0 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION AND 

PROSECUTION OF CYBERCRIME THREATS AGAINST 

COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 

 
by 

803184 
 

 

 

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 

Master of Laws by Coursework and Research Report 

at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 6th March 2023.  
 
 
 



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Research Title: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION AND PROSECUTION OF CYBERCRIME THREATS 
AGAINST COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 

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 3 

 
 
ABSTRACT 

The rise of digital technology has brought about many benefits to modern society. However, 

this advancement has also led to an increase in cybercrime activities, which has become a 

significant threat to individuals and organizations worldwide. In South Africa, cybercrime 

attacks against companies have become increasingly rampant, posing significant risks to their 

operations and even their existence. As a result, there is a growing concern about the 

effectiveness of the measures put in place to detect and prosecute cybercrime threats against 

companies. The purpose of this report is to investigate the efficiency of detecting and 

prosecuting cybercrime attacks against South African companies. While the term "cybercrime" 

encompasses a broad range of activities, this research will focus primarily on evaluating 

cybercrime threats that specifically target companies and their cybersecurity. The reason for 

this is that such attacks can have dire consequences on companies' operations and existence, 

ranging from financial losses to reputational damage. To achieve this objective, the study will 

pursue a twofold approach. Firstly, it will evaluate the effectiveness of South Africa's 

legislation in detecting and prosecuting cybercrime threats against companies. This includes a 

comprehensive examination of the legal frameworks and policies currently in place to combat 

cybercrime activities in the commercial sphere. Secondly, it will evaluate whether companies 

can rely on law enforcement agencies in South Africa to provide adequate protection against 

such threats. This will involve a critical analysis of the capacity and capability of law 

enforcement agencies to respond to cybercrime attacks against companies. The findings of this 

report will contribute significantly to the understanding of the effectiveness of detecting and 

prosecuting cybercrime attacks against South African companies. The recommendations made 

will provide valuable insights into how to improve the detection and prosecution of cybercrime 

threats in the commercial sphere. This study will be beneficial to policymakers, law 

enforcement agencies, and companies operating in South Africa, as it will help to enhance their 

understanding of the threats posed by cybercrime and the measures needed to mitigate them. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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TABLE OF CONTENTS  

 

DECLARATION........................................................................................................... 1  

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................. 3  

1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 5  

 

2. OVERVIEW OF CYBER LAW AND TYPES OF CYBERCRIME THREATS 

AGAINST 

COMPANIES:.........................................................................................................10 

 

3. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW RELATING TO THE DETECTION AND PROSECUTION 

OF CYBERCRIME 

THREATS............................................................................................................... 16  

 

4. SHORTCOMINGS IDENTIFIED 

................................................................................................................................ 24 

 

5. RECOMMENDATIONS 

………………........................................................................................................ 31 

 
6. CONCLUSION 

………………........................................................................................................ 36 

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 38  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  

In the age of digitization, the world has become globally connected.1 Cyberspace provides 

commercial players a platform to execute business with other commercial players on a global 

scale, in an inexpensive manner.2 Unfortunately, this exciting cyber era has also negatively 

impacted society.3 For the opportunistic, global digital accessibility offers new possibilities for 

crime.4 Businesses and individuals alike lose millions to computer-savvy fraudsters.5 For 

example, computer networks may be used to capture confidential information, like trade 

secrets, and disrupt computer systems, threatening companies' success.6  

 

Law enforcement has fallen behind due to the lack of resources and necessary skills needed to 

combat the ever-evolving danger, aptly labeled as cybercrime.7 Existing laws do not adequately 

protect against cybercrimes being perpetrated and new legislation is still trying to catch up to 

practical realities with very few judicial precedents for direction.8 

 

Defining Cybercrime:  

Cybercrime, sometimes known as "computer crime", lacks a definite definition.9 According to 

Wasik,10 cybercrime is a broad issue, making it difficult to agree on specific terminology.11 

Chen, warns that uncertainty over a definition of cybercrime may lead to confusion when 

determining if one is dealing with cybercrime, impeding the creation of effective and consistent 

solutions to cybercrime problems.12 

 

 
1 Cross M Scene of the Cybercrime 2nd ed (2008) 725 at 2. 
2 Ibid.   
3 Cross op cit note 1 at 2.   
4 Rudner Martin ‘Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An Intelligence Challenge’ (2013) 26 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 453- 481 at 454. 
5 Ibid.    
6 Rudner op cit note 4 at 454.  
7 Ibid at 455.   
8 Cross op cit note 1 at 3.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Wasik, M ‘Crime and the Computer’ (1991) Oxford: Clarendon Press 159-160 at 159. 
11 Cassim F ‘Formulating Specialized Legislation to Address the Growing Specter of Cybercrime: A Comparative 
Study’ (2009) 12(4) PER 360 at 39. 
12 Chen, C D ‘Computer crime and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986’ (1990) 10(1) Computer Law 
Journal 71-86 at 72. 



 6 

Cybercrimes are different to traditional crimes because these crimes are committed with a click 

of a button.13 Cybercrimes include the use of fewer resources,  and can be perpetrated in any 

jurisdiction.14  

 

In 2004, the Council of Europe (‘CoE’) defined cybercrime as “any unlawful, unethical, or 

unpermitted data processing and/or transfer activity”.15 According to Sieber, this definition 

proves to be problematic because it is too wide.16 This author is of the opinion that Sieber 

accurately describes the definition as too wide because ‘unethical behavior’ does not always 

imply the commission of criminal conduct punishable by law.17  

 

Academic scholars in South Africa have attempted to define cybercrime. Burchell18 underlines 

the need to distinguish cases in which computers are the subject of a crime and those which 

computers are the mechanism used to perpetrate the crime.19 Burchell expresses the opinion 

that using a computer to conduct a crime is not any different than using a weapon to kill, and 

if a computer is only used as a tool to commit a crime, conventional criminal law should 

apply.20 In the opinion of this author, this definition is problematic because whether or not the 

crime was committed with the aid of a computer, the fact that a computer plays an active role21 

in the criminal offence, should qualify as a cybercrime.22  Prosecution of a cybercrime 

specifically, rather than the offending conduct as a crime in general, has several advantages.23 

First, cybercrimes are often complex and involve the use of advanced technology, which may 

require specialized knowledge and expertise to investigate and prosecute.24 By specifically 

criminalizing cybercrimes, law enforcement agencies are better equipped to investigate and 

prosecute these offenses, as they can focus their resources and expertise on these specific types 

 
13 Cassim op cit note 11 at 39.   
14 Ibid.  
15 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004.  
16 U. Sieber ‘New Legislative Responses to Computer-related economic crisis’ (1986) 76 The International 
Emergence of Criminal Information Law 5 at 23.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Burchell J ‘Criminal Justice at the Crossroads’ (2002) 19 SALJ at 585. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Burchell op cit note 18 at 586.  
21 Kader S and Minnar A ‘Cybercrime investigations: Cyber-process for detecting of cybercriminal activities, 
cyber-intelligence and evidence gathering’ 5 (2015) Acta Criminologica: SAJC 124- 134 at 127.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Salter, M R. and Van Erp, J M ‘Prosecuting Cybercrime: An international Perspective’ 1 (2021) International 
Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime 47- 61 at 50-54.  
24 Ibid.  



 7 

of crimes.25 Additionally, legislatures are allowed the ability to provide specific penalties for 

cybercrime offenses, which take into account the unique nature of these offenses and the 

potential harm they can cause.26 By having specific penalties for cybercrimes, it sends a clear 

message that these offenses are taken seriously and will not be tolerated, which can act as a 

deterrent to potential offenders.27 

 

Watney28 defines cybercrime as: 

 

“Cybercrime includes any unlawful acts in which a computer, computer system, 

information network, or data is the objective of the crime, as well as known illegal 

activities or crimes performed actively through or with the assistance of computers, 

computer systems, information networks, or data”.29 

 

This definition, in the authors opinion, is the most useful guideline for defining cybercrime as 

‘information technology crime’. The definition encompasses any criminal conduct involving a 

computer system, regardless of whether the computer is the tool used to accomplish the 

crime.30 The focus of cybercrime has shifted to data and information technology.31 The above 

definition encapsulates the nature of cybercrimes and is wide enough to allow for future 

cybercrimes to fall within its ambit.32 Furthermore, this definition accommodates the 

technology aspect of the offence and the elements of the crime.33  

 

1.1 Articulating the problem: 

“Throughout history, law has struggled to keep pace with social, cultural, economic 

and technological change”.34 

 

 
25 Salter op cit note 23 at 50-54.  
26 Brenner, S W ‘Prosecuting Cybercrime: Challenges and Solutions’ 97 (2007) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 1361-1395 at 1370-1375.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Watney M M ‘Die strfregtelike en prosedurele middele ter bekamping van kubermisdaad’ (deel 1) (2003) TSAR 
56 at 10. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Watney op cit note 28 at 10.   
31 Ibid.   
32 Dumchikov, M, Fomenko, A, Yunin, O, Pakhomov, V & Kabenok, Y ‘The essence and classification of 
cybercrime in the field of computer information’ 11(51) (2022) Revista Amazonia Investiga 291-299 at 292.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Arkin et al ‘Prevention and Prosecution of Computer and high technology crime’ (1990) 1 at 1.  



