



***South Africa's National Development Plan – Democratic Developmental State
Model in Action?***

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“Those who sow in tears shall reap with shouts of joy!”

- Psalm 126: 5

Abstract

The National Development Plan (NDP) was introduced before Parliament in 2012. The NDP describes itself as a plan for a democratic developmental state. Therefore this research will discuss the concepts of a developmental state and its corollary, the democratic developmental state, whilst trying to ascertain whether the NDP is a prudent and achievable plan for such a state. The main research problems that arise are around the formulation of the plan. The research finds that although the NDP is a prudent plan, there will be issues with its achievability if the issues raised are not dealt with. This is because development is primarily a political process which requires political forces to drive development.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	1
Abstract.....	1
Table of Contents.....	2
List of Abbreviations	4
Section 1: Introduction.....	5
1.1 Background.....	5
1.2 Context.....	5
1.3 Research Question	7
1.4 Research Problems.....	8
1.4.1 Theoretical and Philosophical Pillars of the National Development Plan	8
1.4.2 State Capacity to Fulfil the National Development Plan	8
1.4.3 Opposition to the National Development Plan.....	9
1.4.4 Public Policy and the National Development Plan	9
1.5 Methodology.....	10
1.5.1 Qualitative Examination of Primary and Secondary Sources	10
1.5.2 Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews.....	11
1.5.3 Limitation of Methodology.....	11
Section 2: Conceptualisation of the Developmental and Democratic Developmental State	12
2.1 Literature Review.....	12
2.1.1 Democratic Developmental States	12
2.1.2 African Developmental States	15
2.2 Conceptual Framework.....	18
2.2.1 Defining the Developmental and Democratic Developmental State	19
2.2.2 Essence and Characteristics	19
2.2.3 States versus Regimes.....	21
2.2.4 The South African Context	23
2.2.5 Distinguishing the Traditional and Democratic Developmental States – Historical Context.....	24
2.2.7 The Role of Bureaucrats and Technocrats	25
2.2.7 “Forms of the Democratic Developmental State”.....	28
2.2.9 Summary of Conceptual Framework	33

Section 3: The NDP	35
3.1 Aim of the NDP	36
3.2 Context of the NDP	37
3.3 Method of the NDP	37
Table 1: Summary of the NDP	38
3.4 Issues and Impediments Identified by the NDP	40
3.5 Opposition to the NDP	42
3.5.1 Colonialism of a Special Type	43
3.5.2 National Democratic Revolution	44
3.5.3 Understanding the Opposition to the NDP	46
Section 4: Analysis and Discussion	49
4.1 Problem Identification and Analysis of the NDP	49
4.2 Tension between Democracy and Development	51
4.3 Nationalism and the Democratic Developmental State	52
4.4 Building a Capable and Developmental State	54
Conclusion	56
Appendix	59
Interview 1	59
Bibliography	75

List of Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

NDP – National Development Plan

NDR – National Democratic Revolution

SA – South Africa

SACP – South African Communist Party

Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Following the transition to democracy between 1990 and 1996 – when the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (‘the Constitution’) came into force – South Africa (SA) had to repair a lot of economic, political and social damage that Apartheid had created. And this repair had to happen rapidly and effectively. The repair happened rapidly through a series of legislative measures that were designed to undo a state with immoral and unjust laws, and design a state with democratic laws. Twenty years later, the issue is not so much legislation and its ability to bring about rapid change. Rather, the present issue is now the effectiveness of policies to match the legislation that governs the South African polity. Put another way, SA has moved from the some of its painful past but there are still layers whose depth must be penetrated in order to meet the substance of the values of democratic laws and the Constitution.

1.2 Context

Public Service Delivery

There are a few reasons for researching the National Development Plan. The first reason is that substantive democracy seems to have been deferred because public service delivery does not seem to be improving. Just a listen to talk radio stations everyday illustrates the point that that people are growing more discontented about the quality of public services. And although this content is widespread, it is not even and consistent, as different groups have different concerns. If we fragment the discontented views according to socio-economic class, for the working-class the main issue seems to be the inability of government to secure a decent living wage for workers in industries.

Moreover, it seems that the government is not only unable but unwilling to compel the private sector to provide decent living wages for workers. The latter point was shamefully and painfully shown during the Marikana strike in 2012 (Tolsi, Mail & Gardian, 2013: online), which was dubbed one of the worst massacres in South African history since the Soweto Uprising on 16 June 1976. For the poor, public services are simply little to non-existent, as evidenced by the public service delivery protests witnessed in the last few years (Alexander et al, 2014: online). Some observers note that public service delivery protests are

due to uneven development across townships and informal settlements, wherein some of these areas are serviced better and quicker than others. The result of this is supposedly an unnecessary impatience with government (Bateman, 2012: online) that blows up into public service delivery protests. In fact, the State of the Nation Address of 2014 the President remarked that public service delivery is progressing and that public service delivery thus far is a “good story to tell” (The Presidency, 2014: online). But when one probes this ‘good story’, they may find that actually, the story of service delivery protests can sometimes be traced back to corrupt activity that literally hinders service delivery (Burger, 2009: online). And protestors who manage to unite and fight against poor service delivery, are allegedly assassinated and silenced, as Abahlali baseMjondolo has experienced (Nicholson, 2013: online; Knoetze, 2014: online).

On the whole, it can be inferred that large sections of the South African population are frustrated with service delivery. Some observers argue that if democracy is really about choice, then these same large sections of the population should have voted the current ruling party out of power. Not so, because others argue that their votes are for a liberation movement whose values are incorruptible despite the corruptible characters currently bringing the movement into disrepute. Whatever the arguments are, public services should not be reaching a crisis point – perceived or real. This is contradictory to the claims by government that they have a plan that can solve the public service’s issues. And it leads to the second reason for researching the NDP: lack of public discourse around development.

Lack of Public Discourse around the NDP

If the NDP is the one document that can guide economic and social development, this is not apparent in public spaces. The NDP was launched in 2012 and has not received much government initiated public debate, discussion or discourse about the plan since then. There are two main reasons why this is abnormal. Firstly, the NDP was proposed as a broad plan that has the potential to resolve SA’s pressing issues – such as the public service delivery discussed above – and long term goals – such as development. If the NDP is really in a position to be a resolute and constructive tool for development, the government will be wise to encourage more discourse on the NDP. Therefore, part of this research will aim to discover how the NDP can be perceived in a neutral way in order to allow some objective and active citizenship around its concepts and details. Barber (1984) refers to such engagement between the state, its government, structures and citizens as “[the] politics of participation

and deliberation, in which leadership is a matter of effective citizenship and real issues dominate the agenda” (Barber, 1984: xii) otherwise known as participatory democracy. And it is important for democracy because it maintains open and consistent communication within the state for the purposes of advancing substantive democracy. Current government structures such as the ward system and izimbizo have become political party transmitters and the NDP may challenge the nature of SA’s participation structures.

Secondly, the NDP should have more public discourse around it because it is arguably one of the most significant policy documents in SA since 1994. The only other overarching policy documents have been the Constitution and the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). The Constitution governs all legislature and policy, whilst the RDP was a plan to reconstruct the economic landscape of the SA that was immediately coming out of Apartheid. The NDP has the ability to be a policy document that allows South Africans to continually question the path of their development. Furthermore, the NDP is in the public domain, maybe for freedom of information reasons, maybe not. But access to the NDP as a document does not guarantee an understanding of the document. And public discourse may contribute to an understanding of how to take the plan forward, its justifications and criticisms – both in public and in government.

1.3 Research Question

The NDP came into force in 2012 and ever since its presentation in the National Assembly, there have been comments about it by officials and government departments. However given the Background and Context stated in this report, it should be asked why the NDP is not receiving more attention from the state and the nation as both a goal and a political resolution to some of the issues experienced in SA today. The lack of attention could be due to a lack of understanding about what the plan is and what it entails. Or, the lack of attention could be due to a lack of incentive to use the plan in a more pragmatic way that allows its contents to be scrutinised. Whatever the reason for the disconnection between the NDP and its use, the plan must first be examined on the basis of whether it is a good plan and whether its goals can be accomplished. Therefore, the research question of this report will be,

“Is the National Development Plan, in its present form, a prudent and achievable plan for South Africa to become a democratic developmental state?”

There are four components to this question. Firstly, what is the ‘present form’ of the NDP? It is careless to view the NDP as just a document that has been drafted to temporarily calm turbulent times. The NDP must be examined for what it says, what it implies and how it can be improved, that is, in its

own terms. Second, the component of a 'prudent' plan suggests that the plan could be good, could be difficult or it could signal change in economic and social policy. But, is this change prudent? In other words, how likely is it that the NDP will prove to have been a wise choice if it is implemented? A third component of the research question is the achievability, or likelihood thereof, of the implementation of the NDP. And the fourth component of the research question is probably the largest and it deals with the 'democratic developmental state'. The latter concept is one used in the NDP to describe the desired outcome of the plan. It is a loaded concept that captures a space in political theory and political economy like no other. Therefore if the NDP is asserting its desired outcome as the democratic developmental state, is the NDP sufficient as a basis for that state? The research question seems to have proliferated into a whole set of other questions. But without the detail of the question being explained, there cannot be a foundation upon which to build the research.

1.4 Research Problems

In order to understand whether the NDP is prudent and achievable for a South African democratic developmental state, a few problems must be sorted and clarified. This process will assist with finding the essence of the NDP. And once the essence has been deciphered, a better critical analysis can be conducted. Below is an outline of four research problems that will be dealt with en route to answering the research question.

1.4.1 Theoretical and Philosophical Pillars of the National Development Plan

States, governments and their policies are usually influenced by a way of thinking that affects their actions. Ways of thinking are usually compacted into theories and political philosophy. Therefore one of the research problems is to find the theory and political philosophy behind the NDP. In terms of theory, it is meant the reasons for formulating the NDP in the first place. By political philosophy, it is meant that the knowledge, grounded in empirical and reliable thought, which has been used to inform the formulation of the NDP.

1.4.2 State Capacity to Fulfil the National Development Plan

One of the most important keys for achieving a state's public policy is whether a state has the capacity to carry out the plan. This is a fact that can sometimes be overlooked and that is sometimes conflated with political will. In the case study of the developmental state that Chalmers Johnson (1982) carried out, he noted that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was the driving force behind the Japanese developmental state. This is because the MITI was given the autonomy and capacity to implement developmental changes. In the same way, if the South African state aspires to become a developmental state does it have the capacity to fulfil the goals of the NDP?

A caveat should be inserted, however, when considering the South African state's capacity to fulfil the NDP. Firstly, capacity is built and learned over time, in the sense that South Africa today is catering to more citizens than during Apartheid. Therefore, capacity is as much about numbers as it is about policy. Secondly, and as a counter to the fact that capacity is about numbers as well as policy, capacity requires good state planning and the political will to implement that planning. This means that although the South African state is having to cope with providing more public services to larger sections of the population, there cannot be excuses for the failure of such provision as there should be plans in place to effect this provision. As such, does the NDP display good planning and encourage political will?

1.4.3 Opposition to the National Development Plan

The African National Congress (ANC), which is both the current political party in government and one of South Africa's leading liberation movements, is in alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Within this Alliance there has been heavy opposition to the NDP. One of the main reasons for the opposition to the NDP is that it is a neoliberal path to economic development with which the SACP does not agree (SACP, 2013: online). For COSATU, one of the main reasons for their opposition to the NDP is that the plan should focus on industrialising South Africa, which would lead to job creation, rather than focusing on the capital interests of monopolies present in South Africa (COSATU, 2013: online). Thus one of the research problems which is brought to the fore with the research question stated is to find the source of the political opposition to the NDP.

1.4.4 Public Policy and the National Development Plan

The final research problem that arises from the stated research question concerns the shape of public policy as a consequence of the implementation of the NDP. This research problem is important to consider because public policy will be the means through which the end of the democratic developmental state will be achieved, and it is crucial that this policy reflects the goals of the plan. Thus the research problem of public policy will concentrate on figuring out where policy in South Africa should be headed in order to fulfil the goals of the NDP.

A positive thing to note about South African public policy is that a lot of it is either contained in the Constitution or must align with the Constitution. Therefore, if the implementation and execution of policy is skewed it is not necessarily because the policy is not properly grounded in an understanding of what the state desires and why. But constitutionalism and law are insufficient on their own to create credible and well-reasoned public policy.

1.5 Methodology

Researching a development plan for any country cannot be a library or desktop exercise. This is because there are a lot of factors that go into a policy planning process that one must find as many of these factors. In the South African context in particular, major political and ideological shifts have been seen in the past century. These shifts have always impacted the society and economy and had far reaching consequences that are yet to be dealt with. In addition to this, since the transition to democracy South Africa has used the Constitution, legislation and legislative reform as well as structural changes to the system, such as participatory democracy through the ward system, to inform this policy process. Therefore when considering the research question, one must bear these particular South African factors in mind.

The research method that will be employed is methodological triangulation. Triangulation refers to the use of more than two research tools for research whereas methodological triangulation refers to the use of more than two research methods for research. The usefulness of triangulation lies in the method's ability to verify information, premises and their conclusions using different methods of data collection. And if this verification succeeds, it can be said that the research and the extent of its inferences and conclusions are reliable. In the specific case of researching the NDP, methodological triangulation is useful because the current information on the NDP is scarce. As such, more than one method of research is required to provide a deeper understanding of the NDP. There are two methods that will be used in this research report's methodology, which are: 1. Qualitative examination of primary and secondary sources; 2. Qualitative semi-structured interviews.

1.5.1 Qualitative Examination of Primary and Secondary Sources

A qualitative examination of key primary and secondary sources will be conducted. Qualitative refers to the nature of the sources which tend to be academic literature, as opposed to quantitative which relies on mostly numerical tallying of sources. The primary sources that will be examined are the NDP document, the Constitution, and policy documents of political parties and interest groups. The secondary sources will comprise academic literature, mostly on the concept of the developmental state and the democratic developmental state. The primary sources are essential because they provide evidence for analysis, they are explanatory and, depending on their date of publication, they offer historical context of their time. These factors are important for the research because they form the basis of the research questions and problems. The secondary sources to be used are academic literature and texts that speak to the concepts, especially that of the developmental state, that will arise in the research. These texts tend to be authoritative due to the empirical research contained in them, as well as the length and depth of the case studies covered in these texts. Furthermore, these texts touch on the intersection of different political theories and philosophies and thereby question the validity of pedestrian evaluations of the concepts that will arise in this research.

1.5.2 Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews

The second method that will be used in the methodological triangulation of this research report is semi-structured interviews. The reason for these interviews is to fill the gaps of knowledge that the fairly new NDP policy has. Subsequently, the sample for the semi-structured interviews was chosen selectively based on the potential participants' direct relation to the NDP or the issues that it raises. In this way, the semi-structured interviews will also act as a primary source because the interviews will gather first-hand information from participants. The sampling method that was used to choose participants is selective sampling, as strategic and knowledgeable individuals were sought to answer specific questions on the NDP.

1.5.3 Limitation of Methodology

The main limitation of the methodological triangulation chosen. The first limitation was that not many participants who were selectively sampled to participate in the research actually participated. The sample comprised nine participants who, as explained above, have working knowledge of the NDP. Of those nine potential participants, only two followed through with the interview. As such, the expectation that large amounts of information will be clarified or verified was not fulfilled.

Section 2: Conceptualisation of the Developmental and Democratic Developmental State

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Democratic Developmental States

'Democratic developmental state' is a concept that merges two seemingly irreconcilable theories about how to advance a polity's economic, political and social conditions. In "Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice" (Leftwich, ed., 1996), contributors discuss how and why democracy and development are co-dependent and have united to achieve better conditions for polities. Leftwich begins by tracing the modern history of democracy from the first, to the second and third waves of democracy between the eighteenth century and the 1990s (Leftwich, 1996: 3 – 4). Following this, a "new orthodoxy" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 4) has arisen which claims that democracy and development are correlated because, "democratic good governance is not an outcome or consequence of development ...but a necessary condition of development." (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 4). This means that development has come to be contingent on democracy. There are two assumptions that derive from the new orthodoxy about democratic development (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 4). The first assumption is that there is no clash between democracy's ability to produce developmental goals, like "growth, democracy, stability, equality and autonomy." (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 4). The second assumption is that, "democracy can be inserted and instituted at almost any stage in the development process" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 4), and that development will automatically be better off. This new orthodoxy thereby centralises politics in development (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 5). However, Leftwich disagrees with the new orthodoxy; and, instead, asserts that the "type of *state*" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 5) and not a government or regime, is more important for development. Furthermore, the nature of the state is determined by "politics which both generates and sustains the state" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 5), and not, "technical and administrative arrangements" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 5). Seeing that Leftwich prioritises politics above government or regime, and technical and administrative organisation within the state, he defines politics very broadly as:

"all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in the private or public domains" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 6).

Leftwich moves on to make the link between modernisation in the economic sense and democracy as a type of governance (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 6 – 10), in order to show how politics, albeit by his definition, is central to development. Modernisation theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries held that societies advance from "traditionalism to complex expressions of modernity" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 7). At the same time, the politics of these societies also moves from "non-democratic to

democratic forms of government, or at least various forms of authoritarian rule to arrangements involving wider popular control” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 7). Marx is praised by Leftwich for elucidating the difference between modernity and traditionalism (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 7), by showing how the economic foundations of society greatly influenced politics in that society (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 7). This is where Marx’s famous analysis of society comes from, where the owner of the modes of production determine the politics of a society. From this analysis follows the characterisation of different types of democracy with descending levels of economic and political freedom. These types of democracy are “representative” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 8), with a low level of economic and political freedom for the lowest social classes; “bourgeois democracy” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 8), with a façade of economic and political freedom; and true democracy (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 8), where there are high levels of economic and political freedom (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 8). Twentieth century writers such as Eisenstadt, Smelser and Apter, all recognise that politics plays a powerful role in the economic development of societies (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 9).

