Somaliland: Post-War Nation-Building and International Relations, 1991-2006 by M. Iqbal D. Jhazbhay A Thesis Submitted in fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, in the Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa February 2007 ii Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university. _______________________ M. Iqbal D. Jhazbhay Date: _________________________________ Supervisor, Professor John J. Stremlau Date: iii Dedication To my Parents, Grandparents, Elders and the Children of Somaliland iv Acknowledgements This thesis owes a debt of gratitude to many souls. This study has been six years in the making, a multi-faceted and challenging intellectual journey, and one which would indeed not have been possible without the co-operation and encouragement of numerous individuals and institutions. Permit me to begin with my beloved wife Naseema and sons Adeeb and Faadil, who supported my nine visits to Somaliland, the Horn of Africa and tolerated my absence from them during the school holidays, where I was able to quietly work on my thesis. A debt of gratitude is also due to Professor John J Stremlau, my supervisor, for his intellectual support and consistent reminders to develop the chapters of this thesis. His significant feedback and time during difficult moments is gratefully appreciated. Mohamoud Salah Nur (Fagadhe) and Abdillahi Duale?s official foreign policy mission to South Africa in July 2000 kindled my interest in the topic. I also wish to thank Dr Edna Adan Ismail for support and access to materials at the Somaliland Foreign Ministry. Dr Hussein Bulhan, former Director of the Academy of Peace and Development in Hargeisa, facilitated my field visits and interviews in Somaliland. Dr Ahmed Esa, Director of the Hargeisa-based Institute for Practical Research and Training and Mr Bashir Goth, Editor of Awdalnews.com, both gave their invaluable time to read my chapters and make significant comments. African Union Commission senior officials Patrick Mazimhaka, Ben Kioko and archival staff, for important materials and time to interrogate key continental issues. Somali studies experts Matt Bryden, John Drysdale, Hussein Adam and Ioan M Lewis for the many opportunities to discuss and respond to inquiries. The encouragement of Professor Ali Mazrui spurred me on with this study at a critical juncture of my life. Dr Kinfe Abraham for the opportunity to be based at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development in Addis Ababa and the University of Addis Ababa where the seminars I delivered yielded useful insights on regional geo-political nuances. Ebrahim Edries, John Young and Maryam Al-Mahdi for assistance with my interviews and meetings in Khartoum. Discussions were held with several persons who helped shape my thinking: Adan Abokor of Progressio, Mohamed Saeed Gees, Adam Jibril, members of Nagaad and the National Electoral Commission of Somaliland. My friends, without whose intellectual companionship this study would not have seen the light of day: ?Jobs? ZN Jobodwana, Marcia Wilson, Elinor Sisulu, Patricia Lawrence, Francis Kornegay, Chris Landsberg, and Farhana Paruk. My comrades in the ANC for their time and opportunity to discuss the Horn of Africa from an activist and policy angle: Kgalema Motlanthe, Smuts Ngonyama, Essop Pahad, Welile Nhlapo, Kingsly Mamabolo, Mavivi Manzini-Myakayaka, Mendi Msimang, Mandla Nkomfe, Aziz Pahad, Frank Chikane, Mojanku Gumbi, Zweli Mkhize, Obeid Bapela and Cedric Mayson. v A word of appreciation to the Africa Institute of South Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, South African Institute of International Affairs, Institute of Security Studies, Centre for Policy Studies, Institute for Conflict Resolution, Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute, Somaliland European Communities, Royal Institute of International Affairs and CJTF-Horn of Africa, for the various fora given to me to reflect and discuss issues in relation to Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. A special note of thanks is due to my University of South Africa colleagues, Mandla Makhanya, Chrissie Steyn, Cobus Kruger, Yusuf Dadoo, Ismail Jaffer, whose understanding made it possible to delicately balance my departmental teaching and research duties. I am also grateful to Garth Shelton of Wits University for his advice, and Shaykh Fadhallah Haeri for his enlightening words of encouragement and support. Of particular importance is my mum and late dad, for their unstinted support of my intellectual path of study in Cairo, Riyadh and Manchester, in order to obtain the required tools to study the Horn of Africa and International Relations. vi Contents Declaration???????????????????????????????ii Dedication???????????????????????????????.iii Acknowledgements???????????????????????????.iv Contents????????????????????????????????vi Abbreviations and Acronyms???????????????????????.ix Maps?????????????????????????????????..xii Abstract????????????????????????????????.xiii Overview of Hypothesis and Chapters???????????????????.xiv Chapter 1: Introduction _______________________________________________________ 1.1 Exploring the Roots of Somaliland?s Nation-Building???????????..3 1.2 Hypothesis, Analytical Framework and Research Objectives: the Efficacy of African Culturally-Rooted Nation-Building from the ?Bottom Up?????????..5 1.3 Notes on Data, Research Methods and Sources?????????????12 1.4 A Survey of the Six Chapters?????????????????????.18 1.5 Literature on Somaliland: Consolidated Survey and Review????????21 1.5.1 Literature in Chapter 2 ? Reconciliation: Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and the International Community????????????...25 1.5.2 Literature in Chapter 3 ? Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding?????28 1.5.3 Literature in Chapter 4 ? Religion: Somaliland and the Upheaval within Islam????????????????????. ??.33 1.5.4 Literature in Chapter 5 ? Recognition: Recognising the Unrecognised??????????????????????????..39 Chapter 2: Reconciliation Resistance, Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and the International Community _______________________________________________________ 2.1 ?Xeer Soomaali? Under British Colonialism: Elders the Midwives of Somaliland??????????????????????????..45 2.2 The SNM: Northern Resistance Takes Shape????????????..50 2.3 Somalia?s ?Liberation? Proliferation?????????????????..55 2.4 SNM?s Comparative Advantage in an Escalating Struggle???????.60 2.5 Enter the Clan Elders: Post-Conflict Stabilisation???????????.64 2.6 Sheikh and Borama Conferences: Toward a Traditional- Modern Compact?????????????????????????67 2.7 Reconciliation, A Divergent Perspective: Somaliland and Puntland????????????????????????.??..71 2.8 Somaliland?s Contested Consolidation: From Reconciliation to Constitutionalism????????????????????????78 vii 2.9 Post-Conflict Constitutional Development??????????????..82 2.10 Somaliland?s Electoral Transition?????????????????.?87 2.11 Reconciliation: A Lutta Continua??????????????????..98 2.12 Somaliland, Reconciliation and the New Logic of Continental Union???????????????????????..101 Chapter 3: Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding _______________________________________________________ 3.1 Political Governance: Reconciliation as Political Reconstruction??????????????????????????110 3.1.1 The Security Preconditioning of Political Reconstruction???????.?110 3.1.2 Contradictions in Centralising Security and Decentralising Governance????????????????????..115 3.2 Political Reconstruction Continued: Parliamentary Elections in the Balance??????????????????????117 3.3 From Clan Limits to Political Reconstruction: Rural and Gender Dimensions???????????????????????...124 3.4 Economic (and Corporate) Governance: The Parameters of Economic Reconstruction???????????????????.??129 3.4.1 Somaliland?s Social Economy of Reconstruction: Geo-Cultural Contours??????????????????????..129 3.5 Somaliland?s Sectoral Factors of Reconstruction???????????.134 3.6 Capacity-Building Support: A Brief Survey?????????????....136 3.7 Overcoming the Livestock Achilles? Heel??????????????...139 3.8 The Neglected Marine Economy??????????????????.144 3.9 Education: Somaliland?s Reconstruction Generator?????????.?147 3.10 Transport Communications and Tapping the External Realm?????....154 3.11 Somaliland?s Diaspora??????????????????????...162 Chapter 4: Somaliland and the Upheaval within Global Islam _______________________________________________________ 4.1 Preface?????????????????????????????173 4.2 Somaliland?s Islamic Identity in ?Afrabian? Perspective?????????176 4.3 Somaliland and the Rise of Political Islam in North-East Africa?????.189 4.4 The Geo-Politics of the War on Terror and the Global Islamic Civil War??????????????????????204 4.5 Somaliland?s Islamic Culture of Education: The Influence of Arab/Islamic Charities???????????????..216 4.6 Religion and Stability: the Somaliland Prognosis???????????..234 Chapter 5: Recognition: Recognising the Unrecognised _______________________________________________________ 5.1 Recognising the Unrecognised???????????????????242 5.2 Somaliland Quo Vadis I: Overcoming Africa?s Post-colonial Self-Determination Conundrum?????????????244 5.3 Somaliland Quo Vadis II: The Dilemmas of Self-Determination and Regional Integration?????????????.251 5.4 Who Will Take the First Step? The Dynamics of viii Somaliland and the IGAD Sub-Region ? Scenario I??????????.254 5.4.1 A Legal Advisory?????????????????????????.256 5.5 Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and the IGAD Factor????????????..259 5.5.1 Ethiopia?????????????????????????????.259 5.5.2 Djibouti?????????????????????????????..266 5.5.3 Kenya??????????????????????????????271 5.5.4 The Anti-Somaliland Coalition???????????????????..276 5.5.5 Egypt??????????????????????????????.278 5.5.6 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States??????????????????.281 5.6 Who Will Take the First Step? African 'Out of Area' Actors and the AU ? Scenario II?????????????????????...284 5.6.1 South Africa???????????????????????????.284 5.6.2 The African Union????????????????????????...288 5.7 Who Will Take the First Step III: Extra-African State Actors and the International Community????????????...295 5.7.1 The West????????????????????????????..296 5.7.2 The United Nations????????????????????????.298 5.8 Somaliland Recognition Quo Vadis: In Search of ?An African Solution????????????????????????...301 5.8.1 Conservative Maintenance of the Status Quo????????????...310 5.8.2 Mutual Separation/Commonwealth Option??????????????310 5.8.3 Somaliland-Somalia Confederation?????????????????.312 5.8.4 Somaliland Recognition/Somalia De-Recognition???????????.312 Chapter 6: Conclusion: Interplay of Internal and External Forces as a Strategy to Acquire International Recognition _______________________________________________________ 6.1 Revisiting the Politics of Reconciliation???????????????..317 6.2 Reconstructing Polity, Society and Economy????????????...320 6.3 The Role of Religion in a Turbulent Region?????????????..325 6.4 Recognition Quo Vadis??????????????????????..329 6.5 2006: Reflections????????????????????????..334 6.6 Somaliland: Implications for Further Inquiry?????????????.340 Appendix A: Interviews?????????????????????????.344 Bibliography??????????????????????????????350 ix Abbreviations and Acronyms AFFORD African Foundation for Development AISA Africa Institute of South Africa AL Arab League AMA Africa Muslims Agency ARC Africa Relief Committee ARPCT Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism AU African Union AVU African Virtual University CCIC Consultative Council of Islamic Courts (Somalia) CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan) DDRRR disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration DFA Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa) DIIS Danish Institute for Development Studies EAC East African Community EEPCo Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation EU European Union HAFTA Horn of Africa Free Trade Agreement HEW health-education-welfare ICAO International Civil Aviation Authority ICG International Crisis Group IDP internally displaced person IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority for Development IGD Institute for Global Dialogue IIF International Islamic Front IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization on Migration IPA Institute of Public Administration IRI International Republican Institute ISI Inter-Services Intelligence LET Lashkar-e-Toiba LNG Liquified Natural Gas MEOYS Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Somaliland) MRRR Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction x NEC National Electoral Commission NEPAD New Partnership for Africa?s Development OAU Organization of African Unity OLF Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia) ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia) PSC Peace and Security Council (AU) PVOs private voluntary organisations QUEST Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support RECs regional economic communities RRA Rahanweyn Resistance Army (Somalia) SACG Somalia Aid Coordinating Group SAPD Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development SCPD Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development SDM Somali Democratic Movement NEC National Electoral Commission (Somaliland) SNA Somali National Army SNM Somali National Movement (Somaliland) SOLWO Somaliland Women?s Organisation SOWDA Somaliland Women?s Development Association SPM Somali Patriotic Movement SRA Somaliland Road Authority SRRC Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (Somalia) SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front SSF Somali Salvation Front SYL Somali Youth League TFC Transitional Federal Charter TFG Transitional Federal Government (Somalia) TNG Transitional National Government (Somalia) TOKTEN Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals UAE United Arab Emirates UCLA University of California UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence UDUB Democratic United Peoples? Movement UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children?s Fund USC United Somali Congress VTC Vocational Training Centre WADA Women?s Advocacy and Development Association xi WAMY World Assembly of Muslim Youth WAPO Women?s Advocacy and Progressive Organisation WB World Bank WPF Women?s Political Forum WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front WSP War-Torn Societies Programmes xii Maps Map of the Horn of Africa???????????????????.xv Map of UN Offices in Somaliland and Somalia??????????105 Map of Oil Concession in Berbera ???????????????.160 xiii Abstract This thesis is intended to explore the international relations of emerging nation-building in the Somali coast, with particular reference to the un-recognised Republic of Somaliland in the north-western Horn of Africa region. This study focuses on the international relations of Somaliland?s international quest for recognition, linked to its own culturally-rooted internal reconciliatory post-war nation-building efforts. Informed by written as well as first-hand research interviews, particular focus is placed in this study on the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping a strategy by Somaliland?s elites for acquiring international recognition and national self- determination. These are placed within the broader regional and international context of attempts to resuscitate the Somali state, an endeavour offering a fitting assessment of different modalities of African nation-building within the greater Somali environment. In relative analytic terms, the competitive international relations of nation-building in Somaliland and state reconstitution in southern Somalia informs the underlying hypothesis of this thesis: Somaliland?s example as a study in the efficacy of the internally-driven, culturally-rooted ?bottom-up? approach to post-war nation-building and regional stability, and the implications this holds for prioritising reconciliation between indigenous traditions and modernity in achieving stability in nation-building. By contrast, the internationally-backed ?top-down? approach to reconstituting a Mogadishu-based Somali state remains elusive. Yet, the international status quo regarding the affording of diplomatic recognition to what are normally considered secessionist ?break-away? regions of internationally recognised states, complicates Somaliland?s culturally rooted ?bottom-up? modalities. It also challenges the African Union (AU) during the ?good governance? era of the New Partnership for Africa?s Development (NEPAD), a context within which Somaliland fits comfortably as a good citizen of the international community. The international relations of the Somaliland nation-building enterprise is approached from a ?quadrilateral framework? of interactive elements to the Somaliland experience: Reconciliation, Reconstruction, Religion and Recognition. This framework informs the four core chapters of the thesis. Key words: Somalia, Somaliland, Horn of Africa, nation-building, reconciliation, reconstruction, self-determination, post-conflict stabilisation, geo-politics, Islam. xiv Overview of Hypothesis and Chapters The efficacy of African culturally rooted internally-driven bottom-up approach to nation-building Balancing tradition & modernity Interplay of Internal & External Forces for International Recognition Chapter 4 Religion Chapter 2 Reconciliation Chapter 3 Reconstruction Chapter 5 Recognition HYPOTHESIS ELITES: Shaping strategy Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 6 Conclusion xv Map of the Horn of Africa Source: Economist, 18 January 2007. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction Ama buur ahaw ama buur ku tirso Either be a mountain or attach yourself to one (Somali proverb) This thesis is intended to explore the international relations of nation-building in the Somali coast, with particular reference to the un-recognised Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland has been described as ?the inspiring story of resilience and reconstruction and of a truly African Renaissance which has many lessons to teach the rest of Africa, and the international community?.1 In this respect, the material has been organised in six chapters, which aim to illuminate key elements of Somaliland?s post-war nation-building and international relations, with specific focus on the virtually unknown interconnected elements of reconciliation, reconstruction, religion and recognition in Somaliland?s quest to sustain its independence and development as an important state actor within its region, the greater Horn of Africa and within Africa at large. The author plans to narrate this important 1 Cited in Jeremy Brickhill and and Verity Johnson, ?Rising from the Ashes?, (30 August 2001). http://www.africarenaissance.org/archive/30Aug2001.html; Ken Menkhaus asserts that Somaliland has "a level of peace and rule of law that few neighbouring states can match", in ?Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia?, Conflict, Security and Development, (August 2004a), p. 154. See also Ioan M. Lewis, ?Lessons from Somaliland: Appropriate technology for ?Peace Processes?, paper presented at the 1st Somaliland Societies in Europe Conference, held on 1-2 September at The Royal Institute of International Affairs, (2005), http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6034 This point is further argued by David Shinn, ?Somaliland: the little country that could?, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2002). http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/anotes_0211.pdf 2 story, informed by written as well as first-hand research interviews. The author sets out the specific theoretical concerns that have informed this thesis and relates his analysis to some of the larger issues in the thin body of available scholarship on Somaliland. It is an attempt to add to the substantive knowledge of Somaliland?s post-war nation-building and international relations. It is hoped that the findings from this research, as reflected in the chapters that follow, notably the interplay of external and internal forces in shaping a strategy by Somaliland?s elites for acquiring international recognition, will contribute constructively to: (a) developing a new sub-field of international relations dealing with the ?internationalization of domestic transformation?2 (virtually non-existent in the case of Somaliland), and (b) to an emerging regional discourse on the Horn of Africa in South Africa, as South Africa takes on the tasks of chairing the African Union?s Ministerial Committee on Post- Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan and engaging the principle of self- determination in South Sudan and Somaliland.3 2 For a definitive analysis of this interplay of external and internal forces for national self-determination in Biafra, see John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1977). Another related perspective on this dimension of international relations is the interplay between global economic change and domestic restructuring. The theoretical implication of this dimension is that a strict focus on domestic politics at the expense of international politics or vice versa highlights only one side of the story. See the pioneering work by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics, Cambridge University Press (1996); Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, London: Routledge (2002). 3 Thabo Mbeki, ?Long live the spirit of John Garang!?, ANC Today. Online policy voice of South Africa?s ruling African National Congress (ANC), Vol. 5, No. 31, (5-11 August 2005) http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at31.htm; ANC Statement, ?President Nelson Mandela?s Peace Efforts in Sudan?, (25 August 1997); Iqbal Jhazbhay, ?Sudan: Renewed possibilities and hope in long walk to peace?, ANC Today, Vol. 5, No. 14, (8-14 April 2005) http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at14.htm; Department of Foreign Affairs, ?The Character of Sudan: Causes of Conflict and Prospects for Peace?, Strategic Planning Review Workshop, 40-page confidential report. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, (3-4 October 2004) and Tandeka Lujiza, ?Somaliland?s Claim to Sovereign Status?, Office of the Chief State Law Advisor (International Law), 6- page report, Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, (April 2003). 3 1.1 Exploring the Roots of Somaliland?s Nation-Building Broadly articulated, the question to be answered is: how did Somaliland succeed in reconciling and cohering the clans that currently comprise its society? How did this "new solution" emerge, ending war and leading to a democratic path?4 How did this process of reconciliation give momentum to nation-building in a turbulent and intractable environment, while navigating the religious extremism of a militant Islamism, accompanied by what has become a reasonably sustained diplomacy for international recognition? As such, this treatise will examine the trajectory of Somaliland?s reconciliatory processes, reconstruction tracks, religious discourse and international relations from 1991 through to 2006. On 18 May 1991 Somaliland?s traditional elders and the liberation elite unilaterally declared their independence from Somalia. On 18 May 2006 Somalilanders in many corners of the world celebrated fifteen years of Somaliland?s independence and freedom. This inquiry takes on special urgency in the world that has emerged after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States and what this event brought in its wake in terms of the trans-national movement of Islamic ideas and political currents, terrorism and the quest for international order. The challenges posed by this cluster of dynamics as they impinge on Somaliland are further compounded by the problematic predicament of Somaliland as an unrecognised entity in a continent where the status quo of territorial integrity of colonially inherited boundaries is sacrosanct. The two exceptions to the 4 John J. Stremlau, ?Ending Africa's Wars?, Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2000). 4 latter view are the recent ?African Union Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland? and the European Union?s support of Somaliland?s recent 2005 parliamentary elections.5 The international relations of Somaliand?s bid to overcome this status quo are further complicated by rival geo-political agendas between major state actors in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia, and in Arab North Africa, the Levant and the Persian Gulf, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These geo-politics, in turn, feed into fundamental conflicts over the modalities of nation-building along the Somali coast between proponents of varying federalist formulas and those stressing the need for unitary state centralism; between externally driven ?top-down? interventions to reconstruct and reconstitute a pan-Somali state versus internally motivated, culturally-rooted, regionally-based ?bottom- up? bids to reconstruct more territorially limited domains of Somali sovereignty. To a large extent, the different colonial histories and methodologies of dominance have influenced this contemporary contestation in rival attempts at Somali state reconstitution and nation-building. Compounding this history, contemporary external actors interacting with their Somali interlocutors have complicated these contradictory dynamics. In the process, tensions were generated, which reached a new level of complexity in light of yet another in a 5 African Union Commission, ?Resume, AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, (30 April to 4 May 2005)?, Unpublished 4-page report, Addis Ababa: African Union (2005). This mission was led by the AU Deputy Chairperson, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka. See also, European Commission, ?International Donors Support the Democratisation Process in Somaliland?, Delegation in Kenya ? Somalia Operations, (1 September 2005) and European Commission, ?Somaliland Parliamentary Elections: International Members of the Steering Committee Commend the Process following Proclamation of the Results?, Delegation in Kenya ? Somalia Operations (18 October 2005). 5 succession of ?rebirths of Somalia? to Somaliland?s south: the 2004 Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia.6 However, this process, in turn, has been further compounded in its complexity following the June 2006 ascendancy and displacement of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council over warlord rule and rivalry in the south; a development challenging TFG legitimacy and the regional and external forces supporting the TFG. 1.2 Hypothesis, Analytical Framework and Research Objectives: The Efficacy of African Culturally-Rooted Nation-Building from the ?Bottom- Up? This latest externally-driven ?top-down? attempt to reconstitute Somalia as a, what is now Islamist challenged-TFG remains far from consolidated. Meanwhile, the Somaliland Republic has managed, largely on its own, but with increasing African and international interest and support, to pass the various electoral stages of the transition in order to acquire international recognition. In fact, it could well be that the most recent Islamist and TFG- related events in the south will further enhance the international recognition credibility of Somaliland. Moreover, this sharp dichotomy between local nation-building success seeking international endorsement, on the one hand, and continuing 6 International Crisis Group, ?Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds??, Africa Report No. 95, Nairobi/Brussels, (11 July 2005); and International Crisis Group, ?Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents?, Africa Report No. 66, Nairobi/Brussels, (28 July 2003) http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1682&l=1 6 international state rebuilding failure without local legitimacy, on the other, inspires the central hypothesis of this study: Somaliland?s example as a study in the efficacy of the internally-driven, culturally-rooted ?bottom-up? approach to post war nation-building and regional stability and the implications this approach holds for prioritising reconciliation between indigenous culture and traditions and modernity in achieving relative stability in the nation-building project. As a governance model, the culturally-rooted ?bottom-up? internally-driven phenomenon is more often than not associated with grassroots, participatory forms of economic development rather than democratic participation, although notions of ?participatory democracy? evoke ?bottom-up? forms of popular governance. But, scholars argue governance from the ground-up is often associated with a more technocratic discourse pertaining to debates over the efficacy of centralisation versus decentralisation involving different administrative tiers of government. Alternatively, the interplay between ?bottom-up? and ?top-down? approaches to governance are examined in terms of arriving at an optimum division of labour between issues of participation that are best addressed at local levels of governance, and problems that can only be solved through a trans-national or global consensus, which necessarily evokes elite-driven approaches to governance.7 7 The Spring 2003 issue of Perspective, International Development: Global and Local Perspectives (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) is indicative of the diverse discourses regarding ?bottom-up? nation development as ?meshing the macro and micro? levels of development and governance or decentralisation processes (see ?Bridging Gaps: Decentralization Processes in Latin America,? by A. Harnisch). Ken Menkhaus opposes the idea to rebuild a central nation-state in Somalia, a goal he views as too ambitious for the time being. Menkhaus recommends strengthening the groups that are promoting lawfulness and a modicum of prosperity. See Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of Strategic 7 As an avowedly political nation-building strategy in the African context, the ?top-down? versus ?bottom-up? discourse has, until recently, tended to be marginalised by prevailing assumptions of the need for strong centralised states wherein decentralisation is viewed suspiciously, along with forms of federalism and confederation, which are perceived as threats to territorial integrity and state security. But the emergence of regionally-based post- colonial challenges to incumbent regimes, as in the case of Eritrea?s independence from Ethiopia and Sudan being forced to accommodate the self-determination of South Sudan in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, has begun to force an African rethink on questions of federalism, decentralisation, popular participation and ?top-down? versus culturally rooted ?bottom-up? forms of governance. Somaliland?s experience represents a variation along this theme, having been incorporated under a centralised post-colonial regime at the time of decolonisation in 1960, only to see that system collapse under the weight of Studies (2004); and ?State Collapse in Somalia: second thoughts?, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, (2003). See also I.M Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, 4th Edition, Oxford: James Currey (2002), notably the chapter on ?Chaos, International Intervention and the North? pp. 262-310. See Walter M. Clarke, Jeffrey M. Herbst, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Westview Press, (1997). The Clarke-Herbst book presents analyses by foreign experts, most of whom were directly involved in U.S. or U.N. operations in Somalia in 1993-94. One lesson, say the editors, is that humanitarian interventions in collapsed states are too complicated to be conducted as top-down, surgical operations. See also Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford (eds.), Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st Century, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, (1997).This Adam-Ford book is a collection of 40 papers, over half by Somali authors, addressed to charting a way forward for Somali nation-building. A broad consensus emerges in the debates, which is that although international support is vital, rebuilding Somalia can only be directed by Somalis because they alone can re-stitch, in a bottom-up way, the intricate fabric of their unique culture and society. Another line of thinking which emerges in the literature is that past attempts to fix collapsed states in Africa have gone nowhere. A radical rethinking is needed; and in the hardest cases, international trusteeships offer the best chance for building states. See Stephen Ellis, ?How to Rebuild Africa?, Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2005). For insights into the failed top-down approach in the Somali region of Ethiopia, see Tobias Hagmann, ?Beyond clannishness and colonialism: understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004?, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, (2005). 8 repressive centralisation of political power in Mogadishu, which propelled the Somalis of the Somaliland coastal region to opt for a reassertion of independence. But Somaliland?s uniqueness goes even beyond that, as its experience will be shown to have evolved organically out of a different regionally based cultural and post-colonial dynamic than was the case in Italian Somaliland;8 one in which the reconciliation of tradition and modernity played a major role in Somaliland?s ?bottom-up? nation-building project. The ?bottom-up? nation-building process is rooted in a post-colonial resistance, grounded in the indigenous Somali history and culture of Somaliland, which, it is argued, has contributed to an infinitely greater coherence in Somaliland?s national identity than has been the case in the south of the country. It is on the basis of this ?struggle history?, as well as numerous interviews held with key social players as outlined later under the section on method, that the refinement of the variables and elements are painstakingly arranged and articulated into a viable framework. The problem encountered was in finding a unit of analysis appropriate to the study of Somaliland?s post war nation- building and international relations. To resolve this difficulty, the approach that has been taken is that of an interpretive narrative that frames its reconciliation-reconstruction-religion-recognition elements into what the author calls a 'quadrilateral framework', in their relation to Somaliland?s culturally rooted ?bottom-up? nation-building formation as a strategy of acquiring international recognition. 8 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, (1963). Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, (1982). 9 This approach is suggested partly by the literature reviewed and largely by the interviews undertaken in Somaliland. Within this 'quadrilateral framework' as the pivotal points, the research objectives of this study are four-fold: 1. To illuminate and interpret the 'quadrilateral framework' mentioned above, by examining the points of convergence that have given Somaliland political and social cohesion; 2. To analyse the processes by which the four elements have evolved and how they interplay; 3. To probe into how the international relations of the Horn of Africa, in terms of inter-African state actors and extra-African state and non-state international influences, have combined to shape this 'quadrilateral framework' and how this external realm may affect the future of Somaliland?s prospects and those of the entire North-East African sub- region as they impinge on developments along the Somali peninsula and the Red Sea; and 4. Closely interrelated with this last dimension, to demonstrate how Somaliland?s internal dynamics is a critical factor interacting with these external influences in shaping the international relations of its recognition diplomacy and post-war nation-building. However, these analytical parameters surrounding Somaliland?s quadrilateral processes beg further questions that this study attempts to address. These relate to findings from the last four points concerning research objectives that 10 may be drawn from formulating a sub-hypothesis pertaining to the possible lessons to be learned from the particular interplay of internal and external forces in shaping a strategy by Somaliland?s elites for acquiring international recognition and national self-determination, and from the Somaliland Republic?s emergence within the wider quest for the reconsolidating of a ?greater Somalia? or the Somali peninsula identity. Inter-clan reconciliation has been at the heart of nation-building in Somaliland, to the extent that this process reflects what has come to be recognised as a culturally rooted ?bottom-up? approach to reconciliatory peace and nation- building. This study (in the process of answering the question posed earlier of ?how did Somaliland succeed in reconciling and cohering the clans ??) seeks to demonstrate that such an approach may have more to offer in stabilising African ? and, for that matter, non-African ? conflict situations, in terms of sustainable peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, than the conventional ?top-down? approach often imposed by the international politics of such conflicts; that, to the extent that Somaliland has and continues to develop as a ?success story?9 in the efficacy of ?locally managed peace? and nation-building based on its unique clan politics of reconciliation, it also serves as an object lesson for the rest of Africa in what may be the greater benefits of integrating or balancing tradition and modernity in governance in arriving at 9 Iqbal Jhazbhay, ?As a success story, Somaliland is Africa?s Best-Kept Secret?, Umrabulo, Vol. 18, (2003), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo18/success.html An extended version of this essay can be located under the title: ?Somaliland: Africa?s Best- Kept Secret, A Challenge to the International Community??, African Security Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, (2003). http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No4/EJhazbhay.html 11 optimum formulas for achieving peace and security in Africa.10 State collapse and warfare experienced in Somaliland and Somalia have catalysed the modernisation process, where foreign patronage was abandoned, emerging local political authorities brought into being and free-market capitalism embraced, and in Somaliland, a more self-determined path was developed; and there is ample evidence of this.11 Here, stress must be placed on 'integrating' and 'balancing' since imbalances between tradition and modernity in African governance may serve as continuing sources of destabilisation and unrest, as amply demonstrated within the southern African sub-region in ? like the Somali coast ? the mono- ethnic nation-state monarchies of Lesotho and Swaziland (and, post-election 1994 in South Africa, what is now KwaZulu-Natal province). Finally, given the continuing saga of the Somaliland Republic, the challenge of inter-African, North-East African and international politics is to arrive at a realistic 10 For relevant debates on tradition and modernity, see Tobias Hagmann, ?Review Article, From State Collapse to Duty-Free Shop: Somalia?s Path to Modernity?, African Affairs, 104/416, pp. 525-535. Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, (2003). Little talks about social trust as the traditional value that underpins much of the informal Somali economy. Little follows the ?transformationalist? approach in the debate on the role of kinship in the Somali conflict. There is very little empirical work in this text on Somaliland or Puntland. Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund (eds.), African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, (1997). This text probes into the debates of how, within Islamic societies, the battle between modernity and tradition is unfolding. Ioan M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, James Currey Publisher, (1999). Though much of the field work for this text by Ioan Lewis, the doyen of Somali studies, was undertaken in the early sixties, it has broadly weathered the test of time barring some dated statistics. Lewis' seminal study, which is part of Somali intellectual history over the years, reflects a traditional school of scholarship which overlooks everyday sociology of life. Lewis' contested approach has insisted on the prime significance of the Somali segmentary clan lineage system to explicate politics and statelessness. On the debate regarding the ?transformationalist? and ?traditionalist? approach to the Somali conflict, see Abdi Ismail Samatar, ?Destruction of state and society in Somalia; beyond the tribal convention?, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, (1992), pp. 625- 41. 11 Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhaus and Roland Marchal, Human Development Report Somalia 2001, United Nations Development Programme, (2001). Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the threat of terrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2004). Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra, Somalia ? The Untold Story, The war through the eyes of Somali women, London: Pluto Press Publishing, (2004). Mark Bradbury, ?Living with Statelessness: the Somali road to development, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 3, (2003). Roland Marchal, Jamil A. Mubarak, Michel del Bruno and D.L. Manzolillo, Globalization and Its Impact on Somalia, UNDP/UNDOS, Nairobi, (2000). 12 accommodation of such on-the-ground culturally ?bottom-up? requirements for bringing peace, security and stability to such conflict-ridden regions in the developing world. Here, the political and policy implications of addressing this challenge will be explored. 1.3 Notes on Data, Research Methods and Sources This study is largely shaped by the author?s career as a lecturer in Islamic Studies and as a researcher with an area studies specialisation on the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.12 Much of the study relies on academic literature, primary sources and privileged insider access to select official and unofficial sources of information. In addition, the hypothesis of this study is largely informed by original field research where key ideas were discussed, interrogated and internalised. The 12 Iqbal Jhazbhay, ?South Africa ? North Africa Relations: Bridging a Continent?, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, Issue 2, Winter/Spring, (2004), pp. 155-168. Iqbal Jhazbhay (ed.), ?Horn of Hope', African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004), pp. 1-3. Iqbal Jhazbhay and Patrick Mazimhaka 'Security, Governance and Development: The Braided Strands of Future Prosperity in Africa', in African Security, Commodities and Development, London: RUSI Whitehall Report 4-06, (2006), pp. 1-5. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'South Africa?Middle East Relations During the Mandela and Mbeki Presidency: A Test of Sure-Footed Maturity and Do-Able Morality?' in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (ed.), South Africa?s Foreign Policy 1994- 2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, (2004), pp. 281-296 (second edition reprinted 2006). Iqbal Jhazbhay, Stanley Makgohlo and Elizabeth Sidiripoulus 'North Africa: A Review' in Greg Mills (ed.) South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/01. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, (2001), pp. 199-218. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'South African Political Islam: A Preliminary Approach towards Tracing the Call of Islam?s Discourse(s) of Struggle', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, London, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2002), pp. 225-231. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'The Politics of Interpretation: The Call of Islam and Ulama Disciplinary Power in South Africa', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2002), pp. 457- 467. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'An Emerging Muslim Identity in the Global Village: The South African Presentation at the International Conference on ?Azmat Al-Hawiyya?', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, (2000), October, pp. 369-372. Charl Le Roux and Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'The Contemporary Path of Qibla Thought ? a Hermeneutical Reflection', Journal for Islamic Studies (University of Cape Town), Vol. 12, (1992), pp. 84-100. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'A Fatwa from al-Azhar for South Africa', Journal for Islamic Studies (University of Cape Town), Vol. 11, (1991), pp. 43-52. 13 primary material and interviews used in this study were collected from mid- 2000 to 2006, during various field research visits.13 Nine field trips were made to the Somaliland cities of Hargeisa, Borama, Burao, Gabiley, Berbera and Erigavo, as well as to the regional capitals of Addis Ababa and Khartoum. Stable and safe political conditions prevailed, which did not limit the author's travel to any major town or rural settlement. Some 101 Somali and other informants were interviewed in a variety of settings and circumstances. A list of persons who provided the most useful administrative records, official chronicles and information, anecdotal as well as systematic insights for this study, can be found in Appendix A. Direct face-to-face interviews were viewed as the most effective approach.14 Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis to evaluate the credibility of information provided. The type of questions was informal and tailored to different situations; while some interviews were ad hoc, others were arranged timeously. Most interviews were internalised and recorded by hand at leisure. Another method used was to attend afternoon and evening informal chat groups within the context of Somali oral culture to compare notes, pick up clues, rectify errors and correct memories. At these chat groups, some Somali kinsmen speak to each other cautiously and accurately and others peddle conjecture. Consequently, about one-third of the interviews that were 13 The field-research in and fact-finding visits to Somaliland were undertaken in August 2000, April 2001, May 2002, January 2003, April 2003, December 2003, January 2004, September 2005 and July 2006. Addis Ababa was visited in August 2000, June 2001, January 2003, December 2003, January 2004, September 2005, March 2006, May 2006, and Khartoum in January 2004. 14 Natalie Peutz, ?Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal?, Current Anthropology, Vol. 47 Issue 2, (April 2006), pp. 217-241. This article presents fieldwork conducted in Somaliland examining a group of Somalis who were deported from the U.S. and comments on the sociology of deportation and the use of face-to-face interviews. 14 undertaken involved two or more persons. Often, there was a search for the time honoured Somali traditional principle of seeking consensus (ijma), and at times participants disagreed. In this way a clearer picture emerged, filling in the gaps where some of the written primary and secondary sources were lacking. In addition, telephonic interviews were also used to obtain an update on recent developments. Given the need to answer specific questions and design a viable research framework of study, select policy-makers, traditional elders, shaykhs and opinion-shapers were interviewed in order to elicit on-the-ground, first-hand information on Somaliland and the region for its qualitative value. Individuals selected were mature adults who were a critical source for tapping into the indigenous knowledge systems unique to the region and who were able to unpack Somaliland?s inter-related domestic and international dimensions and dynamics. The on-site interviews were arranged personally, as well as by the Somaliland Academy of Peace and Development and the African Union Commission, which also proved most fruitful in the collation of primary, secondary and archival sources. Meetings at the University of Hargeisa and Amoud University, and the monthly reports from the locally-based international agencies such as the European Commission and United Nations assisted in covering particular issues in Somaliland?s reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. There is no professional International Relations organisation in Somaliland comparable to the South African Institute of International Affairs or the Council for Foreign Relations. Nevertheless, there are many local development research organisations and every clan had its 15 recognised experts on domestic and international issues.15 Many of the informants were interviewed several times over the course of some years to get a better sense of Somaliland?s post-war nation-building and international relations. Interviews and their reliability had to be evaluated against known academic criteria and established area studies information. Interviews with unrelated people from different areas and backgrounds made it possible to discern and confirm the certainty of the information provided. Arabic and English, two known languages of Somaliland, were used for communication with respondents. The author?s knowledge of Arabic, Arabic literature, and Islamic culture and religion, along with the intellectual tools of Political Studies and International Relations were put to use in the interviews and were also employed to probe more systematically into the analysis of information. Each channel was closely examined to verify the exactness of the information, and the author's field research was able to reveal any instance of fabricated or ?doctored? reports. Furthermore, the author's intimate knowledge of the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Middle East, and personal contacts with individuals and key regional institutions worked to his distinct advantage. 15 See also the enabling, international ?thickening? character of the Somali digital diaspora on the internet as a forum for many local voices to amplify their local and international concerns. See this line of argument in Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ?Digital diasporas and conflict prevention: the case of Somalinet.com?, Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association, Vol. 32, (2006), pp. 25-47. 16 Another key method used by the author to engage experts, collate information and conceptualise key questions in this study was the regular attendance of numerous lectures, seminars and conferences on Somaliland, Somalia and the Horn of Africa.16 This study attempts to avoid abstractions that could dilute the evidential value of the information gathered. Sources were treated with caution and interrogated to satisfy the questions of how, when, where and why and the maxim of "who says what to whom for what purpose in what circumstances". This was done to ensure that all conclusions were made only after the sources were carefully evaluated and to probe into the multiple vested interests at work.17 Often, sources were compared with independent reports and experts in Somali studies. Gaps in written literature were overcome by frequent visits and telephonic interviews, fax and e-mail communication with reliable sources. Fortunately, given that this is a new area of study, many reliable sources supported this search for an 'authentic' (al-asil) narrative, as a result of the relationship of trust which developed over the period spanning from mid-2000 to 2006, and 16 For example, the ?9th Somali Studies International Association Conference? hosted by Research Centre on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark, (3-5 September 2004), ?First Annual Somaliland Convention? organised by the Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute, Los Angeles, (25-27 June 2005) and ?Conference of Somaliland Communities in Europe and Somaliland? at The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (1-2 September 2005). Also the ?Roundtable on Somalia?, Washington, US Department of State and National Intelligence Council, (13 October 2005) and US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, ?Mutual Security Conference?, Addis Ababa, (25-25 January 2006). The author was requested to address all of the above-mentioned fora on an aspect of Somaliland. 17 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, ?The Challenges of Doing African Studies?, (26 March 2006). http://zeleza.com/blog/index.php?p=37 17 because many Somaliland scholars and practitioners saw the need for such a scholarly study. Stringent efforts were made to ensure ethical and intellectual impartiality by consulting Somali studies experts18 and corroborating evidence from various sources, despite the author's bias that Somaliland has earned the right to recognition. Resolving this tension was one of the chief methodological challengers of this study. Equally challenging was the predicament faced by a surfeit of information from an over-abundance of sources and the resulting problem of selection. Somali names have generally been used in their usual anglicised format rather than in the orthography of the Somali script. The author's conclusions are approached based on the evidence available at the time of the research. Much of the scholarly knowledge developed here will be within the "middle- range theories"; a range of theoretical endeavour that attempts to formulate specified generalisations of a limited scope and provide good analysis and details that might be used in subsequent studies for theory-building, while assisting in foreign policy decision-making. With specific focus on key areas, the pitfall of over-generalisation is minimised.19 The idea of the 'quadrilateral framework', which focuses on Somaliland?s reconciliation, reconstruction, religious discourse and its search for diplomatic 18 I am thankful to Somali studies experts Prof. Hussein Adam, Mr. John Drysdale, Prof. Ioan Lewis and Mr. Matt Bryden for their scholarly advice, practical counsel and response to numerous queries. 19 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press, (May 2005) p. 266 and p. 75. This lucid study describes the type of theory-building and research objectives used in this study as Atheoretical/configurative idiographic. 18 recognition, did not come easily. After reading the available academic and related literature and especially after the numerous interviews, field-visits and informal probing, the author was able to identify these dimensions as key elements of a viable framework and to confirm that the hypothesis is testable through the data and interviews. This study attempts to approach the available evidence and move beyond the dominant fissions within Somali studies, which focus on the ideological power of state-centric concepts. Almost all discourse on Somalia centres on the absence of a functioning central government to explain developments in Somalia.20 The author follows Tobias Hagmann?s suggested method that reading the available evidence and ?empirical examination rather than well- meant assumptions on the functions and meanings of state institutions is necessary when gauging the Somali situation.?21 1.4 A Survey of the Six Chapters Chapter 1: This chapter will provide a brief background of the study and will include a brief statement of the problem, the research hypothesis and objectives, an analytical framework, the research methodology and data 20 Among the exceptions are Ali Jimale Ahmed (ed.), The Invention of Somalia, Red Sea Press (1995). Menkhaus stresses state-building and peace building are opposite projects in the Somali context, notably in the South. The point is enlarged in ?State Collapse in Somalia: second thoughts?, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, (2003). 21 Tobias Hagmann, p. 534. See also the contested article by Catherine Besteman, ?Representing violence and ?othering? Somalia?, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, (1996). For a cogent counter-perspective and critique on methods used by Besteman, see I.M Lewis, ?Doing violence to ethnography: A response to Catherine Besteman's `Representing Violence and ?othering? Somalia?, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 13, Issue 1, (February 1998). 19 collection, a survey of chapters and a consolidated review of existing literature for each of the four R?s explicated below. Chapter 2: 'Reconciliation: Resistance, Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and the International Community' will review the rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the trauma of repression and resistance between northern, formerly British Somaliland, and the incumbent regime of Mohammed Siad Barre, between 1984 and the collapse of that regime in 1991, along with a revisiting of the Hargeisa genocide of 1988. 1991 marks the move toward nation-statehood formation and the unilateral declaration of independence interacting with the following interrelated socio- political dynamics: the reconciliation of Somaliland clans involving indigenous reconciliation initiatives; interactions between the majority Isaaq clan and the minority clans: ?Iise, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli, followed by the 1991-93 politics of transition involving national reconciliation conferences and influences of the international community. Chapter 3: 'Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding' will capture the momentum of the national reconciliation nation-state rebuilding phase as it drives a reconstruction process involving the: demobilisation of militias; internal state institutional reconstruction focusing on the House of Elders and the House of Representatives; the international dimensions of reconstruction involving humanitarian aid and developmental assistance; private reconstruction initiatives interacting with the development of a monetary exchange process 20 and the participation of the Somaliland diaspora; and the role of women as the backbone of the Somaliland economy, and how all of these social components to nation-state-building are framed constitutionally in the crafting of a multi-party democracy with northern Somali characteristics. However, the broader context in which these reconstructive dynamics unfold is conditioned by the emergence of militant expressions of political Islam within and outside the Somali coast in and around the Red Sea ?Afrabian? trans-region and the Persian Gulf. Chapter 4: 'Religion: Somaliland and the Upheaval within Islam' will describe and interpret these regional (geo-cultural/geo-Islamic) pressures interacting with localised Somaliland expressions of pastoral Sufi Islam and Wahhabi ?Gulf Islam? influences; the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa; the geo- politics of the war on terror and the global Islamic civil war; Somaliland?s Islamic culture of education; and the Somaliland prognosis on Islam and stability and how an Islamist ascendancy might affect Somaliland. The Somaliland international relations and politics of reconciliation, reconstruction and religion dovetail into what has become the ultimate ?bottom-line? in the 'quadrilateral framework' nexus of this thesis: the achievement of international diplomatic recognition ? or, at the very least, a workable contingent status that will facilitate the normalisation of Somaliland?s international relations. 21 Chapter 5: 'Recognition: Recognising the Unrecognised', will examine leadership and the domestic pulse; regional geo-political dynamics interacting within the broader international context and how these dynamics play out in the quest for de jure recognition and the influence of regional politics; Somaliland?s navigating its quasi-juridical sovereignty amid the politics of the Arab League and the African Union (AU) which resonate in the arena of multilateral institutions, while Somaliland?s relations with Ethiopia and South Africa open up possibilities of a departure from isolation. Chapter 6: The conclusion will summarise the ?big picture? emerging from reconciliation, reconstruction, religion and recognition while looking at lessons learned from the uniqueness of the Somaliland experience; where the dynamics of its nation-building process and the interplay of internal and external forces may lead to international diplomatic recognition; and the stabilisation of the fractious Somali coast. The author will suggest areas for future research. 1.5 Literature on Somaliland: Consolidated Survey and Review Somaliland, as a national-state entity, perhaps because of its newness as a state and, in addition to that, one that is unrecognised, has not generated much in the way of systematic literature on its politics, history, economy and people. Thus, any literature review of Somaliland from both historical and contemporary perspectives must start by acknowledging the weakness of the 22 literature base in terms of published volumes as opposed to periodical sources. Two noteworthy exceptions, as far published volumes are concerned are worth mentioning here. There is the War-Torn Societies Programme International work, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (Asmara, Red Sea Press, 2005) and Michael Schiswohl's work. These include Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ?Somaliland? and The Resurrection of Somaliland Against All ?Odds?: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities is a collection of four valuable studies on the decentralisation of government institutions, media and political construction, the livestock economy and the impact of war on the family. Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ?Somaliland?, is a helpful study designed to describe a valid legal framework applicable to Somaliland and to other non-state entities, and the elaboration of the law governing de facto regimes and their human rights obligations. Here, given this latter work?s treatment of Somaliland as a worthy study, another work that cites Somaliland within the context of an emerging body of thought and literature on state collapse and failure is States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control by Jeffrey Herbst. Herbst sees Somaliland, within the context of what he terms ?the new type of state disintegration that parts of 23 Africa is undergoing?, where a nascent state emerges from simply exiting a disintegrating state, as opposed to the Eritrea scenario where a state ?lacks the ability to even contest? a secession. Herbst follows this up by making a case for needed policy changes that allow for new states like Somaliland to be brought into the international economy, so as to benefit from engagement with institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.22 More often than not, Somaliland is referred to and/or dealt with within the broader context of Somalia and the greater Somali peninsula. In some cases, such treatment obscures more than it illuminates with respect to Somaliland.23 A good example in this regard is a report that will be cited again, titled Arab Donor Policies and Practices on Education in Somalia/land (2004, Oxfam Netherlands). In this instance, 'Somalia/land' is more illuminating about Somalia in general rather than Somaliland specifically. Nevertheless, since its unilateral independence in 1991, Somaliland in and of itself and within the broader context of turmoil engulfing the greater Somali region, has generated a proliferation of online journalistic commentaries and periodical articles, academic analyses, opinion and commentary pieces and studies associated with the treatment of the larger Somalia conflict and political environment. Moreover, there are sources that provide regular periodic updates on the Somali coast, such as the International Crisis Group 22 Jeffrey Herbst, State and Power in Africa, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (2000), pp. 267-8. This section is the concluding chapter that discusses 'The Past and the Future of State Power in Africa' with Somaliland being referenced in the sub-section on 'Recognizing New Nation States'. 23 Marc Lacey, ?The Signs Say Somaliland, but the World Says Somalia?, New York Times, Vol. 155, Issue 53601, (6 May 2006), p. A4. 24 (ICG) ?Africa Reports? that address the situation in Somaliland. In this regard, the reports and periodic research papers that have been produced by Matt Bryden (formerly the representative of the War-Torn Societies Programme in the Horn of Africa) have been invaluable sources of information for keeping abreast of ongoing developments in the Somali region, including Somaliland.24 The security situation in the Somali coast and the greater Persian Gulf, Middle East and Arabian peninsula, relating to the rise of militant political Islamist tendencies interacting with the US global war on terrorism, has inevitably brought Somaliland under the international peace and security spotlight.25 Somaliland?s development, therefore, has been intimately caught up in the wider geo-political security environment of the Horn of Africa region and the greater Middle East. Ken Menkhaus? August 2004 article in Conflict, Security & Development, examining the ?Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia? is indicative in this regard, including as it does, a look at Somaliland?s demobilisation process compared to that in southern Somalia. Readily available online sources such as AllAfrica.com, awdalnews.com and hiiraan.com ? the main bilingual English and Somali independent news 24 In addition to the two earlier International Crisis Group reports mentioned, see ?Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means??, Africa Report No. 88, (21 December 2004). ?Salvaging Somalia?s Chance For Peace?, Africa Briefing No. 11, (9 December 2002). ?Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State?, Africa Report No. 45, (23 May 2002). 25 Economist, ?Somaliland : Trying to behave like a proper state?, (29 Sep 2005). http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4466050&no_na_tran=1; Economist, ?Somalia, A state of utter failure?, (14 December 2005). http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5313559 25 service on Africa ? are also useful for area specialists and policy-makers on the Horn of Africa to consult, with respect to contextual unfolding developments in Somaliland as well as the Somali region as a whole. In the following paragraphs, the author attempts to highlight some of the more salient publications, periodical articles and online sources that have been consulted in this thesis. Because of the uneven quality of the literature on Somaliland, it was considered more useful to relate the literature review to the specific chapters rather than to reflect these sources in a more consolidated overview format. 1.5.1 Literature in Chapter 2 ? Reconciliation: Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and the International Community Literature cited and drawn upon in this chapter, focusing on the reconciliation process associated with the birth of Somaliland, is indicative of the range of materials that have emerged over the past few years. There is much material that is now accessible online on various websites, which has proven invaluable. But it is actually an unpublished 2004 paper by veteran Somali specialist John Drysdale, ?A Study of the Somali Hybrid Insurance System and the Consequences of its Rejection by Southern Somalia?s Political Leadership?26 that provides valuable background to understanding the different colonially-based cultural histories of northern Somalia-cum- Somaliland and southern Somalia in establishing the foundation for this study; the differential impacts of British and Italian colonialism and the role that tradition has played in shaping the politics of the two regions. Northern 26 See John Drysdale?s website: http://www.somalilandsurveys.info/Article.htm 26 Somalia?s comparatively more manageable coping with tradition versus modernity dynamics, as explored by Drysdale, resonates with similar tradition- modernity issues in what Mahmood Mamdani conceptualises as the colonially inherited ?bifurcated? urban-citizen/rural-tribal dichotomy explored in his seminal work, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996, Oxford University Press). The kind of discussion that emerges from these works, Drysdale?s unpublished piece in particular, provides a useful basis for reconstructing the scenario of Somalia?s collapse, out of which was generated the struggle for northern Somalia?s independence. In his 1994 work, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (HAAN Publishing), Drysdale provides an informative ?I was there? account of the local, regional and international politics of Somalia?s disintegration, including the context in which Somaliland?s unilateral independence was declared. It profiles many of the key Somali and international personalities who formed the cast of political actors during the early 1990s period of the United Nations (UN) intervention. However, the local political map of this terrain was a product of the resistance to the Siad Barre regime. The background to Somalia?s disintegration and the emergence of a plethora of Somali liberation movements is captured in numerous sources that are drawn upon in the first chapter. The online ?OnWar.com? (http://www.onwar.com) analysis of the Ogaden Ethio-Somalia War as precursor to Somalia?s collapse is captured in 'Ethiopia Somalia Ogaden War 1976-1978', accompanied by online country study sources of the US Library 27 of Congress? treatment of ?Oppression of the Isaaq? in its Somalia study (http://countrystudies.us/somalia/1.htm). An excellent online source for understanding the liberation struggle context of the SNM, which spearheaded Somaliland?s emergence from the larger conflict, sparked by the repression of the Siad Barre dictatorship is Jack L. Davies? August 27, 1994 Civic Webs Virtual Library article on ?The Liberation Movements of Somalia? (http://www.civicwebs.com). A useful companion source that also extends up to the more contemporary post-unilateral independence period is provided by Ahmed Yusuf Farah?s April 1999 study of ?Civil-Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia?. Farah?s piece expands on the liberation movement roots of Somaliland ? the focus of Davies ? to provide a comparative analysis of Somaliland and what is now Puntland, the Somali coast?s north-eastern autonomous region which, unlike Somaliland, did not opt for independence. Once Davies and Farah have established the culture of resistance and the emergence of liberation movements that ultimately lead to the downfall of Barre, the collaboration between Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf in their Review of African Political Economy article examining ?Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence? (No. 97: 455-478, 2003) provides the point of departure for charting the reconciliatory nation- building process that unfolds in the build-up to and in the aftermath of Somaliland?s independence. By laying out the conflicted nature of Somaliland?s early alternation between clan elder-influenced negotiations and factional conflict, Bradbury et al. build on Davies and Farah in providing, 28 overall, an organic framework for understanding Somaliland?s evolution over the early 1990s, against the backdrop of endemic anarchy in southern Somalia. Furthermore, Farah?s comparative focus on Puntland, along with Somailand, also provides an understanding of the intersecting points of tension between Somaliland and southern Somalia that accompany and influence Somaliland?s transition from violence to politics, as outlined by Bradbury et al. From there, several lesser news articles and commentaries capture more recent developments growing out of Somaliland?s reconciliatory nation- building, including its quest for diplomatic recognition interacting with its navigation of the international politics of efforts to reconstitute a post- transitional national government in Mogadishu. Many of these sources are readily available on AllAfrica.com and include articles from newspapers of Ethiopian and Kenyan origin. Other useful sources are periodically available from BBC News and from a Somaliland website, Somaliland.Net. Otherwise, a particularly useful overview of Somaliland?s reconciliatory nation-building experience is provided in ZEF News (No. 14), 'Somaliland: Building Governance Bottom-Up', a piece that succinctly complements some of the materials earlier cited, especially Drysdale?s unpublished paper. 1.5.2 Literature in Chapter 3 ? Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding Literature addressing Somaliland?s post-conflict reconstruction interacts very closely with the reconciliatory nation-building process, though the emphasis 29 shifts from the politics of reconciliation to the imperatives of socio-economic development and the recovery of the economy. Any attempt to explore this terrain should start with the consulting of two major though modest Somaliland publications: The 1999 report of the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development Self-Portrait (SCPD) titled A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins, and the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination?s 2005 report titled ?Somaliland Economic Overview?. Of the two, Self-Portrait provides a comprehensive survey of the country?s socio- economic development. Its narrative weaves in substantial references to Somailand?s building of political institutions of governance at local and regional levels as well as at a national level against a backdrop of having to cope with repatriation and the demilitarising disarmament-demobilisation- rehabilitation-reconstruction (DDRRR) process. Self-Portrait, therefore, contextualises Somaliland?s reconstruction and development dimensions of reconciliation and nation-building in which its establishment of a Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction features. Apart from reintegrating refugee and exile returnees, the incorporation of women and marginalised groups into the new polity and reconstruction process is also addressed by the SCPD report. However, a more focused and important treatment of the gender dimensions of this process emerges in Somalia: The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, edited by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (CIIR and Pluto Press, 2004). Here, the key chapter is the contribution by Zynab Mohamed Hassan and Shukri Harirr Ismail et al., titled ?Women and Peace-Making in Somaliland?, 30 which examines the struggles that Somaliland?s women have had to wage in achieving gender equality within a conservative patriarchal Muslim society. This edited volume fills a gap often neglected by research with a more structural angle. It blends Somali female authorship and daily practice by ordinary Somalis with oral testimony. (Here, another important reference regarding the role of women in Somaliland is an unpublished report presented at the 2nd Post-War Reconstruction Strategies Conference convened by the Institute for Practical Research and Training in Hargeisa on 20-25 July 2000, titled ?Assessment of Potential Women Leaders in Somaliland?, by Amina Mohamed Warsame. It was presented under the auspices of the Somaliland Women?s Research and Action Group.) This is a narrative that embraces both the politics of reconstruction as well as its socio-economic dimension which, within the SCPD report, extends into a survey of Somaliland?s economic sectors, centring on its major dependence on livestock. A more focused discussion of the reconstruction of this and other sectors is the domain of the 2005 Somaliland Economic Survey. What is important about Self-Portrait however, beyond the report itself, is its reflection of the type of developmental research that has been underway in a Somaliland preoccupied with building a diversity of civil society and non- governmental institutions, as well as structures of governance. Subsequent to Self-Portrait, the SCPD became the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development (SAPD). As a leading think-tank, it interacts extensively with Somaliland?s universities as well as with international 31 organisations, donors and government. As a partner organisation of the War- torn Societies Programme (WSP), it has undertaken a number of studies relevant to Somaliland?s development such as examining ?The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict: The Experience of the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development?. A 2002 report on ?Regulating the Livestock Economy of Somaliland? is another such SAPD study. These studies are pertinent to the more technocratic focus on Somaliland?s economic sectors found in the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination?s ?Somaliland Economic Overview 2005?. The 2005 overview surveys the problems faced by the critical livestock sector; what is considered a neglected marine economy, education, training and health; the environment and transport communications, including port development centring on the European Union (EU) supported exploration of developing a rail link with Ethiopia, which will benefit the further development of the Berbera port on the Gulf of Aden.27 Other important source material on Somaliland?s economic development has been generated by the UN through, principally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), despite the fact that the UN does not recognise Somaliland. How it gets around this, as reflected in its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-2006 is the reference to this being the ?Development Plan for Northwest Somalia (Somaliland)?. UNDP sources such as this, Somaliland?s first UN-sponsored development plan, touch the country?s overall capacity-building challenges both at the level of 27 These valuable four studies on livestock, media, decentralisation and war, now appear in the volume: War-Torn Societies Programme International, (2005). 32 governance institutions, as well as in such socio-economic human development sectors, such as in the education field and in the economy. Capacity challenges inevitably highlight what has become another major dimension of Somaliland?s development, which has also been a generator of research and studies: the Somaliland diaspora, the remittance economy that has emerged from this diaspora?s support for family, relatives and projects in Somaliland and how Somalilanders overseas have become actively engaged in Somaliland?s development. Indicative of such research and source materials on this aspect of Somaliland?s reconstruction and development are works by Peter Hansen of the Danish Institute for Development Studies (DIIS), who published in the International Organization on Migration?s (IOM?s) Migration Policy Research ?working papers series?, a study on ?Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland? (No. 3 ? June 2004). The Somaliland diaspora also features as an important case study in the African Foundation for Development?s (AFFORD?s) May 2000 paper, ?Globalisation and Development: A Diaspora Dimension?.28 Literature on the Somaliland diaspora experience and how it intimately relates to Somaliland?s development may, over time, emerge as an important source of findings and ?lessons learned? for how post-colonial African expatriate diasporas, and the remittance economy they generate, can become more coherently integrated into country development strategies in Africa; an area 28 See ?University of Hargeisa, Somaliland Case Study?, pp. 10-12. 33 that is specifically relevant to the New Partnership for Africa?s Development?s (NEPAD?s) priority to resource mobilisation, including human resources and finding ways of reversing the African brain drain and/or coping with it in ways that make it benefit Africa. 1.5.3 Literature in Chapter 4 ? Religion: Somaliland and the Upheaval within Islam No examination of Somaliland?s post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction process can ignore the religious dimension of the role of Islam and how Islam, within the context of its global politicisation, affects Somaliland?s prospects, for this dimension interacts with important aspects of the country?s socio- economic development as it pertains to the education sector. It also interacts with the influences on Somaliland emanating from its diaspora, especially those Somalilanders who have emigrated to the surrounding countries of the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula. This, in turn, also implicates the role of Arab donors and Islamic charities in various aspects of Somaliland?s social and economic development. Here again, education features as a key point of departure. The interest in Islam?s influence in Somaliland also relates to the broader security environment, given the emergence of militant political Islam and, along with it, the global war on terror in the wake of September 11, 2001. Exemplary of this genre is the 2004 study co-authored by Ruth Iyob and Edmund Keller on ?Strategic Security Challenges: The Special Case of the 34 Horn of Africa?. However, arriving at an understanding of contemporary security challenges in the Horn of Africa, as they impinge on Somaliland, requires grasping the historical perspective on the evolution of Somaliland?s national and cultural identity, due to it having interacted intimately with the expansion of Arab/Islamic influences in North-East Africa. Here, an invaluable source for this thesis has been the 1977 thesis of Ali Abdirhman Hersi, University of California (UCLA), titled 'The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influences in the Somali Peninsula'. Hersi?s work is important in as much as it establishes the northern Somalia entry-point to many of the historical cultural and religious influences emanating from South-West Asia, which have shaped this region of the Horn of Africa. It establishes the intimate connectivity between Somali identity and the process of Islamisation that has defined the region?s culture. This may facilitate an understanding of the contemporary interaction between the politics of the Somali region and the current dynamics of political Islam. Other published works adding to this historical context include, In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa, edited by Said S. Samatar (1992, Red Sea Press) and Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan- Based Society, by I.M. Lewis (1998, Red Sea Press). Samatar?s edited works include two Somali-specific contributions: 'Shaykh Zayla?i and the Nineteenth- Century Somali Qadiriya', by G. Martin and 'The Sayyid and Saalihiya Tariqa: Reformist, Anticolonial Hero in Somalia', by Abdul S. Bemath. In March 2005, 35 Samatar issued a paper, which is available on the www.wardheernews.com website, titled ?Unhappy Masses and the Challenge of Political Islam in the Horn of Africa?, with substantial reference to the evolution of Somali Islam, where he contends that the religion may have incubated in its Ethio- Abyssinian ?refugium? prior to its flourishing on Arabian soil. Meanwhile, in Saints and Somalis, Lewis? introductory essay to his volume, titled ?Appropriating Mystical Islam to Sacralise the Social Order?, is deemed of special importance in terms of its challenging what are termed ?single strand? theories on the cult of saints espoused by some scholars and non- scholars. It also sets the stage for the presentation of an intricate and integrated picture of Muslim beliefs and practices among Somalis. It provides a fitting complement to Hersi?s thesis. Hersi, Samatar and Lewis, taken together, help to contextualise more recent developments concerning the interaction between political Islam and the fractious nationalism of Somalis in the contemporary post-9/11 period. September 11 has generated a proliferation of works on the upheaval within the Islamic world, associated with the rise of terrorism and the emergence of jihadist tendencies within militant expressions of ?Islamism? or political Islam. In short, this upheaval within Islam has been depicted by some as a veritable ?global Islamic civil war? of which the recent work, No God but God: The War within Islam, by Reza Aslan (2005), may be indicative. To what extent does the Somaliland democratic republican project hinge on the outcome of this upheaval? Perhaps the best source for monitoring these broader trends, 36 including occasional references to North and North-East Africa is the daily Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) and regular field interviews. Preoccupation with such current trends has given rise to works specifically focusing on the Horn of Africa, of which Alex de Waal?s edited volume, Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (2004, Hurst and Company) is exemplary. Particularly germane to this study has been the de Waal volume?s essay by Roland Marchal on ?Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War?. This contribution establishes the political, cultural and security environment that informs the different trajectories of the north-western Somaliland Republic and southern Somalia based around Mogadishu. This is the context within which Somaliland?s political leaders have had to contend in terms of perceived threats to their isolated project in democratic governance vis-?-vis hostile regional forces such as Egypt and Sudan, which view the entire Somali coast, Somaliland included, as part of the Arab/Muslim sphere of influence. Somaliland, on the other hand, has aligned itself closely with Ethiopia as the dominant power in the Horn of Africa, which also sees itself as a bulwark against jihadist terrorism. An important source for monitoring these dynamics as they impinge on Somaliland and the Somali coast as a whole are the periodic ?Africa Reports? of the International Crisis Group (ICG). As recently as July 11, 2005, ICG published ?Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? (Africa Report No. 95) and its latest report of 12 December 2005 is ?Somalia?s Islamists? (Africa Report No. 100). The ICG?s tracking of terrorism and 37 counter-terrorism in the Somali coast has been ongoing, as reflected in an extensive published study in the Journal of Conflict Studies (Fall 2003,Vol. 23, No. 2) by ICG?s Matt Bryden in July 2003, titled ?No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia?. The year 2003, was, in fact when terrorism emerged as a possible destablisation threat against Somaliland, with the killings of a British couple outside Hargeisa. This incident and its possible implications received wide media coverage as reflected in the November 10, 2003 Business Day article by then columnist Francis Kornegay: ?Sound AU Alarm on Destabilisation of Somaliland?. Because of this charged geo-political environment associated with the challenges of Islamism in the Muslim world, development issues affecting Somaliland in such critical sectors as education and remittances have been complicated by the rise of militant political Islamist tendencies and their impact/influence on Somaliland. The influence of Islamic charities in the Somali coast has been comprehensively researched by Andre Le Sage and Ken Menkhaus in their paper, ?The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas? presented at the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention on 17-20 March 2004 in Montreal. Le Sage and Menkhaus address the global reach of Islamic charities and their politicisation before honing in specifically on Somalia.29 With respect to Somaliland, the earlier cited Oxfam Netherland?s report, 29 Andre Le Sage, ?Somalia and the War on Terrorism, Political Islamic Movements and US Counter-Terrorism Efforts?, Jesus College, Cambridge University, Doctor of Philosophy Degree, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, (June 2004). 38 published in conjunction with the World Association of Muslim Youth, is somewhat misleading in its title reference to ?Somalia/land? when in fact its main focus is on Somalia and there is no real differentiation between Somalia and Somaliland, which would have been helpful in gauging the influence that such charities exert in Somaliland. Where charities do have an indelible impact in Somaliland is in the education sector, specifically in support of Koranic schools. Because of prevalent perceptions of Saudi Arabian-funded Madrassas throughout the Muslim world as vehicles for the dissemination of Wahabist fundamentalism and Wahabism?s link to the flowering of an anti-Western jihadist culture underpinning Islamist terrorism, the Islamic charities-Koranic education nexus in Somaliland would inevitably come under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the available literature, which is not substantial, does not really focus on this religio-political dimension as much as on the adequacy or inadequacy of Koranic schools in filling the education gap in Somaliland during its extended post-conflict reconstruction. This is the focus of Erasmus U. Morah?s article in a 2000 issue of the International Journal of Educational Development titled ?Old Institutions, New Opportunities: the Emerging Nature of Koranic Schools in Somaliland in the 1990s?. If Somaliland?s Koranic education institutions have, at least thus far, avoided becoming vehicles of political proselitisation, this may well have something to do with the intimately inter-woven cultural integration between Islam and Somali society, which again harks back to I.M. Lewis? Saints and Somalis. This raises the issue of the phenomenon of Somali ?religious men? or wadaads, which is interrogated by Marleen Renders 39 of Ghent University in an unpublished paper titled ?Peace and Development in Somaliland: The Wadaads and ?Islamic? Claims to Popular Legitimacy in an Emerging Polity? (2005). The fact that inter-clan peace has continued to be vital for the newer wadaad generation may warrant further inquiry into the role of an indigenised Islam as a stabilising factor during a period of upheaval within the Muslim world, and within the geo-political/security environment of Muslim lands like the Somaliland Republic. Moreover, the continued success of the Somaliland state-building enterprise has been intimately interwoven into the diplomatic quest for African and international recognition. 1.5.4 Literature in Chapter 5 ? Recognition: Recognising the Unrecognised The bottom-line for Somaliland?s elites along the continuum of reconciliation, reconstruction and religion, is recognition. Here there are ample non-African newspaper commentaries arguing in favour of Somaliland?s recognition as a comparative ?model? African state, trudging alone in a region of conflict and instability, and in need of African and international support to sustain its democratic experiment. In fact, while cases such as Somaliland?s are a hard sell in African and developing world politics, the country has, nevertheless, managed to garner an important degree of political if not official diplomatic support from key African state actors such as neighbouring Ethiopia and Djibouti, as well as South Africa. 40 Apart from more than a few occasional news articles and commentaries, there is a dearth of more substantial literature on Somaliland?s quest for recognition and the pros and cons of the issue. However, there are a few important source materials that have seen the light of day. Among them, one of the most compelling cases for recognition is an official South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) legal advisory. In April 2003, the Office of the Chief State Adviser (International Law) produced a report, ?Somaliland?s Claim to Sovereign Status?. This report bases its brief on Somaliland?s fleetingly brief history as an independent state prior to its merger with former Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Thus, in legal terms, Somaliland did not secede from Somalia but simply reverted back to its original independent status in the wake of the disintegration of a Somali state that has yet to reconstitute itself as a credible government. The former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and one-time State Department Director on Somalia, David Shinn, has also produced useful material such as a 2003 analysis, ?The Horn of Africa: How Does Somaliland Fit in?? ? a Weekly Special Report. Shinn was Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996-99. One newspaper article that generated particularly wide coverage and reproduction on a number of websites was ?Somaliland: The Little Country That Could?, by David Shinn. His piece, originally published in Ethiopia?s Addis Tribune in its November 29, 2002 edition, was republished in several other web publications such as on websites like www.globalpolicy.org. What is particularly useful about the State Department ?weekly special report? analysis 41 and Ambassador Shinn?s piece, are their examination of Somaliland?s bilateral relations with a range of regional and ?out of area? actors. These treatments provide very important geo-political context to the challenge which Somaliland faces in achieving diplomatic recognition, and are therefore essential sources from that standpoint. Monitoring the periodic reports of the African Union on political developments in the Somali coast, with particular regard to efforts of Somalia?s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to gain traction, are also useful. In a departure from what used to be the norm of denial and avoidance, the AU?s reports of Commissioner Alpha Konare, make a point of including Somaliland, and the findings of fact-finding missions from the AU that have included Somaliland. Thus, Hargeisa has managed to achieve a certain important degree of informal political, if not diplomatic, recognition from official Africa. In line with this trend are conferences in which research analysts and academics have been brought together to explore a range of options on the Somali coast, such as those convened by the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) in Pretoria in 2004. Here, the debate over Somaliland and Somalia, with implications for a wider African discourse, has moved beyond the pros and cons of recognising one or the other entity, to managing a process of diplomatic and political engagement with both Somali entities, with an aim toward the eventual stabilisation and re-integration of the region. One such presentation, which will be published along with other papers in a forthcoming AISA volume is ?Somalia/Somaliland Dynamics as a Case Study in the International Politics of the Stalemated Recognition of a 42 Collapsed State: Tentative Thoughts on Stabilising the Somali Coast?, by Francis Kornegay of Johannesburg?s Centre for Policy Studies. The foregoing survey of source materials is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the information resources, including those in the Arabic language, drawn upon in constructing the analysis in this thesis. It does not reflect all of the materials consulted, such as various newspaper articles, press announcements, reports, communiqu?s and other informal materials and the eight field research trips to the region. They are footnoted in the body of the thesis and more often than not reflect particular episodes at a point in time within a larger context of unfolding events, in what has been a very fluid panorama of political and security developments in the Somali coast. At the centre of these developments is the process of reconciliatory nation-building, which constitutes the beginning of this narrative analysis. In many ways, reconciliation is an ongoing process that runs throughout the other dimensions: reconstruction, religion and recognition. And all of these dimensions, in one way or another, are overlapping and interactive themes in a dialectical process of Somaliland?s nation-building. 43 Chapter 2: Reconciliation Resistance, Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and the International Community hadduu oday jiro, uu u ood rogo, abaaroodkana way orgootaa ... If an elder looks after it [the herd] and caters to its needs, it could show heat even during the dry season ? (Somali proverb)30 The national reconciliation process that culminated in the declaration of Somaliland independence on 18 May 1991 represents a unique blend of ?modernity? and ?tradition? out of the travails of the peoples of the north-west Somali coast under the ancien regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre, and the war of repression he waged against this region; a trauma that effectively undermined his 'Greater Somalia' project in confirming the defeat of these aspirations in the earlier Ogaden campaign of 1978. The dynamics of Somaliland reconciliation revolve around the complex interplay of accommodation between what might be termed the forces of modernity, represented in the rise of the SNM, Somali National Movement, as an early generation African post-colonial liberation-cum-resistance phenomenon, on 30 This proverb is a tribute to the wisdom of elders. It is one of the lyrics used when the Somalilander cow herder entertains his herd while providing water for them. It means if the caretaker of such herd is a wise elder, it can show signs of heat or have the desire to mate even during the dry season, which is unlikely for cattle during this time, due to lack of water and fodder. 44 the one hand, and the indigenous forces of tradition vested in the north-west region?s clan leadership on the other.31 As a starting point toward the post-colonial readjustment of political identities along the Somali coast in the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Barre dictatorship, this traditional/modern interplay represented a departure from what, throughout much of Africa, had been an essentially ?top-down? transfer of power from metropolitan colonial elites to nationalist elites who had negotiated such power transfers, more or less in the absence of deeper socio- cultural mass transformations with pan-ethnolinguistic nationalist content. Even in mono-ethnic geo-cultural regions like the Somali coast ? much more so in ethnolingusitically diverse regions elsewhere in Africa amalgamated into single post-colonial polities ? such absences of nationalistic social transformations accompanying elite power transfers have, over successive post-independence decades, come back to haunt much of the continent in the form of nominal nation-states with, by and large, weak national identities; situations that, in many instances, have become manifest in post-colonial break-downs in governance, with civil war and chronic unrest threatening the cohesion of many an African state. The ?failed? and ?collapsed? state syndrome has emerged from many such situations, of which Somalia has become a prime example. 31 Hussein Adam, 'Somalia: International versus Local Attempts at Peacebuilding', in Robert Mathews (ed.), Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (2003). John Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for the Somalilanders, London: HAAN Publishing, (2000). 45 2.1 ?Xeer Soomaali? Under British Colonialism: Elders the Midwives of Somaliland?s Reconstruction The Somaliland experience of reconciliation represents a variation on what may be an emerging theme of post-colonial correctives of such oversights in reformulating national identities; and in the process challenging the inter- African and broader international relations impinging on such upheavals. Here, there is a need to revisit the comparative British and Italian colonial legacies along the Somali coast to gain some perspective on the foundations for post-conflict reconciliation that have thus far benefited Somaliland. The veteran British ?insider? on the politics of this region, John Drysdale, has shed interesting light on this legacy in observations he made last year on why, from the vantage-point of history, Somalia is experiencing such problems in reconstituting itself in the south. In an unpublished paper on 'A Study of the Somali Hybrid Insurance System and the Consequences of its Rejection by Southern Somalia?s Political Leadership', Drysdale points out that the former British Somaliland Protectorate of the north-west has three concurrent legal systems: secular law in the English language, Islamic law in the Arabic language, and unwritten Somali traditional law. ?The latter, under the British administrative system, was exercised exclusively by Somali elders who were knowledgeable in traditional law. They operated in both town and country in the six districts then administered by British District Commissioners. To help the elders in the 46 execution of their court orders, District Commissioners had informal clan police available".32 Because traditional law, according to Drysdale, ? was not written, and is still not written, only those elders who had inherited an encyclopaedic knowledge of the time-honoured principles and practices of the traditional law?s tariff systems for the awards of collective compensation to the aggrieved ? case histories, the art of peace-making, consensus decision- making, the avoidance of political power in the hands of one person, the liberty of the individual for humanity?s sake ? no incarceration or capital punishment since you cannot deprive a family of its desperately needed labour ? were qualified as consultants to advise elders in court (the shade of a thorn tree). It was, and still is, a largely unknown subject to the outside world. However ancient traditional law may be, Somalis are comfortable with its judgements to this day, whether disputes coming before the elders are peacemaking in character, or the result of injuries sustained in a road accident, or compensation for injuries inflicted on a person?s pride or wellbeing. Tariffs associated with this system are at the core of Somali justice in terms of applying preventive measures against outbreaks of serious conflict. 32 See Drysdale, http://www.somalilandsurveys.info/Article.htm; and the Report of the Somaliland Protectorate Constitutional Conference, held in London, Her Majesty?s Stationery Office, (May 1960), italics added. 47 Intimately interwoven with this ?indigenous knowledge system? of traditional law vested in clan elders is a guarantee for every Somali of collective support from one?s Tol. A ?Tol,? according to Drysdale, is ?a self-contained group of genealogical lineage with its chosen elders who run the organisation.? These exist in the thousands as institutions that protect the interest of their respective memberships. Drysdale continues: The almost daily voluntary work of elders of the ?Tol? is both physically and intellectually demanding and usually independent of government. No free lunches or four wheels come their way, but governments which have no love of them, frequently use or misuse their energy and talents in the interest of good or bad governance. Their re-emergence into the open society of Somaliland in 1991 from the darkness of their two decades of underground work was fostered three years earlier by the Somali National Movement. The Movement consisted of freedom fighters based in Ethiopia in the 1980s to oust Siyad Barre?s formidable and wicked military garrisons in Somaliland ? The Movement had a problem of recruitment. Reluctantly they called on the elders in Somaliland to persuade surreptitiously their ?Tol? followers to join the Movement. They were successful. The Movement?s commanders, impressed by the elders? aplomb, brought them in as advisers, giving them equal status (italics added). When the Movement ran the garrisons into the sea and formed a government in 1991, the elders were given a place of honour, resuming their open-handed work, with almost ordained honesty, as before. This reflection on how ?tradition? and ?modernity? came together out of the existential circumstances of historical contingency in Somaliland?s resistance to Siad Barre?s Mogadishu regime is instructive for what it conveys about the 48 extent to which these two realms of Islamic-cultural reality have been alienated from each other in post-colonial African polities. Moreover, in Somaliland?s case, they were not necessarily pre-ordained to make common cause against the southern tyranny, but for the armed struggle that was imposed upon the people of the north-west region and the need for the exiled SNM to firmly root itself among the people of the region, in order to wage a successful military resistance. In this way, the region?s clan elders became the midwives of Somaliland?s rebirth. Whether or not Britain?s colonial propensity for indirect rule, through traditional leadership structures was crucial to the continued existence of the system of traditional decision-making described by Drysdale, is not clear. What Drysdale does stress, in contrast to the situation in the Somaliland north-west is the period of the mid-1950s when Somalia, in the south, was still under the administration of the Italian government at the ?behest of the United Nations Trusteeship Council?. Referring to the Somali Youth League (SYL) leader, Abdillahi Issa, Drysdale observes that he ? had several things in common with the Italian administration. One issue in particular was their mutual abhorrence of ?tribalism.? The Italians ignored elders before Abdillahi became prime minister. They felt that Somalis could only modernise if their urban societies could develop bourgeois habits, learn the Italian language and culture, and be Italian in all their beautiful cultural habits including a propensity towards malfeasance. As part of this process the condemnation by the Somali Youth League of ?tribalism? was grist for the Italian mill. ?Tribalism,? in the Somali political notion at the time, was an 49 embedded culture drawing upon virtually every Somali?s allegiance competitively with the modern concept (to Somalis then) of political parties which were deemed to be more like the United States understanding of a ?civil society?. According to Drysdale, during the first republic (on the dawn of independence from colonialism): Abdillahi Issa, as prime minister, forbade the use of lineage names, with which Somalis heretofore identified themselves, and officially discarded the Somali traditional system known for centuries as Xeer Soomaali. The same policy persisted during the first nine years of the Somali Republic (1960-69) ? the union between Somalia and Somaliland ? which was not a very successful experiment in democracy. This was followed by Siyad Barre?s ?burial? of ?tribalism? for twenty-two years which was a farce since he used the members of his own clan affiliations in the security services to intimidate the rest of the country. The rebirth of ?tribalism? out of a compact based on mutual need between the north-west?s (Somaliland) clan elders and the SNM?s exiled leadership would eventually set the stage for the experiment in reconciliatory nation-building based on a marriage ? initially of convenience ? between tradition and modernity, which has resulted in the Somaliland of today. However, this was not a smooth process without its own internal contradictions and conflicts. But the Somaliland national experience, as it unfolded, would confirm the elders 50 as arbiters in resolving the region?s conflicts along the way.33 In effect, ?tribalism? as tradition became the midwife of modernity in Somaliland?s rebirth. To arrive where it is today, it is necessary to revisit Somaliland?s first brief taste of independence in the early 1960s. Somaliland, as the former British protectorate, would go through the ?false start? of Somali republican union with former Italian Somaliland from 1960-69, followed by the nadir of the era of the Barre dictatorship, which eventually rekindled the north-west region?s nationalist impulses as a result of the repression and near genocide that it had to endure. 2.2 The SNM: Northern Resistance Takes Shape The SNM came into being in response to the repression of the Siad Barre dictatorship.34 As a regionally-based post-colonial resistance movement, it represented the northern 'clan-family' of the Isaaqs, centred on the three major urban centres of Hargeisa, the second largest city along the Somali coast, Burco and the strategic port city of Berbera. Other non-Isaaq clans and sub-clans represented in the SNM?s founding included the Dir clans from the south in former Italian Somalia, individual members of the Gadabursi clan groups, and the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans. According to Jack L. Davies, in his 'The Liberation Movements of Somalia', it was founded "more or less simultaneously by different groups of individuals in Saudi Arabia, 33 Ken Menkhaus, 'Traditional Conflict management in Contemporary Somalia', in I. William Zartman (ed.), Traditional Cures for modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine', Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2000). 34 Africa Watch Report, A Government at War with its Own People. Somalia, Testimonies about the killing and the Conflict in the North, London: Africa Watch, (1990). 51 Mogadishu and London,? meeting in London on April 6, 1981.35 Some of the members of the founding committee in London were: Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid (Jimaleh), the group?s President, who became SNM Chairman; Hassan Adan Wadadeed, Vice-President; Ahmed Ismael; and Mohamed Hashi Elmi. The London group that hosted the founding of the SNM has been described as having been ?secular and nationalist in its political outlook?, while the Saudi-based members were defined as ?religious and quite ardent in their support of the Isaq?. Furthermore, ?it seems that the religious element in the organization was most influential during the formative years, but started to wane in importance with the shift of the SNM from London to its base in eastern Ethiopia in 1983 and the subsequent intensification of its ten-year- long guerrilla war against Siad Barre?s forces.? The SNM, as well as the first President of Somaliland, Mohammed Egal, had to contend with strong internal religious sentiments. A case in point is the inscription of the Islamic religious formula on the new flag of Somaliland. This challenge of balancing religion and modernity in Somaliland continues.36 The SNM had been born of a sentiment of marginalisation ? a feeling among the Isaaq and allied clans and sub-clans that the Mogadishu dictatorship under Siad Barre had neglected its clan and region. Southern dominance in the Republic of Somalia had triggered sporadic Isaaq unrest throughout the post-independence period. For example, in 1961, Somaliland?s military 35 Jack L. Davies, 'The Liberation Movements of Somalia', Civic Webs Virtual Library, (27 August 1994). http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/somalia/1994/lib_movments/lib_movements.htm 36 Bashir Goth, 'Editorial ? Taking the new opposition dominated parliament to task', Awdalnews, (9 December 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6603 52 officers, led by Hassan Kayd, attempted to reclaim Somaliland's independence. Yet, in spite of this periodic unrest, the marginalisation and the savage military repression that ensued in the late 1980s, the SNM?s initial raison d??tre was not to secede from the Somali union, but to overthrow the Siad Barre dictatorship. As an inter-clan expression of pan-Somali nationalism, the driving force was a ?unified desire to oppose the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Barre, rather than to support any particular clans, such as the Isaaq clans that provided the largest fraction of its membership. Therefore, it collected intellectuals with a wide variety of political views who shared this common goal.? Short of secession, there was, according to Davies, a longer-term SNM desire, not only to stop the oppression of the central government in Mogadishu, but ?to decentralize much of the power of that government.? However, ?the short-term motivation of stopping the growing genocide of the Isaq group of clans by General Barre focused the goals of the SNM on a narrower clan basis.?37 The increasingly repressive nature of the Barre regime reflected a confluence of pressures stemming from General Barre?s failed ?Greater Somalia? irredentist project. The aim was to detach from Ethiopia its Ogaden Somali region. This was initially undertaken by Mogadishu?s backing of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the so-called ?Somali Abo? insurgent forces at a time when the Mengistu regime was also contending with the Tigre-Eritrean insurgencies throughout the Abyssinian highlands and the Red Sea coast. Having over-committed his regime to the liberation of the Ogadeni 37 Davies, (27 August 1994). 53 (to the extent of integrating them into his regime), Siad Barre?s military defeat by the Cuban forces, which intervened in the Ethio-Somali battle for the Ogaden in 1977-78, eventually undermined the rationale and cohesion of his rule. The Somali armed forces (known as the Somali National Army (SNA)) never recovered from the Ogaden defeat. (At one of the war?s turning point engagements, the battle of Jijiga, the SNA lost more than half of its attacking force of three tank battalions, each consisting of more than thirty tanks! Years later, after the outbreak of the SNM-led northern resistance, Ogadeni troops in the national army defected en masse, contributing to the formation of the Somali Patriotic Movement in a process of proliferating southern anti-regime formations.) Siad Barre had misplayed his hand amid the changing geo-political balance of forces in the Horn of Africa as a result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism. In fact, the nominally ?scientific socialist? regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu were an object lesson in how more mundane agendas of narrowly nationalistic realpolitik had more to do with animating the domestic and foreign policy agendas of such African governments than a commitment to ideology. Having already become political and military mentors of Siad Barre?s ?scientific socialist? regime in Somalia, the Soviet Union and Cuba had been in the process of extending their influence to the increasingly ?scientific socialist? military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. How fitting it seemed 54 then, for both ?scientific socialist? Ethiopia and Somalia to join hands in ?socialist solidarity?, by forming a socialist federation of the Horn of Africa. The only problem was that before this could happen, Siad Barre needed to consummate his irredentist project by liberating the Ogaden. Failing this, the Soviet-Cuban intervention on ?scientific socialist? Ethiopia?s behalf ushered in a changed balance of power in the Horn of Africa, as a weakened Somalia became a client of the US and tacitly aligned with other reactionary forces on the continent. Thus, in the bombing campaigns that Siad Barre unleashed on Hargeisa, Rhodesian and South African mercenary pilots are reported to have been employed by the Somali air force.38 It is in the wake of the Ogaden defeat that endemic inter-clan and sub-clan instability gained momentum in formerly ?scientific socialist? Somalia. The emergence of an Isaaq-led resistance, with its regional inter-clan as well as clan character, unfolded within this wider context of Somali unrest and resistance against an increasingly defensive Mogadishu dictatorship. SNM resistance was part of a broader insurgency to unseat the Barre regime. The SNM?s military campaign, launched in 1988, resulted in the capture of Burco on 27 May, and the capture of a substantial part of Hargeisa on 31 May 1988. 38 Civic Web, 'Letter from Minister of Finance Authorizing Pay for Mercenary Pilots', (13 November 1990). http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/somalia/1990/authorization_for_mercenary_pilots.htm 55 The savagery of government retaliation forced some 300,000 Somalilanders to flee to Ethiopia, further fuelling the insurgency. Five thousand Isaaqs were killed between May, when the SNM captured Burco, and December 1988. This chapter in the SNM?s struggle will be revisited later for what it reveals about the larger geo-political context of repressive regime survival in both Ethiopia and Somalia, as both regimes sought quid pro quos to deal with their respective challenges in which anti-regime liberation movements played proxy roles. But first, the SNM challenge needs to be placed within a broader Somali resistance framework to better understand its uniqueness compared to other Somali movements, and how this uniqueness relates to the reconciliatory nation-building process that has been underway over the past several years in Somaliland. 2.3 Somalia?s ?Liberation? Proliferation In terms of an historical and contemporary perspective on the politics of conflict and accommodation along the Somali coast, Davies39 offers a typology of ?Somali liberation movements? that may be instructive to locating the SNM insurgency and its legacy. He differentiates between ?genuine? liberation movements and ?new? liberation movements; the latter mainly reflecting the fission and fusion of political formations during the post-Barre period. Here, however, Davies offers an insightful commentary on the international politics of Somali liberation and 'reconciliation' that harks back to 39 Davies, (27 August 1994). 