 8 

This report is concerned with the efficiency of detecting and prosecuting cybercrime attacks 

against South African companies. The term ‘cybercrimes’ is very broad, and this report will 

only focus on assessing cybercrime threats that target companies and threaten companies’ 

cybersecurity which has dire consequences for companies’ operations and existence. This 

report seeks to evaluate, first, whether South Africa’s legislation governing detection and 

prosecution of cybercrime threats is effective, and second, whether companies can rely on 

South African law enforcement for adequate protection against cybercrime threats. Thereafter, 

recommendations will be made to contribute to the effective detection and prosecution of 

cybercrime threats in the commercial sphere.   

 

1.2 Structure and Overview  

Chapter 1 served the purpose of providing an introduction to this report by looking at the 

definitions of cybercrime and articulating the problem statement of this paper.  

 

Chapter two provides an overview of cyber law. The chapter also discusses the types of 

cybercrime threats against companies such as phishing, SQLI, and malware. It highlights the 

potential consequences of these threats, including the cessation of a company's production and 

putting companies at the mercy of attackers who manipulate company owners into meeting 

excessive demands. Therefore, the development of legislation and regulation in this regard is 

imperative. Finally, the chapter provides a general overview of cyber law in South Africa and 

its development over time, highlighting the legislative journey in the country, beginning with 

the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 till the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020. 

 

Chapter 3 aims to provide an overview of South African law in relation to the detection and 

prosecution of cybercrime threats. Specifically, it will examine the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 

and evaluate its effectiveness in criminalizing cybercrime threats such as phishing, malware, 

and SQLI. To achieve this, certain sections of the Act will be highlighted and assessed. In 

addition, the chapter will analyze the detection and prosecution procedures outlined in the Act, 

including the strategies, investigative units, and courts used to adjudicate cybercrimes in South 

Africa. 

 

Chapter 4 evaluates the shortcomings in the provisions outlined in the previous chapter by 

highlighting the shortcomings that exist in the current legal framework in South Africa, 

particularly when it comes to dealing with cyber threats.  The chapter analyses the strategies 



 9 

that are in place to address cyber threats, such as detection and prosecution strategies. Another 

significant issue that is addressed in this chapter is the lack of requisite skills in South Africa 

to deal with cyber threats effectively. Additionally, the chapter evaluates the major obligation 

that is placed on companies in South Africa to ensure the security of their networks and data. 

The effectiveness of this obligation is analysed.  

 

Chapter 5 presents suggestions for improvement through an examination of academic literature 

and the authors own research efforts. Specifically, the chapter deals with a recommendation on 

how the investigative units may run more efficiently. Additionally, the author provides an 

avenue for the attainment of requisite skills in South Africa, how companies can handle the 

major obligations that are placed on them via the Cybercrimes Act and the final 

recommendation is for an establishment of statutory SCCCs.  

 

In Chapter 6, this report will draw together the findings from the previous chapters and offer a 

comprehensive conclusion. This chapter will recapitulate the key themes, arguments, and 

insights presented in each chapter and synthesize them into a cohesive whole.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF CYBER LAW AND TYPES OF CYBERCRIME 

THREATS AGAINST COMPANIES 

 

2.1 Overview of Cyber law:  



 10 

Cyber law, like cybercrime, has no precise definition.35 Cyber law is a new branch of law 

dealing with legal concerns that arise from the usage of the internet and other digital 

technologies.36 It covers a wide variety of legal issues, including data protection and privacy, 

cybercrime, intellectual property, e-commerce, and telecommunications.37 Keeping up with the 

fast-expanding technological world is one of the most difficult tasks in cyber law.38 When new 

technologies arise, so do new legal difficulties and challenges that necessitate creative legal 

responses.39 

 

Cybercrime, inter alia, is one of the key focus areas within cyber law.40 Cybercrime can be 

characterized as an illegal activity performed via the use of computer networks or the internet.41 

Structured Query Language Injection, Phishing, and Malware are a few examples of the 

imminent threats in cyberspace which will be discussed in more detail below. Cyber law 

addresses these challenges by establishing legal frameworks for investigating, prosecuting, and 

punishing cyber offenders.42 Cyber law does so by encompassing the legal concerns 

surrounding the use of networked information devices and technology for communicative, 

transactional, and distributive purposes.43  

 

When the Internet was first conceived, its use for unlawful and immoral acts was not 

contemplated.44 Due to the anonymity of the internet, anybody may engage in a range of illicit 

actions without consequence.45 Individuals are taking advantage of "grey zones" to engage in 

criminal activity in cyberspace, thus necessitating the need for regulation.46 Attacks against 

companies, for example, are one of these grey zones.47 Given the lack of legislation in this 

area, as well as the difficulties in detecting and prosecuting such cybercrimes against 

 
35 Chauhan A ‘Evolution and Development of Cyberlaw – A Study with Special reference to India’ (2013) SSRN 
1-18 at 2-3.   
36 Lessig L ‘The Law of the horse: What cyberlaw might teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501-549 at 510.   
37 Brian, C ‘Cyberlaw: The Law of the Internet and Information Technology’ (2020) Pearson Education 1-288 at 
20-23.   
38 Ibid.  
39 Brownsword, R., Goodwin, M., & Johnston, A ‘Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century: Text 
and Materials’ (2012) Cambridge University Press 453 at 1-3.  
40 Gordon, F., McGovern, A., Thompson, C., and Wood, M. A ‘Beyond cybercrime: New Perspectives on crime, 
and digital technologies’ 11(1) (2022) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy. Brisbane, 
Queensland, Australia: Queensland University of Technology. 1-8 at 1-2.   
41 Ibid.  
42 Gordon op cit note 40 at 2.  
43 Chauhan op cit note 35 at 2-3.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Chauhan op cit note 35 at 2-3. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Holt, T. J., & Bossler, A.M ‘Cybercrime and Digital Forensics: An introduction’ (2015) Routledge 1-812 at 14. 



 11 

companies, cyber criminals prey on companies, which can have serious economic 

implications.48  

 

2.2 Types of cybercrime threats against companies:  

Phishing was the first danger to companies in the 1990s.49 Phishing is an attack in which the 

hacker disguises himself as a reputable person or organization to deceive potential victims into 

revealing sensitive information or paying money.50 Spear phishing, which is  type of phishing, 

targets businesses in particular.51 The hackers explore the Internet for studied facts about a 

target's employees, identities and professional relationships of significant individuals in their 

firms.52  

 

The hacker uses this information to craft a convincing email masquerading as an executive in 

the organization, ordering employees to submit a substantial payment to either the executive 

or a corporate supplier, while the fraudulent money transfer link delivers to the attacker.53  

 

In 1998, the threat of Structured Query Language Injection (“SQLI”) began to emerge.54 SQLI 

is a cyber-attack in which hackers use software faults in online applications to steal, destroy, 

or change data.55 A hacker uses SQLI code to disrupt a data base and obtain control of a website 

or information systems used by businesses to store data.56  

 

SQLI is risky because hackers can acquire the confidential information of millions of users in 

a single SQLI attack.57 Cybercriminals sell this personal information on the dark web, where 

 
48 Ibid.  
49 Markus J ‘The rising threat of launchpad attacks’ (2019) 17(5) IEEE Security & Privacy 68-72 at 68-69.  
50 Dhamija, R, Tygar, D and Hearst, M ‘Why phishing works’ (2006) Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on 
Human Factors in computing systems 581-590 at 584.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Sarfraz M ‘Cybersecurity Threats with New Perspectives’ ed (2021) intechopen 178 at 110.   
53 Dhamija, et al op cit note 16 at 584.  
54 Aggarwal, P, et al. ‘Random Decision Forest approach for Mitigating SQL Injection Attacks’ (2021) 
International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication 1-5 at 1.  
55 Halfond W, Viegas, J and Orso, A ‘A classification of SQL-injection attacks and countermeasures’ (2006) 1 In 
Proceedings of the IEEE international symposium on secure software engineering 13-15 at 14.   
56 Ibid.  
57 Singh N & Tiwari P ‘SQL Injection Attacks, Detection Techniques on Web Application Databases. In Rising 
Threats in Expert Applications and Solutions: Proceedings of FICR-TEAS. (2022) Singapore: Springer Nature 
Singapore 387-394 at 389.   