The argument presented by Leftwich is that democracy is not a novel approach to development (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 11), but it is now steadily on the rise again as a complement of development. There are four main reasons for this. Firstly, democracy legitimises the conditions attached to lending and aid from international financial institutions, as evidenced by structural adjustment programmes in the late twentieth century (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 12). Democratic politics was seen as “crucial in determining the success or failure of adjustment programmes” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 12), because decreased state power and increased accountability would allow structural adjustment programmes to work better (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 12). Therefore lending and aid occurred when recipient states were democratic. Secondly, democracy implanted “neo-conservative hegemony” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 13) because neo-conservative economic policies do well in neo-conservative – or democratic – politics. In states that have implanted neo-conservative hegemony the theory is that, “Democratisation in the context of a free economy would thus compel governments to be more accountable, less corrupt and hence more efficient developmentally” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 13).

A third reason why democracy is considered as a complement to development is that communism collapsed when the Soviet Union collapsed (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 13). The collapse of communism seemingly proved that states without democracies could not create economic growth, and that the lack of democratic institutions “directly promoted corruption, economic mismanagement, inefficiency, stagnation and decline.” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 14). Fourthly and finally, “pro-democracy movements” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 14) between 1989 and 1994 rubber stamped the West’s stance on democracy as a key impetus in development. Leftwich points to the fact that each of these support the assumption that politics is the *raison d’être* for development.

In the same book that Leftwich expounds his theory on politics as crucial to development before economics, Sklar explores the theory of developmental democracy (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 25 – 42). Sklar's main argument is that development and democracy are complementary, or more specifically, "A theory of developmental democracy would demonstrate that increments of democratic change are likely to produce positive developmental effects" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 28). Using this argument, Sklar is clearly trying to establish the mutually beneficial relationship between development and democracy. In order to prove this relationship, Sklar gives a few reasons why democracy is highly influential in the process of development. One reason is that democracy and its "basic values...including political liberty and equal rights for all citizens" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 29) is desirable. This is in contrast to "developmental oligarchy" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 28) which political economists support because it prioritises economic accumulation above democratic values (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 28). Developmental oligarchy was practised in South America in the 1970s and 1980s as "bureaucratic authoritarianism" (O'Donnell, 1973; Leftwich, ed., 1996: 28) during the neo-liberal structural adjustment period, and it has proven to be unsustainable as repression and state-sanctioned violence cannot sustain an economy. Sklar notes that, despite the latter experience, developmental oligarchy is making a comeback as "neo-authoritarian oligarchy" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 29) in countries such as China (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 28).

Another reason why democracy is highly influential for development is that democracy provides sufficient conditions for development to take root and flourish. Some of these conditions include a "market economy and democratic representation" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 30) as well as "the rule of law" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 30) and accountability. Sklar sets up this reason in opposition to claims by political sociologists that, "democratic political development is dependent upon a combination of economic, social, and cultural 'requisites' that are unlikely to exist in countries with underdeveloped economies" (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 29). Sklar argues that this is unrealistic and biased because peoples and states in general, not just those in the West, do desire democratic values and systems. Having argued for the relationship between development and democracy, and in so doing looked at the political economists' and sociologists' issues with this relationship, Sklar turns to how this relationship brings about social justice (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 31 – 35) and actual developmental democracy (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 35 – 39).

Sklar notes that the developmental democracy was first used as a term by CB Macpherson, who described it as, "a stage in the evolution of liberal democracy characterised by particular concern for individual self-development as a universal right" (Leftwich, ed. 1996:35). But Macpherson cautioned against this as an end as he thought that, "it minimised the undemocratic implications of class inequality while it greatly exaggerated the democratic effects of political and social pluralism". (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 35). The later view will be expanded in the ensuing discussion on social justice.

Since Macpherson, Sklar has taken developmental democracy to mean, “collective, and specifically national rather than individual, self-development.” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 35). And this concept is based on accountability (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 35), which can unfold, firstly, through groups (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 36) and, secondly, through individual leaders of groups (leftwich, ed., 1996: 35).

The observation about the ways in which democratic accountability can unfold, allows Sklar to make an interesting and persuasive argument about how “[d]emocratic practices may even flourish in a part of the polity despite the absence of a democratically accountable government” (Leftwich, ed., 1996). Sklar states that democratic practices can take place in spheres external to the political, such as corporate entities and “organised labour” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 36). This is because democracy can be utilised and fulfilled in parts, and not only as a whole package (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 36). At this point, Sklar takes an interesting turn by using the Zambian and South African liberation movements as examples of democratic practices in non-democratically accountable systems. Sklar states the following about SA at the time, in particular:

“In South Africa, the contributions of organised black workers to democratisation are second to no other segment of the freedom movement. Opportunely, in 1991, Cyril Ramaphosa, the general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, was elected secretary-general of the African National Congress, destined to become the leading force in South Africa’s first non-racial government” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 37).

Although Sklar was not making predictions about SA’s path following liberation, history has since shown that social justice can be more difficult and compromised than what is usually supposed, the most difficult and compromising example being the Marikana Massacre (Tolsi, 2013: online). In fact, Sklar does say later in the same analysis that developmental democracy will do well to “combine a measure of social justice, defined as fairness in the distribution of wealth with economic and political freedom, neither of which has ever been secure in the midst of deprivation, misery and poverty” (Leftwich, ed., 1996: 37). Using Sklar’s analysis, the question is clear: can SA’s NDP achieve developmental democracy with the necessary and real social justice?

2.1.2 African Developmental States

Thandika Mkandawire (2001) surveys both the literature on the concept of developmental states and the experience of such states on the African continent. His main claims are that the concept of the developmental state has been hijacked as evidence of the perfect functioning neo-liberal laissez-faire economics, as opposed to the highlighting of the essentially “dirigiste” (Mkandawire, 2001: 291) nature of the original Asian developmental states. In terms of the African experience, Mkandawire argues that immediately following decolonisation, there were genuine attempts at developmental

states on the continent (Mkandawire, 2001: 296 – 296); and therefore the idea that African states can never be developmental is actually a falsehood.

The starting premise for Mkandawire's assessment is that both the concept and experience of African developmental states in the 1970s (Mkandawire, 2001: 291) can provide lessons for current attempts to develop African states. The premise is a valid one to begin with because it allows the researcher to question the basis and conditions upon which African developmental states are implementable. Unlike the narrow readings and analyses of some twentieth century developmental state authors that took the Asian developmental state theory as precisely replicable, Mkandawire suggests that the experiences of African developmental states be properly analysed. The starting point of this analysis is to do away with the confusing discourse on African development (Mkandawire, 2001: 289 – 290). According to Mkandawire, this discourse has a great “disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes the possibility of their existence” (Mkandawire, 2001: 289). This means that the general discourse on African developmental states cannot rule out the possibility of African developmental states, whilst prescribing the same possibilities on the other hand. Moreover, the African continent cannot continue to suffer “invidious comparison” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290) with ‘better’ or ‘first world states’, with little “analysis of actual experiences...merely [founded] on first principles, ideological conviction or faith” (Mkandawire, 2001: 289 – 290). Mkandawire's assessment of existing literature on African developmental states is refreshing and shows that better analysis of African states should be conducted to give an effective way forward for development.

There is an “ideology-structure nexus” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290) within the concept of developmental states. The ideology part of the concept is “developmentalist” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290), meaning that its impetus is economic growth caused by “accumulation and industrialisation” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290). States that achieve this previously unaccustomed economic growth base their legitimacy on their ability to do so now. And the social or political elite create an “ideological hegemony” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290) that supports developmentalism and that key groups in the state can buy into. Development can also be motivated by nationalism whereby states use economic development to build up their security and defence (Mkandawire, 2001: 291). The latter is the indirect ideology behind the developmental state, which gives “the rationale for some of the ‘policies’ and ... legitimacy to otherwise unpalatable ‘sacrifices’” (Mkandawire, 2001: 291), both to subdue the masses and unify the elite (Mkandawire, 2001: 291).

On the structure side of the nexus, developmental states pride themselves on their “*capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively*” (emphasis in text; Mkandawire, 201: 290). This capacity relies on “institutional, technical, administrative and political (Mkandawire, 2001: 290) variables. But Mkandawire views the “ideology-structure nexus” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290) of the

developmental state concept as “tautological” (Mkandawire, 2001: 290), lacking real substance and assuming that the repetition of ideology somehow produces facts. Specifically dealing with the structure side of the nexus, the developmental state concept places economic ability on a par with state ability (Mkandawire, 2001: 290 – 291). The latter is problematic because states’ abilities cannot be held in economies alone, but what the economy and other state features can do for people. At this point Mkandawire rightly asserts that the developmental state concept, “must include situations in which exogenous structural dynamic and unforeseen factors can torpedo genuine developmental commitments and efforts by the state” (Mkandawire, 2001: 291). Therefore the experience of developmental states may not be as smooth as expected, but including exogenous facts into the concept allows a rigorous and realistic concept to work with.

Mkandawire moves on to examine and refute arguments used against African developmental states based on the experience of African states in the past. These arguments are dependence (Mkandawire, 2001: 296 – 298), lack of ideology (Mkandawire, 2001: 294 – 296), lack of autonomy (Mkandawire, 2001: 298), neo-patrimonialism (Mkandawire, 2001: 298), public choice and rent-seeking (Mkandawire, 2001: 299 – 302) and poor past performance (Mkandawire, 2001: 303 – 306). Dependence theory syndrome theory evolved after theories about linear capital accumulation, such as Rostow’s, were no longer acceptable (Mkandawire, 2001: 297). However the assertions of dependence syndrome were not helpful for African development because they assumed that because African states were part of the periphery of global trade relations, they could not develop (Mkandawire, 2001: 297). These dependence theories effectively, “ruled out the possibility of developmental states in Africa were either led by national bourgeoisie or capable of nurturing one” (Mkandawire, 2001: 297). In the late 1970s, Cardoso and Falleto (Mkandawire, 2001: 297) and other theorists recognised that African countries were capable of being developmental states, even if this development was dependent – or relied on – the development of the countries in the core of global trade relations (Mkandawire, 2001: 297). These theories became known as “‘associated dependent development’” (Mkandawire, 2001: 297).

The lack of ideology argument claims that Africans lack a philosophy of development “anchored in some form of nationalist project” (Mkandawire, 2001: 294). Fanon, Onimode, Jackson and, Rosberg and Sanbrook are some of the examples of authors that Mkandawire uses, who lament the lack of African nationalist development theory, or blame the immoral character of African leaders, which hinders development (Mkandawire, 2001: 295). Mkandawire contends, however, that “African leaders have always been aware of the need for some ‘nationalist-cum-developmental ideology for both nation building and development. By political commitment and social origins, most of the leaders were deeply committed to the “‘eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease’, which formed an ‘unholy trinity’ against which nationalist swords were drawn in the post-colonial era”

(Mkandawire, 2001: 295 – 296). Here, Mkandawire puts up a spirited defence of post-colonial African states and leaders that attempted to construct developmental states.

The lack of autonomy argument claims that it is the “internal conditions of African states” (Mkandawire, 2001: 298) are the stumbling block to their development. But these arguments are grounded in theories about how personal interests take autonomy away from the state (Mkandawire, 2001: 298). The neo-patrimonialism argument holds that developmental states in Africa cannot be achieved because patrimonial networks between the state and society undermine the state’s ability to implement developmental reforms. Mkandawire describes this argument as a “neo-Weberian critique” (Mkandawire, 2001: 298), and thus the effect of neo-patrimonialism is that it “has eaten into the very core of the edifice of modern administration rendering it both weak and incoherent” (Mkandawire, 2001: 298). Mkandawire has two clear counterarguments that question the neo-patrimonial argument against African developmental states: firstly, is neo-patrimonialism a stage of development that will pass (Mkandawire, 2001: 289 – 299)? And secondly, what do neo-patrimonial arguments actually tell us about which policies should be pursued to achieve African developmental states (Mkandawire, 2001: 299)? But even if neo-patrimonialism is part of African states, Mkandawire maintains that the correlation with development is dubious and that capitalism does have “[a] very wide range of morally reprehensible behaviour” (Mkandawire, 2001: 299) that is part of the accumulation process of development.

Mkandawire says that in the African context, this concept as a hindrance to development is, “conflated or used interchangeably with corruption, patron-clientelism and even the extended African family” (Mkandawire, 2001: 300). With both his refutations of the neo-patrimonial and rent-seeking arguments, Mkandawire is probing for more empirically based assumptions, not denying the existence of such trends. An interesting take on the rent-seeking analysis by Mkandawire is that rents have the potential to be either “‘productive’ [or] ‘unproductive’” (Mkandawire, 2001: 301), whereby productive rents increase economic growth if those pursuing rents are within the firm, as opposed to external to it (Mkandawire, 2001: 301).

2.2 Conceptual Framework

By way of the research question, the concept of the developmental state and the democratic developmental state are at the centre of this research report as concepts that will be used to understand whether the NDP is pushing the South African state towards a democratic developmental state. For that reason, it will be fitting to conduct a proper exploration of the concept of the developmental state, and its corollary, the democratic developmental state.

2.2.1 Defining the Developmental and Democratic Developmental State

In “The Developmental State” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999), Woo-Cumings describes the developmental state as a “seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia. This state form originated as the region’s idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West, and despite many problems associated with it, such as corruption and inefficiency, today state policies continue to be justified by the need to hone the nation’s economic competitiveness and by residual nationalism (even in the contemporary context of globalisation)” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 1). According to this description – note that it is not being used as a definition – Woo-Cumings identifies that the developmental state was firstly, a mix of “political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 1); and that secondly, this phenomenon took place in a specific part of the world; and thirdly, in response to a particular situation. It is important to note this last aspect of the developmental state because the context in which this state arose had a significant impact on the direction of the state. The context situation was the dominance of the West at the time and perceived threat that this could pose to Japan. As Woo-Cumings later puts it, Japan, Korea and China “chose economic development as a means to combat Western imperialism and ensure national survival” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 6). Thus the developmental state was temporarily reactionary and aimed to be proactive in the long term.

Leftwich defines the developmental state in the following terms (White et al, 1998: 61 – 62): it is a “[t]ransitional form of the modern state” (White et al, 1998: 61 – 62); it has an autonomous bureaucracy (White et al, 1998: 61) which has a higher than usual degree of autonomy to allow it to formulate and implement policies for economic growth; it uses the method of “economic growth and [the imperative] to industrialise” (White et al, 1998: 61) to build itself up “economically, militarily or both” (White et al, ed., 1998: 61); and it gains “legitimacy” (White et al, ed., 1998: 61) through the “steady improvement in the material and social well-being of its citizens...thus commonly associated with a high degree of both economic and political nationalism...” (White et al, ed., 1998: 61). Therefore basic characteristics of the developmental state, or rather the common characteristics of examples of developmental states, are that they are transitional, have autonomous bureaucracies, use economic growth as a method of developmentalism and become legitimate over time.

2.2.2 Essence and Characteristics

The term ‘developmental state’ was popularised by Chalmers Johnson, and in “The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 32 – 60) Johnson notes that although his work on the developmental state focused on Japan, its Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) and the specific time frame of 1925 to 1975, his case study has been used to infer grand conclusions and has also been heavily criticised. The context of his writing was the Cold War era, in which the capitalist

and socialist models and ideologies divided the world bilaterally. Chalmers states that he was aiming, move away from this dichotomy when he began his case study. Regarding the term ‘developmental state’, Johnson says he used it to, “characterise the role the Japanese state played in Japan’s extraordinary and unexpected post-war enrichment” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 33 – 34).

Furthermore, Chalmers’s case study was not aimed at being a lesson in economics; it was more precisely concerned with questions about “the uses of the state in the setting and achievement of social goals, the failures of Soviet-type socialist displacement of the market, comparative state bureaucracies and public private cooperation” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 34). Also, his case study was not about the Japanese state’s role in the economy or the implication that the Japanese behaved in a, “command economics (manner) assigning tasks and duties to the Japanese people” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 34). Having discussed what his work was *not*, Johnson moves in to discuss what his work on the Japanese developmental *is*.

Johnson’s “MITI and the Japanese Miracle” recognises that Japan’s priority during the stated timeframe was “economic development” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). Whether Japan was successful at achieving this was debatable but this priority remained “consistent” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). Historically, Japan had been devastated by the Pacific War (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37) and in order to build itself up and free itself from American aid (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37), Japan had to be economically developed (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37) as this would finance its rearmament. When making this observation Johnson is clear that, “(t)he issue is not one of state intervention in the economy. All states intervene in their economies for various reasons.” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). And from this, Johnson states, that states that want to follow Japan’s economic success should prioritise economic development as Japan did. (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). In trying, to achieve this economic development, Japan had to examine the state’s relationship with the private sector (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). During this examination, Japan tried three methods to bring the state and private sector into a working relationship – “self-control, state control and cooperation” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37). None of these methods were seen as purely capitalist or purely socialist (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 37) and thus were deemed to hold economic development as top priority in the Japanese state.

As part of his case study on Japan and MITI, Johnson identified four “essential features of the Japanese developmental state” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 38), as follows: firstly, the Japanese developmental state had a bureaucracy staffed with the “best managerial talent available in the system” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 38). This managerial talent was used to fulfil the tasks of identifying and choosing the “industries to be developed” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 38); identifying and choosing the “best means of rapidly developing the chosen industries” (Woo-Cumings, ed., 1999: 38); and to “[s]upervise competition in the designated strategic sectors in order to guarantee their

economic health and effectiveness” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 38). Secondly, the state gives the bureaucracy “sufficient scope to take initiative and expertise and operate efficiently” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 38). This bureaucracy was supported by the legislature and judiciary, which acted as safeguards (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 38) for the Japanese polity. Thirdly, the Japanese developmental state achieved the “perfection of market – conforming methods of state intervention in the economy” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 39). And there are specific steps towards marked conformity: “creation of governmental financial institutions...tax incentives...use of indicative plans to set goals and guidelines for the entire economy...creation of numerous, formal, and continuously...” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 39). Fourthly, states that would like to emulate the developmental progress of states such as Japan require a “pilot organisation like MITI ... small size, indirect control of government funds...‘think tank’ functions...vertical bureaus for the implementation of industrial policy at the micro level...internal democracy...” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 39).