56 the ?top-down? versus ?bottom-up? dynamics that have distinguished Somaliland?s state-building from statehood failure in the south: Any two Somalis can get together and form a new ?liberation movement? that claims to represent any group of people they want to claim. International ?reconciliation conferences? that give one vote to each faction admitted, use almost non-existent ?liberation movements? in order to deliberately distort voting rights at these conferences. This practice began at the two Djibouti Conferences in the Summer of 1991, More recently, the US State Department and the United Nations in particular have been using this technique to inflate the importance of minor liberation groups that support their own stated goals, in order to weaken the influence of genuine liberation movements that oppose some of their views, particularly concerning recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Therefore, Somalis are beginning to argue that only ?genuine? liberation movements who fought against the dictatorship prior to January 1991 should be admitted as real factions to such ?reconciliation conferences?.40 Besides the SNM, Davies classifies the following as being or having been ?genuine? Somali liberation movements:41 The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which at times has been the Somali Salvation Front (SSF); The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the two factions that it split into: SPM Ogadeni and SPM Harti; 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 57 The United Somali Congress (USC) and the two factions that it split into: USC ?Aidid? and USC Mahdi; The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the two factions that it split into: SDM pro ?Aidid? and SDM pro Mahdi. Without enumerating the ?new? movements of dubious credibility, the SNM insurgency in the north complemented the emergence of the SSDF/SSF and USC, which eventually forced Siad Barre to flee Mogadishu in 1991. Here, some analysis of this larger resistance context is in order as a means of gaining more insight into SNM?s comparative advantage vis-?-vis these other movements, as well as to reference the dynamics that have a bearing on current developments between the Somaliland Republic and the latest ? 2004/05 ? peace conference rendition of a reconstituted Mogadishu government: the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The SSDF/SSF was an older Ethiopian-backed movement formed in 1979, headquartered in Addis Ababa with funding and military aid provided by Libya. As the SSDF/SSF sought to broaden its predominantly Majerteen clan group base, its founding leaders, in reaction to what they perceived as a threat to their leadership, worked a deal with the Ethiopian and Libyan governments which transformed the movement into as much a proxy of Ethiopia against Somalia as an authentic liberation movement. In this transformation, Colonel Mengistu arrested one of the main key SSDF/SSF leaders, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and several of his key aides. They languished in jail until the overthrow of the Mengistu regime. Upon their release, Yusuf, currently 58 President of the new Somali TFG and formerly leader of the autonomous region of Puntland, reclaimed SSDF/SSF leadership. Closely intertwined with what has been ongoing contemporary border tensions between Somaliland and Puntland over the Sool and Sanaag regions, Davies recounts that ?there were jealousies between the SSDF and the SNM, whereby the SSDF tried to force the SNM to join it and the SNM refused. Ultimately, Colonel Mengistu dropped the SSDF and sided with the SNM? although the ?SNM was never as cooperative as the SSDF ? refusing to take orders from the Ethiopian Dictatorship and refusing to accept the ?Green Book? of Colonel Qaddafi as the pre-requisite for receiving financial and military aid from him?.42 The SNM?s uniqueness compared to the other movements, according to Davies, lay in the fact that, apart from having a preponderant clan-base in the Isaaqs, it did not try to expand further to include members from even more clans and groups of clans, although it had an ideological thrust that attracted individuals from other clans. ?In sharp contrast to other liberation movements at that time, the SNM did make a serious effort to use internal democratic procedures to develop political goals based upon an internal consensus ? and to publish them.?43 Davies cites a typical published statement from 1981: ?We propose a new political system built on Somali cultural values of co-operation rather than coercion; a system which elevates the Somali concept of ?Xeer? or 42 Ibid., (italics added). 43 Ibid. 59 inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level?.44 A different take on the SNM?s social base in the north-west is provided by Ahmed Yusuf Farah (1999) in a contribution he made to a Project Ploughshares inquiry into ?Civil-Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia?.45 In a presentation entitled ?Political Actors in Somalia?s Emerging De Facto Entities: Civil Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia?, Farah contends that, in fact, Somaliland is ?socially and politically more complex than Northeast Somalia? ? referring to Puntland ? that Somaliland supports a ?population of mixed (and rival) clan origin belonging to three large clan families (Dir, Isaq and Harti/Darood).? This more pluralistic perspective on Somaliland may account for the Isaaq/non-Isaaq clan strategies that the SNM has pursued in its approach to interacting with traditional authorities in the region. But it may also account for the movement?s motivation in producing a clearly articulated pan-Somali ?national democratic? ideology on which Davies further elaborates. Instructive, in this regard, are the following, taken from the eleven guidelines published by the SNM that stipulated: 44 Ibid., (italics added). 45 Ahmed Farah, ?Political Actors in Somalia's Emerging De Facto Entities: Civil Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia?, Project Ploughshares, presented at the Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Nairobi, (April 1999). http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivefeb01/010414202.htm. See also Farah and Lewis, (1997), pp. 317-325. 60 ? ?The structure of the central and regional government will be as simple as possible. They will be designed to reduce hierarchy and bureaucracy to a minimum and enable the average man and woman to understand and relate to regional and national governments; ? It will integrate effectively traditional Somali egalitarianism and the requirement of good central government; ? It will maximise the effectiveness of the representative and democratic process at all levels; and ? The freedom of the press in accordance with the constitution and the laws of the country will be guaranteed by law.?46 2.4 SNM?s Comparative Advantage in an Escalating Struggle Building on a cohesive clan base, combined with an essentially pan-Somali democratic ethos, the SNM strategy, according to Davies, was to assist other clan and regional groups to embark on their own resistance against the Barre dictatorship. He went on to say that ?it assisted the Hawiyes in forming their USC and the Ogadenis in forming their SPM as sister liberation movements in the fight to oust the socialist dictatorship of General Barre in the war-of- liberation.?47 Nevertheless, the SNM succeeded in attracting non-Isaaqs, though Siad Barre also did well in trying to undermine this attraction. ?General Barre was extremely irritated by the growing number of Hawiyes joining the SNM and the fact that the Vice Chairman was a Hawiye. He succeeded in 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 61 creating a conflict between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SNM, which led to the resignation of Vice Chairman, Ali Mohamed Ossoble ('Wardhigley'). Other foreign countries appear to have co-operated with General Barre in developing the theory that since the SSDF had stopped its armed resistance to General Barre, only the SNM was left. If the SNM could be induced to give up its armed struggle, there would be no further conflict and opposition to General Barre. Despite the various bribes offered, the SNM refused to end its war-of-liberation. Many other leading Hawiye members of the SNM also left the SNM in 1987 as a result of this episode. This attempted ?divide-and-conquer? ploy on Barre?s part forms a crucial backdrop to the escalation of the SNM insurgency within the north during 1988 and the regime?s savage retaliation. This escalation is directly linked to mutual sell-outs of liberation proxies by Mengistu and Barre in the interests of their respective regime survivals. In April 1988, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia struck a peace deal with General Barre, to their mutual convenience, whereby each agreed to stop supporting the liberation movements based in their countries and launching raids in the other country. The basic idea was to force the SNM to withdraw from the border, deeper into Ethiopia, from where they would not be able to launch any more raids across the border. However, with the ?rug pulled out from under 62 their feet?, the SNM went in the other direction and moved its militias to within Somalia?.48 The rest is history in the escalation of Somalia?s civil war, to the point of the Barre regime?s eventual collapse in 1991. The fact that the SNM was able to make the transition from external cross- border raids to full-fledged internal insurgency is a commentary on the accommodation that its ?modern? nationalist leadership had arrived with the traditional authority of the region?s clan elders in the spirit of ?Xeer Soomaali?. Nevertheless, the SNM had its own internal contradictions which, according to Ahmed Yusuf Farah and Ioan M. Lewis,49 would come back to haunt Somaliland in the post-independence declaration period. During the armed struggle phase, the SNM managed to suppress, according to Farah and Lewis, long-held civilian-military leadership rivalries that eventually erupted after the overthrow of Barre and during the early phase of state formation. To some extent, this appears rooted in the movement?s clan dynamics. The military leadership of the SNM had, during the struggle period, been ?eager to transform the organization into a professional and efficient military and political body; but efforts to do so were frustrated by the clan character of the SNM.? Yet, as Farah and Lewis also acknowledge: 48 Ibid., (italics added). 49 Farah and Lewis, (1997). 63 The vital dependence of the SNM on Isaq clansmen made it responsive to the wishes of the wider population, particularly traditional leaders who administer the affairs of local clans. Along with the majority of the public, traditional leaders supported the civilian leaders in the power struggle within the SNM ? an inclination that seems to have endured in the post-military period.50 This tilt toward civilian ascendancy, based on the SNM?s popular base, was the key to its survival during the nadir of the Barre regime?s savage reprisals. Tellingly, Farah, in underlining the breadth of SNM dependency on its social base, points out that the struggle of the SNM depended on support from different sectors of the Isaq population, including the Isaq diaspora, refugees in camps in eastern Ethiopia, and Isaq nomads. It received relatively little external military and financial assistance as both interested governments in Ethiopia and Somalia worked to subvert its objectives.51 Thus, civilian elite ascendancy, for the SNM, was critical to its survivalist self- reliance and self-sufficiency during the armed struggle. But this proved to be at the cost of deferring the resolution of civil-military leadership tensions within the SNM. When they violently resurfaced during the early phase of Somaliland?s state formation in 1991, they would operate to further entrench the traditional leadership of clan elders as the society?s leading agents in 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., italics added. 64 conflict prevention, management and resolution. In a very real sense, the clan elders have served as Somaliland?s guarantors of peace and security; the nation?s ultimate fall-back as an ?insurance policy? against a descent into anarchy. The clan elders became the SNM?s main fall-back during the ensuing state-building phase of democratic post-conflict stabilisation. 2.5 Enter the Clan Elders: Post-Conflict Stabilisation From the late 1980s until the Barre regime?s collapse, the SNM apparently did most of the fighting in the resistance war. It seems that only toward the end, in the last one to one-and-a-half years, did it receive substantial assistance from the USC and the SPM. Once this armed struggle phase ended, the initiative within Somaliland shifted to the clan elders as the SNM handed over to them to navigate what would become a complicated and delicate process of post- conflict reconciliation and political consolidation of a brutalised society that had been under prolonged siege. The backdrop to the unfolding of this clan elders-led national reconciliation phase in the north-west is the state collapse in Mogadishu, which followed on the heels of the regime collapse of the General Barre?s government. It was the USC, a powerful force in Mogadishu, that seized control of the capital only to have the situation deteriorate into a round of factional fragmentation and in-fighting that ushered in what became an era of stateless warlordism in former Italian Somalia. 65 The shift of the initiative from the SNM, as the politico-military vanguard of the struggle against Barre to the more popular based leadership of the clan elders, was underlined by the manner in which Somaliland moved from insurgency toward the outright declaration of independence. Immediately after General Barre?s defeat in January 1991, followed by a February peace conference in Berbera that proclaimed a formal cease-fire, the SNM called a March meeting of the elders of all non-Isaaq clans ?to reconcile any potential differences between them and the Isaq clans ? as agreed upon by all liberation movements before the end of the war-of-liberation.?52 The Berbera peace conference had established the SNM?s policy of peaceful co-existence among the clans of Somaliland. The post-Berbera non-Isaaq meeting was followed up by an April meeting with the Isaaq clan elders in Hargeisa, setting the stage for an end-of-April SNM Congress, together with representatives of all clans, Isaaq and non-Isaaq alike. This became the Guurti Congress of the Elders. The elders and other democratically-selected representatives forced the SNM, against its will, to announce the creation of the independent Republic of Somaliland on May 18, 1991. ?After a one-day pause, the SNM leadership bowed to public pressure and declared Somaliland?s independence.? 53 This declaration was accompanied by the establishment of an SNM-led interim government. Its administration was based on the SNM?s organisational structure, with its Chairman, Abdulrahman Ali ?Tuur? appointed as the country?s first executive President. The SNM central committee functioned as the government?s first parliament. 52 Davies, (27 August 1994). 53 Ibid.; and Bryden, (2004), p. 24. 66 Reflecting the accent on reconciliation, the interim administration was tasked with accommodating non-Isaaq communities by enlisting their participation in the new regime. It also had to start the process of constitutional development and preparing Somaliland for an elected government. However, the new interim regime was acutely vulnerable to the consequences of the devastation that the war had left in its wake, not to mention long-deferred civil-military leadership tensions in the SNM. ?Bereft of a revenue base with which to rebuild an administration, a decimated infrastructure, and with a large number of people displaced from the south or in refugee camps, the government had little capacity to deal with the growing number of freelance militia who were making a living through robbery and extortion.?54 Then, there was a particularly critical political deficit that needed tending to. While the Burco conference restored relations between the Isaaq and other northern clans, ?it failed to heal the schisms within the SNM and among the Isaaq that had developed during the war.?55 Wartime rivalries within the SNM, which carried over into peacetime, resulted in the outbreak of fighting in Burco. In March 1992, fighting erupted in Berbera when the interim government sought to establish control over the port and its revenue. Pacifying this situation deepened the role of the clan elders in stabilising the country. The Berbera confrontation threatened to push Somaliland into a state 54 Mark Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 459. 55 Mark Bradbury, ?Somaliland Country Report?, London: CIIR, (1997). 67 of protracted civil war. This would have replicated the southern deconstruction of former Italian Somalia in the former British colony. 2.6 Sheikh and Borama Conferences: Toward a Traditional-Modern Compact Somaliland?s elders stepped in to re-establish peace through the convening of two major clan conferences in the towns of Sheikh and Borama. According to Mark Bradbury et al., ? the Sheikh conference was significant for several reasons. First, resolving the conflict over Berbera port and confirming its status as a public asset, ensured that future Somaliland governments had a source of revenue with which to build an administration. Second, the conference established a framework for the participation of clan elders in Somaliland?s post-war system of governance by creating a council of elders ? the guurti. In Somali pastoral society, a guurti is traditionally the highest political council comprising titled and non-titled clan leaders. At Sheikh the guurti of Somaliland?s different clans were constituted as a national guurti and given responsibility for controlling the clan militia, preventing acts of aggression against other communities, and for defending Somaliland.56 56 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460; Farah and Lewis, (1997), pp. 84-87. 68 This framework for internal security, which was consolidated in the subsequent Borama conference, was important for what Bron has described as a ?society-rooted process towards state formation.?57 Third, the intra-Isaaq nature of the Berbera conflict required the mediation of non-Isaaq elders, in this instance, the Gadabuursi guurti. Their participation at Sheikh indicated that the influence of the SNM was declining and that if it was to be sustained, Somaliland needed the buy-in of non-Isaaqs. The defining event in Somaliland?s post-conflict politics was the shir beeleed in Borama, which lasted for five months between January and May 1993. Here, ?an electoral college of elders who made up the national guurti, oversaw the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM government of Abdulrahman ?Tuur? to a civilian government headed by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had been Somalia?s last civilian Prime Minister before the 1969 military coup.? The Borama process produced an interim Peace Charter and Transitional National Charter. The Peace Charter re-established the basis for law and order by setting out a code of conduct (or xeer, unwritten contracts, laws, agreements or social codes between clans) for the people of Somaliland in accordance with their traditions and the principles of Islam. The National Charter defined the political and institutional structures of government for a transitional three year period, until a constitution could be adopted.?58 57 Brons, (2002), p. 250. 58 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460. 69 Bradbury et al. contend that, ?In the post-war context, the Borama conference was important for the way in which issues of representation and power- sharing were dealt with, by institutionalising clans and their leadership into the system of governance. The National Charter established what has become referred to as a beel (clan or community) system of government?.59 Described as a ?dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance?,60 this consisted of an Executive (Golaha Xukuumadda) with a President, Vice- President and Council of Ministers, a Legislature, comprising a bicameral parliament with an Upper House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida) and House of Representatives (Golaha Wakiillada) and an independent Judiciary. ?The Charter also established state offices such as an Auditor General, as well as regional governors and mayors. The role of elders was formally recognised by giving them responsibility for selecting a president, for ensuring state security by managing internal conflicts and demobilising the militia, and by incorporating the guurti into the Upper House of the new legislature. The purpose of this was to act as a check on the executive and the representatives.?61 The beel system of government established at Borama recognises kinship as the ?organising principle? of Somali society. In essence, government became a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland?s main clans, integrating tradition and modernity in one holistic governance framework; a framework for fostering ?popular participation? in governance or participatory governance, which might 59 Ibid. 60 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (SCPD), (1999), p. 22. 61 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460. 70 best define the essence of ?democracy? without the encumbrance of a ?Western? connotation. Presidential appointments to the executive were made to ensure a clan balance. In the Upper and Lower houses of parliament, seats were proportionally allocated to clans according to a formula that allotted seats in this legislative body. However, the patrilineal clan system meant that women were excluded from representative politics, because it was ambiguous whether a woman would represent her husband?s clan or that of her father. Bradbury et al. point out that ?the inclusion of traditional leadership in the state apparatus has its antecedents in British colonial rule, when clan elders were incorporated into the administration as salaried chiefs in order to extend control over the rural areas.? Again, reiterating Drysdale, they go on to point out that under ?post-independence nationalist governments, who viewed the ?problem of tribalism? as an impediment to unity and modernisation, the traditional leadership became marginalised from politics?, whereas the SNM ?challenged this by incorporating a guurti of Isaaq elders into its organisation structure.?62 The purpose was two-fold: ?to mobilise support for the struggle and to lay the basis for a more participatory form of democracy in the post- Barre era. Indeed, the National Charter reflected much of what was proposed in the SNM?s constitution for a post-Barre government? for Somalia proper. The government would be built on Somali cultural values, the elevation of xeer to the national level, the incorporation of elders in a two-chamber legislature, and combining traditional 62 Lewis, (1998), p. 167. 71 Somali egalitarianism with the requirements of good central government. The beel system of government established at Borama was intended to be in place for only three years. It lasted a decade.63 2.7 Reconciliation, A Divergent Perspective: Somaliland and Puntland The magnitude of Somaliland?s achievements in constructing what Ahmed Yusuf Farah has referred to as a ?culture of locally based reconciliation processes? may be better appreciated from his critical assessment of strengths and weaknesses of Somaliland and Puntland as divergent examples of ?two relatively stable de facto political entities in northern Somalia?, responding to the larger post-Barre upheavals along the Somali coast.64 This comparison is not just academic, given the fact that Somaliland and Puntland, as neighbours, have long been at logger-heads over the future political reorganisation of the Somali coast; a predicament that has been taken to another level now that Puntland?s former leader, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, has become the Ethiopian-backed interim president of the latest attempt at reconstituting southern Somalia ? the TFG ? which emerged from the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) sponsored Nairobi reconciliation peace talks. Comparing and contrasting Puntland?s and Somaliland?s reconciliation strategies may also be instructive for revealing how both, taken together, point toward some major shifts that may be 63 Samatar, (1988), p. 142. 64 Farah and Lewis, (1999), p. 4. 72 underway in contemporary African thinking about governance and the reconstitution of the African state in the new age of the AU. Within the contested terrain of how the Somali coast region of the Horn of Africa is to be reconstituted, Somaliland, Puntland65 and southern Somalia may be approached conceptually as a continuum of alternative futures: ? The reconstitution of Somalia as a centralised state along the lines of the first post-independence republic; ? The reconstitution of Somalia as a federal state comprising autonomous regions as reflected in the Puntland initiative; ? The reconstitution of Somalia as a region comprising independent sovereign states as reflected in the emergence of an independent Somaliland Republic. The centralised state option that would, in effect, take the region back to the status quo ante, prior to the overthrow of the Barre dictatorship, has been rejected. Yet, there remains no consensus between the federalist and sovereign independence options. Indeed they are in confrontation, as reflected in the outbreak of border hostilities that occurred soon after Ahmed?s selection as the TFG?s new interim leader ? SNM-SSDF rivalry by other means? As such, the confrontation between Somaliland and Puntland/TFG 65 WSP Somali Programme, Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland, London: HAAN Publishing, (2001), p. 53. 73 challenges the sustainability of Somaliland in two respects in terms of the following questions: 1. Is Somaliland?s '?culture of locally based reconciliation processes? sustainable within a regional environment where it is in confrontation with the rest of the Somali region? 2. To what extent are Somaliland?s gains in national reconciliation increasingly contingent on a broader reconciliatory process gaining hold within the Somali region as a whole? It is against this backdrop that the strengths and weaknesses of Somaliland?s national reconciliation can be assessed in gaining an understanding of its achievements, in comparison with its Puntland neighbour. Farah has distinguished Somaliland and Puntland in the following terms: Culturally, Woqooyi Bari Soomaalia (north-east Somalia) is clearly defined by clan exclusiveness and the traditional territorial control of the large Majerteen clan and allied Darood groups (Leylkase, Awrtable and others). In this sense, north-east Somalia differs from Somaliland, as it constitutes a more socially cohesive political entity. Somaliland, on the other hand, supports a population of mixed (and rival) clan origin belonging to three large clan families (Dir, Isaq and Harti/Darood). This makes Somaliland socially and politically more complex than north-east Somalia ? While Somaliland?s experience in peacekeeping and governance had been relatively violent (yet constructive), north-east Somalia has witnessed domestic stability at the cost of political stagnation ? traditional leaders in both Somaliland 74 and north-east Somalia emerged as paramount political actors in the post-military period. In Somaliland, the guurti have been politicized since 1993 when they were institutionalized as one of the two chambers of parliament in the new administration formed in Borama. The Interim Charter of Puntland, however, failed to legislate a similar status for the Isimo who themselves have played a similar role in north-east Somalia, securing internal stability and driving the grassroots political process that culminated in the Garowe conference.66 In Farah?s estimation, Somaliland has presented a much higher risk proposition than Puntland, though the Somaliland experiment has progressed much further. Given the reasons he cites, this may be instructive for the future of both Somaliland?s nation-building future and the prospects of the TFG. Both Puntland and Somaliland, relative to the rest of the Somali region, have benefited from the reconciliatory role of the clan elders. In Puntland?s case, however, as Farah points out, prolonged competition for the chairmanship of the SSDF by ?two prominent Majerteen political leaders, Col. Abdillahi Yusuuf (ex-military officer and now first president of Puntland State) and his arch-rival Gen. Mohamed Abshir Musa (ex-police commissioner and vigorously opposed to Yusuuf) paralyzed the SSDF since 1994.?67 This essentially military ? as opposed to civilian ? leadership rivalry prevented the SSDF leadership and the Isimo ? ?titled clan and sub-clan heads and lineage leaders? ? from achieving any progress in the area of political rebuilding. Indeed, according to Farah, ?the process of building basic institutions of 66 Farah and Lewis, (1999), p. 4. 67 Ibid., p. 3. 75 governance remained frozen in a kind of permanent and uncertain transition prior to the declaration of statehood by Puntland in July 1998.?68 Undoubtedly, in the case of Somaliland and the SNM, the relatively more clearly defined and coherent articulation of a political programme by a civilian nationalist elite, with a more organic connectivity to its social base, benefited the political rebuilding process, which has since steadily advanced. Hence, Farah would venture: ?The relatively more constructive experience of Somaliland in governance in the post-military period and its multi-ethnic composition makes it an interesting case to watch in the process of rebuilding wider political structures from a patchwork of clan-fiefdoms.? Yet, to Puntland?s credit, ?unlike in the SNM, competition for control of the organization and local administration did not degenerate into? what he described as ?the devastating internal power struggle witnessed in Somaliland in the transitional period.?69 Here, unlike in many renditions of the Somaliland experience, Farah delves at some depth in unpacking its contradictions, rooted in the history of the SNM. Old divisions within the military and civilian wings of the SNM resurfaced more intensely in the post-military period, in the absence of a common foe. Opposition to Tuur?s administration coalesced around the alan cas faction of the SNM, which accused the government of having a civilian bias and deliberately under-representing the military wing. Dominated by the military elite of the SNM (who were either dissatisfied with their status in Tuur?s 68 Farah, (1999), p. 2. 69 Ibid., p. 5. 76 administration or were aspiring for high office in the new administration), the opposition also included civilian politicians with a vested interest in ending Tuur?s administration.70 Against this backdrop, Tuur?s attempt to expand the interim government?s authority outside Hargeisa ? as successive Modagishu regimes have failed to do in the south ? by establishing a national army from the clan-based SNM militia only exacerbated matters by helping to trigger inter-clan warfare. In March 1993, the administration organised a multi-clan force in order to establish control over the vital port of Berbera, which brought Somaliland to the brink of civil war. This prospect motivated the clan intervention, which set off the series of successful reconciliation conferences that have managed to stabilise Somaliland ever since.71 Writing in 1999, Farah was hoping that a ?peaceful and constitutional transition? would spare Puntland a similar internal conflict. Unfortunately this hope did not come to the fore. Veering from the path of constitutionalism, Abdullahi Yusuf, instead pursued the route of strongman, warlord rule over Puntland while vying for ultimate leadership of a successor to the failed Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia, and, at the same time, stoking border tensions with Somaliland. In following this route, Puntland?s experience has exposed the limits of clan power in deterring warlord political 70 Ibid., p. 17. 71 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 459. 77 ambitions. In 2001, the region?s clan elders had elected Jama Ali Jama as the new head of Puntland. This was immediately rejected by Colonel Yusuf, who alleged the vote was ?futile and illegal,? thus triggering a war against Jama?s forces, which ended in May 2002 with the defeat of the latter?s forces at Qardo.72 Somalilanders, meanwhile, saw Yusuf?s strongman rule in Puntland as merely a stepping stone for his real objective of ultimately heading up a successor to the failed TNG in Mogadishu which, with Ethiopia?s support ? Ethiopia, also widely seen as pro-Somaliland ? he ultimately achieved. In commenting on his stewardship in Puntland and candidacy for heading up the new TFG, SomalilandNet, on 17 September 2004, commented that: ? he has shown to the IGAD states and Somalis alike that no other person other than him would govern Puntland. With the exception of Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Vice president of Puntland who regularly disagreed with and publicly challenged him, Abdullahi Yusuf has often gotten his way and treated Puntland as his fiefdom. For example, he has been taking almost $250,000 monthly for the last 22 months from the region for his campaign use in Nairobi. This was done over the objection of the vice president and the House of Representatives who would have liked to give more priority to the worsening drought conditions in the Sool, Sanaag and Buuhoodle regions.73 72 Hassan Barise, ?Somali warlords battle for Puntland?, BBC News, (7 May 2002). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1972557.stm 73 Faisal Roble, ?Is Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf the next president??, (17 September 2004). http://www.somalilandnet.com/somaliland_voice/articles/12859.shtml 78 2.8 Somaliland?s Contested Consolidation: From Reconciliation to Constitutionalism While constitutionalism did not take root in Puntland?s experiment in regional autonomy, the clan reconciliation process in Somaliland took that trajectory after the post-Berbera conflict series of reconciliation conferences, though this did not end the violence. Nevertheless, the aim, unlike in Puntland, whose leader hitched its fate to the broader reconstitution of the southern-based Somali republic, was to consolidate the independence of the north-west Somali coast. Putting in place the constitutional underpinnings of this process; one which confirmed civilian ascendancy over the military elites, has been examined in considerable detail by Bradbury et al.,74 starting with their review of the administration of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal ? the old Somali republic?s last civil Prime Minister before the 1969 Barre coup. The transfer from the SNM interim administration of Abdulrahman ?Tuur? to Egal was effected peacefully within the implementation framework of the Borama process. Egal is, in effect, the ?founding father? of the Somaliland Republic. But his tenure would undergo a ?baptism by fire? that would test, yet again, the sustainability of reconciliation in Somaliland. Over the first 18 months of his new post-Borama administration, the Republic?s foundations were secured; the institutions of government were established, the militia was demobilised, a revenue system was created (where the outcome of the battle over the 74 Bradbury et al., (2003), pp. 460-63. 79 Berbera port had been critical) and a secure environment for economic recovery was provided. Constitutional progress, however, was initially slow, as contested issues from the Borama conference still remained. According to Bradbury et al., as Egal?s government ?sought to extend its administrative control dissatisfaction grew among certain Isaaq clans with the formula for sharing political power adopted at the Borama conference. This, combined with political opportunism by certain politicians, pushed Somaliland into civil war.?75 This conflict underlined the fragility of the reconciliation process and Somaliland?s independence, when a section of the opposition to the Egal administration declared its support for a federal Somalia. The war lasted from November 1994 to October 1996, displacing over 180,000 people and causing severe damage to Burco and Hargeisa ? areas that were still trying to recover from the devastation of the war of resistance against the Barre dictatorship. A second national reconciliation conferencing process (or Shir Qarameed), held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and February 1997, ended the civil war and, in the process, accelerated Somaliland?s constitutional development. Egal?s political leadership survived the war, due to the fact that an electoral college of elders extended his tenure in office by another four years. The group also increased opposition and minority seats in the house of parliament, while an interim constitution was adopted, which superseded the Borama charters and provided the basis for a multi-party system of government. 75 Ibid., p. 461. 80 The Hargeisa conference was financed and managed with little foreign support.76 However, it was largely financed by government, thereby strengthening the reality of a central government in Hargeisa, which was constantly eluding the warring factions in southern former Italian Somalia. Twice the number of voting delegates were present at the conference than at Borama, with a number of women permitted to observe the proceedings. The fact that there was no change in governmental leadership meant that the civil war had failed to disrupt the country?s governance, thereby providing for continuity in Somaliland?s continuing transition. Since this last reconciliatory conferencing process in 1997, Somaliland has experienced a period of uninterrupted security. Security, in turn, has facilitated the country?s continuing constitutional, political and socio-economic development. Here, it is instructive to quote at some length Bradbury et al., who explain how, within the dynamics of conflict and accommodation, Somaliland?s reconciliatory capacities, time and again, prevailed over the centrifugal tendencies that have been the feature of politics in southern Somalia.77 Drawing on an observation by political economist William Reno,78 who pointed out that Somaliland illustrates how changes in the global economy do not inevitably produce predatory war economies and the end of political order, Bradbury et al. suggest several explanations why Somaliland has not followed 76 Suleiman Dirir Abdi, 'Report on Peace-Making Initiative in Somaliland, April 1995-January 1997'. London: Conciliation Resources, (29 September 1996). http://www.c-r.org/pubs/occ_papers/occ_somali.shtml 77 Bradbury et al., 2003: p. 464. 