the erotic child and Victorian culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Kitzinger, C. (2000). How to Resist an Idiom. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 33(2), 121-154. doi:10.1207/S15327973RLSI3302_1
- Kövecses, Z. (2003). *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuroshima, S., & Iwata, N. (2016). On Displaying Empathy: Dilemma, Category, and Experience. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 49(2), 92-110. doi:10.1080/08351813.2016.1164395
- Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 22(4), 299-302.
- Land, V., & Kitzinger, C. (2007). Some uses of third-person reference forms in speaker self-reference. *Discourse Studies*, 9(4), 493-525. doi:10.1177/1461445607079164
- Langa, M. (2010). Adolescent boys' talk about absent fathers. *Journal of Psychology in Africa*, 20(4), 519-526. doi:10.1080/14330237.2010.10820410
- Lerner, G. H. (1996). Finding "face" in the preference structures of talk-in-interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 59(4), 303-321. doi:10.2307/2787073
- Lerner, G. H., & Kitzinger, C. (2007a). Extraction and aggregation in the repair of individual and collective self-reference. *Discourse Studies*, 9(4), 526-557. doi:10.1177/1461445607079165
- Lerner, G. H., & Kitzinger, C. (2007b). Introduction: person-reference in conversation analytic research. *Discourse Studies*, 9(4), 427-432. doi:10.1177/1461445607079161

- Levinson, S. (1979). Activity Types and Language. *Linguistics*, 17(5-6), 365-400.
doi:10.1515/ling.1979.17.5-6.365
- Lin, Y.-H. (2015). Uses of someone: Beyond simple person reference. *Working Papers of the Linguistics Circle*, 25(2), 79-87.
- Lindekilde, L. (2013). Claims-Making. In D. A. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Lindsay, J., & Heliker, D. (2018). The Unexpected Death of a Child and The Experience of Emergency Service Personnel. *Journal of Emergency Nursing*, 44(1), 64-70.
doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jen.2017.06.002>
- Lindström, A., & Mondada, L. (2009). Assessments in Social Interaction: Introduction to the Special Issue. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 42(4), 299-308.
doi:10.1080/08351810903296457
- Lozano, R., Wang, H., Foreman, K. J., Rajaratnam, J. K., Naghavi, M., Marcus, J. R., . . . Murray, C. J. L. (2011). Progress towards Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 on maternal and child mortality: an updated systematic analysis. *The Lancet*, 378(9797), 1139-1165. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(11\)61337-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61337-8)
- Lynch, M. (2000). The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Conversation Analysis. *Text - Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse*, 20(4).
doi:10.1515/text.1.2000.20.4.517
- Lynch, M. (2017). *Garfinkel, Sacks and Formal Structures: Collaborative Origins, Divergences, and the Vexed Unity of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis*. Keynote Address.
- Macfarlane, A., & Mugford, M. (1984). *Birth counts: statistics of pregnancy and childbirth*. London: HMSO.

- Martin, A., & Lynch, M. (2009). Counting Things and People: The Practices and Politics of Counting. *Social Problems*, 56(2), 243-266. doi:10.1525/sp.2009.56.2.243
- Masquelier, B., Hug, L., Sharrow, D., You, D., Hogan, D., Hill, K., . . . Alkema, L. (2018). Global, regional, and national mortality trends in older children and young adolescents (5–14 years) from 1990 to 2016: an analysis of empirical data. *The Lancet Global Health*, 6(10), e1087-e1099. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X\(18\)30353-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30353-X)
- Maynard, D. W., & Clayman, S. E. (1991). The Diversity of Ethnomethodology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17, 385-418. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.17.080191.002125
- Maynard, D. W., & Clayman, S. E. (2003). Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. In L. Reynolds & N. Herman-Kinney (Eds.), *Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism* (pp. 173-202). Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
- Maynard, D. W., & Freese, J. (2012). Good News, Bad News, and Affect. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 92-111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Menzel, A. (2014). *The political life of black infant mortality*. (Ph.D.). University of Washington,
- Nannan, N. (2018). *Measuring child mortality in resource limited settings using alternative approaches: South African case study*. (PhD). University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
- Nannan, N., Dorrington, R. E., Laubscher, R., Zinyakatira, N., Prinsloo, M., Darikwa, T. B., . . . Bradshaw, D. (2012). *Under-5 mortality statistics in South Africa: shedding some light on the trend and causes 1997-2007*. Retrieved from Cape Town:
- Nehari, M., Grebler, D., & Toren, A. (2007). A voice unheard: grandparents' grief over children who died of cancer. *Mortality*, 12(1), 66-78.
doi:10.1080/13576270601088475

