Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 1 Tristan Lendrum. 1907015. Masters in Philosophy Research Paper 2024. “An evaluation of genetic editing in terms of its impact on free will, genetic determinism and reason-responsiveness.” Supervisor: Professor Mark Leon. Doctor Ashley Coates. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 2 Contents Acknowledgements. ................................................................................................................................ 3 Plagiarism Declaration ............................................................................................................................ 4 Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 5 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 7 Structure ............................................................................................................................................... 10 Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 13 Genetic influence on behaviour. ....................................................................................................... 13 Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................... 17 Choice and Reasons Responsiveness. ............................................................................................... 17 Reason responsiveness. ..................................................................................................................... 20 Moderate Reasons Responsiveness. ............................................................................................. 29 Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................... 33 Scope of choice. ................................................................................................................................ 33 Reason responsiveness and gene editing. ........................................................................................ 34 Genetic editing as a neutral and necessary component for the expansion of individual freedoms. 39 What might genetic editing mean for free will? ........................................................................... 40 Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................................................... 45 The concrete case. ............................................................................................................................ 45 The hypothetical case. .................................................................................................................. 46 Hannibal Lecter’s Dinner Party. ......................................................................................................... 50 Hannibal. ....................................................................................................................................... 50 Lecter. ............................................................................................................................................ 52 The Dinner Party. ........................................................................................................................... 52 Twin World’s Diverge. .................................................................................................................... 54 Chapter 5 ............................................................................................................................................... 57 Facing an impossibalist argument. .................................................................................................... 57 Discussing Ultimate Responsibility as presented by Kane. ........................................................... 59 What do we mean by ‘the way we are’? ....................................................................................... 61 Directly addressing the requirement of Ultimate Responsibility. ..................................................... 64 Chapter 6 ............................................................................................................................................... 66 Conclusion. ........................................................................................................................................ 66 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 68 Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 3 Acknowledgements. I could not have completed this work without the guidance, support and encouragement of those around me and would like to acknowledge and thank them here. To my wife Caitlind, Thank you for your boundless encouragement, support and endless supply of coffee. To my mother Amanda, Your keen eye and constructive discussion gave me food for thought and direction in converting an intriguing idea into a research paper. My supervisor Mark, Your patience, wealth of knowledge and insight has been invaluable in taking my ideas (some good and many bad) from rough concepts and ramblings to fully formed arguments. Your guidance has in no small way made the completion of this paper a reality. My supervisor Ashley, Having the wisdom of two supervisors on my side has afforded me a wealth of perspectives, it is no doubt that your input and feedback challenged and refined my own arguments in ways that would not have been possible otherwise. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 4 Plagiarism Declaration I ___Tristan Lendrum___ (Student number: _1907015_) am a student registered for Master of Arts in Philosophy by coursework and research_ in the year __2024__. I hereby declare the following: I am aware that plagiarism (the use of someone else’s work without their permission and/or without acknowledging the original source) is wrong. I confirm that ALL the work submitted for assessment for the above course is my own unaided work except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise. I have followed the required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others. I understand that the University of the Witwatersrand may take disciplinary action against me if there is a belief that this is not my own unaided work or that I have failed to acknowledge the source of the ideas or words in my writing. Signature: ___________________ Date: __16/02/2024__ Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 5 Similarity Report Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 6 Abstract Genetic editing has advanced at an ever-increasing speed over the past five decades and has sparked curiosity from all corners of academia. This paper discusses genetic editing in terms of its interaction with philosophical topics relating to the freedom of will. A vast collection of literature has already been published regarding the ethical considerations of genetic editing, however, in this paper I put those concerns to the side and seriously analyse the impact a complete practice of genetic engineering would have on our free will in the context of a moderately reasons responsive framework. Theoretically, the discussion occurs under the theoretical position of compatibilism. The main claim of the argument which develops in this paper is that genetic editing is uniquely positioned to expand our scope of free will in line with a moderately reasons responsive understanding of free will. Key words: Genetic Engineering, Compatibalism, Free Will, Reasons Responsiveness, SMA, Gene editing, Gene by environment interaction. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 7 Introduction This paper aims to explore the relationship between the deterministic nature of a mind understood through the lens of the physicalist, and genetic editing and how this interaction might affect our understanding of free will and freedoms to choose “the way we are” so to speak. This paper will explore this question in two main ways: firstly, it will examine the notion of “the way we are” and the amount of control we might have over his fact. This points us to the realm of free will and more specifically determinism. This paper considers both the positions of the compatibilist and the incompatibilist in how free to control “the way we are” we could be in a deterministic world. Secondly, the discussion will shift towards the factors that might constitute the deterministic nature of the mind, and in taking a physicalist approach, an argument is made that there is a physical basis for determining “the way we are”. From this juncture we can begin exploration on the key topic of this paper, that being: how genetic editing, the manipulation of the physical substrata that come to constitute the mind, might provide us with a way to alter “the way we are” for the first time in our human existence. The intersection between free will and genetic editing may at first seem rather esoteric. This fact is not lost on me, however, I do not believe that this should act as a deterrent for philosophical discussion to be had on the topic. The possibility of genetic editing coming to influence psychological characteristics, intelligence and cognition are rather sci-fi at present, but with the immense speed of progression being seen in the field, discussions such as the one had in this paper may well come to be important topics in the future. Curiosity is a natural and key component to what it means to be human, and that curiosity extends to our own inner workings, it seems intuitive to self reflexively ask: “why do I do the things I do, why do I make certain choices and why are my preferences aligned in the ways that they are?”. Psychology as a field of study is by and large fixated on these kinds of questions. The answers it has attempted to provide thus far range from experiences in upbringing, attachment styles, conditioning, predisposition, environmental influences, sexual drives, life and death instincts, parental relationships, peer modelling and so on and so forth. There is a litany of possible explanations given for our actions and choices. However, the main take away from current psychological research and the work that is most useful for the discussion at hand is the balance between nature and nurture and how this comes to influence and shape the way we are. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 8 The manipulation of environment is something firmly within our grasp at current, that being the nurture aspect of the debate. The very ways in which we try to raise our children is an indication of this. The right school, the right friends, hobbies, and exposure to positive influences are all right at the top of a parents’ list of important factors related to child rearing. We influence the environments of others and of ourselves all the time. In a discussion on the psychology of the Republic, Jonathan Lear hits on a similar notion, the environment we grow up in becomes internalised and as we grow, we process this internalisation and later in life come to externalise this environmental influence, and as such, come to create our world in a way that fits best with our understanding of the world we internalised when we were young (Lear, 1992). On this reading, he sheds light on how Socrates intended to study the soul by examining first the city, this seems to rely on the idea that the mind creates its environment as the environment comes to create the mind. The central point at which we have always lost control, however, is when we journey into the mind itself. Environment, we can control, the mind however remains mysterious and aloof. In a rather ironic way, it seems that the mind hides its true nature away from itself as it attempts to study its own image. Descartes was of the opinion that the mind was indeed incorporeal, something other and non-physical and that in some mysterious way, it came to interact with the body, a definitionally corporeal thing (Descartes, 1993). Thus, substance dualism was born and subsequently discredited in the hundreds of years of philosophy that followed. In today’s age of modern physics, we come to understand that