 12 

it can be utilized for a variety of illicit reasons.58 This leads to identity theft, a cybercrime in 

which a criminal acquires entry to a person's private information in order to steal money, open 

a phone/internet account in your name, arrange a criminal action in your name, and seek for 

government benefits in your name.59 

 

In 2002, the threat of Malware began.60 Malware, sometimes known as “malicious software” 

is a catch-all phrase for any malicious program or code that is damaging to systems.61 The 

Internet and email are the two most popular methods for malware to get access to computers.62 

A Trojan horse is one of the most destructive forms of malware.63 In order to deceive the user, 

it frequently disguises itself as something beneficial.64 Once installed, the Trojan allows the 

attackers behind it to obtain unauthorized access to the infected machine.65 Trojans can then 

be used to steal financial information or install other types of malware, most often 

ransomware.66  

 

Malware attacks result in the cybercrime of Ransomware.67 This is when a company's 

information or the threat of data destruction is being held hostage.68 The company is unable to 

access files, databases, or programs. As a result, the entire business is rendered inoperable.69 

 

These threats' consequences can have long-term effects for companies.70 The implementation 

of these threats might result in the cessation of a company’s production and puts companies at 

the whim of attackers who manipulate company owners into meeting excessive demands.71 

Therefore, the development for legislation and regulation in this regard is imperative.  

 
58 Gokhale G ‘Network analysis of dark web traffic through the geo location of South African IP address’ (2020) 
Smart cities performability cognition and security 201-219 at 201.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Robert, L and Hamrock, J ‘Using entropy analysis to find encrypted and packed malware’ (2007) 5(2) IEEE 
Security & Privacy 40-45 at 40. 
61 Ulrich, B et al. ‘Scalable, behavior-based malware clustering’ (2009) 9 NDSS 8-11 at 8.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ulrich op cit note 61 at 8.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ulrich op cit note 61 at 8. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ulrich op cit note 61 at 8. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ulrich op cit note 61 at 8. 
70 Cashell B, et al. ‘The Economic impact of cyber-attacks’ (2004) 2 Congressional research service documents, 
CRS RL32331 (Washington DC) 1-41 at 15.  
71 Ibid.  



 13 

 

2.3 General overview of Cyber law in South Africa and development over time:  

The legislative journey in South Africa began in 2000.72 The Promotion of Access to 

Information Act 2 of 2000 ("PAIA")73 is a component of South African law that supports 

transparency and accountability in the public and commercial sectors by allowing access to 

information.74 This access to information applies to records in the public or private sectors.75 

The Act is founded on the constitutional right to information, which is stated in Section 32 of 

the Republic of South Africa's Constitution of 1996.76  

 

While PAIA does not explicitly protect against cybercrime, it can be used to acquire 

information needed to investigate or prosecute cybercrime.77 PAIA, for example, can be used 

to seek information from public bodies such as law enforcement or government departments 

that may be pertinent to a cybercrime inquiry.78 

  

The Electronic Communications Act 25 of 200279 (“ECTA”) is a critical piece of legislation that 

has had a major effect on the evolution of South African cyber law.80 ECTA is a general-

application legislation that governs transactions that are completed electronically or by data 

transmissions.81 ECTA has created essential safeguards for people and companies working in 

the online world by providing a legal framework for the regulation of electronic 

communications. Chapter XIII of ECTA deals with cybercrime and controls unlawful access 

to, interception of, or tampering with data, which is relevant to data breaches.82 Sections 85-

88 established a range of cybercrime offenses.83   ECTA had been widely criticized for being 

ineffective.84 An example of one of the major criticism is towards the penalties for engaging 

 
72 Burchell ‘Criminal Justice at the Crossroads’ (2002) 119(3) SALJ 579-602 at 585. 
73 The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 of South Africa. 
74 Papadopoulos, S & Snail, S ‘Cyberlaw @ SA III: The law of the internet in South Africa’ (2012) 3 Van Schaik 
at 5-6. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Papadopoulos op cit note 74 at 5-6.  
77 Papadopoulos S & Snail ka Mtuze S ‘Cyberlaw @ SA The Law of the Internet in South Africa 4/e’ 4th ed (2022) 
Van Schaik Publishers at chapter 1 para 1.2.2.  
78 Ibid.  
79 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 of South Africa. 
80 Van der Merwe ‘Information and Communications Technology Law’ 3rd ed (2021) LexisNexis 795 at chapter 2 
at para 2.4. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Supra note 79. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Van der Merwe op cit note 80 at chapter 2.  



 14 

in cybercrime, as defined in section 89 of ECTA, are deemed to be insufficiently severe.85 It is 

maintained that these sanctions are insufficient deterrents to prevent cybercrime, and that 

ECTA should be changed to incorporate more severe penalties.86 While the ECTA is a crucial 

piece of legislation that provides a legal foundation for combating cybercrime in South Africa, 

some areas needed to be revised and improved in order to better handle new and growing 

cybersecurity threats.87 

 

Following ECTA, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 

Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 (“RICA”)88 came into effect and has made 

a major contribution to the development of South African cyber law.89 RICA protects privacy 

by enabling state officials to intercept communications under specified processes and 

safeguards.90 RICA has contributed to the development of cyber law in South Africa by 

clarifying the government's powers to intercept communications and the boundaries of those 

powers in the context of fundamental rights to privacy and free speech.91 

 

Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (“POPI”) made a major contribution to the 

growth of South African cyber law by introducing a complete framework for the protection of 

personal information in the digital realm.92 POPI Act covers this void by setting principles and 

requirements for the legal handling of personal data both online and offline.93 The POPI Act 

makes an important addition to the development of cyber law in South Africa by providing a 

legislative framework for protecting personal information in the digital realm.94 This 

framework gives people more control over their confidential information.95 Furthermore, it 

provides organizations with clear guidelines on how to legally manage personal information, 

lowering the risk of cybercrime and privacy violations.96 

 
85 Cassim, F ‘Addressing the Growing Spectre of Cyber Crime in Africa: Evaluating Measures Adopted by South 
Africa and Other Regional Role Players’ 44 (1) (2011) The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 123-138 at 129- 134.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Cassim op cit note 85 at 129-134.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Papadopoulos op cit note 77 at chapter 13.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Papadopoulos op cit note 77 at chapter 13. 
92 Van der Merwe op cit note 80 at chapter 2. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ramluckan, T ‘International Humanitarian Law and its Applicability to the South African Cyber Environment’ 
19(3) (2020) Journal of Information Warfare 102-117 at 106-107. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ramluckan op cit note 94 at 107. 



 15 

 

South Africa's most recent development in cyber law is the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 ("the 

Act").97 The Act includes thorough and up-to-date regulations that handle the present 

cybercrime landscape.98 The Act has additional cybercrime charges such as harassment, 

malware dissemination, cyber forgery, and online identity theft that were not previously 

covered by the ECTA.99 This has resulted in a more robust legal structure for prosecuting 

cybercriminals and safeguarding people and companies against online threats.100  

 

Chapter three will focus on key areas of the Cybercrime Act, specifically its effectiveness in 

detecting and prosecuting cybercrime. Effective detection is crucial as companies often don't 

realize they are under attack by cybercriminals.101 Effective prosecution is also important to 

hold lawbreakers accountable and discourage future crimes.102 If these aspects are not 

effective, they must be brought in line with their intended purposes.103 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW RELATING TO THE DETECTION AND 

PROSECUTION OF CYBERCRIME THREATS.  