2.2.3 States versus Regimes

In “The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 137 – 181), T.J. Pempel has a different and purposeful approach to the developmental state concept. Pempel’s main addition to the discourse around this concept is to argue that although the “developmental state” is descriptive and desirable, it does not capture the lesson that development requires a whole system to work in its favour (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 138). Therefore, “developmental regime” is more purposeful as a concept because it looks beyond short term politics and conducts a longitudinal project of development (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 138). Before delving into the concept of a developmental regime, Pempel discusses how and why the developmental state concept is helpful. Firstly, the developmental state illustrates the power of politics in economic development (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 140). That is, the concept of the developmental state brings into focus the potency of political power which, “if wielded astutely, can contribute positively and effectively to a nation’s well-being” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 110). Moreover, the concept’s focus on political power dispels myths about certain cultures being the only ones capable of economic success (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 140).

Secondly, the developmental state concept questions the presupposition about the linearity of development (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 141). This is because developmentalism is a complex achievement that did not necessarily rely on ideological formulas for its success. Thirdly, the developmental state concept recognises that some of the success of such a state is dependent on compatibility of the state bureaucracy within “international market forces” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 142). Put simply, bureaucrats must be able and willing to grow their economies with and using international market conditions. Fourthly, the developmental state concept, “suggests that far more

options exist for industrialising countries” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 142). It appears that by Pempel’s estimation the developmental state concept has done what Johnson MITI case study originally intended: it transcended the capitalist-socialist led ideological war.

On the other hand, Pempel notes that the developmental state concept does have “shortcomings” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 144). The first shortcoming is that, “the developmental state privileges, the political and economic role played by state bureaucrats” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 144) and this has a few associated problems. These problems include control and autonomy over state resources; a “depoliticised” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 144) and isolated bureaucracy; and, most worrying, the problem of whose interests the developmental state works for (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 144). As Pempel puts the latter problem, “which sectors benefit most and which are most noticeably disadvantaged by the specific economic strategies pursued by the bureaucrats of the developmental state? What are the socioeconomic underpinnings of the developmental state? On the matter, developmental state theory is largely silent” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 145). A second shortcoming of the developmental state concept is that it is viewed as a “self-evident” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 146) paradigm in which strong states and “more industrial policy” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 146) automatically produce unfettered economic success. But really, the autonomous bureaucracy of a developmental state can lead to “bureaucratic authoritarianism and antirepresentational politics, with few guarantees of positive economic consequences” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 146). And thirdly, the developmental state concept is inward looking and thereby ignores external factors that influence the state’s development (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 146).

At this point, Pempel presents compelling evidence which suggests that the most successful developmental states to date have been uneven in character and different in their developmental approaches (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 147 – 156). For now, the assertion that developmentalism is not universal, unilateral or easily replicable must be born in mind because it leads to Pempel’s main argument that a developmental regime is more purposeful for the understanding and attempts at developmentalism. Pempel describes a regime as a system (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 157) that operates “above (everyday)...microlevel politics” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 157). In particular, a regime, “involves a sustained fusion among the institutions of the state, particular segments of the socioeconomic order, and a particular bias in public policy orientation. Together, this mixture provides a pattern of elements so unified as a whole that its properties cannot be fully appreciated by a simple summation of its parts” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 157).

To clarify how a regime fits into the broader scope of politics and states, Pempel gives the illustration that, “a constitutional order changes when the entire *character of the game* changes; governments change whenever the *players in the game* change. In between these two levels are regimes, which

change when the nature of the *rules of the game* change (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 157). If one takes the illustration of a regime being the rules of the game, it follows that the players abide by these rules in a certain manner; what Pempel describes as “interactions of specific social sections and key state institutions” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 158). These interactions are based on “commonly accepted principles for organising the nation’s political economy and its public policy profile” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 157). And finally, a regime requires a, “societal coalitional base ... the power of that state ... and the institutionalisation and bias of the public policies that result” (Woo-Cummings, ed., 1999: 158). As such a developmental regime is more long term and less political than the developmental state.

2.2.4 The South African Context

In the chapter on “Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potentials and challenges” (Edigheji, ed., 2010), Edigheji identifies two of the most recent challenges to the building of the democratic developmental state in SA. The first of these challenges is internal and pertains to the “high rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment, as well as improving the livelihoods of South Africans.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 1). The second challenge is external and relates to the global financial crisis of 2008 (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 1). One of the strengths of the South African government is that it is, “one of the few governments in the world that has expressly committed itself to the construction of a developmental state” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 2), and thus has a clear sense of the fact that SA is in need of internal growth and external fortification. In order to deal with this, Edigheji identifies that SA requires a few tools to deal with the internal and external challenges in the state, and these tools can also be used in the building of the South African democratic developmental state. These tools are “competent administrative apparatus within the state...political will to ensure necessary resources are deployed...policy and programmes...programmatic and reciprocal relationships...” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 3).

Edigheji poses three questions that specifically relate to the building of the South African democratic developmental state. The first question is whether democracy and development are able to coexist (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 3). This is a question that will be dealt with in detail in one of the sub-sections below. For now, this questions is important because in the South African context, the hyper-sensitivity to democracy gives the impression that whatever can enhance democracy, is necessarily easy to implement within a democracy. As the discussion below will show, this is not always the case.

The second question that Edigheji poses is whether policies can be formulated in the midst of the weak capacity of the South African state (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 3). Policies are the life blood of the engine of a state because they create the conditions for the state to function. Therefore a state that

cannot formulate, implement, review or redesign policy without other factors – such as politicking – overtaking the process, is a state that will struggle to develop. This point was raised in the NDP and during an interview with Mr Muller, a National Planning Commissioner who stated that SA first requires a capable state and then it can become a capable and developmental state (Muller, 2014). The latter point will be discussed in the Findings of this research report. Thirdly, Edigheji questions whether SA can escape its resource curse (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 3). In the South African case, resource minerals and the extractive industry has been vital for the building for the economy. But these resources can become debilitating if they are concentrated on at the expense of other viable and growth inducing industries. Therefore, SA needs to work out how it can grow its economy using both its natural resources and other sustainable means.

2.2.5 Distinguishing the Traditional and Democratic Developmental States – Historical Context

Edigheji describes the democratic developmental state as, “a state that could act authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a binding manner to formulate and implement its policies and programmes. This will entail possessing a developmentalist ideology. Such a state also has to be able to construct and deploy the institutional architecture within the state and mobilise society towards the realisation of its developmental project.” (Edigheji, 2010: 4). This description focuses on the ability of a state, or rather its government, to direct its policies and actions in a way that develops a country without compromising the legitimacy and national integrity of that state. Moreover, this action must take place within a sustainable institutional framework and society must participate in this development.

Evans makes the observation that there is no ready model for a developmental state, and that the building of a democratic developmental state is, “continually reflective... a flexible, creative process of exploration and experimentation that pays careful attention to local institutional starting points will succeed.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 37). In this way, Evans and Mkandawire are in agreement that the democratic developmental state does not come out of an Ikea-like box with clear instructions. Rather, the process of building such a state requires both the commitment to do and the commitment to learn from hindsight.

In his analysis in “Constructing the 21st century developmental state: pitfalls and potentials” (Edigheji, ed, 2010: 37 – 54), Evans also makes a more crucial observation that developmental states of the 20th century had different conditions and imperatives to the 21st century developmental states (Edigheji, ed, 2010: 38). And therefore, “a successful 21st century developmental state will have all the capacities of the 20th century version and others in addition.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 38). In particular, 21st century version must consider “historical legacies” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 38) that affect its present positions. With both this assertion and Mkandawire’s in mind, this research report will distinguish

between *traditional* and *democratic* developmental states. Traditional developmental states are those East Asian states whose economic and social development between the 1920s and the 1980s was unprecedented, unparalleled and based on sharp and particular changes to their respective economies, and consequently, bureaucracies and state-private relationships. Democratic developmental states have similar economic developmental goals but have a democratic orientation towards politics, society and governance.

There is one particular part of South Africa's historical legacy that Evans hones in on during his discussion about the constructing of a 21st century developmental state – dispossession (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 39 – 40). Dispossession refers to the fact that during colonialism and Apartheid, indigent South Africans had their land taken away from them by settler populations. Evans's discussion of dispossession as a key challenge for 21st century developmental is notable for two reasons. Firstly, the issue of dispossession confirms Evans's initial premise that historical legacy matters for an understanding of and policy for developmentalism. This is because land, as a natural resource, is integral to the survival and growth of countries – as will be discussed soon. Therefore, where land is in dispute, survival and growth become uncertain depending on the nature and intensity of that dispute. Secondly, Evans's indication of the issue of dispossession indirectly questions the validity or the assumption that Africa cannot develop by pointing out that the largest resource for development – land – has not been resolved. This questions the non-developmentalism of Africa because it becomes clear that there are different reasons for lack of development besides government and state organisation.

Drawing on Arrighj et al's (2008) argument (Edigheji, ed., 2010:39 – 40), Evans notes that dispossession has decreased “the resources available to ordinary workers by robbing workers of the possibility of using hybrid rural-urban family strategies and complementing their wages with subsistence production.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 39). This means that where workers could have used land for both their own food and production, workers' choices are limited to wage labour, which in itself is insufficient to meet the needs of workers and their families. Therefore a democratic developmental state framework should include an analysis about how the effects of dispossession, particularly but not exclusive to South Africa, will be countered to help the process of development.

2.2.7 The Role of Bureaucrats and Technocrats

One of the main components of a developmental state is the role and effectiveness of the institutions and authorities that run the state to ensure its primary economic growth and the secondary benefits of this growth. In other words, the state bureaucracy, its bureaucrats and/or technocrats determine how and why developmentalism occurs in the way that it does. However, bureaucracy, bureaucrats and technocrats are all influenced by the theory or ideology that they hold to most. Sometimes this theory

or ideology can be extreme, such as in the case of bureaucratic-authoritarianism; and sometimes the theory or ideology can be more subdued. Evans identifies three streams of development theory and their impact on bureaucracy, bureaucrats and technocrats – both in traditional and democratic developmental states.

The “new growth theory” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 41) placed emphasis on “the role of ideas and human capital as keys to growth.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 41) and this was accompanied by “empirical analysis” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 41). A significant contribution of the new growth theory to development theory is the idea that production and employment move from manufacturing to services (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 41), due to the fact that the manufacturing sector begins to experience a decline (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 41). As such, manufacturing is important in development, “but it is no longer the sector that drives change or the principal source of employment or of increased well-being” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 42). This means that the services sector – which depends on human skills and not machines – become the focal point of economic development.

Next came the “institutional turn” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 42) ideology, which refers to “the key role of enduring, shared normative expectations or ‘rules of the game’ in enabling forward-looking economic action” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 42). At this time then, the emphasis was on institutions and how they functioned to meet the development goals of a state. Institutions are extremely important whether in democratic, developmental or other political situations. Institutions house the rules and actions that determine the outputs in politics. Therefore, the institutional turn was not novel, except for the fact that it sought the answers to how institutions function together and are organised internally for economic development. Evans points out that combining the new growth theory and the institutional turn raises the issue about, “what kind of institutional arrangements will best enable societies to build the organisations and networks needed to generate new skills along with new knowledge and ideas, and to diffuse and take advantage of these tangible assets?” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 42).

Most recently, developmental theory has been focused on the “capability approach” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 43). The capability approach was created and expounded by Amartya Sen (1999), and is literally ground breaking. This political philosophy holds that “growth of GDP per capita is not an end in itself, but a proxy for improvements in human wellbeing” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 43). This is ground-breaking because the scale and the depth to which development is required to take place with the capabilities approach in mind, challenges countries, their development and their internal structures. Evans notes that there are two specific parts of the capabilities approach that complement the previous two streams of development theory (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 43). The complementarity of these three streams has implications for development. Firstly, the capability approach and the institutional turn’s complementarity implies that, “development strategies and policy cannot be

formulated by technocrats, but must be derived from democratically organised public deliberation.” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 43). Moreover, public deliberation is necessary for development because it serves as “the only analytically defensible means of defining specific developmental goals” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44). This effectively displaces the primary role of technocrats in the traditional developmental state, to the secondary role of technical advisors and administrators in the democratic developmental state.

Therefore, the democratic developmental state framework should question the role of technocrats and bureaucrats within institutions in that state. Secondly, the complementarity between capabilities approach and the new growth theory is that human skill require “public provision of capability-enhancing services” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44) such as health and education (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44). The implication here is that economic growth is necessary for the provision of “collective goods” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44) and to ensure that the provision leads to all-round development.

After the analysis, Evans concludes that the complementarity of these three development theory streams requires that a developmental state perform two duties:

- a) “support a *distribution of basic rights* that gives individuals incentives to invest in their own *capabilities*” (emphasis added; Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44).
- b) “In addition to being instruments of achieving societal goals, developmental states must be *vehicles for making social choices and defining developmental goals.*” (emphasis added; Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44)

This differs vastly from the traditional developmental state in several ways. Firstly, the democratic developmental state seeks economic development for the purpose of furnishing the state with economic options and social goods that allow individuals to live better lives, economically and socially. This is an important distinction from the traditional developmental state because the goals of the democratic developmental state are social welfare and choice; whereas the goals of the traditional developmental state are economic advancement mainly to free the state from aid dependence and to build up its military and national interests – and social well-being is a by-product of this economic advancement. However, this distinction should be read with caution because whilst democratic developmental states express their aims and goals using a developmental framework, traditional developmental states did not. Why? Because the history and context are different for both types of developmental states. Thus the assessment of the different goals of traditional and democratic developmental states is an observation, not a criticism, as the former was a method now turned model and the latter is an evolution of the model.

Secondly, democratic developmental states rely on the premise that there are “basic rights” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 44) that inform the developmental project. These basic rights can and should appear somewhere in order for the goals to have a justification. Furthermore, these rights can be found in domestic constitutions, domestic bills of rights and the international human rights system. Constitutionalism matters because politics and governance have become rational and legal in a lot of respects, and subsequently inform the actions of a state.

2.2.7 “Forms of the Democratic Developmental State”

By now it is clear that there are differences between traditional developmental and democratic developmental states. However, according to Leftwich in “Forms of the Democratic Developmental State: Practices and Capacity” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 53 – 78), there are further categories within the latter model. This means that the democratic developmental state is not a static model of developmentalism that has simply evolved from the traditional developmental model. Rather, the democratic developmental state is a model or type of state that can arise in different political conditions which determine its characteristics. These characteristics can be used to further the goal of developmentalism, or hinder it.

Leftwich identifies that in general, there are two “independent criteria” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 55) that need to be satisfied for a state to be classified as democratic developmental state. The first criteria is *economic growth*: growth must be at least 4% for about 25-30 years (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 55). Democratic developmental states cannot escape the condition of economic growth because it is a “crucial precondition for other developmental goods” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 53). Furthermore and in relation to the economic growth of democratic developmental states, Leftwich states that the most “successful” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 61) developmental states are those with “mixed capitalist economies” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 61) The second criteria for democratic developmental states to be classified as such is “minimalist” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 55) democracy. Leftwich uses Schumpeter’s analysis of democracy, which describes minimalist democracy as having basic and procedural aspects of democratic practices, namely, “free and regular elections...peaceful succession where government change; low barriers to political participation; and the protection of civil and political liberties” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 55-56).

But although democratic developmental states can be sought and found using the independent criteria given above, there is a “contradiction” (Robinson et al., ed., 1998: 56) or contention between development and democracy because democracy “is a conservative system of power” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 56) once it has been “consolidated and stabilised” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 56). By conservative, it is meant that over time democracy becomes less conducive to conditions of change as elites and systems become more entrenched in the system of democracy (Robinson et al, ed., 1998:

56). On the other hand, development is “a radical and commonly turbulent process which is concerned with often far-reaching and rapid change in the use and distribution of resources” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 56). Therefore, the merging of a generally conservative process such as liberal representative democracy and a generally radical process such as development is not an easy task.

Ultimately, Leftwich maintains once again that politics is what determines development (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 55). And thus, one must examine the various types of democracy as a politics, in order to gauge how this affects developmental policy and practice. The theory behind democratic politics as a variant in development rests partly on an understanding of what Leftwich terms “the two phases of democratisation” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 57), these phases being transition and consolidation (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 57). Transition refers to the political and governmental change to democracy, and consolidation refers to the sustenance of democracy. Leftwich notes that transition to democracy does not necessarily lead to the consolidation of democracy; but, “*only consolidated democracies can become developmental democratic states*” (emphasis added; Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 57-58). The conditions for democratic consolidation will be discussed later in this research report.

Given the above criteria for a democratic developmental state, such a framework must consider the extent to which “conservative” democracy can be pursued alongside “radical” development. This implies that there is both a perceived and a real trade-off between democratic practices and developmental practices. However, democratic values demand that this trade-off does not move into the authoritarian realm, wherein opposition to developmental ideas and practices is not met with repression – physical or otherwise. The latter also reiterates Sen’s point about public deliberation being the only defensible way of planning and executing development policy.

Moving on to the forms of the democratic developmental state (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 63 – 77), there are four forms of this type of state. These forms are dominant-party developmental democratic states and coalitional developmental democratic states (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 63-70); and non-developmental democratic states, under which there are class-compromise non-developmental democratic states and party-alternation developmental democratic states (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 70-77). Notice that Leftwich continues to use politics – in this case democratic politics – as the momentum behind the developmental, or any other, state. This is seen in the way that he classifies the forms of democratic developmental states mainly by their democratic nature, under which developmentalism is either reached or not reached. In other words, democracy is an independent variable, and developmentalism is a dependent variable.

Forms of the democratic developmental state are important because they illustrate the variations within the broader concept of the developmental state. In so doing, this illustration also shows that democracy and development can either be combined means or separate means towards a state's ends. This means that a state can desire democracy, or development or both at the same time. But as Leftwich's forms will show, the processes of democratisation and developmentalism are not always simultaneous, and often contentious. Leftwich does stress that the forms of the democratic developmental state that he has identified are "ideal types since there are no pure examples" (White et al, ed., REF: 63). These forms are based on examples of states that have lived through the phases of transition and consolidation of democracy and have attempted to develop economically too.