physical entities may only be influenced by physical things. Modern medicine, imaging, genetic analysis, and scientific breakthroughs tell us that whilst thought itself as a concept may not be tangible in the traditional sense, there is nonetheless a physical basis for how this phenomenon occurs. The notion of a non-physical substance somehow interacting with a physical substance holds very little sway in today’s discussion of the mind. As such we might turn towards a physicalist view. The hard-liner physicalist holds that the mind is purely physical, the mind is nothing short of a complex series of neuronal pathways, sensitive to stimulus and reactive in such a way that behaviour is born out of its operations (Stoljar, 2022). As such, physical systems are constrained by physical laws. Matter may not be created nor destroyed, it may only be altered in form, for example. This is the first law of thermodynamics, and this law would hold in any corner of our physical universe. The above is of course a very strict and inflexible depiction of the mind, one which seems to leave out the undeniable intuition that we all have that the mind is something more, something beyond the grasp of a purely physical depiction. This intuition Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 9 is embodied best in the arguments of Nagel and his question: what is it like to be a bat? The subjective, what it is like-ness to live and think and choose causes us to acknowledge the physical and the mental as two concepts rather than being mere synonyms of one another (Nagel, 1987). The way in which I propose reconciling the physical nature of the mind with its undeniably ethereal character of subjective experience is by making an appeal to supervenience. In short, the ethereal mind comes to supervene upon the physical brain, the physical then gives rise to a non-physical entity in virtue of these properties emerging from the complex collection of physical structures that are embodied by the brain (Stoljar, 2023). The explanation above becomes clearer with an example provided by David Lewis. If one is to think about an image printed on a dot matrix printer, we find that the image is made up of many uniform and identical dots, these dots, when arranged in a particular way give rise to an image. This image supervenes on the dots and their structure, the image then emerges from the dots in a way in which the global properties of the image are nothing but a series of dots. If two pictures were printed, they could not differ except for the case in which there is a dot in one and not the other (Lewis, 1986). 1 The mind then comes to be born of and supervenes upon the physical world and as such, it stands to reason that it would be constrained by physical law. The place where we might find the most traction in understanding and shaping the mind then lies in how able we are to manipulate and influence the physical substrata that give rise to the mental. One such sub- stratum would be genetically determined structures that influence the mind and cognition. This will be the primary point of discussion for this paper. The fundamental question for this discussion is whether the manipulation of genetic structures might give rise to the manipulation of the psychic structures of mind and might giving this control to individuals afford them increased personal freedoms? The answer which I aim to argue towards in this paper is that genetic editing is able to expand the scope of individual freedom and thereby increase the amount of personal freedom of will experienced by the individual in a way hitherto never experienced in human history. Genetic editing can, in short, increase our individual capacities for acting freely, when that action is 1 Lewis here is directly quoted within (Stoljar, 2023). Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 10 undertaken in a moderately reasons responsive framework, and those actions taken are done so in accordance with our best or most valued reasons. Structure The way in which this paper will achieve its intended goal is by structuring its focus around three main pillars. The first, is a discussion on choice. This discussion aims to describe in as much detail as is necessary for the argument at hand, the nature of choice and some of its key components. The components most relevant to this paper will be the role individual disposition plays in choice, the predetermination of choice and the extent to which an individual’s choice can be said to be free. The second, is a discussion and summary of scientific advances in the field of genetic editing and the hypothetical, but not impossible, extension of the field into the realm of psychological genetic manipulation. This discussion will tie into the previous section of the paper in that it will be proposed that genetic editing, be that in some future or hypothetical state, stands to meaningfully influence the way in which we come to understand our individual wills and the freedom with which we go about our willing. The third and final pillar is a hypothetical and abstract discussion of what free will might come to be in a world where psychological genetic editing is possible and practiced. The driving point of the argument being that genetic editing stands to expand the scope of human freedom in ways hitherto impossible, and that this kind of genetic editing is not as impossible as it seemed in years passed and becomes more plausible as the field matures from its infancy. The goal of this pillar is to substantiate the claim I make that genetic editing can extend the scope of our individual freedoms and our capacity for acting freely. These three pillars will come to form the three component parts of the paper, however, the structure of the argument will unfold as follows: As a jumping off point, some preliminaries will need to be developed. Firstly, the scientific basis for genetic editing will be discussed in sufficient detail for the argument. This paper is not primarily focused on the feasibility of genetic editing and its effects on psychological constructs, nor is it focused on providing a rigorous review of the scientific literature presently available on the topic. Rather this section will be used to stage the argument going forward. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 11 Secondly, an overview of choice and free will as it is currently understood in academia will be provided. With these preliminaries in place, the argument can run its course. A discussion of choice begins the core argument of the paper, and this then feeds into exposition and arguments made in favour of reasons responsiveness. Moderate reasons responsiveness in particular will be the theoretical perspective from which the argument will set its foundations. Moderate reasons responsiveness provides a theory of choice which can accommodate a deterministic world as well as freedom of will, it does so by promoting decisions made on the basis of good enough reasons. The term good enough simply put, means a reason that is sufficient to satisfy the reasons responsive mechanism found in the agent. When choices are made on the basis of reasons that are good enough, even within a deterministic framework, we find the conditions for freely willed action to have been met. This will be the position I argue for and from in subsequent chapters. Following the foundation of moderate reasons responsiveness, the argument will then turn towards the scope of choice, this refers to the number of choices possible for selection by the individual at the moment of choice. A link can be drawn to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) here, however, I will not be utilizing the concept in the same way as incompatibilist arguments have done in the past. Rather, I will argue that the scope of choice, whether that be a narrow or broad scope, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freely willed action. This point is argued for by first establishing: 1) What is meant by scope of choice in this context, 2) Genetic editing’s ability to expand, and by extension, narrow an agent’s scope of choice, 3) By arguing a concrete case in which genetic editing can be shown to expand the scope of choice available to an individual and lastly, 4) By arguing a hypothetical case in which genetic editing may, in some possible future reality, come to alter human psychological characteristics and impact the agent’s scope of choice in this way. Following this argument, it would be remiss of me to ignore the impossibilist position imposed on free will and choice by Galen Strawson. The Strawsonian position, which calls for responsibility ‘all the way back’ must be addressed if my argument is to hold any more weight than a narrowly applicable and niche thought experiment. For this reason, I will outline and argue against the Strawsonian position on the grounds that total self-determination is an Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 12 unnecessary requirement for choice to be considered free and for individuals to take on moral responsibility for their actions. I will argue instead that, moderate reasons responsiveness provides us a more than adequate system with which to accommodate freely willed choice in a deterministic world and that despite our choosing the way we do because of the way we are, we are still able to choose freely if we make choices that are aligned with our best reasons which are dictated by the way we are. My argument will then take the position that genetic editing can firstly: expand our scope of choice, which is a necessary component of free will. And secondly: I will argue that genetic editing can change our responsiveness to reasons from the moment of administration of a gene therapy. These two combined points provide grounds for the possibility of agential manipulation of the scope of choice, which in turn allows an agent to factor more reasons into their reasons responsive mechanism and also acts to manipulate the sensitivity of the agent’s responsiveness to certain reasons. This argument culminates in a hypothetical in which an agent has more choices than before and the possibility of the agent directly manipulating their sensitivity to reasons in the future. This creates an expansion (or shrinking on a more cynical reading) of human choice and free will which has never before been feasible, in virtue of genetic engineering. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 13 Chapter 1 Genetic influence on behaviour. It seems all discussion had as to the effects of genetic editing on free will come to naught unless there is reason to believe that genetics are capable of affecting behaviour in an important way. The research done on the genetic influence on behaviour has predominantly been concerned with its effect on intelligence and verbal and spatial abilities. In a rather comprehensive review published in 1997, the results cited point toward a rather reliable correlation between verbal and spatial abilities and genetic heritability (Plomin and Craig, 1997). The review considered information from a study that included more than 1500 pairs of twins, across seven different studies, in four different countries and across the ages of childhood to old age (Plomin and Craig, 1997). Viewed from multiple perspectives, the results discuss correlations between parents and their children, siblings, and identical twins. In the case of twins, correlations on verbal and spatial abilities greatly exceed those correlations drawn between fraternal twins, with identical twin correlations on verbal ability being 0.76, whilst fraternal twin correlation is 0.43 (Plomin and Craig, 1997). On spatial ability tests the identical twin correlation was 0.62, whilst in fraternal twins it was 0.34 (Plomin and Craig, 1997). This high correlation, particularly when compared to fraternal twins, indicates that genetic identicalness plays a role in ability when environment is shared. This points towards important information in support of the hypothesis that genetic editing may powerfully influence cognitive abilities, even when environment is considered. If the genetic code in question is that which is possessed by individuals who perform incredibly well in various tests of intelligence, that code may be then copied into the genome of a child before birth or after to give them an advantage in terms of these measures of intelligence. It seems reasonable to conclude that intelligence effects behaviour, at the very least, varying levels of intelligence will influence the decisions different individuals make in terms of their reason responsive reactions to environmental factors. This is not to say that they will ever move away from a reason responsive mode of decision making, but rather that intelligence will affect the various kinds of responses an individual might have to certain stimuli. These responses are also shown to be heritable. In the Swedish Twin Registry, it was shown that responder behaviour in a game-theoretical experiment was 42% heritable (Johnson, Penke and Spinath, 2011). This demonstrates that a particular kind of behaviour is strongly correlated with Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 14 heritability, thereby providing support for the notion that certain behaviours are very much determined by genetic predisposition and mediated upon by environment. In a similar way, environment is also shaped by certain genetic factors. It has been shown that individual differences in socioeconomic status are substantially genetic in their origin according to twin and adoption studies (Kaili et al., 2018). Certain estimates from twin studies cited in Kaili et al (2018), suggest heritability estimates of around 50%, this means that about half of the individual differences in socioeconomic status can be explained by an individual’s inherited genetic sequence. Certain behaviours then are shown to be, at least partially determined by genetic predispositions and, socioeconomic status can also be explained by genetics at least half of the time. Intelligence and genetics are also closely inter-connected, where we find a higher correlation of intelligence between identical twins than we do in fraternal twins. We find genetics to have a powerful role to play in both socio-economic status as well as in intelligence, however, these two factors are not isolated from one another. Socioeconomic status to a large degree determines an individual’s environment, from the nutrition they have available to them, to the education that might be able to receive. Intelligence also acts to predict socioeconomic status to a large degree. So how might these statistics lend themselves to the discussion at hand within this paper? Put simply, individuals who possess similar genetic makeups are predisposed to respond to stimuli in similar ways, this points towards the decisions they make and the way they exercise their free will. If we wish to genetically edit an individual before conception, we might pair the genetic codes of two individuals who demonstrate the kind of decision-making processes we wish to pass on. This child will then be genetically predisposed to make decisions in just such a way. This is in no way a guarantee of behaviour, genetics and genetic predisposition are still nonetheless mediated upon by environment, the converse also being true. If this discussion was had many years prior, dating back to the days of the likes of B.F. Skinner or Ivan Pavlov, our recommendations for creating a super-moral human being would have lain firmly in the region of environment and environmental manipulation. We have always been able to manipulate the environment surrounding development and do so with conscious intent. If this was not the case, we would not have waiting lists for so called ‘good schools’, nor would parents wish to exercise control over what their children see and are exposed to on social media. Environmental manipulation then is no new idea, however, what makes this discussion unique is that for the Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 15 first time we are now able to manipulate the factors lying in the other half of our developmental influences, that being genetics. The flip side to the coin of genetic engineering in humans, turns away from providing otherwise healthy individuals with enhanced intellectual, behavioural, or psychological traits, rather we might consider the effect genetic engineering could have as a preventative medicine. Phenylketonuria (PKU) has been identified as a single gene recessive disorder that occurs in around 1 in 10 000 births, furthermore, the gene responsible for PKU was located on chromosome 12, from this we have been able to identify the gene for fragile X, which is the second most prevalent cause of cognitive disorders (Plomin and Craig, 1997). The predictive power of genomic mapping discussed thus far does not operate as the singular influence on predicting an individual’s cognitive capacity or scholastic performance, rather, genetics and environment come together to create the individual in this respect. From contemporary research using twin studies we may conclude that just over half of the variance in school achievement can be accounted for by genetic influences (Holden, Haughbrook and Hart, 2022). That being that for half of all the variance seen in school achievement in children studied, more than 50% of that variance comes as a direct result of genetics, and the other 50% however, is accounted for by the environment in which these children find themselves. As simple as this picture appears, that being that what genetics fails to account for is captured by environment and what environment fails to account for is captured by genetics, fails to capture the entire picture. What seems to be left out are the experiences of the individuals that make up these samples, context influences the role genetic variation has in relation to environment and vice versa, this consideration of context within the gene environment interaction is termed a gene-by-environment interaction (Holden, Haughbrook and Hart, 2022). What this means is that a gene-by-environment interaction demonstrates the effect of context on phenotype and how this differs depending on the individual’s genetic predispositions, or, when the effect of an individual’s genetic predisposition on a phenotype differs dependant on the context in which the individual finds themselves (Holden, Haughbrook and Hart, 2022). We see this interaction most clearly when we consider the varying contexts of different classrooms. Classroom quality varies immensely across schools, cities, provinces, and countries. The variation between schools in developing nations is substantially greater than in developed countries. If one is to consider the variation between classroom settings in South Africa, we find some elite boarding schools, with fees in the hundreds of thousands of Rand a Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 16 year compared to underserviced government schools where the schooling is free. This inequality not only indicates a substantial difference in access to resources but also points towards a substantial difference in scholastic context as well. This context makes a substantial difference when considering the gene-by-environment interaction amongst the students. Where we find high classroom quality, we also find higher genetic influences on reading skills, and likewise the genetic influence on reading skills becomes weaker when classroom quality is low (Holden, Haughbrook and Hart, 2022). In essence, what this information points to is an alignment with the bio-ecological model, whereby, supportive environments allow for the expression of genetic potential, whereas environments that are not supportive inhibit the expression of genetic potential (Holden, Haughbrook and Hart, 2022). Genetic heritability is not fixed however, it fluctuates over time, in this way its predictive power is limited and yet, this is not to say that its usefulness is negated (Harden, 2021). One might liken genetic heritability to the Gini coefficient which indicates wealth inequality amongst a population, a Gini coefficient of 1 indicates that all the wealth is held by a single household, a score of 0 indicates that the wealth is perfectly shared across the entire population, and much like heritability this coefficient is also prone to fluctuation (Harden, 2021). Despite the propensity to fluctuate it remains a useful tool, genetic heritability is much the same, we should not overestimate its power, but we should not fall prey to the notion that it is useless. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 17 Chapter 2 Choice and Reasons Responsiveness. Choice is a funny concept. It is simultaneously the most freeing thing in the world and the most restrictive and stifling. As technology advances, we become more and more connected to more and more people, services, products, and activities. This means that presently, humanity arguably has more choices to make in more fields and at more times than ever before in history. For example, cell phones did not exist one hundred years ago, there were no multinational cellular communications companies, no data plans, no cell phone contracts and no devices to choose from. Now, however, not only are there cell phones, but one must choose from hundreds of devices, pair that device with one of a dozen plans from a variety of service providers. Even in this small area of choice, the capacity for choice has expanded immensely within one hundred years, cell phones being one small example that put thousands of possible options to choose from before us that our grandparents never had. The question that emerges from this idea is this: are we more free now than our ancestors were, or less free? It is undeniable that the range of possibilities to choose from in our everyday lives has expanded immensely and continues to do so year on year. With more alternatives, we are given the possibility for more choices, more choice means we can choose with greater specificity and that specificity allows us to choose the alternative that is best tailored to our specific ‘need set’. When presented with three hundred different cell phones for example, the likelihood that we will find the cell phone best suited to our needs is much greater than if we were presented with only three options. As wonderful as this increased scope of alternatives sounds, it does come with drawbacks. Firstly, sifting through all three hundred options in search of the correct one is no small task. It is gruelling and time consuming and frankly quite irritating. The process would feel far more pleasant if we were only presented with three options. Secondly, when we are presented with so many alternatives to choose from, we stop looking for the most suitable choice and begin searching for the perfect choice (Schwartz, 2003). Surely amidst the three hundred possible devices to choose from, one of them would be the perfect fit. Our expectations skyrocket in the face of greater alternatives, we become fixated on making the best choice and paradoxically, this fixation on perfection often causes us to freeze up and experience choice paralysis (Iyengar, 2011). Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 18 I often find myself settling down for the evening with the desire to watch something good on TV. I am then presented with my first choice, which of the three streaming platforms that I am subscribed to do I use? Choosing from three alternatives isn’t the most daunting decision and so I make it. I am then presented with thousands upon thousands of on demand viewing options and after scrolling through these options for half an hour, I decide that they are all terrible and I change my streaming platform. Again, on the new streaming platform I am presented with even more on demand viewing options and yet again, I find nothing and change platform. I repeat the process on the third viewing platform and give up on my desire to watch TV and resort to reading a book instead. Surely, being presented with thousands of possible on demand viewing options would give me the best likelihood of finding a show that I want to watch, having all these alternatives to choose from should in some way make me more free than someone who does not have these thousands of viewing options and yet, at the end of the night the person who only has one channel to watch is watching the Sunday night movie, and rather enjoying it, whilst I sit in silence cursing the amount of money I spend on all my streaming subscriptions whilst finding nothing to watch. Despite the fact that I have many more alternatives to choose from than the person who only has one channel, I am enjoying myself significantly less. My multiplicity of possible choices seems to make me more miserable than someone who only has one option, and no real freedom to choose what movie to watch at all (Schwartz, 2003). So why then do we value a multitude of choices so much? Well, the main reason is that if we are devoid of alternatives to our choices, we can’t be said to be making any choices at all, in that sense we aren’t in fact acting of our own free will (Taylor, 1992). Suppose fifty years from now we have a viewing algorithm that is so advanced that it can perfectly predict and choose what you want to watch most. Each night it chooses what you watch for you, and each night you thoroughly enjoy your viewing. You never once choose what you watch and frankly, not once have you wished you were watching something else. Your options for what to watch have been removed and your happiness increases as a result of the simplicity of the process. You have been relieved of a rather tedious choice. However, what you don’t know is that part of the subscription package that this wonderful algorithm comes as a part of, is that it saves money by only making available the single show or movie it selects for you. There are in fact, no other options. You of course remain blissfully unaware of this fact as you continue to enjoy your show each night, never wanting to watch anything else, the issue is that you couldn’t watch something else, even if you wanted to. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 19 This is not to say that should your past choices have been different; you would not have other options available to you. The algorithm examines your past choices and preferences and tailors its programming to suit those choices. If you had possessed a different set of preferences or patterns of choice, the algorithm would have selected other programming for you. In this way, the program selects your viewing on the basis of your best reasons under the assumption that your choices should align to those best reasons. We now ask if you are free or not in terms of your nightly TV viewing. Some philosophers will say that you are indeed free, that despite your viewing being pre-selected and beyond your control, you still enjoy what you watch and would not choose to watch anything else anyway. According to your best reasons, this is the show you want to watch and so you watch it, the presence of alternative viewing options does not factor into your freedom, this school of thought falls roughly into the category of compatibilism (O’Connor and Franklin, 2022). Other philosophers will look upon the conclusions drawn by the compatibilists with disgust, shocked at how one could consider themselves free when they could not choose any other option than the one they do. Any happiness the person feels in this state is not due to their freedom but rather a result of their ignorance. For this group of philosophers, what matters is that there are options and that an individual is able to choose from any of these alternatives, this school of thought falls roughly into the category of incompatibilism (Vihvelin, 2022). Broadly speaking, an incompatibilist argument can occur most commonly in two main forms: 1. Arguments that claim that determinism would prevent us from making choices in the right sort of way, and 2. Arguments that determinism deprives us of the ability to do otherwise (Vihvelin, 2022). A third form, the one which this paper will focus on in earnest, is that determinism deprives us of the ability to exercise ultimate responsibility which in turn excludes the possibility of an agent being held accountable for their choices and by extension, not being able to choose freely at all (Strawson, 1982). Compatibilism by comparison makes the argument that an agent can be said to have free will in a deterministic world. This line of argument takes many forms and has seen considerable evolution over its lifespan. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt, Susan Wolf, John Martin Fischer, and Mark Ravizza to name a few have provided substantial counter arguments to the incompatibilist argument in its various forms. A key point in understanding the compatibilist position is that it factors into a broader question of whether an agent can be held morally Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 20 responsible for their choices if those choices occur in a deterministic world, whereby they could not choose other than the way they do (McKenna and Coates, 2021).2 The compatibilist argues that an agent can and should be held morally responsible for their actions in a deterministic world. A line of argumentation that I find particularly appealing is that the agent’s responsiveness to reasons for their choices should be taken into account when attributing moral responsibility. This line of argumentation is attributed to Johan Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and the collaborative account of this argument is termed moderate reasons responsiveness (McKenna and Coates, 2021). Moderate reasons responsiveness aims to address the concerns Fischer faced previously in his accounts of reasons responsiveness. This refers to a mechanism-based theory of reasons responsiveness that was too responsive to reasons and results in the bar being set far too high for an individual to be held morally responsible for their choices. By establishing a mechanism that is too insensitive to reasons limits only individuals with highly limited or insane sensitivities to reason would satisfy the conditions for freedom (McKenna and Coates, 2021). A moderate mechanism-based to reasons responsiveness slips between these two extremes and provides a strong theoretical basis for the discussions which will follow in this paper. Reason responsiveness. This section will provide a description of the reason responsive account and will apply it to some cases where dysfunction is present. The purpose of this exercise is to create an understanding of the reasons responsive account, demonstrate how examples of dysfunction operate in this model and lastly how genetic editing might be used to rectify these dysfunctions in a reasons responsive model. A reasons responsive compatibilism turns on the notion that agents do what they do because they have reasons for doing it. For example, I am now writing a philosophy paper, I have 2 This is not to say that all compatibilists hold that alternate possibilities cannot be accommodated in a deterministic world, in fact, Frankfurt argues that if determinism threatens our freedom to choose, it is not because it obstructs our ability to do otherwise and even if it did, the freedom to do otherwise is not the right kind of freedom required for moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 1969; McKenna and Coates, 2021). In this sense, the freedom to do otherwise can be included or excluded on different readings of the compatibilist argument, however, at its base it should not come to influence the question of one’s freedom to choose. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 21 reasons to engage in this activity, such as a desire to pass the course, to get my ideas across, to test my own assumptions against knowledge held in the field of philosophy and so on. At present, I have no reasons to stop writing and so I continue to write. If, however, I developed a migraine I would then have a reason to stop writing, and so I would. This indicates that an agent has the ability to select from alternatives the option that most closely aligns with their best reasons (McKenna and Coates, 2021). The agent will always select the option that best aligns with their best reasons, and as these best reasons are formed prior to the moment of choice, they can be said to be determined as the individual will choose according to reasons already formed long before the choice at hand. (McKenna and Coates, 2021). The reasons for action and indeed the reasons for choice are not arbitrary, they take into account a variety of factors ranging from environmental possibility, agential genetic composition, past life experiences and personal preferences. The reason for an action is in many ways formulaic. If a supreme being or highly advanced computer were able to take every aspect of reality into account and measures this against the laws of nature, it would be certain that they would be able to predict the reasons an individual has for the actions they undertake using this formula. This is of course referring to “Laplace’s Demon” (Laplace, 1995). And yet, despite the individual’s choices being entirely predictable and determined by the laws of nature and matters of fact, it remains true that they choose the way they do in accordance with their best reasons. If they were to choose in a manner that goes against their best reasons for the sake of demonstrating that their choices are radically free, they would find themselves choosing alternatives that they don’t actually want. This seems hardly free at all, in fact it seems stifling and counterintuitive (Pereboom, 2001). On a reasons responsive account, an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is not decided by whether they could have done otherwise, but rather it is decided by the fact that the agent’s action has the kind of causal history necessary for that agent to have been the source of their action in an important way (Pereboom, 2006). This view of agential responsibility can be termed a source view, that being that an agent’s reasons for acting originate from within themselves. Understanding why this is an important component of a compatibilist, reasons responsive account of free will is rather simple. If I am sat at my desk writing this paper, not because writing this paper is the action that best aligns with my reasons, but rather because there is a crazed, philosophically inclined gunman standing behind me with a pistol to my head, Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 22 then I am carrying out my action for all the wrong reasons. If I stop writing then I will most likely die and so I write, the reason for my writing however does not come from within myself, it originates externally to me and therefore, I am being manipulated and not acting freely at all. This is a case of coercion. However, say this gunman was good-natured, albeit crazed and dangerous, and he knows that I desperately want to finish writing my philosophy paper and choose to keep writing. I choose to write; it just so happens that I have the additional pressure of the gunman standing behind me to ensure that I do it. In this instance I am acting in accordance with my will to keep writing, I act freely in that I choose to write, gunman or not, however, I could not choose to do otherwise if my will suddenly changed. This amounts to an analogy of many deterministic arguments in that we most often, unless coerced by external factors, act in accordance with our best reasons, however, if determinism is true, which I believe it is, we could not do other than what that reason dictates. The argument then centres around whether acting on our best reasons alone, devoid of alternatives is sufficient for acting freely. My position on the matter is that our best reasons are indeed sufficient for acting freely, and that these reasons could be manipulated by certain genetic means. Standing in opposition to the source view, stands the leeway view, that being that an individual should be held morally responsible for their actions if it is the case that they could have acted other than the way they did (Pereboom, 2006). This view centres on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), that being if alternative actions are possible and available to the agent, they can and should be held morally responsible for the action that they took (Frankfurt, 1969). Agents of course, do not always respond to their reasons in a completely rational way. Take for example the gambling man, who has lost nearly his entire fortune at the blackjack table. Instead of taking his last few thousand rand and leaving the casino before he becomes absolutely penniless, he instead takes his remaining money and bets it all on a single hand. This action is not rational at all, but the decision to bet all his remaining money utilises similar reasons to the decision to leave the casino. The man desires more money, or desires money in general. He could take his remaining money home with him; he could limit his losses and keep what he has and make do. This action would result in the cementing of his loss, and this is an undesirable result for the gambler. Or he could gamble his remaining money and possibly gain more, leaving open the chance that his fortunes could increase, he would then have achieved his desire for having more money. The options in front of him point towards either accepting a certain loss or leaving open to the possibility of making a profit or losing everything. The gambler opts to leave the possibility open. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 23 He is more responsive to the reasoning that he could in fact become wealthier, this outweighs the more rational reason that he should stop so that he does not become completely broke. He is more responsive to the former reason than the latter reason (Pereboom, 2006). The issue at play in this example is that the gambler did not react to the rational reason to act otherwise because he could not have been reactive to this reason. His reasons responsive processes have been clouded by a faulty psychology, that being that he is addicted to the possibility of money and not the money itself and so he gambles (Elster, 1979). If he was responsive to reasons in the correct sort of way, he would see that the only guaranteed action for having money is to keep what he has. This reason should be the one that he is most sensitive to and yet, his reactivity is heightened for the chance of gaining more money and is decreased to holding onto what he has as a sure thing (Elster, 1979). The question that arises from the gamblers story is whether we might consider him to be acting freely at all. He is clearly making a decision to act according to reasons. It is clear that he is more reactive to certain reasons than others, and yet his reactivity to the reasons he chooses is so strong, that his reactivity to rational reasons has become entirely diminished. In many ways, he could not have done other than what he did because of how highly reactive he is to reasons that align with his faulty mechanism of choice and in that sense, he could not have done other than what he did and could not be held morally responsible for his actions. As we learn more about the gambler, we come to discover that he is a long-time gambling addict. This is not the first time he has lost big and unless intervention comes his way, it won’t be the last. The gambler is acting on the impulses presented to him by his addiction, his normal reason responsive mechanism has been hijacked by the overly gambling sensitive reactivity imbued within him by his addiction. It can be said that he is being manipulated to act in the way that he does (Heyman, 2009). This raises the necessitation of a discussion on the differences between addiction, coercion, and manipulation. All three of these concepts share a common trait in terms of the way we intuitively identify them as being non-free depictions of the will, or faulty reasons responsive mechanisms in action. Take the following for example. 1. John orders a cheeseburger instead of a salad, despite knowing that a salad is better for his health. Here we do not bat an eye as cheeseburgers, most often, taste far better than Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 24 salads and so John’s choice is not problematic to us. We can see that he is more responsive to reasons aligned to taste and enjoyment than he is to his health. 2. Suzy opts to buy a designer handbag instead of the no-name brand one, despite the no- name brand one being a quarter of the price and fulfilling largely the same function. Again, we do not feel uncomfortable with this decision as Suzy may simply have an affinity to the brand, seek out the level of quality the brand provides or enjoys the image afforded by luxury brands. 3. Steve, however, spends the last of his money on a bottle of whiskey instead of food, despite being convinced that buying food was the better choice to make. Here we find ourselves becoming uncomfortable with the freedom of his choice (Svirsky, 2021). The above examples point to the moment in which we notice that an individual’s reasons responsive mechanism is not functioning as it should. Steve, knowing that he has better reasons to buy food than whiskey, chooses the option for which the reasons are not as compelling as the alternative. He is not acting in accordance with his best reasons, our question now turns to why this is the case. In cases like Steve’s, we might attribute this dysfunction in his responsiveness to reasons in three ways: Steve may be coerced into choosing the less-good option, that being that an external party is interfering in his responsiveness to reasons by forcing him to choose the worse option. This may be achieved by offering significant reward for going against his best reasons or threatening punishment if he does not comply with the external parties will (Anderson, 2023). Steve may also be manipulated into going against his best reasons, manipulation implies that an external party is interfering in the way an agent thinks about their reasons, thereby altering their response to them (Noggle, 2022). In Steve’s case, a malicious bottle store owner may convince Steve that this particular bottle of whiskey is the last one to be sold in the country due to a trade embargo being enforced the next day. If he doesn’t buy it now, he will never have the opportunity to buy it again. This is not true, however, he is attempting to manipulate Steve to make a decision that is not aligned to his best reasons. The last possibility for Steve’s faulty responsiveness to reasons is that he is an addict. This case differs from the previous two in that the interference in the agent’s responsiveness to reasons comes from an internal source as opposed to an external source. The agent in the case of addiction experiences a weakness of will in that they are physically and or psychologically, incapable of choosing the option that they know they should (Svirsky, 2021). Steve is an Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 25 alcoholic; his body has developed a physical reliance on alcohol and his psyche has become dependent on intoxication for its functioning. Steve knows that buying whiskey instead of food is a poor choice and yet he cannot choose otherwise due to his addiction which interferes with his responsiveness to reasons from an internal source (Svirsky, 2021). Whilst in some sense it can be said that the gambler is being manipulated by his addiction, it does not necessarily follow the same pattern that most straight manipulation arguments do. In a straight manipulation argument an agent is manipulated in to A-ing against their will and so they do not freely A, for example: a voter arrives at the voting booth with the intention to vote for the democratic party and as they are about to cast their vote, a secretly implanted mind control device is set off and forces him to vote for the republican party (Mele, 2008). The example of the gambler is different because the manipulation does not come from an external source but rather occurs at an internal source, much like in the case of Steve. The addiction originates and resides within the gambler’s own mind, being reinforced by repeated exposure to gambling and being affirmed as a valid way of thinking on the few occasions that he wins. In the straight manipulation case, the voter is manipulated by a force external to them, in the gambler case, that force is internal. The action in this case comes from an addictive reason, this addiction warps and alters the reasoning of the individual and whilst within their addiction their best reasons serve the addiction as opposed to the individual themselves. The agent’s best reason or the reason they value most strongly, will be to quit and seek help so as to preserve their own lives. This best reason, however, becomes secondary to the reasons dictated to the individual by the addiction which serves the purpose of prolonging the addiction (Addiction and Responsibility, 2011 & Frank and Nagel, 2017). A common theme within rehabilitation programs is that the freedoms of the individual are often restricted so as to starve the addictive reasons of the resources they require to be satisfied. In these cases, a restriction of freedoms in the short term may lead to an expansion of freedom in the long term. Plain manipulation arguments may provide a better point of reference for the gamblers case. These arguments also contain the premise that an agent is manipulated into A-ing against their will and so do not freely A. The additional premise included with this case is that an agent is not morally responsible for their actions because their reasons for acting are brought about by a deterministic causal process that can be traced all the way back to their birth, the agent themselves have no control over this process and had no say in how it would come to inform the way they are and therefore the way they choose (Mele, 2008). Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 26 In the case of addiction, we find the locus of control in the individual has been externalised. The desire to satiate the addiction overwhelms the desire to act in accordance with one’s best reasons. What I mean by externalization is that the driving force for action is not dictated by the agent’s best interests, rather it is driven by more primitive emotions such as the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Heyman, 2009). An addict seeks to satisfy their addiction as a means of avoiding the pain of withdrawal and this avoidance of pain is an action driven by reasons. The reason an addict continues to use the substance they do is because they do not wish to feel the pain of withdrawal and that their reasons for continuing their addiction are more potent than their reasons for entering recovery. An addict’s reasons responsive mechanism operates in a faulty manner, the definition of a good enough reason changes. Whereas in non- addictive cases, the reason to prolong one’s life or be financially stable are good enough reasons to drive aligned actions, an addict may view the continuation of pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the best reason of all due to the potent addictive effect of their chosen substance. It is akin to examples of coerced confessions, whereby an individual being held by an interrogator is deprived of sleep, food, comfort and so on and is continuously presented with the threat of punishment and pain. A confession is made, not because the individual has decided to own up to something they did, but rather because they wish the pain would stop and that the punishment they have been promised will be reduced if a confession is made. Here the definition of a good enough reason has been shifted and an appeal is made to base human instincts, that being the preservation of life and the avoidance of suffering (Gudjonsson, 2003). The confession comes because of reasons, but it comes for the wrong sort of reasons. The reason most prevalent in the decision-making process is the avoidance of pain and the prevention of suffering. This reason drowns out other reasons we might consider more sensible, such as pleading innocence when they have committed no crime (Gudjonsson, 2003). The falsely imprisoned man and the addict share a common aspect in their decision-making process, that being that they are coerced into choosing an option based on reasons one would not traditionally consider the most sensible, that being, these reasons are not the best reasons. However, in the moment of choice, the reason to choose the option that will bring about the alleviation or prevention of pain is a good reason. The issue lies in the fact that this reason is inserted into the individual’s decision-making process by factors and agents external to the decision maker. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 27 But even in the case of coerced confessions we find that the circumstances surrounding the free will of the individual to be rather dubious. It is clear that they are coerced into confessing to a crime that they did not commit through the actions of an external party, in this way they did not choose freely and know that they are choosing an option which they believe is not the correct one. It is also clear that they are still acting in accordance with their best reasons as they choose to act in a way that will result in the alleviation of pain, which is a sensible thing to do. The scope of the choice made in this instance is multi-levelled. At a high level, the individual makes the irrational choice to implicate themselves in a crime they did not commit by means of a confession. But at a baser level, they make the rational choice of avoiding and alleviating pain. In the case of coercion, the reasons for action are present, but do not arise in the individual in the right sort of way as they are externally sourced by others which seek to control and manipulate the actions of the agent. This becomes apparent when we consider two different mugging victims. The first, takes place in the typical way, an individual is held up at knife point by a thief who demands the victim’s money. The victim hands over their money because they do not wish to be harmed and act according to their reasons to preserve their own safety. These reasons arise in the wrong sort of way. Victim two however, is also held up at knife point and the thief demands their money, however, upon looking at the mugger they come to realise that the mugger needs their money more than they do and so, with an air of good will, hand over their money. These reasons are not coerced, and they arise in the right kind of way, this victim is then not a victim at all, but rather acts freely and not due to coercion. As we can see from this example, the genesis of reasons plays an important role in the freedom of choice and our reasons responsive mechanism (Watson, 2004). The challenging part of this discussion is that a microscopic narrowly scoped choice of pain avoidance, in which the agent acts freely, may have the effect of or give rise to the coerced and unfree choice of confessing to a crime which they did not commit. The agent wants to avoid pain, but also wants to maintain their innocence. These two wants are at odds with one another, and the agent finds themselves in the midst of a dilemma. If they maintain their innocence, they will not be able to avoid pain and if they avoid pain, they will not be able to maintain their innocence. As it is impossible for the agent to satisfy both of their wants in this instance, they must choose the want that they want most, or are willing to sacrifice their other want in order to obtain it. This admits of a want hierarchy in which some wants must be better aligned to the agent’s reasons than others. The agent desires the avoidance of pain, this is a first order desire, one wherein he wishes to act in order to alleviate or avoid pain. This Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 28 desire does not indicate the agent’s will however. The agent desires to avoid pain, however, his will is that he maintains his innocence, this maintenance of innocence is a conflicting first order desire (Frankfurt, 1971). For that reason, the agents will assess which of the two first order desires best align with their best reasons and select that option accordingly. The agent may have reasons which dictate that the maintenance of innocence is far more important than the avoidance of pain, this may be mediated upon by second order desires about the first order desire to maintain one’s innocence (Frankfurt, 1971). The maintenance of innocence as a first order desire may give rise to second order desires such as desiring to maintain one’s innocence as a display of religious purity, or to achieve a sense of martyrdom or even to protect one’s image amongst others. In this sense, whether the agent holds out against the pain or gives in and falsely admits to the crime, they have acted in accordance with their will to either avoid pain or to maintain their innocence which has been satisfied in terms of the agent choosing between the two available options in accordance with their best reasons. Satisfying both desires simultaneously is not possible in this scenario. What remains is that the individual is forced to choose between only two alternatives, the avoidance of pain and a false admission of guilt or the experience of pain and the maintenance of innocence. One of these options will align more closely than the other to the agent’s best reasons, however neither option is entirely preferable. If the agent were to be given a third choice, if their scope of choice were to be expanded, might they now possess the opportunity to choose an option that aligns more closely still to either of the before mentioned alternatives, an option which may be most preferable in this instance. I argue that the scope of choice an agent is presented with stands to impact the freedom of choice that individual has access to. By using a moderate reasons responsive account, we find an opportunity for genetic editing to expand the scope of individual choice in such a way that dysfunctional agents might be presented with an additional option that aligns more closely with their good enough reasons than their dysfunctional response to reasons would. Through gene therapy, the gambling addict might be changed in such a way that their response to reasons that fall in line with keeping their money becomes stronger and as such an additional option is presented. They may now be able to walk away. The notion of an expanded scope of freedom will be discussed in the section that follows. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 29 Moderate Reasons Responsiveness. A moderate mechanism-based reasons responsive approach would dictate that an individual would responds to reasons that are good enough, that being that the agent would be responsive to reasons but not all reasons (McKenna and Coates, 2021). This is best illustrated by an example: Say I am on my way to work, my job pays well, I find it satisfying and challenging and I would not want to lose this job at any cost. Now I have reasons, good reasons at that, to remain at my job and do my level best. Suppose then that I was approached by an employee of a competitor’s company. This person offers me one hundred Rand to skip work for the day. I of course would respond “no” and continue to work. One hundred Rand is not a good enough reason for me to skip work and risk losing my job. Now suppose that this individual had offered me more money than I make in a year to skip work for the day, this is also a good reason, but is clearly a better reason than the hundred Rand and good enough a reason to warrant the risk of being fired for skipping work. We feel this sense of “good enough” intuitively, we often hear phrases such as “no sane person would pass that up” or “they must be mad for not taking the deal” and indeed if I had taken the hundred Rand to skip work the majority of people would most likely consider me a dullard and likewise they would think the same of me if I had turned down more money than I make in a year. This comes down to an internalised value judgement system that we all exercise, and as Fischer and Ravizza have proposed, this system is mechanism-based and moderately sensitive (McKenna and Coates, 2021). By choosing to take the large sum of money and skip work, I must also accept responsibility for the consequences of my actions, including being fired. With this reason and my mechanism- based response to accept reasons that are of a good enough nature, I could not have done other than accept the offer and likewise I could have done nothing other than turn down the one hundred Rand. A reason-responsive account dictates that I respond to reasons in such a way that I respond to reasons that are deemed best reasons (or in a moderate reasons responsive context; good enough) so that, should I be presented with good enough reasons I should choose from the possibilities presented to me by context, the option that best aligns with these reasons. My choice is determined then by the reasons available and my responsiveness to them, however, I am still acting in accordance with my internal reasons responsive mechanism and on this basis, I would be considered morally responsible for my actions. I accept these risks Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 30 based on my response to good enough reasons and I have deemed the risk worthwhile and therefore act in a manner that is deemed free. Returning to the example of the TV show-selecting algorithm, which chooses what you watch and unknown to you, prohibits you from watching any alternatives, the idea of an algorithm choosing what you watch based on certain facts it has learned about you and your viewing tendencies sounds rather advanced, but not all that farfetched. We tend to make choices that can at times seem rather predictable, various patterns of preference become the underlying data set for any algorithm that aims to suggest to us things that we might like. We find these suggestions being offered to us every day, I listen to Black Sabbath, Metallica, and Pantera, so it is likely that my music app’s suggestion for me to listen to Iron Maiden will be fairly well accepted (Anderson, 2008). In our attempts to program software and algorithms for predicting human behaviour and preference, we bake into these systems our own understanding of what a good enough reason might be for selecting the option presented to the user. Given the music I have listened to in the past, it is statistically more likely for me to listen to music of that same genre than to try a genre I have never listened to before for the first time (Anderson, 2008). This is indicative of a deterministic system, whereby an understanding of the past events, states of affairs and rules of the phenomena are sufficient to create predictive models on how future events will occur (Hoefer, 2023). These algorithms attempt to gain an understanding of the way we are. It is the way we are that comes to dictate the way we choose and so, suggesting Iron Maiden to me, given the way I already am in terms of my music taste, is simply offering me an option that is already aligned to the way I am and the way I have chosen in the past. This kind of prediction is not unique to machines, we often use this same predictive mechanism with one another. I know that my wife enjoys chocolate ice cream. It is a preference she has held in the past, and it is the option she chooses over other types of ice cream most often. When I buy her an ice cream, I am going to buy her a chocolate ice cream because it is the most logical choice. It is a good enough reason to select chocolate over the other flavours on offer. Intuitively we can sense that this is the best option, knowing now what you do, that my wife’s favourite ice cream is chocolate and that she consistently chooses this flavour over all the others, you would consider me a bit silly for buying her vanilla ice cream instead. My reasons for buying vanilla ice cream, that it is my Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 31 favourite flavour, are good, but not good enough given the knowledge I have about my wife’s preferences. I could buy an assortment of seven different kinds of ice cream and present them all to her in an unbiased manner so as to preserve her sense of free will and being able to choose an alternative option to the one I predicted she would choose. And without doubt, she would look at me as if I had gone mad and express her annoyance with me wasting money on seven times more ice cream than she needed. And yet she will still most likely choose chocolate. In fact, if I had bought her only one chocolate ice cream, she would have displayed a happier response to my actions than if I had bought her the assortment of ice creams in order to preserve her sense of free will (Schwartz, 2003). Despite my best attempts to act in a metaphysically sensitive manner and respect her free will’s requirement for the possibility of alternative options, I would have received a better response from her if I had simply resorted to utilising my own predictive capacities and bought her an ice cream on the basis of the way she is and reasons that are good enough. A multiplicity of options does not lead to the satisfaction we might think it would when it comes to freedom of choice, and an elimination of alternatives leaves us wondering if there was ever any choice to be made in the first place. The overwhelming concern then is whether our choices are made for us, by external factors and whether we can do anything to influence these choices (Elster, 1983). The idea that our choices have already been made for us relies on determinism. This view holds that, given that we are physical beings and that our brains operate as physical entities, using bio-electrical signals, neurotransmitters and utilise conductivity to transfer information throughout the body, our brains then are also required to abide by the physical laws of the universe. Essentially, these physical laws dictate, in every possible case, the ways in which physical entities may and may not behave. Our brains, being physical entities, guided by physical laws, are then subject to prediction (Churchland, 1984). If one were to have a complete understanding of all the physical facts of the universe, as well as a complete understanding of all physical laws, then that individual could in fact predict any possible event utilising these facts and laws, and seeing as the brain is in fact a physical entity, this individual would be able to predict the choices and actions a brain would take (Laplace, 1995). An entity capable of such immense predictive power is discussed by Laplace in terms of his hypothesis on the now famous “Laplace’s Demon”. In this way, our choices are all Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 32 predetermined by physical facts outside of our awareness, guided by laws which may be beyond our understanding and that the combination of these factors come together to cause this particular keystroke being made at this particular time by me. It could not have been any other way. Determinism then comes to play a pivotal role in our discussion. It has an important impact on the question of this paper. We as human beings, who are physical entities which live, breathe, and think in virtue of physical systems are also bound by physical laws. An assumption prevalent throughout this paper will be that choice, is to a meaningful degree, calculated by our bioelectrical machinery and can be determined by our physical make-up. In this sense, the way we choose is determined by the ways in which our physical being is comprised, this is no more relevant than in the brain itself. This view includes, synaptic connections, the presence of neurotransmitters and ingrained neural pathways that come about as a result of our past experience. Our responsiveness to good enough reasons comes to be determined by our physical make up and as such, the alteration of this responsiveness needs to come from a mechanism that is similarly physical. Genetic editing is the tool with which we may edit and alter the physical make up of individuals, both in the body and in the brain, this is the mechanism through which we may create change in the individual’s responsiveness to reasons. With regards to the above claim, my position in this paper is that choice and the freedom of will is bound by physical laws and if we are to alter this responsiveness in any meaningful way, we are required to do so in line with the physical laws that govern the neurological mechanisms of choice. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 33 Chapter 3 Scope of choice. All discussion to be had with regards to the topic of free will comes to mean very little if we do not first address the notion of choice. Free will differs from what I have termed the ‘scope of choice’ in that free will is the ability to choose freely from an array of options, or to take a reasons responsive approach, to choose in accordance with one’s better reasons. Free will concerns the action of choosing, the actual moment of selecting an option or enacting one’s will or preference (Haji and Cuypers, 2005). The scope of choice, however, does not concern the action of choosing at all, rather it concerns those things which could be chosen. Regardless of how determined or undetermined we are, our ability to choose is reliant on the avenues of action we could possibly take. An individual who is completely paralyzed, unable to move any muscles other than his eyes would most likely not care very much about how free he may be to choose his actions. This is precisely because, he does not have many options to choose from. He could not stand up and close the window because he felt a draft, nor could he choose the chicken over the beef on the canteen menu. All he can do is lie in his bed. The freedom of will this man has, in this instance matters less than the scope of choice he has. His scope of choice relates to the actions that he might possibly be able to do. As I sit in front of my computer, my scope of choice is rather broad. I could continue to write, or I could get up and make myself coffee, or I could go for a run, or I could procrastinate and watch TV instead. These options are all in the realm of possibility concerning my action, the collection of these options comes to form my scope of choice. Returning to the example of the addict and the coerced confession, I will argue that the reason for their actions being considered irrational or constrained, comes about as a result of a considerably decreased scope of choice rather than the fact that they are not free to choose other than they do. The addict may appear to have a broad scope of choice available to them, much the same scope as those possessed by the majority of people of earth, however, this is the wrong way to approach the choices available to him. It may seem as though the addict could stand up from the blackjack table and play the slots instead, or he could leave the casino and Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 34 enrol in gamblers anonymous, or he could go watch the latest movie at the cinema and so on and so forth (Mele, 2015). This understanding of the options he has available to him is mistaken. Rather than the addict being able to choose from an array of options, he is in fact reduced to choosing between just two. He could experience pleasure by continuing to indulge his addiction, or he could experience pain by starving his addiction. When faced with a choice between pleasure and pain, the most reasonable action is to elect pleasure and forgo pain. It is an evolutionarily hard-wired response within our minds. We seek to experience pleasure and avoid pain. As children we learn not to touch hot stove plates because when we do, we get burned and this pain enforces the notion in our minds that this action is to be avoided at all costs. Likewise, we learn that praise is pleasurable and when we act in ways that cause our loved ones to give us praise, we learn to repeat these actions in future so as to receive more instances of this pleasurable experience (Austad, 2020). With our coerced prisoner, we find that they too are faced with a dichotomy of choice as opposed to a branching series of options. They can choose the continuation of pain or the cessation of that pain. The prisoner’s best reasons dictate to them that they should seek the cessation of pain and so they often do. Internally, this choice is made according to the individual’s best reasons, from an external perspective however, this choice may be regarded as being irrational, because we understand the continuation of harmful activities to be a worse option, however, as an addict their responsiveness to reasons is faulty because of the interference of the addiction which is a type of coercion but of an internal origin (Svirsky, 2021). Reason responsiveness and gene editing. The discussion had so far has focussed on freedom with regards to an agent being able to choose in accordance with their better reasons. It has also been considered that an agent who is coerced, manipulated, or influenced by addiction so that they choose an option that they normally would not choose could not be considered free. However, they may be selecting the option that aligns best with their base desire such as the avoidance of pain or the experience of pleasure, this then indicates a manipulation of their will. The agent may desire food as a first order desire but will have competing second order desires about their first order desire in that they want to eat more Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 35 healthily and so eat a salad, or they have a desire for tasty food and eat a cheeseburger (Frankfurt, 1971). The two desires are at odds and yet, the individual forsakes their desire to eat a cheeseburger and chooses instead the desire to be healthier, their will in this instance is that they eat healthier, and it is these reasons that win out in their decision making. They choose freely to not satisfy a desire that they hold because they hold other reasons more important than the ones in place for eating the burger. The question this paper is concerned with however, is what the manipulation of the very mechanics of reason would mean for the freedom of choice and reasons responsiveness. This section aims to argue that genetic editing holds a unique, and never before considered place in the free will discussion. That unique role being its ability to manipulate and alter the biological components that constitute our reason responsive mechanism. This manipulation and alteration are by design, this design may come in two forms, the first being design by the individual and the second being by the design of an external party. A short example will clarify what is meant by the statements above. Mahatma Ghandi demonstrated immense bravery in the face of pain and persecution and demonstrated significant mastery over his response to pain so that he could achieve his greater goals. In the case of a hunger strike, an individual possesses the first order desire to eat (this is a base desire), however, they also hold two competing second order desires about their first order desire. These competing desires are to prolong hunger so they may send a message about a cause they are passionate about, but on the other hand they also hold the competing second order desire to eat and alleviate the discomfort of hunger. The desire to send a message, to stand for what one believes in and through their actions to inspire others to do the same, is also indicative of a first order desire, however it’s aims are considerably more abstract and less basic than the desire to eat or avoid pain (Nussbaum, 2004). To eat is a physiological desire, one which we all experience daily. The neglect of this desire will often lead to physical harm over prolonged periods of time. The neglect of the desire to stand for what one believes in or to engage in protest against an injustice will not result in physical harm, it is not physiological but psychological and any harm that it causes will be of that nature. The distinction here lies in physical desire and psychological desire, in the case of a hunger strike, the primary (and physical desire) to eat, is being overlooked in favour of the second order desire (about the first order desire to eat) whereby the individual wishes to prolong hunger to send a message, which is fuelled by the desire to stand for what one believes in, which may be a more base Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 36 psychological desire (Nussbaum, 2004). This forgoing of a competing second order desire so that it’s opposing desire may be realised is indicative of an individual’s will. Likewise, if the agent lacks the constitution to withstand starvation in order to convey their message and decides to forego their desire to send a message so that they may satisfy their desire to eat, this too is indicative of their will. Ghandi possessed a unique constitution, one which allowed him to inspire and move millions. This constitution is undoubtedly due to his unique reason responsive make up. This make up can be found in many other great individuals throughout history: Harriet Tubman, Steve Biko, Martin Luther King, Malcom X and others. All these individuals were able to withstand persecution, discomfort, pain, and threat of death in order to satisfy their desire to influence the minds of the people of the world in important ways. This characteristic of fortitude in the face of immense threat is something that at a general level, can be said to be shared amongst all these individuals. Now imagine for a moment that we had exact and highly detailed information on each of these individuals’ genetic and neurological makeups and were able to identify a common gene amongst them. Let us call this gene the “fortitude gene”. As farfetched as this may sound, consider recent discussion had on the warrior gene3 and how the presence of this gene has come to influence discussions had in court rooms in the United States4 Now, our hypothetical fortitude gene has been identified and synthesised and is ready to be administered to live or soon to be born individuals through a gene therapy. This treatment will fundamentally manipulate and alter the reason responsive processes of the recipient and may 3 The monoamine oxidase (MOA) gene has been the subject of many studies focussing on its role in the reuptake of certain neurotransmitters, the likes of which have certain behavioural effects. One of these effects is the likelihood of increased aggression and risk taking in those individuals who possess this genetic variation. One controversial study cites that this variation is more present in Māori men. This is discussed and disputed in the following paper. Lea, R. and Chambers, G. (2007) ‘Monoamine Oxidase, Addiction, and the “Warrior” Gene Hypothesis’, The New Zealand medical journal, 120, p. U2441. 4 The use of a genetic MOA criminal defence in United States has gained a great deal of media attention, but very little sway in the court of law. (Defendant’s MAOA Gene Evidence Deemed Inadmissible in Murder Case, 2020; Convicted Murderer Claims ‘Warrior Gene’ Caused Him to Kill, no date; State v. Yepez: Admissibility and Relevance of Behavioural Genetic Evidence in a Criminal Trial | Psychiatric Services, no date) Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 37 be administered by request of the individual or be administered before the individual is even born. Here we see how design by individual and design by an external party comes to influence the discussion and how this will shape the direction of the paper moving forward. We have patient X, an individual who has always desired to change the world and take a stand for what they believe in. Patient X, however, has a remarkably low tolerance of pain and discomfort and in previous attempts at taking radical action towards achieving their goals of inspiring change in the world, they have found themselves giving up on hunger strikes at lunch time and giving up on protests as soon as the weather turns cold. Patient X has the strong desire to avoid discomfort and so too do they have the competing desire to inspire change in the world. These two competing first order desires are of two different kinds. Pain elicits a physiological and in-built response within in us to avoid pain, or make it stop. Anyone who has accidently placed their hand on a hot stove plate knows how automatic our response to withdraw is. The desire to inspire change in the world is of a distinctly psychological nature. Failing to strive towards this desire will not cause us bodily harm but may well cause us psychological harm. The basis of these desires are different, so too are the consequences of failing to satisfy them. And so, upon hearing about the fortitude gene therapy available, they sign themselves up and begin receiving treatment. The treatment is successful, Patient X is now able to withstand considerably more discomfort than they ever had been able to before and are able to make it a few days into a hunger strike before giving in and now attend weekly demonstrations in front of parliament. If you would suspend your disbelief with regards to the possibility of such a scenario coming to pass in the near or distant future, consider the philosophical ramifications of the choice Patient X makes. Patient X has willingly chosen a therapy that alters their reason responsiveness in a fundamental way. They chose to take this action so that they may be able to satisfy their desire to make a lasting and meaningful impact on the world and in order to make this a reality, they needed to be less responsive to reasons relating to the alleviation of discomfort. The ethical reasons to endure a hunger strike are now good enough to warrant the physical discomfort that comes as its price. Patient X now responds to reasons differently to the way they did before, and this has allowed them to satisfy the competing desire to effect change in the world through demonstrations of this nature. In this example, Patient X has utilised gene editing to expand Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 38 their scope of freedom, allowing themselves to select from an expanded set of options that more closely align to their higher order desires and will. The gene therapy has expanded their scope of freedom as they are now able to engage in the activities that were usually neglected in favour of the satiation of their desire for the avoidance of discomfort. By contrast, let us now consider an example of an individual whose genetic alteration comes from without. Consider Patient Y, a newly minted conscript of a nefarious military regime. Patient Y will be deployed to a highly volatile territory where soldiers are often captured and tortured in brutal ways so that the enemy may extract intelligence from them. The leadership of the military Patient Y now serves, deem the risk of information falling into enemy hands too great to risk and so, upon hearing word of the newly developed fortitude gene therapy begin to administer this therapy to their new conscripts. As part of basic training, Patient Y receives daily injections carrying the fortitude gene therapy for a duration of months and upon completion of their training they are far more resilient to torture than the average person. Patient Y is aware of the gene therapy and what it aims to achieve, however, Patient Y has no choice in receiving this therapy as it constitutes a mandatory component of basic training. Patient Y now responds to reasons related to the avoidance of discomfort and pain significantly less than they did before and possesses a far stronger constitution. However, by contrast with Patient X, Patient Y did not elect to receive this therapy and whilst they have experienced an expansion in terms of their scope of choice, now that an aversion to discomfort factors into their decision-making process less, they have experienced this expansion of the scope of options available to them in the service of the military and not in service of themselves. This marks a reduction in Patient Y’s personal freedom, whilst simultaneously eliciting an expansion in their scope of choice. The interaction between the freedom of an individuals will and the scope of their choice is an important one. An expansion in the scope of choice an individual has is a necessary condition for their expansion of free will, however it is not a sufficient condition. As we have seen from the discussion just had about patients X and Y, an individual’s scope of freedom may act in favour of their freedom or in favour of their servitude. Tristan Lendrum Masters Research Paper 1907015 Page | 39 Genetic editing as a neutral and necessary component for the expansion of individual freedoms. An individual will choose the way they do because of the way they are. That being that each person has a set of reasons responsive sensitivities that make them more likely to act in certain ways than others and those choices align with a deterministic and predictive model of choice. This is not to preclude their freedom of will, all this tells us is that an individual’s choices may be predicted and known beforehand, the freedom of those choices is dependent on whether or not the choice made aligns to their best reasons (Frankfurt, 1971; O’Connor and Franklin, 2022). Genetic editing as a practice has been shown to alter the human body, whether that be phenotypically or in terms of rectifying genetic abnormalities and disease. The scope is broad, one may alter their eye colour with this technology or reverse blindness that comes about as a result of a genetic abnormality5. This paper is not primarily interested in genetic editing’s ability to alter the human body phenotypically, but rather, this paper is concerned with the possibility of altering the human mind and the scope of individual choice. A genetic basis for behavioural traits is a topic of immense interest and attracts a great deal of research, however its results are as of yet inconclusive. For this reason, I do not wish to pin the strength of my argument on an inconclusive and hypothetical possibility, rather, I wish to first consider a more concrete case for the expansion of human freedom with the use of genetic editing in which and individual’s scope of choice may be expanded by means of reversing genetic illnesses and then entertain the hypothetical of genetically altered minds afterwards. This approach aims to establish a base for future discussions surrounding freedoms and the scope of choice as they come to be affected by genetic editing and alteration, discussion which may take years to occur in earnest. 5 Ahmad, I. (2022) ‘CRISPR/Cas9—A Promising Therapeutic Tool to Cure Blindness: Current Scenario and Future Prospects’, International Journal of Molecular Sciences, 23(19), p. 11482. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijms231911482. Botto, C., Dalkara, D. and El-Amraoui, A. (2021) ‘Progress in Gene Editing Tools and Their Potential for Correcting Mutations Underlying Hearing and Vision Loss’, Frontiers in Genome Editing, 3. Available at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fgeed.2021.737632 (Accessed: 7 August 2023). Sahel, J.-A., Bennett, J. and Roska, B. (2019) ‘Depicting brighter possibilities for treating blindness’, Science Translational Medicine, 11(494), p. eaax2324. Available at: https://doi.org/10