 

3.1 The Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020:  

The Cybercrimes Act is South Africa's existing legislation regulating cybercrime.104 The Act 

will not be examined in its entirety, rather, the parts highlighted below are those that are 

 
97 The Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 of South Africa.  
98 Papadopoulos op cit note 77 at chapter 13. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Papadopoulos op cit note 77 at chapter 13. 
101 Gerstein, D.M ‘Better Anticipating and Managing Today’s Growing Cyber Risks’ 7 (4) (2022) The Cyber 
Defense Review 15-30 at 27-30.   
102 Ibid.  
103 Gerstein op cit note 101 at 27-30. 
104 Supra note 97.  



 16 

pertinent to cybercrime threats against companies. The inquiry will specifically look at whether 

the Act is effective in criminalizing cyber threats such as phishing, malware, and SQLI threats. 

Furthermore, this portion aims to determine the effectiveness of the detection and prosecution 

procedures. 

 

The purpose of the Cybercrimes Act, according to the preamble, is to: “To create offences 

which have a bearing on cybercrime; … to provide for the establishment of a designated Point 

of Contact; to further provide for the proof of certain facts by affidavit; to impose obligations 

to report cybercrimes; to provide for capacity building; to provide that the Executive may enter 

into agreements with foreign States to promote measures aimed at the detection, prevention, 

mitigation and investigation of cybercrimes;…”.105  

 

Chapter 2 of the Act deals with “Cybercrimes, Malicious communications, sentencing and 

orders to protect complainants from the harmful effect of malicious communications”.106 Part 

1 of Section 2 creates new cybercrimes as criminal offenses. Section 3 criminalizes the 

unlawful acquisition of data and provides that any person who unlawfully and intentionally 

accesses or intercepts any data, computer program, or system, with the intent to acquire 

information that they are not authorized to obtain, is guilty of an offense.107 

 

Subsections 3 (1)(a) and (b) of the section seek to punish the methods used for which data can 

be obtained illegally, such as phishing.108 Phishing involves unauthorized access to computer 

systems or data for fraudulent purposes.109 Phishing is a cybercrime technique used by 

impersonating a trustworthy source to trick individuals into providing sensitive information.110 

This illegal conduct falls under Section 3(1) of the Cybercrimes Act as the attacker 

intentionally gains unauthorized access to victim's computer system or data with the intention 

of using it for fraudulent purposes.111 Therefore, this section of the Act can be used to 

effectively prosecute individuals who engage in phishing activities.112 

 
105 Ibid.   
106 Supra note 97 at Chapter 2.  
107 Supra note 97 at Section 3. 
108 Supra note 97 at Section 3. 
109 Markus op cit note 49 at 584.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Supra note 97 at section 3.  
112 Markus op cit note 49 at 584. 



 17 

Section 4 criminalizes unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tools.113 Section 4 states 

that any person who unlawfully and intentionally alters or destroys any data, computer 

program, or system, or causes such an act to occur, is guilty of an offense.114 In simpler terms, 

the Act makes it illegal for anyone to deliberately alter or destroy computer data, programs, or 

systems without authorization or permission. If someone does commit such an act, they are 

committing an offense under this section of the Act. 

In this section, the final objective of the crime is the main focus, such as serious crimes, like 

data interception or interference.115 Malware offenders exploit the ability to connect computer 

networks; they are often not present at the crime site, all they need is to get past the security 

measures that safeguard the database, network, or computer equipment.116  Malware is a danger 

that falls under the purview of sections 3 and 4.  

 

Malware results in the serious crime of ransomware.117 Section 5 criminalizes unlawful 

interference with data or computer program in that any person who unlawfully and intentionally 

interferes with or obstructs data, a computer program or system, with the intent to hinder or 

interfere with its functioning, is guilty of an offense.118 Ransomware is a type of malware that 

encrypts the victim's computer data and demands a ransom payment in exchange for the 

decryption key, which is an offense under this section of the Cybercrimes Act.119  

 

Additionally, the conduct of SQLI also falls within the ambit of section 5.120  Section 5 of the 

Cybercrimes Act criminalizes tampering with data or a computer program.121 The element of 

an individual who unlawfully and willfully intercepts data from a computer device, network, 

or a national essential information structure must be satisfied for the activity to constitute a 

crime.122 The provision is wide in its discretion of which devices may apply which is 

 
113 Supra note 97 at Section 4.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Supra note 97 at Section 4. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ulrich op cit note 61 at 8. 
118 Supra note 97 at section 5.  
119 Alenezi M. N, Alabdulrazzaq H, Alshaher A & Alkharang M.M ‘Evolution of malware threats and techniques: 
A review’ 12 (3) (2020) International Journal of communication networks and information security 326-337 at 
329. 
120 Ibid.  
121 Supra note 97 at section 5. 
122 Aggarwal op cit note 54 at 1. 



 18 

commendable as the provision attempts to be all-inclusive of the instruments that can be used 

to interfere with data.123  

 

The criminalization of SQLI is to protect the integrity, privacy, and confidentiality of data 

within a computer device.124 Unlawful access permits the criminal to take additional steps to 

illegally get data.125  

The above-mentioned sections highlight the fact that these threats, if materialized, are 

adequately criminalized by the Act and allow for prosecution. However, the Act contains an 

additional section to cover the event of the cyber threat not materializing.126 Section 10 

criminalizes the offence of cyber extortion and provides that:  

10. “Any person who unlawfully and intentionally— 

(a) threatens to commit any offence; or 

(b) commits any offence, 

contemplated in sections 3(1), 5(1), 6(1) or 7(1)(a) or (d), for the purpose of—          

(i) obtaining any advantage from another person; or 

(ii) compelling another person to perform or to abstain from performing any act, is 

guilty of the offence of cyber extortion”.127  

The provision criminalizes the threat and/ or the actual commission of an offence for the 

purposes of obtaining any advantage of another person.128 If any of these means are used to 

obtain any advantage from another person, then such an offence is punishable under this 

provision and constitutes the offence of cyber extortion.129   

 

3.2 Procedural provisions, strategies, and investigative units: 

 
123 Papadopoulos op cit note 77 at chapter 1.    
124 Lakshmi, P.V.S ‘SQL Injection detection analysis using deep learning’ 8 (2022) Journal of Engineering 
Sciences 13 at 1-3.   
125 Manhas, S ‘An Interpretive Saga of SQL Injection Attacks- Emerging Technologies in Data mining and 
information security’ 1 (2022) Proceedings of IEMIS, Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore 1-3 at 1-3.  
126 Supra note 97 at section 10. 
127 Ibid.  
128 S Mabunda ‘Cyber Extortion, Ransomware and the South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill’ (2018) 
Statute Law Review 9. doi:10.1093/slr/hmx028. 
129 Supra note 97 at s10.  



 19 

The Criminal Procedure Act serves as the legal foundation for search and seizure operations, 

therefore, it remains the starting point for all criminal investigations.130 The purpose of the 

CPA is to regulate and control the manner in which law enforcement officials can carry out 

searches and seizures of property, including electronic devices and data, during criminal 

investigations.131 The CPA sets out specific procedures that must be followed by law 

enforcement officials when conducting searches and seizures, including obtaining a search 

warrant from a magistrate or judge before conducting a search or seizure.132 There are concerns 

that the CPA may not be sufficiently updated to address emerging issues related to digital 

technologies and electronic evidence.133  

The  Act, Chapter 5, gives police officers special procedural authority. 134 These provisions are 

intended to be utilized in conjunction with procedural procedures of Section 35 (1) of the 

CPA.135 Section 35 (1) calls for the “return of any weapon, instrument, or other thing by means 

of which the offence in question was committed or was utilized in the commission of the 

same”.136 In circumstances where a laptop or computer is used to aid illegal behaviour, 

investigating authorities may take any 'device' used to facilitate the crime under Section 35 (1) 

of the CPA.137 

The Act also allows for enhanced extraterritoriality jurisdiction.138 Section 24 of the Act grants 

jurisdiction over crimes committed in other nations if such offenses have “effect in the 

republic”.139 Cybercrime is international with a multijurisdictional presence.140 Thus, 

extradition is a critical instrument in the prosecution of cybercrime.141 In addition to Chapter 2 

of the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act of 1996, Chapter 6 of the Act allows 

for mutual help in the detection of cybercrimes and preservation of evidence.142 It is critical to 

establish a framework to allow reciprocal cooperation between foreign authorities in the 

 
130 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 of South Africa.  
131 Basdeo, V ‘The Constitutional Validity of Search and Seizure Powers in South African Criminal Procedure’ 
19 (2009) PER/PELJ 307-360 at 310-312.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Basdeo op cit note 131 at 310- 312.  
134 Supra note 97 at chapter 5.  
135 Supra note 130 at s35.  
136 Ibid.  
137 Supra note 130 at s35. 
138 Supra note 97 at s24.  
139 Ibid.  
140 Plachta, M & Zagaris, B ‘Economic Sanctions’ 38 (2022) IELR 291 at 12.  
141 Ibid.  
142 International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act of 1996.  



 20 

detection and prosecution of cybercrimes.143 Given the internet and the multijurisdictional 

nature of cybercrime, global investigating authorities' strategic and joint efforts are critical to 

the effective prosecution of offenses.144 

In addition to ‘mutual assistance’, chapter 6 of the Act introduces the 'Designated point of 

Contact', also known as the ‘24/7’ point of contact clause.145 It has not yet been legally 

constituted, but the Act mandates it be controlled by a cabinet member who is responsible for 

procuring workers, operating procedures, and maintenance plans.146 The Cabinet member must 

be a police officer with experience and technical knowledge in cybercrime and 

cybersecurity.147  

With regards to reporting cases to the Designated Point of Contact, it is deemed adequate to 

follow existing procedures.148 As amended by the South African Police Service Amendment 

Act 10 of 2012, reporting must be made in the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 

(DPCI) in terms of section 34(1) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 12 of 2004 

(“PoCA”). The Directorate Investigation offices can be contacted through email or fax number 

websites.149 

 

The 24/7 point of contact clause is significant to address the difficulties of cross-border 

cybercrime since it is operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week.150 The office is tasked 

with investigating cybercrimes that are major international concerns, and allows investigators 

to contact other countries in order to persuade international governments to cooperate with 

South African officials on issues of concern, particularly cybercrimes in which other countries 

have a similar or identical interest.151 

 

To ensure the Designated Point of Contact clause is effective, the Act places an obligation on 

the Cabinet Member responsible for policing to ensure there is sufficient and human and 

 
143 Plachta op cit note 140 at 12.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Supra note 97 at chapter 6. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Supra note 97 at chapter 6. 
148 Khan, S, Saleh, T, Dorasamy, M, Khan, N, Leng, O & Vergara, R ‘A systematic literature review on cybercrime 
legislation’ 11 (2022) F1000Research 971 at 176.   
149 https://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/reportingguide.php.  
150 Supra note 97 at chapter 6. 
151 Ibid.  

https://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/reportingguide.php


 21 

operation capacity to detect and prevent and investigate cybercrimes.152 To ensure the SAPS 

receives basic training relating to detecting and investigation and to develop and implement 

accredited training programmes for members of the SAPS.153 Computer or digital forensic 

professionals, in particular, are at the heart of the system for investigating and detecting 

cybercrimes.154 Detecting and recovering evidence from websites and technological gadgets is 

a tough procedure that necessitates knowledge of information technology (IT) and computer 

forensics.155 Any error, technological malfunction, biased intervention, or fabrication done at 

any level of an inquiry might impair the evidential value of the data gathered, rendering it 

inadmissible as evidence.156 

 

The last point this report would like to draw attention to is that the Act places an obligation on 

Electronic Communications Service Provider (“ECSP”).157 Section 54 of the Act requires 

electronic communications service providers to “take reasonable steps to inform clients of 

cybercrime trends that may affect them; establish procedures for clients to report cybercrime; 

and inform clients of cybercrime prevention measures”.158 

 

Furthermore, if an electronic communications service provider discovers that its network is 

being used to commit cybercrime, it must promptly notify the National Cybercrime Centre and 

retain any information that will be useful in the detection of the cybercrime committed.159 

Failure to comply with the foregoing conditions will result in the service provider being 

charged with an offence and facing a fine of R10,000 for each day of non-compliance.160 

 

After examining the Act in the context of cyberthreats, the Act is an effective piece of 

legislation that can be used effectively with regard to the detection and prosecution of 

cybercrime threats.  

 

 
152 Supra note 97 at s55.  
153 Ibid.   
154 Van Vuuren, J. J., Leenen, L,. & Pieterse, P ‘Development and Implementation of Cybercrime Strategies in 
Africa with Specific Reference to South Africa’ 19(3) (2020) Journal of Information Warfare 83-101 at 85-89.  
155 Ibid.  
156 Van Vuuren op cit note 154 at 85-89.  
157 Supra note 97 at s54. 
158 Ibid.  
159 Supra note 97 at s54. 
160 Ibid.  



 22 

3.3 Prosecution of cyber threats in South Africa:  

Article 22 of the CoE Convention governs the exercise of jurisdiction.161 Section 90 of the 

ECTA reflects this, and section 24 of the Act expands on it. A detailed reading of the ECTA 

and the Act reveals that South Africa launched the Specialized Commercial Offences Court 

(SCCC) in 1999, with backing from Business Against Crime, to encourage a concentrated 

approach to the prosecution of commercial crimes in South Africa.162 

 

SCCCs are not legally defined.163 They are essentially the result of court specialization, which 

is one of the government's tactics for providing a number of accessible and service-oriented 

courts as well as "other judicial and quasi-judicial institutions" for all areas.164 Based on this, 

the SCCC is a government plan to develop an environment in which human capabilities, 

management systems, and accessible infrastructure are more suited to particular concerns than 

in more generic court contexts.165 

 

The Serious Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU) prosecutes serious, complicated, and organized 

commercial crime in the SCCCs, which are dedicated courts on the regional court tier.166 The 

SCCU is a business unit of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) tasked with prosecuting 

complex commercial crime cases originating from SAPS commercial branches.167 The unit's 

clientele includes a diverse range of business complainants, ranging from private persons and 

corporations to governmental entities.168 In general, the investigative technique is what is 

known as a 'prosecution-led investigation,' which comprises the prosecutor offering 

instructions on how the prosecution should be done as well as legal advice as needed along the 

process.169 

 

 
161 Velasco 2025 ERA Forum 7.  
162 The National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2018/2019 at 69.  
163 Ezeji, C. L., Olurola, A. A., & Bello, P. O. ‘Cyber-related crime in South Africa: extent and perspective of 
state’s roleplayers’ 31(3) (2018) African Journal of Criminology & Victimology’ 93-110 at 93-96.  
164 Ibid.  
165 Altbeker 2016 Research Gate 31.  
166 Ezeji op cit note 163.  
167 Ibid.  
168 Ezeji op cit note 163.  
169 Ibid.  



 23 

At the end of 2019, the NPA has ten dedicated courts dispersed around the nation, with 

additional satellite offices in certain areas.170 The SCCC technique is a prosecutor-guided 

investigation, in which prosecutors and the SAPS collaborate as a team, and the SAPS and 

courts are co-located to accelerate case resolution.171 The prosecution's function during the 

investigative stage is to give legal advice. Cybercrime risks including commercial crime, in 

this author's perspective, were also supposed to come under the jurisdiction of the SCCCs.172 

Based on the Act, this author interprets cybercrime as a commercial crime, that is, a crime 

involving dishonesty that is designed to defraud a victim of his or her own property, which 

might be monetary in character.173 As a result, since cybercrime risks like as phishing, 

malware, and SQLI, among others, are criminalized, they will be tried alongside other business 

crimes in the SCCCs.  

 

The Cybercrimes Act can help detect and prosecute crimes against companies, but a lack of 

understanding among investigators and prosecutors may hinder its effectiveness. Chapter 4 will 

address these shortcomings. It's important to note that the Act is still new, so it's unclear how 

effective it is due to a lack of precedence. 

 

 

 

 

 
CHAPTER 4: SHORTCOMINGS IDENTIFIED  

 

4.1 The Cybercrime Act: 

The previous chapter illustrated a detailed analysis of how certain cyber threats, such as 

phishing, malware, and SQLI are criminalized under chapter 2 of the Act. Furthermore, the Act 

goes a step further to make provision for an instance where these threats do not materialize, 

whereby the Act deems ‘cyber extortion’ as a criminal offence. In this aspect, the Act has done 

well. However, there are shortcomings identified of the Act. In this section, the problems 

identified with regard to the legislation are compared to the current status quo of South Africa.  

 
170 The National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2018/2019 at 69. 
171 Altbeker 2016 Research Gate 31. 
172 Ibid.  
173 Altbeker op cit note 171. 