The first form of the democratic developmental state is "dominant-party developmental democratic states" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64 – 66). In this type of state, the bureaucracy has a high level of autonomy precisely because of the "relatively unchallenged central power of a single and overwhelmingly dominant party" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64). In the examples of Botswana and Singapore, Leftwich finds that dominant parties affirmed their dominance during democratisation, because they are heavily involved in the set-up of the "rules of the political game" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64) during the transition to democracy. Moreover, these dominant parties came to dominate because there were neither previous political parties that were strong enough to challenge their dominance or position prior to their dominance, nor "was there a proliferation of new parties or splits in the old ones" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64). The latter is partly because "[c]ivil society was clearly weak, or weakened from the start" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64). Therefore, power sharing was not an issue.

These societies were for the most part homogenous as, "no major regional, ideological, class, or ethnic cleavages existed, or were allowed to exist" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 64). Their economies did not create or absorb "significant institutionalised economic interests" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 65) before or during democratic consolidation and the new militaries did not have ties to the past (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 65). The results of dominant-party developmental democratic states have been that insulated and autonomous bureaucracies have been fostered, in order to independently and fiercely implement economic developmentalism (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 65). Another result is that democracy has legitimised developmentalism through the "formal procedures of democratic electoral politics" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 65). But there are issue with this form of democratic developmental state, the most glaring issue being that these dominant-party developmental democratic states "raise very uneasy implications for both the theory and practice of liberal (or social) democracy and the protection of civil rights" (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 66).

The second form of the democratic developmental state, according to Leftwich, is the coalitional or consociational form. In coalitional or consociational states, "no single party has emerged to

dominate” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 66) the political or developmental agenda, and thus the state/bureaucracy lacks the pivotal autonomy required to implement developmental changes. Democratisation in this situation can only be consolidated if “political coalitions” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 66) are reached. This consolidation relies heavily on “the rules of the game and...the distribution of the spoils of power” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 66), because coalitions and consociations cannot function without clear agreements on both of these, especially to consolidate democracy (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 66).

Using the examples of Mauritius and Malaysia, Leftwich observes the following about coalitional/consociational democratic developmental states. To begin with, these states have “sharp and primary vertical cleavages in ethnicity, culture, or religion – even where this is compounded by regional fact or horizontal cleavages in class” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 67). In the Malaysian case in particular, these societal divisions are essentially overcome by coalition parties that represent the broad demographic of the state (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 69). Next, once these coalitions are established, there are two important aspects that need to be in place to assist with developmentalism, especially in socially divided states. Firstly, there needs to be a “[f]undamental policy consensus about a national development strategy ...” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 69). And secondly, there needs to be “[r]espect for the constituents of its pluralist social structures” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 69). Policy consensus and respect for pluralism in society was apparent in the case of Mauritius and it allowed Mauritius to pursue a strong developmentalist path at the time.

Based on these analyses, a democratic developmental framework needs to consider if a state with this potential can learn from the developmental democratic examples above. In the example of a dominant-party developmental democratic states, is it wise to have only procedural and not substantive democracy in order to meet developmental objectives? Moreover, as procedural democracy becomes consolidated, specifically through elections that legitimise developmental changes, can such a state withstand shallow democracy as development frees individuals in economically developmental ways? In the example of coalitional/consociational developmental democratic states, can coalitions suspend perceived or real differences for long enough to forge a developmental programme? And where this is possible, how is democratisation secured when coalitions and consociations become insecure?

The third form of the democratic developmental state is the “party-alternation non-developmental democratic” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74 – 77) form. In this model, no dominant party has emerged to secure continuous rule, and thus different political parties alternate power following wins and losses during elections. Leftwich notes that the only way that such democracies can “secure democratic stability” (Robinson, et al, ed., 1998: 75) is when the biggest political parties – which are

compromise a range of socio-economic classes (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74) – agree on “a broad consensus about development policy” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 75). This means that for as long as there is some sort of national agenda for development and the biggest political parties maintain this agenda as long as they alternate, democracy remains stable.

However, democratic stability becomes under threat “when a major ideological divide opens up between such party, leading to sharp shifts in policy (both internal development policy and external relations), democratic stability has come under intense pressure which has in turn had negative implications for growth and development” (Robinson, et al, ed., 1998: 75). The lesson with the party-alternation non-developmental democracies is that policy can seem consistent and democracy can be stable until a void in the political spectrum is filled by other political parties or interest groups that shift the agenda, possibly radicalise it. Once this happens, the development agenda can become a great question as opposed to remaining the great achievement that it seemingly once was.

The fourth and final form of the democratic developmental state is the “class-compromise non-developmental” democracies (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 70 – 74). Leftwich’s analysis now concentrates on non-developmental states that are democracies. Class-compromise refers to economic and/or social classes compromising their original ideological positions in order to reach a consensus. For instance, Leftwich uses the illustration of Venezuela, wherein capitalist and workers compromised on “democratic institutions” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72) and “private appropriation of profit” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72) respectively.

The reason for this is that each class compromised in order to avoid a “*more militant alternative*” (emphasis in text; Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72). This type of non-developmental democratic state tends to arise under three main conditions: firstly, where “class is the dominant cleavage (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 70); and secondly, where “[m]ajor political forces and interests...have come to recognise that while successful revolution (the seizure or state power) is impossible, continued repression has profound economic costs and is thus counter-productive” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 70). Thirdly, class compromise non-developmental democratic states arise when imminent changes “will threaten other interests (internal and external) so fundamentally that those interests are likely to adopt non-democratic means” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 70).

The lessons from the class-compromise non-developmental democratic states are that class-compromises under democratic processes become the most feasible and peaceful way of politics (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72). However the pace of developmentalism is what is at stake in such democratic states. This is because developmentalism is slow and as it relies on compromises and the ensuing delays (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72). In the Venezuelan example that Leftwich describes,

developmentalism was not just slow, it was “limited” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 72). On the other hand, class-compromise became productive in Venezuela when the bureaucracy increased and provided basic or social goods to large sections of the population, thereby legitimising class-compromise agreements (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 73). Developmentalism also increased under class compromise when governing “elites” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 73) held onto power from the centre, which allowed consistent actions and policies (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 73). Finally, class-compromise democratic developmentalism was successful when elites rolled out developmental plans using the autonomy given to them (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 73).

Despite the compromises and elites organising the state, class-compromise democratic developmental states have important missions to accomplish. These are the correction of “gross inequalities of the past” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74); the promotion of “rapid economic growth” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74); and to “maintain democratic political stability (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74). Leftwich adds a cautionary note about these class-compromise non-developmental states: “For while civil and political liberties are protected in both Venezuela and post-apartheid South Africa, *developmental state autonomy is necessarily limited by the pacts and agreements which underwrite the democratic process.*” (emphasis added; Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 74).

2.2.9 Summary of Conceptual Framework

What the description by Woo-Cumings shows is that the developmental state is the culmination and coordination of state structures to achieve political and economic goals. In the case of the Northeast Asian developmental states in the twentieth century, the developmental state was a reactive decision to the global context at the time. And that context was a world dominated by Western imperialism, which motivated the Northeast Asian developmental states to act in such a way that they would be less dependent on this imperialism. This point about context matters because it brings to the fore the effects of external forces on a country’s economy, politics and society. The issue of context still matters for the democratic developmental state because the history of the state has determined its current position and will continue to determine its direction if not dealt with. For SA specifically, the issue of land dispossession complicates the historical context. This is because land is a foundation and resource for the economy, thereby determining whether the economy will survive or succeed.

Keeping the focus on the South African context, the three questions that Edigheji poses provide the basis for a critical analysis of the possibility for a democratic developmental state. These three questions can be restated as the democracy-development paradigm, public policy in the democratic developmental state and overcoming the resource case. What these three questions do is point to the South African case’s particular obstacles to developmentalism. Furthermore, how these obstacles are dealt with can test the political will and ability of the South African state.

Johnson picks for essential characteristics that the Japanese developmental state implemented to succeed. These essential characteristics were bureaucracy, independence of that bureaucracy, market-economy methods and an institution such as the MITI. Taken together with the concept of a developmental regime, these characteristics can function together to create a state that favours development. The insistence that a developmental state should have bureaucrats or technocrats to run the state should not be taken too literally. That is, bureaucrats and technocrats refer to professionals with certain skill sets that enable them to implement the developmental project. The skill set is what matters, not the adjective that describes the professional, because it will be used in the development machine room to drive change needed for the developmental state. It is important to note that whether the skilled workforce of the state are called bureaucrats or technocrats only matters to the extent that these labels influence the behaviour of such individuals in the government workforce. In SA, bureaucracy in public administration almost became a swear word following the transition to democracy because it was assumed that this was an immoral and ineffective way of organising government, based on the experience of Apartheid. Technocrats are similarly associated with authoritarian regimes – such as bureaucratic-authoritarian governments in South America (O'Donnell, 1988) – that carried out developmental reforms at the expense of civil and political liberties. Therefore one cannot ignore the connotations of these labels but the essence of the skill set must be emphasised and recreated to achieve development.

Finally the forms of the developmental state show that there is a spectrum along which states can be developmental or non-developmental and this depends largely on the type of democracy that has been forged in the state. Leftwich stresses and attempts to prove that development is primarily a political feat and the forms of the developmental state that he finds and presents is substantial evidence of this assertion. According to Leftwich's analysis, SA at the time was a class-compromise non-developmental democratic state. There is consensus that SA's democracy began as a consociational or class-compromise democracy. What remains to be ascertained is whether SA's class compromise continues to hamper development and whether the economic development standard of 4% GDP growth per annum is achievable if political conditions allow.

Section 3: The NDP

The NDP was devised by the National Planning Commission (NPC) which is part of the Department of The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. It was launched in August 2012 and is over four hundred pages long. When the plan was launched, the Chairperson of the NPC was Trevor Manuel – who has since left government. The current NPC Chairperson is Cyril Ramaphosa. There are twenty-six commissioners who are politicians, academics and business people. The outline of the plan is as follows:

- Vision Statement
- Overview
- Summary of objectives and actions
 1. Policymaking in a complex environment
 2. Demographic trends
 3. Economy and employment
 4. Economy infrastructure
 5. Environmental sustainability
 6. An integrated and inclusive rural economy
 7. Positioning South African in the world
 8. Transforming human settlement
 9. Improving education, training and innovation
 10. Promoting health
 11. Social protection
 12. Building safer communities
 13. Building a capable and developmental state
 14. Fighting corruption
 15. Transforming society and uniting the country
- Conversation with South Africans

In order to grasp the essence of the plan, this research report will be examined and explained in a way that sets the plan out as an experiment. The reason for this is that it is apparent, having read the NDP, that although this is a plan for economic growth, it is also an experimental way to induce economic growth and reap its socially developmental benefits. Thus this report will dissect the NDP in the following way:

1. *Aim* of the NDP
2. *Context* of the NDP
3. *Method* of the NDP
4. *Issues and Impediments* for the NDP

In addition to this, the following aspects relating to the NDP will be discussed:

5. Parliamentary Responses
6. Opposition to the NDP

3.1 Aim of the NDP

The NDP describes itself as a “plan for the country to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030 through uniting South Africans, unleashing the energies of its citizens, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capability of the of the state and the leaders working together to solve complex problems” (NDP, 2012: 1). As such, the NDP aims to secure economic development as well as human development in SA by creating a robust and equipped state. The plan also makes clear that “faster progress, more action and better implementation” (NDP, 2012: 1) is required in order to build such a state. This indirectly refers to a public policy process which is able to move quickly and effectively with a developmental agenda. In addition to this, the NDP identifies nine main challenges in SA today, these challenges are (NDP, 2012: 25):

- i. Under-unemployment
- ii. Poor quality school education for black pupils
- iii. Lack of well-positioned, adequate and well-maintained infrastructure
- iv. Lack of inclusive development due to “spatial divides”
- v. “resource intensive” economy
- vi. Poor quality healthcare system
- vii. “uneven and...poor quality” public services
- viii. Corruption
- ix. Division in society

In order to deal with these issues, the NDP prioritises six areas of action in SA today (NDP, 2012: 26):

1. “Uniting all South Africans around a common programme to achieve prosperity and equity.
2. Promoting active citizenry to strengthen development, democracy and accountability.
3. Bringing about faster economic growth, higher investment and greater labour absorption.
4. Focusing on key capabilities of people and the state.
5. Building a capable and developmental state.
6. Encouraging strong leadership throughout society to work together to solve problems.”

In addition to this, the NDP defines the developmental state as one that “builds the capabilities of people to improve their own lives, while intervening to correct historical inequalities” (NDP, 2012: 27).

3.2 Context of the NDP

The NDP is very assertive about some of the external factors that have led to the formulation of the NDP and why SA requires such a plan to proceed with a particular type of development locally, regionally and internationally. In the first chapter of the NDP, the plan talks about the 2008 global financial crisis and how increasing globalisation has led to increased and shared risk when such crisis occurs (NDP, 2012, 76 – 78). The NDP recommends that the South African economy be built up to withstand such crises in future by increasing the “role of government” (NDP, 2012: 79) so that the government can “regulate” (NDP, 2012: 79) economic activity. Apart from this, the NDP states that emerging economies “are becoming key areas of growth in consumption, production and in some cases, innovation” (NDP, 2012: 82) thereby using the new opportunities presented by globalisation to gain a foothold in global markets.

In the second chapter of the NDP, the plan discussed the demographic trends (NDP, 2012: 98 – 108) that need to be concentrated on in order to be turned around in order to bring SA to a “Rapid economic development” (NDP, 2012: 99) scenario. There are three trends that require the focus of the NDP: fertility, migration, HIV/AIDS (NDP, 2012: 99). The aim in these areas is to increase life expectancy (NDP, 2012: 101), continue to decrease the spread of HIV/AIDS (NDP, 2012: 102) and plan better for the increasing rate of urbanisation (NDP, 2012: 103 – 105).

3.3 Method of the NDP

How will the envisioned democratic developmental state be built? This forms the bulk of the NDP and therefore this section will summarise the relevant chapters that explain how SA will map out its development. The chapters in the NDP that focus on how the developmental state will be built, are chapters 3 – 11, and they have been summarised below. .

Table 1: Summary of the NDP

Policy/Portfolio Area	Objectives	Actions	Issues of Note
Economy and Employment	<p>Decrease unemployment;</p> <p>Increase economically active population (plan does not use this term but suggests it.</p> <p>Increase labour force participation rate;</p> <p>Increase national income earned by lower 40% of the population;</p> <p>“Broaden ownership of assets to historically disadvantaged groups”</p> <p>Increase participation in public employment programmes.</p>	<p>Decrease cost of living and create (plans)/proposals and long term strategies for “an acceptable minimum standard of living”</p> <p>Decrease business costs and “attract offshore business services” as well as build on SA telecoms, banking and retail in other countries;</p> <p>Increase the benefit to the country of our mineral resources” through a series of measures;</p> <p>Public works programme to increase to 2 million fulltime equivalent jobs by 2020”</p> <p>Tax incentives, subsidies, youth employment, immigration and labour laws.</p>	<p>The NDP discusses a lot of economic change, but does not discuss whether these changes will have short-term trade-offs which will leave the economy worse off or difficult to bear until the targets set are reached.</p>
Economic Infrastructure	<p>Increase access to electricity grid and introduce non-grid options;</p> <p>Increase supply of electricity to 29,000MW, 20,000MW should be derived from “renewable sources”</p> <p>Increase access to water;</p> <p>Decrease water demand in urban areas;</p> <p>Increase public transportation and have “user-friendly, less environmentally damaging, cheaper and integrated or seamless transport” by 2030;</p> <p>Increase Durban port capacity;</p> <p>Supply “Competitively priced and widely available broadband”</p>	<p>Split into coal, gas, electricity, liquid fuels, transport, information and communications infrastructure;</p> <p>Under gas: “Enable exploratory drilling to identify economically recoverable coal seam and shale gas reserves, while environment investigations will continues to ascertain whether sustainable exploration of these resources is possible”</p> <p>Under liquid fuels: “Upgrade fuel refineries ... (and) continue to import refined fuels”</p> <p>Under water: create a “management strategy including investment programme for water resource development, bulk water supply and waste water management for major centres by 2012, with reviews every five years</p> <p>Provide new water and irrigation systems as well as “regional water and waste water utilities”</p> <p>Under transport: expand freight corridors (logistics) and public transportation.</p> <p>Under information and communication infrastructure through the rolling out of fibre optic cabling and other relevant infrastructure</p>	<p>Government has said that it will explore alternatives to energy sources, such as gas. However, the exploration of these alternatives will probably involve environmental damage.</p>

<p>Environmental Sustainability and Resilience</p>	<p>“indicators for natural resources, accompanied by publications of annual reports on the health of identified resources to inform policy”</p> <p>Targets for protected land and ocean areas;</p> <p>“Achieve the peak, plateau and decline trajectory for greenhouse gas emissions, with the peak being reached around 2025”</p> <p>Zero emissions and major decreases in waste sent to landfills;</p> <p>“improved disaster preparedness for extreme climate events”</p> <p>Investment in technology, research and development for agriculture.</p>	<p>Government to establish a Climate Change Centre, to be supported by government, business and civil society;</p> <p>“regulatory framework for land use” (64);</p> <p>Review of environmental standards associated with buildings, transport and other infrastructure</p>	
<p>Inclusive Rural Economy</p>	<p>Increase direct and indirect jobs in “agriculture, agro-processing and related sectors”</p> <p>“Maintain a positive trade balance for primary and processed agricultural products”</p>	<p>Build rural economies by “improved infrastructure and service delivery, a review of land tenure, service to small and micro farmers, a review of mining industry commitments to social investment, and tourism investments”</p> <p>Increased investment in “irrigation infrastructure”</p> <p>Security of land tenure for “communal farmers, especially women”</p>	<p>Does not mention how women will be enabled to work the land and derive benefit from it in a generally patriarchal system such as agriculture, despite the fact that women tend to be the ones working and cultivating the land.</p> <p>Does not discuss the role of traditional leadership and governance in SA, when most rural land is situated in jurisdictions that are governed by traditional leadership structures.</p>
<p>Human Settlements</p>	<p>“Strong and efficient spatial planning system”</p> <p>All informal settlements on “suitable, well located land” to be upgraded;</p> <p>“More people living closer to their places of work”</p> <p>Higher quality of public transportation;</p> <p>“More jobs in or close to dense, urban townships”</p>	<p>Revised and better coordination in the current planning system;</p> <p>Formulate a strategy for “densification of cities and resource allocation” to assist with “better located housing and settlements”</p> <p>Input major investment into “safe, reliable and affordable public transport.”</p>	<p>Housing and human settlements are constitutionally provided for and the Department of Human Settlements has made great strides in providing RDP housing.</p>
<p>Education, Training and Innovation</p>	<p>Prioritise ECD and direct resources towards “appropriate emotional, cognitive and physical development stimulation”</p> <p>Minimum of two years of pre-school</p>	<p>Concentrate on making sure that early childhood education, schooling, further education and higher education work together to produce a capable workforce.</p>	<p>Extensive interview with Professor Rensburg from the University of Johannesburg showed that the further and higher education sectors in particular need to undergo drastic structural changes in</p>

	education for all children; 90% of school learners in “grades 3, 6, and 9 must achieve 50 percent” in national assessments, particularly in “literacy, maths and science.”		order to educate more South Africans beyond school level and even out the qualifications gained.
Healthcare	Improve the health indicators of life expectancy, infant mortality and decrease levels of curable or treatable diseases. Create a system in which everyone can access healthcare, “regardless of their income”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. “Address the social determinants that affect health and disease” b. “Strengthen the health system” c. “Prevent and reduce the disease burden and promote health” d. “Implement National Health Insurance” e. “Build human resources in the health sector” 	

Source: The National Development Plan (2012); except Issues of note (researcher’s own)

3.4 Issues and Impediments Identified by the NDP

What are some of the critical factors within the state that need to be addressed in order for the NDP to be implemented smoothly and effectively? There are three chapters that have been identified by this research report as chapters that emphasise these critical factors. These three chapters are “Building a Capable and Developmental State”, “Corruption” and “Transformation”. These three chapters have been identified as issues or impediments to the NDP because if the critical factors that they discuss within the state cannot function in a particular manner, the NDP cannot be implemented well.