- Ochs, E., Schegloff, E. A., & Thompson, S. A. (1996). *Interaction and Grammar*: Cambridge University Press.
- Ochs, E., & Schieffelin, B. (1989). Language has a heart. *Text - Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse*, 9(1), 7-266. doi:10.1515/text.1.1989.9.1.7
- Osterman, P. (1980). *Getting started: The youth labor market*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Parsons, T. (1937). *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Patel, L. (2005). Social development and curriculum renewal in an African context. *The Social Work Practitioner-Researcher*, 17(3), 363-377.
- Patel, L. (2008). Getting it Right and Wrong: An Overview of a Decade of Post-Apartheid Social Welfare. *Practice*, 20(2), 71-81. doi:10.1080/09503150802058822
- Peräkylä, A. (2004). Reliability and validity in research based on naturally occurring social interaction. In D. Silverman (Ed.), *Qualitative Research: Theory, method and practice* (pp. 283-304). London: Sage Publications.
- Peräkylä, A. (2012). Epilogue: what does the study of interaction offer to emotion research. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 274-289). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peräkylä, A., & Ruusuvuori, J. (2012). Facial Expression and Interactional Regulation of Emotion. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in Interaction* (pp. 64-91). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peräkylä, A., & Silverman, D. (1991). *Owning Experience: Describing the Experience of Other Persons* (Vol. 11).
- Peräkylä, A., & Sorjonen, M.-L. (2012). *Emotion in Interaction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Pillay-van Wyk, V., Msemburi, W., Laubscher, R., Dorrington, R. E., Groenewald, P., Glass, T., . . . Bradshaw, D. (2016). Mortality trends and differentials in South Africa from 1997 to 2012: second National Burden of Disease Study. *The Lancet Global Health*, 4(9), e642-e653. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X\(16\)30113-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(16)30113-9)
- Pillay-van Wyk, V., Msemburi, W., Laubscher, R., Dorrington, R. E., Groenewald, P., Matzopoulos, R., . . . Bradshaw, D. (2013). Second National Burden of Disease Study South Africa: national and subnational mortality trends, 1997–2009. *The Lancet*, 381, S113. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(13\)61367-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61367-7)
- Pino, M. (2017). I-Challenges: Influencing Others' Perspectives by Mentioning Personal Experiences in Therapeutic Community Group Meetings. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 80(3), 217-242. doi:10.1177/0190272517706048
- Pizarro, D., Inbar, Y., & Helion, C. (2011). On disgust and moral judgment. *Emotion Review*, 3(3), 267-268. doi:10.1177/1754073911402394
- Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments : Some Features of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of Social Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme Case Formulations: A Way of Legitimizing Claims. *Human Studies*, 9(2-3), 219-229. doi:10.1007/BF00148128
- Posel, D. (1991). *The making of apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Posel, D. (2000). A Mania for Measurement: Statistics and Statecraft in Apartheid South Africa. In S. Dubow (Ed.), *Science and society in Southern Africa* (pp. 116-142). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2003). "I'm a Bit Concerned"--Early Actions and Psychological Constructions in a Child Protection Helpline. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 36(3), 197-240. doi:10.1207/S15327973RLSI3603_01
- Prior, L. (1985). Making sense of mortality. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 7(2), 167-190. doi:10.1111/1467-9566.ep10949063
- Psathas, G. (1995). *Conversation analysis: The study of talk-in-interaction*. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Ratele, K., Shefer, T., & Clowes, L. (2012). Talking South African Fathers: A Critical Examination of Men's Constructions and Experiences of Fatherhood and Fatherlessness. *South African Journal of Psychology*, 42(4), 553-563. doi:10.1177/008124631204200409
- Raymond, G. (2004). Prompting Action: The Stand-Alone "So" in Ordinary Conversation. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 37(2), 185-218. doi:10.1207/s15327973rlsi3702_4
- Raymond, G., & Heritage, J. (2006). The epistemics of social relations: Owning grandchildren. *Language in Society*, 35(5), 677-705. doi:10.1017/S0047404506060325
- Richter, L., & Morrell, R. (2006). *BABA: men and fatherhood in South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Rose, N. (1989). *Governing the soul: Technologies of human subjectivity*. London: Routledge.
- Rose, N. (1998). *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rusnock, A. A. (2002). *Vital Accounts: Quantifying Health and Population in Eighteenth-Century England and France*. Cambridge University Press.