 24 

 

4.2 The shortcomings identified in the procedural provisions, strategies, and investigative units:  

Concerning the establishment of investigative teams to combat cybercrime, the Designated 

Point of Contact section raises concerns. According to Sections 17B and 17D of the South 

African Police Service Act, 1995 as modified, the DPCI is tasked for combatting, investigating, 

and preventing national priority crimes such as major organized crime, serious commercial 

crime, and significant corruption.174 This clause does not directly address cybercrime, but 

considering the commercial character of cybercrime conducted to defraud victims of their 

money, it is reasonable to presume that cybercrime is included in the definition of severe 

commercial crime in this provision.175 According to the DPCI website, section 34 (1) of the 

Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PCCAA Act) requires any 

person in authority to report the offense to a police officer in the DPCI.176 The PCCAA Act 

gives no mechanism for the average citizen to report to a police station.177 

 

In terms of how commercial crime is being investigated in South Africa, the investigation is 

prosecution-led, with investigation teams comprised of prosecutors who give legal assistance 

and DPCI detectives.178 However, Altbeker believes that instances should not be so serious 

that they warrant detection and prosecution by the Directorate of Special Operations, the 

forerunner of the DPCI.179 

 

Furthermore, the Designated point of contact clause places the SAPS in charge of coordinating 

both domestic and international investigations, however, this seems to be overreaching for one 

agency to handle.180 The idea to build a cybercrime reporting centre within the SAPS by the 

beginning of 2016 has fallen through.181 The SAPS's annual performance plan for 2020-2021 

aims to re-establish it as a component of the SAPS's medium-term planning.182 This is 

 
174 Watney M ‘Cybercrime and the investigation of cybercrime” in Papadopoulos S and Snail S (eds) Cyberlaw@ 
SA III The Lay of the internet in South Africa 3rd ed 333-350 (Van Schaik 2012).  
175 Ibid.  
176 Watney op cit note 174.  
177 Ibid.  
178 Watney M op cit note 174.  
179 Altbeker A “A model for justice delivery: The Specialized Commercial Crime Court” (2016) Research gate 
31-34.  
180 Ibid.  
181 Watney op cit note 174. 
182 South African Police Service Annual Performance pka 2020/2021.  



 25 

unfortunate since the reason cybercrimes are not reported to regular police is because society 

lacks trust in the police response. 

 

Over the years, the SAPS has been widely chastised for its inefficiency.183 This is primarily in 

response to the SAPS's overall poor performance and significant levels of police 

misbehaviour.184 The SAPS annual reports portray a bleak image of diminishing efficacy, 

stating that contact crimes including murder, common assault, and robbery surged by 21% from 

2020 to 2021, while commercial crime grew by 15% in the same period.185 At the same time, 

the SAPS has been forced to pay more than R140 million in civil claims for behaviour by police 

officers between January and May 2021.186 The public's trust in the SAPS has been eroded as 

a result of this irresponsible behaviour.187 

 

Furthermore, the SAPS are understaffed and underfunded, which has made it difficult for the 

SAPS to deal with typical crimes.188 Due to a major lack of skills and competence as a result 

of a lack of finances, it is difficult to determine how the SAPS would handle the designated 

point of contact if traditional crimes are not successfully controlled.189 

 

4.3 Attainment of requisite skills:  

Section 55 of the Act imposes a responsibility on the South African government to guarantee 

the creation of an operational capability to identify and investigate cybercrime.190 Computer or 

digital forensic professionals, in particular, are at the heart of the system for investigating and 

detecting cybercrimes.191 Years ago, it was recognized that an experienced team in the field of 

 
183 Johan Burger and Stuart Mbanyele ‘Old Solutions won’t fix South Africa’s deteriorating police service’ 
available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/old-solutions-wont-fix-south-africas-deteriorating-police-service 
accessed on 18 January 2022.  
184 Ibid.  
185 Business Tech ‘Crime Data shows South Africa’s murder rate on the rise’ available at: 
https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/539532/crime-data-shows-south-africas-murder-rate-on-the-rise/ 
accessed on 18 January 2022.  
186 Nicole McCain News24 ‘Police ordered to pay R140m for misconduct over five months’ available at: 
https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/police-ordered-to-pay-r140m-for-misconduct-over-five-
months-report-20210621 accessed on 18 January 2022.  
187 Ibid.  
188 Nic Andersen ‘Cops are losing the war on crime’ available at: https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/cops-
are-losing-the-war-on-crime-police-officials-alarming-revelation-on-crime/ accessed on 18 January 2022.  
189 Ibid.  
190 Supra note 97 at s55.  
191 Ibid.  

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/old-solutions-wont-fix-south-africas-deteriorating-police-service
https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/539532/crime-data-shows-south-africas-murder-rate-on-the-rise/
https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/police-ordered-to-pay-r140m-for-misconduct-over-five-months-report-20210621
https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/police-ordered-to-pay-r140m-for-misconduct-over-five-months-report-20210621
https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/cops-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-police-officials-alarming-revelation-on-crime/
https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/cops-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-police-officials-alarming-revelation-on-crime/


 26 

digital or computer forensics was needed to aid detectives in the discovery and subsequent 

detection of cybercrime.192 This resulted in the establishment of cyber inspectors, as mandated 

by the ECT Act, which was passed more over a decade ago.193 

 

However, South Africa today has a scarcity of experienced and competent forensic 

professionals.194 According to forensic expert Jason Jordaan's 2017 submission on the 

Cybercrimes Bill to the South African Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional 

Services, based on research on the quality assurance of digital forensics in South Africa 

currently, only 59% of forensic practitioners have completed an undergraduate degree or 

diploma, with only 43% having an undergraduate qualification relevant to the practice of 

digital/ computer forensics195. Only 0.09% of practitioners with a Bachelor of Science degree 

in Computer Science, one of the particular certifications required for digital forensics, hold a 

Bachelor of Science degree.196 Finally, just 23% of digital/computer practitioners have a 

postgraduate degree.197 

 

To provide for a competent and qualified operational capability to identify and investigate 

cybercrime, the aforementioned problems must be completely addressed. “The cybercrimes 

Act is not a silver bullet; we still lack the capabilities to apprehend cyber criminals”, says the 

director of the Electronic Crime Unit of South Africa's investigative authority, the Hawks.198  

 

4.4 Major obligation placed on ECSP’s:  

The anonymity of the internet appeals to the majority of cybercriminals.199 The global 

information system is free, and there is no information about who a user is or where they are 

at any given time.200 This makes it more difficult to determine a user's identity, especially if 

 
192 Sutherland A ‘Governance of cybersecurity – The case of South Africa’ 2017 AJLC 83 2077-7213.  
193 Ibid. 
194 Sutherland op cit note 192.  
195 Jordaan, J ‘Submissions on the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill’ available at 
pmg.org.za/files/170913DFIRLABS.pdf (10 August 2017) Accessed on the 20 August 2022.  
196 Ibid.  
197 Jordaan op cit note 195.  
198 Brigadier Piet Pieterse, Head of the Electronic Crime Unit of the Hawks, made this statement in 2015. See S 
Naik & R Serumula ‘Dark Web thriving in SA’ (17 October 2015) available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news.south-
africa/dark-web-thriving-in-sa-1931641. Accessed on the 20 august 2022.  
199 Sommer ‘Against Cyberlaw’ (2000) Berkley Technology LJ 1154-1232 at 1168.  
200 Ibid.  

https://www.iol.co.za/news.south-africa/dark-web-thriving-in-sa-1931641
https://www.iol.co.za/news.south-africa/dark-web-thriving-in-sa-1931641


 27 

the person hides their location by using several search engines at different times.201 

Cybercriminals can mask their identities since there is unrestricted freedom in cyberspace.202 

 

When a cybercrime is reported, for example, by an ECSP in accordance with their duties under 

Section 54 of the Act, the Act requires ECSPs to provide details to the court.203 The court may 

request, inter alia, the electronic communications identity number from which the data 

message originated and whatever information that an electronic communications service 

provider has access to that might help the court identify the person.204  

 

There is significant concern about this provision, particularly the details on the person's identity 

number, surname, and address. The provision fails to account for instances where the electronic 

communication is stolen, or the identity number is falsified by a perpetrator using someone 

else's identity.  

 

An example of the above scenario can be seen in the case of Sony Pictures205 whose security 

was attacked by a series of spear phishing emails addressed to Sony employees.206 After 

researching employee names and positions on LinkedIn, hackers posed as colleagues, sending 

phishing emails with malware to unsuspecting employees.207 In the end, more than 100 

gigabytes of corporate data were taken, including freshly released files, financial records, and 

client information.208 Sony lost more than $100 million as a result of the phishing attack.209  

 

Cybercriminals are able to commit crimes by using false information that cannot be traced back 

to them. Even if the cybercrime is prosecuted, it is unlikely to result in a successful outcome 

because the information used by the hackers is fake. The Cybercrimes Act, which mandates 

 
201 Sommer op cit note 199 at 1168.  
202 Ibid.  
203 Supra note 97 at s21(1)(b).  
204 Ibid.  
205 Aaron Mamiit, Tech Times ‘Sony Pictures Cyber Attack may cost $100million, says experts’ available at: 
https://www.techtimes.com/articles/21869/20141210/sony-pictures-cyber-attack-may-cost-100-million-says-
expert.htm accessed on 18 January 2022.  
206 Gregg Keizer ‘Sony hackers targeted employees with fake Apple ID emails’ (2015) available at: 
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2913805/sony-hackers-targeted-employees-with-fake-apple-id-
emails.html accessed on 13 August 2021.  
207 Ibid.  
208 Gregg op cit note 190.  
209 Ibid.  

https://www.techtimes.com/articles/21869/20141210/sony-pictures-cyber-attack-may-cost-100-million-says-expert.htm
https://www.techtimes.com/articles/21869/20141210/sony-pictures-cyber-attack-may-cost-100-million-says-expert.htm
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2913805/sony-hackers-targeted-employees-with-fake-apple-id-emails.html
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2913805/sony-hackers-targeted-employees-with-fake-apple-id-emails.html


 28 

companies to provide information about their communications with hackers, is insufficient 

because the hackers use personal information from actual employees, making it difficult to 

identify the actual perpetrators. Requiring ECSPs to provide information is not a practical or 

adequate solution to identifying cybercriminals. 

 

4.5 Prosecution of cyberthreats in South Africa:  

As described in the preceding chapter, the Serious Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU) 

prosecutes serious, complicated, and organized commercial crime in the SCCCs, which are 

dedicated courts on the regional court tier.210 SCCCs are Regional Magistrates Courts, the only 

courts in the country that are not governed by legislation. The Constitutional Court, Magistrates 

Courts, Equality Court, Labour Court, and Labour Appeal Court, for example, are all courts in 

the country that are formed or constituted in accordance with some piece of legislation or 

regulation.211 However, the SCCC is not particularly named as the go-to court for prosecuting 

cyber risks.212 

 

The Act, in section 24, incorporates a jurisdictional aspect, as discussed in the preceding 

chapter; nonetheless, the issue of the SCCC's activities as the forum for the prosecution of 

cyber threats would continue without enabling legislation, risking the proceedings being 

deemed illegal. The principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), enshrined in section 

35(3)(l) and (n) of the Constitution, is central to the rule of law and respect of human dignity.213 

It demands that the state not exercise power over anyone unless it does so within the law.214  

 

The selection of which form of cybercrime will be prosecuted at the SCCCs is one example of 

the consequences of the absence of regulation in this respect.215 This was recently highlighted 

in the NDPP's perplexing report, which said that cybercrime was prosecuted by the Serious 

Business Crimes Unit without separating the commercial aspect that should be punished 

exclusively at the SCCCs.216 

 
210 Altbeker A Monograph 76: Justice through specialization? The case of the specialized commercial crimes 
court. (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies 2003).  
211 Ibid.  
212 Altbeker A op cit note 210.  
213 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
214 Ibid.  
215 Altbeker A op cit note 210. 
216 Ibid.  



 29 

 

Furthermore, the absence of legislation extending the SCCCs' jurisdiction can be deduced from 

the need for the SAPS investigator connected with the SCCC to approach the High Court for 

an order to intercept indirect or real-time communications as part of his or her detection of the 

crime, which is generally accepted to have cross-border dimensions.217 

 

The nature of cyber threats as a cross-border crime and related issues were on display in the 

Western Cape Division of the High Court, when a final sequestration order was confirmed 

against a foreign citizen located in Cape Town who cheated a victim in the United States.218 A 

total of $15 million USD was deposited into the perpetrator's South African bank account. He 

then transferred a major chunk of the money to several bank accounts abroad, leaving the 

victim with irreversible losses.219 Section 21 (2) of the SCCU determined jurisdiction in this 

case based on the respondent's residency. It is true that when cybercrime is found, crime 

detectives must be able to act promptly or the electronic trail would become cold. This danger 

is increased by the necessity to appeal the order to the High Court.220 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
217 Altbeker A op cit note 210. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Altbeker A op cit note 210. 
220 Ibid.  



 30 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS  

 

5.1 To address the shortcomings of investigative units put in place: 

The provisions of the Cybercrimes Act can effectively be used to investigate and successfully 

prosecute cybercrimes facilitated by cyber threats toward companies. However, there seems to 

be a disconnect between the provisions of the Act and the status quo of South Africa.  

 

 With regards to the Designated Point of Contact clause, the SAPS is in charge of overseeing 

investigations under the Act, but there are severe shortage of skills, expertise, and people.221 

Karen Allen advises that South Africa seek foreign financiers as well as interact with Interpol 

and business sectors to gather resources, mentorship, and knowledge transfer in order to bridge 

this capacity gap.222  

 

The project's goal is to promote intelligence-led, coordinated operations against cybercrime 

and its perpetrators in African member countries by creating a standardized regional 

coordination framework for drafting joint action plans and executing law enforcement 

 
221 Karen Allen ‘South Africa Lays Down the Law on Cybercrime’ (2021) available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/south-africa-lays-down-the-law-on-cybercrime Accessed 13 August 2021.  
222 Ibid.  

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-lays-down-the-law-on-cybercrime%20Accessed%2013%20August%202021
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-lays-down-the-law-on-cybercrime%20Accessed%2013%20August%202021


 31 

actions.223 The Africa Cybercrime Operation Desk, housed in INTERPOL's Cybercrime 

Directorate, would be central to the initiative.224 The desk will create and implement the 

framework, as well as conduct joint operations, enhancing Africa's ability and capabilities to 

combat cybercrime.225 

 

Activities will focus on both prosecuting cybercrime criminals in Africa and preventing it.226 

While the preventive programs will seek wide regional participation, the operational actions 

will concentrate on nations who have already actively engaged with our Cybercrime 

Directorate to build a baseline for these operations.227 

 

South Africa would benefit from working with a larger entity with resources and influence by 

engaging with groups such as INTERPOL.228 A dedicated agency like this one has devoted 

manpower to combat cybercrime as well as shared understanding with other countries.229 It 

brings together international and regional law enforcement authorities through the INTERPOL 

conversation to guarantee a coordinated response to global security concerns.230  

 

 

5.2 To address the attainment of requisite skills:  

With regards to section 55 of the Act which places an obligation on the South African 

government to ensure that there is an establishment of an operational capacity to detect and 

investigate cybercrimes.231 It is unfortunate that the Act fails to realise that these skill sets are 

scarce in the country, as illustrated in the previous chapter.  

 

Academic author, Cross, explains that it should be apparent that cybercrime detectives need 

broad training to work efficiently in this specialty area.232 This need is usually acknowledged 

 
223INTERPOL: ‘African joint operation against cybercrime’ available at: 
https://www.interpol.int/en/crimes/cybercrime/cybercrime-operations/afjoc-african-joint-operation-against-
cybercrime accessed on 2 October 2021. 
224 Ibid.  
225 INTERPOL op cit note 223. 
226 Ibid.  
227 INTERPOL op cit note 223. 
228 Ibid.  
229 INTERPOL op cit note 223. 
230 Ibid.  
231 Supra note 97 at s55.  
232 Cross ‘Scene of the cybercrime’ 2nd ed (2008) Burlington: Syngress publishing Inc.  

https://www.interpol.int/en/crimes/cybercrime/cybercrime-operations/afjoc-african-joint-operation-against-cybercrime
https://www.interpol.int/en/crimes/cybercrime/cybercrime-operations/afjoc-african-joint-operation-against-cybercrime


 32 

in wide law enforcement agencies, where IT professionals and computer sciences might be 

enrolled to handle cybercrime investigations. 233 

 

Examples of categories of cyber investigators by skill set involve the following:234  

 

A) The detectives who specialized in computer/ network crime. They are detectives 

first with a secondary interest.235  

B) Computer experts who conduct investigations. They are information Technology 

Professionals first, with a secondary interest in law enforcement and in 

investigation.236  

C) Those who qualify skilled, skilled or interested in investigation and IT. they are 

involved in computers/cybercrime from the beginning of their careers, they have 

equivalent training in both fields, such as a double main in criminal justice and 

network engineering programming.237  

D) Those who have not skilled or attracted in either investigation or IT. These could 

be police officials who were sent to the investigation division and drew a 

cybercrime case casually. They aren’t really attracted in the investigative field and 

would desire to be working patrol.238  

 

The author believes that the Cybercrimes Act can be more effective in investigating and 

prosecuting cybercrimes with proper training and resources. Adequate training for government 

officials and police in computer-related skills can improve their understanding of the Act and 

lead to more effective methods. Extensive training for police is necessary to combat 

cybercrimes and other online crimes. 

 

 

5.3 Major obligations placed on ESCPs:  

 
233 Ibid.  
234 Cross op cit note 232.  
235 Ibid.  
236 Cross op cit note 232. 
237 Ibid.  
238 Cross op cit note 232. 



 33 

As noted in the preceding chapter, when an ESCP reports a crime, businesses are required by 

section 54 of the Cybercrimes Act to provide any information that they have.239 It was also 

demonstrated in the previous chapter that this information might be fraudulent, and if a 

cybercriminal cannot be identified, a company might experience difficulty in successfully 

claiming monetary damages.   

 

Companies can remedy the deficiency in the Cybercrimes Act by investing in cybersecurity 

infrastructure. Companies can recruit cybersecurity-savvy programmers. Programmers have 

devised deft methods for obtaining information about hackers following a cybercrime.240 Many 

programmers, for example, utilize Python Traceback. This coded language, also known as 

Back-tracing (or traceback), is the process of tracking down the offender or digital equipment 

used to commit a cybercrime.241 A preliminary inquiry is carried out to expose information 

about the cybercrime by an analysis of log files, for instance, through event logs which are files 

produced by systems as a result of activity.242 This method can provide information about the 

cybercrime and how it occurred.243  

 

For example, event logs “automatically record... events that occur within a computer to provide 

an audit trail that may be used to monitor, understand, and diagnose network activities and 

problems”.244 “These logs include application logs, which record “events logged by programs 

and applications”, and security logs, which “document all login attempts (both legitimate and 

erroneous) and the installation, opening, or deletion of files, programs, or other objects by a 

computer user”.245 These event logs may provide information on the IP address utilized in the 

cybercrime.246   

 

 
239 Supra note 97.  
240 Edward Krueger & Douglas Franklin ‘A simple way to trace code in Python’ available at: 
https://towardsdatascience.com/a-simple-way-to-trace-code-in-pythod-a15a25cbbf51 accessed on 1 October 
2021.  
241 Ibid.  
242 Edward op cit note 240. 
243 Ibid.  
244 Miller, L ‘Cyber Insurance: An incentive alignment solution to corporate Cyber-insecurity’ 7(2) (2019) Journal 
of Law & Cyber Warfare 147-182 at 150.  
245 Ibid.  
246 Edward op cit note 240. 

https://towardsdatascience.com/a-simple-way-to-trace-code-in-pythod-a15a25cbbf51


 34 

This is only one of many examples of how businesses may help solve problems. This avoids 

providing inaccurate information to investigators and contributes meaningfully to the inquiry. 

Many academic authors believe that IT experts and government authorities should work 

together to tackle the rising cyberattacks. This objective can still be attained by companies and 

IT specialists working together to locate reliable facts to contribute to a State-led probe. 

 

5.4 Establishment of statutory SCCCs.  

The final recommendation is in regard to the forum where cybercrimes is to be prosecuted in 

South Africa. This author recommends that existing courts legislation and regulations 

governing magistrates’ courts be amended, or new legislation and regulations be developed, to 

establish the SCCCs or similar courts as the preferred for a for the prosecution of commercial 

cybercrime, including cyber threats in the country upon the finalization of laws combating 

cybercrime.247 The SCCCs are the only courts in the country not founded in legislation or 

regulation.248 It is therefore submitted that in legislating the establishment of the SCCCs, this 

anomaly will be corrected.249 Additionally, it will solve the problem of a timely prosecution 

and resources involved in the activities of the investigators.250 This may be resolved according 

to the SCCCs jurisdiction akin to that of the High Court as has been done with the case of 

Divorce Courts, which, like the SCCCs, are located in the Magistrates Courts.251  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
247 Sukardi, D ‘Legal protection against cyber-crime threats for business economics’ 11(4) (2022) Legal brief 
2227-2235 at 2228 – 2230.  
248 Ibid.  
249 Altbeker op cit note 210. 
250 Ibid.  
251 Altbeker op cit note 210. 



 35 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION:  

This report sought to evaluate first, whether South Africa’s legislation governing the detection 

and prosecution of cybercrime threats are effective and secondly, whether companies can rely 

on South African law enforcement for adequate protection against cybercrime threats. 

 

In concluding the first aspect, the author has come to the conclusion that the current legislation 

of governing cybercrime threats in South Africa is effective. Chapter 2 of the Act adequately 

criminalizes cybercrime threats and the Act goes a step further to make provision in the instance 

where these cybercrime threats do not materialize, the Act categorizes this instance as cyber 

extortion under section 10 and it is effectively criminalized. The author is of the opinion that 

on the face of it, a detailed analysis of the Act seems to adequately and effectively offer 

investigative methods and prosecution methods. However, one cannot be certain due to the Act 

being so new, there is not much to compare the practicality of the Act to. This author 

investigated the Acts provisions against the status quo of South Africa and found that a major 

focus needs to be placed on the attainment of requisite skills. All investigative- role players 

need to be adequately trained and molded for the role that is being bestowed upon them by the 



 36 

Act. This will ensure a more effective way in which cybercrime in South Africa will be 

combatted.  

 

In concluding the second aspect, the author is of the opinion that while there are measures in 

place to which companies can turn, because of the disconnect from the provisions of the Act 

and the status quo of South Africa, this author recommends that companies could mitigate the 

pressure of law enforcement by taking proactive steps in helping law enforcement combat 

crime. The Act places an onerous obligation on ECSPs and the Act sort of tucks companies 

into the category of an “investigative role player”. One of the ways in which companies can 

ensure their existence is not threatened is to is to obtain cybersecurity insurance.252 

Cybersecurity insurance is designed to safeguard against losses caused by a variety of cyber 

disasters, such as data breaches, business interruption, and network damage.253 A thriving 

cybersecurity insurance market might assist minimize the frequency of successful cyber-

attacks by first promoting the use of preventative measures in return for increased coverage;254 

second, by basing premiums on an insured's level of self-protection, premiums are encouraged 

to be implemented best practices.255  

 

Traditional commercial general liability and property insurance policies frequently exclude 

cyber risks, necessitating the emergence of cybersecurity insurance as a "stand alone" line of 

coverage.256 This coverage shields companies against a wide range of cyber event losses that 

they may directly or indirectly cause to others.257  

 

Since 2012, CISA has collaborated with academia, infrastructure owners and operators, 

insurers, chief information security officers (CISOs), risk managers, and others to create 

strategies to improve the cybersecurity insurance market's capacity to address this growing 

cyber risk sector.258 CISA has also sought comments from these same stakeholders on the 

market's ability to compel enterprises to improve their cybersecurity in return for more 

 
252 Cybersecurity & Infrastructure security agency available at: http://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-insurance 
accessed on 4 October 2021.  
253 Ibid.  
254 Sukardi op cit note 247 at 2230.  
255 Ibid.  
256 Cybersecurity op cit note 252. 
257 Ibid.  
258 Cybersecurity op cit note 252. 

http://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-insurance


 37 

coverage at a cheaper cost.259 CISA is actively fostering discussions with CISOs, Chief 

Security Officers (CSOs), and insurers about how a cyber threat data repository could aid in 

the discovery of emerging cybersecurity methodologies across industries, as well as the 

emergence of new cybersecurity insurance policies that "benefit" businesses for implementing 

such best practices.260  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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