In “Building a Capable and Developmental State”, the NDP focuses on the facts that the public administration in SA needs to be organised in some areas and strengthened in others in order to build an administration that can implement the development goals outlined in the preceding chapters. This chapter of the NDP identifies that the “main challenge [in public administration in SA] has been unevenness in capacity that leads to uneven performance in local, provincial and national government. This is caused by a complex set of factors, including tensions in the political-administrative interface, instability in the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability and authority, poor organisational design and low staff morale” (NDP, 2012: 408). This chapter also describes what it means by “capable” (NDP, 2012: 409) and “developmental” (NDP, 2012: 409) – “capable in that it has the capacity to formulate and implement policies that serve the national interest; developmental in

that those policies focus on overcoming the root causes of poverty and inequality and building the state's capacity to fulfil this role" (NDP, 2012: 409).

One of the NDP's main proposals for building a capable and developmental state are firstly, to "stabilise the political-administrative interface" (NDP, 2012: 411) which refers to a series of measures that should allow the public administration to meet the service needs of the country whilst not fearing political interference or using political motive and influence when carrying out its duties (NDP, 2012: 411). Under this proposal, the remedies for a stronger public administration are the strengthening of the Public service Commission (NDP, 2012: 411 – 413), creating the role of an "administrative head of the public service" (NDP, 2012: 413 – 414) who will oversee the public administration and manage the careers of heads of government departments, improving the system of "top appointments" (NDP, 2012: 414) and allowing managers more ownership over the appointments that they make in the public administration (NDP, 2012: 414 – 415). The other proposals include making the public service a more attractive career choice through a "formal graduate recruitment scheme" (NDP, 2012: 416) whilst also focusing on increasing and sharpening the skills of existing staff (NDP, 2012: 419 – 422); growing the "technical and specialist professional skills" (NDP, 2012: 423 – 425) within the public administration; improving the "delegation, accountability and oversight" (NDP, 2012: 426 – 435) abilities of the public administration; and giving local government greater scope and control (NDP, 2012: 435 – 442).

In the chapter on "Fighting Corruption", the NDP discusses the fact that corruption is one of the biggest impediments to building a democratic developmental state. This chapter states that, "For a more effective state, there must be accountability. Accountability refers to institutionalised practices of giving account of how assigned responsibilities are carried out" (NDP, 2012: 446). In this way, the NDP recognises that corruption can be one of the worst impediments or issues for carrying out developmental goals because it involves diverting resources from their proper and assigned uses. South Africa ranks 67th out of 174 countries in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2014: online), therefore it sits close to the middle of both highly corrupt countries and countries that are relatively less corrupt in the global scale.

The CPI is a significant measure of corruption that "measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption" (CPI, 2014: online). Corruption is not only debilitating for development, it also has the ability to dominate media headlines, and detract from other issues within a state that require attention. The latter was found during an interview with Professor Rensburg, who stated that the NDP has not received due attention in Parliament or public discourse because other issues such as Nkandla – an example that he specifically referred to – have dominated the Parliamentary agenda and the media headlines (Rensburg, 2013). Rensburg referred to this as a "top of mind" (Rensburg, 2013). However, the root of top of mind issues is the government behaviour and that cannot be ignored. The

NDP's proposals for fighting corruption are to build a "resilient anti-corruption system" (NDP, 2012: 447 – 453) that detects corruption at an early stage; embeds anti-corruption into all sectors of society, including the private sector; protects whistle-blowers; and "improves oversight" (NDP, 2012: 450) over government procurement efforts such as the tender system. In addition to this, the democratic values of rule of law and accountability are referred to as important for fighting corruption in a developmental SA (NDP, 2012: 451 – 453).

The final issue identified by the NDP as important for building a democratic developmental state is "Transforming Society and Uniting the Country" (NDP, 2012: 458 – 463) which discusses the exercise of social cohesion and nation building. This chapter begins by narrating the South African story of how our country is democratic and avoided devastating conflict at the end of Apartheid, but how this has not been able to produce a national identity that one can be proud of due to the persistent challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment (NDP, 2012: 459). This exercise of social cohesion and nation building is envisioned to take place at a number of different levels and in different ways by "Fostering Constitutional Values" (NDP, 2012: 460) in families, schools and the media(462 – 463); creating "Equal opportunities, inclusion and redress" (NDP, 2012: 464 – 472) which mainly involves eradicating discriminatory behaviour in economic spheres; "Promoting social cohesion" (NDP, 2012: 472 – 474) through mostly cultural activities; encouraging "Active citizenry and leadership" (NDP, 2012: 474 – 475); and "Fostering a social compact" (NDP, 2012: 477), which will be analysed later in this research report.

3.5 Opposition to the NDP

One of the research problems identified in the introduction of this paper, is the political opposition to the NDP. As alluded to in the introduction, the NDP has had public criticism from particular political parties and organisations; particularly the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). What is striking about this opposition to the NDP from COSATU and the SACP, is that these political entities form part of the Alliance that is the ruling party in SA – which will be further expounded on below. Examining the opposition to the NDP has two empirical benefits. The first empirical benefit is that the opposition to the NDP may present some valid issues that can either help or hinder the implementation of the NDP. The second and most notable empirical benefit of examining the opposition to the NDP is that it allows the researcher to pose the normative question about whether the NDP should be a national goal at all. And when asking/posing the latter question, one will indirectly answer the original research question of this paper: is the NDP a prudent and/or achievable plan for a democratic developmental state in SA? The answer to this question, from the opposition's perspective, is steeped in the history of the struggle of Apartheid, the ideological recourse that certain political parties took to overcome Apartheid and the ideological conclusions that are now unfolding before the NDP. Therefore, this section of findings

will explain the Alliance, the historical roots of the current opposition and the ideology that influences the political philosophy behind the opposition to the NDP.

3.5.1 Colonialism of a Special Type

Apartheid was a system of codified and legislated oppression by the white Afrikaaner minority and the African majority – comprising black indigent Africans, coloured Africans, Indian Africans and other minority groups. Apartheid was a system of separate development whereby Afrikaaner development was prioritised and the development of other ethnic and racial groups was allowed to the extent that it furthered Afrikaaner nationalist development. The economic, political and social oppression meted out by the Afrikaaner nationalists at the time is not unique to this group, their target group or history. If anything, human nature is consistent across colour and any group can become an oppressor for different reasons. The description above is clearly articulated in order to give a simple picture of the Apartheid context at the time.

Apart from the fact of Apartheid, a theory about the nature of oppressor was used to describe the system of the time. This theory is known as Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). In 1987, the ANC stated that, the then “South African social formation (is) a system of internal colonialism” or “colonialism of a special type”. What is special or different about the colonial system as it obtains in South Africa is that there is no spatial separation between the colonising power (the white minority state) and the colonised black people. But in every respect the features of classic colonialism are the hallmark of the relations ... compounded by the fact that the white South African state, parliament and government are juristically independent of any metropolitan country and have a sovereignty legally vested in them by various Acts of the British government and state...” (emphasis added; ANC Discussion Document, 1987: online).

This meant that whereas normal/external colonialism involved a transient power occupying a territory using a governor or similar authorities to dominate from a distance, in South Africa the coloniser was present and resident in the colony. The former characterisation of a transient power is also known as a protectorate, whilst the latter characterisation is an internal domination of one resident group over another resident group.

For the coloniser, the purpose of CST is to dominate a group in order to establish an economic system that benefits the coloniser (Wolpe, 1990: 29). However, according to Wolpe, economic exploitability was not part of the original conception of internal colonialism advanced by Leo Marquard, who first characterised SA as such (Wolpe, 1990: 29). Wolpe observes that, “For Marquard, the internal colonial structure was exclusively racial, political and ideological phenomenon which has no relationship with, or bearing on, the South African economy. (Wolpe, 1990: 29). Furthermore, Wolpe notes that Marquard’s liberal position diverges from that of the “national liberation movement

... (which) defines the co-existence and articulation of a colonial relation between black and white people and a developed capitalist economy within the confines of a single national state.” (Wolpe, 1990: 29) – as also quoted earlier. It is accurate to claim that the national liberation movement, led by the ANC, saw CST as economic exploitation with political and social oppression used as means to increase economic productivity.

Policy documents from the ANC at the time state that the white minority managed to institute an “advanced capitalist state in its final stage of industrial monopolies and the merging of industrial and financial capital” (ANC Speaks, 1977 in Wolpe, 1990: 29). In addition to this, or for the purposes of capitalism, “The indigenous population (was) subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all democratic rights and political domination” (ANC Speaks, 1977 in Wolpe, 1990: 29). There is also evidence, contrary to Marquard’s liberal position, that internal colonialism or CST in SA had an intrinsic space in Apartheid. Education policy documents from as early as 1855 clearly state that education for black Africans should be limited to socialising black Africans into Afrikaner culture and being able to work in manufacturing and industrial jobs that would grow the Afrikaaner nation’s economy (Rose et al, 1975). Marquard’s theory may not have foreseen this point in 1957, but it played out practically during Apartheid.

CST theory led to a peculiar path of resistance and revolution against the Apartheid government. This path was peculiar because it did not involve the steady march of antagonism towards Apartheid eventually ending in the overthrow of that regime. Instead, it involved a compromise between different classes – as Marxism classifies them – to unite against Apartheid despite their different end goals. This path is called the national democratic revolution (NDR) and it was influenced by CST because the idea of internal colonialism in a nation guided liberation down an equally nationalist revolution, in which the emancipation of a nation mattered as much as the emancipation of a class. In 1988 Joe Slovo, then General Secretary of the SACP, described the NDR path in a document titled, “The South African Working Class and the National Democratic Revolution” (Slovo, 1988: SACP online). Two sections in this document are integral to the understanding of the political philosophical roots of the opposition to the NDP: “Class Struggle and National Struggle” (Slovo, 1988) and “Stages of Struggle” (Slovo, 1988).

3.5.2 National Democratic Revolution

In the section on “Class Struggle and National Struggle” (Slovo, 1988), Slovo describes the NDR as “broad objective interests not only of the working class but also of most of the other classes within the nationally-dominated majority, including the black petit-bourgeoisie and significant strata of the emergent black bourgeoisies. *This really provides the foundation for a struggle which aims to mobilise to its side all the oppressed classes and strata as participants in the national liberation alliance*” (Slovo, 1988). In other words, the NDR was an “inter-class” (Slovo, 1988) struggle which

would assist the national struggle, based on the CST. Slovo tried to tie class struggle to national struggle by arguing that different classes can and were similarly united against an oppressor, who inflicted division and brutality. The latter were real lived experiences that required real and persistent action to fight the “humiliations of race tyranny” (Slovo, 1988). This national struggle, Slovo argued, “illuminates most brightly the underlying relationship ... between capitalism and national domination” (Slovo, 1988), because it was the black worker, or black and worker, who suffered the most violation due to their race and their class status. Therefore, the black working class had to be part of the Apartheid struggle in a very distinct way.

Slovo also argued for the inclusion of the “Black middle strata and the emerging black bourgeoisie” (Slovo, 1988) in the national liberation alliance. This was because these classes had limited upward social mobility due to their race, despite their economic success. Moreover, the black middle class were usually the “most vocal articulators of demands ... (as we have experienced with black consciousness) (and) they are sometimes the pioneers of new variants of purely nationalist ideology” (Slovo, 1988). As such, the black middle class also had a distinct role in the struggle as intellectuals and opponents to a capitalist system that was supposed to be meritocratic, but was actually withholding reward for success.

Hudson (1986) points out that NDR was not part of the European brand of Marxism and Leninism, as neither saw the real place of national domination and its effects on colonised nations in Africa. Rather, the focus was on the dichotomy of classes (Hudson: 1986: 14) and this failed to account for the interface between race and class. However, as decolonisation in Africa grew in momentum, Marxist and Leninists began to see this interface as both a lived reality and as part of a strategy towards socialism (Hudson, 1986: 14). This was because capitalism enabled “social formations” (Hudson, 1986:18) and the development of “necessary goods” (Hudson, 1986: 17) that would assist the path to socialism. As Hudson puts it, “In order to fill what was considered to be a significant conceptual breach in Marxist-Leninism the concept national-democracy was introduced” (Hudson, 1986: 18). Once national democracy was recognised, it became part of the stages of struggle towards socialism.

In his part on “Stages of Struggle” (Slovo, 1988), Slovo argues that Apartheid struggle at the time would lead to national-democracy, not bourgeois-democracy (Slovo, 1988). Bourgeois democracy can be described as follows: “A government that serves in the interests of the bourgeois class. The word Democratic is attached to such a government, because in it all people in society have certain freedoms: those who own the means of production, the bourgeoisie, are free to buy and sell labour power and what is produced solely for their own benefit. Those who own their own only their own ability to labour, the proletariat, are free to sell themselves to any bourgeois who will buy their own survival, and giving greater strength and power to the bourgeoisie. The state fundamentally

represents the interests of one class over another” (Encyclopaedia of Marxism, 2014: online). Therefore a bourgeois democracy is one in which there is some sort of procedural democracy whereby power and authority is dispersed to larger sections of the population, through procedures such as voting. However, the government that may be elected only works in the favour and interests of elites, whilst continuing to exploit workers.

Slovo argued that bourgeois democracy was not a fitting label for the struggle at the time because the then ruling class “achieved and maintained its hegemony precisely through the mechanism of denying ‘bourgeois-democratic rights’ to the majority of the population” (Slovo, 1988). This meant that the disenfranchisement of the majority of black South Africans was the missing element in the characterisation of SA as a bourgeois democracy – hence the characterisation of Apartheid SA as heading for a national democracy instead, because “white political privilege has been the device to create and protect white economic privilege” (Slovo, 1988). Thus, once the black majority had been emancipated and given political freedom, a national emancipation would have taken place – leading to national democracy and not bourgeois democracy. In sum, and contrary to Marquard and early Marxist-Leninism theory, it was precisely the denial of democratic rights on the basis of race that maintained Apartheid.

At this point, it must be emphasised that Slovo, Lenin and the Marxist-Leninism tradition saw democracy as just a stage in the path to socialism. As Lenin said, “They [“petty-bourgeoisie democrats”] themselves share, and instil into the minds of the people, the false notion that universal suffrage “in the *present-day* state” is really capable of revealing the will of the majority of the working people and of securing its realisation” (Lenin, 1977: 247). This means that despite the disagreement of the relevance of national democracy and bourgeois democracy and other issues within the Marxist lineage, there is agreement within this political philosophy that democracy is not a permanent state. It is important to remember this because it forms the political philosophical roots of some of the opposition against the NDP.

3.5.3 Understanding the Opposition to the NDP

There are a few issues that need to be separated in order to understand the opposition to the NDP. Firstly, the political philosophy behind the SACP and COSATU’s ideology, namely the NDR, directly informs their opposition to the NDP. Moreover, this political philosophy sees the democratic state as a stage or step and not an end for SA. And the fact that these two groups are part of the Alliance compounds the issue. For these groups, it seems that the only way that the NDP can be acceptable is if the NDR has been effected and continues to move the country towards a communist or socialist state. However, despite how rich and interesting this political philosophy is, it remains an issue that the Alliance must tackle, and probably with the participation of as many groups as possible from outside the Alliance, who would be affected by the decisions made by the Alliance. This participation

is warranted because in our democracy we should continue to expect that democratic processes are considered for decision making and that participation and accountability remain at the core of those processes.