- Sacks, H. (1972a). An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing sociology. In D. Sudnow (Ed.), *Studies in Social Interaction* (pp. 31-74). New York: Free Press.
- Sacks, H. (1972b). On the analyzability of stories by children. In J. J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.), *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication* (pp. 325-345). New York: Rinehart & Winston.
- Sacks, H. (1984). On doing 'being ordinary'. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of Social Action* (pp. 413-429).
- Sacks, H. (1992). *Lectures on Conversation* (Vol. 1 & 2). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Sacks, H., & Schegloff, E. A. (1979). Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons in conversation and their interaction. In G. Psathas (Ed.), *Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology* (pp. 15-21). New York: Irvington.
- Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn Taking for Conversation. In J. I. M. Schenkein (Ed.), *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction* (pp. 7-55): Academic Press.
- Sarma, R., & Choudhury, L. (2014). Infant and Child Mortality at District Level of India : A Modified Brass Approach. *Middle East Journal of Age and Ageing*, 11(2), 29-34.
doi:10.5742/MEAA.2014.92400
- Schegloff, E. A. (1986). The routine as achievement. *Human Studies*, 9(2), 111-151.
doi:10.1007/bf00148124
- Schegloff, E. A. (1987a). Analyzing single episodes of interaction: An exercise in conversation analysis. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 50(2), 101-114.
doi:10.2307/2786745

- Schegloff, E. A. (1987b). Recycled turn beginnings; A precise repair mechanism in conversation's turn-taking organization. In G. Button & P. H. Lee (Eds.), *Talk and Social Organization* (pp. 70-85). England: Multilingual Matters.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1988). Description in the Social Sciences: Talk-in-interaction. *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics*, 2(1-2), 1-24. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1075/iprapip.2.1-2.01sch>
- Schegloff, E. A. (1992). Repair After Next Turn: The Last Structurally Provided Defense of Intersubjectivity in Conversation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(5), 1295-1345. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781417>
- Schegloff, E. A. (1996a). Confirming Allusions: Toward an Empirical Account of Action. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(1), 161-216. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782190>
- Schegloff, E. A. (1996b). Turn organization: One intersection of grammar and interaction. In E. Ochs, E. A. Schegloff, & S. A. Thompson (Eds.), *Interaction and Grammar* (pp. 52–133). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schegloff, E. A. (1997). Practices and actions: Boundary cases of other-initiated repair. *Discourse Processes*, 23(3), 499-545. doi:10.1080/01638539709545001
- Schegloff, E. A. (2007a). Conveying who you are: the presentation of self, strictly speaking. In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural and Social Perspectives* (pp. 123-148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schegloff, E. A. (2007b). Conveying who you are: The presentation of self, strictly speaking. In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural, and Social Perspectives* (pp. 123--148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Schegloff, E. A. (2007a). *Sequence Organization in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schegloff, E. A. (2007b). A tutorial on membership categorization. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 39(3), 462-482. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2006.07.007>
- Schegloff, E. A., & Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up Closings. In *Semiotica* (Vol. 8, pp. 289).
- Scheibman, J. (2007). Subjective and intersubjective uses of generalizations in English conversations. In R. Engelbretson (Ed.), *Stancetaking in Discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction* (pp. 111-138). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Schmid, J. (2010). A History of the Present: Uncovering Discourses in (South African) Child Welfare. *The British Journal of Social Work*, 40(7), 2102-2118.
doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcp124
- Schmid, J., & Patel, L. (2016). The interaction of local and international child welfare agendas: a South African case. *International Social Work*, 59(2), 246-255.
- Schutz, A. (1970). *On Phenomenology and Social Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Searle, J. R. (1958). Proper Names. *Mind*, 67(266), 166-173. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108>
- September, R., & Dinbabo, M. (2008). Gearing Up for Implementation: A New Children's Act for South Africa. *Practice*, 20(2), 113-122. doi:10.1080/09503150802067286
- Sidnell, J. (2007). 'Look'-prefaced turns in first and second position: launching, interceding and redirecting action. *Discourse Studies*, 9(3), 387-408.
doi:10.1177/1461445607076204
- Sørensen, T. F. (2011). Sweet dreams: Biographical blanks and the commemoration of children. *Mortality*, 16(2), 161-175. doi:10.1080/13576275.2011.572424