78 William Reno, 'Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy', QEH Working Paper series No. 100, Development Studies at Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, (February 2003), p. 30. http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps100.pdf 81 the path of the south into protracted civil war: ?The political system adopted at Borama which integrated traditional authorities in the state administration guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule.?79 It has been argued that due to the particular experience of British colonialism these are more entrenched and stronger in the pastoralist communities in the north compared to southern Somalia.80 The Sheikh and Borama conferences were only two of 33 clan peace conferences that took place in Somaliland between February 1991 and 1996.81 This explanation, however, overlooks the influence of other factors. These include the different political experience of northwest Somalia within the Somali Republic, the legacy of democratic practices within the SNM, the relatively good relations between the northern clans, a different resource base than the south, and the lack of international intervention in Somaliland in the early 1990s, which in the south had served to strengthen the power of the warlords. The experience of the war in the north was also very different from the south. It was fought mostly within Isaaq territory and the SNM, while some elders worked to maintain social and economic relations between the clans and neutralise the potential for violence. The war served to create a political community among the Isaaq which was reinforced by the experience of self-organisation in the refugee camps in Ethiopia ? The creation of Somaliland also reflected a broad consensus on the need for some form of government to manage internal conflict and external relations. This 79 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 462. 80 Reno, (2002), p. 13. 81 Academy for Peace and Development, (2002). 82 consensus is apparent from the financial support given to peace conferences by communities and business people. The SNM?s stated vision of a government which integrated traditional authorities in the state administration ? established a political system that guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule.82 There is more to this explanatory reflection by Bradbury et al. that will be revisited in the next chapter on reconstruction. After all, what is described here ? which reinforces earlier insights provided in this chapter by Drysdale on the region?s progressive ?clanism? ? is the unfolding of a uniquely self- reliant and self-contained path toward political and economic development; one that is the essence of ?popular sovereignty? as opposed to the more prevalent ?national sovereignty? that tends to euphemistically provide protection for ruling elites against local and international accountability. Somaliland?s constitutional phase of reconciliatory nation-building, the stage it is currently experiencing, which formally culminated in successful parliamentary elections in September 2005, was intended to further entrench and institutionalise the emerging political culture described by Bradbury et al. and many others. 2.9 Post-Conflict Constitutional Development In the aftermath of the civil war, the interim constitution adopted at the Hargeisa conference, enshrined principles intended to enhance the development of stable civil-military relations. According to Ahmed Yusuf 82 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 462. 83 Farah, a possible solution was to introduce a constitution that clearly defined the ?institutional functions and mandates of security and civilian institutions, while at the same time adopting democratic rules governing access by the elite to high public office regardless of professional bias.?83 Farah then cites the following articles that were introduced to regulate the distribution of power and authority between the civilian and military elites:84 Article 38: Freedom of Association It is forbidden [for] any organisation with aims and objectives that are deemed detrimental to the wider interest of society, including covert and underground organisations, armed and with military structure, or any other organisation that violates the constitution regardless of its form. Article 61: Joint Sessions of the Two Chambers of the Parliament The two chambers of the parliament (council of elders and elected legislature), will hold joint sessions to deliberate on the following issues: x. The decision and the declaration of war when the Republic of Somaliland is faced with a state of war. 83 Farah, (1999), p. 25. 84 Ibid. 84 Article 77: The Power and Obligation of the Council of Representatives The decision by the executive to introduce emergency rule throughout the country or parts of the country should seek the approval of the two chambers of parliament. Article 115: The Powers of the President 3. Nomination and change of high public officials of the government after consultation with the responsible Minister, and having considered the constitution and by-laws. Article 148: Commanders of the Armed Forces and their Deputies 1. The armed force is responsible to defend and secure the integrity and independence of the country from external aggression, in addition, it will act in response to necessary emergency as circumstances demand, in accordance with the constitution. 2. The armed force must always abide by and ensure the execution of the constitution and by laws of the country. 3. The formation of the National Army is an internal matter limited to the different parts of the country. 4. The individual nominated to be the Minister of Defence must be a citizen and a civilian. 5. A by-law defining the structure of the National Army will be formulated. 85 Article 149: Police Force and Prison Corps The police force is responsible for domestic security and stability and ensuring the execution of the constitution and laws of the country, their structure and functions will be defined in a by-law. The prison corps are responsible for keeping and rehabilitation of the prisoners, their structure and functions will be defined in a by-law. In addition to institutionalising the regulation of civil-military relations within a constitutional framework, the interim constitution set out a schedule for the legalisation of political parties and the holding of democratic elections. It would take four years, however, before a referendum was held on the new constitution. According to Bradbury et al., ?Egal linked the transition to multi- party democracy with Somaliland?s desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international community would not recognise Somaliland?s independent status unless it adopted such a system.? Here, they point out that ?a major impetus for implementing the constitution was the formation of Puntland in 1998 and the TNG in 2000,? stressing that ?Puntland, which claims authority in areas of eastern Somaliland, and the TNG, which claims sovereignty throughout Somalia, directly challenged the legitimacy of Somaliland.?85 Somaliland?s constitutional consolidation, therefore, was intimately intertwined with its regional security interests within the broader fluid context of the reconstitution of the state along the Somali coast. 85 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 463. 86 As Bradbury et al. state,86 with Article 2 of the constitution affirming Somaliland?s independent status, the constitutional referendum of 31 May 2001 was effectively a vote on the status of Somaliland vis-?-vis the rest of the Somali region. This constitutional confirmation of Somaliland?s status set the stage for the institutionalisation of the country?s multi-party political system, in a phase that would now extend the constitutionalisation of reconciliatory nation-building toward a consolidation of democracy. The Somaliland parliament legalised the formation of political organisations on 6 August 2001, and scheduled presidential elections for February 2002. President Egal followed up this legalisation of political organisations by announcing the formation of Somaliland?s first such organisation ? the Democratic United Peoples? Movement (UDUB). With a further six organisations registering by the end of September 2001, the politics of Somaliland began making the transition beyond the ?liberation movement? era of the SNM and its turbulent aftermath, toward a more normalised phase of civilian democratic governance. Bradbury et al. describe this as a transition ?from community politics to multi-party politics.? As this transition unfolded, the power-sharing system of governance established during the Borama process has proven critical to the process of reconciliation and recovery in Somaliland, succeeding where numerous efforts in Mogadishu have, to date, failed. 86 Ibid. 87 2.10 Somaliland?s Electoral Transition The new constitutional system introduced the principle of universal suffrage, thereby extending to women the right to vote. Within the context of the electoral system, under the new constitution, the installation of the different tiers of government has been a ?bottom-up? process, starting with local district elections. These involved electing 379 councillors to 23 district and municipal councils in Somaliland?s six regions. According to Bradbury et al., ?the reason for starting with a district election was to determine which three parties would contest the presidential and parliamentary elections.? Besides the UDUB, President Egal?s party, ?the local elections were contested by six organisations: ASAD, HORMOOD, Kulmiye, SAHAN, UCID ? who were able to demonstrate adequate support in six regions.?87 In December 2001, an Nationa Electoral Commission was established to oversee elections. A number of problems became apparent: ? Electoral commissioners lacked experience in managing elections; ? The political organisations had no experience in contesting elections or resources for mounting one; ? No consideration was given to selecting women candidates; ? There had been no voter education; ? Somaliland?s media lacked experience in elections coverage; 87 Ibid., p. 265. 88 ? There was a mutual lack of trust between political organisations, and between them and the electoral commission; ? The participation of the Sool and eastern Sanaag regions was controversial due to local ambivalence in those regions toward Somaliland (and, undoubtedly, their being contested terrain with Puntland); and ? The lack of a census and an electoral register proved problematic. Civil society organisations played an important role in addressing some of these problems. Such involvement helped generate an environment of popular participation that, with outside technical assistance and expertise, as well as funding for training from such quarters as the European Commission and the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI), helped to carry Somaliland through an important learning curve. By the time voting in local elections were underway in 2002, President Egal had passed away in South Africa, and was succeeded by his minority clan Vice-Presidential successor, Daahir Rayale Kahin of the Gadabuursi clan. Voting in the district elections occurred on 15 December 2002, at 726 out of 800 polling stations. Because of security considerations, they did not take place in Sool, eastern Sanaag and parts of the Buudhoodle district in Togdheer region. A total of 440,067 valid votes were counted and 332 District Councillors were elected. Kaahin?s party, the UDUB, was the clear winner, followed by a cluster of close competition between UCID (30,676 votes), Kulmiye (29,923 votes) and HORMOOD (29,104 votes). Because of the 89 problems experienced with the district elections, making additional electoral legislation necessary, the presidential and parliamentary election time-tables were delayed. The presidential election took place in April 2003. Civil Society organisations again provided training for polling station staff, domestic observers and party representatives, while the Integrity Watch Committee worked with the parties to recommit themselves to the Code of Conduct.88 Efforts were made by the Somaliland National Electoral Commission (NEC) to ensure that democratic practices were followed by all parties. Yet the NEC had few powers to control the parties? campaigns. Kulmiye outspent the governing UDUB party of the president, raising money from the Somaliland business community and the diaspora. Kaahin, however, was elected in a poll that generally received favourable reviews from international and domestic observers, though various irregularities were noted. As a result, the closeness of the contest ?presented a harsh test for Somaliland?s aspiring democracy?,89 as the UDUB outpolled Kulmiye by a mere 80 votes. What is more, according to Bradbury et al., UDUB supporters as well as the supporters of Kulmiye had expected the latter to emerge victorious. The outcome triggered small protests in Burco and Gabiley, which are Kulmiye strongholds. However, in spite of fears that there might be outbreaks of violence, such destablisation failed to materialise. This was the result of government?s emergency precautions and 88 Ibid., p. 466. 89 Ibid., p. 469. 90 the Kulmiye leadership?s decision not to contest the outcome, though it did present evidence of mathematical miscalculations by the NEC. In the end, in accordance with the Electoral Law, the Supreme Court delivered the final verdict in favour of the ruling UDUB, increasing its victory margin to 214 votes after submissions by all parties and the NEC; an outcome that was immediately contested by Kulmiye, in the process, raising questions about the court?s competence as well as highlighting Somaliland?s weak judicial system. This is a point of increasing concern by Somalilanders who, in fact, question the Supreme Court?s independence from the Executive. Bradbury et al. drew the following implications from the April 2003 presidential elections and their district election antecedents:90 ? In spite of the contested nature of the electoral outcome, there was no ?political entrepreneurial? constituency for violent or even massive non- violent opposition amid timely civil society interventions (such as the Integrity Watch Committee) to mediate and advise parties on settling matters peacefully; ? The regional distribution of votes illustrated a demographic and socio- political division between western and eastern Somaliland related to ?the non-participation of eastern Sanaag and Sool regions,? which accounted for significantly lower voter participation in the east ? an area contested with Puntland; 90 Ibid., p. 471. 91 ? To some extent, this east-west differentiation reflected partisan divisions between more western support for UDUB and more eastern support for Kulmiye; ? Much of Somaliland?s population (or at least politically active population) is concentrated in the west as reflected in the Woqooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa region), Awdal and Saxil, areas accounting for over 60% of voting in both district and presidential elections; ? The fact that 40% of all voting centred in the Hargeisa region ?dramatically illustrates the urban drift towards Hargeisa and its growing dominance as the capital?; ? Elections in Somaliland, based on these perceived patterns, are largely an urban event as there was ?limited campaigning and voting taking place in rural areas?; ? Successive Somaliland governments will face a major challenge in preventing eastern, primarily rural and nomadic marginalisation and feelings of alienation from the rest of the country, especially within the context of ongoing contestation between Somaliland and efforts to reconstitute a Mogadishu-based Somalia; ? The elections ? district and presidential ? have facilitated an electoral transition from an electoral college of elders to individual voters though the introduction of multi-party competition has not seemed to adequately solve problems of representation; ? At local levels, people appear to vote along clan lines irrespective of a shift from an electoral college of clan elders to individual voters; 92 ? Given the continuing clan influence on voting preferences and the majoritarian voting system, ?minorities have no representation on any of the new councils?; ? Given the fact that the UDUB has a majority in 11 out of 15 district councils and shares an equal number of seats with Kulmiye in two such councils, with the majority of mayors also being UDUB, ?the district and presidential elections have therefore given UDUB sweeping authority over Somaliland?s political institutions?; ? The extent of UDUB dominance is important because ?the elections ? drew attention to the issues of the decentralisation of government and political power? which, given the disastrous experience of centralised authoritarian rule from Mogadishu, influenced the 1993 Borama Charters and the subsequent constitution in the direction of institutionalising a decentralised system of government ?as a way of preventing a return to authoritarian rule and strengthening popular participation in government,? thus: ? the election of district and municipal councils that are accountable to the local electorate holds great potential for creating a form of government that is responsive to local needs and one that will prevent the recentralisation of political power.91 This last implication drawn from the district and presidential electoral experience has broader regional significance within the larger Somali coast 91 Ibid., p. 474. 93 context. Decentralisation within Somaliland and the existence of an autonomous Puntland, linked to the federalist outcome of the Nairobi talks, resulting in the current TFG, indicate an overall direction in post-Barre Somali political culture toward a decentralised reconstitution of the state within the greater Somali region. Whatever the outcome in the contestation between Somaliland and the rest of the Somali region, a future centralisation of power along the Somali coast is highly unlikely. This fact will dictate the terms of a future reconciliatory dynamic within the region if such a process emerges. Here, to bring the problems and prospects of Somaliland?s reconciliation experience up to date, it may be useful to speculate on these broader reconciliation prospects vis-?-vis Somaliland and the rest of the Somali region. 2.11 Reconciliation: A Lutta Continua92 The effective ascendancy of decentralised state-building in Somaliland and the greater Somali region grew organically from the political, territorial and military fragmentation that has been so much a feature of the destabilisation of the region, in the wake of the collapse of the Barre regime. The fracturing of Somali society emerged dialectically in over-reaction to the hyper- centralisation of power during the Barre period coupled with, in Somaliland?s case, the marginalisation and ultimate alienation of an entire region and its 92 For details on the reconciliation process, see Bashir Goth, 'Editorial ? SNM in balance: The need for a Truth and Reconciliation Committee in Somaliland', Adalnews, (7 April 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5150 94 peoples. Reversing fragmentation appears to have led naturally to a decentralising ?equilibrium?, which has given impetus to another ascendant trend: the re-assertion of the very ?clanism? depicted derisively by some ?modernisers? but which, in fact, has played a pivotal stabilising role, as expressed in the interventions of clan elders as the arbiters of conflict and accommodation. In the case of Somaliland, clan leadership ascendancy was facilitated by the modernising nationalism of the SNM which, ideologically, sought to bridge the cultural gap between tradition and modernity and which, from the standpoint of self-reliant pragmatic survival, depended on the clan elders as pillars of support in mobilising the social base for insurgency and post-conflict governance. Because of external isolation, Somalilanders have had, as Bradbury et al. put it, ?certain freedom to craft an indigenous model of modern African government that fuses indigenous forms of social and political organisation within a democratic framework.? Herein may reside one path toward transcending the African post-colonial predicament of ?the bifurcated state?, as interrogated by Mahmood Mamdani.93 Organised differently in rural areas from urban areas, the governing inheritance bequeathed by colonialism was a state that, according to Mamdani, ?was Janus-faced, bifurcated. It contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority?, which counter-poised the 93 Mamdani, (1996), pp. 16-18. 95 modernising ?civil power? of rights and freedom to the ?customary power? of custom and tradition, each signifying ?one face of the same bifurcated state.?94 Clan leadership, as the arbiter of national reconciliation in Somaliland, appears to have assisted the north-western brand of Somali nationalism in overcoming this bifurcating legacy. And so has this same social stratum of leadership emerged as a key actor in the ongoing efforts to revive a semblance of government in former Italian Somalia, where ?clanism? was once anathema. Only here, unlike in Somaliland (or at least to the same degree), inter-clan dynamics were to become complicated by the militarised balkanisation of a factionising southern Somalia; a process that gave rise to that region?s ?warlord? phenomenon, and the parasitic political economy and culture it has spawned. While the logic of decentralisation ultimately prevailed over external pressures for a ?unified? ? read, unitary centralised ? Somalia, the jury remains out on whether or not the TFG, led by Somaliland?s nemesis, Abdullahi Yusuf, can replicate the reconciliatory dynamic that has characterised the north-west in the south, much less reconcile with the reality of an independent Somaliland. Somaliland itself is still undergoing its own process of consolidating reconciliation into sustainable statehood. Provided that the IGAD states, the AU and key state actors like South Africa and neighbouring Ethiopia, are able to prevent hostilities between Somaliland and Somalia, the latter?s five-year transitional phase that its TFG must navigate, could provide ample space for Hargeisa and Mogadishu to work on 94 Ibid. 96 their respective nation-building/re-building projects and, perhaps, converge toward a workable accommodation. Throughout the Mbagathi talks, which gave rise to the TFG, Somaliland was vigilant on the question of those talks not presuming to incorporate its region into the scope of the settlement being sought. However, as recently as President Kahin?s trip to South Africa in late January 2005, his Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail made it clear that Hargeisa sought good relations with Mogadishu: ? Let the other side (Somali Republic) set in motion a credible government, accountable to its people and we will think of having a relation like we have with other neighbours ? Let them salvage the country and the people from destruction and nightmare. It is only then we can talk of relations and issue of mutual interest.95 In the process, she downplayed border tensions between Somaliland and Puntland, while indicating that whatever happened in the Republic of Somalia, it had to address the interests of Somaliland.96 97 There are a number of issues to which the new TFG and its parliament must tend, which have a bearing on establishing the preconditions for a wider regional reconciliation. Over the next five years, Somalia must conduct a 95 Edna Adan Ismail, 'Somaliland ? Africa?s Secret Success Story', unpublished lecture delivered at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, (3 February 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmprint.php?ArtID=4760 96 Ibid. 97 national census, draft a new constitution and have that constitution approved by an internationally supervised national referendum. This process, in turn, would establish the playing-field for national elections. With the current process of dialogue amongst Somalia?s new MPs in Jowhar and Mogadishu in progress, and the eventual return of their president and his cabinet (some of whom, at the time of writing had already returned) to Mogadishu, the security situation within Mogadishu and environs has been a major preoccupation of all interested parties in getting the new Mogadishu government?s mandate underway. The region is still at the mercy of factional warlord-strongmen and their ?technicals?, and several murders of TFG security personnel and officials are indicative of what could be an uphill struggle for the TFG to prevent itself from going the way of the former Djibouti-backed TNG. Although clan leadership has figured importantly in the Mbagathi process, its role has not produced an inter-clan security consensus ? that would necessitate warlord buy-in ? which would guarantee the safety and security of the incoming government. As critical as this should be to the integrity and legitimacy of the TFG, that part of the Mbagathi settlement calling for an African peacekeeping presence in Mogadishu, has proven controversial. President Yusuf?s appeal for a 20,000-strong AU peacekeeping force ? seemingly without Transitional Federal Parliamentary approval ? has apparently been seen by elements in Mogadishu as a ploy by him to impose his authority through the multilateral instrumentality of a ?foreign? force. Thus, ?a number of Somali leaders, including several key Islamists, have since flagged their opposition to the plan, reportedly sending the price of weapons 98 and ammunition in Mogadishu skyrocketing and a reported flood of new stock entering the city?s arms markets?.98 Though initially supported by IGAD members Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, Yusuf?s request was subsequently deflected by both the AU and the UN Security Council as a means of avoiding ?a repeat of the disastrous ?Black Hawk Down? episode of 1993?. Instead, the AU is reported to be continuing plans for the introduction of a modest peace support mission, possibly accompanied by a small ?protection force.?99 Even these limited deployments, however, would require prior approval, which may hinge on the TFG managing to obtain credible militia approval by the new parliament, along with a measurable cease-fire arrangement put in place ? both disarmament and disbanding which, again, would seem to require on- the-ground agreement/acquiescence from clan-cum-warlord leaders. The AU peace support mission that is contemplated would, among other things, be charged with training the new Somali security forces. So far, only Uganda and Sudan has pledged troops ? 1,700 ? in the hope that other member states, ?especially frontline states Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, follow suit,? though there is opposition to Ethiopian involvement in such a force. One Somali intellectual ventured an opinion that ?African forces should come here ? they are welcome ? but not Ethiopians,? reflecting also a suspicion that Abdullahi Yusuf, as President, is a puppet of Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, with the inclusion in the cabinet of four factional leaders, who were left out of the initial line-up, ?sources close to the transitional government 98 International Crisis Group, ?Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means??, Africa Report No. 88 (21 December 2004), p. 1. 99 Ibid., p. 2. 99 believe that the main task of the government now is to disarm the militias through persuasion.?100 Priority though this may be, whether it is a realistic prospect, could be judged by a Nairobi-based mid-January report from a Maxamed Xaaji Ingirilis, stating that ?lately, fierce fighting has flared up across the country. Inter-clan war backed by the fiendish business community of both sides is currently going on in the central regions of Hobyo and Gelinsor?101 (italics added). More reassuring may be the reception received by 50 Somali MPs, including the Speaker of Parliament and the Minister of National Security, when they entered Mogadishu from Kenya on the 6th of February. They were met by a crowd of 5,000 people as they entered a stadium in Mogadishu. Assuming that the security situation pans out sufficiently to allow the interim government to settle down, another crucial hurdle is the establishment of a Federal Commission, as stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). This Commission would be mandated to set in train ?the elaboration of a federal framework for the state ? with or without the inclusion of Somaliland?, as a precondition to laying the ground for free and fair elections.102 Donors, at least initially, would be expected to support these ?regional federal states of Somalia?, which introduces another dimension with implications for Somaliland advancing its cause in the international community: ?the jostling by 100 Fred Oluoch, ?Security and Reconstruction Behind Kibaki's Return Call?, The East African, Nairobi, (17 January 2005). http://www.nationmedia.com/eastafrican/17012005/Regional/Regional170120051.html 101 Maxamed Xaaji Ingirilis, 'Mogadisho Will Only Be Safe Once Abdullahi Arrives', wardheernews.com, (19 January 2005). 102 Ken Ramani, 'Fragile Unity in Mogadisho', The Standard, Nairobi, (15 January 2005). http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/print/news.php?articleid=10822 100 frontline states for strategic positions in readiness for the reconstruction programme?, which will introduce major donor resources and possible investments into the region.103 This prospect, in fact, has been cited as a major impetus behind Kenya?s pressure on the TFG to relocate back to Somalia. Sections of Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki?s cabinet have been pushing for a quick relocation of the TFG and Parliament back to Somalia, ?lest Kenya lose out on the reconstruction programme to other stakeholders who have been positioning themselves to clinch major project deals?.104 Kenyans view their country as the natural gateway for Somalia?s reconstruction in terms of proximity, human resources and facilities which, undoubtedly, may also reinforce the gateway role that Kenya is positioned to play in another post-conflict reconstruction challenge: southern Sudan, in the wake of its hosting of the recently- culminated Naivasha peace process. Otherwise, with respect to Somalia, some Kenyans see their reconstruction gateway role threatened by others, notably Ethiopia, the latter which has been hoping for a peaceful and stable Somalia as a means of expanding its access to the sea. The building up of momentum toward a political economy of post-conflict reconstruction for the TFG is likely to escalate pressures for the TFG?s diplomatic recognition which, in turn, will complicate Hargeisa?s campaign to gain sufficient international recognition to break out of its current isolation. The international politics of Somaliland?s quest for recognition is the subject of the 103 Oluoch, (17 January 2005). 104 Ibid. 101 concluding chapter, and will thus not be elaborated on here. However, there may be a dialectical relationship between Somaliland?s internal and external reconciliation prospects and its competition for recognition vis-?-vis yet another ? the 14th ? transitional government in Somalia. The politico-economic dimensions to Somalia?s reconstruction, in terms of external aid and supporting investment, which will benefit IGAD member states, could prove irresistible in undercutting the politically constructive diplomatic role they might play in calibrating a managed process of conditional recognition of the TFG, accompanied by a serious consideration of recognition options that might also benefit Somaliland and, in the process, move the politics of reconciliation in both countries toward an eventual convergence that could conceivably lead to a wider reconciliation process in the Somali coast region. 2.12 Somaliland, Reconciliation and the New Logic of Continental Union The prospects for a convergence in reconciliation between Somaliland and Somalia is not a purely academic exercise when viewed in the broader context of the trajectory of the politics of the AU. Unlike its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU?s vision departs significantly from the constraints of non-interference, the inviolability of ?national sovereignty? and, ultimately, the dictum of territorial integrity. The AU Commission under Prof Alpha Konare and his deputy have made efforts to change the political and institutional culture of the AU significantly and to convince member states 102 to follow. Most member states have been slow in enracing the new AU ethos. Otherwise, Somaliland might have already become an officially recognised member of the AU. But the conceptual framework of the AU, its fledgling organs and its vision of promoting a regional integration process that moves the continent toward a confederation of sub-regional federations, radically changes the terms of reference pertaining to the age-old debates about the sanctity of territorial integrity and the options for self-determination, including secession. Based on the AU?s commitment to continental federation and its Constitutive Act of Union, what is emerging in the transition from the OAU is a continental proto-government; a conception that, theoretically, at least, creates a situation wherein the territorial integrity of any member nation-state of the AU is ultimately superseded by the territorial integrity of the continent itself. Though political thinking in Africa has not fully assimilated this new paradigm, it is one that should facilitate a new flexibility and creativity in addressing regional tensions within and between countries that are part of the unresolved legacies of colonialism. No sub-region of the continent has been as ill-served by the OAU?s inflexibility on issues of territorial integrity and self-determination as the Horn of Africa. Here, for example, Eritrea?s independence had to be resolved militarily, because the OAU?s strictures combined with ingrained antipathies ? rooted in post-colonial fears of divisive external ?divide-and-rule? threats to ?national unity? (and territorial integrity) ? made it impossible for the Organization to accommodate the Eritrean liberation movement and its people?s aspirations for self-determination. A politico-diplomatic conflict prevention-management- 103 resolution option did not exist until the ?facts on the ground? dictated ultimate OAU recognition of Eritrean sovereignty. In large measure, the AU has already seen an advance over this inflexibility in the case of the Sudan, where the Naivasha interim settlement allowed for a self-determination option exercised through a referendum after six years of south Sudan autonomy. This amounts to the first time in Africa?s post-colonial history that the right of secession has been politically and diplomatically accommodated in a political settlement to a conflict. However, interestingly, in southern Sudan?s case ? with implications for Somaliland ? this AU and internationally recognised self- determination/secession option is likely to be wrapped in a broader geo- political dynamic that will forestall and/or contain the fragmenting logic of this option that has been afforded to the southern Sudanese. By the time south Sudan?s six year interim period culminates in a referendum on self-determination, there is likely to be in existence an East African federation, which would come into being in 2010 ? in a mere four years? time; the self-life allotted for Somalia?s TFG. The logic of south Sudan?s self- determination could likely lead it out of a federation with ?New Sudan? and into one with the East African Community (EAC); and an expanding one at that, as Burundi, Rwanda and possibly even the Democratic Republic of the Congo may join the greater East Africa. Alternatively, a ?New Sudan? in its entirety, south Sudan included, could link to the prospective East African federation ? all within the framework of the new AU logic of continental federation-building. Moreover, Sudan?s possible post-conflict integration into an expanding East 104 African federation, automatically places the Horn of Africa, including the Somali coast, into this eventual new emerging geo-political reality. In short, Somaliland is by no means a ?finished product? within the larger context of reconciliation along the Somali coast. Should a convergence in the politics of reconciliation in Somaliland and southern Somalia progress toward an eventual co-equal political arrangement between the two, the logic of such an evolution would dovetail with the larger logic of federation-building in greater East Africa and the continent as a whole. The year 2010 is not far off. With that in mind and the fact that 2010 is also the year in which Somalia?s federal transition would culminate in a reconstituted republic, there should be ample room for the AU and key members of its PSC, such as South Africa and Ethiopia, to work with Somaliland and Somalia in nurturing a reconciliation process that informs new approaches to the question of diplomatic recognition; that expands their and the AU?s options within the larger unfolding geo-political context of a greater East Africa, and that possibly revisits the aspirations of pan-Somali reconciliation within a broader pan- African framework, as opposed to the old OAU nation-state constraints. By implication, these constraints meant that pan-Somali nationalism could be nothing more than the destabilising irridentist force that it, in fact, turned out to be. Somaliland?s reconciliation process, which has been an ?example?105 for 105 US State Department, 'Regional Parliamentary Elections in Somalia', (Somaliland), Washington, (3 October 2005). http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/54215.htm 105 the rest of the Somali coast could, if reconciliation takes hold in the south, return the region to a pan-Somali future, intimately intertwined with the larger unfolding pan-African future of greater East Africa. Map of UN Offices in Somaliland and Somalia Source: OCHA Somalia, Nairobi. 106 Chapter 3: Reconstruction Rubble to Rebuilding Rag waa kii kufa ee haddana kaca ... A man is he who stumbles and then pulls himself up ? (Somali proverb) There is no neat distinction or cut-off point between reconciliation and reconstruction, though reconciliation is first and foremost a political process. Reconciliation lays the political foundation for the post-conflict reconstruction of an embattled polity. In the process, it mutates into a multi-faceted phase of reconstruction; reconstruction constituting a more elaborate radiation of reconciliation into institutional and socio-economic dimensions of societal rebuilding and, in the case of a new nation-state, nation-building. Reconstruction, in essence, is reconciliation by other means; reconciliation ?in depth? or, if you will, ?deep reconciliation?, with the political process of reconciliation continuing apace and dialectically interacting with institution building and socio-economic development.106 This can be graphically seen in the case of Somaliland, which, at the time of writing, was entering what could be the last phase of its reconciliatory process of political transition from a largely clan-based representational enterprise, to a fully-fledged parliamentary 106 Jama Musse Jama, A Note on My Teachers? Group, Hargeisa: Ponte Invisible, (2003). 107 system of governance. This continued unfolding of the politics of reconciliation remains a hotly contested terrain that is open-ended, even as Somaliland?s post-conflict reconstruction and recovery has long been underway and has continued to gain momentum. As such, reconciliation and reconstruction in Somaliland can be viewed as mutually reinforcing imperatives.107 As an internationally unrecognised state that has had to compete with successive attempts by the international community to underwrite the reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery of Somalia in the south, Somaliland?s recovery has necessarily evolved along a self-reliant path as ?an example of the importance of the bottom-up approach to building societies from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and political consensus?.108 Hargeisa, and its communities, have had to pursue a political and developmental path that has made a virtue of necessity for self-reliance, based on the political realities of international isolation. Within these parameters, post-conflict reconstruction has been embedded in the actual protracted process of reconciliation itself. This process required instituting the demilitarising of the country amid the construction of a national army and police force as the guarantors of peace and security. 107 See recommendations of The Institute for Practical Research and Training, ?The First Conference on Reconstruction Strategies and Challenges Beyond Rehabilitation?, Hargeisa, (20-24 October 1998). http://www.iprt.org/FirstConfOnReconstruction.htm 108 Lewis, (1-2 September 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6034 See Abdulqadir Jirde, 'Memorandum on Somaliland', Speech delivered by Abdulqadir Jirde, on behalf of the two houses of the Somaliland parliament, on the occasion of the visit of the African Union to Hargeisa, Somaliland, (3 May 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5330 108 Therefore, this chapter will commence with reviewing the demilitarisation of Somaliland?s polity and society ? a process that has been intimately intertwined with the political transition which, in terms of reconstruction, has made mandatory the institutionalisation of government and its democratisation. This politico-demilitarisation process has, in turn, been intimately tied in with a securing an enabling environment, in which the fledgling Somaliland government could generate its own revenues.109 This was a particularly critical imperative in the light of its having to pursue a self- reliant path of development; one that necessarily ruled out external assistance due to the country?s popularly chosen political route of independence, and the realities this carried with it of being diplomatically unrecognised and, as a result, internationally isolated. ?It was achieved without any external demobilisation or security sector reform assistance whatsoever".110 The ongoing process of political reconstruction sets the stage for a more detailed look at Somaliland?s economic reconstruction. This involves surveying the country?s social economy in historical and contemporary perspective. Here, ?social factors of reconstruction? are examined for determining their developmental reconstructive role: how they contribute to levels of participation in development, in terms of the role played by Somaliland?s civic leadership; the extent of women?s participation and the 109 Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, ?Somaliland in Figures 2004?, Hargeisa. This is the 5th in a series of publications. http://www.so.undp.org/pdf/Somaliland%20in%20figures%202004.pdf 110 Ken Menkhaus, ?Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia?, Conflict, Security and Development, (August 2004a) p.160. See also Paula Souverjin, ?We Did it Ourselves? Linking Relief and Development: A case study of post conflict rebuilding in Somaliland', MA thesis in Development Studies, University of Nijmegen, (2001). 109 gender dimensions of development; the role of NGOs and civil society as well as the status of the rural areas and their development for overcoming the proverbial African predicament of ?bifurcation?, as conceptualised by Mamdani.111 This interplay of social forces, in turn, ties in with social service delivery. This crucial area is augmented by what has been a very active diaspora. The Somaliland overseas community has played a major role in Somaliland?s development and sustainability, therefore warranting more than a passing focus as a critical social factor in its reconstruction. It is a constituency that also brings with it its own political significance in terms of an ongoing assessment of Somaliland?s internal balance of political forces. How these actors have interacted with one another in meeting the challenges of post-conflict recovery lays the framework for examining other factors of reconstruction in Somaliland?s ongoing attempt to rebuild its economy. In what is a largely agricultural and pastoral society, this panorama includes different sectoral factors of reconstruction: pastoral production, trade and services, fisheries, frankincense and salt, as well as such critical sub-sectors as finance and infrastructure. How these are managed brings into focus the issue of ?economic and corporate governance?, which is discussed in terms of the following dimensions: reconstruction without aid; the growing international presence within Somaliland, despite its being internationally unrecognised; external trade and investment within an emerging geo-economic and political context, conditioned by the growing importance of hydro-carbon resources; and finally, how Somaliland?s self-reliant reconstruction prospects relate to the 111 Mamdani, (1996). 110 bigger changing picture of international commitments to Somalia?s reconstruction and the African Union?s focus on sub-regional economic co- operation and integration.112 3.1 Political Governance: Reconciliation as Political Reconstruction 3.1.1 The Security Preconditioning of Political Reconstruction The fact that Somaliland has a Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction (MRRR) serves as a fitting point of departure for exploring the country?s post-conflict recovery. This process is one that emanates from its disarmament ? demobilisation ? rehabilitation ? reintegration ? reconstruction (DDRRR) experience, which was crucial to establishing a foundation of stability and a secure environment for reconstructive development to gain momentum. Somaliland, after all, had to go through two periods of conflict and instability before its politics of reconciliation produced the current period of sustained stability in governance. Otherwise, up until early 1996, Somaliland was as much a battleground as was the stateless south. There was the crucial 1992 confrontation between the fledgling central authority in Hargeisa and the militia in control of the vitally strategic port of Berbera ? a confrontation that had to be resolved in the government?s favour, if the diplomatically unrecognised Republic was to secure a major source of 112 Centre for Conflict Resolution, 'The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture', University of Cape Town, (December 2004). http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/fileadmin/template/ccr/pdf/AUNEPAD_Report1.pdf 111 revenue from international trade and transport via the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Once government had extended its control to this vital sector, what continued was a much longer, drawn out and destructive post-Borama conference civil war during the initial tenure of the Egal administration, which lasted from 1994 to 1996. Thus, the difficulties of 1992-96 belie the current perception of Somaliland as an oasis of stability in an otherwise chaotic Somali regional environment. At least, compared with the south, throughout this period Somaliland possessed a central government, embattled though it was. But the post-unilateral declaration of independence violence underlined the tenuousness of this distinction. Overall, these conflicts, on top of the previous periods of violence emanating from the Barre repression, had turned Somaliland into a nation of internally and externally displaced persons. Somaliland?s demilitarising DDRRR process, therefore, had to cope with a larger process of reintegrating refugees. As the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (SCPD) report of 1999 ? 'A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins' ? graphically points out, ?Somaliland, for all practical purposes, is a land of returnees?, where virtually every Somalilander has been displaced at one time or another over the past decade up to that point. The MRRR reported that 682,000 people were involved in the massive exodus to Ethiopia that followed the escalation of the war in 1988 and a ?similar, although undetermined number, are believed to have become internally displaced during the same period? with a much smaller number taking up refuge in Djibouti.113 During the 113 SCPD, (1999), p. 69. 112 1992 strife, associated with the conflict over the Berbera port, a large portion of the population of Burco and almost the entire population of Berbera were displaced. During the second round of fighting during the Somaliland civil war of 1994-1996, over 150,000 people were displaced from Hargeisa and Burco, approximately 90,000 of whom crossed the border to Ethiopia.114 In 1999, when the SCPD report was written, nearly 200,000 people were still registered in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti, awaiting repatriation. For the most part, repatriation and reintegration was accomplished without significant external assistance. Members of Somaliland?s diaspora figured significantly in this process, through their efforts to help family members re- establish their homes and businesses by contributing a portion of their earnings. Ethiopia?s closure of refugee camps, catering to displaced Somalilanders in 2001, was seen as a fitting testimony to the new Republic?s hard-won peace and security, evidenced by the momentum that repatriation and reintegration had on reconstruction. It is within this context that the DDRRR of former combatants in Somaliland?s conflicts took place; a process which, according to the late South African peace and security specialist, Rocky Williams, was one of Africa?s most successful, alongside South Africa?s.115 Along with returnees, government assigned top priority to veteran guerrilla fighters, ex-militia and former government soldiers. One must bear in mind that the Somaliland DDRRR unfolded against a backdrop of division and in- 114 SCPD, (1999), p. 69. 115 Interview with Mr. Rocky Williams, Radio 702, 'Global Eye' programme, (4 January 2005). See also UNDP, ?Proposed Agenda for the Somaliland Security Sector Transformation Workshop?, UNDP: Hargeisa, (November 2004); and the view of another demobilisation specialist, Jeremy Brickhill, (30 August 2001). 113 fighting between the country?s former SNM military and civilian political factions ? dynamics at least in part attributable to Somaliland?s instability during the much of the first half of the 1990s. According to the SCDP report, the demilitarisation and demobilisation process passed through several phases. The first step, after reconciliation, was to distinguish between regular (and therefore authorised) and irregular (or ?non-statutory? in South African parlance) security forces. ?This was achieved through the formation of a national army, which absorbed many members of the wartime militia units,? along with the establishment of a civilian police force achieving a similar purpose.116 The central police training school in Mandheera has emerged as a key institution in the reconstruction of Somaliland?s police force.117 However, it has suffered from resource shortages, compounded by the challenge confronting instructors of transforming former militia members ? many illiterate and initially exhibiting little respect for discipline and authority ? into reliable guardians of law and order. The disarmament dimension of this process was crucial in so far as separating militia and their armaments from the direct control of their clans, which enabled government to minimise the likelihood and consequences of further inter-communal violence, though some heavy weapons did remain 116 SCPD, (1999), p. 70. 117 United Nations, ?Situation of human rights in Somalia, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/59?, E/CN.4/1999/103, (18 February 1999). http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/34e2e0228ab8201a8025675b0035d345?Ope ndocument 114 cantoned in their clan areas. In exchange, each clan was given an allotment of recruits in the national army, which provided them with a profession and a steady income. The process, however, has been costly, with the SCPD report pointing out that government was maintaining approximately 18,000 members of its security forces on its payroll, ?nearly three times as many as it requires, at a cost of 70% of the national budget?. Government?s security rationale: ?better to keep the militia busy in camps, away from the cities and roads, than to return to the days of banditry and insecurity before the national army.?118 Demobilisation, meanwhile, has not constituted a formal programme as much as a spontaneous and voluntary process. The fact that training camp numbers were being reported by military officers to be declining as some recruits quit voluntarily, meant that there was an attrition of quiet integration into civilian life. There are opportunities for demobilised soldiers to acquire civilian- relevant skills through the Sooyaal or veterans association.119 Under their auspices, a Vocational Training Centre (VTC) was established in Hargeisa in 1994. It has offered a variety of courses to ex-combatants, war-widows and returnees from the refugee camps. On a critical evaluative note, the SCPD report had this to say: The fact that the government payroll has not decreased in line with the shrinking population of the training camps has been a subject of some 118 SCPD, (1999). 119 Yusuf A. Gaboobe, ?Demobilisation and Reintegration Programs (DRPs)?, Republican, Issue 47, (19 December 1998). http://www.somalilandforum.com/news/papers/demobilisation.htm; and see Mohamed Ahmed Abdi 'ARABETE', ?SOOYAAL Mine Victim Assistance Program?, 'The Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa', proceedings of a workshop held in Hargeisa at the Institute for Practical Research and Training, (23-24 November 1999). http://www.iprt.org/menace_of_landmines_in_the_horn_.htm 115 controversy. It is widely believed that various interest groups within government, military, clan and commercial circles seek to benefit from the lucrative contracts involved in maintaining the army, and therefore work to undermine the transparency of the system?Disarmament and demobilisation has worked best in areas where confidence in peace and security is high. In the less settled eastern regions, much remains to be done. As long as the risk of conflict lingers, however remote, then communities are unlikely to surrender their militia and their arms.120 3.1.2 Contradictions in Centralising Security and Decentralising Governance On this critical note, the issue of governance looms as a continuing variable in determining the viability of the reconstruction process. This process has been intimately tied in with the imperatives of demilitarising Somaliland?s society as the key to establishing the peace and security foundations for development.121 The politics of demilitarisation, as reflected in the DDRRR process, has essentially aimed at aggregating the disparate and decentralised bases of coercive capability into a consolidated and centralised coercive power for the functioning of the new state. This would help counteract the emergence of the warlord tendencies of southern Somalia which also have their clan links. The consolidation of the coercive powers of the state, through the building of a national army and a civilian police force, has gone hand-in-hand with the 120 SCPD, (1999), p. 71. 121 Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, ?Survey of Small Arms in Somaliland?, Hargeisa: Centre for Creative Solutions, (2004); and Ekkehard Forberg and Ulf Terlinden, ?Small Arms in Somaliland: Their Role and Diffusion?, BITS Field Report, (March 1999). http://www.bits.de/public/rr99-01.htm; World Bank, ?Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics?, draft version, (January 2005). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf 116 institutionalisation of other arms of government and their democratisation. This is an ongoing process unfolding through the evolution of the electoral and judicial systems and the representational institutions ? the latter being a process that has yet to run its course, and one that has become highly contentious. Stabilising the security environment has naturally reinforced the basic tendencies toward state centralisation, as the national government has had to aggregate unto itself the monopoly of coercive power that defines ?state power?: One universal expectation of the central government is that it should provide security throughout Somaliland ? albeit in a benign, unthreatening way. Somalilanders everywhere recognize the importance of peace and security as a precondition to economic and social development.122 Otherwise, these centralising tendencies associated with security have been offset by governing tendencies toward decentralisation, though the SCPD report pointedly cautions that the ?theoretical debate over decentralization? has been gradually pre-empted by the ?facts on the ground?, as central government and local administrations have expanded their writ and elaborated their structures in what has been described as ?haphazard and sometimes contradictory ways.?123 122 SCPD, (1999), p. 38. 123 Ibid., p. 37. 117 Thus, while decentralisation has become a preferred governing framework in reaction to the Somali coast?s past experience of centralised misrule from Mogadishu, demands have been placed on the central government in Somaliland that reflect pressures for it not to neglect the regions and districts. This is reflected in criticism that Hargeisa has been ?too slow to establish administration in the regions and districts,? contradictions that are seen as epitomising ?the legacies of past governance practices: a deep distrust of central government on the one hand, elevated demands of it on the other.?124 These, in essence, apart from the centralising imperatives of security, reflect the centralising implications of a developmental state, which is under pressure for ?delivery? in reconstructing the socio-economic foundations of a fractured society. Security, being a function of governance, has inevitably reflected some of the pressure emanating from competing interests in Somaliland?s DDRRR process, as indicated in the SCPD report.125 3.2 Political Reconstruction Continued: Parliamentary Elections in the Balance The SCPD report?s critique, which alludes to the politics of diverse groups with a vested interest in maintaining a bloated government payroll linked to the DDRRR process, may be indicative of a larger phenomenon of contestation over the political terms of governance in Somaliland. As such, its political reconstruction as a fledgling state would have to be considered as remaining 124 Ibid., p. 38. 125 Ibid. 118 quite fragile. The stability of political reconstruction may be largely contingent on the capacity of the Somaliland government to remain the preponderant coercive force in society while retaining a loyal security establishment ? military and police ? and sufficient popular legitimacy from a population that, however exercised over contentious political issues, would not wish for a return to the violence and civil strife that has characterised the anarchic state of the south. Nevertheless, each phase of this process appears fraught with uncertainty, as was the case with the parliamentary elections. These constitute the last step in Somaliland?s transition from a clan-based representational to a conventional parliamentary representational system. Pending a decision on whether or not to delay the parliamentary elections planned for March 2005, renewed questions and doubts about sustainable political stability in Somaliland were raised. These concerns may have been prompted by the closeness of the contestation between the ruling UDUB government and the leading opposition Kulmiye; a competitiveness that placed noticeable strains on the legitimacy of the governing system in the wake of the presidential election of 2003. In February 2005, the Chairman of Kulmiye, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, called on the people of Somaliland to demonstrate peacefully if elections were not held by the end of March. This came after the interim parliament, under its UDUB majority, passed an electoral law calling for a census and a full registration process as 119 preconditions for the end-of-March elections, articles that were seen as unrealistic and unworkable within the targeted time frame for the elections.126 Voicing suspicions that the parliamentary elections, therefore, might be postponed amid an extension of the term of the house of representatives, on the basis of such articles of the election law not being implementable, Silanyo elaborated further on concerns about the electoral system that might militate against a free and fair election: the alleged usage of public funds by the government, the public media, an increase in the number of members of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) that had not been requested, and also that Kulmiye had no part in nominating new NEC members. Given the importance attached to Somaliland culminating its democratisation process as integral to its political reconstruction, the possibility which arose at the beginning of 2005, that this accomplishment might go unfulfilled as a result of a delay in the parliamentary elections, began eliciting critical comment. Steve Kibble and Adan Abokor,127 note that fulfilment of Somaliland?s democratisation is so intimately tied in with its gaining de jure international recognition, amid comparison with the chaos in the south, and what appear to be increasingly uphill efforts to kick-start the TFG, emerging from the Mbagathi process. They consequently express their fear that ?if there is not an 126 Jamhuuriya, 'Silanyo called on the people of Somaliland to demonstrate', (14 February 2005). 127 Steve Kibble and Adan Abokor, ?Democratic Steps Under Threat in Somaliland?, Pambazuka News, (17 February 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=4833 120 election the one stable part of ?greater Somalia? will relapse from the democratic path, thereby rendering useless the internal and international goodwill, investment and work that has been undertaken so far.? Kulmiye and other opposition parties allege that parliamentarians, especially those allied to the ruling UDUB, are more committed to retaining their seats in the interim parliament than furthering the democratisation process as a result of the census and registration preconditions; and this amid the correct prediction, according to Kibble and Abokor, that ?many Somalilanders also expect UDUB to lose to Kulmiye.? Kulmiye, in their assessment, appears to have strong support from women and the youth, as well as from the ex-combatant veterans of the SNM, together with a strong base in the Somaliland diaspora. This latter dimension, in fact, has reportedly prompted the UDUB to counter charges of its reliance of the advantages of incumbency with the greater diaspora remittances going to Kulmiye. Kibble and Abokor perceive a possibility that, given President Riyale?s commitment to the electoral process and hope for donor support, a lack of substantial funding for the parliamentary elections might, in itself, contribute to a questionable outcome which could ?at least demand a great deal of consensus,? by inference, adding additional strain to the legitimacy of the political reconstruction process. ?The worry is that without support the cash-strapped government will not be able to run an election that can be shown to be free and fair and therefore that instability will result ?? Given the fact that Somaliland?s self-reliance has generated an attraction among 121 donors,128 in spite of its lacking de jure international diplomatic recognition, Kibble and Abokor express a concern that sustaining such external support, in the absence of credible parliamentary elections, could be further complicated by these very same donors re-engaging in funding the reconstitution and reconstruction of southern Somalia. The fulfilment of Somaliland?s political reconstruction at the national level, therefore, is intimately tied in with the international politics of Hargeisa?s quest for recognition and external assistance within the fluid context of the international relations of reconstructing a new regime in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, this political reconstruction process within Somaliland has been seen to be uneven at the local level. Given the geo-politics of the greater Somali region, this carries implications for Somaliland?s stability. In the western regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Saaxil, government administration was well established by the end of the 1990s. In the eastern areas that border Puntland, government authority had been slower to take root.129 Notably, "where local government has gained ground, progress appears to be more a function of community leadership and initiative than of central government support?,130 an observation which may make Somaliland an excellent barometer on the extent to which popular participation in development, as espoused in the 1990 Arusha African Charter on Popular 128 European Commission, ?International Donors Support the Democratisation Process in Somaliland?, Nairobi, (1 September 2005). http://www.delken.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/ 129 A case in point is the new Somaliland currency, the Somaliland Shilling. It is only used in the central Waqoyi Galbed (Hargeisa), Awdal (Borama) and Sahel (Berbera) regions. Eastern regions, including Togdheer (Burco), still use the old Somali Shilling. This partly explains their preference to use Bossasso port in Puntland than the port at Berbera. 130 SCPD, (1999), p. 39. 122 Participation in Development and Transformation,131 can advance the good governance objectives of NEPAD. As such, however, this may have to factor in an inevitable ?dynamic tension? between local government and participatory development and central government. Thus, the SCPD report132 cites the fact that while local leaders in both Gabiley and Boorame were proud of the achievements they have made in establishing their own local administrations and revived taxation systems, their relationship with Hargeisa was awkward, especially when local government may be expected to foot the bill of visiting officials and ministers. The Burco municipality?s revival of local government has been cited as a particularly note-worthy achievement.133 After it was almost totally destroyed in the civil war in 1996, it had re-established its administration by July 1997. By the end of the 1990s, all local departments were functioning, except for an office of census and statistics. An impressive range of rehabilitation initiatives have also been undertaken ? such as rebuilding the regional hospital, repairing and furnishing several schools and developing a new 1,200-stall market, intended to become the largest in Somaliland ? relying mainly on locally raised funds and community contributions. Self-help initiatives have also been cited for spurring development in smaller communities, though, on the other side of the local reconstruction ledger, the involvement of extended families and clans in lobbying for civil service appointments and entitlements 131 See http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/april2002/dev_bank/page5.php 132 SCPD, (1999), p. 39. 133 See also Borama Local Council, 'The Statistical Abstract of Borama Municipality', Economic and Project Management Committee, (December 2003). http://www.so.undp.org/pdf/Borama%20MSA%202003.pdf 123 are judged to have retarded effective governance. In fact, it may well be that as essential as the clan system has been as a partner in Somaliland?s development, from its pre-independence struggle phase to the present, the viability of the state in reconstruction will hinge on the extent to which a more modernising and rationalising of governance occurs. The same strengths of the clan system, as a generator of participation, can also work against good governance to the extent that clan and kinship networks promote and sustain conflicts of interests underpinning corruption ? a major challenge facing government at all levels in Somaliland. Nevertheless, it is worth recounting the extent to which popular participation has become a major preoccupation in the country?s fledgling political culture. In reflecting how Somaliland?s governance has evolved, the SCPD report noted that the early transition from SNM rule to more broadly-based civilian administrations had ?already gone some way towards the realization of participatory government.? It proceeded by saying that: The importance of broadly consultative fora at which decisions are reached through consensus is one notable feature; the growing confidence and seriousness with which Parliament approaches its responsibilities is another.134 Still, to the extent that popular participation tended to remain linked to the traditional beel system, there are limits to how such a framework could cope with the demands of modern governance. The inevitable bureaucratisation of 134 SCPD, (1999), p. 36. 124 governmental management and administration, along with the technocratic nature of problems in any number of sectors in demand of solutions, ensures that such a system, on its own, is unlikely to cope, though the report cites such observations as ?people need to be consulted, educated and their awareness raised, about government and its activities?, as indicative of how the culture of consultation that has emerged in Somaliland?s various phases of development can be brought to bear in enhancing participation. Rural participation and women?s participation are special challenges. Here, a very basic and fundamental challenge is posed: The rural population ? particularly the nomads ? has long been estranged from the political process. Improving the pastoral population?s participation in governance poses a formidable challenge, raising the question of what form of government is best suited to Somaliland?s rural majority. Many are concerned that the shift to a party system might alienate pastoralists even further. According to one Hargeysa intellectual: There is no government outside Hargeysa, and unless the rural man participates in and benefits from government, we cannot talk about [political] parties.135 3.3 From Clan Limits to Political Reconstruction: Rural and Gender Dimensions The challenge of rural participation in governance is compounded by local representational issues, where there are tendencies for clans to want their own districts, thereby generating pressure from below for a proliferation of 135 SCPD, (1999), p. 36, (italics added). 125 administrative units which may have nothing to do with effective local governance and decentralisation. Women, on the other hand, have traditionally enjoyed no formal role in the clan-based political process, though this is slowly changing as a result of the democratic transition.136 Despite such exclusion, women have played an active role in mobilising for both peace and war.137 Some took on the role of combatants against the Barre regime. Others raised funds to sustain the war effort and nursed the wounded. Here again, it is expected that Somaliland?s political transition from a clan-based to a more modern multi-party parliamentary system will effect the necessary changes to enhance women?s participation. The constitution, for example, affirms the rights of women to vote and hold public office, while women?s NGOs have emerged as important actors in Somaliland?s burgeoning civil society.138 With respect to the provisional constitution and women?s right to vote, Somali human rights activist, Rakiya Omaar, implies that the underlying clan foundations of Somaliland?s transition may be emerging as double-edged sword producing ?an ineffectual government.?139 This she sees as reflective of the fact that ?sadly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the political landscape of Somaliland today resembles the multiparty politics of the early 1960s? where 136 Amina Mohamoud Warsame, Queens Without Crowns: Somaliland women?s changing roles and peace building, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, (2002). 137 Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (eds.), Somalia: The Untold Story. The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, London: Pluto Press and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (2004); Debra M. Timmons, The Sixth Clan ? Women Organize for Peace in Somalia: A Review of Literature, University for Peace, Africa Programme, Geneva, (2004). http://www.africa.upeace.org/documents/somalia_the_sixth_clan.pdf 138 Nagaad Umbrella Organisation, 'Overcoming Cultural Barriers: Promoting Gender Equality and Equity', Annual Report, Hargeisa, Somaliland, (2004). http://www.somali-civilsociety.org/partners/partner_nagaad.php 139 Rakiah Omaar, ?Peace-Building and Democracy: The Lessons of Somalia and Somaliland?, in Global Challanges and Africa, Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue, Whitehall Paper 62, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, (2004), pp 83-92. See page 91, specifically. 126 Hargeisa is ?intent upon claiming the meagre resources of the country to fund its own political interests? ? amplifying opposition claims that emerged early in 2005 regarding the prospect that parliamentary elections would be delayed or postponed. In her opinion, the clan system ? as opposed to the promised multi-party system that is trying to emerge ? which excludes decision-making and leadership roles for women ?no longer offers a very real mechanism for accountability? in the political reconstruction of the country. Omaar contends that ?the elders should have withdrawn from active political service once they had delivered peace? that, unfortunately, ?their extraordinary success in the early 1990s proved too strong a temptation? whereupon they ?transformed their role from community representatives and peace-makers to power- brokers.? The successful recent intervention of the House of Elders in calming the political ?scuffles?140 as a result of the stalemate between the ruling UDUB party and the opposition, suggests that the Elders have a select role as Somaliland?s ?custodians of the peace and harmony.?141 With this ?bifurcated? impasse, Mamdani proposes ?that the way forward lies in sublating both, through a double move that simultaneously critiques and affirms?.142 Omaar?s sentiments, while contentious, are echoed in Somalia: The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women. In the section on 'Post- War Recovery and Political Participation' that addresses 'Women?s Participation in the Governance of Somaliland', which draws on papers prepared by Shukri Hariir and Zeynab M. Hassan, and interviews with Noreen 140 Irin News, ?SOMALIA: Scuffles mar opening of Somaliland parliament?, (1 Dec 2005). 141 Bashir Goth, ?Somaliland's wisdom again frustrates doomsayers?, Editorial, Awdalnews, (6 December 2005). 142 Mamdani, (1996), p. 3. 127 Michael Mariano, a member of the Women?s Political Forum of Somaliland ventures that: Women have no chance of competing with men while clan remains the main basis for political life in Somaliland. Male candidates are supported by their clans but women are not. In the absence of a fully-fledged multi-party parliamentary system, women?s participation is largely dependent on the political calculations of male politicians. That the current incumbent, President Rayaale, saw fit to name women as ministers of family and social welfare and foreign affairs is indicative of the president?s awareness that in today?s world, the politics of gender must be factored into Somaliland?s interactions with the international community. Thus, Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail, as the most senior ministerial position held by a woman in the Horn of Africa, has been an asset in the country?s diplomacy. However, pending a full transition to multi-party democracy, it is the NGO sector where women?s participation has had its greatest impact. The extent of women?s participation at this level is extensively elaborated on in Somalia: The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women.143 By the beginning of the 1990s, the leading women?s organisations operating in Hargeisa were the Somaliland Women?s Development Association (SOWDA) and the Somaliland Women?s Organisation (SOLWO). Both organisations played a leading role in lobbying 143 See also ?Draft report: Workshop on the Status of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action in Somaliland?, Hargeisa, 19-20 October 1999; Annex I in Halima Aman and Shamis Hussein, Women at the Crossroads, Somali Women?s Progress in Implementing the Beijing Platform for Action, (November 1999). 128 the interim Tuur administration for the establishment of a police force and a judiciary system. SOWDA promised that women would contribute to a police programme, and did so by donating 500 police uniforms, bedding and utensils to different police stations. Later, organisations such as the Women?s Advocacy and Progressive Organisation (WAPO) ? which became the Women?s Advocacy and Development Association (WADA) ? and Dulmar began moving away from a purely social welfare reconstruction role toward the open advocacy of women?s rights. After the beginning of the new millennium in 2000, Somaliland women were moving toward seeking a greater political voice through the formation of the Women?s Political Forum (WPF), which decided to create its own political party, Qoys (Family) to represent women?s concerns. Importantly, a recent World Bank (WB) study found that women constitute 70% of breadwinners in Somaliland?s households.144 The challenge remains for this critical role to be appropriately represented in the political sector. 144 World Bank, 'Somalia. Socio-Economic Survey 2004'. Report no 2, Somalia Watching Brief. Washington: UNDP, Somalia and World Bank, (2003). See also Irin News, ?SOMALIA: Somaliland women take on new roles?, (3 May 2005). For a fascinating account of possibly the world?s first women?s mosque in the world, see Abdi Ismail Samatar, ?Social Transformation and Islamic Reinterpretation in Northern Somalia: The Women?s Mosque in Gabiley? in Geographies of Muslim Women. Gender, Religion, and Space, Ghazi-Waud Falah and Caroline Nagel (eds.), New York and London: The Guilford Press, (2005). 129 3.4 Economic (and Corporate) Governance: The Parameters of Economic Reconstruction 3.4.1 Somaliland?s Social Economy of Reconstruction: Geo-Cultural Contours Between the conundrums of rural development and women?s participation in the political reconstruction calculus, the cultural contours of what might be depicted as Somaliland?s ?social economy? emerge as the backdrop to its economic reconstruction. Here, the SCPD report145 makes reference to the optimism that has been attached to Somaliland?s prospects as an inheritance from what was ?the relative prosperity it enjoyed in the decade prior to independence? ? referring to its immediate post-colonial independence and amalgamation with the south. ?During the 1950s, the Arabian oil boom generated an unprecedented demand for Somali livestock. The central towns of Hargeysa, Berbera, and Burco became the hubs of that trade, forming a triangle that would eventually become the core of economic development in the region.? The report further states:146 During the same period, in the Hawd region, the colonial authorities?built a chain of earth dams along the Ethiopian border to collect run-off water. These man-made depressions prolonged the period nomads could graze their livestock in the Hawd, and thus changed the face of the land forever. Permanent settlements began to appear, raising surplus livestock for export 145 SCPD, (1999), p. 39. 146 Ibid., p. 12. 130 to Arabia through the markets of Somaliland?s central economic hub. In the years following independence, this zone became increasingly specialized in the commercial production of livestock and related export services. The relative dominance of this central triangle, and its relationship with the Arabian livestock markets, has changed very little up to the present day. This narrative provides a fitting backdrop for the current geo-political- economic context and gaining an understanding of the current political predicament confronting Somaliland?s economic reconstruction; an environment that the country?s unilateral declaration of independence transformed into a hostile neighbourhood. Geo-politically, a Somaliland independent of the rest of the Somali coast has come to be seen by the Arab governments bordering the Red Sea as a challenge to an inter-regional status quo which balances the Afro-Arab, Christian-Muslim power equation on the Horn of Africa side of this ?Afrabian? corridor. Hence, the 1998-1999 Arab regional boycott of the North-East African livestock economy was not unrelated to Arab hostility to Somaliland?s independence bid. This complicated the country?s economic reconstruction struggle, in what Rakiah Omaar has defined as a ?context of international neglect.?147 Tellingly, however, with implications for Somaliland?s current predicament vis- ?-vis the rest of the Somali coast, and Puntland especially, the SCPD report points out that ?eastern Somaliland (composed essentially of present day Sool and Sanaag regions) was affected relatively little by the livestock export 147 Rakiah Omaar, 'Peace-Building and Democracy: The Lessons of Somalia and Somaliland', in 'Global Challenges and Africa, Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue', Whitehall Paper 62, p. 2, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, (2004). 131 boom? before and after Somalia?s post-colonial independence at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. Within a political reconstruction context relevant to economic recovery, this history puts into perspective the challenge of rural participation confronting Somaliland?s nation-building project: Nomadic pastoralism has historically been the predominant social and economic mode in eastern Somaliland, but the area has nevertheless evolved somewhat separately of the central economic zone between Hargeysa, Berbera and Burco. Sanaag region has long maintained independent, sometimes clandestine, trade ties with the Arabian countries, especially Yemen. Export of livestock and frankincense in exchange for consumer goods from the Arabian side evolved into a strong commercial and cultural relationship of central importance to Sanaag?s social and economic life. Further south, the inhabitants of Sool region long ago developed a niche as an economic and social gateway between Somaliland and Somalia ? a role the region still plays.?148 While less marginalised than the east, western Somaliland, comprising the Awdal and western Woqooyi Galbeed regions, is also depicted as having experienced a slightly separate development? from the Hargeisa-Berbera- Burco central economic zone. Around the turn of the 20th century, inhabitants of the area began to borrow ox-plough farming techniques from the neighbouring Oromo groups (in Ethiopia) and have since developed an agropastoral mode of production in which cattle raised in sedentary agricultural villages have replaced camels as the principal stock. The region 148 SCPD, (1999), pp. 12-13. 132 has since become increasingly specialised in the production of cereal crops ? chiefly sorghum and maize ? which are traded throughout Somaliland. More recently, cereal production has been supplemented by fruits and vegetables grown on small scale irrigation farms for domestic consumption (italics added).149 Of particular importance here, relative to eastern Somaliland?s gravitation toward a more Arabian geo-cultural and economic sphere of influence, is the extent to which western Somaliland?s social economy integrates it regionally into an Ethiopian Ogaden geo-cultural/economic sphere-of-influence. Thus: The sedentary agricultural mode of production in the west created a concentration of settlements unmatched elsewhere in Somaliland, including Gabiley, Tog Wajaale, Dila and Boorame. Furthermore, this zone came to serve increasingly as a transhipment point in the trade linking Djibouti, Jigjiga and Dire Dawa to the major population centres of Somaliland. Despite the region?s ?separate development,? western Somaliland?s relative prosperity, the metropolitan influences from neighbouring towns, and the settled nature of the population have encouraged its gradual integration within Somaliland?s broader economic and political context.150 This relative stability of western Somaliland?s sedentary social economy vis- ?-vis the central economic zone compared to the more marginal pastoral- nomadic linkages of eastern Somaliland to the Hargeisa-Berbera-Burco ?triangle? revisits the relative success of local government, as cited by the 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid., p. 13. 133 SCPD report; the fact that, ?in the western regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Saaxil, government administration is well established, whereas in the east, government authority has been slower to take root.?151 These dichotomies within Somaliland may prove crucial for future reference in a broader stabilisation of the Somali Peninsula inclusive of both Somaliland and Somalia as the challenge of governance in the Somaliland east may be amplified more broadly in the governance challenges of political reconstruction in and around Mogadishu and its hinterland. As the SCPD report (1999) makes clear, by the end of the 90s, Somaliland?s social economy had become configured around an essentially west-central axis dominated by the central economic zone: The growing importance of central Somaliland over the past century has been matched by the gradual decline of the coastal areas. The importance of ancient settlements like Seylac, Bullaxaar, Xiis, Maydh, Laas Qoray and Ceelaayo was diminished when the British colonial authorities shifted their administrative centres from the uncomfortable coastal climate to the cooler Oogo zone, and was further eclipsed by the development of major ports at Berbera and Djibouti. Among the coastal towns, only Berbera, by virtue of its port facilities and its key role in the central ?triangle? export trade, has gained in size and importance.152 The current use of the Berbera port by Ethiopia for its critical imports within the context of regional tensions, and the EU plans to facilitate regional 151 Ibid., p. 39. 152 Ibid., p. 13. 134 infrastructure by developing a Berbera-Addis Ababa corridor, which augurs well for Somaliland?s economic development prospects.153 3.5 Somaliland?s Sectoral Factors of Reconstruction The foregoing survey of the geo-cultural contours of Somaliland?s social economy ? between a declining pastoralist eastern region that has been traditionally influenced by Arabian/Red Sea inter-regionalism and an economically more vibrant sedentary agricultural economy in the west, linked to the Djibouti-Ethiopian Ogaden axis ? contextualises the challenges of economic reconstruction. These efforts are confronted by what might be termed Somaliland?s ?sectoral factors of reconstruction? in terms of the country?s productive sectors (its livestock economy and agricultural sector, the coastal marine economy, comprising employment and entrepreneurial activities in fisheries); the social sectors of water and sanitation, and the ?HEW? cluster of health-education-welfare and the environment, as well as a revisiting of security and the post-September 11, 2001 preoccupation with anti-terrorism; the infrastructural sectors of transport communications via roads (surface transportation), civil aviation and sea transport revolving around the strategic Berbera port; the fuel and energy sectors which are 153 Louis Berger S.A and Afroconsult, ?Pre-Feasibility Study of the Regional Transport Sector in the Berbera Corridor?, Kenya: The European Commission, (September 2003); Aracadis Grabowsky and B.V. Poort, ?Provision of Technical Assistance for the Rehabilitation of the Road Network in Somaliland?, Institutional Policy Paper prepared for the Somaliland Road Authority, Kenya: The European Commission, (February 2000). http://www.delken.cec.eu.int/en/publications/Berbera%20Corridor%20Pre- feasibility%20Study%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf 135 attracting foreign direct investment; communications inclusive of telecoms154 and national broadcasting; and programme funding efforts involving assessments and project cost estimates. Economic reconstruction in these sectors is also accompanied and/or complicated by drought, which has had a particularly severe impact in eastern Somaliland.155 A major precondition for the economic and corporate governance dimensions of reconstruction in Somaliland revolves around human resource capacity. This is perhaps the most central preoccupation of government in reversing the legacies of war-induced economic and social decline. As Somaliland?s Ministry of National Planning and Coordination makes clear in its 2005 report on the 'Somaliland Economic Overview',156 the country, as a result of ?the civil war and severe loss of all its professionals at all levels through brain drain,? has had to cope with a system is very weak as far as personnel is concerned. The personnel are characterised by low levels of education, inadequate professional skills and lack of work experience ?contributing to poor delivery of the Government services to the public.?157 There are technical and institutional shortfalls at almost all levels of government. To rebuild its civil service capacity, Somaliland?s government has embarked on a ?bold step of carrying out the most feared Civil Service Reforms,?158 aimed at addressing major 154 Knud Erik Skouby and Reza Tadayoni, 'A Case Study of Somaliland in the context of WDR', WDR Discussion Paper 0306, World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, (2004). http://www.regulateonline.org/content/view/210/31/ 155 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=som 156 Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (January 2005), p. 13. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 136 impediments in the civil service and at stimulating private sector economic growth. Economic and corporate governance, within this context, will mean confronting the following reconstruction challenges outlined in the report:159 ? Most ministries lack the capacity to articulate clear national development visions, strategies, objectives and policy directions for public institutions. ? Almost all ministries lack the capacity to set long-term national development plans as guides to their overall functions and operations. ? The capacity to design and implement concrete action plans and systems that can ensure good governance, efficiency and accountability in the public sector is inadequate. ? Periodically monitor and evaluate outputs and expected results are limited. ? Foster mutual co-operation and collaboration among public and private institutions for wider economic development are almost non-existent. 3.6 Capacity-Building Support: A Brief Survey In trying to address these challenges, Somaliland?s government has been engaging the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In spite of Somaliland?s lack of international recognition, the fact that it has in place a functioning government helps to facilitate the UN?s developmental objectives in the Somali coast (see the UN Offices in Somalia/Somaliland map). Thus, in 159 Ibid., p. 8. 137 seeking to fulfil its objectives of enhancing the delivery of basic services in public institutions through training, institutional capacity-building and public sector reform, the UNDP has engaged Hargeisa in the establishment of an Institute of Public Administration (IPA) and its curriculum development. Under the rubric of 'Northwest Somalia', it has prepared and finalised Somaliland?s first ?Development Plan for Northwest Somalia (Somaliland)? in what has been termed the 'Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004- 2006'.160 As part of a broader objective of strengthening the governance capacity preconditions for development, the UNDP has supported the development and strengthening of Somaliland?s legislative bodies (specifically the Guurti/Upper House of Somaliland) and, notably, in terms of economic development, supported a needs assessment conducted by the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, for the purpose of strengthening its strategic economic planning capacity. Related assistance has gone to supporting registration and ground-breaking cadastre establishment in Somaliland under its Ministry of Agriculture,161 and toward training courses in Law and Business Administration for civil servants, with the aim of skills re- qualification at the University of Hargeisa.162 Accomplishments cited by the UNDP have been the finalising of the Cadastral Survey in Gabiley in Somaliland, and the extension of this survey to Borama as a means of facilitating title ownership to the area?s farmers (thereby reducing conflict over land), the conducting of a training and study tour of Somaliland women 160 http://www.so.undp.org/Themes/Governance/Administration.htm 161 http://www.somalilandsurveys.info 162 Website of Hargeisa University, http://www.universityofhargeisa.net/ 138 leaders to Uganda, and of traditional elders to South Africa. In the urban sector, the UNDP has supported a Land Management Information System survey for the capital, Hargeisa; development of the first ever Hargeisa City Charter and its translation into Somali; and rehabilitation work of the Hargeisa/Borama/Hudur municipal buildings. On the distance education front, the UNDP has made use of resources from the African Virtual University (AVU) and other online sources to establish satellite technology at the Universities of Hargeisa and Amoud163 and has helped them create local area networks, and in the process, allowed them to network their computers at the learning centre. In all this, the capacity-building reconstruction challenges have been many. In public administration, the challenge has been to overcome obsolete managerial, technical and administrative cadres, which have suffered from the disruption of academic institutions, emigration of skilled human resources, and overstaffing of institutions, resulting in high recurrent costs and low productivity amid a climate of high social tension and insecure employment conditions. In the area of governance, the challenge has been hostility and resistance to the discussion of women?s issues in the political arena. The urban sector, meanwhile, has been challenged by the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to areas such as Hargeisa, which has placed the limited resources of the local authorities under immense pressure. This is compounded by returnees? unwillingness to move and the inadequate 163 Irin News, ?SOMALIA: Online higher learning initiative launched?, (1 Dec. 2005); Website of Amoud University, http://home.earthlink.net/~amoud/. 139 capacity and resources of the local authorities, thus making urban planning difficult. 3.7 Overcoming the Livestock Achilles? Heel This brief highlighting of capacity problems illuminated by the UNDP assistance to Somaliland, within the context of the UN?s assistance in the Somali region, is illustrative of the overall challenges confronting the sectoral factors of reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction, after all, is a particularly sensitive sphere of political and economic governance contingent on capacity. Equally critical, is the extent to which Hargeisa is able to manage Somaliland?s regional economic interdependencies within the Red Sea/Somali Peninsula/Gulf of Aden geo-economic zone. Here, the vagaries of the livestock economy has proven to be particularly challenging during Somaliland?s first independence decade, given Arab opposition to its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. As a draft report from 2002 by Somaliland?s Academy for Peace and Development on 'Regulating the Livestock Economy of Somaliland' points out, ?pastoralism, in one form or another, is the primary production system in Somaliland? wherein the livestock economy has played a central role as a revenue generator. ?Taxation on livestock exports is the main source of government revenue and of funding for the re-establishment of government institutions.? As the SCPD report164 emphasises, livestock exports are the 164 SCPD, (1999), p. 85. 140 Achilles? Heel of Somaliland?s economy in the absence of diversification, although it is the ?leading exporter of livestock among eastern African states and among the world?s leaders in live animal trade.165 In February 1998, the government of Saudi Arabia imposed a livestock ban on all animals originating from Horn of Africa countries and Yemen due to an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia. The blanket import ban was seen as having especially serious consequences for Somaliland and the Ogaden 'Ethiopian Somali National Regional State', both being areas where local economies depended heavily on the export of livestock. At the time of the ban, Somaliland was seen as likely to suffer the most, since normally 80% of hard currency earnings, as well as the bulk of the government?s tax revenue, are derived from livestock exports. Furthermore, the Saudi ban came at a time when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was implementing a regional refugee repatriation programme which, it was feared, could be undermined by the boycott. The 1998-1999 ban had a dramatic impact in terms of its ?collateral damage? beyond the livestock sector itself. ?Somaliland national income suffered a sudden drop of as much as 40% ?The ban affected all sectors of Somaliland society including urban dwellers, many of whom previously believed that only 165 This report has been published as, War-Torn Societies Programme International, (2005), pp.189-268. Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, Great Britain: The International African Institute, in association with James Currey, Indiana University Press and Btec Books, Hargeisa, (2003), p. 132. 141 nomads depended on livestock. Even beyond the central ?triangle? of Somaliland?s livestock trade, economic activity slowed to a crawl.?166 Immediate relief was experienced in mid-1999 when the ban was lifted. But then, less than three years later, another ban was imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, only to be partially lifted by the UAE in June 2001. At the time of the 2005 'Somaliland Economic Overview?s' release, the ban was at least partially in force, as made apparent in the report?s discussion of ?sector modernisation? of the livestock economy; the fact that as ?the ban of Somaliland?s livestock export had been triggered by Rift Valley disease outbreak, modern laboratory establishment would prevent livestock exposure to such disease and control any new epidemic ??.167 The Academy for Peace and Development report, drafted in 2002, tabled several recommendations, one set addressing the role that could be played by international donor agencies, which serves to highlight Somaliland?s precarious predicament, given its lack of even partial or preliminary international recognition. Thus, at the top of the list of actions ?required from international aid agencies? was ?providing diplomatic support for lifting the livestock ban?. Otherwise, it was noted that ?despite the central role that livestock trade plays in the reconstruction and well-being of the people of Somaliland, the contribution of donor agencies to the promotion of livestock trade has been virtually zero?, although ?the engagement of the aid agencies 166 SCPD, (1999), p. 48. 167 Ibid., p. 13. 142 in the sector would contribute to the county?s development, and the nation?s food security and socio-economic wealth?.168 Diversification, according to the Academy report,169 should take two forms in terms of developing new non-pastoral economic resources and sectors such as those cited in the SCPD report ? such as coal mining, oil exploration, cement production, tourism, an economic free zone, financial services and internet commerce ? along with the diversification of pastoral products and markets. Within the context of such a strategy, government should give priority to: ? Provision of basic human services and essential infrastructure to encourage movement to coastal areas; ? Provision of support for the voluntary migration of pastoralists to coastal areas, and assistance for those who seek to engage in fishing; ? Diversification of the livestock trade, which will demand greater domestic processing and an aggressive international marketing strategy. To achieve this will require leadership of the government collaborating with the chamber of commerce; ? Encouragement of the development of a domestic processing plant for chilled meat and hides for export, by offering credits, tax breaks and free land for construction; ? Periodic inspections by government inspectors and international experts of the Somalia/Somaliland chilled meat processing infrastructure and 168 SCPD, (2002), pp. 81-82. 169 Ibid., p. 85. 143 procedures and the submission of the report to the relevant authorities in the exporting countries; ? Technical support to the private sector in facilitating chilled meat so that international standards are met; ? Provision of an environment that encourages foreign investment in this sector and that safeguards this investment.170 These recommendations amplify one of the observations made by the SCPD report concerning rationalisation and diversification, with regard to alleviating rangeland pressures. Exploiting other economic options would be ?unlikely to yield much revenue unless they are linked to greater domestic processing capacity, and aggressive international marketing strategies.?171 Diversification into a broader agricultural complement to livestock would, among other things, mean reversing the severe erosion of arable land, which is compounded by periodic droughts. According to the ?2005 Economic Overview Report?, arable land in the country is roughly estimated at 150,000 hectares, approximately 60% of which has been subjected to severe erosion. This means that an integrated ecosystems-based economic recovery strategy would have to be at the foundation of further agro-pastoralist development. ?For natural erosions, agriculture restoration projects are envisaged by the government who is conscientious that it would not be feasible without foreign investments or substantial international community assistance.?172 One 170 SCPD, (2002), p. 80. 171 Ibid., p. 85. 172 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, ?Somaliland Economic Overview?, Hargeisa, (2005), p.13. 144 productive sector contemplated by the report for revival is date production. Before the civil war, there were many date plantation projects. These were among the economic casualties of war. Date plantations had been envisioned as a key to raising the social and economic standards of people living in the coastal areas. The report recommends an urgent rejuvenation programme that would require the development of thousands of hectares, which, in turn, would necessitate importation of hundreds of thousands of shoots. ?For the up-keep of deteriorated existing palms and planting on new lots, it is desirable to acquire initial investment for the purchase of more pumps and digging earth wells. The groves to be rehabilitated will start fruiting from 2008 onward and assuming that 70% of the palms will be rejuvenated, annual production will probably be thousands of tons.?173 3.8 The Neglected Marine Economy Developing the marine economy is recognised as a major alternative to dependence on agro-pastoralism, as the coastline, stretching for over 850km along the southern shores of the Gulf of Aden, is seen as having great fishing potential that could generate employment and income for many people, enlarge and enhance the nutritional intake of consumers and increase Somaliland?s foreign exchange earnings through exports to international markets. At the time the ?2005 Economic Overview Report? was published, the challenges facing the development of this sector as an alternative to agro- pastoralism, were: 173 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p.13. 145 ? The number of communities that depend on fishing was very small and poor; ? The demand for fish in Somaliland is very low as seafood is not popular; ? The seafood export market is non-existent due to lack of proper infrastructure and information; ? There is a shortage of qualified manpower in the sector; ? Marine resources have not been properly studied and estimated, yet;174 ? Those very resources are already prey to unscrupulous poachers and polluters.175 Clearly, fisheries would appear to be more of an export market resource than one for internal consumption. Measures are being contemplated ? or implemented ? in licensing and registration, the provisioning of fishing gear and processing equipment, marine resources conservation, and in the realm of laws and regulations. To develop this market, the ?Economic Overview Report? indicated that the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Development would have to undertake an extensive fisheries and marine resources research and survey programme.176 174 Some studies undertaken include: Michael H Schleyer, ?Biodiversity Assessment of the Northern Somali Coast East of Berbera?, IUCN and Oceanographic Research Institute, Durban, South Africa, (March 1999) http://www.iprt.org/SOMALIILAND%20BIODIVERSITY%20BERBERA.pdf and Ahmed H. O. Gulaid, ?Omane? ?Feasibility Report on the Fisheries Sector in Somaliland: Current status, opportunities and constraints?, Kenya: UNDP, Somalia, (2004). http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/pressreleases/fisheries%20cover.pdf 175 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), pp. 14-16. 176 Ibid., p. 16. 146 In the ?HEW? social sectors of health, education and welfare, the war and conflict situations have reinforced the top priority of addressing Somaliland?s water and sanitation problems. Since there are no rivers in Somaliland, the harvesting of run-off water in surface reservoirs and tapping the subterranean aquifer are the country?s only two key water sources. Growing urbanisation, as well as rural welfare during the current ongoing reconstruction period, underline the importance of development in this sector. In fact, overcoming this problem is basic to rural development. Here, ?immediate priorities? based on the 2005 Somaliland Economic Overview are: ? Rehabilitation of surface water sources, especially that of the Hawd public water reservoirs; ? Rehabilitation of existing bore-wells; ? Creation of permanent dry season water sources (bore-wells) to Hawd pastoral zones, to the hot western coastal plains and to the eastern Sool plains; ? Enhancement of drought preparedness capability at both the regional and national levels to supplement existing private operational capacities (an area of development that, in fact, makes regional co-operation with neighbouring countries imperative); and ? Improvement of rural and village sanitation facilities.177 With regard to urban water systems, providing this resource to new returnees and internally displaced person (IDP) settlements and other outlying 177 Ibid., p. 25. 147 communities highlights the need for several medium-term undertakings, such as the construction of subterranean dams, weirs and bunds to conserve underground water levels; the compilation and updating of available hydrological data; and the establishment of a water data/information centre within the Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources, in collaboration with the Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment. 3.9 Education: Somaliland?s Reconstruction Generator Given Somaliland?s human resource deficits and capacity-building challenges, the education (and training) sector is an emergency priority. Here, reconstruction has to be seen within the broader context of how Somaliland is drawing upon the participation and resources of its far-flung diaspora, as well as on efforts aimed directly at reviving the qualitative and physical infrastructural aspects of the country?s education system. This was all diluted and ultimately destroyed during the era of military rule from Mogadishu and as a result of the subsequent wars. The development of the education sector has been a critical 'social reconciliation bridge' for Somalilanders abroad.178 For example, the setting of Somaliland?s first Amoud University cohered Somalilanders abroad across clan divides, in cities such as Abu Dhabi, and inspired many other university initiatives on the Somali coast. Today, Amoud University is seen as a key symbol of Somaliland's resilience. Often the University?s survival track record 178 Amoud Foundation is one of the initiatives of the diaspora to support education and humanitarian development in Somaliland. http://www.amoudfoundation.com/ 148 is seen as an example of Somaliland's stability and self-reliance. Clearly, this tertiary institution has played a pivotal role in the consolidation of Somaliland?s reconciliation agenda and its emerging identity. Amoud University was transformed from Amoud High School seven years ago and has been successful in drawing on its symbolic capital as the first Somaliland Protectorate secondary boarding school and the alma mater of generations of Somaliland?s educated class, including leaders such as the current Chairperson of the Kulmiye Party, Mr Ahmed Silanyo.179 On the schooling front, since 1991 when there was an enrolment of 10,000 students in 47 primary schools organised through community initiatives, the combined public and private primary school enrolment had jumped to 96,201 in 354 functioning schools by 2000/2003. There are currently 15 functioning secondary schools serving a population of 4,380 students. The total number of teachers, both public and private is 2,346. Here, international engagement, despite diplomatic non-recognition, has played an important role. With such help, Somaliland succeeded in operating functioning schools with 2,386 rehabilitated classrooms. Meanwhile, according to the Somaliland Economic Overview, ?a long process of primary school curriculum reform has borne fruit, with the first consignment of new textbooks already in use.? Now, as a complement to this, attempts are underway ?to develop a multi-purpose non- 179 A known academic and contentious critic of Somaliland?s political project for independence has reflected on how Amoud University has succeeded in serving common rather than sectarian interests. See Abdi Ismail Samatar, ?Somali Reconstruction and Local Initiative: Amoud University?, World Development, Vol. 29, Issue 4, (April 2001), and Mohamed a Nur- Awaleh and Dorothy Mtegha, ?Shared Governance and Leadership in African Universities: Experiences from Mzuzu University, Malawi and Amoud University, Somaliland?, Africa Development, Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, Codesria, (2005). http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad1_05/awaleh_Mtegha.pdf See also Andrea Useem, ?In a Breakaway Region of War-Torn Somalia, a New University Takes Root?, Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 45, No. 19, (15 January 1999). 149 formal education curriculum.?180 What is more, overall, the educational revival process is attempting to mainstream gender issues by integrating such issues into educational resource materials and programmes. Such gender mainstreaming in education is reinforced by what is also becoming an emerging focus on the education of girls ? an area highlighted as among the sector's ?immediate priorities?, along with the more medium-term priority of rehabilitating rural education.181 Although Somaliland?s educational system achieved early success in disseminating rural education well into the 1970s, the current education revival is seen as being overly biased toward urban areas. Within this context, there are ?serious regional disparities of access to educational opportunities?182 with Ministry of Education official statistics showing that most of the country?s schools are now concentrated in the Galbeed region, which accounts for 47.1% of total student enrolment in Somaliland; the other 52.9% is divided up among Awdal (14.4%), Sahil (7.9%), Togdheer (9.7%) and Sool and Sanaag with 10.6% each. This urban bias is reinforced by the fact that most teachers are concentrated in towns as a result of these being venues where other income-generating opportunities can be accessed. In the medium term, priorities focused on reviving education in the rural areas include: 180 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 26. 181 Ibid., (2005), pp. 26-27. 182 Ibid. 150 ? Supplementary sources of income for rural teachers; ? Expanding primary schools into rural communities and urban settlements that are currently not being served; ? Establishment of regional level technical institutes; ? Support studies on the sustainability of the present cost-sharing system for financing public education and that of private education and potentialities for improved payment of teachers, improving educational access for the pastoral population, feasibility of expanding non-formal education and the instilling of moral values in education.183 Overall, the key to education?s revival is overcoming the teacher bottleneck. ?There has not been a supply of new teachers for more than a decade now, and older generation teachers are leaving the profession because of age or because of change of occupation.?184 Recently, a teachers? training college was opened in Hargeisa, while Amoud University is producing a limited number of secondary school teachers, which is expected to increase. The capacity of such institutions to produce a new generation of primary and secondary teachers for public and private schools, highlights the role that tertiary education institutions are playing in Somaliland?s reconstruction and educational revival.185 With the opening of Burco University in August 2004, Somaliland now has four institutions of higher learning, namely, Burco, Amoud University, 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid., p. 46. 185 Afrol News, (20 August 2004). 151 Hargeisa University, which graduated its first-ever students in 2004, and Berbera University. As Afrol News reported, ?this exceptional density of educational centres has been made possible by bold government policies and the financial support of many Somalilander exiles,? 186 referring to the impact of the diaspora communities overseas, which contain many individuals who not only make financial contributions but travel back and forth to Somaliland in a variety of support capacities related to institution and capacity-building. From the standpoint of attracting external assistance ? despite Somaliland not being recognised ? Burco University?s founding represents one route to this goal by emphasising the school?s German roots as a means of attracting this nation?s support. According to Afrol News, Burco University ?takes up the heritance from a technical institute that was constructed with German state aid but left in ruins by earlier hostilities. Consequently, the town?s new university plans to specialise on engineering and technical studies.? In the process, it is hoped that, as a matter of continuity, German funding can be attracted to support the institution. Former graduates of the old Technical Institute of Burco have been among the many contributors to its revival as Burco University, a reflection of how ?the Somaliland Diaspora has played an important part in financing the country?s four universities? as well as in raising funds to reconstruct Burco.187 The density of Somaliland?s tertiary education sector, given the small size of the country, reflects a broader renaissance of an institutionalised civil society as another source of reconstructive capacity-building. In addition to the 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 152 women?s NGOs mentioned above, institutions like the SAPD interact with the universities, international organisations and government in augmenting the kind of research and analysis into Somaliland?s manifold developmental challenges, which is hoped will sustain reconstruction momentum. The SAPD, formerly the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development has, for example, worked closely with the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) in profiling Somaliland?s reconstruction and developmental needs. Prior to its 1999 report, SAPD, in its SCPD incarnation, had identified four strategic areas (Entry Points) in Somaliland society for prioritising the rebuilding process: ? Regulating the pastoral economy; ? Consolidating government institutions at central and local levels, including decentralisation; ? The role of the media and oral culture in rebuilding; ? The legacy of war on the family, culture and values.188 Through the kind of participatory research that such institutions undertake, in this case enlisting the involvement of a private sector (by and large livestock traders), linkages have been forged between Somaliland?s indigenous ?knowledge sector? and the larger society. This larger society, in terms of the private sector, also includes an organised business community in the form of the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce which, with the assistance of the UNDP, has published its own directory providing a comprehensive list of products and services, as well as public and private institutions. This civil 188 SCPD, (1999), pp. 8-9. 153 society complement, inclusive of the universities, makes Somaliland potentially the hub of reconstruction throughout the greater Somali region as a whole.189 In the health sector, the priority areas of intervention pertain to the need for constructing a comprehensive health care system, which does not exist due to the lack of resources.190 The lack of medical supplies and equipment, as well as the need for training, is seen as vital in expanding health delivery services which, at present, must also cope with the HIV/AIDS/STD pandemic cluster of health threats.191 Again, like the education system, the health care delivery system is seen as heavily biased toward Somaliland?s urban areas. Developing the health infrastructure interacts intimately with the development of urban and rural water and sanitation systems which, in turn, tie in closely with increasing environmental concerns. Environmental concerns have become more manifest with recurring droughts affecting Somaliland and the Horn of Africa as a whole, exacerbated by coal production, resultant deforestation, population growth and expansion.192 Here, the salient issues of great concern to Somaliland have been summarised by the ?2005 Economic Overview? as: 189 An encouraging indicator is the range of regional meetings convened in Hargeisa. See for example, Amnesty International?s regional Horn of Africa meeting: Amnesty International, ?Human rights in Somaliland: Awareness and action. A report of a workshop held in Hargeisa, Somaliland? (17 - 19 October 1998) http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR520011999 190 Ministry of Health and Labour, ?Annual Health Report 2002?, Hargeisa (2003) and Ministry of National Planning and Co-ordination, ?Strategy for Economic Recovery and Poverty Reduction Plan 2003-2005?, Hargeisa (2003). 191 UNICEF, ?Efforts to Prevent HIV-AIDS in ?Somaliland??, (December 1999). 192 The increased demand for coal has led to deforestation in Somaliland. Ecological degradation is the key theme of research to sustain Somaliland?s pastoral economic base. See Mohamed Jama, ?The Political Ecology of Colonial Somaliland?, Africa, Vol. 74, No. 4, (2004) and Martin Herzog, ?Forestry and Woodland Management in Somaliland: Problems, Background, Development Potentials? HEWW, (n.d.). http://www.brainworker.ch/reports/Somaliland/Somaliland%20recommendations.htm 154 ? Environment information and research; ? Environmental impact assessment of policies, programmes and project components; ? Environmental education; ? Sustainable management of the environment and natural resources; ? Environmentally sound management of pollution; ? Improvement of living and working environments; and ? Providing a national framework for integrating conservation and development.193 Again, this is an area that demands major capacity-building in human resources development to deal with interrelated health, sanitation and environmental issues in a challenging ecosystem.194 3.10 Transport Communications and Tapping the External Realm There is a broad cluster of sectoral factors of reconstruction that link Somaliland?s fate to the outside world; factors of regional and global economic interdependence that impinge on the country?s continuing reconstruction and recovery prospects. These have to do with transport communications within Somaliland, which are interlinked with the rest of the Horn of Africa/Red 193 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), pp. 32-33. 194 Somaliland?s current Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail has been a consistent champion for better health services. See her inspiring story of building Somaliland?s only maternity hospital, the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital: http://ednahospital.netfirms.com/ 155 Sea/Gulf of Aden geo-political-economic region; Somaliland?s access to foreign donor assistance, private investment and international expertise, which brings into greater focus the role of the Somaliland diaspora; and the interaction of Somaliland?s self-reliant development path with the imperative sub-regional economic co-operation and integration within the framework of an overlapping array of regional economic communities (RECs) within the AU. Despite Hargeisa?s unrelenting bid for internationally recognised independence, the transport communication interdependencies that tie its economy to the rest of greater North-East Africa and the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region are critical to its continuing post-conflict recovery. Moreover, Somaliland has a regional comparative advantage in its strategic Berbera port on the Gulf that, potentially, could make it the gateway to the entire IGAD195 community of nations that are among Somaliland?s neighbours. Because of Berbera?s berthing capacity, coupled with a landing strip that is one of the second longest on the entire continent, Berbera?s port development and rehabilitation could benefit a range of regional and external transport communications requirements, from peacekeeping to humanitarian aid and disaster relief deliveries, to a range of commercial export and import trafficking of goods to and from the region.196 195 Current members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. http://www.igad.org/ 196 Peter D Little, pp. 38, 116 and 131. The port of Bossaso in Puntland is used primarily by Somalilanders in the Eastern region of Somaliland and constitutes competition for the port of Berbera. 156 However, Berbera must be seen within a wider matrix of transport communication rehabilitation requirements identified in the ?2005 Economic Overview'. Rehabilitating surface transportation along with aviation and maritime-port capacity constitutes a major dimension of recovery, as much of this vital infrastructure was either destroyed or degraded during Somaliland?s conflicts, dating back to the days of military retribution by the Barre regime, or was left to perdition due to neglect and disrepair as a result of successive deployments, military build-ups, build-downs and redeployments by the former Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, when Berbera?s strategic value was a major geo-political prize. Within this context, rehabilitating surface transport has been a basic priority in re-establishing internal and external economic linkages. The ?Economic Overview? cites, in this regard, the role of the Somaliland Road Authority (SRA)197 in co-ordinating and seeking external financing, as well as engaging the private sector in the maintenance and provision of services. These include: hiring professional and technical expertise to assist the SRA in developing maintenance plans, programmes, schedules and budgets, as well as providing site supervision services; delegation of maintenance responsibilities to other agencies such as local authorities; and outsourcing physical works to commercial contractors, communities and individuals. 197 See the work of the EU funded Berger Group, which helped the Somaliland Road Authority, http://www.louisberger.com/berger/world/2003q4/sah.html. The Somaliland Road Authority has also commissioned land mines clearance projects, http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/somaliland.html 157 Somaliland?s road network is estimated to comprise around 2,200km of paved road, including the road link to Erigabo and the unpaved roads to Ethiopia via Hargeisa. The maintenance cost of priority roads has been estimated in the neighbourhood of US$5.3 million. Particularly high priority is attached to the maintenance of the unpaved road from Burco to Erigabo and the cross-border road network linking Wajale, Inu-Guha and Allay Baday. These two roads total 500kms. The government is committed to raising about 35% of the capital needed for the Burco-Erigabo axis, with the remaining 75% being sought from international donors. Meanwhile, regional, district and village communities are being encouraged to formulate their own road rehabilitation projects for integrating into the larger surface transport communications matrix. Hargeisa has, with the support of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), prepared feasibility studies for upgrading the airports of Hargeisa, Berbera and Burco. Such upgrading would come at an estimated cost of between $18 and 32 million. This is critical given the high volume of air traffic coming in and out of Somaliland, despite its lack of international recognition. The civil aviation reconstruction aims are to: maintain high standards of flight safety; review and update legislation to keep abreast with international standards; and expand existing airport capacity. Air transport reconstruction is intimately tied in with sea transport upgrading, especially in the case of Berbera.198 According to the economic overview, the port will require significant investment in infrastructure development and management if it is to serve as a regional port. This will entail expanding services and facilities at 198 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 36. 158 the port as a basis for growing maritime services and stimulating greater employment and economic activity. This will strengthen the IGAD region?s economic co-operation and cross-border trade and technical co-operation in Somaliland, as the government of Ethiopia has started using the Berbera port for government imports, while the EU has used the port for the humanitarian shipment of food aid. Such sectoral rehabilitation and expansion should also fuel the momentum of external investment in other sectors, especially in energy.199 For the past few years, there has been a growing interest in Somaliland?s off- shore hydrocarbon potential. A British-Chinese joint venture (China?s Sinopec and Britain?s Rova) were granted exploration licenses in 2000 to explore oil deposits in two offshore blocks totalling 7 million acres. Recently, the South African owned Ophir energy corporation acquired 75% of the issued share capital of Rova, which is a special purpose company established to develop the Somaliland interests.200 In 2003, leading South African businessman, former Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale, Chairman of Mvelaphanda Holdings, led a five-man delegation to Somaliland to assess mining and oil development prospects. This visit paved the way for active offshore oil prospecting by Mvelaphanda, which is part of the company?s pursuit of African investments in its upstream energy business201 (see Map of Oil Concession in Berbera). 199 Ibid., p. 35. 200 Financial Mail, 'Mvelaphanda: A Matter of Timing', (2005), pp.18-21; and Ophir energy, http://www.ophir-energy.com/assets/somaliland.asp 201 See also some of the debates: Rova Energy Corporation Limited, 'A Response To The Open Letter To His Excellency The President Of Somaliland Regarding PSA Between The Government Of Somaliland And ?Unknown?; Company Called REC For Exclusive Right to Conduct Petroleum Operations in Somaliland', Somaliland Times, (2005). http://somalilandtimes.net/202/28.shtml 159 In Somaliland?s case, such prospects will enhance the need for a rehabilitated Berbera port within the context of expanding external oil and natural gas exploration along coastal East Africa. Given the escalating demand for oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), combined with Somaliland?s relative stability in the Somali region, exploiting its energy potential may well offer the best prospect for generating foreign investment in the development of Somaliland?s natural resources sector, thereby building momentum for increased international involvement in its economy, despite what is still an uphill diplomatic struggle for recognition. In 2001, the European Community-funded Progressive Interventions, was engaged with the Somaliland government and its private sector, in an effort to organise the mining and marketing of the country?s gemstone deposits. 160 Map of Oil Concession in Berbera Source: Ophir Energy Company Ltd, http://www.ophirenergy.com. Among the issues that were embarked upon by Progressive Interventions were: investment in exploration and mining, including equipment; training of local miners to identify the different gem minerals; organising the miners and dealers into a mining and trading association; setting up marketing channels for the gemstones, including inviting overseas gemstone wholesalers to visit the country; and looking at ways to add value through cutting and polishing. According to South African gemologist, Dr Judith Kinnard, Somaliland has two known emerald producing areas, one at Alihiley and another at Simodi in western Somaliland. To the east of the emerald gem belt in this region, the gemstones are still in what are called ?pegmatite,? and they can, reportedly, be 161 seen as white criss-crossing bodies on the hillside. Thus, beside emeralds, in this generally neglected eastern region, miners are working on pegmatite with aquamarine, according to Kinnard. Rubies and sapphires also occur in the gem belt, in metamorphic rock instead of pegmatite. A bright red ruby said to be similar to the ruby from Longido in Tanzania, has been found in a metamorphic rock. However, the most abundant gemstone in Somaliland, according to Dr Kinnard, is garnet: ?Everywhere I went there were garnets by the bucket loads ? garnets in varying sizes and colours from red to orange, grossular garnet, pyrope and almandine garnets.?202 Somaliland also has an abundant supply of a variety of quartz. In short, the development of Somaliland?s minerals and energy potential, at a time of growing external market minerals and energy demand offers, perhaps, the best route for Somaliland to diversify its economy out of its dependency on livestock exports. 203 Indeed, the successive Horn of Africa livestock bans imposed by Arabian peninsular states have spurred the country?s efforts to attract foreign involvement in developing these sectors. One additional comparative advantage that Somaliland may enjoy in attracting foreign investment as a means of overcoming its political isolation and, in the process, developing commercial services, including retail trade, transportation and professional services as bases for generating urban employment, alongside developing the 202 Jewellery News Asia, ?Rich gemstone potentials discovered in Somaliland?, No. 195, pp. 58-63, (24 January 2001). http://www.somalilandforum.com/articles/gems_in_somaliland.htm 203 Jennifer Henricus, ?Mining and marketing Somaliland?s resources,? Jewellery News Asia, No. 95, p. 63, (January 2001). 162 minerals and energy extractive sector, is the fact that, out of circumstances of necessity, it has developed what could be one of the largest African indigenous private sectors relative to the governmental private sector.204 This is a phenomenon that ties in with the Somaliland ? and larger Somali ? diaspora, spawned by the upheavals along the Somali peninsula. Over the decades, conflict throughout the region has generated a far-flung diaspora of refugees and exiles alongside an already existing pool of migrant labourers, who have worked in countries throughout peninsular Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This diaspora, in turn, has spawned a remittance economy which has helped to sustain the people of Somaliland and act as a stabiliser to the benefit of a government hard-pressed to deliver public services. Thus, it is important to gain some appreciation for the role that the Somaliland diaspora (and migrants), and the remittances it generates, has played in Somaliland?s reconstruction. 3.11 Somaliland?s Diaspora Roughly half of Somaliland?s 3.5 million nationals have been estimated to live outside its borders. The past 15 years and more have meant numerous cross-border displacements, leaving the entire population as either repatriated/repatriating refugees or IDPs. In producing this exodus, Somaliland?s wars have, in the process, displaced a substantial middle class of Somalilanders, who have had the means to relocate overseas and, 204 Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 'Somaliland Trade Directory 2001', Hargeisa (2001) and Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 'Somaliland Trade Directory 2003/2004', Hargeisa (2004). 163 therefore, transfer portions of their income to their relatives back home while, on the other hand, remittances have been flowing into Somaliland from nationals working as migrant labourers in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. The Somaliland diaspora/remittance phenomenon has been fairly well studied.205 Findings have highlighted the fact that, as a result of the socio-economic nature of much of the exodus, most remittances from the diaspora flow to the cities and middle classes within Somaliland and that "these large capital flows have contributed to rapid economic recovery in post-war Somaliland and the development of a dynamic private sector".206 The socio-economic composition of the Somaliland diaspora thus ? in comparison to labour migrants ? comprise families who already have access to financial resources and have thus been able to establish themselves largely in the West. Many diaspora Somalilanders have been engaged very actively in conflict resolution and developmental projects aimed at alleviating the Somali region?s humanitarian crises. They have, in effect, been employed in what might be characterised as the international ?development industry? with local and international NGOs and private voluntary organisations (PVOs); organisations that are and have been involved in rehabilitation and reconciliation, in the process, helping fuel the development of Somaliland?s 205 Nauja Kleist and Peter Hansen, ?Big Demonstration ? A study of transborder political mobilization?, AMID Working Paper Series 42, Aalborg University (2005); Nauja Kleist, ?Somali-Scandinavian Dreaming. The Case of Somscan and UK Cooperative Associations?, paper presented at 'Determinants of Transnational Engagement', Santa Domingo, The Dominican Republic (2003); R.B. McGown, Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London and Toronto, Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press (1999); D. Griffiths, Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London. New Identities in the Diaspora. Aldershot: Ashgate (2002); N Farah, Yesterday, Tomorrow. Voices from the Somali Diaspora. London and New York: Cassell (2000). 206 Ismail I. Ahmed, 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-war Somaliland', Disasters, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 380-389, (2000). 164 civil society. Since 1997, many have in fact returned to Somaliland and countless travel back and forth, living abroad for part of the year as well as remaining for the other part of the year in Somaliland.207 Many are heavily involved in political, economic and judicial processes within the country. The remittance economy that ?diasporisation? has generated, is estimated to be in the neighbourhood of US $500 million annually for Somaliland. According to a paper published in 2000 by Ismail I. Ahmed on 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland?, this intake was around ?four times the value of livestock exports. In fact the livestock export ban by Saudi Arabia in 1998 in response to the Rift Valley fever outbreak in Kenya and southern Somalia was predicted to lead to the collapse in international trade and market exchange.208 It was feared that the shortage of hard currency needed to finance imports would spell disaster for the country. The ban lasted 14 months and the number of animals exported from Somaliland fell sharply from 2.9 million in 1997 to just over 1 million in 1998. However, this failed to affect the volume of imports mainly because remittances financed the entire import bill? (italics added). Tracking the Somalia/Somaliland remittance economy, according to this report, has been extremely difficult in terms of quantifying and monitoring such flows. The channels are diverse, with cash flows often taking place on 207 Good examples include the cases of human rights activist Rakiya Omaar, psychologist Hussein Bulhan, and medical researcher-businessman-politician, Ahmed Esa. 208 Ismail I. Ahmed, 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-war Somaliland', Disasters, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 387, (2000). 165 the black market. Ahmed writes that estimating remittances in Somaliland is problematic for a number of reasons: First, remittances are transferred in a number of forms and through different channels. They can be cash in kind e.g. cars, furniture, jewellery, clothing or electronic goods and they can also be channelled through trusted merchants or hand carried by migrants when they visit home. Second, there is no data available on the global numbers of migrants and refugees from Somaliland. Third, Hawaalado (money transfer companies) who are responsible for a significant part of transfers, sometimes deliberately under-report the size of the flows for fear of government interference in the form of taxes or new regulations.209 The study found that the average annual remittance received by households was US$4,170 and that there were approximately 120,000 recipient households throughout Somaliland ? roughly one-third of the population. Interestingly, it was found that ?for agro-pastoralists internal remittances from migrant workers in urban areas are more important than international ones?, which makes an important statement on the impact of internal rural-to-urban migratory labour and income flows within the country. Further, because of what the report sees as ?recent changes in the demographic structure of migrants, an increasing proportion of those receiving this kind of income are women?.210 In broader socio-economic terms, though diaspora remittances have undoubtedly been an economic ? and hence, social ? stabilising factor for the country, they may constitute something of a ?double-edged sword? in 209 Ibid., p. 382. 210 Ibid., p. 383. 166 that the study finds that ?remittances have increased income inequality? and probably, by inference, reinforced an urban-rural economic divide in the process. For although the effect of remittances on households, according to the report, has been considerable in providing secure livelihoods. ?The migrant workers and refugees, themselves, were found generally to come from better-off families who could afford the relatively high investment costs involved in sending someone abroad".211 Yet another off-setting impact of the diaspora-remittance dimension of Somaliland?s recovery and reconstruction, apart from its relationship with growing socio-economic inequality, is the fact that this phenomenon has been the source of large capital flows that have contributed to a relatively rapid post-war economic recovery and dynamic private sector development. This latter outcome is particularly noteworthy as, given the capacity deficits of the state, the Somaliland private sector within and outside the country has, of necessity, played a major and strategic role in Somaliland?s governance and development. A study conducted by Peter Hansen entitled 'Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland' notes, for example: Partly because of the absence of a functioning state with its financial, economic and social institutions, the private business sector has grown tremendously in Somaliland. Even though Somaliland has the most stable administration in the former Republic of Somalia, traditional government services such as the provision of education, health services and electricity 211 Ibid.,p. 387. 167 have largely been taken over by private companies or at least have been privatized in practice. Somaliland may not officially be a state providing these services, but, in fact, Somaliland is a free trade zone where it is possible to import and export goods almost without taxation. Many Somalilanders from the West come to invest in the supposedly booming and unregulated economy. Their investments have created jobs and stimulated the provision of services (italics added). 212 This is, indeed, a revealing insight into the nature of Somaliland?s post-war reconstruction as a harbinger of the country?s future economic development; in essence, a country embarked on a development path imposed by circumstances that dictated the fashioning of an indigenous African public- private partnership state integrated into the global economy through a diaspora spawned by Somaliland?s adversity but which has become intimately involved in the home-country?s development. This carries both internal domestic and external geo-political implications. Internal domestic political implications are evident in Somaliland?s culminating governance reconstruction, which revolved (at the time of writing) around the country?s parliamentary elections, which were expected to conclude the transition from clan-based governance to multi-party parliamentary governance. With the fact that the opposition Kulmiye and Ucid parties emerged as serious contenders in the election, this signalled the emergence of the diaspora and its remittance economy as an ascendant socio-economic political force in Somaliland?s governance. 212 Peter Hansen, 'Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland', International Organisation for Migration, Working Papers series, No. 3, (June 2004). http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/mpr3.pdf 168 A major part of Kulmiye?s political base is reported to be in the diaspora. Because of the already referred to class composition of this diaspora, Kulmiye?s emergence also signifies, perhaps, the beginning of a consolidation of political dominance by Somaliland?s middle class and educated elite, over more traditionalist sources of power and influence in the society. Whether this could lead to a widening polarisation between urban and rural Somaliland is still questionable. The latter?s increased marginalisation would depend on how inclusive Kulmiye?s leadership and allied coalition of forces prove to be, and how committed they are to preventing such polarisation; an important consideration in as much as rural Somaliland has provided the country its reconciliatory base which, up to now, has successfully bridged ?bifurcation? between urban modernity and rural tradition. Otherwise, the diaspora provides Somaliland with a crucially strategic link to the outside world in a way that has helped it to overcome the diplomatic isolation imposed by non-recognition.213 Somalilanders from the diaspora have provided much of the person-power for implementing any number of international ?development industry? humanitarian and rehabilitative activities not just in Somaliland, but throughout the Somali region. In the process, as has already been indicated by the involvement of the UN, international organisations and NGOs have been, because of the chaotic political circumstances in southern Somalia, 213 Three key Somaliland diaspora organisations are: the US based Somaliland Policy and Research Institute, the UK based Somaliland Societies in Europe and the Somaliland Forum. See their activities at: http://www.sopri.org/, http://www.sse4.com/, http://www.somalilandforum.com/ and Irin News, ?SOMALIA: IRIN Interview with Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi, spokesman for Somaliland Forum? (13 July 2000) 169 unavoidably drawn to co-operating with Somaliland in undertaking any number of reconstruction and development undertakings. Although concerns exist that southern Somalia?s post-Mbagathi transition, under its new TFG, may draw donor support away from Somaliland, the latter may have already established itself, de facto, as the centre of gravity of the Somali region?s recovery by dint of the fact that this is where the region?s indigenous capacity resides. Even with Somaliland?s own capacity deficits, the country?s diaspora has helped to offset these shortcomings by their own devotion to rebuilding their country as a base of political and economic stability in an otherwise chronically unsettled region. Somaliland has thus developed an ambivalent relationship with the international community that, in a sense, cannot ignore its presence. This is amply reflected in the case of the UN which, at a political level, has up to now felt committed to recognising whatever regime emerges in Mogadishu while, in practice, is engaging Hargeisa as a necessity in implementing development undertakings.214 In this regard, the June 2004 update report to the UN Security Council is instructive: In general, areas in the north of the country offer a more secure environment for aid operations than parts of the south where continuing instability poses greater challenges. This is far from saying, however, that the north is secure. In June, ?Somaliland? authorities are reported to have arrested several members of militant groups in Burao who were alleged to be carrying 214 See the recent visits of senior UN staff to Somaliland: ?SOMALIA: UN envoy commends Somaliland's stability?, Interview with UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia, Fran?ois Lonseny Fall, Hargeisa, IRIN News, (1 Nov 2005); and IRIN News, ?SOMALIA: Interview with Maxwell Gaylard, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Hargeisa (27 Oct 2005). 170 explosives. Such groups, also reportedly based in Mogadishu, are believed to oppose international activity in Somalia, including the deployment of foreign troops, even as observers.215 This relative security has led the UNDP into anchoring its public administration support programme on the Somali region with the Civil Service Commission of Somaliland; an initiative aimed at making the Somali civil service more effective in delivering services to the general public and which "required a comprehensive training needs assessment?.216 This was carried out in late 2003 by a team drawn from the Somaliland Civil Service Commission. The project?s terms of reference were intended to develop capacity for the TFG. Hence, Somaliland seems inextricably linked, within the context of the international politics of aid to the Somali region, to developments in Mogadishu wherein its relative stability and capacity have conferred on it a degree of de facto international recognition at certain operational levels of multilateral engagement. Moreover, this is an engagement that reinforces the diaspora connection in the Somaliland equation through UN programmes such as the Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support (QUEST) project, a modified version of the UNDP?s global Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) initiative.217 Nevertheless, as the report makes clear in its reference to ?the north?, the risk of terrorism in the region is a high one and the proximity of Somaliland to the instability of southern Somalia has made it vulnerable to such pressures. 215 United Nations Security Council, p. 6, (8 October 2004). 216 ?UNDP Institutional and Capacity Development?, Somalia (2006). http://www.so.undp.org/page.asp?id=663 217 http://www.so.undp.org/Themes/PRESR/QUESTS.htm 171 Thus, in almost siamese twin-like fashion, the US-led anti-terrorist international crackdown on the largest Somali remittance agency, Al-Barakat, has affected Somaliland and Somalia alike. However, Somaliland has remained resilient in the face of this challenge as the Hansen report makes clear, noting that: ?Despite the fear that the closing down of Al-Barakat would cause a severe hardship to people in Somaliland, international financial transfers to Somaliland have not declined. Quite the contrary, remittance companies have noticed an increase in the period 1998 and 2003.?218 This resilience, within a ?rough neighbourhood?, may also benefit Somaliland in a larger regional co-operation context, where it stands to benefit from its proximity to Ethiopia which, as a landlocked incipient sub-regional power locked in a stalemated confrontation with neighbouring Eritrea, has a security interest in a friendly Somali coast outlet to the sea. Within this context, a fitting conclusion to this chapter?s survey of Somaliland?s post-war reconstruction is to note the 2005 Economic Overview?s ?commerce and industry? references to its reliance on a larger regional environment, in which to grow and develop its economy. With potentially decisive implications for its ultimate international recognition within Africa and beyond, the report reveals that, ?on the external side, the government is negotiating with Ethiopia on entering in agreement on [sic] a customs union? while also ?embarking on active participation in regional and international integration and cooperation schemes such [sic] as the East 218 Peter Hansen, (June 2004), p. 10. 172 African Community, COMESA and ACP-EU.?219 This is a dimension to Somaliland?s economic development that ties into a broader diplomatic recognition agenda. In the final analysis, Somaliland?s positioning as a strategic outpost of democratising stability along the Somali coast/Gulf of Aden littoral may ensure that its post-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery gains momentum, pending the ability of Hargeisa to sustain an effective governance track record.220 219 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 17. 220 Mark Bradbury, ?Somaliland?s Parliamentary Elections?, Paper for the Roundtable Conference on Somalia, U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau, Arlington Virginia, (13 October 2005); Irin News, ?SOMALIA: Interview with Mark Bradbury, Somaliland poll observer?, Hargeisa, (10 Oct 2005) and William Reno, 'Somalia and Survival In the Shadow of the Global Economy', QEH Working Paper series No. 100, Development Studies at Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, (February 2003). http://www2.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps100.pdf 173 Chapter 4: Religion Somaliland and the Upheaval within Global Islam Gaal dil oo gaartisa sii You may kill an infidel but do it justly (Somali proverb) 4.1 Preface This chapter, written in 2005, is particularly relevant in placing in context the most recent 2006 developments in southern Somalia, which saw the eclipsing of US-backed warlords by Somali Islamists. In many ways, the scenario implications outlined in the body of this chapter anticipated the events that actually unfolded and remain relevant to the continuing saga of developments in the Somali region. A major factor that will have a continuing bearing on the sustainability of Somaliland?s stability in terms of ongoing reconciliation and reconstruction, ultimately affecting its international recognition prospect, is the influence of Islam; the interaction between Islam as it has been practised in Somaliland over the centuries in its pastoral Sufi forms221 with the more recent rise of 221 Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed al-Zaila?i, Al-Fid Al-Rahmani fi Nubza min Manaaqib al-Qutb Al- Jilani, (not dated and no publisher); I.M. Lewis, ?Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam?I?, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 581-602 (1955); ?Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam?II?, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 145-160 174 ?political Islam?, ?jihadi Islamism? and ?missionary activism? and the geopolitics of the so-called ?war on terror?.222 This chapter, therefore, will delve in more detail into Somaliland?s Islamic identity within that great swathe of geo-cultural terrain defined by Ali Mazrui as ?Afrabia?.223 This entails looking at the evolution of Islam in the manner in which it has constituted the religious foundations of Somaliland society interacting with Somaliland?s links with the Arabian peninsula. The Arab/Islamic dimension of Somaliland society forms the historical backdrop for exploring the more recent contemporary developments associated with the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa. The rise of political Islam, especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001 hijacking terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., brings into view the contemporary context of Islam as a religious and political force along the Somali coast. How this impinges on Somaliland entails locating the rise of political Islam and its links with the post-9/11 ?war on terror? within a much broader context of the upheavals underway throughout the Muslim world.224 (1956); Francesca Declich, ?Sufi experience in rural Somali: A focus on women?, Social Anthropology, Vol. 8, No. 3, Cambridge University Press (2001). http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=62998 222 Ken Menkhaus, 'Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism', Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford University Press (2004); and International Crisis Group, (12 December 2005). 223 See the seminal lecture, Ali Mazrui, ?Africa and the Arabs in the New World Order??, UFAHAMU, UCLA (1992) and Abdalla Bujra, 'Afrabia and African Union', lecture delivered at ACARTSOD, Tripoli, Libya (September 2002). http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/Afrabia-AU.html 224 A number of Muslim scholars such as Yusuf Qardawi have probed the current contradictory interpretations of Islam. See Asghar Ali Engineer, ?Clash of Terrors??, Secular Perspective, Vol.16, No. 31, (October 2001) http://ecumene.org/IIS/csss60.htm See also Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam, Columbia University Press (November 2004). Roy explores how neo-fundamentalism has been gaining ground among a rootless Muslim youth? particularly among the second- and third-generation Muslims ?and how this phenomenon is feeding new forms of radicalism, ranging from support for al-Qaeda to the outright rejection of integration into Western society. 175 Political Islam?s impact within North-East Africa generally and along the Somali coast in particular may be seen as representing one theatre in what might be defined as a Global Islamic Civil War. This larger struggle taking place within Islam, it will be argued, has shaped the geo-political terrain of the ?war on terror? wherein the anti-US sentiment has become a convenient organising prop around which to mobilise the different revolutionary tendencies at play within the Muslim world.225 The Somali coast forms an integral part of this geo-political terrain of Islamic civil war-cum-war on terror dynamics.226 The localised manifestation of this larger upheaval, in turn, inevitably impinges on the influence of Islam in Somaliland given the fertile ground for jihadi militant Islamist tendencies that have gained a foothold in southern Somalia amid the different geo-political forces attempting to determine the current and future trajectory of the greater Somali region.227 A major agency for disseminating Islam as a religion and culture in Somaliland, as elsewhere throughout the Muslim world, has been through education. The funding of religious and/or religious-based education by 225 ?For Muslims in the Horn, 9/11 came at a moment when the Islamist project had been overtaken by the politics of exhaustion. By declaring his War on Terror, President Bush provided a convenient new enemy, but resisting America is so remote from the real problems faced by ordinary Muslims as to be meaningful only to a handful of misfits and criminals. Luuq was a real and courageous attempt to build an Islamic community in Somalia?s ruins, though it was fatally hijacked by al-Qaida. Ayro?s murders, by contrast, are utterly meaningless.? See Alex de Waal, ?Chasing Ghosts - rise and fall of militant Islam in the Horn of Africa?, London Review of Books, Vol.27, No.16, (18 August 2005). 226 ?Cross-cutting the New Regionalism is the worldwide Islamist movement, which was the pretext for the Iraq intervention (the notion of Saddam Hussein giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists). That the United States has lost credibility in the Islamic world is a platitude. Islamic militancy has not diminished since the Iraq intervention and all reports point to its increase. Rather than advancing the "war on terrorism", the Iraq intervention has pushed it back.? See Michael A. Weinstein, 'The New Regionalism: Drifting Toward Multipolarity', Power and Interest News Report (7 June 2004) http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=178