The second issue is that although there have been rumblings from the SACP and COSATU about their opposition to the NDP, there does not seem to be a consistent approach to formulating and dealing with their opposition position. They do not seem to have a concerted effort towards responding to the NDP. Starting with the SACP, the party has released a “discussion document” (SACP, 2013: online) entitled “Let’s Not Monumentalise the National Development Plan” (SACP, 2013: online) which outlines their regard of the NDP. The SACP outlines four issues with the NDP in this document: how the NDP diagnoses SA’s difficulties; the process associated with building “national consensus” (SACP, 2013: online) for the plan; the NPC’s “institutionalisation and composition” (SACP, 2013: online); and the “specific recommendations” (SACP, 2013: online) of the NDP. But this document is not thorough in that it does not say what parts of the NDP it really agrees with and disagrees with. The only thing it does to this effect is give a few lines on its agreement with the NDP on a National Health Insurance (NHI) system, “demilitarisation of the police” (SACP, 2013: online), infrastructure building, human settlement reform and corruption. Also, the document takes political swipes at the DA and the NPC, which questions their ability to work with groups that suggest alternatives to the current state of SA. As an interview with Mr Muller, a National Planning Commissioner, revealed, it is not enough to oppose something. One must or should suggest realistic and workable solutions.

COSATU has two documents publicly available that discuss their regard for the NDP – “Summary Critique of the National Development Plan, March 2013” (Critique document; COSATU, 2013: online) and “Mangaung and the second phase of the transition” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online). These documents are far more detailed and explain how COSATU’s gripe with the NDP centres on the economic detail of the plan. The Mangaung document in particular outlines problems that the NDP presents to COSATU. These problems are a limited or “unrealistic” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online) unemployment definition which does not consider “discouraged work seekers” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online); proposal of “low quality and unsustainable jobs” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online) in the NDP; the persistence of “high levels of inequality” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online) until the plan is finalised; and, a “very low poverty measure” (Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online). These are valid concerns as they affect the way in which the economic development of SA as a democratic developmental state will occur. However, both the COSATU documents state that they are “not the official view of COSATU” (Critique document and Mangaung document; COSATU, 2013: online), which questions the validity and reliability of these documents.

Despite the uncoordinated response to the NDP, both the SACP and COSATU question the detail of the NDP. That is, rather than buy into the nationalist aspect of the NDP which aims to unify the country behind a plausible plan, these groups pick up on the fact that the developmentalist details still needs to be clarified.

Section 4: Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Problem Identification and Analysis of the NDP

The NDP acknowledges that SA needs to develop, but not develop for development's sake. Instead, it does well to use development as a tool to advance the state from transition to independent and able to stand against a diverse range of challenges – be they exogenous external economic shocks or internal weaknesses. However, the way in which the NDP characterises the problem that South Africa is facing – the problem analysis and identification is inaccurate at worst and exaggerated at best. Firstly, the NDP begins by identifying the economic challenges as being partly a result of the 2008 global financial crisis. The NDP says that this crisis was unforeseen, SA was unprepared and the result has been a rethink of the economic and social policy. It's true that the world relied too heavily on asset bubbles and illusory and unprinted bank notes. But this is not the beginning of SA's story or need for an NDP. Although the NDP does not say that the global financial crisis is the root of SA's development problems, the plan implies this and reads so. It seems as though the NDP identifies the problem as being South Africa's unpreparedness for exogenous economic shocks and analyses its situation as inevitably linked to the rest of the globe.

Secondly, the plan moves on to discuss how SA should become a powerhouse in the region and cooperate with its neighbours to uplift the continent. This may be a valid goal but it does not have enough justification to be reason for development internally. In the course of regional history, SA was the rogue state during Apartheid whose colonialism of a special type was loosed with the help of both regional and international powers. And since then, SA has seemingly taken the lead in democracy, institution building, rule of law and economic growth – after Nigeria, which very recently overtook SA as the fastest growing economy in SA. However, the impetus to be a regional leader seems to be derived from more of a superiority complex than a regional African complex. Development regionally makes sense if it is justified by the need for African development that utilises economies to provide more than bread, competitiveness with the world without leaving each other behind and protecting national and regional interests through conflict resolution instead of backdoor quiet diplomacy. The NDP does not note any of this. Instead, it repeats the need to become a regional powerhouse as though repetition will lead to justification of the NDP. Thirdly, at the end of the plan, the issues and impediments such as corruption and a state struggling with where to concentrate power, as mentioned bywords, as opposed to some of the problems needing urgent attention.

In essence, these three segments of the NDP could be better placed within the plan and within the narrative of South African development, which could give a better problem analysis of why the NDP is needed at this time. The NDP already identifies that poverty, inequality and employment are part of the reason for SA's vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks, but these should be recognised as

precipitating causes of the problem and analysed as such. In fact, poverty and unemployment are underlying causes of the need for development because they signify a lack of ability of the state and economy to either provide the opportunities conducive to a decrease in poverty and an increase in employment, or the lack of the state's ability to provide public and social goods to protect individuals and communities when they are in relative poverty or unemployed. On the other hand, the NDP does not acknowledge that inequality in SA is partly as a result of a widening income gap between the poor, the working-class, the middle-class and the new as well as the entrenched wealthy strata. The NDP rightly proposes ways to deal with this through skills and training programmes, job creation, concentration on potentially viable industries and social protection. But the NDP fails to acknowledge that the issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment should be dealt with within the internal context of South Africa, before looking to the external or global context that exacerbates these issues in difficult global economic times.

Why does it matter whether the NDP identifies and analyses the problems of SA using an internal or global context? It matters because the motive and strategy for the NDP will be reflective of the problem identification and analysis. It also matters because it does not work hard enough to speak to a South African who is more concerned about their daily survival than the global context. Dealing with the first reason, if the state identifies that poverty and unemployment as underlying causes and inequality as precipitating causes of grow from the root cause of the structure of the economy and society, then the NDP would have to admit that the procedural gains for democracy since 1994 have not necessarily led to the substantive gains that democracy could be yielding for South Africans today. On the other hand, if the problem is identified and analysed using the context of the global financial crisis, the NDP is only forced to admit vulnerability and not culpability. This means that the NDP takes advantage of hindsight as a good teacher by using the global financial crisis to motivate the NDP and inform part of its strategy, instead of being clear about the fact that South Africa had possibly not taken enough economic ground between 1994 and 2008 to survive such a crisis in the first place.

The other reason that it matters whether the NDP identifies the problem using an internal or global context, is because the NDP needs to speak to the situations of all sections of South African society and not just to those who understand or found themselves affected by the global financial crisis. If one was poor, unemployed and/or marginalised due to inequality prior to the global financial crisis, how does the NDP speak to their situation through the narrow context of the global financial crisis? It does not. It uses their situation to suddenly wake up and realise that there are people who were and continue to be vulnerable if the state does not provide conditions and opportunities for them to survive. This raises another issue of the NDP, which is indirectly related to the problem analysis and identification: who is the NDP written for? An academic investigation of the NDP forces one to understand it, a business or industrial investigation makes one curious about how their interests will

be protected through it and a government department will be forced to implement it. But the NDP does not read like a document that a poor person can understand or grapple with, and this is partly why public discourse around the NDP is so vital.

If the state is serious about building a democratic developmental state for everyone, then everyone should at least be able to read or understand the plan for themselves and decide what they feel about it. Not even representation through interest groups and political parties is sufficient to understand the plan. During the interview with Professor Rehnsburg, it was found that there has been a lack of government-initiated public discussion around the plan, possibly because other matters – namely Marikana and Nkandla – have consumed the public discourse for the past four years. Firstly, both Marikana and Nkandla are a result of government action, or lack of, that have to be dealt with properly by government and the state because they question one of the very tenets of our democracy – accountability. Secondly, government can take certain and positive steps towards making the NDP accessible to everyone if it is really a plan that will be seen through. These steps can include summarising the NDP into a simple pamphlet that can be found at any government office in the country; translating the NDP into the other ten official languages in SA (English being the eleventh official language); encouraging government departments to have strategy planning sessions on how they can align with the NDP and presenting the findings of those sessions; having debates on radio and television about what the NDP is, etc.

4.2 Tension between Democracy and Development

Earlier in this research report, reference was made to the conditions of consolidating democracy (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 58 – 61). According to Leftwich, “the conditions of consolidation are crucial in shaping the democratic developmental state” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 58) because they determine the direction of development. Leftwich gives three conditions for the consolidation of democracy. The first condition is “Legitimacy” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 58) comprising “*geographical, constitutional and political legitimacy*” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 58). Geographical legitimacy refers to the agreement of territorial boundaries of a state; constitutional legitimacy refers to agreement about “the rule for the organisation and distribution of political power” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 58 – 59); and agreement on fair elections (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 59). The second condition of democratic consolidation is “Consensus and constitutionalism” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 59), whereby there is “agreement about the rules of the political game by major parties and groups” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 59). The third condition for consolidation is “Policy restraint by winners” (Robinson et al, ed., 1998: 59). This means that groups or parties must realise that their policy plans may be constrained if the losers perceive that policies are a threat to their position. This is a constraint for development.

The significance of consolidating conditions for democracy is that although SA has somewhat passed the first two conditions of democratic consolidation, the third condition for consolidation is not certain. This is because firstly, the opposition to the NDP is from within the Alliance, which means that either compromises must continue to be made, or the NDP along with other issues could bring about a shift in the democratic order of SA – which will impact the course of development. Moreover, policy such as the NDP could be constrained by winners for short-term trade-offs or fear of their unknown political future. The point here is that the NDP cannot be read in isolation from a number of factors within SA, as the pulse of SA as a possible democratic developmental state *is* democracy. As such, democracy in SA with class-compromise as a backdrop could delay the achievement of the NDP.

Another significant factor that the NDP raises between democracy and development, is that the plan assumes that development and democracy are compatible processes. This is not always the case. Recall that earlier in this research report, some of the academic literature explained that development is usually a radical process whilst democracy is usually a conservative process, especially when elites within a democracy seek to entrench their positions. The Mangaung document by COSATU alludes to this tension between democracy and development when it says that “the NDP accepts that massively high levels of concentration of wealth and poverty will still be in place by 2030” (Mangaung document, COSATU, 2013: online). Therefore the NDP is not a remedy in the medium term and the comfort that it implies will not be experienced for a while yet. However, the NDP does recognise that “Developmental states have been created in both authoritarian and democratic countries. In many cases, democracy has been crucial in ensuring the state has sufficient legitimacy to bring about transformation” (NDP, 2012: 409). This illustrates that the NDP is aware of the possible tension between democracy and development, but that it intends for SA to follow democratic obligations when embarking on its developmental path.

4.3 Nationalism and the Democratic Developmental State

Mkandawire touches on the fact that in the instances of developmental states that the world witnessed in the twentieth century, nationalism played a cohesive role in the fortification of the development state. As Mkandawire puts it, nationalism can be a “means of binding together a nation” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 61), supplying an “ideological rationale to the indigenous classes in their own struggle against foreign domination” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 61) and creating “internal cohesion and discipline” (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 61). On the other hand, Mkandawire notes that nationalism may be used to justify illogical economic decisions in order to secure development (Edigheji, ed., 2010: 61). Before discussing the role of nationalism in the NDP, the concept of nationalism will be explored briefly.

There are different definitions of nationalism and all of them express a sentiment or connection between the state and characteristics of the inhabitants that live in that state. This connection can be physical in the sense that a group can be indigent to a particular territory; or it can be aspirant, in the sense that a people group can align its religion, culture and other practices and beliefs to a territory or state. As one definition puts it, “Nations are more fluid – defined at their most basic by a sense of belonging to a community, and possessing a sense of separateness” (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2009: online). Similarly, another definition says that “Nationalism is an ideology that supports a direct relationship between political state and ethnic group” (Strychin, 2008: online). Nationalism can become contentious when it is used to claim benefits and entitlements from the state, and nationalism has had a different journey in different parts of the world (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2009: online).

The former definition of nationalism offered above observes that “nationalist movements seen in the developing world at the time of decolonisation were the product of different forces” (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2009: online). This is understandable because the historical fact of colonisation divided people groups, and the states that they found themselves in were not always homogenous, in terms of religion, culture, language and other characteristics. Therefore another connection needs to be made to tie various people groups to the state. This is where different definitions of nationalism become useful, such as the one that asserts that nationalism “is associated with the idea of political agreement between the individuals, rather than being coterminous with a racially defined people” (Strychin, 2008: online). It is the aspect of political agreement that is essential for people within borders that are not necessarily a homogenous people group. Political agreement allows groups to move forward with a mutually beneficial agreement – as discussed in Leftwich’s forms of the democratic developmental state. Another definition of nationalism recognises this, saying that nationalism usually describes one of two instances: “(1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination” (Zalta, ed., 2014: online). In the case of SA, political agreement and self-determination through democracy can be said to constitute the nationalist element of the NDP. The NDP does admit that “nation building has been more difficult in times of slower economic growth” (NDP, 2012: 35), which illustrates the point that self-determination and democracy inform the NDP’s stance on nationalism.

The idea that democracy is used as a type of nationalism in the NDP and as a cohesive tool is not unfounded. During an interview with Professor Rensburg it was found that the background to the formulation of the NDP is the Constitution. This means that part of the foundation of the NDP is the mandate that the Constitution has to uphold democracy through a functioning state that delivers substantive freedom and not just procedural democracy. This being the case, democracy is used

indirectly to justify developmental reforms even if the detail of those reforms is uncertain and in dispute.

4.4 Building a Capable and Developmental State

The NDP should be given credit for recognising that in order to effect the changes that are necessary for development, the state needs to be equipped and fortified in as many areas as possible. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, if one agrees, as evidence by Leftwich has shown, that development is primarily a political task in the sense that politics is what directs and guides reform, then institutions should be organised in a way that supports public administration that can make the necessary political changes for a development agenda.

Secondly, a democratic developmental state has to focus its energy and resources on both maintaining democracy and implementing development. Both of these activities must be continually scrutinised in order for a democratic developmental state to be realised. But building a capable and developmental state is not necessarily a new agenda item now that the NDP is in place, or now that the NDP has said that this is a priority. If one reads the relevant chapter closely in the NDP, one finds that the chapter is actually referring to public administration issues in SA. These issues are not new and there have been attempts to reform the public administration in SA since 1994.

Attempts at reforming the public administration in SA have usually been in the shape of legislation such as the Public Administration and Management Act (Parliament, 2014: online) which deals with some of the recruitment recommendations that the NDP proposes; and the point here is that the changes that the NDP is recommending in the area of building a capable and developmental state are changes which have been attempted before and whose outcomes are yet to be seen because the enforcement of these changes – through legislation – will take time. Thus there are gaps between current legislation, public policy and action in public administration reform, and the closing of these gaps will determine the effectiveness and the ability of the state to implement developmental changes. On the other hand, the attempt of the NDP to close the said gaps is also definitely an attempt to do what successful traditional developmental states have done in the past, by isolating the public administration, then known as the bureaucracy; and strengthening it from within by reforming the way in which it works. This should go a long way in ensuring that the NDP is achievable in the long run.

Where corruption is concerned, again, there are existing measures in place in SA that are in place to prevent corruption, which impedes development. Some of these measure include legislation such as the Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act (Government of SA, 2004: online) and “Chapter 9” (Constitution, 1996) institutions such as the Public Protector and the Auditor General. The problem that arises here is that where corruption in SA is concerned, it seems that there is no clear public

policy strategy for dealing with this issue. Instead, corruption at all levels is seen with disdain but is not treated with the urgency and remedial action that individuals and institutions expect. Take for example the issue of Nkandla: at the time of writing, Parliament had just experienced a fracas between the opposition parties and the executive, over unsatisfactory answers over whether the President would pay back money overspent on his personal residence. At the heart of this issue is a lack of accountability and a disrespect for institutions that have made recommendations on the required remedial action. Therefore, although the NDP speaks about dealing with corruption, it cannot be said that SA has reached a point where legislation, public policy and national plans are consistent on this matter.

Conclusion

Four research problems were identified at the beginning of this research, namely, finding the theoretical and philosophical pillars of the NDP, whether the South African state has the capacity to fulfil the NDP, the opposition to the NDP and what shape public policy should take to realise the NDP. It was found that the overarching theoretical pillar of the NDP is the democratic developmental state, which compromises the need for the continual consolidation of democracy in order to legitimise the developmental agenda of the state. However, with this finding came the realisation that firstly, democracy and development are not always compatible because liberal representative democracy is mostly a conservative process whereas development can be a radical process. The NDP does note that the Constitution must be upheld in all development processes that take place in SA, which recognises the need to sustain procedural democracy and produce substantive democracy.

But the danger with democratic developmentalism is that democracy may be used to justify or circumvent some issues that arise when the development process begins. Furthermore, due to the legitimising nature of democracy, the assumption that the development reform taking place is sound is not always true. This means that whereas processes such as developmental oligarchy may become authoritarian and brutal by nature – for other reasons than development – democracy seems to mask some of the injustices that may take place under the banner of development. This is clear in the response of COSATU to the NDP, which correctly recognises that although development is beneficial for the long term, short term issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality may persist until the goals of the NDP are achieved.

The second research problem which arose is whether the South African state has the capacity to fulfil the NDP. The research found that although development involves economic growth which then fuels changes in society, development is primarily a political task. What this means is that political forces – be they political parties, socio-economic classes or the government – should be the ones to set the development agenda and oversee it. Currently, political forces in SA have managed to set the agenda through the NDP. The uncertainty comes in when we ask whether these forces can drive that change, both by keeping the NDP at the forefront of everything the country does and by appropriately reforming the state apparatus – the public administration – to implement the developmental goals set in the NDP. The research also found that where development has relied solely on economic growth without an equally focused concentration on governance, developmental oligarchy takes root and is unsustainable. In this regard, SA has rightly maintained that democracy requires development but that the changes that take place under development should align with the democratic Constitution of South Africa.

The third research problem identified was how the NDP can proceed with the opposition within the Alliance. The research found that although seemingly uncoordinated, the opposition to the NDP does raise the fundamental issue of whether the plan will be able to achieve both the processes of development and democratisation comfortably – as discussed above. Moreover, democratic SA began as a country whose socio-economic classes had to compromise in order to reach the point of democracy. This class compromise still exists and can be seen in the response of the opposition to the NDP. Class compromise may be a stumbling block for the NDP because without all socio-economic classes buying into, or understanding the NDP, there will continue to be backlash against the plan.

A final and fourth research problem raised was what the shape of South African public policy should take in order for the NDP to be realised. The research found that there is need for there to be consistency between the development goals of the NDP, legislation and public policy. It is almost pointless to present a plan for the growth of our country, whilst disregarding current legislation, checks and balances. Based on the findings related to these research problems, how prudent and achievable is the NDP?

In terms of achievability, the research found that historically there have been examples of developmental states in Africa, particularly in the period following decolonisation. Coupled with the need for a consideration of the history of individual states, SA is on the right track when it considers how issues such as land and human settlements will affect the implementation of the NDP. What remains is for government and the state to continue to make the changes in these policy areas that are required, in order to realise the NDP to its fullest possible extent. Where the NDP fails in this regard is that it does not acknowledge some of the existing issues on the ground that affect the vital land issues under dispute. For instance, the NDP does not really discuss the fact that women are affected by the rural economy, or how traditional leadership and governance will be strengthened, or lessened, to achieve the NDP. Again, this is a public policy issue that should be properly thrashed out.

Also related to the achievability, the lack of engagement between the state and the public on the NDP is worrying. There is agreement that the NDP comes at a time when urgent changes to SA's society and economy are needed. But if no attention is being directed towards the NDP, it is difficult to fathom how the state will achieve the plan because those who should be working on it and aware of it, are not mindful of it. The research also found, especially through interviews, that the responsibility for constant public engagement with the NDP is the responsibility of the government. It is true that other issues may arise that dominate the public mind for a while, but those issues are not solely created by the public. Government must ensure that no matter what dominates the agenda for short periods of time, there should be a beacon that always points to the NDP. Therefore the suggestions about how the government and the state can engage with the public on the NDP should be taken seriously by policymakers.

The NDP can be said to be a prudent plan overall because it does aim to address the critical challenges that SA faces today. And this was emphasised by one interview, in which it was found that although individuals and groups may not be completely satisfied with the details of the plan, the NDP is a possible method of handling some of these challenges.

Appendix

Interview 1

Date: 14/11/2015

Interviewer: Thokozani Jean Chilenga (TJC)

Interviewee: Professor Ihron Rensburg (IR), National Planning Commissioner on the National Planning Commission for South Africa's National Development Plan

Time: 14:30

Transcript

TJC: So for the purposes of the recording, I am Thokozani Jean Chilenga on behalf of the Political Studies Department at the University of Witwatersrand. I will now be interviewing Professor Rensburg – Vice Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg, who is a National Planning Commission – sorry National Planning *Commissioner* – for the National Development Plan. Professor Rensburg, thank you very much for agreeing to do this interview.

Just as background, please may you explain your role as National Planning Commissioner.

IR: That's an interesting one. So the National Planning Commission's focus is on developing a national plan for South Africa. That was completed just over a year ago or more. Um, and so that is a development plan for 2030. And so, like my fellow commissioners, um, it was our duty to spend some time to consider, reflect on the future of South Africa that we would wish to have and that is in line with our Constitution, or at least, advances the ambitions of our Constitution for a new society. Inclusive, caring, prosperous – inclusive key word – um, democratic, non-sexist. Um, um, a society that um, is less unequal and a society in which there is no poverty. So we spent quite a bit of time having a conversation about our ideal future. That is, in 2030. Our job then was to organise ourselves into various working groups, the purpose of which was then to dissect, to analyse, to examine, to dialogue, and to debate for those different component, um, of this new society, um a detailed, uh, view of the present, a detailed view of the future, an initial examination of how to get there. So in essence that was the work. Subsequent, then to the beginning, uh, or the initial work. We then developed and delivered a first report called a Diagnostic Report, and the Diagnostic Report was then intended to provide South Africa with, in many respects what South Africa knows, but nonetheless to provide South Africa with a Diagnostic view; at the same time to provide a critical comment on that diagnosis. Um, in particular to highlight why and what is wrong with this, uh, society that we currently find ourselves in. And economy for that matter. That was delivered and that became the focus of much debate and much dialogue that was initiated by the National Planning Commission.

Uh, and then subsequent to that we went back to work to construct the development plan. Um, and that work was completed as I say a while ago – there's a copy of the plan there. And um, subsequent to tabling the report to the President and to Parliament, we've then gone back into commission again in order to begin to conceptualise and develop catalytic programmes and activities in order to catalyse the development plan itself. Ultimately, it's the job of the state, to having adopted it by way of the ruling party and by way of cabinet and for that matter by way of affirmation by Parliament - across the board parties affirmed the National Development Plan. And, ultimately though, it's the job of the state to give effect to the National Development Plan. Um, and so my current role, as we wind down our own timeline, which ends some time at the end of April for this first commission, and since the tabling of the development plan, my work has been to chair one of the three working groups. And the working group that I chair is one for social protection and human capabilities. Um, and so that is where we are catalysing or seeking to catalyse some important initiatives.

TJC: Ok, you say that it was the National Development Plan was affirmed by Parliament and looking at the development trajectory since 1994, the RDP was actually made and act, the um, sorry the Reconstruction and Development Plan was actually an act. Is there a reason, whether it's ideological, theoretical, philosophical or otherwise, why the National Development Plan was *not* an act?

IR: No, um, now we of course had a green paper that became the source of the work for the National Planning Commission. Um, the National Development Plan was conceptualised, or at least the process and its outcomes was conceptualised, as a document for society...

TJC: Ok

IR:...and so I'm correcting myself – it's not just for the state, it's for society. It's for the state to implement significant dimensions and aspects for the plan but it's for society, business, labour, everyone to embrace the plan. So it's a plan for society. Conceptually, do we need an act for society, just to compel society to implement the plan? No, clearly not, it is a matter of consent. It's a matter of dialogue and deliberation. It's a matter of engaging with it on the assumption that it is presented on a regular basis, actively in society, both for cognitive engagement but also for practice engagement and perhaps that is an interesting gap, um, as we stand now because since the plan and the initial, uh and the support built around the plan, and we'll come back to differences shortly, um, since then you may say that there's been a vacuum in terms of communication and advocacy around the plan. Um, a closer scrutiny might find that there are sporadic or limited interventions from time to time which is a real pity, uh, in and of itself. And of course since the tabling of the plan there've been so many events that have dominated the headlines, therefore in turn have, um, been the focus in the minds of society – whether from the middle and upper classes, the working class, the lower middle class, or from the poor, the unemployed, the urban and the rural. There's simply too many things that, um, reach them intellectually on a day by day basis. Just consider yesterday's, um, extraordinary events in

Parliament, um, as the culmination of a whole series of background activities around Nkandla. Clearly, uh, building up to the national provincial elections last year. And subsequently, Nkandla has been an absolute dominant factor, um um, not only for the elites – the political and economic elites – but also for ordinary South Africans. That seems to be the focal point, which stand at odds of course, with the desire to have, um, the National Development Plan, um, top of mind. Uh, so there is a top of mind problem here, and or issue here, or dynamic or challenge. And top of mind is simply, or at least allegedly, is what is in the media and what is in Parliament. Uh, that seems to be the kind of debate, although I suspect bottom up for people, it's about a job and particularly for one third of South Africans who are unemployed it's about a job. So uh, it's it's it's about a day to day struggle. So for 40% or so of our population it's about just the grind of getting food on the table for themselves and their children. Um, whereas for perhaps the middle classes, and the elites more broadly, it is about Nkandla um, top of mind issue.

TJC: Ok. Now, you wear two hats for the question I'm about to ask because not only are you a National Planning Commissioner, you're also Vice Chancellor of UJ. The NDP says that it will quote, "strengthen and expand the number of FET colleges to increase the participation rate to 25%" end quote. And also, quote, "increase the graduation rate of FET colleges to 75%", end quote. As a Vice Chancellor can you identify a link between universities such as University of Johannesburg and FET colleges and the outcomes that this link could possibly produce?

IR: Um, of course the, what lies behind that policy direction, uh, and policy decision ultimately, are a set of important issues – allow me just to digress just briefly. So, if one looks historically at the evolution of South Africa's system of post-school education – for that post-school education, if you look at the whole system, um, um, and I use system loosely – um, if you look at it from um, approximately the middle of the twentieth century, um, the beginnings of Apartheid, but still the experience of colonialism preceding that period. If we just use that as a starting point and we look at the last, um, sixty four years since then, right? A little older than me [laughs]. So if we look at that period since then we see a trajectory which is informed largely by its British colonial history. Although Britain has moved on in some respects subsequently with the kind of robust growth of the FET colleges in the UK, uh, but also alongside it a fairly robust apprenticeship system. But clearly not on the same scale as Germany right, or Switzerland, a smaller nation but still a robust system of technical, vocational post-school educational opportunities which are valued and valuable. So if we look then at South Africa against that background and we trace then the evolution of the system, not in quantity but in quality – sorry not in quality but in quantity, apologies – we see then a sixty-odd year period in which the university has been prefaced. Um, and so what matters – and of course I'm referring to a period here of racism and Apartheid and of bulkanised, Bantustan-nised, um, nativised, tribalised, um schooling colleges and universities – so against that kind of background. But if we extract the data, if you look at the trajectory, it's the university, right. And therefore as a consequence

every parent and ipso facto every child, ipso facto every teacher in school, principal, that stands behind that child or in front of that child too often, um, the storyline drummed into that child from the first year of high school is, 'what matters in life is university education'. Um, I'm just reminded of a story in this morning's paper about South Korea coming to a standstill today. Um, and why? Because it's the big university entrance exams which are written today. Um, it is so important an event in that nation because it determines who you're going to get married to, what job you're going to get, what your future prospects are, right. It's quite extraordinary. But there's a practical illustration of it in today's The Times right, it's something worth referring to or checking out. Um, so much so that you're be fascinated to know that one of the things, everyone tries everything to make sure that nothing disturbs any of the children from getting to that exam. Today was English, right, um, a writing test. And s, just by way of example, the first appeal was that workers should arrive late at work in order to allow these young folk to get to their exams, so that the roads are not clogged, right. Secondly, I think it is in particular in the capital Seoul, um, the police had set aside all of their vehicles, emergency vehicles in order to escort any young person who's stuck somewhere and unable to get to the exam, to get to that exam, right, with, a flash lights and everything. I'm just using this as a quick reference to illustrate how in some societies university education is so hyped up that if you don't get into university you're a failure, right. Alternatively, you have to bargain for less than you could have bargained for than if you'd ended up with a university qualification. Of course the assumption is that once you get in you actually get a qualification in the end.

Um, so coming back, backing up then, South Africa's trajectory is informed by such an account, right, such an intensity, uh, about going to university. And so what has happened as a consequence, because of that – or shall I say despite that? Even right – is that the design of the system that has evolved is a design of school, little bit of college, but university. There was a period, and um, you probably will have come across this, uh, the de Langer Commission, uh, established, uh, in the, if I have it right in the early 80s. Um, its job, uh, from an Apartheid planning point of view was to try and correct that. But clearly it was a failure, um, um, because it simply didn't get traction. Nonetheless, so what has happened in South Africa is five years ago, just backing up to five years ago we had roughly, 850 000 students in university and 300 000 in the college sector. It's extraordinary, it should be the other way around, yeah, simply because a nation needs a critical mass of technical and vocational skills and capabilities. Uh, and the ratio should be 5:1, but 3:1 is ok. So for every three persons in a technical vocational college, one in a university. Of course what has happened is that at the same time we have seen the technical colleges, some of them, emerging as technikons in the early 70s and 80s. And of course the technikons subsequently, their leadership have fought hard to be recognised as universities. But that's a debate for another day. But it's worth then, actually, stripping out that volume of students enrolled in technical vocational education at university level, um, to get a better ratio – I just don't have that number in my head now. I'm guessing that out of the 850 000 five years ago roughly

enrolled in university, possibly 200 000, were enrolled, maybe 150 000, were enrolled in technical vocational university education. So you may want to add that to the 300 000, and then you end up with 550 against 700. Nonetheless, you still sit with a problem. So that then is the context and of course the evolution of the economy into the future, set the scene for or provides the context for rethinking this structure – this lopsided structure. Um, in fact put it differently, this inverted pyramid, we've got to bring the pyramid back on to its base, in essence, uh, in order um, to, to accommodate the requirements of the new economy and society. But also to provide massive expansion in the colleges. As we speak now that picture's changed somewhat, um, and so we have now approximately 1.1 million students enrolled in the university system and about 700 000 in the college system. Again if we were to strip out those in the university system in technical vocational, let's say this time it's grown to 200 000, so you then sit with 900 and 900. You can see that if we use that kind of formulation, both categories of post-school technical vocational education – both college and so called university level – um, then you sitting with a 900 000: 900 000 ratio. Our plan, then, the plan, I should correct myself – *the National Development Plan* – then provides for this evolution to continue to a point where in 2030 we've 1.6 million enrolled in the university system including some private provision and some in the, uh, college system to evolve to close to 2 million. So, so, so if we again strip out the 1.6, maybe 400 000, or even 300 000, um, you could then end up with a 2.3:1.3 ratio. Ideally, we're looking for a 3:1 ratio. Um, so against that background then, the question arises, so um, where do universities fit it. Clearly in the verses of technology would be the primary players given the programme offerings that they offer. And for that matter then comprehensives such as the University of Johannesburg which have merged the technikon Witwatersrand and Rand Afrikaanse University. Um, and so we've also brought in a sizeable chunk, um, at the point of merger we had brought in 18 000 students from technikon Witwatersrand mainly enrolled in health sciences, engineering and some management programmes, right. So those 18 000 or so students then coming in together with some 30 000 students from RAU including about 1000 from Vista University. So the ratio inside the university now as we speak, um, subsequent to ten years ago is roughly a ratio of, um, out of 42 000 undergraduate students, about 16 000 are enrolled in diploma programmes or let me put it differently, in technological programmes because many of those programmes are degree programmes as well. So a degree in audio visual in design and art faculty, right, um, that is a technical vocational, or a technical offering; it's not a humanities offering, it's a technical vocational offering, or to use the politically correct term – it's a technological programme right. But it's a degree programme so one has to catch oneself all the time that it's not just the diploma programmes that sit in that domain. So I know that, and I guess the lead for you, would be that NMMU, unless you've already got them in focus, um, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, has established a centre, uh, whose job it is to drive partnerships with the college sector.

Um, coming back to big question – so what’s the deal what’s the issues? It could be that it’s important for universities, comprehensives but especially universities of technology to work closely with these colleges on two fronts, maybe three fronts. The one front is programmes, and programme offerings and the quality of those programme offerings. And so there the issue is that it is quite possible for these colleges to evolve to offer many of the programmes that are offered in universities of technology and in comprehensives. The certificate programme by way of example as we all as the diploma programmes for that matter. There’s a very important development by way of example in engineering, where historically we’ve had a, the following stack up in terms of qualifications: a two year national diploma which, to which we add one year work integrated learning. So it’s a three year programme although it’s a two plus one programme. A bachelor of technology qualification, which is a one year qualification, right, which follows after your one year diploma, right. So you then end up with a national diploma and a BTech. Right? Then of course you have the MTech and the DTech, right. So the focus in the engineering, uh, space in the country, has been to say, actually this idea of a two – of a diploma plus a DTech, two plus one plus one – doesn’t work. Ideally what we’re looking for – yes the national diploma, that’s the technician level – and that’s the part that I believe can be covered eventually, tackled by the colleges, so that we elevate those colleges from simply offering equivalent to high school qualifications and a little bit more, to offering substantive qualifications. Uh, my own thinking is that the certificates and diplomas of UJ in engineering – its diploma not certificate – we can easily transfer to our neighbouring, uh, um, FET colleges. In particular those that carry engineering or are engineering focused, right. And there are a couple of them that we’re working with. So that would be the big idea. But now what is happening is then the, the, engineering profession together with universities have developed a new qualification called, a Bachelor of Engineering Technology. So that is a full three year degree programme. So instead of a BTech, its now called and BET, right. So the idea then is that you have a diploma technician, a BET technologist; overlapping with it but different, I wouldn’t want to lock them into the same system, but overlapping with it but next to it, the Bachelor of Engineering, or the BSc Engineering which is a four year qualification leading to professional registration as a professional engineer. That’s really the three part system then within engineering. I’m just using this as an example then to make the case that there is a real possibility that in the next decade, colleges will be elevated, and they can be elevated in this manner that I’ve described. That’s the first big issue.

The second big issue, um, obviously arising from this set of issues, of articulation, right, programme articulation. So if I’ve completed a national diploma for argument’s sake in the future world at a college, right, um, what happens if I want five years later after working for five years, I actually think I’m ok to become a technologist. And so those designing issues are important, to, to secure articulation and mobility, um, vertically within the profession, right. And then of course, a horizontally between colleges and universities. So that’s the second bug issue. And both of these are

ultimately about quality assurance, both of these are ultimately about the third issue as well which is teacher qualifications or lecturer qualifications. And so a big role for universities of technologies and comprehensives, is to step up, step into that bridge and provide leadership in terms of providing both the current but the future set of lecturers. I mean, if we're going to go from a system of now 700 000, three times up, triple it, where do we get those skills from, um, and and, therefore the training and the offering of of, these qualifications within these educational faculties or colleges of universities. And universities of technology are important, um and a critical step to enable this college system to evolve. I should say finally that um, this system is evolving, ironically at the cost of universities because ordinarily that investment would have gone into universities. You get that point right? So universities in terms of their own ambitions are capped. Um, precisely because of this important policy direction being taken. I should say of course that this policy direction also took its cue from the Department of Higher Education and Training's own green paper at the time, now white paper for post-school education and training.

TJC: Ok. So you've identified the structure and how FET colleges and universities can and should work together to realise 2030. Having done research on the education system through my Honours paper, which was on the Limpopo Textbook Crisis, and you know, some of the fractured parts of the system that were inherited. Do you think that some of this change will involve changing parents' perceptions or guardians' perceptions or teachers' perceptions about FET colleges?

IR: Absolutely. I'm sure you want to hear more from me on that [laughs]. I think that uh, if you're looking for a fourth leg of this whole value chain or game plan then um, an active, um, uh, advocacy programme is absolutely important. Just to illustrate, this year, um, for admission into next year's academic class, we've received some 35 000 applications. And that again reinforces this line of argument that universities still are seen as the real deal, that colleges – that's trading down, right. And I will trade down when I don't have an option of getting into university but let me put my hand up, uh. So, so, so advocacy is important. What the department is doing is a pull, is implementing a pull strategy and that pull strategy is to make available student aid to those who then opt or who end up trading down into the college system. Um, and again that's a chunk of money, two billion Rands, that ordinarily would have gone into um, state aid for for university students who aren't able to finance their studies. And it would have gone a long way to breaking the back of the backlog, or the high demand, of of our students for our students for the National Student Financial Aid Scheme. That seems to be successful in terms of having moved the system from 300 000 to 700 000.

TJC: Ok. The NDP refers to creating an attractive graduate recruitment programme to capture highly skilled personnel for the public service. Do you think that the NPC and the – sorry the National Planning Commission – and the Public Service Commission are currently doing enough to realise this vision?

IR: Just remind me of the first part?

TJC: The NDP refers to creating an attractive graduate recruitment programme to capture highly skilled personnel for public service in particular.

IR: Look, I mean it's clearly a work in progress. Um, I, I think that you know the waxing and waning of public opinion about the public service um, notwithstanding that – let me put it that the waxing and waning of public opinion and public anxiety about the state and of the state, um. It's interesting that when you do, and I can't remember now where, who did this survey, um, amongst black graduates was done recently which shows that 90% of black graduate would be looking for a job in the state. It's a safe job, guaranteed job, no risk. Um, so it's a very interesting. So irrespective of the state, irrespective of the state of state owned enterprises – SAA, SABC, Eskom, you know, that appear to be struggling entities – um, young people still would like a job at SABC, SAA, Eskom in management or supervisory levels. They would still like a job in Home Affairs, you know, despite its image of being a struggling department.

TJC: So following on from that question, uh, question, my idea is that there would be some sort of cadet public service programme to recruit graduates into the public service. Be that the education department, or like you say, a state owned enterprise. What role do you think a South African higher education institution such as UJ, could play in fulfilling such, you know, a vision – if it is there or if it is part of the discussion?

IR: Look, I think that the focus of of the public service administration department has been on, appears to be primarily on upping the game of existing public service. And hence the reinvention of the um, the institute, um, responsible for the development of of civil servants into this new entity that is being created. Um, and I must concede that I'm not particularly knowledgeable about this new institution that is being created. There was this big launch um, a year ago, um, and I'm not sure what has since happened. And that launch of course was in line with the um, advice in the National Development Plan. So I think you're absolutely right, the gap here seems to be such a programme. Although I think we just need to not get too far ahead of ourselves on this topic because the state is indeed a large, uh um, employer of graduates. Um, if you think of it, the teaching profession, the nursing profession, the medical profession. So if you think of schools and hospitals, uh, think of schools close to 350 000, um, uh, graduates, um, whether they have the old school senior or primary school certificate, which you may want to discount. Or those, probably half of them who in the last twenty years will have been able to complete a basic degree, right. So um, in numbers, nursing, again you may want to disaggregate the basic nursing from the professional nurses – but again the professional nurses in the state sector it's a big number – together with pharmacists, together with doctors, together with physiotherapists, together with occupational therapists, together with physiotherapists, I can go done the line; that the state is the biggest employer. And your question, I

suspect, is held – what’s the, why’s there no deliberate initiative, this is more by osmosis. More by they’re jobs, lets apply for the jobs, rather than opposed to a Japanese or a Chinese approach um, to to to career development. And of course we know that in China there are several sets of important exams in order to move up the chain whereas in South Africa you know, let me not be too harsh here on south Africa, where you know, we are still so close to our democratic breakthrough. Um, and we are not far enough away from it in order to secure, uh, the public service to to to ensure that the public service employs the best and the brightest. And so that’s the biggest issue that the public service does get the best and the brightest but not all of the best and the brightest. Um, many of the best and the brightest avoid the public sector because of deep concerns with cronyism and the appointment events at the top of the pile in the public service, and even the, not top of the pile, in the senior management service of the state. That’s from director level. There is a perception and in many instances demonstration of the perception of cronyism, I guess what we call cadre deployment in the case of South Africa. So you sit then with a the old in the new, and you sit with the new in the old. The new in the old often in the senior management service still being um, not still, often being political appointments into critical executive positions that are important, ironically, for delivery of basic, and for that matter, advanced services. Of course, if you push the envelope, what are universities? You know, what are public universities? Are they part of the public service? No, they are not. Are they state owned enterprise? No, they are not. They are an independent, um. They are independent entities established by society, um, to do the things that universities are challenged to do. But nonetheless, there is an interesting question there. If we put the lens or the microscope light on universities, not the microscope the spotlight in universities, do we find here, can we therefore not ask the question again? Well, universities employ much of the best and the brightest graduate employees as well. So are they quasi state, you know, the state pays at least half of the bill, bills of universities. Anyway, I’ll leave that question.

TJC: The next question – so you’ve answered a lot of questions to do with education. I do appreciate that it gives a good overview of the detail of some of the plan. The next question is about, uh, the NDP and the critique it lacks philosophical or theoretical substance as a document that intends to guide South Africa’s development. What is your response to this view?

IR: I think it’s an imperial view. It’s, it’s, I think it exceeds the point that it seeks to make, such a criticism and because it’s important to examine the purpose of the NDP. The NDP has its political philosophical source, it’s basis within the Constitution of the Republic. I think that is the fundamental point that needs to be made and therefore we may want to ask, what is the philosophical intellectual source of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa? It’s almost as if asking, what is the political and philosophical source of an academic publishing an article, right? And the political and philosophical source for that is simply wishing to improve knowledge of a particular matter, that’s the job of an academic posing questions about that matter. Ideally, ultimately, one hopes, not ideally

ultimately one hopes to influence society for the good, or the economy. I'm using the term society broadly, in a sense, rather than the narrow sense of the economy. We could use the term nation state for that matter, but let's stick to this language for now. So coming back then, the source and the resource for the NDP really is the Constitution of the Republic. In fact if you work your way through the NDP, you will see that we weave through it this image of the future, derived from our Constitution.

END INTERVIEW

Interview 2

Date: 28/01/2015

Interviewer: Thokozani Jean Chilenga (TJC)

Interviewee: Mr Mike Muller (MM), National Planning Commissioner on the National Planning Commission for South Africa's National Development Plan

Time: 14:00

Transcript

TJC: So for the purposes of the recording, I am Thokozani Jean Chilenga. And I am doing my Masters at the University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Political Studies. I am interviewing Mr Mike Muller.

Thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed for my research.

South Africa has a development trajectory that has been established through the Reconstruction and Development Plan; the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan; and the New Growth Path. Therefore, why the need for the National Development Plan?

MM: Ok. Just get it right: the Reconstruction and Development Programme was the programme prior to democracy for a new government. Umm, that has been in place now for twenty plus years – I hope this quality is good enough, you better keep it up – that's been in place...that raises a couple of questions about what's necessary next. The Growth and Employment and Redistribution strategy was primarily of the macroeconomic element of, which was not covered in the RDP and was introduced subsequently, it shouldn't be regarded as a separate plan. It was actually part of that original, um, strategy of the new government when they got to grips with the, uh, macroeconomic challenges that they faced. The New Growth Path is one of a range of, uh, initiative that's have happened since say, 2000. One thinks of Asgisa, uh, there've been a range others, uh, I'm just trying to think. There's one which I'm missing, um. But these have been partial strategies addressing specific elements of, uh, government's business, uh, of government's strategy and because of that I think we will find that it was a decision of the African National Congress, uh, that said we need to have a national development plan. Um, it was an initiative, I think also supported by COSATU, I don't have the details – I think that's your job to go and do the cross check, um, and get the background. But, uh, the National Development Plan was seen as an instrument that was necessary, um, we're talking about almost twenty years after the democratic government, 2010 so sixteen years after the democratic government's installed, uh, seventeen years after the RDP is drafted, um, it is necessary to have a review of where we are and the direction which the country needs to go. It is very specifically a plan

for the whole country rather than a plan for government and some of the other, uh, instruments you've mentioned have been plans for government. Um, so there was a political decision to have a national development plan, to set up a national planning institution. The NDP, produced by the NPC, is the product of that decision.

TJC: How was the National Planning Commission established?

MM: As I said, there was political decision to have a national planning, uh, capacity, capability. There was a review conducted by, I think it was Picas – the Policy, uh, remind me of what the abbreviation means – um, and that policy review – yeah, Policy Coordination and Advisory Services – um, that policy review then made some recommendations, um, ahead of the 2009 elections. Recommendations that were broadly taken up in a green paper, um, and then because this was not a piece of legislation that was required um, I think on the basis of the recommendations of the green paper, the Presidency simply went ahead and established a commission – which is within their powers to do, uh, they didn't need anything further. There has been suggestion that there wasn't sufficient discussion at that green paper stage, but that misses the point that there had been a whole lot of previous study and discussion at the political level, um. And, uh, it was felt that it was necessary to make progress rather than to have a long round of lengthy discussions about what kind of planning institution was needed.

TJC: As a National Planning Commissioner, what is your role and special expertise on the NPC?

MM: I actually was part of the, uh, study process, um, before I did some work for PICAS on national planning approaches of different countries. We did a review of six developing country, uh, planning systems. And, um, so I come to this with, uh, firstly a background of being interested, uh, in the national planning process as well as, uh, having specific government experience. So I think I come with, I can start with let's say, technical expertise in a particular sector of water and sanitation and water resources and natural resources; environment and related matters. Um, I come to it also with public admin experience from being a DG [Director General] in South Africa and also working in other administrations. And then I come to it with having a long engagement, um, well before South Africa as well in national planning processes and having being party to the preparatory work that led to the establishment of the NPC and drafting of the uh, green paper.

TJC: How did the idea of a democratic developmental state get to be included in the National Development Plan?

MM: I mean the developmental state has been a topic for discussion for, uh, the entire life, uh, of South Africa's democracy. Um, uh, what's his name? Peter Evans, uh, is one of the proponents has visited South Africa and talked to many people. Um, the developmental state concept reflects what quite a few of the political forces, uh, would identify as their preferred strategy, if there's a state led strategy. It's a state led strategy directed by goals of development. I think quite often it is misunderstood; people think that it is a state that promotes social development and in fact the developmental state is really about a state led – state led strategy for growth which quite often does not immediately lead to social development, and that's not its main objective. Um, but, for a range of reasons, both confusion because people think that developmental state focuses on social development which it doesn't but people don't necessarily understand that, uh, but also because its state led, uh, that was felt to be important in a society in which, uh, capital is still, uh, largely controlled by minorities and large interests – uh, it was felt that a state led approach was important. And so the developmental state, uh, concept, was clearly going to be, uh, in the NDP. And you could also argue that, um, you can't really have a developmental state unless you have a clear structured strategy and institution to develop and implement the strategy. So in a sense the NPC's establishment is already, uh, a hallmark perhaps of the developmental state.

TJC: In the history of the concept of the developmental state, and now the democratic developmental state, one of the central features of such a state is an autonomous bureaucracy that can implement the economic changes associated with development. Do you think that South Africa has such an autonomous bureaucracy? If such a bureaucracy exists, is it functioning to meet the 2030 deadline? If it does not exist, why not?

MM: If you look at the, uh, draft of the National Development Plan, which was widely circulated, and the final version, um, the chapter, uh, names, uh, have been contested; uh, the chapter about the state, if I remember rightly was first, 'A Capable State'. And that was later changed to, 'A Capable and Developmental State', um, and I think that is a nice indication of what the issues were that were addressed. Uh, I don't think that there was any question, but that we, um, the objectives of the developmental state were widely shared, and were certainly shared in the commission. And um, the concern was that an effective state led strategy required an effective state and our diagnosis was that the effectiveness of the state was probably the primary constraint on achieving the goals of the developmental state. We then said we should actually concentrate on state capability as a first step, um, and took the concerns of people who felt that this meant moving away from the concept of developmental state. And I think correctly now have phrased it as, uh, a goal to have a capable *and* developmental state. So I think it was a process of, uh, diagnosis, uh, but always based around the, uh, assumption that it was going to be an interventionist state promoting the goals of development. Development broadly, uh, conceived which is economic focused because economic is necessary to

make, uh, social development possible; um, but certainly that was the major focus of the, uh, the plan. A state capable of driving economic development that could support the social development required.

TJC: There is opposition to the NDP from both COSATU and the SACP, which are both driving forces of politics in South Africa. Can you comment on the origin and nature of this opposition?

MM: It's very hard to understand, uh, the opposition, um, given that there were two parties – not capital letters – two interest groups that were very, uh, prominent in calling for the establishment of a planning commission. And one I think needs to interpret it as, uh, a concern around the, uh, structure of the planning commission and the fact that, it, that, because it is a planning commission conceived of as a drawing up a plan for the society but the country as a whole, it necessarily had to include sufficient elements of the country as a whole to make it effective. Um, you cannot plan for people who are not present at the table or who don't have people who they, with whom they can articulate, at the table. Um, and I'd suspect that, uh, that there was discomfort at the composition of the planning commission, um, from those two parties. But then, uh, the ruling party which sees itself very clearly as, uh, running a mixed economy, um, not necessarily a socialist economy, um, not necessarily an economy controlled by workers or their allies, um, I think it reflects the *ANC's* position quite clearly. And one understands that the SACP and COSATU, which prefer a slightly different political composition – that is a political matter that ought to be resolved outside of the, uh, frame of the NPC. It's a larger political issue and it's disappointing that they, um, weren't able to take advantage of the, um, opportunities offered by the plan and argue the case for initiatives and approaches within it. Um, I think what it suggests is that, they, uh, although they don't like the society they don't live in, they're also not able to, uh, conceive of approaches that will *work* within the society that we live in. Um, and, uh, I see their opposition as much as frustration at their own impotence as critiques as such of the plan. The plan attempts to deal with the realities of South Africa today and more generally the realities of the global economy which imposes huge constraints and places huge pressures on South Africa. And one doesn't deal with those constraints and pressures just by saying, 'we don't like them'; you actually need a strategy to deal with them. And in 20-, uh, -12, was it? – when we published? – um, what we put on the table was what we believed was a strategy that could work in the real life context of time; not a sort of idealistic, idea, proposal, which stood, stood little chance of being implemented

TJC: Final question: the National Development Plan has been criticised for having no substance or depth concerning its content. Can you respond to that criticism as one of the National Planning Commissioners?

MM: Well it's difficult to respond because to say it has no content or depth – I think most people actually haven't read all four hundred plus pages of it. So it would be necessary to be much more specific about where it lacks content and depth. Um, it isn't an ideological document in that it doesn't go into great detail of, uh, the driving forces and uh, what those are and what those may be. I think that correctly has been left up to the political parties concerned; the ruling party has made its own decisions about the context, I think by proving, and very enthusiastically promoting the NDP. Um, so I suspect what people are saying is that they don't believe that it reflects an adequate political analysis. Well, the challenge then is for them to produce, uh, an alternative, and uh, if they wanted to drive development in South Africa rather than characterise the state of conflict and political, uh, contestation, um, they must find ways of phrasing it appropriately. Um, I think there's been regrettably little engagement on that kind of substance and I think it reflects the fact that behind that kind of criticism is an absence of strategy and an absence of ideas. So, there is opposition without presentation of alternatives; um, which is unfortunate because the plan will work best if everyone is behind it and if certain forces choose to oppose it not because they have anything better ideas, but because they don't feel comfortable with it because of their political perspectives, um, they're not doing the society any good and they're not doing themselves any good because they're not creating the conditions of growth and development which they could, uh, profit from politically and build their political base on.

TJC: Just as a follow on from that, do you think that there is a lack of understanding then, of where in the public policy process the NDP sits?

MM: I think there's a lot of confusion about what the current public processes are. We are now in a normal democracy where things aren't all rational, and organised, and structured, and um, to make uh, let's say rational sense, you know, to be followed with intellectual rigour. Um, so just run back the first part of the question?

TJC: So – the follow on question?

MM: [agrees to the follow on question]

TJC: I asked if there's a lack of understanding of *where* in the policy process the NDP sits.

MM: Ok, so first of all I don't think there's a clear public policy process at all. And the NDP becomes *part of a* confused process. I think that's the first point. The second point is, I don't believe there is an adequate understanding of the uh, external environment and the constraints it imposes as well as the internal resources and the opportunities and constraints that *they* impose, um, that informs

this kind of discussion, and again I think it's unfortunate that people choose to make political pronouncements rather than engage with substance, because the substance would suggest that the challenges really are rather more immediate and less ideological than we've been led to believe. And problems like lights going out, um, are good illustrations of what happens if you concentrate too much on ideology and political, uh, control without sufficient understanding of the content and the practical challenges. Uh, so you might have an institution that is now duly captured by, under public, uh, control as a public institution but if its, uh, a policy process which its involved in doesn't allow it to, uh, do its job to keep the lights on, the lights go off and the entire development strategy is hampered as a result. So I do think that we, that the opposition's plan is informed by political discomfort but, uh, is unable to bring to the table any, uh, convincing, uh, practical alternatives. And the nature of the plan is that it's supposed to be something that can be implemented – not something that one might desire in some sort of idealistic way. Um, and that, I think, brings a degree of discomfort to people because the plan in its tabling is a statement of the constraints that are faced by the society. And the constraints that are imposed on political, uh, objectives and people are very uncomfortable about that. But that's not a problem of the plan, that's the problem of the context. I think that's enough.

TJC: Yes, thank you very much

END INTERVIEW

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