- Sorjonen, M.-L., & Peräkylä, A. (2012). Introduction. In A. Peräkylä & M.-L. Sorjonen (Eds.), *Emotion in interaction* (pp. 3-15). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- StatsSA. (2013). *Millennium Development Goals, Country Report 2013*. Retrieved from Pretoria:
- StatsSA. (2015). *Millennium Development Goals 4: Reduce Child Mortality*. Pretoria, South Africa: Statistics South Africa
- Stivers, T. (2007). Alternative recognitionals in person reference. In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person reference in interaction: Linguistic, cultural, and social perspectives* (pp. 73-96). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stivers, T., Enfield, N. J., & Levinson, S. C. (2007). Person reference in interaction. In N. J. Enfield & T. Stivers (Eds.), *Person reference in interaction: Linguistic, cultural, and social perspectives* (pp. 1-20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stivers, T., & Rossano, F. (2010). Mobilizing Response. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(1), 3-31. doi:10.1080/08351810903471258
- Stokoe, E. (2012a). Categorical systematics. *Discourse Studies*, 14(3), 345-354. doi:10.1177/1461445612441543
- Stokoe, E. (2012b). Moving forward with membership categorization analysis: Methods for systematic analysis. *Discourse Studies*, 14(3), 277-303. doi:10.1177/1461445612441534
- Timmermans, S. (2005). Death brokering: constructing culturally appropriate deaths. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 27(7), 993-1013. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9566.2005.00467.x
- Turmel, A. (2008). *A historical sociology of childhood: developmental thinking, categorization, and graphic visualization*. Cambridge.

- UN. (2018). *Levels and trends in child mortality*. Retrieved from New York:
http://www.childmortality.org/files_v22/download/UN%20IGME%20Child%20Mortality%20Report%202018.pdf
- UNICEF. (2017). *Levels and trends in child mortality report 2017*. Retrieved from
https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Child_Mortality_Report_2017.pdf
- United Nations, G. A. (1989). *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child*. New York
- Wang, H., Abajobir, A. A., Abate, K. H., Abbafati, C., Abbas, K. M., Abd-Allah, F., . . . Murray, C. J. L. (2017). Global, regional, and national under-5 mortality, adult mortality, age-specific mortality, and life expectancy, 1970–2016: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2016. *The Lancet*, 390(10100), 1084-1150. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(17\)31833-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31833-0)
- Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society* (G. Roth & C. Wittich Eds. Vol. 1). New York: Bedminster Press.
- Weir, L. (2006). *Pregnancy, risk and biopolitics: on the threshold of the living subject*. London: Routledge.
- Wetherell, M. (2013). Feeling Rules, Atmospheres and Affective Practice: Some Reflections on the Analysis of Emotional Episodes. In *Privilege, Agency and Affect: Understanding the Production and Effects of Action* (pp. 221-239). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Whalen, J., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1998). Observations on the Display and Management of Emotion in Naturally Occurring Activities: The Case of "Hysteria" in Calls to 9-1-1. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 61(2), 141-159. doi:10.2307/2787066

- Whitehead, K. A. (2009). "Categorizing the Categorizer": The Management of Racial Common Sense in Interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 72(4), 325-342.
Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677374>
- Whitehead, K. A. (2011). An Ethnomethodological, Conversation Analytic Approach to Investigating Race in South Africa. *South African Review of Sociology*, 42(3), 1-22.
doi:10.1080/21528586.2011.621227
- Whitehead, K. A. (in press). On Sacks and the analysis of racial categories-in-action. In R. Smith, R. Fitzgerald, & W. Housley (Eds.), *On Sacks: Methodology, Materials and Inspirations*. London, UK: Routledge.
- WHO. (2016). *Global health estimates 2015: deaths by cause, age, sex, by country and by region, 2000–2015*. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates_regional_2000_2015/en/
- Wilce, J. M. (2009). *Language and Emotion*: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilkinson, S., & Kitzinger, C. (2006). Surprise As an Interactional Achievement: Reaction Tokens in Conversation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(2), 150-182.
doi:10.1177/019027250606900203
- Winnicott, D. W. (1957). *The child, the family, and the outside world*. United States of America: Estate of D W Winnicott.
- Winnicott, D. W. (1960). The theory of the parent-infant relationship. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 41, 585-595.
- Wolpe, H. (1972). Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid. *Economy and Society*, 1(4), 425-456. doi:10.1080/03085147200000023
- Zelizer, V. A. (1994). *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children*: Princeton University Press.

Zimmerman, D. H. (1998). Identity, context and interaction. In *Identities in talk*. (pp. 87-106). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd.