UNIVERSITY OF THE
WITWATERSRAND,
JOHANNESBURG

Rethinking Civil Society and Pan-African Participatory Governance: The Case of the African Union-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU-NEPAD)

Romao XAVIER

Student Number 543371

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the School of Humanities, Faculty of Social Sciences.

Department of International Relations

University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. South Africa

Supervisor: Prof. Vishwas Satgar

2021

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

DocuSigned by:

Romao XAVIER

0BEED2640BC3433...

(Signature of candidate)

_____28_day of ___October__2021__at__Johannesburg-South Africa

Dedication

In memory of my parents

To Ray and Ronny

Knowledge is power….

"There are no power relations without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations"
Michel Foucault

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been a long and tiring, though very engaging and enriching journey involving a lot of reflection and interaction in and between the four countries to which I regularly travelled: Mozambique, South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya. I would never have come to an end without the support, encouragement and inspiration of several people. Just to mention a few, I am particularly indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Vishwas Stagar, at the International Relations Department (Wits University). He has been my mentor, inspiration and guide throughout the whole journey. I have greatly learnt a great deal from him, hence my strong words of thanks and gratitude for his invaluable overall guidance, assistance and technical support, without which this thesis might not have reached the level it got to.

The financial assistance of the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences NIHSS), in collaboration with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NIHSS and CODESRIA. Hence, my greatest thanks to the NIHSS, through its African Pathways programme, which provided the financial resources from my second third and fourth years necessary for my study and extensive field work in South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Kenya.

A very special thanks goes to the Pan-African Citizens Network (PACIN) formerly the Centre for Citizens Participation to the African Union (CCP-AU) for the support and inclusion in the debates around pre-AU Summits and the continental citizens' conferences, as well as the insights into my field work from all the great Pan-Africanist. Here a special mention goes to Donald Deya and Achieng Akena, for their continuous and unconditional support.

Most important of all, I wish to thank all those who participated in the interviews, group discussions and informal debates in Maputo, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Johannesburg, whose invaluable accounts of the Pan-African civil society making at the intersection with the AU-NEPAD have made me understand the power dynamics being played within AU structures and processes.

I would also like to mention the support and friendship received from many unnamed friends and Pan-African activists who have provided moral support and have been a permanent source of motivation and inspiration during my research.

To my family, I am very grateful, especially to my wife Ana Paula, who tirelessly took on the burden to nurture and provide the necessary care to our children, while I was away; my sister in-law Beatriz for her amazing care; to my boys, Ray and Ronny for their innocent yet deep understanding and patience and constant encouragement throughout. They are always very close to my heart and very dear to me. Thank you for your continuous love and support.

List of Acronyms

ACS	African Civil Society
ACHPR	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
AfCHPR	African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
AGA	Africa Governance Architecture
AGRA	Agrarian Green Revolution for Africa
AfDB	AfDB – African Development Bank
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AUC	African Union Commission
AUDA	African Union Development Agency
AYC	African Youth Commission
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program
CIP	Centro de Integridade Pública (Centre for Public Integrity)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
FDA	Foucauldian Discourse Analysis
FMO	Fórum de Monitoria de Orçamento (Budget Monitoring Forum)
G-7	Group of the 7 Most Developed Countries
G-20	International Forum of 19 countries governments and Central banks + EU
GMD	Grupo Moçambicano de Dívida (Mozambican Debt Group)
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INIA - IIAM	Institute Nacional de Investigação Agrária (National Agrarian Research Institute)
IR	IR – International Relations
MMD	Movimento Moçambicano de Dívida (Mozambican Debt Movement)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
HIPIC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HSGIC	Heads of States and Government Implementation Committee
NAIP	National Agriculture Investment Plan
NAFSIP	National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan
NCSM	National Civil Society Mechanism
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa´s Development
NIP	National Investment Plan
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization for Africa Unity
PAC	Pan-African Citizens
PACS	Pan-African Civil Society
PACIN	Pan-African Citizens Network
CCP-AU	Centre for Citizens Participation to the African Union
PAI	Pan-African Institutions
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PEDSA	Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário (Strategic Development Plan for the Agrarian Sector)

PNISA	Plano Nacional de Investimento do Sector Agrário (National Investment Plan for the Agrarian Sector)
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PROAGRI	Programa Nacional de Invetimento Agrícola (Agriculture Sector Public Expendicture Programme)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ProSAVANA	Rural Investment Project
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facility
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
UN	United Nations
UNAC	União Nacional dos Camponeses
UNECA	United Nations Commission for Africa
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPC	União Provincial dos Camponeses
USAID	United States Development Agency

Abstract

This thesis is a journey of critical interrogation of power relations that underpin practices, techniques and rationalities of contemporary forms of governance represented by the governing strategy of the AU-NEPAD. It asks the question, 'how is the Pan-African civil society made within the context of neo-liberalised Pan-African Institutions?' To navigate this complex question, the study used a combination of three case studies, drawing on the nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality from Michel Foucault in conjunction with the Arnestein´s ladder of citizens 'participation and the John Gaventa's Powercube . The study found that there is a clear disconnect between the discourse on citizens driven AU-NEPAD and the praxis of enabling civil society to meaningfully engage in decision making processes. The use of neoliberal rationalities of governing which transform the governments of Member States into a self-disciplined neoliberal subject that must behave in an appropriately competitive fashion congruent with the ethos of market rationality is the AU-NEPAD attempt to discursively legitimise their political and developmental strategies through the imposition of a neoliberal economic agenda for Africa.   AU-NEPAD promotes Pan-African civil society to comply with neoliberal requirements and at the same time contests Pan African civil society through what Arnstein calls co-optation, on one hand, and the divide-and-rule strategy, on the other hand, allowing AU-NEPAD to maintain the 'status quo'. Therefore, Pan-African civil society faces monumental challenges to meaningfully participate (hardly going beyond placation and tokenism) in the making of a people´s driven and owned African Union.   In addition, the study found that although heterogeneous in scope, capacities, size and resources endowment, Pan-African civil society undertakes 'non-compliance' as a counter response of hegemonic dominance from the AU-NEPAD. This is one possibility of Foucauldian 'counter-conduct' through which Pan-African civil society undermines and challenges the shrinking of civic spaces and the AU governmental-driven forms of power, by setting up what Gaventa calls ´invented spaces´.

Contents

Chapter I

Introduction

After the World War II, the world started a deep political, social, and economic transformation to accommodate the new economic order with the deepening of liberal policies. In fact, Sewell argues that regardless of political orientation, all states were then governed by "state-centred regulatory regimes". While the industrialised western countries were based on free markets and private property with democratic welfare states, the communist/socialist countries including most of the African states were guided by authoritarian state institutions or state led development (Sewell 2005).

On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War, development discourse changed considerably. As noted by some scholars, globalisation and neoliberalism have taken central stage (Sewell 2005). Hence, theories related to good governance and participation, globalisation, governmentality, and neo-liberalisation have been gaining prominent space in development discourse and academic circles. Participation and governance in today's development world go hand in hand and it is believed that they improve the outcomes of any development endeavour and contribute to good governance, which are the cornerstone of any democratic process.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalisation became a key feature in the development of the world. This meant, according to some thinkers, the weakening of state or its withdrawal and a creation of borderless self-regulated markets[1] on a scale never seen before. As a result, the world witnessed the spread and expansion of liberal economic systems and the emergence and increase of transnational and global social forces, including transnational social movements and global civil society (Prentis 2013, Lumke 2010).

The ever rapidly changing world is also witnessing a fast-changing nature and expressions of power, power dynamics in decision-making and policy making processes, worldwide. In this line of development, Africa calls for a new governance arrangement to adopt a ´participatory governance´ and ´co-governance´ approach. Although, this may challenge the traditional view

---

[1] Liberal economic theories

of power, which sees powerful actors as the ruling elites and powerless actors as the ruled or have-not, that is, the policymakers and the public (Gaventa, 2005).

This dissertation is inspired by the work of Michel Foucault on analytics of governmentality (2007a) and *Security*, *territory*, *population* (Foucault 2007a), as well as all his lectures at the Collège de France in the Spring terms of 1977–1978 and 1978–1979 where he set out his perspective on governmentality. This is further strengthened by the works of some governmentality writers such as Thomas Lemke (Lemke 2010) and Mitchell Dean (Dean 2006, 2007, 2010), Carl Death (Death 2013), Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (Rose and Miller1992 and 2008). Foucault has contributed to generate a new approach to governmentality, which is widely accepted as an analytic tool for investigating the empirical practices of governing in the modern world. Using Foucauldian approach to governmentality, it helped to investigate the dominant discourses and practices being inculcated within the context of AU-NEPAD at the local, national and continental levels and how they related to the day-to-day lives of the making of Pan-African Civil Society.

This chapter sets out the main framework of the dissertation. It states the significance and contribution of the research to the problem being investigated, the main research questions and objectives of the research, as well as the scope and limitations, and the summary of the dissertation.

1.1. Significance and Contribution of the Research

The findings of this research will benefit the society at large, the African Community, the African Union, and its institutions, considering that participatory governance and the role of civil society are key to the development of Africa. The greater demand for improved and good governance justifies the need for understanding the technologies of rule used by Pan-African institutions to promote or disempower Pan-African Civil Society. Thus, the recommendations derived from this research will contribute to improved power relations between the AU-NEPAD and the Pan-African Civil Society and African catenary. Governments, politicians, and Pan-African Civil Society can adopt the recommendations of this research to lessen the existing tensions, mistrust, and suspicious relationships in order to achieve better continental performance and to build the Africa that African citizens want. Using Foucauldian approach, the Ladder of Citizens´ participation and the Power Cube, helped to uncover critical areas not completely explored by other researchers on the making of Pan-African Civil Society and the

governance of Pan-African institutions. This makes this research a novel contribution to the field of African Governance and Civil Society participation.

This research argues that, within the context of a neo-liberalised AU-NEPAD, the technologies of rule used by Pan-African institutions promote and at the same time contest the emergence of Pan-African Civil Society based on neoliberal principles of disciplining citizens through the institutionalisation of a strong state guided by market forces. This results in a disempowered, divided and disarticulated Pan-African society.

Therefore, the making of Pan-African Civil Society (PACS) within the neo-liberal framework of the African Union-NEPAD, according to the technologies of rule used by AU-NEPAD, faces challenges and opportunities to influence the outcomes of the continent's development. More so, Pan-African Civil Society is a contested platform used as a battleground between the states of the Union and Pan-African Non-state forces, where power relations are played out.

This assertion is supported by the finding of the assessment on how the Pan-African Civil Society is constructed and deconstructed within the discourse and practices of government in Africa; the strategies it uses to engage with AU-NEPAD, the mechanisms through which PACS participates in the governance of Pan-African institutions, how it constructs its identities and subjectivities and whose interest does it represent in order to establish the meaning of Pan-African Civil Society for the theoretical conceptualisation of global civil society.

The thesis also claims that for Pan-African civil society to participate in the governance and accountability of Pan-African institutions genuinely and meaningfully towards the citizens of the continent it should enhance and strengthen the process of policy design, governance and decision making. This will increase the ownership of African processes and materialise the constitutive dream of a people centred and African owned African Union. Furthermore, it would enhance the ownership of the content of those policies and decisions. At the end, it would contribute to a more democratic governance and accountable development process, centred on the people of the continent rather than the interests of the African governments or their western sponsors and powers. This will ultimately shift the development paradigm towards the *endogenousing* of social, political, and economic development of the Continent. The Thesis explores and addresses the knowledge gaps on the making of African Pan-African civil society in the context of neo-liberalised AU-NEPAD as well as the level of involvement

in the governance of the Pan-African Institutions. To reach to the main conclusions the study analysed empirical data vis-à-vis theoretical undertakings from Foucauldian governmentality approach.

1.2. Problem statement

The West has since strived to drive the development of the African continent through Eurocentric and neoliberal policies, such as structural adjustment and others. How Pan-African civil society is constructed and contested in this context is the problem being addressed in this thesis, and the subsequent questions used to unravel this concern are widely addressed throughout.

One of the major problems as identified by researchers in Africa is the lack of participation of national civil society in the process of developing and formulating policy as well as its implementation in African countries. An example is the PRSP process. In the cases that CSOs are involved, this occurs in a limited and not meaningful capacity. In many cases, participation in the PRSP process was and is still on adhoc basis; it is not in a consistent and systemic manner. This results in gaps in CSO participation in development policy formulation and governance of the continent (Action Aid 2004, Christian Aid, 2001; Craig and Porter, 2006 and Whitehead, 2003). Another problem underscored by some researchers is the perception of an increased shrinking of Civil Society Space in the continent. For example, the AU commitment to democratic participation was questioned when the attendance of civil society at AU Summits in Kigali, July 2016 and January 2017 was restricted and several restrictive laws have been introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2012. The third level of problem is the lack of capacity of the Pan-African civil society to use the opportunities given by the formal guiding documents of the AU-NEPAD provisions, to meaningfully demand their participation in decision making and influence the outcomes of African policies.

Fourthly, there is a widespread perception that the African Union and NEPAD processes are government/state, elite and market driven (with big corporation playing a huge role); they leave out key players of the development paradigm, the non-state actors, such as the civil society organisations and their constituencies, the citizens of the continent. Moreover, critics of the AU-NEPAD process regard it as neoliberal in nature; it uses neoliberal approaches to

promote and at the same time contest the emergence and involvement of civil society (Murithi, 2005, Ngwane, 2005 and Bond, 2005).

Lastly, the level of mistrust between AU-NEPAD and the Pan-African civil society undermines the existing potential and opportunities for joint efforts to promote a united and prosperous Africa.

1.3. Main Research Question and Objectives

The bulk of work of the research undertaken was geared towards a better understanding of the making of Pan-African civil society within neo-liberalised Pan-African Institutions with focus on the AU-NEPAD processes. Therefore, the main research question is: How is Pan-African civil society made within the context of neo-liberalised Pan-African Institutions? This research aims to provide an understanding of the technologies of rule used in making Pan-African civil society and the level of its participation in the governance and policy making process of Pan-African Institutions. It examines the degree to which Pan-African citizenry, particularly its organised arm - the continent's civil society organisations, have been participating in the governance of Pan-African Institutions, using the AU-NEPAD process at NEPAD and AUC, and policy frameworks such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Mozambique as case studies.

Furthermore, the study aims to investigate how these Pan-African civil society organisations respond strategically to socio-economic issues, by looking at the level of their participation in the process of formulating programmes and policies. Subsequently, the study suggests the ways that can be used to address the main challenges the civil society organisations encounter in their quest to participate fully in the governance, accountability and overall socio-economic policies and changes in Africa.

The specific objectives of this research project include the following:

(1)   To assess the strategies of rule used by AU-NEPAD to constitute and contest Pan-African civil society.

(2)   To investigate how Pan-African civil society organisations gets involved AU-NEPAD, their practices, the nature of their involvement and whose interests they represent

(3)	To map out the key stakeholders in the governance of CAADP and APRM in Mozambique and assess the level of participation of African civil society in the process using Arnstein Ladder of citizens' participation.

(4)	To establish what constitutes Pan-African civil society in the context of liberalised Pan-African Institutions and what it means for global/transnational civil society theoretical conceptualisation.

An historical overview of the AU and NEPAD since their establishment is provided as a contextual framework for analysing the making of Pan-African civil society and its role in the governance and accountability of Pan-African Institutions (PAI) within the framework of African led and African owned development.

The research explored the levels of participation of African civil society, specifically the African Civil Society Organisations (ACSOs) in decision making within the NEPAD and AU Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It further examined the context under which the African civil society organisations are involved in the governance and accountability of AU-NEPAD to determine how enabling the political environment is for genuine participation of African civil society in the development of the continent. Equally, the research examined the strategies African civil society use to enable their participation in the governance of the continent. It finally assessed the meaning of Pan-African civil society for the global civil society theoretical conceptualisation.

The research was conducted under the assumption that in a liberalised AU-NEPAD, the technologies of rule in making of Pan-African civil society are neoliberal driven. Hence by liberal democracy principles, African leaders should be elected democratically and promote enabling environment for corporate enterprises to flourish by deregulating markets, and minimising state intervention in the economy, that is, reducing the state apparatus to a mere facilitator of business and relegating citizens' responsibility to a mere compliance mechanism through voting and helping to discipline the State. Equally, the research assumption was that power resistance as a natural reaction to power occurs mainly by promoting the participation of the citizens through their organised arm - the African civil society organisations, as a basic condition for a genuine democratic and inclusive development. It is believed that civil society organisations represent the voices and views of the marginalised, poor, and voiceless sectors of

the African population, whose voice would have never been otherwise heard or put in the dialogue table. In fact, some African scholars argue that civil society plays a significant role in Africa's democratisation process and development policies and programmes (Adésínà, 2006a, Adedeji 2008 and Akokpari, 2008).

1.3. Scope and Limitations

The scope of this study is limited to recent experiences happening since the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was established in 2002, and the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU) was changed to African Union (AU). It also covers the challenges faced by the African civil society organisations in Africa to establish themselves as key players of policy making and development within the context of a neo-liberalised process, specifically the establishment of two policy frameworks: CAADP and APRM processes.

The study does not focus on the content of the policy documents, rather it is an examination of the technologies of rule in constructing and deconstructing Pan-African civil society as well as the degree of its interaction with AU-NEPAD processes. This study highlights the emergent challenges and opportunities within the process in relation to the roles and approaches of NEPAD, AUC; African leaders; and African civil society organisations in governance and policy making; it defines the frameworks for international relations within the continent and with the outside world.

This study sought to contribute to the scholarly knowledge on the making of Pan-African Civil Society and its role in policy making and governance of the continent. Thus, it aims to draw a useful framework for civil society participation in policymaking at continental level, contributing to regional and continental levels' governance and policymaking frameworks for Pan-African Institutions, governments, civil society, non-governmental organisations, and academics.

This research aims to contribute to the knowledge on the making of Pan-African civil society and enhance the existing knowledge on the important role Pan-African civil society plays in the development of the continent and the imperative need for its involvement if sustainable development and democratic practices are to be promoted in Africa. Finally, the research aims to contribute to the scholarly literature and discourse of civil society making and participatory

governance in Africa, the Africa led and owned sustainable development in the quest to eradicate poverty and promote inclusive growth and wellbeing of the people of the continent.

1.4.　　Summary of the Thesis

This thesis critically analyzes the way Africa conceptualizes Pan Africa civil society and its role in the governance of regional institutions, taking the neo-liberalized African Union-NEPAD as an example. To answer the main research question "How is the Pan-African civil society made within the context of neo-liberalised Pan-African Institutions?", the thesis is organized into 9 chapters.

Chapter I provides a summary of the importance of the research, and its contemplated contribution to the body of knowledge on the making of Pan-African civil society and the governance of Pan African Institutions, the problem statement, and delineation of research questions, methodology, research scope and limitations, and the summary of the thesis.

Chapter II gives account of the detailed Theory and Literature Review explaining the theoretical and conceptual framework, exploring the concepts of civil society, participation and governance; the theoretical conceptions on international relations theories, neoliberalism, African governance and the civil society, Pan-Africanism and the African Union-NEPAD; African Union Architecture, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Union Architecture and civil society.

Chapter III provides a detailed account of the methodology, including the methods for selecting participants, data collection and analysis, and ethical considerations.

In Chapter IV, the thesis explores the making of civil society from the colonial encounter to post-colonial and the defeat of Pan-Africanism.

Chapter V provides an analysis of the establishment of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the emergence of the neoliberal AU-NEPAD.

In Chapters VI and VII, the thesis explores two case studies: the AU-NEPAD and Pan-African civil society; it also provides an analysis of the Mozambican Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Chapter VIII draws the main conclusion looking at the technologies of rule for the making of Pan-African civil society at the intersection with the neoliberal AU-NEPAD, the political

subjectivity of the Pan-African civil society, the meaning of Pan-African civil society for the transnational civil society conceptualisation. Chapter IX provides a comprehensive list of the literature used to complete the research and an Annexure with a codified list of the study participants.

Chapter II

Theory and Literature Review

2.1. Introduction and Overview

This chapter draws the main conceptual framework for the dissertation, looking at the key concepts being applied throughout the dissertation. Firstly, it discusses key international relations theories and how they conceive governance and civil society. Secondly, the chapter brings in the Foucauldian Governmentality Approach. Thirdly, it discusses the notion of participation and its conceptualisation. Fourthly, it discusses the concept of Power Cube Analysis, and fifthly, the notions of Neoliberalism and Globalisation are discussed. Sixthly, the chapter discusses the notions of Democracy and African Governance, and lastly, it discusses the notion of civil society and civil society organisations.

Scholars have since debated and differed in the way they theorise and interpret state relations with society. For example, International Relations theories have always based their assumptions in a statist centred approach ignoring the influence that social forces have on the state (Williams, 2005). Although recognising that states have always been at the centre stage of any socio-economic change, scholars started to consider that states are part of societies and that societies affect the states and states affect societies. The level and effectiveness of state-society interaction may vary; the boundaries between societies and states are often blurred, thus states and societies are mutually transforming. Although in some cases, the power relation   between states and societies is a struggle for gaining power over the other, there is an account that this relationship can and is an empowering process for both the state and the society (Migdal, Kohli and Shue, 1994).

A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) approach, for instance, discusses the relationship between state and social forces placing emphasis on neo-liberal governmentality and technologies of rules. The key issue addressed is the approach to power, which, according to Foucault analysis, transcends politics and sees power as an everyday, socialised and embodied phenomenon. It sees the ways that norms can be so embedded beyond one's perception causing people to discipline themselves without wilful coercion from others. It is a form of

discourse analysis focusing on power relationships in society as expressed through language and practices (Foucault, 1991, Foucault, 1997b and Foucault, 1988).

Although controversial understanding of civil society characterises its development and debate, there is a common theoretical framework in which most of the scholars base their discussions and arguments.

2.2. Theories of International Relations

The attempt to explain the relationships between people and different groups of people within a society has prompted debates and different theories. As a discipline, International Relations has been built over several theories, most of which are fiercely contested; however, they could not be considered rivals while interpreting some universal truth of world politics. Each of them has its own assumptions and epistemological considerations, which are constrained by contextual and specific conditions while pursuing its own analytical meaning. Each one of these theories possesses useful tools for understanding international politics, hence they should not be deemed right or wrong.

Within the International Relations field, the dichotomy hegemony-pluralism theories dominated the worldview. Realism is considered as a set of related theories of international relations that emphasise the role of the state, national interest, and military power in world politics, prominently the classical realism and neorealism.

Since the end of the Second World War, the academic study of International Relations was dominated by realism, whereby eminent realists claim to explain accurately state behaviour and a set of policy prescriptions for ameliorating the inherent element of destabilising international affairs, chiefly the balance of power between states (McGlinchy, et al 2017:21). Moreover, realism and neorealism are mostly concerned with patterns of interaction in an international system that lacks a centralised political authority (a condition of anarchy). This makes the rational functioning of international affairs different from the domestic affairs that are driven by a sovereign power.

Realism is the dominant mainstream theory in the field of IR. However, realism is contended by other theories such as liberalism, constructivism, and the English School. To some extent, the practice of international politics today is still in accordance with the principles of realism.

State actors, power competition, self-help strategy, national interest, the world disorder, and the balance of power remain important aspects in international politics. Realism is therefore central to international politics both theoretically and practically (Dunne and Schmidt 2001:141; Heywood 2011:53).

Classical Realism can be traced back to Thucydides (c. 460–c. 400 B.C.E.) who defined politics as involving moral questions, asking if relations among states can also be guided by the norms of justice while exercising their power as a crucial element of their position to one another. Moreover, Thucydides' assertion highlights the issue of human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral principles, which translate the relationships between states (Williams, M. C., 2007; Williams, M. F. 1998). His work has inspired realists such as Machiavelli (with his famous political rational 'the ends justify the means') and Hobbes, and contemporary neorealist such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. Moreover, on one hand, Thucydides influenced the work of other neorealists, mainly students of International Relations, such as Francis Carnford and Robert Gilpin. On the other hand, he drew skeptical criticism from authors such as Geoffrey de Ste, Croix and Daniel Garst, who argued again Thucydides' scientific account of his thoughts.

Kohout (2003) notes that the hegemonic theories conceive the organisation of state based on the powerful dominant states over others. These theories contrast the assumption of realist theories of an international order of anarchy and more so, in the hegemonic transition theory, where the international system is viewed as hierarchically organised like the domestic and national political systems. And it stretches that player in the international system accept their position and role in the system based on the power distribution difference within the system. Pluralist theories of international relations on the other hand defend that there is no such organisational form of international order based on the hegemony of one nation over others; instead, there is a pluralist world order of mixed hierarchy and anarchy with emergence of a concept of balance of power. This accordingly can be described as factual distribution of power in the international system at a given time (Kohout 2003:51-66).

For some analysts of International Relations Theories, realism is a theory that claims to explain the *reality* of international politics. For theorists, realism emphasises the constraints on politics that result from humankind's egoistic nature and the absence of a central authority above the state. The survival of the state is the major goal of realists, and despite its criticism, realism

continues to be a valuable analytical tool for international relations and it explains the fact that states' actions are judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral principles (Antunes & Camissao 2018:18).

It is worth stating that realists assume the state as the key actor in international politics. Realists believe that the core features of international relations are the relations among the states. This was the reason realists failed to understand the word politics and international affairs with the growing importance of multinational corporations as well as international and non-governmental organisations, in the middle of the twenty centuries, and in the 70s with the decline of the Cold War.

In a nutshell, realism is a constellation of ideas based on shared principles about what determines states' behavior. For realists, there is no centralized global authority that limits sovereign states and determines their actions; hence nation-states are the only legitimate actors in international affairs and neither supranational nor domestic actors can restrict them. When there is anarchy and an unpredictable future, nations rely only on themselves, that is, national interest is the only driving force.

Trying to understand these phenomena, scholars brought back the idealist thinking, which led to a new line of interpretation named pluralism or neoliberalism, represented by scholars such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Neoliberalism (pluralism) proposes a new framework to describe a much complex world reality in international affairs, the complex interdependence. Pluralists accept some of the basic points of realists; however, they argue that the future does not need to look like the past, hence there can be and there is progress in international relations (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018:31).

Morgenthau (1962) argues that realism should not be accommodated only within the positivist perspective of international relations because it is a practical and evolving theory which is historical and political contextually driven. Thus, it is more than a moral and a static theory. Therefore, its judgment is based upon its relevance and ethical standards to the prudent political decision-making process (Morgenthau 1962).

Pluralism, on the other hand, sees power and resources as widely scattered throughout society, hence resources are available to everyone, and at any time the amount of potential power may exceed the amount of actual power. Miller (1983:739) put it this way, "a theoretical tradition

used to analyze political actions in modern democratic states… mainly based upon a perspective that citizens are involved in political arenas through different interest groups, and that political power should be dispersed to secure its own legitimate interests and none of these groups will dominate the system". This provides for a democratic balance of power among different interest groups. Even the smallest groups are encouraged to maintain their own interests and the government should provide a political system that works, by trying to solve the emerging problems and conflicts between interest groups and government (Self 1985 and Miller 1983). This is great, though limiting. How do we practically implement such in a system?

Pluralism seems to neglect some key social realities. For example, that real societies are made by groups that are dominant over others. The dominant groups can forcefully influence small groups to follow them as a crowd. These dominant groups can even influence the government; therefore, government does not play its role of solving and preventing conflicts. Moreover, power dispersion needs a string coordination to be efficient and effective; therefore if (as it is in many stances, mainly the African context) coordination is not attained, the society becomes ineffective and inefficient (Self 1985).

Realism and neoliberalism defend that the social and psychological framework for the constitution of power in the form of state and the interrelations of states that make up the world order is unchangeable (Ayers 2008). This is in contrast with the Gramscian interpretation of power. Discussing how a class exerts influence over other classes, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony to explain how the dominant class maintains its rule over others. He divided the society into two major super-structural 'levels. One can be called 'civil society', which can be understood as the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the state'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society, and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government (Germino and *Gramsci, 1990;* Hoare et al, 1971; Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

Ideological hegemony, according to Gramscian thinking, is the way the dominant class exercises its power over the rest of the people through a centralised coercive state´s apparatus, including other forms of domination, namely the religion, traditional family and the media. For

him hegemony is as important to the dominant class as it is for the masses or other social forces, because these ones need to replace the dominant classes.

The major shortcoming of these theories for the purpose of this study is the lack of theoretical analysis and incorporation of the role international organisations and other non-state actors play in the international relations system. There is also scarce literature on the use of Foucauldian governmentality approach to analysing the making of civil society in the context of Pan-African institutions. The hegemonic realist theory or realism and its current expression neo-realism provide a rational for imperial domination through 'hegemonic states or a 'hegemon' and conceive the world order as constituted by states living in anarchy as primary and unitary actors in the world political economy. Moreover, neo-realism sees states as rational actors and power-maximising (Hnyder, 2002, Bieler, 2014), thus leaving non-state actors out of the picture. As Mearsheimer will argue, it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2006).

In contrast, neoliberalism represents a more elaborated theoretical challenge to contemporary realism. Thus, for the neoliberals, institutions exert a causal force on international relations, shaping state preferences and locking them in to cooperative arrangements.

Post-1945 period, liberals turned to international institutions to carry out several functions the state could not perform. This was the catalyst for integration theory in Europe and pluralism in the United States. By the early 1970s, pluralism had mounted a significant challenge to realism. It focused on new actors (transnational corporations, non-governmental organisations) and new patterns of interaction holding that the social good will be maximised by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, seeking to bring all human action into the domain of the market (Harvey, 2005).

In neoliberal thinking, regimes and institutions help govern a competitive and anarchic international system and they encourage, and at times require, multilateralism and co-operation as a means of securing national interests. Democratic peace liberalism and neoliberalism are the dominant strands in liberal thinking today (Borner, 1997, Thorsen, 2009, Harvey, 2005).

Neo-realists define hegemony as a system where great power dominates, when it is the only great power within; while, neo-liberals define hegemony as a preponderance of material resources, which result in economic dominance of a state within a system. On the other hand,

neo-Gramscians view hegemony as a dominating mixed structure of a system, combining ideas, institutions and material capabilities. In neo-realism and neo-liberalism states, rational actors are the main actors of international system. Neo-Gramscian state is a construct made of social classes, including civil and political societies.

In a complex world order explained by liberals, where competing social forces help in governing the international relations, there is a compelling need to study the technologies of rules in making civil society, thus the present research will explore and investigate the making of Pan-African civil society.

Neo-realism and pluralism as stressed above do not consider and conceptualise the role of social forces, let alone the influence of civil society over international relations construct. Moreover, neo-Gramscian hegemony theories, although conceptualising social classes and power relations, they do not explain the technologies of rule in making the different social actors. Hence, there is the need to use Foucauldian conceptualisation of governmentality in order to understand the political subjectivity of the making of Pan-African civil society.

2.3. Foucauldian Thoughts and Governmentality

To discuss the relationship between state and society, that is, the power relations being played, this research reflects on the work of Michel Foucault, a French Philosopher who shifted the debate on governance, power relations, and civil society. Foucault's major work is summarised in 'The Birth of ´Biopolitics' (1997b); ´Governmentality' (1978), 'The Subject and the Power'(1982a), 'La phobie d'Etat' (1984), 'Technologies of the Self' (1988), 'La Population' (1992), the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self' (1993) and 'Security, Territory, and Population'(1997a) and most of the lessons at the College de France. The influential philosopher has developed his unique framework on his reflections and lessons. Some concepts are relevant to this work such as governmentality, apparatus (dispositif), archaeology versus genealogy, the arts of existence (life as a work of art), discipline, discourse, non-discursive practice and discursive practice, freedom, power, power-knowledge, regimes of truth, power and biopower, resistance to power and the limits of power, the State, subject, technology, technique, and truth. ; The key concepts to be applied throughout this dissertation are governmentality, discourse and power.

Foucault sees apparatus as the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures used to enhance and maintain the exercise of power within a social body. He defines archeology to describe his approach to writing history. It is about examining the discursive traces and orders as a way of looking at history to understand the processes that have led to what we are today. Whereas, genecology is the level where true and false grounds are distinguished via mechanisms of power. Foucault defines 'techniques of the self' or 'arts of existence' as 'those reflective and voluntary practices by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria' (Foucault, 1992, 1984:11).

Foucault believes in human freedom, arguing that freedom is a practice rather than a goal to be achieved. Knowledge starts with rules and constraints, not freedom. Freedom is also a condition for the exercise of power. This argument is by far against nineteenth century established and existentialist views of an abstract freedom and a 'free' subject.

For Foucault, truth is of particular importance in the context of its relations with power, knowledge and the subject. For him, truth is an event which takes place in history. It is something that 'happens' and is produced by various techniques (the 'technology' of truth) rather than something that already exists and is simply waiting to be discovered. Foucault conveys that he is not interested in 'telling the truth', in his writing; rather, he is interested in inviting people to have a particular experience for themselves. This is because 'the effect of truth' he wants to produce consists in 'showing that the real is polemical'. And he conceptualizes the 'regimes of truth' as the historically specific mechanisms which produce discourses which function as true in particular times and places. In that sense, Foucault challenges the established notion that power is wielded by people or groups by way of 'episodic' or 'sovereign' acts of domination or coercion. He, instead, sees it as dispersed and pervasive. For him, 'Power is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere' so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure. Instead, it is a kind of 'metapower' or 'regime of truth' that pervades society, and which is in constant flux and negotiation. Foucault uses the term 'power/knowledge' to signify that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding, and 'truth' (Foucault 1998: 63).

The notion of State, for Foucault, is that the State is a codification of relations of power at all levels across the social body. It is a concept which provides a 'scheme of intelligibility for a whole group of already established institutions and realities. Furthermore, 'the State is a practice not a thing'. Foucault emphasizes that the State is not the primary source of power (Foucault 2004:282). For Foucault, the subject is an entity which is self-aware and capable of choosing how to act. This is in opposition to the nineteenth century and phenomenological notions of a universal and timeless subject which was at the source of how one made sense of the world, and which was the foundation of all thought and action. This, according to Foucault's thoughts, presented an important shortcoming. That is, it fixed the status quo and attached people to specific identities that could never be changed (Foucault, 1982a:206).

Another important notion within the Foucauldian work is the technology, technique or techne, which is considered as 'a practical rationality governed by a conscious aim'. He uses more often the word 'technology' to encompass the broader meanings of *techne*. Sometimes he uses the words techniques and technologies interchangeably, although sometimes techniques tend to be specific and localized and technologies more general collections of specific techniques (Foucault, 1988).

Discourse

Foucault uses discourse to refer to the material verbal traces left by history. He also uses it to describe 'a certain "way of speaking" (Foucault, 1972; 1969:193). Discursive practice refers to a historically and culturally specific set of rules for organizing and producing different forms of knowledge. It is not a matter of external determinations being imposed on people's thought, rather it is a matter of rules which, a bit like the grammar of a language, allow certain statements to be made. Non-discursive practices include 'institutions, political events, economic practices and processes. In addition, discourse does not underlie all cultural forms; for example, art and music are not discursive. He also notes: 'there is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous layer of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, institutions, social relations, political relations, and so on…´ (Foucault 1967:284).

Power

Foucault refined his accounts of power over time, having sometimes contradictory views on power, from his work on institutions laid in his writings on *Madness and Civilization*, *The*

Birth of the Clinic, *Discipline and Punish* to his most recent writings on sexuality and governmentality. At beginning, Foucault's writings gave a sense that he considered power as something inherent in institutions themselves, and not in the individuals that make those institutions function. However, Foucault clarifies clearly in his recent writings, that power ultimately does inhere in individuals, including those that are surveilled or punished. Furthermore, he argues a few points in relation to power and offers definitions that are directly opposed to more traditional liberal and Marxist theories of power. He sees biopower as the technology for managing populations, which incorporates certain aspects of disciplinary power. He argues that if disciplinary power is about training the actions of bodies, biopower is about managing the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of a population. He argues strongly that mechanisms of power produce different types of knowledge which collate information on people's activities and existence. He refutes the idea that 'knowledge is power' attributed to him and affirms that his interest is studying the complex relations between power and knowledge without saying they are the same thing, because the knowledge gathered in this way further reinforces exercises of power (Foucault, 1972). Foucault believes that there are a number of ways in which the exercise of power can be resisted, and that resistance is co-extensive with power, namely as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. He suggests that if there is no such thing as a society without relations of power, this does not mean that existing power relations cannot be criticized. It is not a question of an 'ontological opposition' between power and resistance, but a matter of quite specific and changing struggles in space and time. There is always, he argues, the possibility of resistance no matter how oppressive the system (Foucault, 1982a:208). Foucault explains in his work on The Subject and Power, that "something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action…in itself, power is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few" (Foucault, 1982a: 219). Therefore, for him, power is not the same as violence because the opposite pole of violence "can only be passivity. By contrast, a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses,

reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up…Power always entails a set of actions performed upon another person's actions and reactions…although violence may be a part of some power relationships, in itself the exercise of power is not violence…it is always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action" (Foucault, 1982a: 219-220). At the very end, Foucault argues that power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government, understanding government in its broadest sense.

Governmentality

The concept of governmentality, which is the chief approach for this research and often discussed by several authors as developed by Michel Foucault, guides the analysis of the making of Pan-African Civil society in the intersection with the neo-liberalized AU-NEPAD.

The concept of governmentality was originally developed by Foucault to describe a particular way of administering populations in modern European history within the context of the rise of the idea of the State. As most of his reflections, the term governmentality evolved with the time to incorporate other dimensions, such as techniques and procedures, which according to Foucault, are designed to govern the conduct of both individuals and populations at every level of life, not just the administrative or political level.

Foucault developed the concept of governmentality from the assumption that government is a discursive field in which exercising power is rationalised and pinpoints a specific form of representation. In this light, Foucault defines government as conduct, meaning "the conduct of conduct". This covers two distinctive dimensions of government: "governing the self" and the "governing others" (Lect. Feb. 8, 1978/1982b, 16/17; Foucault, 1982a). He summarises this as "encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self, I call 'governmentality" (Foucault 1997a:225). Furthermore, Foucault considers governmentality as a set of power instruments that is characterized by its fluidity (Foucault 2007), power instruments, as an assemblage of diverse tactics that aim to control people as a whole, through a number of different ways in which these 'tactics' operate (Foucault 2007:99). Hence, governmental power does not only operate through institutions, but also through procedures, analyses, reflections, and calculations (Foucault 2007:144). This is important to note as we discuss the making of Pan African civil society and its role in the governance of the Continent. As Foucault discusses the history of governmentality, he makes deliberate effort

to understand and explain how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual engage and promote the emergence of one another, which is relevant for the establishment of a united Africa and a Pan-African civil society.

Governmentality refers to the ways in which government may be construed when the Foucauldian genealogical approach is applied to the matter of how society has been, is and might be ruled. In this light, governmentality is the art of governing self and governing others (Foucault, 1988). Foucault formulated his ideas having as his point of departure the hypothesis that during the sixteenth century the general problem of an art of government flourished, in all its various meanings: the government of oneself, the government of souls and conduct, the government of children, and finally the government of the State (Foucault 2007 and 2008).

Foucault developed his analytical ideas tracing a historical development of the concepts, mainly the concept of government. In fact, Foucault discussed his ideas through his 1978 lectures, discussing the genealogy of governmentality from Greek and Roman classical days through to the contemporary notion of state reason and the science of the police. Based on the works of Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Ferguson, Foucault analysed the classic liberal art of government as well as the neoliberal governmentality, particularly the German post-War liberalism and the liberalism of the Chicago School. In his analysis, Foucault argues that government is "the conduct of conduct", that is, it includes "governing the self" and the "governing others" as the main features of government. He termed it as governmentality, which comes from the juxtaposition of two terms, the governing (gouverner) and thought (mentalité). In fact, the term governmentality, according to Foucault, incorporates two distinct dimensions: a form of representation, on one hand, where exercising power is rationalised, and on the other hand, the concept is based on the assumption that there is a reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms of knowledge, which was developed in his lectures on Neo-Liberal Governmentality at the Collège de France . Foucault emphasizes that the study of the technologies of power is intrinsically linked to the political rationality governing these technologies.

Foucault (2001b) defines the technologies of the self as "the operations by which individuals have an effect on their own way of being and thinking, on their body and conduct. These technologies can be carried out by the individual or with the help and benevolence of others, and their objective is to transform the individual whether the aim was to find happiness,

wisdom, peace of mind, purity or perfection" Foucault (2001 b:1604). Investigating the variety of associations between the art of governing others, letting oneself to be governed, and the arts of governing the self through daily conduct, Foucault consolidated his contribution to governmentality as the intersection between the techniques of the self and technologies of domination (Foucault 2001:6).

Foucault's work can be located into three distinctive periods: (i) the archaeology of knowledge, within the structuralism of the 1960s. This period of his work is portrayed by the book "The order of things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences in 1966", (ii) the genealogy of power. This phase is captured by the study of the concept of power, its different modalities and its relations with knowledge, (iii) the problematization in the order of discourse. It was in this period of work where Foucault unveiled the process which establishes anything as obvious, evident and secure.

The ideas developed by Foucault produced a significant shift in the way established traditional thoughts conceptualized power, subjectivity, government, state, knowledge, and other key concepts, which produced critics and defenders within the academic circles. However, the critics and the defenders of Foucault´s thoughts agree on one thing: they both point out that he had a very new and radical perspective to political questions and his accounts of power and subjectivity. Nevertheless, they clearly differ when it comes to his stances on political side. The critics situate him to the right due to his rejection of traditional left's liberal views on freedom and justice. While some defenders view his stances as compatible with liberalism, other defenders see him as neither left nor right, situating him beyond any traditional political category or as a revolutionary leftist thinker (Gane 2008). Nonetheless, all have used his work as analytical tools, mainly on ´governmentality´ and ´biopower´, which present a radical view of social power.

The major feature of the Foucauldian governmentality approach lies on the rejection of the high importance given to 'the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty' by the classical (Lumke, 2010; Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2009; Saul, 2005). Accordingly, the term governmentality was employed to refer to the 'conduct of conduct' and places emphasis on the techniques and practices used by the state to govern the conduct of others (Lumke, 2010).

Traditional political theories focus their approaches on abstract principles and rules, in contrast to the neo-Foucauldian approach which places emphasis on the technologies of rules, specific mechanisms, procedures and tactics used and developed to materialise development programmes (Mackinnon, 2000). For Foucault, there is no possibility of studying the technologies of power without an analysis of the underpinning political rationality. This means, according to Lumke, there are two sides to governmentality; a specific form of representation which includes agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms that enable people to govern the objects and subjects of a political rationality, whereas the other side of governmentality represents the close "link between forms of power and processes of subjectification" (Lumke, 2010:2).

Using unusual approach to power and knowledge, Foucault sees power as what makes people and institutions who they are. He has been shaping the understanding of power, emphasising the idea that ´power is everywhere and that it is embodied and diffused in discourse, knowledge and ´regimes of truth (Foucault, 1991). In fact, as Gaventa put it, "power is diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them" (Gaventa 2003: 1). Here implies the idea that people or institutions do not use power purely as an instrument of coercion.

Uncovering the relationship between power and knowledge (genealogy of power) behind the suffering power to disciplinary power, on one hand, Foucault sees power as something that is intrinsically based on knowledge and as something that makes use of knowledge. On the other hand, for Foucault, power reproduces knowledge by shaping it in accordance with its intentions. Therefore, Foucault understands power as creating and recreating its own fields of exercise using knowledge (Foucault 1991 and 997b).

In his late work, the genealogy of power and knowledge had a clear and coherent meaning. For Foucault, the idea of power works as a ´regime of truth´, a constant flux going back and forth in a constant negotiated fashion, which is composed of certain accepted forms of scientific understanding, knowledge and truth produced by multiple forms of constraint. Therefore, Foucault disagrees with the view of power as something exerted by acts of domination or coercion by people or institutions in an episodic or sovereign way (Foucault 1998).

To locate the Foucauldian thought around power, truth and discourse let us see one of his most famous quotes

> …we are obliged to produce the truth by the power that demands truth and needs it to function. We are constrained; we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it. Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it. …In a different sense we are also subject to the truth in the sense that the truth lays down the law; it is the discourse of truth that decides, at least in part; it conveys and propels the effects of power. (Foucault 1972-1977, 1991 and 1998)[2]

Foucault argues that the regime of truth induces a regular effect of power and, the regime of truth is contextual, hence it differs from one society to another. This means that, in Foucault´s arguments, a regime of truth or its specific general politics, that is the accepted discourse that makes the truth works as a truth, is established, and produced by each society. Foucault puts it plainly, "the society establish instances and mechanisms enabling one to identify statements as true or false, including the disciplinary measures, techniques and procedures for the acquisition of truth as well as the individuals or institutions in charge of establishing what counts as true" (Foucault, 1991:223).

Foucault sees the scientific discourse and institutions establishing the mechanisms, such as education system, flux of political and economic technologies and the media, through which the regime of truth and the general politics are constantly reinforced and redefined. Accordingly, he sees this process of reinforcement and redefining as a battle of rules separating the truth and the false and showing the specific effects of power related to the truth and the economic and political roles that the truth plays (Foucault, 1991).

In fact, researchers recognise that Foucault has brought in a new way of understanding power, by shifting the traditional way of seeing power that is ´centred in feudal states to coerce their subjects´, diverting the attention from the ´episodic and sovereign´ exercise of power. He considers power as a source of social discipline and conformity, a new type of ´disciplinary

---

[2] See comprehensive statements on Foucault Interviews "Truth and power" (1st publ. 1977) can be found in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980; Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: the birth of a prison. London, Penguin and Foucault, Michel (1998) *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge*, London, Penguin.

power´ that could be learned by people to discipline themselves and behave in a socially expected way. This new kind of ´disciplinary power´ is reinforced and recreated by administrative systems and social services, such as schools, prisons, hospital (Gaventa, 2003; Death, 2012).

Most of Foucauldian critics indicate that most of his reflections are based on western events, hence do not consider events in non- or quasi-liberal states, in Africa and Asia, labelling him as a Eurocentric and non-political intellectual (Death 2012). However, looking at recent studies of African politics and global affairs it is worth noting that the use of governmentality approaches was and is still on the rise. More so, you can mention Foucault's more politically connected work as being developed after his stay in Tunisia. Foucault lived and worked in Tunisia from 1966-8 and was closely involved with student anti-government protests in Tunis against the Bourguiba regime (Foucault, 2000: 279-80). Foucault also appears to have considered a move to Zaire, and was attracted to "the sun, the sea, the great warmth of Africa" which he believed allowed him a sense of perspective and a better vantage point to reflect upon European social and political institutions. The shift from archaeology to genealogy can be attributed to his period in Tunisia (Death, 2012, citing Ahluwalia, 2010).

Researchers have initially read Foucault's work as distant from International Relations. Only lately, most researchers are regarding Foucault's work as an analyst of orders and communities, allowing them to see Foucault's contribution as a relevant tool for International Relations. Thus, Foucault does not present any elaborated theory as such; instead, he elaborated a detailed device for analysis and interpretation of the phenomena . Foucault does not give answers, rather gives questions and problems, which help to open possibilities and contextualisation of analysis. To him, answers are always temporary and local circumstances bound. Henceforth, Foucault's starting point is that any order is a struggle and a contested one; that is, a perpetual struggle over power.

While realist theory ignores the experiences and propositions of most of the actions in a system (Kelley 1990:100), Foucault recognises a society, but not in liberal terms. To him, society is a forum for struggle, distancing himself from both the realist and liberal models of society.

Foucault analysed the subjectivation which led him to pose the question of the mode of subjectivation of individuals according to external ethical code. From this analysis Foucault

departed himself from the discussion of the genealogies of power, towards a study of ethical techniques of the self (Foucault 1990 and 1997c).

Neo-Foucauldian approaches give prominence at the ascendency of neoliberalism as a distinctive political rationality. These approaches look at the dynamics of social forces in the governance of states, highlighting contradictions, interlinked practices and technologies of rule. They offer substantive framework for the study and understanding of the rationalities underpinning the making of civil society in the African context.

This work looked at the key critique of Foucauldian analysis laid down within the Foucauldian-inspired global governmentality literature, by the work of Carl Death which traces a clear distinction between governmentality as an approach and governmentality as a description of a specific form of neoliberal power relation. Death's assertion that Foucault's work is useful to the study of politics if conceptualized as an approach to the study of regimes of rule is a useful reflection to analyzing the governance of Pan-African Institutions and understanding the making of civil society (Death 2012).

Death argues that the Foucauldian analytic framework should not be used to study political affairs as a form of power relations or a rationality of rule (liberal or neoliberal); it rather emphasizes the study of visibilities, practices, knowledge and subjectivities of the conduct of conduct and the interrelationship between sovereign, disciplinary and liberal power relations (Death, 2010a and 2012). Although governmentality has been used more productively and incisively as a description of a specific form of ordering the work, such as liberalism and neoliberalism as a governmental rationality, governmentality shall be used more broadly to understanding how the world is governed and ordered.

Therefore, the present study draws from the neo-Foucauldian governmentality approaches to understanding how Africa is ordered and governed. It investigates the technologies of rule used by AU-NEPAD to promote and contest the emerging Pan-African civil society, the dynamics underpinning the constitution of political subjectivity at the intersection of AU-NEPAD and African civil society, the strategies used by Pan-African civil society to engage and critique the neo-liberalized AU-NEPAD and the building of the African continent, the meaning of the construction and deconstruction of Pan-African civil society to the global theoretical conceptualisation of civil society.

A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) approach, for instance, discusses the relationship between state and social forces placing emphasis on neoliberal governmentality and technologies of rules. The key issue addressed is the approach to power, which, according to Foucault analysis, transcends politics and sees power as an everyday, socialised, and embodied phenomenon. It sees the ways that norms can be so embedded beyond one's perception causing people to discipline themselves without wilful coercion from others (Foucault, 1991, Foucault, 1997b and Foucault, 1988).

Foucault explains his governmentality theory as the approach to the study of power relations emphasising the governing of people's conduct through positive means rather than the sovereign power formulating the law. His assertion is in contrast with a disciplinarian form of power. Hence, governmentality is generally associated with the willing rather than forced participation of the governed. Foucauldian researchers see this as different conceptual lens through which they can study governance, not in individual terms but as a social construct; both as a product and generator of power and knowledge.

The concept of governmentality conversely takes the conceptualisation of government defined as the exercise of organised political power by a nation or by State and goes further to expand it to encompass the active consent and willingness of individuals to participate in their own governance. Furthermore, it proposes that government by the state is only one form of governing, that the terms *state* and *government* are not synonymous, and that the actions taken by the state alone cannot bring about its desired ends (Foucault 1982a:208). This is very critical in looking at the governance of the Pan-African Institutions and understanding how citizens are engaged to consent in participating willingly and actively in their own governance in Africa, that is, understanding the technology of rules used by Pan-African institutions to promote and at the same time contest the making of Pan-African Civil Society.

2.4. The Concept Participation

Within the governance field, the concept of participation has been critically moving to the center of debate on the quality of governance and democracy. With the governmentality framework, participation takes a very special stake as it is a decisive term for exercising the different types of power. The literature on participation shows that it became a prominent topic in governance since the 1960s. It was around that time that an article by Sherry Arnstein in

1969 established a conceptual framework describing a "ladder" of increasing citizens' influence and authority over government decision-making. It was widely accepted and is still an influential piece in the field, to be discussed later. However, the focus of interest in public participation has since changed.

Participation defies a single definition. It is really an umbrella term or rubric under which a number of clearly definable elements may be assembled. The term, though, has been used more and more frequently since the late 1970's to the extent where its inclusion is almost obligatory in any development strategy

For some researchers, participation is defined as a voluntary process by which people, including the disadvantaged (in income, gender, ethnicity, or education) influence or control the decisions that affect them. The essence of participation is exercising voice and choice. Many researchers conceptualize participation as contributing, influencing, sharing, or redistributing power and control, resources, benefits, knowledge, and skills to be gained through beneficiary involvement in decision-making. The World Bank, for example, debates the fact that participation can be either a means or an end, or both (World Bank 1992).

In fact, in the 1990s, the World Bank viewed participation as the process that helps individuals to influence the decision-making that affects them and play a role in these decisions (World Bank 1996). However, as D 'Aquino argues, depending on the approach on the weight of the points of view of the actors, participation may take different shapes: a) for some people, participation means an exchange of viewpoints with the main objective to allow the transfer of one's own analysis (awareness raising) to the targeted actors; b) for others, participation means going beyond the existing viewpoints to building a common vision, which requires that each one agrees to modify his or her initial analysis (participatory approach); c) the participation time limit is also used by approaches intended to share the different tasks and responsibilities included in the management of a resource, area or chain of production with the other actors (collaborative management); and d) participation can also define a shared pre-management decision making process concerned with prioritizing values and goals to be dealt with subsequently (participatory democracy) [D 'Aquino 2007].

As implied above, participation has a wide range of definitions. On one hand, some schools of thoughts see participation as meaning simply engaging with any specific action (Bishop & Davis 2002; Paul 1987); other schools regard participation as a process through which people

influence and share control over agenda setting, development initiatives or decision-making process [Arnstein (1971); Shand & Arnberg (1996); World Bank (1996)]. More and more researchers now recommend the later consideration for development processes at local and regional levels. Arnstein (1969) developed her conceptual framework with eight rungs, namely: 1) Manipulation, 2) Therapy, 3) Informing, 4) Consultation, 5) Placation, 6) Partnership, 7) Delegated power and 8) Citizen control. In contrast, Wilcox (1994) and the International Association for Public Participation (2003) proposed five stages of people's participation, which are: 1) Inform: one-way communication; 2) Consult: two-way communication; 3) Involve: Deciding together; 4) Collaborate: Acting together; and 5) Empower: Supporting independent community interests. This study uses Arnstein's framework to look at the levels of people's participation. Below is a tentative detailed account of this conceptual framework.

Current literature highlights the importance of participration as a key success factor of any democratic society; however, it also stretches the issue of exclusion to most citizens; mainly the poor, the marginalised and less powerful citizens. This is well illustrated by the Voices of the Poor Study (Naraya, D. et al 2000) and by the Commonwealth Foundation (1999:37) which found 'a growing disillusionment of citizens with their governments, based on their concerns with corruption, lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor, and the absent participation or connection to ordinary citizens'.

The Ladder of Citizens' Participation

Foucauldian Governmentality is a much comprehensive framework to understand power relations, knowledge in the context of regional institutions. However, it lacks the frame that can be used to understand the level of participation of individual or organised citizens in decision making. To fill in this gap, the ladder of citizen's participation is a useful conceptual framework to understand the nuanced participation of citizens in policy and decision making. In her "ladder of citizens' participation" Arnstein points out eight levels of participation grouped in three main patterns, namely Non-participation, Tokenism and Citizens' power.

The Eight levels are: a. **Manipulation**: is non-participation by the less powerful while the powerful use them to achieve their ends.

b. **Therapy**: Arnstein regards both levels 1 and 2 as non-participative (Arnstein, 1969). For Arnstein, the aim is basically to cure or educate the participants. The proposed plan is put

forward as the best and the role of participation is only to achieve public support by public relations rather than contribution.

c. Informing: This is the most important first step to legitimate participation, but too frequently the emphasis is on a one-way flow of information. There is no channel for feedback.

d. **Consultation**: Again, a legitimate step utilising such things as attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings and public enquiries. But Arnstein still feels this is just a window dressing ritual.

e. **Placation**: A good example of this level is a co-option of handpicked 'worthies' into committees. It allows citizens to play an advisory role or plan but retains for power holders the right to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. The last three levels (informing, consultation, and placation) represent what Arnstein called Tokenism, thus people can hear and be heard, but they still lack a power to make their points be considered by the powerful and decision makers. Therefore, at these levels of participation there is no assurance that the status quo of policies, laws or programmes will be changed.

f. Partnership: In this level, according to Arnstein, power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power holders. Planning and decision-making responsibilities are shared. The have-not citizens can negotiate and engage in 'trade-offs' with power holders, e.g., through joint committees.

g. **Delegated power**: Arnstein considers that at this level, citizens hold a clear majority of seats on committees with delegated powers to make decisions. Therefore, the public now has the power to assure accountability of the policies and programmes to them.

h. **Citizen Control**: The have-not citizens handle the entire job of planning, policymaking and managing a programme, e.g., neighbourhood corporation with no intermediaries between it and the source of funds or states. Furthermore, powerless citizens obtain most decision-making seats in the committees or a full managerial power. The three last levels of participation (partnership, delegated power, and citizen control) represent the most balanced and effective concept of genuine participation.

Fig 1: Representation of the Ladder of Citizens' Participation

Fig1. Ladder of Citizen Participation

Source: Adapted from Arnstein (1969)

However, in the real world, people and programmes are more heterogeneous; therefore, there will be much more than eight levels of participation without clear sharp distinctions among them. Many of the characteristics used by Arnstein to illustrate each of the eight levels might be applicable to other levels.

For easy analysis of participation of the Pan-African Civil Society, the table below is used to operationalise the Ladder of Participation.

Table 1. Adaptation and Operationalisation of the Ladder of Citizens' Participation

Manipulation Therapy	Information	Consultation Placation	Partnership	Delegation	Control
Press releases	Surveys	Key contacts	Advisory	Public inquiries	Referenda
Advertising	Toll-free phones	Interest groups	Committees	Impact assessment	-
-	Public information	Meetings	Policy	Citizens' forums	-
-	Campaign	Focus groups	Communities	-	
-	Meetings	Public hearings	-	-	-
-	Circulation of proposals	-	-	-	-

Source: author own summary

Although Foucault´s work on power offers a distinctive and original perspective with the potential to afford insights into the nature of participation, governmentality is drawn out as a potentially useful tool in understanding participation as a profoundly ambiguous phenomenon (Gallagher 2008). It is necessary to deepen the analysis of participation in the making of Pan-African Civil Society within the context of the AU-NEPAD. Therefore, the Powercube was used to deepen this understanding.

2.5. The Power Cube

Arnstein's ladder of citizens participation used as an analytical framework was supplemented with the power cube analysis. This tool is developed by John Gaventa; it is a framework for analysing the forms, level, and spaces of power, based on the work of Andrea Cornwall on

spaces for participation and power relations. According to Gaventa (2003), assessing the transformative possibility of political space involves a) how spaces are created; b) the places and levels of engagement and c) the degree of visibility of power within these spaces. The Power Cube ended up as a useful framework for understanding the power played in the intersection of the Pan-African Civil society and the AU-NEPAD architecture.

As Gaventa points out, "power is increasingly re-entering the development vocabulary and is critical to meaningful citizenship and democracy" (Gaventa, 2003:3). Thus, understanding the dynamics and relationships of power while exercising power is key to understanding the making of Pan-African Civil Society.

According to Gaventa (2003), Power Cube presents a dynamic understanding of how power operates, how different interests can be marginalised from decision-making, and the strategies needed to increase inclusion. It describes how power is used by the powerful across three continuums of a. **Spaces**: how arenas of power are created; b. **Power**: the degree of visibility of power; c. **Places**: the levels and places of engagement of different stakeholders.

Figure 2. Power Cube

Source: The power cube (Gaventa, 2003, 2005, 2006)

Gaventa goes far and classifies spaces according to who coordinates and manages it. When government coordinates and manages the space, Gaventa calls it an invited space, whereby stakeholders are invited by the power holders to attend. Here is the very problem, how power holders select who to invite, who is truly invited, when the invitation is communicated, what information the invitees are given or getting to prepare themselves for these spaces. Power holders will tend to invite stakeholders who are not strongly critical of the policies and practices of the power holders, leaving out most of the critical voices. On the other hand, when non-

government stakeholders organize, coordinate, and manage their own spaces, these are called invented or reclaimed spaces. They are normally established or opened as a response to the lack of genuine space within the invited spaces; non-government stakeholders organize these spaces to be able to freely voice their contributions and concerns around specific policies and/or practices from the power holders.

For this study, Arnstein's typology of participation is used as a general guide only to look at how meaningful and to what extent the Pan-African civil society has participated in the development of AU-NEPAD in the continent, specifically within the context of APRM and CAADP policy processes. The power cube framework helps to understand the power dynamics surrounding these processes. Nevertheless, the World Bank and African Development Bank's definition will be used as the common and operational conceptualisation. Indeed, in this study, the World Bank's understanding of participation will be adopted. It exposes stakeholders' influence on such a degree that they share control over priority setting, policy making, resources allocation and programme implementation. The same World Bank defines empowerment as "the process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those into desired actions and outcomes" (World Bank, 1999:10).

According to the World Bank's resource book the following groups should participate: (a) the general public, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups; (b) the government, including parliament, local government, line and central ministries; (c) Civil Society Organizations such as NGOs, community-based organisations, trade unions and guilds and academic institutions; (d) private sector actors such as professional associations; and, (e) donors, both bilateral and multilateral (World Bank, 2002:250).

The World Bank also distinguishes three categories of participation:

a.   Facilitation;
b.   Dialogue and consultation; and
c.   Partnership.

Throughout this study overlapping with Arnstein's typology these three categories of participation are discussed while looking at the level of participation and the way it is operationalised by the Pan-African civil society within the context of liberalised AU-NEPAD.A close triangular analysis of the three frameworks/approaches to understanding power dynamics,

highlights the strengths of each of them, while Foucauldian theoretical framework digs down to analysing details of the subjectivities and technologies used to exercise power and govern. It helps to understanding the relationships played out by state actors to discipline citizens, by promoting and contesting the emergence of civil society actors, the ladder of citizens' participation. It helps to explore the levels of participation in decision making, hence looking at the power relations played out over or with citizens. The power-cube helped to locate the space, type and level of power played out by the different actors over the priority setting and decision making.

Moreover, we are not arguing that Foucauldian approaches to power should not be used to understand African politics. Arguably, we are strongly suggesting that it is a relevant and important framework as a tool to analyse power relations and the production of knowledge between the state and the non-state actors. As such the study is using Foucauldian as the main tool and is complementing it with two other tools, namely the Ladder of citizens' participation and the Power-cube analytical frameworks.

2.6. Neoliberalism and Globalisation

Neo-liberalism can be considered a way of looking at the world as a strong ideology. The guiding principles of neoliberal ideology consider the involvement of government in the economy as not being beneficial, hence considering the private enterprise as the major player. With the rise of neoliberalism this became the norm for the modern government and public policy. This contrasts with the "classical liberal thought", that is, the liberalism of the Enlightenment era, represented by thinkers like Adam Smith and John Locke. Neoliberalism is a broad ideology that became popular in political, economic, and governmental circles in the 1970s and reached its peak in global popularity in the 1980s.

Anonymous (2017) summarizes this well ´Originating from the ideas of liberalism of the 18th century, Neoliberalism evolved in the early 20th century and has reached its peak and real-world implementation in the 1980's with Thatcherism (Margaret Thatcher) and Reaganomics (Donald Reagan) as its most prominent exemplifications´ (Anonymous, 2017:3). In fact, as Adom Getachew (2019:180) put it, ´the rise of Ronald Reagan in the United States of America and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, who "buried" the Third World's demands for

equality, had led to the collapse of the New International Economic Order´ and championed the spread of neoliberalism and the corresponding globalization.

Looking at the work developed by David Harvey, neoliberalism is seen as a product of a series of transformations occurring from the late 1970s, namely, the emergence of anti-inflationary policies resulting in the end of the dollar's gold convertibility, and the ascension of monetarism as the dominant economic paradigm in many industrialized nations. Hence in neoliberal theory, the rule of law, individual freedom and private enterprises play driving role, whereas the state plays a regulatory and forceful role; as Harvey puts it "the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs" (Harvey, 2005:64).

In the classical literature, neoliberalism is often referred to as a new political preference for market mechanisms as a way of ensuring social and economic wellbeing. Most analysts of neoliberalism movement have been focusing more on the decline of the economy at national levels as well as on the erosion of Universalist conceptions of social welfare systems (Larner, 2005:11). This analysis, accordingly, has been giving less attention to the complex and often very debated processes in which the construction of new spaces, subjectivities and socialites takes place.

After the work of Antonio Gramsci, many researchers have lined up into two divided fields. Some have adopted and others contested his thoughts and ideas for understanding International Relations and the field of politics. As Yes (2008) will wisely put it, 'there are changes in the political economy of the global capitalism with special note on the rise of neoliberal thought and policies as well as the so called ´globalization´. These phenomena made it difficult for the classic liberal and realist theories of International Relations traditions to develop an acceptable interpretative framework for these changes giving way for experimentation of alternative approaches. Moreover, these changes have also challenged the existing Marxist traditions to approaching world economy, chiefly the theory of capitalism of the early twentieth century. A

shift from economy passed analysis to a more political one was needed to understand the dynamics of the national vis-à-vis the global and the rise of intergovernmental institutions[3] . However, one can look at Foucault´s work on understanding and conceptualising neo-liberalism and tap on to address these complex processes of construction of new spaces, subjectivities, and rationalities.

Authors classify neoliberalism in different ways. David Harvey, for example, in an interview with Bjarke Skærlund Risager from Aarhus University, said "I have always treated neoliberalism as a political project carried out by the corporate capitalist class as they felt intensely threatened both politically and economically towards the end of the 1960s into the 1970s. They desperately wanted to launch a political project that would curb the power of labor" (Risager 2016)[4].

Harvey´s thesis is that the neoliberal project is of counterrevolutionary nature, trying to stop the tide of revolutionary ideas and ideologies around the world, many from developing world, such as China, Angola, and Mozambique, as well as developed world of Europe, such as France, Italy and to some extent, Spain, where communist influence was rising. The rise in social movements in the 70s forced the introduction of some anti-corporate reforms, such as protection of environment, consumer protection, safety, and health administration, to name a few that empowered labour. Indeed, this move threatened the power of the backbone of capitalism, the corporate capitalist class. This forced the ruling elites of the capitalist world to look at the struggle they are facing in all fronts (ideological and political, including curbing the growing power of labor). **"**Out of this there emerged a political project which I would call neoliberalism", Harvey concluded (Harvey 2005:37). Costas Lapavitsas defends "that capitalist economies are continually restructured due to pressures of competition and the underlying drive to maintain profitability. However, some transformations have a distinctive historical significance, and financialization is one of those" (Lapavitsas 2013:293).

According to him, at the end of the 19th Century new methods of production in heavy industry emerged and a monopolistic and joint-stock enterprise rose. This coincided with the time of the long depression which saw a shift in power balance from Britain towards the United States of

---

[3] See Hugo Radice´s Chapter - Gramsci and Neo- Gramscianism:To What Purpose? on Ayers, A. J. (ed.), (2008), Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory
[4] Interview with David Harvey on neoliberalism in https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/david-harvey-neoliberalism-capitalism-labor-crisis-resistance/

America and Germany, rising as superpowers. During this period, mass consumption based on mass production emerged in several countries in Europe and the United States. Production became dominated by transnational monopolistic enterprises and finance was operated by a national and international system of controls. However, after the 1970s financial activities increased sharply making the financial sector robust with the permeation of economy and society driven by financial relations and a rapid financial profit growth (Lapavitsas 2013:294). Nolke, however, stressed that although financial deepening has been seen in recent decades as an option of enhancing economic growth and competitiveness, it has turned more controversial after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-8. Financialization was seen as a technocratic domain until recently; however, in recent years this has been a topic of public debate (Nolke 2013:210). The political nature of financialization highlights the very idea that this is a human-made phenomenon; therefore, it can be resolved by political initiatives. He argues that to have a better understanding of the forces behind financialization there is a need to use a "broad notion of politics, based on power relations that encompass the instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions of politics understood both as intended and unintended action. Regarding the latter, it has convincingly shown that financialization in the US has not just been the product of a purposeful 'Wall Street–Treasury Complex' but also an unintended consequence of policies devised in reaction to the low growth period of the US economy during the early 1970s" (Nolke 2013, citing Fuchs 2007; Krippner 2011 and Gowan 1999).

Bond´s accounts of the devastating forces of financialization of imperialist development in Africa, gives us a perspective of how Africa had and is still suffering from the imperial expansion, which includes the aid industry inflow. He continues to state that the enforcement and imposition of the spirit of neoliberal policies in Africa has had pernicious effects by increasing the combined and uneven development in Africa, widening the divide between poor and rich. This is mainly attributed to the ´Washington Consensus´ which imposes "trade and financial liberalization, currency devaluation, lower corporate taxation, export-oriented industrial policy, austere fiscal policy aimed especially at cutting social spending, and monetarism in central banking (with high real interest rates)" (Bond 2012:258). This responds not only to the principles and strategies of neoliberalism, such as, "deregulation of business, flexibilised labour markets and privatization (or corporatization and commercialization) of state-owned enterprises, but also the elimination of subsidies, the promotion of cost-recovery

and user fees, the disconnection of basic state services to those who do not pay, means-testing for social programmes, and reliance upon market signals as the basis for local development strategies" (Bond 2012:263).

In fact, as Bond clearly points out in his work on South Africa geopolitical position and the role it plays before the institutions responsible for advancing neoliberalism in Africa, financialization and commodification are the key features of the neoliberal advancement in Africa, taking South Africa as its "deputy Sheriff and sub-imperial power" (Bond 2006, Bond 2005 a, Bond 2005 b and Bond 2012).

Coming back to the meaning of neoliberalism, I would sum it up with support from Lorenzi (2018) who summarizes his understanding of Foucault on neoliberalism "as a particular art of governing human beings. That is, neoliberalism as a set of technologies structuring the 'milieu' of individuals to obtain specific effects from their behavior; neoliberalism as a governmental rationality transforming individual freedom into the very instrument through which individuals are directed; and neoliberalism as a set of political strategies that constitute a specific, and eminently governable, form of subjectivity" (Lorenzi 2018:165).

The research project is exploring these new spaces, subjectivities, socialites, and trajectories to understand the technologies of rule used by AU-NEPAD, the strategies used by Pan-African civil society (PACS), the meaning of the construction and deconstruction of Pan-African civil society to the global theoretical conceptualisation of civil society. The political project of neoliberalism is seen as a way of visualising free-market ideas and to realise the need for downsizing the notion of nation-states and enlarging the spaces for corporate accumulation, individual freedoms and market forces. In parallel the notion of globalisation represents the increasing borderless of markets and markets competitive rules and logics predominate, while the notion of nation-states reduces its influence (Kapitonenko, 2009 and Tickell and Peck, 2014). Thus, neoliberalisation and globalisation are phenomena translating the political drive and the economic drive of today's world economy.

Indeed, several authors defend that the global economic shift towards neo-liberalism that has occurred since the late 1970s in the global north has had impacts on the global south. The African continent, although beset by context specific economic circumstances that are different from those facing the post-industrial economies of the north, is, however, like all the other parts of the globe, subject to many of the same pressures and forces. The continent has seen

different cycles, namely, (a). the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SPAs) between the 1980s and early 1990s whose impact is felt throughout Africa in the curtailment of state investment in the public sphere, and the replacement of public sector jobs by jobs in export agriculture and manufacturing; and (b). the neoliberal reforms, coinciding with increased economic globalization following the end of the Cold War. Major features of this cycle are the push for building global systems and global capacity within nation states, as well as encouraging multi-party democracy and free elections on the continent. They also include forging large-scale programmes of modernization and industrialization in favor of courting international investment in commercial enterprises that have unpredictable life expectancies, resulting in increased economic instability throughout the region. Within the African continent it turned into the virtual disappearance of Pan-Africanism, the non-aligned movement, and international Marxism. It exacerbated competition not within the global economy but between African states (Bond, Saul, Shivji).

As Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck will put it "…both globalisation and neoliberalism place emphasis on the relevant need for corporations, governments and social actors to adjust to the new 'realities' of global competition…the role of markets in terms of apolitical, largely being an integrating forces…governmental bureaucracies and social collectivises as impediments to economic progress…establishment of world-wide processes of upwards convergence-a 'race to the top'-culminating in the establishment of a new orthodoxy or 'era'…" (Tickell and Peck, 2014:288).

This implies also that neoliberalism and globalisation are not monolithic or undifferentiated processes; they can be influenced by specific and context market dynamics, the social forces, and specific government bureaucracies. Thus, they are context specific although following a universal set of principles. Hence, it is relevant to study this within the African context.

In his paper ´ Neoliberalism in Sub-Saharan Africa: From structural adjustment to the New Partnership for Africa's Development´, Patrick Bond offers a clear picture of the effect of neoliberalism in Africa:

> Distorted forms of capital accumulation and class formation associated with neoliberalism continue to amplify Africa's crisis of combined and uneven development. A new, supposedly home-grown strategy, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), corresponds to neoliberalism and relies upon compliant by African politicians. There is little prospect that other mild mannered global-scale initiatives being promoted

by 'Post-Washington Consensus' reformers - for example, lower US and European Union agricultural subsidies, a bit more debt relief, or slightly better access to brand-name anti-retroviral medicines to fight AIDS - will change matters, aside from increasing African elite acquiescence in the structures of power that keep the continent impoverished. New strategies and tactics summed up in the terms 'deglobalization' and 'decommodification' will be necessary for Africa to break from systemic underdevelopment. The continent's leading popular movements are taking steps in these directions (Bond 2005:292).

In the context of neo-liberalized AU-NEPAD, this work investigated and endeavoured to answer these key questions: how are the social forces formed and how do they influence the neo-liberalization of the continent, what are the specifics of the African context under which Pan-African civil society is made and what are the technologies of rule used to promote and contest the emergence of Pan-African civil society?.

2.7.Democracy, Participation and African Governance

Governance and Participation have been gaining prominent space in the development discourse. In fact, participation and governance in today's development world go hand in hand; it is believed that they will improve the outcomes of any development endeavour, improve civil society role and contribute to good governance, which are the cornerstone of any democratic process

Despite decades of intense academic debates, governance continues to take a contested concept, with no commonly and universally accepted definition. In the mainstream literature, the term governance is as old as history. However, it is widely used in development circles and prominent in the international public policy lexicon that mounted in the early 1950s. Many academics and international practitioners employ 'governance' to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private; while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with 'government' (Weiss, 2000).

According to Weiss, the New Webster's International Dictionary defines the term in much the same way as journalists from the New York Times or The Economist: 'act, manner, of force, or power of governing; "government', 'state of being governed', or 'method of government or regulation'.

Analysts of international relations and international civil servants, in contrast, now use the term almost exclusively to describe phenomena that go beyond a synonym for 'government' and the

legal authority with which such *policies* are vested. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance defines 'governance' as 'the sum of the many way individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken.

Weiss (2000) argues that the emergence of governance can be traced at the country level to a disgruntlement with the state-dominated models of economic and social development so prevalent throughout the socialist bloc and much of the Third World in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. At the international level 'global governance' can be traced to a growing dissatisfaction among students of international relations with the realist and liberal–institutionalist theories that dominated the study of international organisations in the 1970s and 1980s (Weiss, 2000), which failed to adequately address the increase, in both numbers and sequence of non-state actors and the implications of technology in an age of globalisation. Chatterjee (2004:41), on the other hand, puts this in the following terms "the contemporary regime of capitalist power has established a "governmentalization of the state" using surveillance and welfare apparatuses aimed at the population, who are not right-bearing citizens and thus inhabit the zone of political society" (Chatterjee, 2004; 2011).

All the definitions above underline the common understanding that governance and participatory governance are imperative features of contemporary democracy and development affairs, and it has implicit meaning of public sphere management and accountability at various levels, community, local, regional and international.

Globalisation, as the ultimate expression of the interconnectedness between states and people at international level, is bringing a new complex paradigm on the concept of governance and civil society, which create the need for rule making at global level. Some scholars argue that without global governance cooperation and interaction between people and states will not be sustained. In fact, Bernett and Duvall argue that only with global governance states and people will be able to cooperate on economic, environmental, security, social and political issues and settle their disputes in a non-violent manner and advance their common interests and values (Bernett and Durvall, 2005).

The African Development Bank, on the other hand, has adopted the following descriptive working definition for civil society, "Civil society encompasses a constellation of human and associational activities operating in the public sphere outside the market and the state. It is a

voluntary expression of the interests and aspirations of citizens, organized and united by common interests, goals, values or traditions, and mobilised into collective action either as beneficiaries or stakeholders of the development process. Though civil society stands apart from state and market forces, it is not necessarily in basic contradiction to them, and it ultimately influences and is influenced by both" (African Development Bank, 2003 :2).

The participation of organised civil society in development policy drafting and implementation has been seen in the last years by most researchers as a sine qua non condition for development policies and a democratic process to succeed.

Castells (2008) defends that the public sphere, the space where ideas and projects are debated between the state and civil society is an essential part of socio-political organisation and it allows for citizens to articulate their views and influence political institutions of society. More so Castells considers the relationship between state and civil society as cornerstone of democracy; therefore, the ability of civil society to structure and channel citizens' views and interests makes states to focus on their objectives and become accountable to their citizenry, mounting the relationship between state and civil society beyond elections (Castells, 2008).

With advent of globalisation, the state-civil society relationship has shifted as matters of global interests interfere in the domestic sphere and matters of national interest impact the global world. Castells points out "The process of globalisation has shifted the debate from the national domain to the global debate, prompting the emergence of a global civil society and ad hoc forms of global governance" (Castells, 2008:79). This gives relevance to the study of participatory governance within the realm of International Relations; that is, how the making of the Pan-African civil society shapes international relations and how does African governance shape the making of Pan-African civil society.

At global level, it is a common feature to recognise global civil society as the organised expression of the values and interests of global society. The polity of society is indeed defined by the relationships of state-civil society and their interaction on the public sphere, which has also shifted from national to global. How this shift happened in the context of making Pan-African civil society is case for study in this project.

Hence, the rise of global interconnectedness created a different set of problems and issues in society, which could not be dealt with using the traditional relationship of state-civil society anymore. Again, Castells illustrates this as "the rise of non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) with a global or international frame of reference in their action and goals ...so called Global Civil Society...that act outside government channels to address global problems. Often, they affirm values that are universally recognized but politically manipulated in their own interest by political agencies, including governments" (Castells, 2008:85).

The examination of participation is done bearing in mind that one of the key principles of democratic process is the national/local ownership and empowerment facilitated by wide consultation and participation of all stakeholders in society within the very neoliberal point of view. In effect, this study is examining the breadth and depth of the PACS's political subjectivity and its participation in governance and accountability of AU-NEPAD and the associated challenges.

Stewart & Wang discuss the meaning of participation as meaning different things in different contexts. They point out two important distinctions: On one hand, participation can be interpreted as involving 'empowerment' which implies significant control over decision-making or can simply mean consultation with little or no delegation of power for decision-making. On the other hand, the distinction could be made between participation as a means or an end. Instrumental approach views participation as a means to improving implementation, efficiency, and equity, while an empowerment approach values the process of increasing participation as an important end in itself (Stewart & Wang, 2003 citing Nelson & Wright, 1999 and Goulet, 1989:295).

However, there is need to note that for some scholars, the African context offers some different perspectives into the concept of democracy as defined by the neoliberal and western framework. These scholars argue that while democracy could have some universal features, the presentation of liberal democracy as the political messiah to rescue Africa out of her multifarious proclivities can be seen as an integral part of the cordiality package of neo-colonialism. More so they argue that diverse nations have every right to construct new conceptions of democracy, which respond to their religious, economic, and social needs (Fayemi, 2009).

Some African scholars recognise that the concepts of democracy and governance were interrelated but were not the same. While on one hand "good governance entails the efficient and effective reciprocity between rulers and the ruled, with its incumbency upon government to be responsive. . . Majoritarian democracy, on the other hand, entails a broad consensus on

values and procedures; the participation in the selection of ruling elites, and the accountability of leadership to the electorate. Both concepts were related to processes in society within the context of reciprocity (African views African Voices, 1992).

 Furthermore, in most African countries, you will find a few individuals with power who exercise their power to suppress most of the elements of good governance such as accountability and transparency, legitimacy, democratic practices, human rights and freedom of information, justice and decentralisation and devolution of power, which undermines the very principles of good governance and democracy. This is well illustrated by the African Views and African Voices issue in 1992:

> … democracy in Africa has been badly hindered by the state's control of the economy; this has meant that the only way to get rich has been through political office, intensifying the problem of corruption, and inducing leaders to cling to political power. This has been disastrous for the economies in African countries. Thus, economic liberalization, empowering ordinary producers, may well be an aid to political democracy (African views African Voices 1992:24-25).

Arguably, African governments are deeply in need of governance. The personalised nature of rule mixed with cult of personality, the failure of the state to advance and protect human rights, the tendency of individuals to withdraw from politics, and the extreme centralisation of power in the hands of few people as well as corruption are the major reasons for poor governance and "bad" politics in African countries.

The Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), has incorporated several dispositions to tackle these pressing realities. However, the praxis may tell otherwise. It is within this context that the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation was developed and enacted by the Heads of States Assembly, which recognises the absence of democracy as principal reason for the persistent developmental challenges facing Africa. The Heads of States have re-affirmed that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved, and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity, and popular enthusiasm of most of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development should and must accrue. Unless the people of Africa see the light

of day, the structures, pattern, and political context of the process of socioeconomic development are appropriately altered, neither can Africa's perpetual economic crisis be overcome, nor can a bright future for Africa and its people come true (African Views and African Voices 1992).

Attesting to this, Akokpari (2014) notes that good governance in most of African countries has been elusive. He believes that the failure of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to address Africa's developmental challenges, including the crisis of governance, is what led to its death; and, therefore, for Akokpari , the transformation of OAU to African Union (AU) as well as all the innovative development programmes such as the New Partnership for Africa' Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), is in fact, an attempt to promote good governance, and address Africa's post -cold war several challenges (Akokpari 2014).

Despite the hope and euphoric excitement around these initiatives, mainly by the development partners of the AU, that they should re-energise the need for and implementation of good governance in Africa, Akokpiri believes that this shall bring change in the implementation of good governance in Africa. He goes on to highlight some reasons why these initiatives have no capacity to bring about good governance, namely the intrinsic contradictions in these projects, the vulnerability of the initiatives to be manipulated by African leaders, the neo-patrimonial nature of politics in Africa, the current tendency of the key development partners of the AU (the G8) to renegade their own initial aid commitments, and lastly, but not least, the unclear (sometimes unhealthy) relationship between the different initiatives/institutions, especially between the AU and NEPAD (Akokpari 2014) .

2.8.   Civil Society and Civil Society Organisations

2.8.1. The Concept of Civil Society

In Africa the concept of civil society is gaining ground and establishing its own discourse and field, whereas globally it is experiencing a tremendous revival and upsurge in academic circles. In the western society the concept of civil society has been in the public discourse and academic circles since the eighteenth century and has been an object of hot debates. In fact, the term civil society has been used in the political and intellectual circles since the early

sixteenth-century with more restrict meaning and no distinction between the state and society. Only in the eighteenth-century the distinction between the state and the non-state realm of civil society was clearly made (Kane, 1998).

According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology (2006), the concept "civil society" was first used by the philosopher and historian Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) in "An Essay on the History of Civil Society" (1767) to distinguish the civilization of Western Europe and the despotism of the East. However, Ferguson did not clearly differentiate between civil society, civilization, and civility.

Later, Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), in "The Philosophy of Rights" (1821), made this distinction, separating the civil society as a specific area of ethical life, which exists or mediate between the family and the state. For Hegel, civil society exists between the state (a coercive institution) and the economy (an institution based on self-interest).

More recently, by analysing the role that institutions (such as private institutions that serve public purposes: voluntary associations, charities, non-profits, foundations, and non-governmental organisations) play in society, which do not fit in the two sectors world view (state-market), social scientists now clearly acknowledge the existence of the third sector, the so called "civil society".

Under communism, the nations of Eastern Europe never had a 'civil society'. A civil society exists when individuals and groups are free to form organisations that function independently of the state and that can mediate between citizens and the state. Because the lack of civil society was part of the very essence of the communist state, donors have been seen creating such society and supporting organisations independent of the state –NGOs – as the connective tissue of democratic political culture, to transform these communist nations – an intrinsically positive objective (Wedel, 1994, and Hann and Dunn, 1996).

In this light, civil society was seen as the opposite of despotism, a space in which social groups could exist and move – something, which exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence. However, there is no assurance that a society emerging out of dictatorship will necessarily mean it will be civil (Hall, 1996).

Drawing a comparative historical analysis of civil society in the contemporary world, from the Greek democracy, the British political society, through to the post-communist European society, the African experience with democratisation to the Chinese quasi-communist society,

Perez found that the common feature and underlining assumption is that civil society is an intrinsic part of any democratic process in the western conception (Perez at all, 2005).

The concept of civil society has been used in very different social worlds, geographic and political contexts that it creates, more often than not, certain confusion. For example, the fall of communist system created the rise of civil society which showed how very diverse social forces creating and spreading civil society can be. Whilst Eastern Europeans favoured the advent of capitalism, the Western post-Marxists privileged the so called 'new' social movements that served as functional equivalent to the proletariat within their conceptual system.

The account given by Neera Chandhoke (2002) is very interesting. He stresses that civil society has discrete and distinct characteristics that make it different and autonomous from both the state and the market; hence it is an alternative to both. Therefore "civil society emerges as the third sphere of collective life" (Chandhoke 2002:36). In fact, when he looks at power relations being played out in contemporary society, he sees power as manifesting itself in and through different forms, apparently disconnected from one another. However, according to him, globalisation, for instance, seems to be a rationalisation of economy and having nothing to do with fundamentalist movement. Nevertheless, looking closely one finds that both manifest different forms of power because both limit the efforts of human beings to make their own lives with autonomy. He concludes saying, "this admittedly is difficult to fathom, simply because various forms of power not only appear as contradictory, oppositional, and diffused, but also happen to operate in invisible and intangible ways that escape the human gaze. Today, theorists tell us, and practitioners claim that it is difficult to decipher power since it does not originate from a single point" (Chandhoke, 2002:61).

The interactions between the state and society became more intense and cooperative relations within the states became of greater importance due to competition in war within the multipolarity of the society given the pre-existing social relations.

Hall notes that it is important, though, to stretch that civil society gained self-consciousness from the experience of fighting against politico-religious unification drives, and the balance of power politics allowed the rise of toleration, diversity and differences; nonetheless accepted as imposed by circumstances beyond one's control. In this dynamics, civil society rises as "a complex balance of consensus and conflict, the value of as much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum of consensus necessary for settled existence" (Hall, 1996:6).

It is worth noting that with the advance in means of communication, the creation of mass print culture and the spread of literacy the role of civil society was amplified, and self-organisation was enhanced. This increased pace of civil society role varied from the Anglo-Saxon, where the growth of commercial societies enabled and encouraged lateral social communication; and the Prussian side, where the more statist version of infrastructural development was pioneered (Hall, 1996).

Some claims of the nature of civil society based on the revolution on communication technique were made; rational will formation encouraged by the emergence of the so called 'public sphere' and the construction of new identities in civil society emerged for political reasons, the civility in society is increased by an elective affinity between commerce and liberty; and the element of civil society is the refinement and fashion. Civil society in the eighteenth-century was thus seen as a 'lovely sphere marked by the spread of new codes of manners' (Hall, 1996:7). In other words, civil society is the self-organisation of strong and autonomous groups that balance the state.

With the growth of globalisation, the role of civil society was expanded and a scene for transnational civil society dialogue was set, giving birth to a Global Civil Society. As John Dryzek (2012) points out, the roots of global civil society can be traced back to a century or even two, especially during the past two decades or so. He stresses the fact that this "concept has become a popular concept within the field of academia, and political global civil society is today a popular concept among academics and political actors alike, and it has changed the terms of discourse about and within global politics" (Chandhoke 2002:52). However, it remains ambiguous to determine the extent to which global society is global or is only transnational, and who belongs to that global society, the extent to which the global society draws the line between civility and activism (Dryzek, 2012 citing Corry, 2006 and Chandhoke, 2002).

Concluding, researchers see global civil society organisations emerging as a powerful and influential force on the society, with the power to effectively influence not only the international public opinion against policies or practices that they deem undesirable, but also power to decide on the agendas and the fate of undemocratic and authoritarian regimes. Nowadays, they have the support of the digital revolution which increased their capacity to produce evidence as well as technical capacity to mobilise and organise public opinion in a global scale (*Chandhoke, 2002;* Hall, 1996; Dryzek, 2012*)*

In a nutshell, social movements are something that people create to press for social change. They are spaces that are made by people to allow relationships between them that can challenge power (Gerlach and Hine, 1970).

The notion of civil society, nowadays, continues to be important and it is believed that it sustains democracy, by being the sphere where opinions are formed, developed, and exchanged, permitting criticism of government policies and ministries (Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology 2006:70).

Originally theorised by Antonio Gramsci and underlined by Hearn, civil society constitutes the place where the state and other powerful actors interact to influence the political agendas of organised groups with the intention of defusing opposition; it is a potential battleground (Hearn, 2001). Moreover, understanding civil society for and against the state and the political society is what Gramsci and Habermas tried to do in their work. While Habermas (1966) puts civil society in the public sphere[5] outfit in which members of the society come together for deliberation about common concerns for the public, Gramsci, on the other hand, claims that civil society is a part of the political society of hegemony that is constructed through the "manufactured consent" and the civil society should create a counter-hegemony against the state.

Keane contributes to the debate by throwing in a strong warning signal, that from the onset, the concept of civil society was constructed under the dichotomy of domination and inequality, hence based on exclusionary framing as an image of the civilised western male individual (Keane 1988).

Foucault, on the other hand, contributes putting the notion of civil society in terms of conflicts and power. In so doing, Foucault went steps ahead in understanding democracy and civil society. Interesting from Foucault is that he does not prescribe neither process nor outcome, that is, he does not bring in universal norms and laws. He rather recommends a focus on conflict and power relations. He believes that the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination, which is crucial to civil society, is understanding the power relations, the

---

[5] Habermas discusses and defines Public Sphere as: "a body of private persons assembled to discuss matters of public concern or common interest." For him public sphere in a deliberative democracy model where the members of the society come together and discuss in deliberation. The parts of society must be in communication with each other to reach a consensus where they construct the public sphere. He argues that the difference of these parts of the society must accept each other in deliberation. Habermas believe that the key for all these different parts that come along with the understanding of equality between each member is the "dialogue".

conflicts, and the struggle over one another. He recognizes that civil society is heterogeneous, hence prone to internal conflicts, that is different groups within the civil society can fight overpower. On the other hand, civil society can also struggle overpower with external environment, that is, struggling for their very existence against the power holders (government and business) (Michel Foucault 1980a, 1980b, 1988).

Reading both Foucault and Habermas, one can easily see that they completely differ only in the way the former puts emphasis on the realities of rationalities of power relations and conflicts; the later completely ignores the realities and lays emphasis on norms and universalities of rationalities. This means both agree with one another in terms of the regulation of actual relations of dominance as a crucial aspect of democracy and its correspondent institutions. While Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts.

It is believed that because of this form of looking at issues of power and his working with marginality Foucault developed a "sensitive thinking to difference, diversity and the politics of identity, something which today is crucial for understanding civil society and for acting in it" (Flyvbjerg 1998:225).

For Cox, the term civil society can be viewed in two different perspectives; "in a 'bottom-up' sense, it is the realm in which those who are disadvantaged by the globalisation of the world economy can mount their protests and seek alternatives…In a "top-down´ sense, states and corporate interests influence the development of this current version of civil society towards making it an agency for stabilising the social and political status quo" (Cox, 1999: 23).

This may be the context under which AU-NEPAD and the emergency of Pan-African civil society operate. This research project undertakes to investigate the technologies of rule used to promote and contest the emergence of civil society at continental level.

Simon summarises the discussion on civil society pointing out that the two intellectual traditions dominate the historical development of the notion of civil society: the Anglo-American tradition and the German tradition. The liberal Anglo-American tradition of John Locke and Adam Smith conceive civil society as a "special non-state sphere of the social organism. Simon adds that the individual freedom and "the self-regulating" function of civil society is the most important repository of individual rights and freedoms, as a defence against state encroachment. The German intellectual tradition materialised in the works of G.W.F.

Hegel and Marx. Rather than focusing on individual freedom as a means of safeguarding civil society, Marx envisioned the State as protector of the independence of civil society.

According to Simon, Marx notes that only the State, as the absolute spirit and universal political community, can fulfil the common interest. However, Marx's conception of communism goes beyond the state, putting emphasis on class consciousness and a socialist transformation of the capitalist mode of production. Marx plainly declares, "we do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old" (Marx, 1967:212). This tradition blurs the line between State and society, eventually merging the two into one. At national level in Africa both world views can be found depending on which ideological influence the newly independent states followed (Simon, 2004).

However, Simon also highlights that the modern society is far more complex than that of Locke/Adam and Hegel/Marx, thus most of the ideas developed by them are nowadays contested as the concept of civil society evolved with the time. While today the liberal tradition dominates global conceptions regarding civil society, no contemporary society exactly embodies either tradition. The German-Marx tradition historically dominated Russian consciousness of civil society but has today strayed from its ideological roots; it is frequently accepted in Russia that civil society is a self-governing sphere, independent of the state (Simon, 2004).

CIVICUS defines civil society as meaning 'the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests. Civil society therefore encompasses civil society organisations (CSOs) and the actions of less formalised groups and individuals. CIVICUS introduces the notion of 'organised civil society' which refers to independent, non-state and non-private sector associations and organisations that have some form of structure and formal rules of operating, together with the networks, infrastructure, and resources they utilise (CIVICUS, 2012).

Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements,

business associations, coalitions, and advocacy group, etc. (London School of Economics-LSE, 2007:2).

This definition agrees with the World Bank guidelines that include all groups such as academia, charities, citizens' militia, civic groups, clubs (sports, social, etc.), community foundations, community leadership development programs, community organizations, consumers/consumer organizations, cooperatives, cultural groups, environmental groups, intermediary organisations for the voluntary and non-profit sector, media, non-governmental organizations, non-profit organisations, policy institutions, private voluntary organisations, professional associations, religious organisations and trade unions.

The above definitions are considered throughout the research, and organised civil society is considered a comprehensive phenomenon. Thus, for this study the definition of "civil society" according to the LSE/World Bank definition is only the starting point and assumption. This can be summarised as referring to the average citizen as opposed to government; therefore, press associations, unions, churches, and other NGOs represent civil society. However, the major focus of the research is to understand how this neo-liberal definition has been operationalised in the context of Pan-African civil society making and to what extent has AU-NEPAD taken this on board.

Nevertheless, in the African context, the neoliberal western view and conceptualisation of civil society are not always applied, hence alternative views of defining civil society are discussed. Some scholars would argue that in Africa, the concept of civil society during the colonial era could be extended to include small associations, chiefly informal, minimally organised, and concerned mainly with confronting local authorities. Some other scholars argue that collective action during the colonial era does not constitute civil society activity - choosing to refer to it as mere "associational life"; however, some others insist that collective action against the colonial state constitutes the struggle of civil society.

Civil society organisations in colonial Africa had deep roots in the "primordial public realm" and constituted what is referred to as the "grassroots civil society" (Orji, 2009). Orji continues arguing that secular African movements of resistance against colonial penetration and occupation dominated civil society engagement in colonial Africa. He goes on highlighting the issue of imposition of alien political, economic, and social arrangements that provoked revolts from the local people. For Orji the deepening and sophistication of colonialism have generated

an environment in which the less organised local movements against the colonial authorities achieved such maturity and began to give way to the rise of a more organised nationalist movement (Orji, 2009).

It can be argued that the idea of self-government and self-determination was crystallised from the developments described by Orji above. It was brought forward by the evolution of a 'strong mechanism for the aggregation and articulation of diverse local interests and sentiments' into a much structured and purposeful movement with a clear objective of challenging and replacing the authoritarian colonial rule. It is therefore noted that indigenous civil society was actively involved in various forms of rural and urban protests against the colonial state in Africa (Orji, 2009).

It is worth noting that the neo-liberal and western conventional notion of civil society, mainly defined above, restricts only western-type NGOs, leaving out most of the traditional type of African civil society groupings; it is not entirely appropriate and useful tool for the conceptualization and analysis of civil society in Africa[6]. Because this neoliberal notion of civil society undermines the contributions of traditional organizations to the deepening of democracy and good governance in the continent, within the analysis undertaken in this study, a comprehensive notion of civil society is often adopted. It allows to deepen the understanding of the making of Pan-African Civil Society which considers the role of both traditional and modern organizations from the African society. In his analysis of civil society in Africa using an Afrocentric perspective, building on the work of several other scholars, such as Arato, Cohen, Hodgkinson, Foley and Edwards Alan, Fowler stressed that the domain of civil society can be understood in many political ways. One of them is the sense of civil society "acting as a political space for communication and interaction between citizens pursing individual and collective interests that co-determine how a society function" (Fowler, 2012:11). Another consideration defended by, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Dewey, according to Fowler, is that civil society is an 'associational force for attaining, pluralising and overseeing a democratic, market-driven political order'. Moreover, according to Antonio Gramsci, civil society can be regarded as a 'site of agency which resists class-based hegemonic predilection of states towards its territory and citizens'. It is well established that Gramsci's view of civil

---

[6] Ibid

society is a 'location for agency which counters the extractive and accumulative logic and monopolistic predispositions of capital" (Fowler, 2012:11).

Some African scholars argue that civil society plays a significant role in Africa's democratisation process and development policies and programmes. Yet the concept of civil society is one of the most controversial in cultural and political circles in Africa. As a result, civil society participation did not receive the appropriate attention of both its advocates and its detractors, who consider it to be the product of an alien civilization. It is therefore important to explore the space within which African civil society organisations participate in the policy process (Adésínà, J.O 2006a, Adedeji, A. 2008, J., 2008), and determine the conceptions of civil society that better characterise the lived reality of Africa's citizens and their power relations thereof.

Some analysts and scholars implicitly assumed that civil society plays a positive role in development, and it contributes to democratisation. However, it is well documented that not all civil society organisations are necessarily democratic or contribute to a more democratic society, nor are they democratic themselves. More so, it is known that many organisations are not democratically constituted and serve the interests of a very small group of persons; this is true for a good number of NGOs in Africa (Fowler, 2012).

Achieving the desired level of development requires different actors within the society, such as the state, corporate and civic sector to work together. The role of civic sector, or more particularly the civil society, is the subject of the present research proposal. This study is based on the premise that the existence of a real, dynamic, and vibrant Civil Society, independent of both State and Family, and based on the concepts of civilization and tolerance will lead to improved policy development which will in turn ensure full integration of all national, regional, and continental levels in Africa (Adésínà, J.O. (2006a).

The argument of the author supports an earlier assertion of Motsamai. She points out that civil society plays a critical role in strengthening democracy, and it brings about the movement from a bureaucratic administration, characteristic of most of the African institutions and setting, to a more representative administration, mainly in the public sector. She further argues that civil society in Africa brings about active co-operation and an ongoing commitment in the process of policy formulation and implementation between politicians, senior management, frontline workers, and citizens (Motsamai, 2003).

More so, civil society encourages the divergence from the traditional regime-driven or government focused policy process to one where there is a multiplicity of negotiated determinants of the problem identification, formulation of policy principles, setting of objectives, development of options according to agreed criteria, and the formulation of an implementation strategy. Motsamai also stretches that the way this process occurs and the contribution of the various stakeholders at various stages in the process characterise democracy.

2.8.2. Civil Society Organisations

As discussed above CSOs include national and international interest groups such as NGOs, community-based organisations, farmers' groups, religious associations or groups, trade unions, academic institutions, as well as professional institutions and independent media (Rebelo, and Kaarhus, 2003). The concept of CSOs was developed in the 1990s as a way to group wider associative forms of organisations involved in the development field rather than the 'traditional' concept of NGOs only, which meant the valued-based and non-profit organisations (Jenkins, 2001). Thus, it can be understood that CSOs are organised groups of society representing the interests of any chosen sector of society.

Jenkins maintained that civil society organisations in the developing countries have gained ground through development aid agencies. While the preservation of individual liberties is deemed by most agencies to be good, it is the contribution of individual rights to engendering and maintaining democracy and promoting sound government policy and economic performance that primarily animates aid policy. By funding organised groups within developing countries, aid agencies seek to create a virtuous cycle in which rights to free association beget sound government policies, human development, and (ultimately) a more conducive environment for the protection of individual liberties. From the standpoint of the role into which civil society has been cast in promoting this equilibrium, there are several problems with this model. The most serious shortcoming is that aid agencies expect too much of civil society. In order to justify its reliance on civil society for so many different missions, USAID has assigned a range of meanings to the term. Each use is, in effect, context-dependent (Jenkins, 2001).

For Jenkins the notion of civil society as mutable, something capable of adapting to new configurations of power, might even appear as an attractively flexible idea. However, the problem arises when efforts are undertaken to operationalise these varying conceptions by building (or "fostering", or "supporting", or "nurturing") civil society through the application of foreign aid. It is in their attempts to wed theory to practice that USAID and other donors have effectively stripped the notion of civil society of any substantive meaning. This is not to say that there are no empirical referents to the term in each of these various definitions. In each instance, it is clear which types of associations qualify as constituent elements of civil society, and which do not. Rather, the main difficulty is that the definitions are not capable of producing, in a coordinated way, the three main outcomes assistance to civil society is designed to produce: (1) transitions to competitive politics, (2) the "consolidation" of fledgling democracies, and (3) the establishment of market-oriented economic policies, and subsequently positive developmental performance (Jenkins, 2001).

The problem with these analysts is that they have implicitly assumed that civil society performs a positive role in development; more specifically, that it contributes to democratisation. In this sense, these functionalists operate with a hidden normative agenda which is not always the case, as it is recorded in several studies that not all civil society organisations are necessarily democratic or that they contribute to a more democratic society. Many organisations, such as a good number of NGOs in Africa, are not democratically constituted, but serve the interests of a very small group of people (Hyden, 2002).

It is worth noting that the birth of civil society activity in Africa preceded the establishment of the colonial state. Similarly, the organisation of civil society before the colonialisation of Africa had its own features and characteristics, mainly based on age grades, women, youths, and brotherhood associational groups. The history underscores that these traditional forms of associational life provided the ground for the emergence of new forms of voluntary associations during the colonial period, namely hometown associations, labour unions, and professional associations, etc. The form and means used by the colonial state to repress and disrupt these initial forms of associational life have contributed to the transformation and structuring of African civil society. As Orji rightly puts it, ''while on one side, the state governed a racially defined citizenry, bounded by rule of law and an associated regime of rights; on the other side, the state ruled over subjects that were under a regime of political and economic coercion. As a

result, individuals organised themselves and began to confront the state (symbolised by the native authorities and the colonial administration). Henceforth, many voluntary associations became openly political – offering the people a voice in their opposition to the indignities of colonial rule and demands for self-determination" (Orji, 2009).

In summary, as pointed out by Jan Aart Scholte, in terms of objectives, civil society includes conformists, reformists and radicals. The general distinction is important, although the lines are blurred in practice. Conformists are those civic groups that seek to uphold and reinforce existing norms. Business lobbies, professional associations, think tanks and foundations often (though far from always) fall into the conformist category. Reformists are those civic entities that wish to correct what they see as flaws in existing regimes, while leaving underlying social structures intact. For example, social-democratic groups challenge liberalist economic policies but accept the deeper structure of capitalism. Many academic institutions, consumer associations, human rights groups, relief organizations and trade unions promote a broadly reformist agenda. Meanwhile radicals are those civic associations that aim comprehensively to transform the social order. These parts of civil society are frequently termed 'social movements'. They include anarchists, environmentalists, fascists, feminists, pacifists and religious revivalists, with their respective implacable oppositions to the state, industrialism, liberal values, patriarchy, militarism and secularism" (Scholte, 1999).

Chapter III

Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This dissertation is based on desk review and relies on both primary and secondary sources, including books, scholarly articles, reports, speeches, official documents, resolutions, and recommendations of African Union-NEPAD. To argue the main proposition and to attempt to answer key research questions, this study employs two methodological approaches. The first approach constitutes a theoretical analysis and the second one constitutes the empirical study through a two-pronged case study.

A review of the current literature has shown the need to understand how the Pan-African civil society is constructed and deconstructed, the strategies it uses to interact with AU-NEPAD in the context of neo-liberal African owned and driven development, the mechanisms used for its participation in the governance of Pan-African Institutions and whose interests it represents. Hence the purpose of this study is to assess these concerns. To that end, the Critical Research Questions being answered by the study are as follows: how is Pan-African civil society made and articulated in the context of a neo-liberalised AU-NEPAD? What are the strategies of rule used by a neo-liberalised AU-NEPAD to constitute and contest Pan-African civil society (PACS)? How is African civil society constituting its political subjectivity at the intersection with AU-NEPAD? How is Pan-African civil society articulating itself in the intersection with AU-NEPAD? What are civil society practices all about? What has been the nature of their involvement? What interests do they represent? How are they selected? What constitutes Pan-African civil society in the context of liberalised Pan-African Institutions? What does this mean for global/transnational civil society theoretical conceptualisation? In fact, these questions have helped to address the main knowledge gaps, using a qualitative research approach.

To answerer these questions, a research was undertaken within the qualitative tradition of inquiry, using case studies, mainly exploring historicisation and discursive analysis. The main research technique is based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which explores

Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) approach using historical and political tracking of documents over time and the conceptual notion of power for interpretation.

CDA argues against a realist, neutral and relativist view of the world. It aims at unlocking the hidden power relations mainly constructed through language and to demonstrate and challenge prevailing social inequalities. The use of Foucauldian discourse analysis helps to look at the discursive possibilities in the making of Pan-African civil society and identifies the positions and subjectivities occupied and activated by Pan-African civil society itself and by the AU-NEPAD.

In addition, and in order to really understand the power relations being played in negotiating participation, the study explores two other different methodological analysis to power, namely the ladder of citizen participation developed by Arnstain (1969) which tries to explain the level of participation of citizens in policy and decision making processes, and the Power cube analytical framework proposed by Gaventa (2000) which discusses the Spaces, Places and Forms of power where power relation is played.

This chapter discusses the rationale for empirical research which outlines the reasons behind choosing to do an empirical study rather than just a document analysis of existing literature on the making of Pan African civil society. This is followed by the research design, which outlines the strategy for the central research problem structuring the research strategy, approach and paradigm chosen for the study. It also discusses the methods, that is, the research process and the tools applied to yield the results, including the sampling techniques for the selection of participants/respondents, the strategies and tools for data collection, which explain how data were collected either in literature or empirical field data; and data analysis, that is, the techniques used to analyse the available data, as well as measures for trustworthiness, which points out how to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, conformability, authenticity and coherence of the analysis of the available data. Finally, it looks at ethical assurance, that is the procedure to ensure that all ethical considerations were followed.

3.2. Rationale for Empirical Research

Although much has been researched on civil society participation in Africa, most of the studies focussed on the country level participation of civil society. The making of Pan-African Civil society is an area which is under-researched, and little is known about the level of participation in the African Union–NEPAD processes. Hence, an empirical research is necessary. In addition, a triangular use of Foucauldian governmentality and discourse analysis, the Ladder of Participation and the Power cube framework helps to understand power relations within AU-NEPAD processes by analysing policy discourses against the actual practices in civil society engagement. It is a novel work, which needs to be supplemented by empirical research.

In reading through available literature, one struggles to get a deep understanding of the making of Pan-African Society and its participation in the governance of Pan-African Institutions, in general and in the African Union-New Partnership for Africa's Development processes. Much that is researched on is the participation of national civil society in specific policy processes at country level, mainly related to the structural programmes (SAPs), Development Aid and the current Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

If this is true for the domestic and national domain, how is this process translated into the Pan-African stances? Does Pan-African civil society exist? If yes, what are the technologies of rules AU-NEPAD uses to promote and contest it? What are the strategies this Pan-African civil society uses to engage and criticise, as well as influence the bureaucracies of Pan-African institutions? How is Pan-African civil society conceived and used by the Bretton Woods Institutions, such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank in their development discourses to substitute and sometimes to educate and control non-compliance African state? These are fundamental questions for civil society interface with Pan African Institutions such as AU-NEPAD. However, available literature does not consistently debate these concerns. The processes of individual and collective forms of political subjectification are what the present research project investigated in trying to fill the knowledge gap.

Most of the research on civil society in the African context shows limited or compartmentalised understanding of power, mainly focusing on formal power.

The discussion of hidden or invisible power or the powers within remains minimal. There is no much use of such powerful frameworks such as the Foucauldian governmentality analysis, the Ladder of citizen's participation and the power cube to understand power relations within the AU-NEPAD architecture.

3.3. Case Studies

The review of literature shows a contentious account of the main concepts used in this research. Thus, case studies are used to understand the making of civil society in Africa within the context of neo-liberalised AU-NEPAD. In this light, two case studies were undertaken: One, to understand the technologies of rules underpinning the neoliberal environment at AU-NEPAD level (in Midrand, South Africa – Headquarters for NEPAD, and at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – Headquarters of the African Union Commission). This case provides the opportunity to empirically test the theories and frameworks used in the research in terms of the power dynamics played out at the African Union level, which set out the subjectivities and identities of the making of Pan-African civil society. This exercise gives a clear picture of the African Union Architecture and the governance processes and structures, under which Pan-African civil society is made and contested.

The second case study zoom-in into local and country realities of the making of African civil society and its interaction with Member States around two policy frameworks. Namely, the the Comprehensive African Agriculture programme-CAADP in Mozambique, looking at how knowledge and power relations are played out at sectoral and country level, including the agriculture policy and practices in Mozambique and the consequent involvement of civil society. Further it discusses the making of civil society within the governance programme of the AU, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Mozambique. Which undertakes the examination of broader governance of African countries and the interplay between the national governments and the local African civil society while exercising the prerogative of voluntary self-performance assessment.

3.4. Selection of participants/respondents

    a. The participants/respondents for this study are drawn from 3 different types of institutions: namely:

b. The central level officers of the African Union-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU-NEPAD) at the headquarters, including former officers who have served at this level, although are no longer working there; from this category of respondents the expectation was to get insights of the key policy discourse and practices around the governance architecture of the AU-NEPAD as well as official perceptions of civil society role within the policy making processes of the AU-NEPAD.

c. Country level public officers: the aim of interviewing this category of participants was to understand the implementation of both the African Peer Review Mechanism and CAADP processes at country level, looking at the role of the government, the civil society, including media and private sector as well as the role of the central AU-NEPAD structures in facilitating the APRM and CAADP at the country level.

d. Civil society Organisations, including the Private sector, Media and Academia that are involved with the AU-NEPAD processes at both the continental and country levels. In addition, few civil society organisations not directly involved in any AU-NEPAD processes were interviewed, although they have interests in these processes. The objective of interviewing this category of respondents was to get insights of the perceptions of the civil society itself about their role in AU-NEPAD policy making and the challenges they face in getting involved or not in these processes.

The overall strategy for participant selection was a purposeful sampling, that is, key informants were identified within the AU-NEPAD structures and processes, as well as within the Civil Society settings, including Mozambique, South Africa, and Ethiopia. The key informants helped to gather more potential participants who were contacted for the interview. Demographically, all the officials at the AU-NEPAD headquarters and the government officials at the country level are public servants with experiences between one to 35 years; they are both males and females, although more male participated in the actual interviews. In addition, 5 former AU-NEPAD officials and 1 former eminent person at the African Peer Review Mechanism were interviewed. From the civil society, people with experience ranging

between 1 year and 25 years participated. They are also both males and females, again more males participated in the interviews. In total, 61 people were interviewed in 4 countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa), including 2 group discussions.

3.5.   Data collection

Data for the thesis were collected from both primary and secondary sources, including direct in-depth interviews, group discussions and observation. The primary sources included basic and policy documents such as statutes and declarations, charters, treaties and communiqués of the AU, NEPAD and other AU Organs, official circulars, and publications by relevant governing bodies of the African Union or country governments, statements and speeches and declarations by key political figures, in addition to civil society organisations and think tanks' position papers.

Most of the thesis is based on research conducted from secondary sources. This included archival library research reports and the use of books, monographs, the Internet, journal articles, magazines, conference and seminar proceedings and reports. Materials and documentation were also sourced from the offices of international bodies, particularly the United Nations´ Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); African Union Commission both based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the NEPAD Agency in Midland, Johannesburg, South Africa, the African Peer Review Mechanism in Midland, South Africa and Maputo, Mozambique. Archival library research consisted of sourcing for data from books, journals, newspapers, and studies from other scholars. Data from these sources were used to analyse the historical development of African initiatives, including the African Civil Society. The data have given special and detailed account of the processes and circumstances that witnessed the establishment of the African Union and NEPAD from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as well as the making of African civil society during these events.

To build a robust understanding of the making of civil society, the available literature was extensively reviewed in two dimensions: first on the making of global civil society within a neoliberal and globalising context which allowed building an understanding of the historical process and forces driving the establishment and contestation of global and transnational civil society; the second dimension on the making of Pan-African civil society within a neo-

liberalized AU-NEPAD context. Moreover, African Union policy document analysis was carried out, with special focus on documents related to the African Union Commission (AUC), the Comprehensive African Agriculture Programme (CAADP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) processes as case studies.

The review of literature was supplemented with Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews (SSDI) and Group Discussions (GD). A semi-structured interview schedule was administered to key informants and respondents/participants within the NEPAD-African Union structures and from the civil society.

A pilot of the interview schedule was conducted with five key APRM and CAADP officials. The schedule was too long, and some questions were leading ones. As a result, the schedule was simplified and adjusted to the reality on the ground.

The key informants included specialists in civil society participation and African Union processes at key African and global civil society organisations, the African Union institutions and academia. The respondents/participants are all drawn from the various categories of stakeholders, namely the Pan-African civil society organisations based in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kenya and South Africa, international NGOs operating in Africa interested in policy and continental governance; AU-NEPAD leadership and officials, AUC representatives, CAADP and APRM leadership at continental and country level in Mozambique.

Implementing an in-depth interview using semi-structured questions, a total of sixty-one (61) participants were interviewed, and five groups participated in focus group discussions using open-ended questions. At the AU headquarters, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ten African Union senior officials were interviewed: four were women and six were men in the Division of Citizens and Diaspora Organisation (CIDO) which serves as the Secretariat for ECOSOCC, Agriculture and CAADP Division, the Gender Directorate and the Policy Department. At the NEPAD headquarters in Midland, Johannesburg, South Africa four persons were interviewed (2 women and 2 men) and at the African Peer Review Mechanism in Johannesburg four persons were interviewed (1 woman and 3 men). From the African Civil Society in Ethiopia and Kenya (this later was not initially part of study's site, however the work in Ethiopia had shown that Nairobi is the actual Pan-African Civil Society hub), four persons were interviewed (3 men and 1 woman). In South Africa, interviews were conducted

with fifteen persons (6 women and 9 men) , 9 participants from civil society organisations (4 women and 5 men), and 4 government officials (1 man and 3 woman). In Mozambique, interviews were done with 9 persons from civil society organisations (4 men and 5 women) and 6 government officials (4 men and 2 women). In addition, organise 5 group discussions were organised with members of civil society organisations, being two at continental level in Ethiopia at the margin of the Summits and parallel civil society meetings, and three at country level in Mozambique.

A participant direct observation was planned through attending key meetings such as the AU summit (attended by the Head of States and Government), the NEPAD Head of States Orientation Committee meeting, and the CCP-AU meetings. However, this was not carried out at the Summit due to the difficulties in getting through these high-level protocoled events as an individual. Instead, the author strategically got involved with the organisers of side meetings. This strategy yielded results as he was invited and attended parallel summit meetings called Citizens Continental Conference (CCC) organised by the AU Civil society forum, led by the Pan African Citizens Network (PACIN) formerly known as the Centre for Citizens Participation on the African Union (CCP AU) in Addis Ababa in January and July 2017 and again in January 2019. This is one of the invented spaces by civil society, with participation from the major players from African civil society organisations in the continent. Most importantly is a space that invites AU organs such as the African Union ECOSOCC, African Court and other AU organs' representatives to participate in the sessions and give their account. It is a very well-established platform for advocacy on AU pertinent thematic and generalist issues. During the author's stay in Addis to attend these pre-summit meetings he used the opportunity to engage with the African Union Commission's bureaucrats/technocrats where he managed to get the full picture of the functioning of the AU machinery and had vivid stories from the officials' perspectives.

3.6. Data analysis

To analyse the study data, discursive analysis was used based on an explanatory, illustrative and interpretive pragmatic approach, supplemented by narrative analysis, that is, giving the research participants the opportunity to make sense of their experience of the substantive

issues at hand (Riessman, 1993; 2002). The participants were given opportunity to express their experiences in participating in the making of Pan-African civil society and the governance of AU-NEPAD. Additionally, the meaning of this to the research questions is explained by trying to answer them through the accounts of the research participants.

Content analysis was used to analyse the data collected within existing literature. This was supplemented by using the Ladder of Citizens Participation by Arnstein to assess the level of participation and influence Pan-African civil society has in the AU-NEPAD process.

In-depth interviews and focus group discussions, responding to open-ended questions were supplemented by document analysis. Data collected through in-depth interviews have been analysed using the power analysis developed by John Gaventa and his team at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom. It helps to understand the different dimensions, such as the level, spaces and the forms of power played by different actors in negotiating different perspectives in setting development agendas and actions.

The triangulation of these three different analytical frameworks (Foucauldian discourse analysis, the Ladder of participation from Arnstein and the Powercube from Gaventa) forms the basis for the data analysis and the research report writing. The analysis was contextualised within the discussion in the literature on the making of Pan-African civil society and the strategies it uses to influence the AU-NEPAD processes, specifically the CAADP and APRM. The literature review on civil society making provided a backdrop to the primary data that were collected from the key informants and respondents. This triangulation allowed for enhancing the credibility of the outcomes of the study as a whole (Berg, 2007 and Berring, 2007).

The analysis and conclusion derived from the data have shown the technologies of rule used in making Pan-African civil society, the level and role it plays in the governance of the continent, the type of civil society strategies used to influence AU-NEPAD processes, the power dynamics being played at continental and country level as well as the overall governmentality at the AU-NEPAD. Finally, they indicate the implications of the making of Pan-African civil society for theoretical conceptualisation.

3.7.Ethical measures

An ethical clearance from the University was sought. The research participants of this study were all people of certain level of literacy and adults with no special circumstances. It was previously determined that there was no eminent risk associated with dealing with the human subjects; however, the respondents received detailed explanation of the process and objectives of their participation and each of them gave oral consent before the interviews or group discussions began. This provided all participants with a clear understanding of the objectives of study and their voluntary participation as well as the final use of the research findings. The participants were made to understand the nature of the research, what their participation entailed and how the research findings were to be used. Moreover, the participant was informed that they could withdraw from the research at any given time. Additionally, they were assured of their confidentiality and anonymity anytime and wherever possible. It was only the author and his supervisor that managed the research material and determined where the responses came from, as all responses were anonymous and did not bear the identity of the respondents. Thus, all responses were coded for data input if and where needed, including citations and direct quotes. Data analysis is based on anonymous information, which does not allow any identification of the source of information.

Chapter IV

From the Colonial Encounter to Post-colonial and the Defeat of Pan-Africanism

4.1. Introduction

With the assumptions that to understand the present, one is bound to examine the past, it becomes imperative to consider the causes and consequences of Africa's encounter with colonialism which marked, and still does, the development trajectory of the continent; the post-colonial era and the way paved to the defeat of the Pan-African ideal. Therefore, this chapter attempts to shortly rescue these past influential phenomena through which the continent endured its history, it discusses how these phenomena informed the governmentality of Africa and the making of a Pan-African civil society.

The Chapter discusses key events that marked the development of Africa since the first encounter of Africa with colonial explorers, through the slave trade, the partition of Africa (Berlin Conference), e the rise of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonial movements; the struggle against colonialism and the role of civil society, the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Post-colonial civil society and the defeat of Pan-Africanism, the crisis of governance and Civil Society in Africa and the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union (AU). By drawing on the history of Africa since the first encounter with her colonizers, the European explorers, the chapter explores the inherent African secular resistance against foreign domination which is deeply rooted in the culture of the African people and its effect in the power relations established between the colonial system and the African people. Furthermore, the chapter analyses the technologies of rule and the changing power relations occurring during the transition from the colonial, the slavery, the post-colonial, the Cold War and the economic liberalization and globalization of the continent, to the current days of the transformation of the Organization for Africa Unity.

Pre-colonial Era

From diverse literatures, it is referenced that from western conception Africa tends to be viewed as one "country", designating all the people of Africa as Africans; although the reality

is that Africa is a huge continent, the second biggest in the world only losing to Asia. This view tends to favor the oversimplification of African civilizations and the continent's diversity. It is known today that African environments are incredibly diverse. They range from dry deserts to dense rain forests and tropical savannahs. The diversity of its environments makes it to have a diverse wealth of resources, such as rich minerals, oil, agricultural land, forest for wood, just to mention a few. This played important role in the adaptation of Africa's peoples and civilizations, which resulted in the formation of the Africa we know today, composed of 55 countries with more than 800 languages (Falola, 2000 and Falola and Fleming, 2003).

Before the modern era, the primary institutions of governance across the African continent were the chieftaincy and support offices of councils, advisors, governors, subordinate chiefs, and commanders (Eldredge, 2018:91). The history of Africa accounts for an existence of strong Chiefdoms prior to the colonization of Africa, whose chiefs consolidated their control over productive resources and trade. Hence, they accumulated wealth, and increased their authority and power to control the political and economic functions of their polity and their positions. This was accompanied by institutionalization of the roles of other governing and administrative officials. Eldredge highlights the fact that most of these institutions became well-structured and complex and have suffered marginal influences during the colonial rule and still relevant to the understanding of the contemporary development of the continent (Eldredge 2018). In fact, researchers recognize that precolonial Africa had generally progressed everywhere beyond the stage of primitive communism.

Tayin Falola and Tyler Fleming (2003), for example, argue that pre-colonial communities were never completely isolated. They interacted with one another as neighbors, across regions, and even outside of the continent, mainly through commerce, trade routes, fertile agricultural land, cattle, marriage, migration, diplomacy and warfare. There are accounts of the East Africa Region establishing contact with Chinese, Middle Eastern, and Indian traders, and Portugal establishing in today´s Ghana the Elmina as its first African trading outpost, in 1482. In fact, commerce was instrumental in state formation, while trade provided the much-needed networks to exchange local surpluses for rare foods and goods, across the Saharan desert and along the Swahili coastline of East Africa (Falola, T. and F. 2003).

 Mahmood Mamdani (1996), in his book *Citizens and Subject*, argues that before colonial settlers arrived in Africa, ethnicity dominated the African society, which was used by the

colonial rulers to their benefit and as a result, the conception of civil society in Africa did not follow the same trajectory of the western countries, because they suffered disruptive consequences of colonialism.

European penetration in Africa

Under the reign of Prince Henry of Portugal, the first encounters of the African continent with European explorers were in the remote years 1482 and 1488 when the Portuguese navigators Diogo Cão explored the Kingdom of Kongo in 1482 and Bartolomeu Dias led the first European expedition to sail around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, leaving Tagus, Portugal in 1487.

As noted by researchers, Africa has been a continent of unique and specific development patterns. Most of the continent societies developed state structures by 1800, although with different levels of sophistication. They point out several factors that combined to make this state formation possible in Africa. These include: (i) Strong and charismatic leadership was a significant factor because the need for security made political leaders essential. It is the political leaders who later organized the military, economic and social structures of their respective societies. In this respect, strong and able leadership became important in state formation and which enabled them obtained goods they could not produce. (ii) Trade was another important factor in state formation. Some states developed state structures because they lived near caravan routes and had therefore got involved in the long-distance trade. Through trade contacts they were able to obtain firearms and other goods especially from the coastal Arabs and later Europeans. Firearms became an important military asset and contributed to the growth of centralized states. Some societies even traded with their neighbors before entering the long-distance trade. (iii) The military factor was vital especially in centralized states. By 1800 many parts of Africa were undergoing a period of Iron Age, and this provided military tools. Able leaders tried to mobilize their people and created standing armies. These were used to maintain stability, security, and territorial expansion. (iv) Religion was an important social factor in many societies. It acted as a unifying factor. (v) There were natural factors (environmental) such as good climate and fertile soils. This encouraged agriculture, led to abundance of food and eventually high population growth. In some areas, availability of

minerals, such as salt and iron became a source of revenue. (vi) Advancement in technology levels was yet another important factor. In the period of Iron Age, people such as the Banyoro, Nyamwezi were able to make iron equipment which they sold to their neighbors. These were sometimes used as weapons and also helped to increase agricultural production (Isichei 1997 and Shillington 2005).

Trade and Slavery in Africa

The phenomenon of slavery is an old practice. Even before the colonisation started, various forms of slavery flourished in Europe and Africa. However, these forms differ significantly from the types of slavery that developed after the institution of the Atlantic slave trade in the 1500s. The old slavery practices were practically driven by language, culture, and religion differences rather than racial considerations to distinguish enslaved and freeborn people.

Researchers studying the History of Africa highlight the importance of key events in Africa, among others, the slave trade and the actual colonization (from the Berlin Conference), the so-called partition of Africa.

Many researchers on Africa´s history and development have been arguing that the slave trade and the accumulation of capital arising therefrom fueled the Industrial Revolution in England and Europe and derived the development of the Americas we know today.

It is undisputed the fact that slave trade has greatly shaped the economic world that we know today and may have also contributed to the existing racial and political divide of today's politics of life, shaping the existing power relations between the Africans and the colonial system. For instance, in a publication called Great Britain's Commercial Interest, Malachy Postlethwayt, a British historian, political and economist writer described back in the year 1751, Slave Trade as "the principal foundation of all the rest, the mainspring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion. Therefore, its preservation, development and improvement were a matter of high importance to the Kingdom and the plantations thereunto belonging". The importance of the African slavery in supplying the much-needed labor to steam the industrial revolution which led to capital accumulation, despite the brutality of the slavery system, is fairly documented.

Bertocchi (2016) reminds us that "over the five centuries running from 1400 to 1900, the slave trade encompassed four distinct waves: the trans-Saharan, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and trans-

Atlantic slave trades. The last one was by far the most significant in terms of volume and duration: within the period of 1529–1850, over 12 million Africans were embarked, mostly along the coasts of West Africa, and forced to undertake the Middle Passage across the Atlantic Ocean" (Bertocchi, 2015, citing Berlin, 2003; Eltis et al. 1999 and Curtin 1969).

History tells us that the trans-Atlantic slave trade began during the 15th century; first with Portugal kidnaping people from the west coast of Africa and taking those enslaved people back to Portugal, later, other European kingdoms followed by expanding overseas and reaching Africa. This dictated the misfortune of Africa and the fortune of Europe.

However, the historians argue that, before 1500, Africa's economic and social development may have been ahead of Europe's. For instance, it is believed that the empire of Mali alone was larger than the Western Europe and it was considered one of the richest and powerful empires in the world during the 14th Century. The advanced development stages of the African Empires of West Africa, Ghana, Mali and Songhay in the 13th and 14th centuries decisively contributed with their gold to the economic take-off of Europe and derived the concentration of European imperial interest in western Africa.

Bertocchi summarizes in the following terms:

> …the peak was reached between 1780 and 1790, with 80,000 slaves per year being transported, but the traffic remained very intense during the nineteenth century, when between three and four million people were embarked. Throughout the period, the Portuguese were always at the center of the trade: they were the ones that initiated it and they continued it long after Britain outlawed it in 1807. The involvement of Britain culminated in the eighteenth century. France also had a prominent role, followed by Spain, the Netherlands, and the USA. The decline started after 1807, even though the process was very slow and became significantly low only after mid-nineteenth century when Brazil joined in (Bertocchi, 2015:14-15).

In fact, the supply of African slaves to American plantations reached an all-time high in the late 18th century. After anti-slave trade legislation finally shut down the Atlantic slave exports, commodity exports filled the gap, opening space for the expansion of tropical agriculture using intensive labor, mainly in communal farms, estates, and smallholders. This was reinforced by the establishment of colonial rule in the interior of Africa between 1880 and 1900, and colonial control facilitated the construction of railways, induced large inflows of European investment, and forced profound changes in the operation of labor and land markets. It is fair to say,

colonial regimes abolished slavery, but they replaced it with other forced labor schemes (Klein 1999).

It is worth noting the fact that, although slavery was a barbaric process, the slaves have always dreamed of freedom. As SAHO (2019) highlights it, there was a great deal of resistance to slavery, and many slaves themselves resisted being captured by escaping or by jumping overboard from slave ships. For example, events such as, on the Ship Amistad, where a group of slaves rebelled and took control of the ship, the Queen Nzingha of Angola and King Maremba of the Kongo who fought against the slave traders, just to mention a few. This is very interesting if looked at from the perspective of power and resistance from Foucault´s thoughts. In fact, this confirms Foucault's assertion that there are several ways in which the exercise of power can be resisted, and that resistance is co-extensive with power. As soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance and that there is always the possibility of resistance no matter how oppressive the system (Foucault, 1982a:208). And he adds, "that power is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights" (Foucault, 1982a: 219). That is to say, there is no attempt to supplant the notions of state authority where power is typically exercised vertically through the application of decisions, bureaucratic structure, or rules; there is, however, an additional horizontal approach to power relations being taken to gain an understanding of the underlying technologies of power relationships.

The Partition of Africa (Berlin Conference)

History tells us that it is within this background that in 1884, imperial and colonial powers divided Africa for their own interests at the Berlin Conference. This was termed as the Partition of Africa or Conquest of Africa or the Rape of Africa, and some call it the Scramble of Africa. This marked a period of over 20 years of active events of splitting Africa into artificial new boundaries, staring an effective occupation and colonization of Africa. By 1914 seven western European powers invaded, divided, occupied, and colonized most of the African continent. This was considered by most historians and writers as the most remarkable episode of all times.

John Mackenzie (2005), in his book, The Partition of Africa 1880–1900, stresses that,

> *The Scramble for Africa (as the Partition is sometimes more luridly known) was the most dramatic instance of the partition of the world by Europe and America in the late*

nineteenth century. It inaugurated a great revolution in the relationship between European and African peoples, and it sent out political, economic and social shockwaves, which continue to be felt in Africa to this day. Africans naturally find the partition a distasteful event, yet they are prepared to defend the artificial boundaries established by it to the point of war if necessary. The modern challenge to Africa remains the struggle to consolidate and develop the national and economic units carved out by Europeans in the partition period, and so knowledge of the partition is fundamental to an understanding of contemporary Africa (Mackenzie 2005:10)

Historians highlight some of the major reasons for the scramble.

Social reasons are mostly because the Europeans wanted to spread Christianity into Africa to counter the spread of Islam on the continent especially North Africa and some parts of West Africa, hence it was regarded as a threat to the spread of Christianity which should be stopped with urgency. In addition, the Europeans considered the Africans as backward and illiterate and saw it as their responsibility to educate and civilize these "backward" people. Equally, there was an issue of overpopulation in certain parts of Europe; therefore, Africa offered an interesting perspective as a place to resettle "surplus" citizens.

Economic reasons for the partition and scramble of Africa can be summarized as the need for new market for the growing manufactured goods from the industrial revolution in Europe, particularly England. Therefore, Europe saw the need to acquire territories outside Europe to serve as a market for their surplus goods and Africa as a newly found continent by the Europeans, was the right place. For the industrial revolution, Africa was a source for raw materials to boost their production. Of equal importance is the issue of unemployment in Europe. During the industrial revolution, manpower was being replaced by machine, sending many workers to unemployment. The boom of the industrial revolution boosted the economy of west Europe prompting capital accumulation and the need for more expansion. European powers found Africa as a place to invest in the exploitation of natural resources of the continent.

Political reasons for the partition of Africa assume that at the time of the scramble, for a country to be considered powerful and prestigious it should display the possession of more territories in Europe and outside Europe, hence, acquiring more territories served as a form of national pride and superiority over others. The need to protect European citizens in Africa was also a political reason for the scramble of Africa. As some African ethnic groups were hostile

to the early European explorers, merchants, and traders, this made the Europeans to annex those territories as a way to protect their citizens.

The consequences of the partition of Africa marked the recent history of Africa and are still felt in the continent's day-to-day life, politics, and development trajectory today as it laid the foundation for the Europeans to colonize the continent. The colonization meant to establish legal spheres of influence bounding any European country not to trade in a colony without the permission of European legal authority which led to Africans losing their sovereignty in their own lands and had to fight for their independence. The scramble of Africa had equally undermined indigenous institutions and the Europeans established political control in the conquered territories, to which some Africans resisted. Poorly demarcated territories and borders by the European, and the bringing together of different African ethnic groups to form countries with no sense of national unity have greatly affected Africa by prompting inter-ethnic wars in many African countries, which could have been avoided if Africans were allowed to develop their social structures. The colonization of Africa created an enabling environment for the exploitation of the natural resources of Africans by Europeans. These events have fertilized the sense of African descent and the need for freedom from Africans, which resulted in growing sense of urgency for liberating Africa, paving the way for Pan-African pride and anti-colonial struggles.

4.2. The Rise of Pan-Africanism and Anti-colonialism

The history of Africa is constructed and built under very unique circumstances such as the slave trade, in some circles called the 'Shame of Humanity', based on a cruel mass deportations that shaped the African continent of its life-blood in the process of its share contribution to the economic and commercial expansion of Europe; as well as the colonisation process thereafter, that shaped the past and current relations between Africa and the rest of the word and between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world. The effects of this process on population, economics, psychology, and culture have impacted the process of decolonisation and still shape the process of African nation-building today (Boahen, 1985).

It is recorded that after 1900, in an effort to increase revenues from the colonies, Europe started to change its colonial rules, which included seizing land from African people and making it available to the Europeans pouring into Africa and giving it to the growing number of Europeans in the colonies. In addition, several types of taxes were introduced forcing Africans to work for Europeans to pay taxes in cash instead of species as was done in the past. All these contributed to the growing resentment among African people, resulting in the rise of resistance movements in Africa (SAHO, N/D). This time coincided with the rising of contestation of the

colonial rules from people of African descent within the continent and in diaspora, mainly from formerly enslaved Africans in the Americas to the colonial borders of the 1884 Berlin Conference. by Pan-African icons such as Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, to name a few. In Foucauldian analysis of power, he challenges the idea that power is wielded by people or groups by way of 'episodic' or 'sovereign' acts of domination or coercion. He sees power as dispersed and pervasive. 'Power is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere' so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure (Foucault 1998: 63).

At the beginning, Pan-Africanism was an idea that helped them see their commonalities as victims of racism and associated the African continent with freedom. They also related that the Berlin Conference (colonialism) created pseudo-nation states out of what was initially seen as an undivided continent. Pan-Africanism provided an ideology for rallying Africans at home and abroad against colonialism, and the creation of colonial nation-states did not erase the idea of a united Africa (Malisa, M. and Nhengeze P. (2018).Mamdani noted two important presumptions when one starts discussing colonisation, particularly in Africa: one is prejudice, which is an uninformed way of looking at the phenomena, the second and the most important is the widespread idea that organised power did not exist until the colonisation started (Mamdani 2009).

The Rise of Pan-Africanism

"Pan Africanism can be safely equated as an ideology that takes the black race as one political and cultural unit having a common history in the past and a common destiny in the future. Pan-Africanism is born out of resistance to subjugation, slavery, racial domination, and that takes unity of the black race and empowerment of the same to reverse this negative trajectory. Thus, what captures the heuristic essence of Pan-Africanism is the fact that it is struggle for self-determination of Africa. It is a struggle for Africa to be the master of its own fate and a quest for dignity as a member of mankind endowed with all attributes of a society for self-rule (Alemayehu, 2016:3).

Most authors consider that the general term 'Pan-Africanism' is used to designate various movements in Africa developed from the end of the 19th century, which have as their common goal the unity of Africans and the elimination of colonialism and white supremacy from the continent,

resting in four key common elements, namely, a sense of common historical experience; a sense of common descent and destiny; opposition to racial discrimination and colonisation and a determination to create a 'new' Africa. However, on the scope and meaning of Pan-Africanism, including such matters as leadership, political orientation, and national as opposed to regional interests, the authors are widely, often bitterly, divided (shivji 2011, Amate 1987, Shepperson 1962).

History of Pan-Africanism indicates Sylvester Williams, an African descent lawyer, as the first person to call the Africans' convergence as "Pan-Africanism," in 1900. It is however, noted that the ideas of Pan-Africanism first started to pass around in the middle of the 19th century within the United States of American. The movement was chiefly headed by Africans of the Western Hemisphere origin. Two black Americans, Alexander Crummel and Martin Delany, and a West Indian, Edward Blyden, are often mentioned to be the most renamed pioneers of Pan-Africanist movement. Normally the common features emphasized by these first advocates of Pan-Africanism were the similarities between voices of Africans and black societies in the United States of America. Furthermore, Delany strongly believed and widely shared his views that people of African origin could not prosper beside whites. He tirelessly worked and advocated to expand his ideas defending that black people should separate from the main Federation of States (United States) and create their own independent State. Influenced by the Christian missionary passion, some Delany contemporaries' thinkers, chiefly Blyden and Crummel, found Africa to be the natural and most convenient place for the creation of the new nation. Therefore, they suggested that all Africans in America should go back to their Africa (their motherlands). More so, they suggested that these Black Americans while back in Africa should civilise and convert the African populations (James and Kelley 2012).

According to Amate, Pan-Africanism gained legitimacy with the founding of the African Association in London in 1897, and the first Pan-African Congress held, again in London, in 1900. Henry Sylvester Williams, the power behind the African Association, and his colleagues were interested in uniting the whole of the African Diaspora and gaining political rights for those of African descent. Others were more concerned with the struggle against colonialism and imperial rule in Africa. One catalyst for the rapid and widespread development of Pan-Africanism was the colonisation of the continent by European powers in the late 19th Century (Amate 1987).

More and more meetings were held; however, Shivji **argues that** the turning point was the 1945 Fifth Congress at Manchester. The moving spirits behind that Congress were George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah. The demand was unambiguous – Africa for Africans, liberation from colonialism. It ushered in the national liberation movement. Pan-Africanism thus gave birth to nationalism (Shivji, 2011).

For Shepperson, after the first congress more followed in Paris (1919), London and Brussels (1921), London and Lisbon (1923), and New York City (1927), organised chiefly by W. E. B. Du Bois and attended by the North American and West Indian black intelligentsia. However, they did not propose immediate African independence; they favoured gradual self-government and inter-racialism. In 1944, several African organisations joined in London to form the Pan-African Federation, which for the first time demanded African autonomy and independence. The Federation convened (1945) in Manchester at the Sixth Pan-African Congress, which included such future political figures as Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast, S. L. Akintola from Nigeria, Wallace Johnson from Sierra Leone, and Ralph Armattoe from Togo. While at the Manchester congress, Nkrumah founded the West African National Secretariat to promote a so-called United States of Africa (Shepperson, 1962:346).

Amate considered that Pan-Africanism as an intergovernmental movement was launched in 1958 with the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana. Ghana and Liberia were the only sub-Saharan countries represented; the remainders were Arab and Muslim. Thereafter, as independence was achieved by more African states, other interpretations of Pan-Africanism emerged, including: The Union of African States (1960), the African States of the Casablanca Charter (1961), the African and Malagasy Union (1961), the Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States (1962), and the African Malagasy-Mauritius Common Organization in 1964 (Amate, 1987).

Authors defend the idea that although the movement led by Delany, Crummel, and Blyden was essential to ignite Pan-Africanist movement, W.E.B. Du Bois, a high-ranking intellectual of his time, is the chief thinker behind the modern Pan-Africanism, hence, he is its founding father. Because Du Bois became a consistent activist for the African culture and history studies throughout his extensive career, he was, in fact, the most famous among the few academics studying the African continent consistently. He pointed out at the end of the 19th century that the twentieth

century key problem was the colour-line problem, which was made with Pan-Africanism sentiment in his mind. However, for Du Bois, the colour line problem and the so called "Negro Problem" (Black Americans' social status problem) were not limited only to the United States of America. He made his assertion with an awareness and knowledge that the European colonial ruler's yoke was agonising many Africans on the African continent itself (Okoth, 2006).

Following the World War I, in the first decades of the 20th century, a Jamaican-native Black Nationalist called Marcus Garvey was recognised as one of the most influential Pan-Africanist intellectuals and he championed the African independence cause. Garvey created his Union (UNIA) building and reinforced the positive attributes of the past collective actions of the black people. The UNIA assembled a significant number of members planning to go back to Africa. Garvey allocated his own ship, the Black Star Line, to partially transport Africans back to their continent. Nevertheless, the ultimate results were disappointingly unsuccessful.

Okoth points out that the three decades of 1920th to 1950th, George Padmore and C.R. James were the most vocal black intellectuals promoting Pan-Africanist notions. In fact, between 1930 and 1959 Padmore was the leading Pan-African philosophy theorist in addition to thinkers such as Aimé Césaire, from Martinique and Léopold Senghor from Senegal, as well as Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, who was Padmore's disciple (Okoth 2006).

It is noted that James and Padmore, although not of United States origin, drew most of their accepted wisdom from the culture of African- American because they lived in the U.S. for a considerable period. These two intellectuals benefited greatly from the exchange of African ideas and African descent peoples with the African- Americans, including the Black American singer and actor, Paul Robeson, who was particularly active in the '30s and '40s of the 20th Century.

.

In Fact, from the end of the 1940th the leadership of the Pan Africanism from African American intellectual movement leadership had withdrawn, giving prominence to Africans. This has seen Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah rise prominently. He defended that colonial rule over Africa by Europeans could only be ended if Africans could come together economically and politically. He led the independence movement in Ghana that came to completion in 1957 with the country gaining its independence from British. This move was very well received from the Americans of African descent. Hence, it influenced the restoring of the Pan-Africanism cultural thinking in the United States of America in the '60s and '70s. This

prompted a revival of African Pride and the study of African Cultural history and African cultural practice forms and dressing styles by the Black Americans (James and Kelley 2012).

Shivji argues that with the prominence of African leaders in the Pan-African Movement a clear shift in their demand and aspirations was seen, the need for an Africa for Africans and the liberation from colonialism. For him, Pan-Africanism was turned into nationalism, expressed by the national liberation movement. This, according to him, triggers a set of fundamental questions, namely would this nationalism be territorially premised on separate colonially created borders or Pan-Africanist nationalism? If territorial, what would be the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion, race, or citizenship? And if Pan-Africanist, would it be global including the African Diaspora or continental excluding the Diaspora? Even if continental, would it be racial/cultural including only Black Africans while excluding Arabs (Shivji, 2011)? These questions had influenced the newly independent states of Africa.

Amate considers that Pan-Africanism as an intergovernmental movement was launched in 1958 with the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana. In that conference, Ghana and Liberia were the only sub-Saharan countries represented; the others were Arabs and Muslim. Thereafter, as independence was achieved by more African states, other interpretations of Pan-Africanism emerged, including: the Union of African States (1960), the African States of the Casablanca Charter (1961), the African and Malagasy Union (1961), the Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy States (1962), and the African Malagasy-Mauritius Common Organisation in 1964 (Amate 1987).

It is recorded in history that by 1963 the continent had 31 independent nations. Among these nations some defended the immediate establishment of a Continental political union, whereas other nations advocated for slower path of incremental consolidation of unity towards the formation of the Continental union. This will later be discussed on the founding of the Organization for African Unity.

By this time, it was clear that the history of Africa from the pre-colonial era to the formation of a Pan-African Ideal was constructed by the inherent need for freedom of the African people, who resisted the penetration of the first colonisers, together with the people of African descent in the diaspora. In turn, the Pan-African ideal was critical to consolidating the anti-colonial movement and the struggle for independence of most African countries.

It is worth mentioning the work of Adom Getachew (2019), which brought in new perspective of analysing the anticolonial nationalism trajectories after 1945. Building on the ideals of key intellectuals and leaders of that period such as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, George Pandmore, Nmandi Azikiwe, W.E.B Du Bois, Eric Williams and Michael Manley, whose ambitions for rebuilding nations went beyond and asked for a remaking of the world, their ideals of Pan-Africanism as lived and everyday struggle for independence and self-determination emphasised the need for equal self-determining states. They proposed different models of state architecture, mainly different kinds of states and trans-states, namely federations and confederations as discussed above, with the belief that these are the most appropriate models of self-rule combining individual rights and self-government.

Getachew conveys that with these leaders and intellectuals the proposal of Pan-African struggle and anticolonial worldmaking included a critique of global inequalities by calling for a radical change that demanded reparations and postcolonial debt cancellation. The efforts of these anticolonial nationalist icons of the twentieth century committing to transform international institutions into more democratic and egalitarian platforms for global emancipation culminated with radical steps. These included the declaration of the New International Economic Order (NIECO), the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement and the organisation of various Pan-African Congresses. Finally, Getachew recognised that although the vision and ambitions of these leaders of an equalitarian world were unrealised and still remain to be realised, their struggle was not futile (Getachew, 2019).

Nevertheless, she notes that the attempt to build a postcolonial state as the "site of a politics of citizenship that could accommodate racial, ethnic, and religious pluralism was called into question", at the time postcolonial ruling elites faced with internal crises and limits, hence could no longer poses serious challenge to hegemonic imperial world rule, contributing to the fall of self-determination (Getachew, 2019:179).

In summary, Pan-Africanism emerged at the end of nineteenth century as an idea and later an action programme by Africans in colonial territories – a response to slavery, imperialism, colonialism, and racism. From the onset, Pan-Africanism became an anti-thesis to European imperialism, domination, and racism. … 'The idea of Pan-Africanism was intended to challenge the main activities of European imperialists, namely, the slave trade, European

colonisation of Africa and racism'. Basically, this was an ideological response to the 1884/85 Berlin Conference (Maimela, 2013, citing Thompson).

Pan-Africanism can be seen from key phases of evolution since its first manifestation until today, namely, (i) Pan-Africanism: a universal expression of black pride and achievement; (ii) Pan-Africanism: a return to Africa by the people of African descent living in the diaspora; (iii) Pan-Africanism: a harbinger of liberation; and (iv) Pan-Africanism: the political unification of the continent. With this in mind, it is worth concluding that Pan-Africanism meant a 'vehicle that was used to reclaim African history and rediscover the African Personality that had been subjugated under European cultural domination (Maimela, 2013, citing Tondi).

The Rise of Pan-Africanism and Civil Society

It is worth noting the role civic movements played in the advancement of the Pan-Africanism idea; for instance, the student and social movements in Africa in the 60s and 70s which highly contributed to the building of Africa's identities, including Pan-Africanism and the liberation of the continent. Inspired by the French students' movements of 1968, in Africa popular protests dominated the political action of the 60s in addition to most of the colonies in Africa gaining their political independence, with the liberation movements transforming themselves in a one-party main power in their own countries; many of them formed (often military) governments with a form of authoritarian populism fighting against neo-colonialism and post-colonial imperialism. In some parts of the continent, mainly the Southern region, where a regime of white minorities established the Apartheid regime, a new generation of leaders led the struggle against the settlers' colonialism and the Apartheid (Becker and Seddon 2018).

In much of these events, key role was played by citizens, either organised or not so well organised in specific groups such as socialist and communist political parties, students' associations (mainly at universities) and workers' unions. Some authors recognise that these struggles have taken an international fashion as they have not only taken place in different individual country across the continent at the same period and in similar circumstances, but also there was a link between protests in one country and another in Africa. These interconnectedness or linkages served as stimuli and invigorating action to country struggles, which in turn worked to build and reinforce inter-relationships between all the struggles everywhere (Seddon 2017; Zeilig 2007).

Examples of these protests in Africa can be found in all regions of the continent. In North Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are the most prominent examples.

In the 50s, a military regime was established in Egypt by Gemal Abdel Nasser through a Coup to the King who was a British protected or imposed puppet. Nasser was hostile to the landowners and political opposition or the simple idea of creating trade unions to represent the working classes directly. However, his popular discourse was promoting peasantry and workers' classes while 'speaking for the people'. Moreover, Nasser was forced to resign when Israel defeated Egypt in June 1967, opening for a huge political and military crisis. The crisis triggered a massive popular support for Nasser forcing his return to power, although his credibility was jeopardized; hence could not succeed in leading Egypt to prosperity.

Nasser's inability to lead an open society led to students and workers' massive protests for political reforms in Egypt in February 1968. Nasser's response to this protest which saw more than 100,000 students coming together, was an exceptionally conciliatory speech if compared with extremely intimidating discourses on the June 1967 defeat. Most Egyptian analysts argue that this "popular movement forced Nasser to issue a manifesto promising the restoration of civil liberties, greater parliamentary independence from the executive, major structural changes, and a campaign to rid the government of corrupt elements" (Backer and Soddon 2018:24). This was an important shift from regime of political repression to liberalisation. However, it is also argued that the manifesto and the promised measures have, over time, largely remain unfulfilled and the status-quo continued.

The student protests have continued throughout 1968, including high school and university students and peasants. It resulted in clashes with security forces and the consequent death or injury of innocent people, protesters as well as police and military forces. As a result, the Egyptian economy went from stagnation to the verge of collapse leading to an increased political repression against opposition groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation paved the way for privatisation and liberalisation policies. These policies turned to be unpopular amongst the more radical students who did not approve the removal of "Arab socialism" promoted by Nasser in favour of a form of "neo-liberalism" and the no final reckoning with Israel, which led to more uprising in 1972 (Backer and Soddon 2018).

The uprisings have also happened in Morocco. The turning point was the decree issued in 1965 which affected all students above 17 years of age representing more than 60% of students

prevented from attending high school. This prompted demonstration from the affected students and a violent repression from the security forces. The response from the security forces triggered some even more massive demonstrations, where not only affected students marched, but parents, workers, unemployed and people living in the neighbouring slums joined. This movement was highly reprised by the King Hassan II using military and police forces to fire the crowd. The King finally blamed teachers and parents, by declaring that his country was better off with illiterate people, "Allow me to tell you that there is no greater danger to the State than the so-called intellectuals. It would have been better if you were all illiterates" (King Hassan of Egypt. March 30th, 1965).

Researchers point out this message as the landmark of radicalization of the King's violent regime which lasted from the 60s though to 80s. In fact, his regime took the events as an opportunity to arrest any suspected political dissident, such as communists' activists and Iraqi teachers, including attempt to disband the radical political opposition, mainly under the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), whose leader ended up abducted and assassinated in October 1965 in Paris after a state of emergency was declared by the King. These events created a climate of extreme fear among the citizens to a point that, students in Morocco, although aware of the development of 1968 in France, were afraid to rise in protest against the King's regime. The period of King Hassan II regime was marked by extreme violence from the state against activists of democratic openness and political dissidents; hence, the period between 1960s and 1980s is known as the "Years of Lead" (Hendrickson 2012; Becker and Seddon 2018).

Different circumstances in Tunisia prompted students' uprising, which is believed to have a direct link with the uprising of 1968 in Paris (Hendrickson 2012). There is clear evidence that during the students' protests of March 1968 at the University of Tunis, there was an intense communication network between political activists across Tunisia and France.

Hendrickson argues that the strict links between the former colonial movement and local students helped Tunisian activists to understand the need to shift their struggle from global anti-imperialism towards the expansion of human rights at the national level. Becker and Seddon note that although certain aspects of the Tunisian movement were specific to the local context, the movement was also transnational for several reasons: i) activists identified with international and anti-colonial causes such as Palestinian liberation and opposition to the

Vietnam War; ii) actors and organizations involved in the protests frequently crossed national borders, especially those of Tunisia and France; and iii) the Tunisian and French states responded to specifically transnational activism with varying degrees of repression (Becker and Seddon 2018).

The violent response of the Tunisian regime to the 1968 protests triggered unprecedented activism in the region and prompted the shift of Tunisian claims to a more Human rights driven movement. This was well represented by creation of the Tunisian League for Human Rights (Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme) in 1976 and the establishment of the first Amnesty International section in Tunisia in 1981.

For central Africa, examples exist; most of the protests of 1968 took a different shape in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Congo, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, is one of the examples. Since the ascension of Mobutu through a Coup in 1965, students supported his radical rhetoric on returning Congo to its African roots, condemning tribalism and promoting a new nationalism, manifested by a process of renaming Congolese cities, towns and provinces. Replacing European names by authentic African ones was one of the strong points for conformation of the students who ended up co-opted, through its representative, the Union Générale des Étudients du Congo (UGEC), at the point of recognising Patrice Lumumba as national Hero. The Students' Union was far well organised than any other civil society groups, hence rhea petit of Mobutu's regime to have strong control over it as an effective way to co-opt all civil society organisations. Circumstances made clear that the relationship between UGEC and the regime was not a genuine one and it came to a clear end in 1968 when the regime banned the UGEC following the arrest of the president André N'Kanza-Dulumingu and students' protests in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa and Kisangani (Becker and Seddon 2018).

This event made many of the movement leaders to be co-opted because Mobutu would not tolerate an independent voice of students' organisation. The ruling party created a new organisation, the Jeunesse du Mouvement populaire de la révolution (JMPR). The new organisation was blindly loyal to the Mobutu regime. This new arrangement did not prevent violent demonstrations and strikes across the country, which became a common feature of Mobutu's reign.

In East Africa region, similar events hit throughout. Examples are the Kingdom of Ethiopia, where universities were closely controlled by the Emperor Haile Selassie regime, who was the

Chancellor with government members sitting on the ruling Council of universities. However, university students began their push for political and social change and participation subtly in the form of poetry which expressed ideas of concerns in the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1965, students started to hold large demonstrations under the slogan "Land to the Tiller!" which called for a redistribution of land from wealthy landlords to working class tenants. Although this was directed to the Parliament, it was clearly demanding the regime to look at these political concerns. The students' movement in Ethiopia was not organized and did not have a strong leadership until 1967 when they became one organisation, the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) and focused on overthrowing the government. The response from Selassie regime was a more violent repression to the protests.

Another example from East Africa is Kenya. The American Government supported Kenya's education since its independence in 1963. Tom Mboya programme started sending students for higher education in the US, supported and funded by the John Kennedy regime. This programme supported close to 70% of the Kenyan top elite. A vivid example of it is Wangari Maathai, the first ever African Woman Nobel Prize Winner. This set-up a different path to the relationship of government with social movements (chiefly the students' movement). The 1968 events in Kenya were against the Soviet Union influence in East Europe. As a fact, hundreds of students from the University College of Nairobi marched, accompanied by a contingent of anti-riot police, to protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The students' union president, Chibule wa Tsuma, delivered a strongly worded memorandum to the Soviet Ambassador urging the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, and the release of Mr. Dubcek and all the other arrested political leaders. Another event was the arrest of students involved in organising a demonstration to protest the hanging of an African Nationalist in Rhodesia (Becker and Seddon 2018).

Southern Africa examples vary in their context. Taking South Africa as an example, it witnessed the 1960s as the decade of mass protest in the country, where political organisations were violently repressed, chiefly the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC), of which their leaders were forced into exile or imprisoned by the Apartheid regime. The brutality of the Apartheid regime made its clear statement of repression during the demonstrations against political organizations and passed laws in Sharpeville and Langa in 1960 which led to banning of the ANC and PAC under the enacted Unlawful Organisations

Act No. 34 and later the repression of the Liberal Party under the Suppression of Communism Act.

Researchers defend that the banning of these political organisations left a gap that influenced the path of the struggle against Apartheid; however, as Raymond Suttner argues "the gap left by the ANC in the public domain was partially filled by liberal organisations and the new vibrant self-assertion of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). There was also active support now from the international community and from 'anti-apartheid movements' in many parts of the world" (Suttner 2012:6).

Becker and Seddon point out that in that period students were seen as a 'particularly dangerous source of protest against the apartheid regime'; therefore, 'segregation' was further used as a method of strict control of students' actions. For this to be legally binding the Apartheid regime, through the Minister of Bantu Education assumed control of the University of Fort Hare on 1st January 1960. This University was already identified by the regime as a key source of resistance and rebellion. Under the segregation method all "black" students (including Coloured and Indian) were prohibited from attending formerly "open universities," particularly the Universities of Cape Town (UCT) and the Witwatersrand (Wits) [Becker and Seddon, 2018].

Under the 1959 Extension of University Education Act, the University of Fort Hare was transformed into an ethnic institution for Xhosa-speaking students, as well as several ethnic "bush colleges" were created to cover various racial and ethnic groups. This included the University of the Western Cape (UWC) for people of mixed descent 'Coloureds' and the University of Durban-Westville (UDW) for people of Asian descent 'Indians'.

The tightening of the Apartheid regime segregation measures resulted in the students' movement to become more vocal in their struggle for better education for black and people of no-white descent, which turned into more anti-apartheid struggle emerging among students and university/college staff. It led to resurgence of reformed student organisations and student political protests; prominent organisations such as NUSAS (the National Union of South African Students, which was founded in 1924), the ANSB (the Afrikaanse Nationale Studente bond, which was founded in 1933) and the SASO (the South African Students Organisation which was founded in 1968). Particularly NUSAS, which was always very critical of the

Apartheid regime supporting the struggle against repression by adopting the ANC led Freedom Chapter and defended multiracial membership.

However, some radical students have seen NUSAS as dominated by white students, hence not able to lead the struggle for black people. Among its prominent voice is Steve Biko, a student at the all-black University of Natal Medical School (UNMS), who insistently defended his objection to "the intellectual arrogance of white people that makes them believe that white leadership is *a sine qua non* in this country and that whites are divinely appointed pace-setters in progress"[7].   Biko was clear about the dominance of liberal whites in anti-apartheid movements and he believed that even if the white liberals are well-intentioned they were unable to wear black people's shoes , hence they failed to comprehend the black vivid experience of the apartheid and often they acted in a paternalistic manner. He believed that black people needed to rid themselves of any sense of racial inferiority, an idea he expressed by popularizing the slogan "black is beautiful."[8]

Biko's ideas triggered the formation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO), which was influenced by the African-American Black Power movement and Frantz Fanon to develop the Black Consciousness, which was adopted as the SASO's official ideology. SASO campaigned for an end to apartheid and transition of South Africa toward universal suffrage and socialist economy.

The apartheid regime came to realise the strong influence of SASO, not only among back students, but within universities' staff and beyond. They declared it as a key enemy to disband. However, the organisation structure of SASO was so strong that the regime failed to completely suppress it. The apartheid regime succeeded in the assassination of its top Leader, Steve Biko, in 1977.

At the time of Biko's murder, all students' associations, despite the split, white and black students worked together, including new generations of white radical anti-apartheid who discovered the true history of resistance in South Africa and became active in organizing massive campaign for the release of all political prisoners. It paved the way towards the uprise of the Soweto and Langa Massacre, the massive uprisings of the 1980s and eventually the end of the apartheid regime in early 1990s.

---

[7] For more elaborated account please read Steve Biko' Book: *I write What I Like: Selected Writings by Steve Biko.* 1987 London: Heinemann
[8] Ibid

Alongside the students' led movement is worth noting the black labor movements. The major force was first the Industrial and Commercial Union of Clements Kadalie in the 1920s, followed by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which was dissolved in 1965, and whose members were aligned with the African National Congress, a movement that was banned.

As Dan O´Meara (1985) warns in his review, after the period of string restrictions for the labour movement, since the end of 1985 the black labour movement of small federations transformed itself in a strong worker's confederation (the Congress of South African Trade Union-COSATU) gaining strength through strength. According to him, during the 1980s, a critical democratic movement emerged influenced mainly by the Steve Biko´s Black Consciousness philosophy and built an informal alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). This movement, under the leadership of the ANC, called for a multiracial democracy (O´Maeara 1985).

The labor movement in South Africa played a critical role in the struggle against the apartheid. The apartheid regime relied on black labor to keep the economy going. This was important to give prominence to the black labor force to take up radical measures to pressure the apartheid regime. For example, in February 1973, about thirty thousand workers went on strike country-wide, with sixteen thousand in Durban alone. This showed that widespread discontent could be mobilized to disrupt the work that kept the regime in power. The Durban's labor activism helped to inspire strikes elsewhere and then a student uprising that included a 1976 Soweto march. This was an important step towards a small shift in the apartheid struggle, as shown by the statement of Mr. Vorster, then Prime Minister of South Africa calling on employers to see their employees as "human beings with souls." (Davie, 2012, Saul and Bond, 2014)

Similarly, the role of peasantry within the independence movements in Africa played a critical role. Let us take the example of the Portuguese colonies, such as Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. A common feature is the overwhelmingly majority of these countries´ inhabitants being peasants or living in rural areas, relying only on agriculture for their livelihoods. This makes this social group as unavoidable in any mass revolution endeavors. However, as a driving revolutionary force, peasants were not much of influence in Guinea Bissau and Angola where the liberation movement was unable to organise an indigenous

counter-state formation, which provided clear alliance with peasantry, capable of breaking through the colonial control and seizing political power; unlike in Mozambique, where the liberation movement clearly mastered an alliance between the peasantry and the proletarian forces as strategy to build the new State (Luke 1982 and Henriksen 1976). In all the countries, however, there was a clear recognition that strategically an alliance between the peasantry and the proletarian was of critical importance. Amilcar Cabral (Guinea Bissau) [9] Eduardo Mondlane (Mozambique) [10] clearly recognised this, while trying to spread the liberation consciousness. Although it was difficult and hard in Guinea Bissau, it was important to build the conscience of the peasantry to play a role within the revolution (Cabral, A. 1966, 1969: 73-90).

Historians about Africa underscore the idea that most of the European conquer saga was not motivated by territorial occupation, as such in the 100 years of colonisation in Africa there was no true territorial occupation, with few exceptions. Only in the last 100 years or so attempts to establish an Empire in Africa started, with France taking the lead in 1830 by invading what is today Algeria, followed by the British taking over Egypt, and Belgium occupying Congo. These set the foundations for the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884-5, which is known as the actual start of effective colonisation and occupation of Africa. This impacts the development of Africa still in our contemporary days. The sphere of influence is still a reality. Africa is divided by Anglophone Africa, closer to their colonisers, Francophone Africa, dependent on their former master, Lusophone Africa linked to their coloniser. These influences go beyond any economic dimension to political and social dimensions at the point that a citizen of France has easier access to any of French former colonies than a neighbour citizen of a fellow African country, and member of the African Union.

In real sense, Pan-Africanism has been one of the key strategies for decolonisation and anti-colonial struggles. It is still used as strategy for the struggle against neo-colonialism and for

---

[9] Amilcal Cabral, is a Guinean leader and intellectual behind the founding of the African Party for Independence of Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) which led the national guerrilla towards the independence of the two countries. He did not live enough to enjoy the independence, was murdered in 1973.

[10] Eduardo Mondlane is the mind behind the union of several resistance movements into the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) which led the country to independence after a ten-year guerrilla war against Portuguese colonial rule into FRELIMO. He died in February 1969 and replaced by Samora Machel who drove the guerrilla to the country independence in 1975.

continental unity. As the journey for unity picks up on revival, it is a means for solving African developmental challenges to putting Africa on top of the global market.

The literature states that the quest for Africa is to retain territorial integrity, take part in constant scuffle to develop her society, as well as control and manage political conflict. Pan-African philosophy emerged as a collective tool in manipulating political behaviour and organising the society in the 70s and 80s (Becker and Seddon 2018).

In a nutshell the movement for African identity and self-determination around all corners of the globe is the tipping sherry of Pan-Africanism, which culminated in the establishment of institutions of Pan-Africanism highly represented by the Organisation for African Unity. It is at the least a philosophy of the African identity.

The end of the Second World War has divided the world into two opposing political and economic blocks; the Socialist bloc led lead by the Soviet Union and the Capitalist bloc led by the United States of America. It is under this context that most, if not all, the African countries gained their independences from roughly beginning of the decade of the 1960s. Depending on each individual colonisation or liberation struggle circumstances, the newly independent countries followed one of the blocs.

Notwithstanding the formation of the two blocs, a group of non-industrialised countries formed a movement, the Non-Aligned Movement. The 1961 Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade was the first official summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, orchestrated by three key figures: Josip Broz Tito, the president of Yugoslavia; Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt; and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India. The idea of this movement was a direct response to the division of the "spheres of influence" settled between the major world forces after the World War II (Prashad 2007).

The history of Africa underscores the competition of the superpower over influence on Africa in the late 1950s and early 60s. This period coincided with the rising of African liberation movements seizing independence of their countries from the colonial powers, mainly Britain and France, and also the Portuguese rulers. The independence of former colonies by forcing out the Europeans brought in new players, Washington, Moscow and in some instances, Beijing was eager to move in replacing the Europeans. In the 1970s, the Soviets started deploying Cuban proxies in Africa as Portugal was defeated and expelled from its colonies in Angola and Mozambique.

All of the African newly independent states were avidly wooed by Washington and Moscow with large amounts of economic aid and modern armaments. When the Cold War ended, and the blocs partially or completely disbanded, these highly impoverished nations of Africa found themselves desperate for friends, as the superpower rivalry has been replaced by international indifference. In fact, with the end of the cold war, Africa has lost whatever political lustre it once had. Former geopolitical, strategic, and economic countries, such as Ethiopia and Somalia, which were at the centre of the tussle for influence on the African continent in the 1970s were abandoned and left literally orphans of the post-cold-war era (Prashad 2007). Most of them got lost in trying to fill the void created by the abandonment of their masters and find themselves within the chaos of political jungle created thereafter.

The independence of African countries in general opened space for the superpowers to explore their approach to Africa seen as fertile territory for their ideologies and for the reaping of rich resources at low cost formerly explored by the colonial powers and created a close dependency in terms of technical skills development, strategic, economic, and political orientation/leadership.

As part of the rush of the two blocs, on one hand, Moscow was playing a 'good Samaritan' with its Marxism, taking advantage of the anticolonial fervour, took the first steps. For instance, the then President of Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev embraced African leaders at the United Nations in 1960 and set in Soviet embassies even in known African countries. On the other hand, the then president of the United States of America, Kennedy responded by appointing a high-profile politician, Governor G. Williams, as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, as a clear signal of the commitment from Washington to keep as many African countries as possible out of the Communist influence (Prashad, 2007).

In this chapter, it is worth bringing back the discussion about the concept of civil society. In fact, as discussed above (chapter II, numbers 2.1 and 2.1.2), civil society is a contentious term with no established consensus among the academic and political communities; hence it may differ from one perspective to another, even within the neoliberal and western schools of thoughts and can be contextualised. With this in mind, this session discusses African civil society engagement (making) during and after the Cold War.

The Struggle against Colonialism and Civil Society

The struggle of Africans against the colonial forces is recorded since the onset of the colonial saga in all parts of the continent and the blood of resistance to colonial domination writes the history of Africa.

> "The history of the African resistance against foreign encroachment and domination has deep roots. The Africans generally welcomed the European explorers, traders, missionaries, and colonizers in the spirit of the African generosity. However, whenever the Africans felt that their generosity was not reciprocated, they resisted in various ways but with a single goal in mind – freedom. Practically, the struggle between the Africans and the Europeans was not an equal one. Most Africans hated colonialism because of what it did to them. The Africans resorted to force which provides a means of unilateral decision making. It would be wrong to argue that most of the Africans at any time accepted the Europeans colonialism" (Msellwemu, 2013:57).

Corroborating with Msellwemu's assertion, historians of African colonial past believe that there are critical factors that contributed to the resistance of the African people to the colonial domination in Africa. One of the key factors that precipitate the implosion of the movements of African revolt and resistance is the land alienation which is the main livelihood source and mode of tax collection for Africans or other similar causes. At the core of the African resistance there was, in fact, the aspiration for political liberation, the concern to terminate the foreign domination (Msellwemu, 2013). The power relations in this context show the clear sedimentation of power, where there is vertical power exercise of the state authority through the application of decisions, bureaucratic structure, or rules, against the horizontal power of underlying relationships, which constitute the people and institutions within the African population.

It is worth noting that in response to colonial transformation, Africans started seeing the formation of political parties as a way out of colonialism rule. In fact, from main colonial towns and groups, few Africans who had access to education through missionary schools started forming groups with political orientation. At first, these parties did not seek to create a mass following, but to lobby their respective colonial governments to recognise the civil rights of Africans and protect and recognise the land rights of Africans in rural areas (SAHO, N/D). Researchers see this as a reflection of significant change in the way African nationalism was

manifesting against clear west and Christianity education influence. However, they continue to be excluded from participating in colonial rule because they were Africans.

Some researchers defend the idea that the manifestation of civil society activities in Africa was only felt in recent decades, mainly with the introduction of the economic reforms under the structural adjustment programmes; however, others defend the idea that civil society is part and parcel of the `African quest for its self-determination. The latter is well illustrated by the work of William Gumede. He highlights that many African liberation and independence movements emerged from civil society groups, professional associations, cultural and religious groups or trade unions. Moreover, many leading African independence and liberation leaders cut their political teeth in civil society. During the African liberation and independence struggle, many civil society groups were also aligned to these movements as part of broad anti-colonial and antiapartheid fronts Gumede (2010, 2017). To back his assertion, Gumede goes on to share several examples of the sort.

The case of Ivory Coast, where the independent leader, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, was first the president of a civil society called African Agricultural Union, later transformed into the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (POLITIKON). The same with the Nigerian independence leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who came from lobby group for the interests of Ibos, the Ibo State Union. He mentioned even influential Pan-Africanist Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who was the president of the organisation of civil servants, the Tanganyika Association, later transformed into Tanganyika African National Union, which led the country to independence. Many examples of leaders from students' associations of colonies in Europe turned to be leading liberation and independence movements in their countries. For instance, from the Portuguese colonies it is worth mentioning key independence leaders such as Agostinho Neto (MPLA, the Angola Popular Liberation Movement) Angola, Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC- The African Party for Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde) Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front) Mozambique, just to mention a few (UCLA, N/D), all coming from students' associations.

Moreover, for the South African case of fighting against apartheid, protest politics played a crucial role in the struggle that culminated in the transition from apartheid to democracy. Protests continue to play a role in the democratic post-apartheid South African society although it is yet unclear what the long-term implications are for the country. The history of the anti-

apartheid struggles suggests that protest politics can be essential in the struggle to create a better and more just society. Forms of mass mobilisation such as demonstrations, marches, protests and direct action are, therefore, modes of political engagement that help ordinary people to challenge vested interest in order to win their demands and satisfy their needs (Ngwane, 2011).

Studies indicate that for the Arabic and Northern Africa world, there are differentiated approaches to civil society action. In general, the birth, action of civil society and the waves of democratisation had a different pathway. If compared to the Sub-Saharan Africa, the freedom of information was less tolerated and still facing challenges in several Arabic countries. For instance, the 2011 CSO sustainability report (USAID, 2011) brings in some hard data and information to substantiate this assertion. The CSO sector in that part of Africa has differing levels of capacity to organise, sustain themselves, advocate for legislative and policy change, garner public support, and provide social services. The report highlights the fact that even for the Arabic Spring, it is clear that the intervention of organised CSO in all countries had little to do with what happened (Ngwane, 2011). Several studies indicate that the Arabic Spring was more a result of social movement from citizens.

There is a widespread belief that Pan-Africanist ideals have shaped the manifestation of civil society during the Cold War and there is a revival of these ideals in current days.   Various movements in Africa developed from the end of the 19th century, which have as their common goal the unity of Africans and the elimination of colonialism and white supremacy from the continent, rest in four key common elements, namely, a sense of common historical experience; a sense of common descent and destiny; opposition to racial discrimination and colonisation and a determination to create a 'new' Africa. However, on the scope and meaning of Pan-Africanism, including such matters as leadership, political orientation, and national as opposed to regional interests, the authors are widely, often bitterly, divided (shivji 2011, Amate 1987, Shepperson 1962).

4.3. The Founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The Organisation of African Unity as the first Pan-African organisation has evolved over time, transforming itself to respond to the specific challenges of each time. These processes were not

always a peaceful endeavour and have witnessed the rise of different leaders and drivers of the African transformation.

> *Never before have a people had within their grasp so great an opportunity for developing a continent endowed with so much wealth. Individually, the independent States of Africa, some of them potentially rich, others poor, can do little for their people. Together, by mutual help, they can achieve much. But the economic development of the continent must be planned and pursued as a whole. A loose confederation designed only for economic co-operation would not provide the necessary unity of purpose. Only a strong political union can bring about full and effective development of our material resources for the benefit of our people (*Kwame Nkrumah, 1961)

The work and political thought of Dr Kwame Nkrumah is recognised to have shaped the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, and special notes to his contribution are the publication of the 'I Speak Freedom' in 1961 (Nkrumah 1961) and the 'African Must Unite' in 1963 (Nkrumah, 1963). Authors, however, mention the delay in creating the OAU due to the existence of three different and opposing groups; namely: The Casablanca Group, defenders of independence for all African countries, with strong desire for political and economic unity among African states. The group was very concerned with the role former colonial powers might play in opposing or compromising the independence of African countries. The Brazzaville Group, concerned with the situation of French colonies and the liberation war in Algeria from 1954 to 962, and how to mediate this without causing hostility to the former coloniser who continued to provide support for their military and economic endeavours. The Monrovia Group, defending a more gradual strategy to the idea of African Unity; this group included members of the Brazzaville group.

Most of the countries liberated by 1960 either aligned with the Monrovia or with the Casablanca groups. Lack of consensus among these two groups jeopardised the creation of the Organisation of African unity, which only took place in 1963, where neither of the two most opposing groups or positions had taken precedence.

In spite of all the opposing views on how Africa built its future, the Charter for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was signed on May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by thirty-two African Heads of States, namely Algeria, Benin, Burundi,

Burkina Faso (formerly known as Upper Volta), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Tunisia, and Uganda). This date is currently celebrated as the day of Africa, in memory of the founding of the Organisation for Africa Unity.

In Fanon's own words, colonialism does not just exploit people economically and politically, it also creates subjective categories, like "the colonized," that, when people identify with them, dehumanize or disempower them. Colonialism creates a type of man who is submissive and exploited. In turn, decolonization creates "new men" by creating the possibility for men to go from a dehumanized "thing" to an empowered man with agency in his world. The fight for liberation itself creates new subjectivities people can embody (Fanon, 1963).

In 1963 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded to promote unity and cooperation among all African states and to bring an end to colonialism. It had fifty-three members by 1995. OAU struggled with border disputes, aggression, or subversion against one member by another, separatist movements, and the collapse of order in member states. One of its longest commitments and greatest victories was the end of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule in South Africa.

Voices recognise that under OAU much was done, mainly around economic, political, and cultural issues, OAU was, however, seen by many Africans and around the world as a bit of an "old club of dictators" detached from its people and citizens, pursuing their own interests and defending one another instead of the interests of their people and the development of their countries. This resentment comes out mainly because the continental body has never acted against African leaders and abusers of political and human rights. Some authors and analysts see several causes or reasons for this dismal of OAU, namely, the political and economic context under which OAU was born and implemented, such as the politics of the Cold War in the international system. The Cold War between the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR) exacerbated by ideological rivalry, which promoted the creation of two blocs of followers; lately, in the 1990s the end of Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent dismantlement of the Soviet Union, have had significant consequences for the Pan-African thought and the way OAU operated.

The end of Cold War in the 1990s meant a period of uncertainty for the African countries that drove their economies based on outside aid since independence poured by the two superpowers that are no longer interested in Africa by the end the Cold War. The continent found itself in a situation that opened a room for Africans to start demanding for democratic governments, which resulted in confrontations between the old leaders and their citizens. Bad leadership, mismanagement and resource looting, bad governance, internal civil wars, and internal ethnic conflicts as well as a massive epidemic of the HIV as a public health emergency wrecked Africa. This was added to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa until the beginning of the 1990s. For some Africans, chiefly from the Southern Africa Economic Community (SADC), South Africa (SA), was offering a glimmer of hope after the apartheid era, as SA was the only industrialised nation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Another limitation to bring about true unity and uplifting of the African people by OAU was imbibed in the very principle of its constitution within its Constitutive Charter "the sovereign equality of all member states" which further included a commitment to "non-interference in the internal affairs of any member state" (OAU Charter 1963). Some scholars and opinion makers have voiced concerns on the capacity or ability of OAU to promote the goals stated in its Constitutive Charter if it complies with the commitment underpinning the core principle in the very same Charter, including the protection of the rights of Africans and the resolution of a number of destructive civil wars on the continent.   Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania, was one of the vocal top leaders frustrated with the limitations imposed by the Charter and the consequent inability of OAU to fulfil its mandate towards the African people. During this period, according to **Shivji,** African nationalists put imperialism on the defensive situation, morally and ideologically. They were educated in the theories of their master and borrowed from the cultures and history of the coloniser; the nationalists attempted to reconstruct their African identities and polities using the idiom of nationalism, sovereignty, self-determination, and citizenship. Accordingly, the philosophical underpinning was the notion of the atomist individual with equal rights. This struggle was unfortunately defeated by the current neo-liberalism view **(Shivji, 2011).**

The 7th and last Secretary General of OAU who served until July 2002 and was instrumental in changing OAU to AU had also voiced his frustration and disagreement with the state of OAU, "The people did not feel that OAU satisfied their aspirations. It did not involve

people on the ground. It was too heavy. OAU is the most difficult organisation I have ever seen" – Amara Essy (OAU Secretary General, 2002).

Africans in general and the leaders themselves have finally realised that the Organisation of African Unity had failed the promise to put Africa in the development route. However, it did tremendously well in other domains, such as the liberation of Africa from colonial rules and the end of apartheid, hence the need for a profound transformation of the continental body. This issue is discussed further in the next section.

4.4. Post-Colonial Civil Society and the Defeat of Pan-Africanism

Defeat of Pan-Africanism

To start this section, let us take one of the quotes of Nkrumah below:

> "By far the greatest wrong which the departing colonialists inflicted on us, and which we now continue to inflict on ourselves in our present state of disunity, was to leave us divided into economically unviable States which bear no possibility of real development" Kwame Nkrumah

Is Nkrumah's thinking of the 1960s still true today? What is the role of civil society post-African independence in the defeat of Pan-Africanism? Will it go along the lines of Nkrumah's assertion?

After all, these liberation movements immediately after independence, implemented their governance based on the 'one party-state' conception, and considered civil society as appendages of the party, hence they demanded uncritical loyalty from civil groups, trade unions and the press. This was supposedly a way to form a 'united' front against enemies of the new state, whether within or outside the country (Gumede, 2010).

Examples abound in excess to support this assertion. In 1977; just to mention a few, the MPLA incorporated and co-opted the main Angolan workers' union, the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos. The independence regimes in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique kept the trade unions on a tight leash. FRELIMO subsumed local 'civic', cultural, and voluntary organisations into the party, including the strong Mozambique Women Organisation (OMM in its Portuguese acronym) and the Mozambique Youth Organisation (OJM in its Portuguese acronym). The Tanzanian trade unions actively campaigned against colonialism,

during the 1964 military mutiny, Julius Nyerere and the governing independence movement alleged involvement of senior trade unionists and banned the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL). It was substituted by a more pliant new union, called the National Union of Tanganyika Employees (NUTA), which was supposed to be an 'economic development orientated/state institution'. Intellectuals associated with the liberation and independence movements were also expected to be uncritical. If not, they were often also silenced, or they censored themselves, not to fall foul of the party and leadership. Many intellectuals failed to 'draw the line between principled support of the (liberation and independence) movements and uncritical apologia' the misdeeds of the movements and their leaders (Gumede, 2017).

The leaders of the independent nations of Africa betrayed the founding fathers' vision of a United and prosperous Africa. Nkrumah was right on this. They have failed to keep the imperative of Pan-African ideals and principles and they transformed themselves into tyranny of their own people by seeking personal and individualistic gains at the expenses of a United Africa, where its people enjoy prosperity and the promise of freedom.

An interesting analysis by Firoze Manji on the failing of most of the liberation movements in Africa highlights key factors for the demise of the liberation and freedom dream promised by these movements. He argues that most of the liberation movements in Africa failed their populations from the onset, as they sought only to gain independence and occupy the colonial state, "rather than transform it" (Manji, 2014:7).

After a very successful mobilization of the masses to accept that the only way through to freedom and ending of the colonial suffering and humiliation was to gain political independence, many liberation movements succeeded in mobilizing people for the struggle. They surely attained their independence during the golden period of the end of the 50th , the whole of 60th to mid-70th of the 20th Century. With Pan-African spirit that no freedom will be enough in Africa while it is still a single country under oppression, the newly independent nations joined hands and supported the remaining colonized countries under the humiliating and dehumanizing oppression of apartheid system in South Africa to secure their own independence.

However, after the first objective was achieved, almost all these continental, nationalist and Pan-Africanist leaders believed that taking full control of the state apparatus was enough to satisfy the needs and demands of the popular masses in their respective countries. The reality

though, was that this was far from enough! Because the state apparatus was embedded into the imperial and colonial power and its driving force, the corporations and banks, which serve their own profit and interests.

The colonial state was set to serve and defend colonial and imperial interests, using its monopoly through police, armed forces, secret services and other elements of enforcement and intimidation, including the use of factual violence when the need arises. Ignoring these dimensions for freedom and the other factors laid down above has caused a great deal of the spirit and aspirations of many Africans to emancipatory freedom and the whole Pan-African dream.

As pointed out by Nkrumah in the initial main quote, an important factor which led Africa to fail with Pan-Africanism was the lack of unity, a weapon well mastered by the colonial rulers in the dark age of the colonialism and again well mastered by the leaders who fought for freedom. This is in conjunction with the same superpower spearheading imperialism, capitalism whose global expression is neoliberalism.

The very spirit of Pan-Africanism, the belief that Africa had a common interest, hence the unity was key to building a prosperous Africa, preached by the African leaders of the time, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, Oliver Tambo, Eduardo Mondlane, Patrice Lumumba, Robert Sobukwe, Amilcar Cabral, Franz Fanon, Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere, Thomas Sankara, Kenneth Kaunda, just to mention a few, was replaced.

To add to this, during the peak of the Cold War, the fight between global superpowers influenced the political, economic, and social landscape of the Continent.

On one hand, the neo-colonial, capitalist, and neoliberal superpowers led by the United States of America with its allies from Europe, though often absent from retellings of the Cold War, conceived alliances to conquer Southern Africa between the 1960s and 1980s, which had a profound and sometimes devastating impact on the history of the continent. The newly independent nations such as Angola, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provided the stages for some of the bloodiest proxy battles between "East" and "West", as the United States, and apartheid-era South Africa tried to prevent the spread of communism in the global south. These allies had continuously thrown spanners in the way to the progress of Africa, with support of their financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the use of violence, towards the leaders who had firmly stood against the neo-

colonisation and subjugation of their respective countries. Examples of such abound; Thomas Sankara, who is regarded as the greatest African to have ever lived, continuously faced opposition from the Europeans, was assassinated and replaced with a French puppet, and Samora Machel, who was assassinated, as well as Patrice Lumumba, who also assassinated.

On the other hand, the Eastern Bloc and to some extent Cuba sought to support the expansion of communism, and with the new player, China, all trying hard to conquer the newly African nations for advancing the establishment of Marxist regimes in the Third World or economic expansion respectively, making Africa a strategic battleground between the two-world political and economic systems. In between them were the Front-Line States (Jackson 2010 and Onslow 2009).

Additionally, there were some attempts to counteract these events: the efforts of OAU with the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in April 1980 by the Heads of States. This plan was truly ambitious in the sense of breaking the developmental paradigm of Africa. In trying to replace Africa´s export turned developmental model into a collective self-reliant thrust type of developmental model.

Through the ideas developed in the Lagos Plan of Action, Africa would gradually achieve self-sufficiency in food and manufacturing production, by using its extensive resources primarily for its own development, and at the same time producing primary commodities for traditional markets. This strategic move would help Africa break its excessive dependency on Western markets, investments, and technical expertise, though without striving for autarchy, ultimately creating the much-needed collective self-reliance. At the same time, the sub-regional common markets would expand considerably paving the way for a continent-wide community market, which will enable producers realize an economy of scale (Sandbrook, 1993).

However, these commitments from the Heads of States 40 years later were, ignored by the governments Africa-wide. Whereas the Bretton Wood Institutions advocate to opening up African economies in the global markets, betting Africa´s future in the global economy is highly problematic. Hence, in 1989, the Economic Commission for Africa formulated some of its earlier ideas in ´African Alternative Framework´ into conventional Structural Adjustment Programme (ECA 1989).

The liberation movements of yesterday, after independence, reclaimed the monopoly of the very people they liberated. The leaders of the newly independent states started to show their

true intentions, turning into worse dictators than the abominable colonial regimes they had just unseated. This gave birth to a new class system where the elite class emerged out of the liberation leaders in power, the very same individuals who vowed to be representing their people. Then one wonders why Africa, despite its rich resource endowment, ranks the poorest in the world. Indeed, resources that were meant to be shared with the people became State resources, which they constantly tapped into to build their empires. The leaders in power started owning mansions and investing in business abroad, building economic empires for themselves and their clubs of friends and loyalists.

In fact, the end of formal occupation has not signaled the withdrawal of colonial categories, procedures and technologies of rule, nor has its beheaded Europeans the sovereign subject in deference to which many postcolonial histories and geographies are constructed (Chakrabarty, 2000).

It is then understandable that almost all the liberation movements have mastered the colonial technologies of rule and procedures and promoted powerful party-state apparatus and fallen into authoritarian regimes. As Henning Melber (2002) notes:

> *Tendencies to autocratic rule and the subordination of the state under the party, as well as politically motivated social and material favors as a reward system for loyalty or disadvantages as a form of coercion in cases of dissent are obvious techniques. The political rulers' penchant for self-enrichment with the help of a rent- or sinecure-capitalism goes with the exercise of comprehensive controls to secure the continuance of their rule. Accordingly, the term 'national interest' means solely what they say it means. Based on the rulers' (self)perception, individuals and groups are allowed to participate in, or are excluded from, nation-building. The 'national interest' hence serves the purpose 'to justify all kinds of authoritarian practice' and allows that "anti-national" or "unpatriotic" can be defined basically as any group that resists the power of the ruling elite of the day* (Melber 2002:5-6)

Following this logic, it is easy to see how the newly independent states, former liberation movements turned into the ruling elites did not promote civil society or any other voice other than their own. As Melber (2010) continues, "there is a lack of (self-) critical awareness and extremely limited willingness to accept divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed in public. Non-conformist thinking is interpreted as disloyalty, if not equated with treason. This marginalization or elimination of dissent drastically limits the new system´s capacity for

reform and innovation. A culture of fear, intimidation and silence inhibits the possibilities of durable renewal at the cost of the public good. In the long term, the rulers are themselves undermining their credibility and legitimacy" (Melber 2010:6).

In turn, Roger Southall (2013) emphasizes how the former liberation movements embraced colonial pathologies and transformed themselves from victims to perpetrators, pointing out that these movements "have not only become authoritarian, intolerant and careless, but also violent, abusive of human rights and racist" (Southall 2013:23).

The culture of non-critical awareness and non-acceptance of divergent opinions of most of the liberation movements was crafted as part of the struggle for independence. These movements endured and did not change after they became government. As Brutus (2005) notes, resistance movements normally adopt rough survival strategies and techniques while fighting an oppressive regime. That culture, unfortunately, takes root and is permanently nurtured. All summed up, it becomes questionable whether there is a truly fundamental difference between the political systems they managed to throw out and what they establish in that place. The justification for the legitimacy of the new regime lies primarily not in being democratically elected but in having fought the armed struggle, which liberated the masses (Brutus 2005:12).

Under this context, civil society in post-colonial Africa was critically neutralized by the ruling elites and former liberation movements, the same way they were not promoted during the colonial era. Civil society found it very hard to flourish and play its role.

It is important to note that, according to Bond (2003), some microeconomic programmes, such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed on African countries by the World Bank and IMF, often with 'homegrown' orientations are still bedeviling Africa future and they have deep roots.

It is equally necessary to note that the political nature of the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism in Africa both produced or at least exacerbated most of the problems identified, and they are mainly associated with what Frantz Fanon (1961) described as 'false decolonization'. Namely, the colonialism's artificial borders, racism and ideological control, ethnic divide-and-rule strategies, land acquisition, labor control, suppression of competition from indigenous sources, military conflict (independence struggles) and replacement by African nationalism; for women, pre-colonial patrilineal systems evolved into colonial forms of inequality (e.g., minority status and legal guardianship) which often persisted and evolved as

post-colonial forms of structured oppression (e.g., market-related bride price); and the political continuities from past to present which include unreformed state structures, international political and cultural relations with colonial powers, and especially class alliances involving *compradorism*. The economic structure of Africa's neo-colonial societies was relatively similar (Bond, 2003). These are key important factors to consider while analyzing the making of Pan-African civil society and its interaction with neo-liberalized AU-NEPAD, which impacts the construction of power relations. As Foucault stresses, power and power relations are a context bound phenomenon.

4.5. The Evolution of Governance, Democracy and Civil Society in Africa

The first scramble, partition and beginning of the actual colonisation of the African Continent at the Berlin Conference in 1884-5 were based on an ideology of supremacy with all intended and unintended consequences for humanity, human rights, socio-political and economic justice. The idea of liberating Africans by introducing liberal and western ways of political, social and economic development was the main, if not only, option at disposal of the Africans. Resistance to these impositions has been noticed throughout.

Key features of the liberal democracy as described by Western theories are the rule of law, human rights and freedoms and separation of power. Liberal democratic discourse has dominated the development of Africa since the end of the Second World War, through the Cold War and the Post-Cold War.

With authoritarian regimes in Africa being increasingly challenged across the continent, and competitive multiparty systems emerging in Africa resonating in the emergence of democratic governments in an environment where legacies of poverty, illiteracy, militarisation, and underdevelopment produced by incompetent or corrupt early post-colonial governments; there are challenges to be overcome to bring about true change, where genuine democratic institutions and processes can hold ground, and can meet the demands of the international community and the demands of theirs citizens for better governance and development translated in better lives for the Africans (African views African Voices 1992).

According to the African Views and African Voices, in the decade of 1980-90, the international financial institutions (led by the Word Bank and International Monetary Fund-

IMF) set up specific and strict conditions for their assistance to African governments for the implementation of structural adjustment and economic stabilisation programmes. This meant in real terms that the World Bank, the IMF, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) started demanding policy changes, such as currency devaluation, removal of subsidies for public services, reduction of state intervention in agricultural pricing and marketing, greater concern to the development needs of rural areas, privatisation of parastatal bodies, and reduction in the size and cost of the public sector (African views African Voices 1992).

These economic reforms alone were not yielding the desired results. Therefore, at the beginning of the 90s, the donor community started to demand political reforms. In fact, future economic assistance started to be directly linked to democratic political reforms in Africa. Although to varying degrees almost all donors supported participatory development, including democratisation, improved governance, human rights, liberty, good governance, reduction in military expenditures; and there is an agreement among international donor community that political reforms "reduced corruption and promoted more financial accountability, better observance of human rights, independent media and an independent judiciary, participatory politics, and a liberalised market economy in order to move closer to the ultimate goal of meaningful economic growth and development" (African views African Voices 1992).

However, the term governance has been defined diversely among different observers and actors concerned with development in Africa. The World Bank, for example, defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank, 1991:234). This definition puts emphasis on the efficiency and the capacity of state institutions beyond the public sector to the rules and institutions that create a predictable and transparent framework for the conduct of public and private business, as well as accountability for economic and financial performance. Weena Gera (2018) defines governance as fundamentally a political process —a process upon which power is controlled, exercised, and allocated in society. It is about who controls what, how and for whom, which is the very essence of politics. As a paradigm shift in the role of government, governance is a political process, which extends beyond the confines of, yet still predominated by, the government.

It is worth noting that the continuing reliance on foreign aid in Africa has increased the opportunities for bilateral and multilateral aid agencies to influence policy making in the region. There is an account of international donors discussing development and debt of African countries and devise aid strategies for African governments. More so, foreign aid is said to be setting up prescriptions for changes in both economic and political policies pursued by African governments. This trend is gaining prominence at the point that state governments are more accountable to the international donor community than to their constituencies (Olowu, 2003a and Abrahamsen 2005).

From theories of governance, it is known that a State has a reliable, competent bureaucratic organisation at its disposal for three principal reasons. First, a democracy requires a state (bureaucracy) that can carry out its main functions of citizen protection, collection of taxes, delivery of services in an orderly, predictable, and legal manner. Secondly, bureaucracy is crucial as an impersonal and accountable instrument for carrying out state functions in a democracy to assure state legitimacy and ensure that it serves all of society, not segments of it (an issue that is responsible for much of the conflict that goes on across the continent). Finally, a permanent, professional bureaucracy lessens the pain of regime change from one party to the other in a multiparty system if the top echelons are recruited not based on party affiliation but professionalism and technical expertise (Olowu, 2003a:9).

Abrahamsen points out clearly that policies towards the continent are still subjected to the normal rule of the liberal democratic political game. Attempts to introduce reforms and strategies to develop the African continent are documented squirrel of failures in addressing the pressing development needs of the continent (Abrahamsen 2005:59).

It is recognised that in attempting to reduce the levels of poverty in Africa the International Financial Institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been setting up a variety of poverty reduction strategies from the 1980s, such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPIC), Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), Policy Framework Papers (PFPs), Concessional Development Fund, and lately the Poverty Reductions Strategy Papers (PRSPs). These strategies were all based on the thinking that good planning and straightforward implementation of the plans was enough to make poverty reduction come true in developing

countries as it did for most of the now developed countries during the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Cheru points out that,

"Since the 1980s, there has been a strong and coordinated intervention of donor community in the national economic policies of poor countries through stabilisation packages and structural adjustment programmes as a precondition to receiving loans from the multilateral financial institutions. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have reflected the liberalisation of markets and trade. This process resulted in the one-size-fits-all economic policies, which were often poorly adapted to a specific country's needs, lacked a broad popular support, and failed to make poverty reduction a priority" (Cheru 2006:355).

Cheru continues arguing that towards the end of the second decade of adjustment, the role of the state was significantly curtailed, hence the dominance of market forces was set in place and the African economies were wide open to external penetration, thanks not only to adjustment programmes, but also to the continued pressure of globalization and market integration (Cheru 2002:303).

Development paradigm has since been dominated by neoliberal approaches. As Rita Abrahamsen argues, 'development partnerships in modern societies in Africa can be regarded as a form of advanced liberal rule that increasingly governs through the explicit commitment to the self-government and agency of recipient states' (Abrahamsen 2005:5). This is well illustrated in the process of creating the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and infusing and developing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in developing countries. It was led by the Bretton Woods Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, where a philosophy of inclusion and incorporation is played in order to advance a direct/indirect domination and imposition of rules and practices by the neoliberal west. It is helping to produce new and modern self-disciplined states and citizens.

Along with the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes in their different phases, the international financial institutions have realised that one of the key obstacles to fighting poverty within developing world was the lack of good governance at different levels. Thus, they started putting emphasis on good governance as a precondition to continue

supporting the much-needed reforms. As defined by the World Bank, good governance shall encompass a wide participation of all development stakeholders.

The widespread rhetorical acceptance of participation, as well as rights and strengthened forms of civil society engagement has been helping to conclude that creating new institutional arrangements and talking about participation will not necessarily result in greater inclusion and involvement of all interested stakeholders; it will not make the policy change happen neither the institutions real. It will instead depend much on the kind of relationships in exercising the power of all the stakeholders within the new and more democratic institutions which open spaces for more and more groups concerned with participation and inclusion to realising their rights or changing policies.

Crisis of governance

According to Isa Shivji (2005), the decade of 1980s, described by economists as Africa's 'lost decade', was also the transition decade which marked the beginning of the decline of developmentalism and the rise of neo-liberalism, euphemistically called, globalisation. In 1981, the World Bank published its notorious report, 'accelerated development for Africa: An Agenda for Africa'. Shivji argues that this was certainly an agenda for Africa set by the erstwhile Bretton Woods institutions with the backing of western countries; it had little to do with development or otherwise (Shivji 2005:3). It was in fact a ´poisoned honey´ given to the African leaders which did more damage than good to the little and small gains independent African states had achieved so far.

Although less spoken, according to Shivji, there have been struggles against Structural Adjustment Programmes and globalisation in the streets and in lecture halls of Africa. He goes on to underscore the fact that even African states and bureaucracies have not surrendered without some fight to the imposition of the IMF and World Bank led structural reforms (Shivji 2005). Key African states have proposed alternative approaches and programmes such as the Lagos Plan of Action, (1980); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (1989); the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development (1990) and Delinking from the Eurocentric World System (1990). All these alternative proposals were clinically dismissed by the Bretton Woods institutions and the donor community at large. Major features of these alternative proposals

from Africans highlight the issue of holistic approach to Africa's development, regional integration, collective reliance, and sovereignty in policy-making, human centred and people-driven development.

The basis for Amin´s proposal was a more radical decolonization from a central capitalist control. As John Saul emphasized in Amin´s memorial, "this to be achieved through an actual and active "delinking" of the economies of the global South from the Empire of Capital that otherwise holds the South in its sway. For Amin, delinking was best defined as "the submission of external relations [to internal requirements], the opposite of the internal adjustment of the peripheries to the demands of the polarizing worldwide expansion of capital; it is seen as being "the only realistic alternative [since] reform of the [present] world system is utopian." History shows us that it is impossible to "catch up" within the framework of world capitalism; in fact, "only a very long transition" (with a self-conscious choice for delinking from the world of capitalist globalization as an essential first step) beyond the present situation of global polarization will suffice (Saul, 2018: Tribute to Samir Amin).

In his delinking proposal, Amin [11] calls for "Marxism as a decisive force for social transformation in Asia and Africa…because only in Africa and Asia, Marxism can be seen most closely associated with social transformations… as Marx put it, Marxism is not a philosophy satisfied with interpreting history it seeks to change, it is undeniable that it plays a genuine role in the life of the peoples" (Amir 1990:147).

The good governance discourse of the 90s and the first years of the 21st Century has shifted the development focus. Some researchers regard the state of governance and politics in Africa as being greatly improved between 1990 and the 2000's (Cheru 2006). However, the reality is that the political landscape in some African countries is worsening and becoming out of control; it is not rare finding places in Africa where the rule of law is fairy-tale; murder, political violence and intimidation, lack of total freedom, arrest, political and social intolerance are the order of the day.

---

[11] Please see Samir Amin´s work from 1974, first with his book, titled "Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. (1974)" And more acutely with his book titled "Delinking: Toward a Polycentric World", firstly published in France (1985) and later in English (1990)

According to Freedom House (2015), by 2015 - Africa had twenty dictators of this the first four; Teodoro Obiang (Equatorial Guinea), Jose dos Santos (Angola), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Paul Biya (Cameroon) have been in government for over 30 years, respectively. The next three, Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Mswati III (Swaziland), Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan) have been in government for over 25 years, respectively. Although in recent years the situation had changed, with some dictators being overthrown or forced to step down; examples are Omar Al Bashir of Sudan, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Africa is still a huge cause of concern in global freedom terms, as shown by the Freedom House Report (2019).

"Several of the continent's aging authoritarian leaders continued to cling to power. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya, now in office for 36 years, presided over deeply flawed elections in which he secured a seventh term, while in Uganda, Museveni—in office for 32 years—oversaw the removal of a presidential age cap from the constitution, allowing him to run for a sixth term in 2021. In Togo, one of only two countries in West Africa without term limits, President Faure Gnassingbé (whose family has been in power since 1967) resisted popular efforts to impose such a barrier" (Freedom House Report 2019:13).

Moreover, Africa is house for the top 10 dictators, according to Africa Answer publications. These are Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan, Siad Barre of Somalia, Sekou Touré of Guinea, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Macias Ngema of Guinea and Hissene Habre of Chad; this list is complemented by dishonourable mentions including Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, Muammar Khadaffi of Lybia, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (Congo), Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Mingistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Basongo of Equatorial Guinea, and Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola (Freedom House (2015).

Globally, freedom has steadily declined in the last 13 consecutive years (Freedom House Report 2019:17). That is, the main indicators around political rights and civil liberties are worsening in most countries. That is true for the African Continent at large, where most of the countries rate from no free to partially free within the Freedom House rating[12] for 2015. Out of

---

[12] Freedom House Rating consider Political Rights and Civil Liberties on scale of 1, represents the freest and 7, the least free rating. *The ratings reflect global events from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014*

the 55 countries, only 8 countries fall under the free country's category, while more countries fall under partially free countries, and the clear majority are classified as no free countries; situation only compared with the Asian Continent. More so, out of the 13 global countries classified as the worse of the worse, 7 are African (Freedom House Report 2019).

In African politics elections are classified as fair and transparent by international observers and local authorities, but all the contenders, mainly the losers, do not accept the results, resulting in a turmoil. Examples of Côte d'Ivoire post-election crisis of governance, the 2010 Kenya elections, the Mozambique elections in 2009 and 2014, etc. show the governance problems that afflict the whole of Africa, which comprises countries with different political and governance systems. This also underscores the latent and permanent danger emerging from the lack of respect for electoral results and the determination by particular politicians to remain in power at any cost.

Currently, in some African countries, the national liberation movements which become one party-state have evolved into a party that either legally or effectively monopolised power with the argument of preserving independence and sovereignty from foreign interference, and often these parties became the political elite instrument to hold political and economic power at all costs and they are not interested in tolerating serious opposition or even dissidents (African views African Voices, 1992).

Moreover, adherence to and institutionalisation of constitutionalism and the rule of law remains a major challenge; though on the increase, is still limited in Africa. It is frequent in Africa to observe the executives of some countries attempting to forcefully change their constitutions to allow their incumbent presidents to stay in power, beyond legal terms. This is, often, accompanied by reduced freedoms for citizens' activities, including the environment for free media operation. Moreover, the African Governance Report (2009) shows reported that from 1990 to 2008 constitutions were amended in eight African countries to elongate the term of office of their presidents, mostly against popular opinion. This is a clear indication of the state of governance in Africa. The saddest thing is countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya (regarded as having a vibrant media and civil society), Rwanda, and Uganda are among these examples.

More so, the inability of leaders to identify, sieve and apply relevant development policy options and theories as proffered by World Bank, IMF and other development institutions and agencies reinforces the governance and leadership crises in Africa (Iheriohanma and Oguoma, 2010:415).

4.6. The Transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union (AU)

> *... But I never believed that the 1965 Accra summit would have established a Union Government for Africa. When I say that we failed, that is not what I mean, for that clearly was an unrealistic objective for a single summit. What I mean is that we did not even discuss a mechanism for pursuing the objective of a politically united Africa. We had a Liberation Committee already. We should have at least had a Unity Committee or undertaken to establish one. We did not. And after Kwame Nkrumah was removed from the African political scene nobody took up the challenge again...* (Nyerere 1997).

In spite of the successful endeavours of the Organisation of Africa Unity, the widespread feeling that the OAU is no longer fulfilling the ambitions and dreams of the African people after achieving its core goals, the liberation of the continent and the end of apartheid in South Africa, the inability of the OAU to bring about sustained and systemic change and to promote growth for the African people as well as greater African economic, social, and political integration led to the establishment in 2001 of the African Union (AU), a successor organisation to the OAU modelled on the European Union (AU Echo, 2013).

For many, the transformation of the Organisation for Africa Unity into the African Union was seen not only as the dropping of one letter from the acronyms, but it was expected to represent a true 'shift from a "dictators' club" to a people-based grouping' (Reynolds, 2002:14). It is true that all steps taken by the African leaders have been epitomised in a declaration at an Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on 2 March 2001, where the Heads of States of the then Organisation of the African Unity unanimously decided to establish the African Union (AU). This was a culmination of all the legal steps followed since the decision taken by the Heads of States and after the 36th member of the Organisation of the African Unity (Nigeria) had finally ratified the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (CAAU) by submitting its ratification instruments to the OAU General Secretariat. This marked the conclusion and compliance of the legal requirement for adoption of two-thirds. Henceforth, the Constitutive

Act entered into force on the 26th of May 2001. This allowed countries to sign the Constitutive Act. At the opening session of the Lusaka Summit on 9-11 July 2001, fifty-one countries had signed the Constitutive Act giving birth to the African Union. The newly signed Constitutive Act establishing the African Union replaced the old one, which established the OAU.

 OAU is a convenient set up for dictators, and as discussed above, it was a strong belief of the OAU leaders that no state should interfere in other countries' business. This made the OAU not to interfere when a country does not respect its people's liberties, rights or prevent political violence. As a lesson from the past the new African Union has a clear mandate: to promote democratic institutions and principles, good governance, and popular participation, intervene in case of genocide and war crimes imposing even sanctions and have right to initiate a peer review of a country's record.

African leaders have come to realise themselves that in this ever-changing global environment, Africa needs to transform itself and meet the guiding principles of democratic development, one of which highlights the need for wide participation of all citizens in the process of policy setting and implementation. In this context the following statements of the Head of States say it all:

> We the *Heads of State and Government of the African Union assembled to celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the OAU/AU established in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963, Evoking the uniqueness of the history of Africa as the cradle of humanity and a centre of civilization, and dehumanized by slavery, deportation, dispossession, apartheid and colonialism as well as our struggles against these evils, which shaped our common destiny and enhanced our solidarity with peoples of African descent…* (AU Summit Declaration)

This was a preamble to the common ideals and the need to reassure the African people of the continuing of Pan-African aspirations of the forefathers, to unite all Africans towards a great economic breakthrough, providing for a better life for all Africans. Therefore, the Heads continue in their declaration:

> *… Reaffirming our commitment to the ideals of Pan - Africanism and Africa's aspiration for greater unity, and paying tribute to the Founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as the African peoples on the continent and in the Diaspora for their glorious and successful struggles against all forms of oppression, colonialism and apartheid…*

> *Guided by the vision of our Union and affirming our determination to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena… Determined to take full responsibility for the realisation of this vision; Guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of our Union and our Shared Values, in particular our commitment to ensure gender equality and a people centred approach in all our endeavours as well as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of our countries…*(AU Summit Declaration)

The Heads of States and Governments of the African Union closed up the declaration with an acknowledgement of the current state of affairs of the OAU. It makes them realise the need for a structural and profound transformation of the current Institution into a new body with clear directives to address the pressing challenges of the moment in Africa and globally

> *…. ACKNOWLEDGE THAT: The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) overcame internal and external challenges, persevered in the quest for continental unity and solidarity; contributed actively to the liberation of Africa from colonialism and apartheid; provided a political and diplomatic platform to generations of leaders on continental and international matters; and elaborated frameworks for Africa's development and integration agenda through programmes such as NEPAD and APRM'* (AU Summit Declaration).

This statement at the celebration of the OUA/AU Jubilee is symptomatic of the way African leaders have come to the realisation of the need to embrace the transformation in the main purpose of the Organisation of Africa Unity and the way it operates; incorporating more democratic and people centred processes.

The newly established African Union goes far beyond its predecessor by establishing principles and mechanisms for participatory and democratic governance, wide citizens' participation as a core principle and monitoring system in line with the neoliberal commandments. However, the vast literature shows consistent gaps in participation of the Pan-African civil society.

The general underlying assumption within the neoliberal context is that civil society participation in development is key because it is regarded as a democratic end in itself and the quality of any democracy suffers without participation of all sectors of society. Moreover, participatory channels should not be seen as restricted to elections and parliamentary involvement only, hence it should go beyond and be institutional part of the whole chain of democratic process and policy matter, from the conception, implementation to monitoring and evaluation. In this light, participation is a means and an indispensable requirement for positive developmental outcomes, inclusive and sustainable democratic processes for the continent.

For instance, if one looks at the Article 3 (g and h) of the Constitutive Act which "provides for the —promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; protection of human and people's rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and other human rights instruments" (Constitutive Act:4), as well as the Article 4 of the same Constitutive Act in its page 5 which "provides for the —participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union" (The Constitutive Act of the African Union), arguably the AU-NEPAD is guided by neoliberal principles.

Although there is a clear recognition that civil society organisations are not a homogeneous group and still in construction, in Africa many civil society organisations represent marginalised individuals and groups who are consequently less able to influence policy and participate in the development debate. Therefore, the assumption is that Pan-African civil society organisations are well placed to speak on behalf of these groups and individuals due to their closer proximity, on one hand to the intended beneficiaries of development policies, and on the other hand to the decision and policy makers in the continent. Therefore, Pan-African civil society organisations should participate in the governance of the continent and contribute to a more efficient, effective, accountable, and equitable development through influencing rational use of resources and policy formulation as well as monitoring policy implementation and evaluating outcomes.

However, scholars are cognizant of the fact that the advent of decolonisation for the African continent from the late 1950s to the early 1960s and beyond opened a remarkable shift in the development of the world since the abolition of slavery (SAT 2004). Since then, the continent has witnessed different and interesting transformational development steps, which include the establishment of the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU), the transformation of the OAU to

the African Union (AU), the institutionalisation of the Peer Review Mechanism (PRM) and the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) Agency.

In fact, with the full establishment of the AU in 2002 and as part of consolidation of African Union structures after a transitional period, Pan-African Institutions within the African Union context are given specific mandate to complement one another in the quest for Africa's development and growth. Such institutions comprise among others the AU itself with overall leadership and political mandate, the NEPAD with the leadership of economic and social development, within NEPAD framework, the APRM with the leadership in governance and democratic development, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) with legislative role, the Pan-African Court with judiciary role, and the African Development Bank with financial role (SAT, 2007, AU Echo, 2013).

As Moyo (2007) summarised it all, the creation of the African Union (AU)'s organs and programs aimed at primarily improving governance, promoting sustainable development, and ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights in the continent. In that vein, the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union at the African Union Summit in January 2007, served as the re-affirmation of the Heads of States on their promise for improved democratic practice in Africa.

The AU organs are as follows: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union (this includes the Chairperson); the Executive Council of Ministers; the AU Commission; the African Court of Justice; the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); the Permanent Representative Committee; the Specialized Technical Committee; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). In addition, other institutions are increasingly taking prominent roles in the construction of the African Union. Some examples can be highlighted here: the Peace and Security Council, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), now the African Union Development Agency (AUDA), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and other related institutions such as the Regional Economic Communities. Due to their relevance to this study, in Chapter 6 and 7, NEPAD and APRM will be discussed at large.

Structure of the African Union according to the Constitutive Act Author's own representation

The Assembly of the Union

The Commission

The Executive Council

The Pan-African Parliament

The Financial Institutions

The Court of Justice

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council

The Specialized Technical Committees

The Permanent Representatives Committee

RELATED INSTITUTIONS:
a. Regional Economic Communities

ESTABLISHED BY OTHER TREATIES, PROTOCOLS OR AGREEMENTS:
a. Peace and Security Council b. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights c. African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child d. African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights e. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) f. African Peer Review Mechanism

How does the African Union architecture facilitate neoliberal governmentality or humper the participation of different stakeholders, mainly the Pan-African civil society? Are most of the problems highlighted by the literature on African Union participatory governance due to the architecture of the AU, or other subjective factors? Looking at the guiding constitutive documents of the AU, one clearly one concludes that the neoliberal arrangement of the AU-NEPAD is set to facilitate the establishment of neoliberal principles and practices of forging individual freedoms and enterprise building, through global corporate driven foreign investment. However, practices on ground do not always resonate these principles in the AU-NEPAD processes. For instance, individual freedom in Africa has been a highly challenging matter, with many authoritarian governments reinforcing state measures to inhibit individual freedom and reinforcing state control over individuals and businesses. This makes the state the key player. This calls for other subjective factors to explain the power relations in the context of the African Union. Foucauldian governmentality framework may be of use for that purpose. In fact, according to Foucauldian understanding of power, context matters for building power relations. There is a need to look at the non-coercive power that is built in the process of

building knowledge as a ´regime of truth´ even outside and beyond institutions; the power that is produced in the process of governing the self and the resistance to the power over the governed, which in itself results from the power exercised within a specific context. In this vein, closing institutional spaces for Pan-African civil society to participate ignites some counter-conduit and resistances.

One key step to improve governance of the African Unions was taken when the African Governance Architecture (AGA) was established in 2020. This was done by the endorsement made by the Executive Council's decision EX.CL/Dec.525(XVI) at the Summit dedicated to the Shared Values of the AU, calling on the AU Commission to identify obstacles and measures aimed at facilitating regional integration premised on such values, and devise a Pan-African architecture on governance. The establishment of African Governance Architecture was influenced by the ideological and political transformations of the Organization of Africa Unity that took place with the founding of the African Union. One of the critical transformations was the removal of the old African human rights system that gave much emphasis to the 'sanctity of national sovereignty and non-interference in [the] domestic affairs' of the Member States. This was replaced by a policy of 'non-indifference' as set out in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act.

The primary aim of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) was to promote the shared values of AU Member States as reflected in AU instruments and coordinate initiatives that advance human rights and democratic governance in Africa. At the very inception, the AGA played a critical role as the African Governance institution, constituting a mechanism for dialogue between various African Union (AU) stakeholders and sub-regional organs and institutions to promote good democratic governance in Africa. However, this African Union arrangement has inherited limitations. It coordinates between AU organs, regional groupings, Member States, and other external stakeholders dealing with democracy, good governance, and human rights matters; it only has a promotional role to play. Hence, it plays no protective role, nor can it make binding decisions, and compel States to fulfill their obligations regarding democracy and governance. These limitations may in the long run jeopardize this arrangement meaningful contribution to the good governance dream of the African Union. This can be prevented if it changes, and the Africa Governance Platform starts exercising its powers as a state report monitoring body as envisaged under the African Democracy Charter.

Once, Professor Horace Campbell argued that Africa needs a new alliance of traders, workers, small farmers, progressive students, cultural artists, and religious leaders to create a movement for putting in place the mechanisms for the unification and freedom of Africa and not the current reformist leaders that the continent has. In other words, there is also a need for a Pan-African civil society to have strong and visionary leadership that can galvanize a revolutionary shift towards a real unification and liberation of Africa.

The unification agenda has been on the table since the founding of the Organization of Africa Unity and has been postponed with the gradualism argument defended by some ever since. Moreover, it has been brought back in recent years. For example, the Ghana 2007 Summit had only one agenda item in the table: deliberation of the implementation plans for the full unification of Africa. This prompted some vocal Pan-Africanists, such as Abdul-Raheem, to campaign all over Africa and the Diaspora for the acceleration of the process of setting up the mechanisms for unity at that summit. However, those opposed to the full unification agenda of the continent urged caution and proposed a gradualist approach to the question of unity, reminding the world and, particularly, Africans the old argument that was laid out by some of the Founding Fathers of the OAU.

Four years later, in 2021, Muammar el-Gaddafi was assassinated, and Libya was destroyed, which led to the European Union seizing the over USD $2 billion Dollars promised by Libya to be the seed money for the creation of the common African currency.

When Paul Kagame of Rwanda took over as the AU chairperson, he advanced the acceleration of the reform process, which led to the Kagame report recommending mechanisms for acceleration of the unification of Africa. The report was then endorsed by the extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa, November 2018.

4.7. Conclusion

Discussing historical pathway of African transformation from the precolonial to the post-colonial era, including the transformation of the Organization of to Africa Unity to the African Union has helped to deepen the understanding of the present by analyzing past discursive forms of life and power relations. Therefore, past colonial power relations with Africa have been built in such a way that the prevailing power relations speak to the past. Slavery, colonisation and partition of Africa in artificial borders, as well as the liberation movement and the rising of Pan-Africanism are landmarks in the construction of

the present power relations in Africa. Insofar, the technologies of rule and procedures put forth are meant to control the people. As defined by Foucault, power instrument is an assemblage of diverse tactics that aim to control the people, through a number of different ways in which these 'tactics' operate (Foucault 2007:99). Hence, governmental power does not only operate through institutions, but also through procedures, analyses, reflections, and calculations (Foucault 2007:144).

The emergence of Pan-Africanism and the liberation movements is the result of the resistance to the disciplinary and institutional power of the slavery and the colonial systems. The idea of freedom propelled the great leaders of the Pan-African ideal and the liberation movements to get off the ground.

After the independence of most African countries, the expected transformation of the colonial system has not come true. The new leaders have mastered the colonial technologies of rule and failed their own people. The organization they founded, although has secured support to promote the independence of many more African countries, it failed to infuse the economic and social transformation of the continent. This resulted in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union, with the hope that this new structure would advance economic and social transformation. Unfortunately, the new African Union and subsequent establishment of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development have deepened the shift to a much more neoliberal body. The institutional arrangement of the AU-NEPAD as well as all the procedures, and calculations are set to facilitate the establishment of neoliberal principles and practices of forging individual freedom and enterprises building, through global corporate driven foreign investment. In recent years, there is a re-rise of concerns around what the African Union people want and a need for profound reforms to allow the African continent to unite. Recently, with the endorsement of the Kagame report, an impetus to transform the continent is put back in the agenda. However, a true transformation that will empower Africans to drive their own destiny is yet to be seen. This will be revisited   while discussing the integration of NEPAD into the African Union processes.

.

Chapter V

The Establishment of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Emergence of the Neoliberal AU-NEPAD

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development as the driving neoliberal incorporation of the continent, looking at the power relations between the citizens of the continent and the government led African Union-NEPAD neoliberal project. The chapter discusses issues pertaining to the governance of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development and the processes of its integration into the AU structures and processes. Then, it analyzes the recent transformation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to the African Union Development Agency (AUDA) and the additional power that came with it. Further, the African Union Architecture and the making of the Pan-African Civil Society and the emergence of other AU/NEPAD spaces for CS Participation are discussed. The chapter looks at the opening of invented spaces for civil society participation in African Union/NEPAD, and the African civil society Post-Cold War. Finally, the re-rising of Pan-Africanism is examined.
.

5.2. Emergence of the neoliberal AU-NEPAD

The Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) mandated Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa to develop a comprehensive and integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa. These 5 countries tirelessly worked to develop a strategic framework document, which gave rise to the current New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted at the 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001 and ratified by the AU Summit of July 2002.

It is worth highlighting the role played by South African president, Thabo Mbeki, who embarked on his African Renaissance exercise in late 1990s, that was reinforced by the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MARP), and personally endorsed by the president of the World Bank Group James Wolfensohn in South Africa. This gesture has boosted Mbeki´s role in setting up a neoliberal plan for Africa and opened doors for support from some key African

heads of states, namely the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. However, they came under massive mass protests accompanied by civil, military, religious or ethnic disturbances in their home countries. This jeopardised their utility as role model leaders in Africa. The year 2001 became a successful year for Mbeki, as he managed to secure more pro-West African leaders into his proposal, and at the Davos World Economic Summit in January he briefed the state elites and capitalist world leaders. This was a key steppingstone to the Lusaka (Zambia)´s July 2001 African Union Summit, which witnessed the merger of Mbeki´s plan with the Infrastructure Omega Plan championed by the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade into the New African Initiative. The popularity of President Mbeki soared within the world capitalist elites shown by the endorsement received from the Washington multilateral banks and the Johannesburg Capital (Bond, 2002).

After changing again its original name, the Heads of State and Government Implementing Committee (HSGIC) finalised the policy framework (the New African Initiative) and named it NEPAD on 23 October 2001 in Abuja. The NEPAD Initiative had four objectives, and these are: to eradicate poverty; promote sustainable growth and development; integrate Africa into the world economy; and to accelerate the empowerment of women. NEPAD, originally called the New African Initiative, was adopted at the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia in 2001 and launched at the first meeting of the Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria later the same year (Mwangi 2008, NEPAD Secretariat 2001, Ottosen 2010, EISA 2003).

The NEPAD rationale, as set up in the Constitutive Act, is to eradicate poverty and hunger; to accelerate the pace of economic growth; to place Africa and individual African countries solidly in the global arena; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the world social and economic orders; empower women and other socially disadvantaged groups; and build the requisite infrastructure for sustainable development.

The Constitutive Act of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) states that NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world. The Act adds that The New

Partnership for Africa's Development is about consolidating and accelerating these gains. It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations (NEAP 2001). The Constitutive Act sets out neoliberal principles for the development of the continent.

As illustrated by Ottosen, "NEPAD emerged not in a vacuum but as the result of a series of historical circumstances that included the end of colonialism and the first steps towards regional policy integration in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War and the democratic reforms in the 1990s. The NEPAD initiative was formulated based on the successes and failures of earlier attempts at promoting regional policy integration in Africa, such as the creation of OAU, the Monrovia commitments, the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Abuja Treaty" (Ottosen 2010).

Akokpari notes that with the issues pertaining to Africa's renaissance holding grounds, it also became imperative to interrogate the performance of the existing Pan-African bodies in the face of emerging globalisation drives and regional challenges. As the existing institutions were found to be inadequate in meeting Africa's needs for the 21st century, new Pan-African projects such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, the African Union (AU) in 2002 and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) were established to propel the African claim of the 21st century, forward. Henceforth, OAU was dissolved in 2002 and replaced by the African Union (Akokpari 2008).

With the establishment of the African Union, the heads of states decided to integrate NEPAD into the structures of AU resulting in the transformation of the NEPAD Secretariat to the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). The integration of NEPAD into the African Union structures and processes transformed NEPAD into a programme of the African Union that seeks to eradicate poverty, place African countries, both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development, build the capacity of Africa to participate actively in the world economy and body politic, and accelerate the empowerment of women (NPCA 2010). The heads of states reaffirmed, "in the general context of our meeting, we recalled our shared commitment underlying the establishment of NEPAD to eradicate poverty and to place our countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy

and body politic on equal footing. We reaffirm this pledge as our most pressing duty" (NEPAD 2002:4). As it stands, the heads of states are indubitably telling us that NEPAD is set to advance neoliberal development agenda with market driving the development, hence focussing on economic growth rather than on social and human development.

The mandate of NEPAD is to drive the development of Africa, by facilitating and coordinating the implementation of continental and regional priority programmes and projects, mobilizing resources and partners in support of programmes and projects implementation, conducting, and coordinating research and knowledge management, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of programmes and projects, advocating on the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles/values.

The establishment of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development has prompted heated debates, mainly among intellectuals and civil society due to the lack of factual involvement of key development players and the African citizenry. For example, by 2002, almost all progressive individuals and African civil society organisations and their networks strongly criticised NEPAD contents and processes, for not being widely discussed by Africans, hence there was no consultation whatsoever. In addition, the very characteristics of the policies put forward by NEPAD were i) neoliberal economic driven, repeating the structural adjustment programmes spirit, ii) the process of its constitution and operationalization is neoliberal, iii) although discursively recognises the role of African people, these have not been allowed to play their role in the conception, design and formulation of NEPAD, iv) and all the social and economic policies adopted contributed to the marginalisation of women, although they proclaim gender equality, v) NEPAD policies favoured foreign donors and investors, hence promoting market driven development; and vi) they put more emphasis on external conditions fundamental to Africa's development over the internal conditions (Bond 2002 and Adesina 2002).

5.3. NEPAD Governance

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as part of the African Union structure and processes is governed by the African Union Assembly, the Heads of State and

Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC), the NEPAD Heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the NEPAD Steering Committee, Personal Representatives of African Heads of States, and the Steering Committee Representatives. All the governing structures work in a collaborative and coordinated manner to ensure that NEPAD plays its role within the AU architecture. An executive structure is in place to run the everyday business, under the leadership of a Chief Executive Officer, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, with headquarter in Midrand, South Africa.

- The Assembly of the African Union: The chairperson of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) reports to the African Union Assembly on NEPAD activities and makes recommendations for consideration and adoption.
- Chairperson of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC): The NEPAD agency provides the chairperson with technical support on drafting the chair's summary report to the Assembly and prepares the draft decision(s) to be tabled in the Assembly for resolution.
- NEPAD Heads of State and Government: The other NEPAD related reports are provided to the Heads of State and Government to widen understanding, engagement and ownership of NEPAD by all the Heads of State and Government in the Assembly.
- NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC): It was established in February 2010 at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in line with the integration of NEPAD into AU structures. The HSGOC is the result of the transformation of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), and provides leadership to the NEPAD process, sets policies, priorities, and the programmes of action. It comprises the Heads of State and Government of 20 African countries, who are elected based on the AU five regions. This 20-member committee includes the five founding countries of NEPAD: South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Senegal. Membership of the other 15-member states rotates every two years or following regional consultations within the AU.
- Chairperson of the AU Commission: Chairperson of the AU Commission also participates in HSGOC Summits.

- NEPAD Steering Committee: The NEPAD Steering Committee is primarily responsible for developing the terms of reference for identified programmes and projects, and for overseeing the work and programmatic activities of NEPAD.

- Personal Representatives of African Heads of States: The Committee consists of the personal representatives of African Heads of States and normally meets about four times a year. It provides policy guidance and strategic advice to NEPAD.

- Steering Committee Representatives: It also includes the eight AU-recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Development Bank (AFDB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA) and Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

5.4. Integration of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) into the AU Structures and Processes

Literature on NEPAD shows that the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development was a contentious process. It was since considered as imposition of foreign interests, mainly from the major economic and dominant political power. Many have considered the establishment of NEPAD as the materialisation of the very neoliberal nature of old imposed African processes driven for a top-down approach with no genuine African people's interests. It responds to the commands of western interests instead of the genuine African ones. As such it is not a welcome initiative. In fact, 'NEPAD's critics have fought a lot and questioned the very idea that it constituted a truly developmental plan, preferring to see it as a 'top-down' programme in which leaders drove the process without much civil society involvement' (Landsberg 2008:17). The critics have questioned the economic nature of NEPAD, arguing that "NEPAD harboured 'neo-liberal' economic tendencies and orthodoxies, and that these were not ideal for promoting poverty eradication and people-centred development" (Landsberg 2008). Despite the recognised Pan-African scope and nature of the guiding documents of the establishment of NEPAD, some argued that although they welcome initiatives such as NEPAD, this 'cannot fulfil its objectives because it is written largely in the language of neo-liberal economics' (Murithi 2005:9). The disbelief and dislike of NEPAD were so high that in some circles it was considered as a waste of resources setting-

up such structures which do not address the real causes of poverty and do not promote the development of the African people. Several critics have even seriously accused the secretariats of the African Union and the NEPAD of duplicating efforts and using African scarce resources. . This undermines the credibility of both the AU and NEPAD.

This situation is well mirrored by one of the most influential leaders of the time, Muammar Khadhafi, the Libyan leader and at the time the seating African Union Chairman. He believed that NEPAD was an idea of the American President George Bush, who divided African leaders with his famous proposal to disband NEPAD. This he did by suggesting disbanding one of its key governing structures, the Heads of State Implementing Committee, founded by Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa and leaving the NEPAD programmes entirely in the hands of the African Union.

The firm determination of some of the key founders of NEPAD and other vocal defenders of the idea and key players at the time made it possible to overcome the proposal from Khadafi at the 22nd Heads of State Implementing Committee Summit which was attended by Khadhafi himself, the Chairperson of the AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, AU Chairperson, Ethiopia Prime Minister Zenawi , the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and South Africa´s Jacob Zuma, the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, Malawi's President Bingu wa Mutharika, Namibia's Hifikepunye Pohamba, Lesotho Prime Minister Bethuel Pakalitha Mosis and ministers of foreign affairs of the NEPAD.

In fact, the meeting was used to reaffirm the strong commitment of the African Union to implement the decision of the 21 Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State Implementing Committee to ensure a smooth integration process of the NEPAD into the AU structures and the commitment to ensure that the various decisions of the AU Assembly on the integration of NEPAD are fully implemented. It was arguably the implicit reaffirmation of the neoliberal driven agenda of the continental body.

 All the debates about the integration of NEPAD into AU structures and processes have found some different ways of implementing this decision. One of the ways was to revert NEPAD to its original mandate and assume the role of a technical agency for the AU. This implies that NEPAD shall prevent itself from being involved in policy making processes; it should keep only the programme implementation function as its sole mandate.

A group of critics proposed that NEPAD should become a platform where the heads of state and government shall meet, reflect, and spell out ways for partnership between Africa and the international community. It should function as an intra-African partnership between states, private sectors, civil society, mass people's organisations, and others, should be set as the true participatory platform for agenda setting for Africa. Therefore, NEPAD should transform itself into the real technical advisory body for the African Union, hence be the real Development and Governance Forum, through which Africa would engage the international community as well as fellow Africans. This means NEPAD should be directly integrated into the AU structures and processes.

Another option discussed is to transform NEPAD into a Development Plan, like the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for the United Nations. The idea among the defenders of this approach was to bring in all the previously developed plans within the OAU/AU, namely the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) of 1989, etc. This was guided by the strong belief among the defenders of this idea that giving NEPAD this mandate would provide a legal and genuine platform for Africa-wide support, providing NEPAD with such a strong credibility and legitimacy to drive Africa's development.

Interestingly enough, this long process of continuous discussions among African leaders, the Head of States, African Scholars and Civil society representatives had a common feature: almost all agreed that the integration of NEPAD into the `African Union processes and architecture should be addressed as a matter of urgency and all NEPAD programmes should become AU programmes and the legitimacy of NEPAD as an AU programme should also be addressed. However, the driving force behind that need may differ from the government perspective and that of civil society. While the state leaders´ driving idea behind it is to maximise the economic standing of the continent, by advancing neoliberal capital in the continent; Pan-African civil society on the other hand sees the integration of NEPAD into the AU processes and structures as a way to minimise dispersion of resource, allowing for more focussed approach to development and the use of an African and people´s centred socio

economic development approach that promotes the well-being of the African citizens and not that of the neoliberal capital and African elite.

5.5. Transformation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to the African Union Development Agency (AUDA)

As discussed above, the New Partnership for Africa´s Development was born out of the formal structures of the AU. It has a clear vision of a prosperous, interconnected and rich Africa for each of its countries and their inhabitants, based on key neoliberal principles of economic driven development with big corporations taking leadership role. Some people regard it as the returning of a true Pan-African view on development, by bringing back the ideal of African driven development by Africans and for Africans. The decision to make the regional economic communities' key steppingstones for fully continental integration and centres for policy definition and coordination was the strategic contribution of NEPAD.

The Heads of States and Government recognized the need to maximise the contribution NEPAD was making to the development of the African Union, starting the process of integrating it into the AU structures and procedures

Recent developments following the AU Institutional reform process led by the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame (the Kagame Report) as the sitting Chairperson of the African Union and the champion of the AU Institutional reforms process indicate that the process of integrating NEPAD into the AU structures and processes was coming to the final stage. A proposal to transform NEPAD to Technical Development Agency of the Union was discussed at the 31st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Union Heads of State and Government in Nouakchott, Mauritania.

The Heads of States and Governments of the African Union, during the 31st Assembly approved the transformation of the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) into the African Union Development Agency (AUDA); a technical body of the African Union with its own legal identity, defined by its own statute. It was presented and adopted at the 32nd AU Summit at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2019.

It is believed that these reforms and the consensus in transforming NEPAD into a technical body endowed with enough legal power and (hopefully) resources clearly indicate member states' commitment to making the NEPAD Agency the Union's own instrument which shall

support countries and regional bodies in advancing regional integration as the stepping-stone to a United Africa. This is in line with the 2063 Agenda of the African Union, specially articulated in the seven aspirations and 20 goals of the continent's development vision (the Agenda 2063).

This can well be attested to by the remarks from Ibrahim Mayaki[13], the CEO of the NEPAD Agency, who highlighted the strategic importance of this transformation:

> "A core aspect of the current reforms is to streamline and improve effectiveness and efficiency in delivery in the implementation of AU decisions, policies and programmes across all AU organs and institutions. In this sense, as the NEPAD Agency is the technical implementation agency of the AU, one specific recommendation in the Kagame report is to transform it into the AU Development Agency. We are enthusiastic about this transformation, which will make it possible to deploy our programmes even more effectively in the service of our continent's development" (Mayaki, 2018).

The question here is 'where does the Pan-African Civil Society stand?' There is no clear indication within the discursive practices of the role civil society should play in effecting these reforms, neither is there mention of civil society engagement in defining the kind, depth and timeline of these reforms. It sounds like ´business as usual` approach of the AU-NEPAD processes, whereby only government institutions of the member states drive and effect these ideas, leaving out the spectrum of the non-state actors of the continent.

As a culmination of these discussions and the reform process led by President Kagame of Rwanda, at the AU Assembly of July 2018 in Nouakchott-Mauritania, the establishment of AUDA-NEPAD was approved. With own statute, the AU-NEPAD shall be the technical executive agency and development anchor of the continent, to deliver on the development priorities articulated by the AU in its Agenda 2063. The Executive Council of the African Union adopted the Statute, Rules of Procedure and Structure of African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD). At the 35th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, held in Niamey-Niger on the 4th and 5th of July 2019, the decisions were endorsed and became effective.

---

[13] More details see NEPAD news on www.nepad.org/news/nepads-transformation-african-union-development-agency

The boost of the role given to NEPAD, through its transformation into AUDA-NEPAD, is an attempt to align the role of the several organs and institutions of the African Union and is coherent with the vision of the AU blueprint, the Agenda 2063. It is believed that it will greatly contribute to improving the Union's impact and operational efficiency and the implementation of the continent's major projects for regional integration, with the close involvement of the private sector, as clearly highlighted in all neoliberal motivated policies. This reaffirms the view of an AU-NEPAD that is neoliberal driven institution. The statement from the CEO of NEPAD is arguably conclusive in this regard,

"This transformation enshrines the role of the AUDA-NEPAD at the core of the African Union Pan-African development strategies. The Agency will play an important role in fostering coordination within the AU system by providing knowledge-based advisory services and technical assistance to African Union Member States and regional economic communities. AUDA-NEPAD will act as a catalyst for Africa's integration and will play a fundamental role in the operationalisation of the AU Continental Free Trade Area" (Ibrahim Mayaki, CEO of the AUDA-NEPAD).

In fact, the boost that NEPAD (the AUDA) received is a clear indication of the strengthening of neoliberal commandment of the African Union which provides for a top-heavy approach to development and a weakening of the state forces against the strengthening of private enterprises and individual freedom. However, it undermines the participation of Pan-African citizens in policy and decision-making processes.

5.6. The African Union Architecture and Civil Society

The African Union's very basic principle is inspired by the influence of the notion of popular participation, which is deeply embedded in the African Charter on Popular Participation and Development (1990). Implicitly, participation of civil society shall be included in all treaties, protocols, rules of procedures, and strategic plans of the African governance institutions. The wording is already a step ahead when compared with previous statements in the main documents; however, the translation of these written statements and wills into actionable and

institutionalised platform for meaningful participation is a challenge that needs to be critically addressed.

Before the transformation of OAU, the relationship between the Organization for Africa Unity and Pan-African Civil Society was never a priority; hence it was mainly an adhoc event. Moyo (2008) traces this relationship back to 1997, when the sitting secretary general of OAU recommended to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union that there was a need for formalized and effective ways of collaboration with the civil society in Africa. This recommendation set the foundations for the first ever OAU–Civil Society Conference held in Addis Ababa in June 2001, with the objective of assisting the promotion of a ´homegrown´ African civil society and enhancing its contribution to the fulfillment of the Union's mission (Moyo 2008:12).

This historical conference went far to setting up a consultative committee tasked by the Heads of States to develop a road map for institutionalisation of the engagement of civil society with the OAU and propose a Statute for the ECOSOCC.

After OAU was transformed into the current AU, the Commission on the African Union (2004) on its 2004–2007 Strategic Plan of Action clearly stated the AU Commission's objectives: to target African citizens and ensure that their talent, resources, and dynamism including those in the diaspora are fully utilized in the implementation of the programmes of the AU, and also to enhance the meaning and value of citizenship in Africa. As a result of this determination, the ECOSOCC became the formal platform for civil society engagement with the AU. This engagement was extended to country and regional level in addition to the decision to direct AU organs to support Pan-African Civil Society organizations and networks through providing financial direct support or providing observer status. These events culminated with the establishment of a regular pre-AU Summit. It was in this context that the AU Commission planned to establish adequate frameworks for the full participation of various societal groups in the AU. These included the following: having national commissions at the level of each member state; having AU delegations to RECs; establishing AU offices, establishing ECOSOCC as the principal formal channel for civil society; establishing national meetings with private sector and the civil society (AU Commission, 2004).

The AU/NEPAD ECOSOCC

Participatory governance is a concept included in most of the African Union documents. The Constitutive Act of the African Union and particularly the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991), the Abuja Treaty, all make provisions for the inclusion of civil society in the programmes of AU. As a result, the launching of ECOSOCC as the official platform for civil society in the African Union has officially opened the space for civil society participation through their representatives, the civil society organisations (CSOs). Operationally and at the NEPAD level, the introduction of a civil society desk and the think tank has meant that civil society can contribute to NEPAD programmes and their implementation. Furthermore, Moyo notes that the African Peer Review has an inclusive nature, and these spaces constitute the institutional mechanisms for citizens and civil society to engage with the African Union Architecture (*Moyo, 2008 P2*). However, civil society organisations have been very vocal claiming that most of these institutional provisions are limited and sometimes discriminatory, thus, do not encourage participation. Therefore, some creative spaces have been opened and are controlled by the civil society organisations themselves (reclaimed and invented spaces).

In fact, within the African Union and due to the transformation of the Organisation for Africa Unity, there is a specific mechanism for civil society engagement, the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is an advisory body composed of representatives of civil society, professional groups and cultural groups both in Africa and in the Diaspora. It is believed that ECOSOCC is mainly established for the ordinary African citizens to participate greatly in the activities of the Union, including governance and policy making process through representative civil society organisations and professional groups. The main objectives of ECOSOCC include to allow the African Civil Society to participate in the promulgation and implementation of the policies and norms of AU and to develop communication between the ordinary citizens of Africa on common issues of the continent. ECOSOCC is given the task to popularize AU norms among the citizens of Africa and give advisory services to the organs of the Union on how best to implement the norms and policies of the Organisation using its own initiative or at the request of organs of the Union. The structures of ECOSOCC include General Assembly as the highest decision-making organ with

150 members of the civil society elected at the level of member states, sub-regions, the continent, the African diaspora, and ex-officio members appointed by the commission; the Standing Committee to coordinate the works of the ECOSOCC appointed by its General Assembly; Sectoral Cluster Committees to advise on specific areas; and Credentials Committee. The AU ECOSOCC was launched in Addis Ababa (the headquarters of AU), Ethiopia, on March 27-30, 2005.

Some authors recognise that although recently ECOSOCC has undertaken activities to provide a dynamic leadership in the involvement of African civil society in the work of the African Union, this involvement is government and elite led and oriented instead of being citizen led and driven (Adedeji 2008, Akokpari 2008). This assertion suggests the need for more improvements in the participation of all citizens of the continent in the governance, accountability and policy making of the African Union. The main hindrance for effective AU-civil society engagement is the restrictive strategy ECOSOCC had adopted: the membership requirements. In fact, Article 6 stipulates the following requirements: i. CSOs should be national, regional, continental, or an African diaspora, ii. CSOs must have objectives and principles consistent with those of the AU as set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act; iii. CSOs must be registered in a member state of the Union and/or meet the general conditions of eligibility for the granting of observer status to NGOs; iv. CSOs must show a minimum of 3 years of proof of registration as either an African or an African diaspora organisation prior to date of submission of application, including proof of operations for those years; v. the basic resources of such an organisation shall substantially (at least 50%) be derived from contributions of members of the organisation; vi. CSOs should provide information on funding sources in the preceding 3 years; vii. CSOs should adhere to a Code of Ethics and Conduct for civil society organisations affiliated to or working with the Union.

As highlighted above, some criteria limit in one way or the other the ability of Pan-African Civil Society to fully engage in the policy process within the AU/NEPAD structures and processes. For example, it is not clear whether these CSOs are African CSOs or CSOs in Africa. Most African civil society formations are generally not organised and/or formalised (if they are formalised, are poorly resourced to engage in any formal and highly technical debates). That means these are likely to be excluded from becoming members of ECOSOCC. Also, the requirement that CSOs must have similar objectives with   AU might be viewed as

coercing organisations to look and think like AU, and those that are critical of AU might be excluded. This might lead to an uncritical and ineffective ECOSOCC (Moyo 2008). Furthermore, the requirement to be registered in a member state goes against reality in many African countries, where civil society organisations or any civic activities are not legally allowed. There is also the requirement for organisations to have their funding (over 50%) coming from own sources or more precisely from membership contributions. Again, this is truly unrealistic. Registration is often used as a tool to repress or silence critical voices. As a result, many civil society organisations, especially advocacy ones, are not registered in many countries. This means that most of these will be excluded in ECOSOCC. Also, the requirement to provide information on sources of funding could make many countries to deny those CSOs entry into ECOSOCC. The Code of Ethics and Good Conduct for African Civil Society Organisations working with AU might be a mechanism to reign in the autonomy of CSOs (AU SASCO, 2003).

For example, the Code of Conduct in its provisions in Article 7: Financial Management and Accountability, Section F states that CSOs shall strive towards the attainment of self-reliance rather than continued dependence on donor aid or charity. This limits the scope of funding for CSOs. More so, if combined with the AU regulations for CSO funding which obliges a minimum threshold of 65% funding coming from own sources, they substantially reduce the possibility of most civil society organizations to formally participate in AU processes.

Another example is the Article 10: Enforcement of the Code 1 the Steering Committee set up under the terms of the Statutes of ECOSOCC, which states that African Union shall be responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code. This gives total control of CSOs' behaviour to ECOSOCC, hence threatening their independence and autonomy. While Article 5: Good Governance, Section A states that CSOs shall be legally constituted in their country of operation. This limits the ability of CSOs to operate within countries with restrictive laws and despotic government. If a country closes participation of civil society, African civil societies are restricted to operate in such countries as they will not be registered. In addition, within the Code, there is no mention whatsoever of any provision that ensures critical distance of CSO to the AU governing bodies. Hence, the code seems to be concerned with bringing civil society into a closer relationship with the state, and very little thought is given to maintaining a critical distance. There are fears that CSOs signing this code will cede and

negate their critical distance between themselves and the state, as well as between themselves and AU (Jager, 2004:23). It is in the sectoral committees, however, that ECOSOCC will be most effective. These sectoral clusters are aligned with those of AUC and are as follows: peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; social affairs; human resources, science, and technology; trade and industry; rural economy and agriculture; economic affairs; women and gender related issues; and crosscutting programs. These and other challenges confronting ECOSOCC should not, however, deter civil society or governments and the business sector in forging partnerships. There is no doubt that the concept of civil society is attractive in a policy sense. For most countries, civil society serves to limit state power and authoritarianism and serves as a ´transmission belt` by which citizens make their interests known to government. In most cases, as argued by Wiarda (2003), civil society tends to be good for the state, society, and democracy. So, it should be for AU and Africa's democracy and development.

5.7. Other AU/NEPAD Spaces for CS Participation

Out of the ECOSOCC, there are other parallel, sectoral engagements of civil society organisations with AU happening on an adhoc basis, hence there are mixed results. For example, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) has a long standing relationship with civil society organisations, particularly the African civil society organisation by realizing the forum for the participation of NGOs in human and people's rights summits, The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process at country level, the African Development Bank, etc. The current interface between NEPAD and civil society is best captured in the institutional frameworks that have been established to interact with civil society. These include the NEPAD/CSO Think Tank, the NEPAD Gender Task Force, and the NEPAD/PAP Parliamentary contact group 3. According to the NEPAD Progress Report, NEPAD continues to interact with civil society groups at various levels. On a generic level, a civil society desk has been established at the NEPAD Secretariat with a view to having a one-stop focal point for civil society. At a sector level, all programmes are being implemented in consultation with relevant civil society groups (Nkuhlu, 2005:9).

In fact, the African Peer Review Mechanism was established in 2003 by NEPAD to foster adoption of polices, standards and practices leading to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, mitigation of conflicts, regional integration, and promotion of good governance in the continent. This is a voluntary compliance process amongst member states of the African Union who wish to avail themselves of the review process. The APRM process is regarded as the first African mechanism with strong potential as a tool to promote and strengthen good governance in the continent (Makara 2009).

As prescribed in the governing guidelines, the APRM process takes 5 phases to be completed. The first one is self-assessment, where the interaction between the APRM secretariat and a country starts, and ground rules and a preliminary plan of action are agreed upon. The second phase is the country's 's review mission consisting of the country's review team visiting the country. The third phase is where the draft of the country's review report is discussed and agreed on as well as finalisation of the country's plan of action outlining policies and practices for implementation. The fourth phase consists of presentation and discussion of the country's review team's report and the plan of action at the APRM forum. Finally, the report is tabled to the AU Summit and is published.

It is believed that the legitimacy and sustainability of NEPAD depends on the extent to which the African people and civil society are involved in the process of implementing NEPAD programmes and activities. In translating this view and imperative, most African governments have made in their documents and principles a strong commitment to work in partnership with civil society and other partners in NEPAD-related activities (EISA 2003:5-7). How this national level engagement is translated into Pan-African wide approach, and how the AU-NEPAD continental level operationalises and rules the emergence, construction and contestation of a Pan-African civil society are still not well researched on. Thus, this study will address this knowledge gap.

EISA study suggests that there are different levels of African civil society engagement. ACS can engage in NEPAD related processes at the national, regional, and international levels. From national level, African civil societies can be engaged in ensuring good governance and accountability of government and policy makers to the national citizenry, influencing the formulating policies, and be significantly involved in monitoring the progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the regional level, civil society can be engaged at

the African Union (AU) level and in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts as well as accountability and governance of regional and Pan-African Institutions. And at the international level, civil society can work with northern counterparts lobbying and advocating on behalf of Africa in such areas as debt relief, increased official effectiveness development assistance, and increased market access for African exports (EISA 2003); thus, shaping the International Relations for African Nations and Pan-African Institutions.

During the first five years of NEPAD, the mainstream debate saw African civil society as a foreign imposed initiative rather than a genuine African born and led programme, which influenced the level of its engagement with civil society and ownership of NEPAD by African people. At this stage of NEPAD establishment, according to Shilimela, most of the problematic areas revolved around its African Peer Review Mechanism (the political review component), its unclear relationship with the African Union and other key African organisations and the question of ownership, as many Africans perceive it as a foreign-imposed initiative (Shilimela 2004, Akokpari 2005).

It is relevant to assess how this African civil society operates, what are its strategies, challenges, and which and whose interests it pursues. These are the concerns the study is addressing.

Before the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the African Union in 2010, there was a unit within its Secretariat dealing with issues pertaining to civil society, the Gender, Civil Society and Parliamentarian Affairs; it was a unique mechanism for civil society participation in the development of NEPAD. Although, it had contributed little in enabling civil society genuine participation. Moreover, the consequent integration of NEPAD into AU structures and processes and the creation of NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) saw a different structural arrangement being set with no specific civil society engagement mechanism. The onset of the NEPAD Constitutive Act highlights no role for African Civil Society in the development of the continent neither for the governance and accountability of NEPAD itself.

The extensive literature on NEPAD and AU, although discusses civil society participation, there are no studies on the making of Pan-African civil society and the strategies they use to influence the development agenda and policy setting in the continent, through a Foucauldian governmentality framework. There is also a gap in terms of analysis on the level of

participation of each category of stakeholders, mainly the African Civil Society, as well as the implications for the governance of the continent in the context of Pan-African Institutions building. Therefore, this research aims to apply Foucauldian governmentality to understand the governance of the AU-NEPAD architecture and its relationship with the Pan-African Civil Society as an attempt to fill these gaps.

5.6.1. The Invented Spaces for Civil Society Participation in African Union/NEPAD

The work developed by Gaventa has emphasized the importance of people reclaiming their right to participation. To this end, he has pointed out the dimensions under which power can be exercised, namely the level, the space, and the forms. His recommendation is that in democracy, reclaimed spaces should be the major feature of any process. In fact, invited spaces are mainly where the power holders have total control of the processes and the level of participation, including who should participate and to what extent; hence the level of freedom to voice one's concerns is very limited (Gaventa 2003, 2005, 2006).

Looking back at the account of Pan-African Civil Society participation in the AU-NEPAD space, which is characterised by shrinking citizens' participation, mutually suspicions relationship, abuse of power, limitation of freedom of information, hidden powers, co-optation etc., it is easy to come to a conclusion that there is still a lot to be done if civil society needs to meaningfully participate in the decision making of the African Union. The use of formal and invited spaces for civil society engagement does not suffice to bring about the desired change, nor does it enable civil society empowerment. As a result, Pan-African Civil Society strategized its engagement with government to use alternative spaces where they have major control over the agenda setting, the processes and the final outcomes, the reclaimed spaces.

For Gaventa, reclaimed spaces are very powerful platform for influencing policies and programmes. Most reclaimed spaces start as such; however, they end up influencing the invited spaces and the actors are finally invited to the formal tables, transforming these reclaimed spaces into invited ones. These spaces are being widely used to influence AU-NEPAD duty barriers. Throughout the continent there are several civil society-initiated spaces for policy influencing at country, regional and continental level. Few examples of selected Pan-African reclaimed spaces are shown below:

The Centre for Citizens Participation on the African Union (CCP-AU), currently known as the Pan-African Citizens' Network (PACIN)

CCPAU is a response to the prevailing restrictive environment for genuine civil society engagement and it resulted from the perception of Pan-African Civil Society that the African Union is still heavily government orientated and that the promise of making an African Union of the people for the African people is far to be realized. It was established in 2007 as an independent network that aspires to broaden and strengthen opportunities for substantive engagement between the African Union (AU) and citizens.

Vision

CCPAU envisions a people driven African Union, which is accountable and accessible to African citizens.

Mandate

According to the Constitutive Statutes, the Citizens Participation on the African Union was established with the mandate to coordinate and facilitate citizens' engagement with AU for it to be a Union that delivers to African peoples and addresses their issues.

In real sense, CCPAU is a network of national, regional and continental African civil society organisations and citizens working to ensure that AU is a people driven entity, which is accountable and accessible to all African citizens; that the continent has its people at its centre rather than governments; and that decision-making is driven by, and accountable and accessible to African citizens. CCPAU regards itself as a Pan-Africanist initiative which facilitates deeper engagement of African civil society organisations and citizens with regional and continental policies and programmes, with the African citizens as the legitimate right holders who need to be more involved in claiming the promise of a "peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa" from the African leaders.

It utilises invited and claimed spaces to foster substantive and procedural changes within regional and continental mechanisms, and to amplify African citizens' voices. Hence the approaches of the CCPAU materialise the need to use citizen-led accountability as the bedrock of democratic governance and development on the continent.

The Centre for Citizens Participation on the African Union is governed by a board which is the policy-making organ of CCPAU; it is composed of regional and thematic representatives. The executive arm of the Centre is its Secretariat based in Nairobi, Kenya.

In the past 3-5 years, CCPAU has undergone a profound reflection on the context under which it operates and started a process of transformation which culminated in the birth of the Pan-African Citizens Network (PACIN). It is believed that this will enable African citizens to meet their mandate as a network of national, regional, and continental African civil society organisations and citizens. The network is a key player in bringing Pan-African citizens together to voice their needs and views to the African Union leadership. Some of the key interventions of PACIN include to organise and convene a movement called Citizens Continental Conferences, provide sound and thoughtful research and production of policy briefs on pertinent continental issues to inform advocacy and influencing activities while engaging with the AU structures and processes at different levels. PACIN has been vocal and active in providing training, campaigns and mobilisation, and cross-continental exchanges. It is establishing itself as a leading knowledge centre on AU. It is believed that the transformation is a move that will enable the expansion of its scope of programming that was previously limited to areas around African Union on Women`s Rights; Economic Justice; Democracy, Governance and Human Rights.

The Pan-African Lawyers Association (PALU)

Pan-African Lawyers Association (PALU), with offices in Tanzania, is the umbrella association of African lawyers and law societies; it brings together all the five regional and fifty-four national lawyers associations of the continent. According to its governing statutes, it can also accept individual lawyers as members. It is a continental membership forum for African lawyers and lawyers' associations. African Bar leaders and eminent lawyers, to reflect the aspirations and concerns of the African people and to promote and defend their shared interests, founded PALU in 2002.

The mission of the Pan-African Lawyers Associations is a united, just, and prosperous Africa, which is built on the rule of law and good governance. As stated in its Constitutive document it has a mission to work towards the development of the law and legal profession, the rule of law,

good governance, human and people's rights and socio-economic development of the African continent, including legal support for the African regional integration.

The Constitution of the Pan-African Lawyers Association indicates that the governing bodies with complementary responsibilities towards policies, strategic and financial oversight are as follows:

a. The General Assembly: It is the highest policy and representation body with power to elect the Executive Committee and consists of all its corporate and individual members; it meets at least once every three years;

b. The Council: It is a consultative body of the Association and is made up of the Presidents of the five regional and fifty-four national Lawyers' Associations (Bar Associations and Law Societies); it meets at least once every year;

c. The Executive Committee: Elected by the General Assembly, it is the Executive arm of the Association, as such it leads and represents the organisation, formulates its policies and strategies, and supervises the Secretariat, which is headed by the Chief Executive Officer.

In the name of the Executive Committee, the Secretariat implements all the programmes, projects, and activities of the organisation. The Secretariat is in Arusha, Tanzania, which is also the seat of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, amongst others. Through its Secretariat, PALU actively engages and works with the African Union (AU) and its various organs and institutions. This collaboration is based on the formal Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation and Collaboration with the AU. Currently, the Executive Director of PALU is the siting president of the board for the Pan-African Citizens Network (PACIN).

State of the Union Coalition (SOTU) under the Oxfam Pan Africa Programme

Based in Nairobi, Kenya, the State of the Union Coalition was established to regularly monitor the implementation of the 14 key AU legal instruments, protocols, treaties; policy standards. Initially, it started by monitoring the status of implementation in 10 countries, namely, Tunisia, Kenya, Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana; and Senegal, across the 5 regions in Africa and at the continental level.

To be able to implement its mission, SOTU works through 3 Pillars. These are:

R1 – Citizens Informed and empowered to act to claim key rights and freedoms.

– Developing national and continental campaigns to raise awareness and invite citizens' participation in holding their governments accountable on the 14 instruments

– Designing community/sectoral hearings in focus countries to enable communities of directly affected people to assess state performance against AU standards and instruments in the presence of AU and Government officials and;

– Encourage informed public debate on decisions and policy choices emerging out of AU Summits.

R2 - The African Union and Member States act to ratify, popularise, and monitor implementation of key standards.

– State of implementation (compliance with AU commitments) regularly monitored at country and continental levels and publicly shared with Governments, Regional Economic Communities and AU Organs;

– National platforms regularly engage executive, judicial, and legislative arms of the state on status of and urgency for accelerated implementation;

– Governments supported to hold multi-stakeholder experts and public consultations prior and post regional and continental decision-making events.

R3 - Inclusive national and Continental Platforms capacitated to popularise, engage and hold Governments accountable.

– Working with SOTU members to ensure they have the institutional capacity built within national SOTU members to manage fluid and responsive national platforms, understand AU structures, policies and instruments, conduct high quality research, effectively use new and mass media technologies, public advocacy and campaigning methods and report back to/debrief citizens;

– National platforms actively support participation in national and continental experts, parliamentary and government events, conferences, and meetings, and

– They produce high quality evidence to measure the performance of governments against their obligations.

Key members are given in Table 2.

Table 2 Members of the SOTU Coalition

Member	Mandate/objective
OXFAM	Is a confederation of 14 like-minded organisations working together and with partners and allies around the world to bring about lasting changes. In Africa, Oxfam works directly with communities and partner organisations to save lives, build livelihoods, and hold Member States of the African Union and rich countries accountable for the realisation of pro-poor political, social and economic rights.
CLADHO – Rwanda	Collectif des Ligues et Association de Defense de Droits de l'Homme au **(CLADHO)** is the umbrella of Human Rights Organizations in Rwanda established in 1993
FAHAMU – Kenya	**Fahamu** is a Pan-African social justice organisation established in 1997, with programme offices in Kenya and Senegal. As a member of the SOTU coalition, Fahamu continues to work through the Monitor initiative towards the realisation of rights enshrined in key AU instruments
RADDHO – Senegal	La Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme **(RADDHO)** – The African Forum for the Defence of Human Rights was established in Senegal in 1990. It was founded by African intellectuals largely drawn from researchers and teachers at the prestigious Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. The RADDHO goal is to promote and protect human rights, the right to privacy and human dignity in Senegal and Africa
HURISA – South Africa	The Human Rights Institute of South Africa **(HURISA)** was formed in 1994 as a continuation of the work performed by the then Institute for the Study of Public Violence (ISPV) which was founded in 1993 as the research arm of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry
CESC – Mozambique	Centre Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building **(CESC)** is a non-profit organization, dedicated to the facilitation of learning and capacity building of civil society organisations, focusing at the local level to improve the level and

Member	Mandate/objective
	quality of their participation in development processes.
IDEG – Ghana	Ghana Institute for Democratic Governance **(IDEG)** is an independent, not-for-profit, non-partisan policy research and advocacy institute established in Accra in January 2000. IDEG's focus is on projects that contribute to effective interfacing and purposeful collaboration between the state and non-state actors on key public policy issues in the domains of governance, democracy, and development
NDH – Cameroon	Nouveaux Droits de l'Homme **(NDH)** is a non-governmental non-profit organization created in 1977 and legalized in Cameroon in 1997 under No. 032 / RAD / F35 / BAPP and has consultative status with the United Nations. Its national headquarter is in Yaoundé with two regional offices in Douala and Bafoussam.
CISLAC – Nigeria	Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre **(CISLAC)** is a non-governmental, non-profit, advocacy, information sharing, research, and capacity building organisation. CISLAC has successfully engaged key members of the National Assembly to wield their influence in ensuring that civil society positions are accommodated.
MEJN – Malawi	Malawi Economic Justice Network **(MEJN)** was established in the year 2000 and currently comprises over 100 members of civil society organisations seeking to maximize their involvement in economic governance through networking and synergies. MEJN strives to create partnerships that will ensure that Government policies and actions are of direct benefit to the poor, while also creating sustainability in the civil society policy engagement.
AIHR – Tunisia	Arab Institute for Human Rights **(AIHR)** was established in March 1989. The

Member	Mandate/objective
	Arab Institute for Human Rights is an independent regional organization that works for promoting human rights in the Arab region. AIHR aims at raising awareness of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UDHR) and the related international accords.

The African Youth Commission

The African Youth Commission (AYC), formerly known as the African Union Youth Working Group (AU YWG), was idealised in 2013 during Consultation with the Youth on the African Union Agenda 2063 held in Tunis, under the theme **"the future we want for Africa by 2063"**. This gathering was fully convened by the African Union Commission in collaboration with the NEPAD Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

From the perspective of the participants and founders of the idea, the main objective of establishing the Commission was to bring in the voices of the youths in an organised manner in Africa and in the Diaspora. Its ultimate purpose was to promote African unity and development by building the linkage of youths and youth structures, as well as mobilisation of resources (human, technical, technology and finance). This in line with the need to support the work of African youths, youth structures, Pan African Youth Union, and Youth Division of the African Union Commission in their quest for effective service delivery and advocacy activities on the African Youth Charter, other AU legal instruments and youth projects at national, regional, and continental levels for the advancement of Africa. More than 60% of the African population are youths (population dividend).

It was clearly set at the gathering that the vision of the Youth Commission was to become the youths' own version of the AUC, where all inspiring and capable young African leaders and African Diaspora can organise themselves, take up their responsibilities, strengthen cooperation among the youths, create youth structures as a platform for them to speak up and promote

youth voices in the context of Africa's development through the Africa 2063 development Agenda, with all its 17 aspirations. The ideas came out inspired by the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the African Union/Organisation of the Africa United which was marked during the celebration of the African Youth Day under the themes **"Youth United in Action for Agenda 2063"** and "Pan Africanism and African renaissance".

In summary, reclaimed spaces are in fact an all-inclusive platform for citizens' participation where civil society actors take lead and control over the agenda setting and proceedings; however, it is worth noting that the diversity and heterogeneity of civil society challenges the good will of equal engagement level for all actors. For instance, participating in 3 sessions of the Pan-African Citizen Forum was elucidative of the power dynamics being paled there. Regional representations, country representations and linguistic representations are dimensions that challenge the organisers to make these forums truly all-inclusive.

While on one hand, the Pan-African Citizens Forum, for example, is heavily dominated by English speaking countries. Although there is translation of English to French and there are no translations for other languages; on the other hand, GMAC is completely dominated by French speaking countries, although there is translation from French to English and there are no translations for any other languages. These dynamics are equally observed in terms of the number of representatives of the countries: while some are heavily represented (some even represented by citizens of these heavy weight countries) others are minimally or not represented at all. This speaks of asymmetric distribution of resources even among civil society. This in fact mirrors the African Union/NEPAD political and economic landscape. This will be discussed in more depth within the case studies.

These independent networks of Pan-African civil society are some examples of the critical movement being formed to counterpoise the neoliberalised AU-NEPAD top-down vision of a Union of the government of African. They have a clearly bottom-up and a people-based, people-centered vision of an alternative Africa, which is integrated economically, socially, politically, and culturally. They aim to link the largely autonomous activities of grassroots and citizens' movements throughout the continent.

5.7.   What shapes African Civil Society Post-Cold War

Worldwide, there is an account of shrinking spaces for civil society engagement.

> "The introduction of laws, policies and practices by states to restrict civil society is happening in all parts of the world, including both established democracies as well as emerging and post-conflict economies... non-state actors, such as business or other vested interests, can also play a role in threatening and reducing the space for civil society – often with the tacit or implicit support of the state… According to the Civicus Monitor, which aims to track and share reliable, up-to-date data on the state of civil society freedoms around the world, there are only 22 countries remaining where the state both enables and safeguards the enjoyment of civil society space for all people. Of these, 19 are in Europe, two are in Oceania and one in the Americas. Currently, there are no open countries in Africa and Asia. This means that civil society is restricted in almost every country where aid agencies operate, making their ability to operate increasingly difficult. A number of countries have enacted laws that specifically target international development funders and actors" (Oram and Doane, 2017:6).

This statement is all elucidative. `The climate´ under which civil society operates in Africa is not an easy one. Moreover, several authors account for severe and restringing environments for free civil society action in Africa. Civil society organisations have been claiming that most of the formal and official mechanisms for civil society engagement are shrinking, not only within specific country, but also within the African Union structures, including the Regional Economic Communities.

Researchers highlight the fact that the end of the Cold War has opened space for more democratic societies, where civil society and the citizens at large have more freedom of information, and association. However, this did not come as an easy offering. It has its own challenges and fault lines. Jean Hearn reminds us that "The current discourse on 'civil society' in Africa, conducted by Northern governments, international NGOs, activists and academics, often presents civil society as the *locus sine qua non* for progressive politics, the place where people organise to make their lives better, even a site of resistance… We need to remind ourselves that, as originally theorised by Antonio Gramsci, civil society is a potential battleground. It also constitutes an arena in which states and other powerful actors intervene to

influence the political agendas of organised groups with the intention of defusing opposition" (Hearn, 2007:34).

In the current literature, African Civil society is shaped by several factors. Donor funding is one of them. It plays a significant role in providing the much-needed resources for the CS to keep momentum in their contribution to the development, and most importantly for those working on policy and advocacy but is seriously side-lined by their governments. The fact that organisations are financed by mainly, western counties reinforce the perception from governments and AU-NEPAD that they are advancing foreign interests rather than genuine citizens' concerns.   It is argued that donors have been successful in influencing the current version of civil society in Africa so that a vocal, well-funded section of it, which intervenes on key issues of national development strategy, acts not as a force for challenging the *status quo,* but for building societal consensus for maintaining it. Faced with sometimes hostile governments and with foreign funding drying up, African civil society groups are battling to survive the tough times. But they will continue to strive to improve their societies (Hearn, 2007).

Moreover, literature highlights the fact that, since 2000 Pan-African Civil Society organizations have become actors in the fight against corruption on the continent, which contrasts with the situation some two decades ago, when they were virtually absent. In fact, civil society mobilisation against corruption in Africa has also been at the heart of recent waves of protest on the continent.

Examples of this shift can be witnesses continent-wide, however with more intensity in some key African countries. For instance, in South Africa post-Apartheid of the late 1990s, civil society mobilisation against corruption has often been part of a wider effort involving the government and other institutions. This led to the launching of the National Anti-Corruption Forum, a platform that brings together civil society, business, and government in the fight against corruption. The forum subsequently adopted a comprehensive Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy committing the government to combat corruption within the public service. The South African effort to combat corruption was stated by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report in 2006, "the development of key partnerships between the government, civil society and the private sector in fighting corruption is one of the central aspects of the country's effort''. The fight against corruption movement in South Africa has

grown steadily since, incorporating many other independent organisations. However, corruption is still on the rise and is worsening.

Another example may be drawn from the oil exploration in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Community leaders, trade unionists and civil servants launched Corruption Watch, a civil society organisation that relies on the public to report corruption, and…uses these reports as an important source of information to fight corruption and hold leaders accountable. This gave rise to the fight against corruption movement in the late 1990s. It brought many other civil society organisations since 2003 with support from the Publish What You Pay coalition, a global network of civil society organisations calling for openness and accountability in the extractive sectors.

In Senegal, for instance, the stepping down of President Abdoulaye Wade and his governing parents and Cabinet members, many of them, later accused of corruption, was mainly because of the 2011 and 2012 anti-corruption campaigners, which gained momentum with protesters´ rallies on the streets of Senegal's capital, Dakar, in the last months of Mr. Wade's presidency. This campaign was later joined by very influential public figures in the country, including artists and journalists, and received a significant boost.

The Arabic African world also witnessed some interesting shifts, for example, in Tunisia, a movement of discontentment that started as a reaction against the corrupt ways of the ruling elite, using external publishing sources such as Wikileaks, led to the ousting of former long standing President Ben Ali in 2011.

These examples show the rise of Pan-African Civil Society engagement in key development matters of the continent. Recent examples of Pan-African key role in trying to improve good governance in the continent are on the rise and include the Mozambican civil society campaign on the hidden debts, that will be elaborated in more details in Chapter VII.

Hearn (2017) notes that many CSOs in Africa successfully partner with governments on development issues to work towards development objectives. He gives the examples of the Addis Ababa's Good Governance Conference, where representatives of African governments and CSOs from across the continent focusing on good governance met in Addis Ababa and agreed to jointly fight corruption on the continent. Other civil society organisations are reluctant to work with governments as they focus on exposing ills in societies. Governments criticise these organisations classifying them as focusing only on the bad to be able to attract

funding from donors; and they perceive these civil society organisations as ´foreign-funded agents of the opposition´.

In some other countries, mainly in Northern Africa, civil society organisations are not allowed to engage in political activities. The example of Morocco and Egypt where the USAID CSO Sustainability Index *for the Middle East and North Africa* shows that even without clarifying what political activities are some are barred the right to associate and to participate. Civil society organisations are concerned with arbitrary enforcement of laws that restrict civil society activities.

Some senior civil society leaders have shared their concerns around what they called promiscuity between governments and some civil society organisations. Governments are able to co-opt these civil society organisations by offering seats to their top leaders as an effective way of stopping the critical voices of these organisations. The Pan African Civil Society leaders went on to mention the tendency that AU member states have for the religionisation of politics and politicisation of religions (that is making religion "political" or politics to harness or exploit or subvert religion for its own ends (Irish Examiner, 2019:3); the ethinicisation of politics and politicisation of ethnicity, the glorification of African state leaders, the politicisation of African traditions; the institutionalisation of corruption and promotion of corruption of institutions, etc. which help them to perpetuate their dictatorship and silence civil society´s role for accountability and democratic wash-dogging.

5.7.1. The re-rise of Pan-Africanism or a New Pan-Africanism

Early independence period was characterized by a strong initial popular mobilisation of masses about African independences and freedom and the building of the liberated nations. It is a process supported by the Pan-African Ideal of Unity and solidarity with other African people, led by the brave generation of liberation movements, from the late 1950s to the end of the 1980s. This golden period of Africa´s rebuilding from the long dark colonial era, what the prominent political and leading intellectual Amilcar Cabral calls the "re-Africanisation of minds" or to "rebecome Africans," saw Pan-African icons work hard to implement the Pan-African ideals. However, this was followed by a political ´U´ turn, where some of the African liberators started mastering the colonial masters´ techniques and ideas. They became dictators and began exploiting the very people they liberated; taking advance of global events happening

around the world; the end of cold war, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the raise of the Globalisation phenomena, to name a few. Most of these leaders embraced the tide of the neoliberal and capitalist upraise, led by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank on behalf of the Capitalist superpowers. This turn represented a long period of Pan-Africanism hibernation.

To discuss this, Issa G. Shivji (2004)´s provocative thoughts[14] will be depended on. He takes us back to understand a key concept and its meaning for Africans. That is the concept of nation building and its expression, nationalism. He goes on to answer the nationalism question in these terms:

> "The dominant discourse on the National Question has run along different lines, however. In both the political right and left, the central debate has been over whether Africa has nations and nationalities or tribes and ethnic groups. In the Eurocentric worldview, nations represent a higher level in the evolution of social and political formations than tribes fed on Stalin's rather schematic formula, and therefore unable to find nations within the territorial units called African countries. Even radical Marxists, like Slovo, have found it difficult to theorise adequately about the National Question. In the hands of rightwing pundits, it has been worse. The so-called lack of nations has been used to debunk and delegitimise African nationalist movements and their achievements. With the current hegemony of neo-liberalism and the imperialist comeback, the spokespersons of imperialism have been quick to condemn nationalism as nothing more than an expression of ethnicity and tribalism" (Shivji, 2004:9).

Many African liberation leaders have discussed and made sense of the question of Nationalism, looking at the history of African people who were forced by colonial interests to be divided in artificial boundaries to satisfy colonial interests, and were kept divided by promoting tribal and ethnic groups rivalry to facilitate the colonial occupation and humiliation, making the African people believe that they cannot build a nation. The likes of Amilcal Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Jo Slovo, Marcelino dos Santos have theorized this question. For example, Dos santos sees nation building in Africa as common fight against a common oppressor to create a nation that

---

[14] For more details please see Shivji (2004) The Rise, The Fall and The Insurrection of Nationalism in Africa
https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/rise-fall-and-insurrection-nationalism-africa

binds the diverse groups and cultures together and this nationhood building shall continue even after attaining political independence. On the other hand, Amilcar Cabral defends that the foundation of national liberation lies in the inalienable right of every people to have their own history. Kwame Nkrumah sees the ideology of African nationalism as a Marxist-socialist-led revolt by African nationalists against imperialism, colonialism, and racialism in Africa; hence, nation building must include the common fight against imperialism and capitalist domination.

For Shivji (2004) and many Pan African leaders and intellectuals, the question of nationalism in Africa is a threefold question: it is first and foremost a question of Unity, without which no nationalism in Africa can materialise, then is Independence, which will not be attained without Unity; and Equality. These are interrelated aspects, and all form the Nationalism. They add to it the question of Pan Africanism, for, there is no nationalism in Africa without Pan-Africanism (Issa Shivji, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere).

For Africa Unity, Independence and Equality means the attainment of the Pan African dream. As Nyerere (1963:23) puts it, "African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism". Unfortunately, most of the so called fathers of the African newly independent states have heavily failed their countries and they could not materialise the very dream that fueled their struggle for independence. For more than 30 years, African peoples have waited largely in vain for the Pan-African dream to materialize

As Amoah (2019) notes, the people of Africa, including the youths have seen so many ´Pan-African presidents remain in power for decades without experiencing any development for their nations. They are tired of those who use the Pan-African rhetoric for their own interest. If the previous iteration of Pan-Africanism was a hymn to African identity and African unity, today the concerns of Pan-African are good governance, democracy, and inclusive economic development (Amoah 2019).

Perhaps, due to this, nowadays it is striking to see how young people Africa-wide feel attached to the concepts of African identity and African unity and Pan-Africanism. This wave of a new impetus of African nation rebuilding through lenses of Pan-Africanism adds to the aspects of Identity, Unity and Equality a fundamental new feature, the quest for democracy, good governance, and inclusive economic development, in the belief that this is what was missing until now.

5.8.Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development, its integration into the AU structures and procedures, which culminated in the transformation of NEPAD into the African Union Development Agency (AUDA), and the role of civil society. Literature has shown that the establishment of NEPAD was a contentious issue, prompting to some level of contestation, because it is seen as the materialisation of the very neoliberal nature of old imposed African processes driven for a top down approach with no genuine participation of the African people. This has worsened with the transformation of NEPAD into the African Union Development Agency, which has deepened the neoliberal nature of NEPAD. Looking at the discursive practices of the AU-NEPAD, one can see how dispersed approaches to governing shape and influence the making of Pan-African Civil Society. This led to civil society organisations setting up their own spaces to exercise their power. Nonetheless, these forms of exercising power are not liner and produce mixed results.

Chapter VI

Case Study 1: The AU-NEPAD and the Remaking of African Civil Society

6.1.Introduction

This chapter represents the main empirical research for the dissertation which tries to make sense of what the literature tells us and what people perceive as being the relationships between the AU-NEPAD and the Pan-African Civil Society in its making. The use of the work of Michel Foucault on governmentality to understanding key concepts such as power, power relations, resistance, knowledge, and participation helps to analyze the prevailing relationships between the AU-NEPAD and the Pan-African Civil Society at the AUC headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and NEPAD Headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa. This supplementation of Foucault´s theorizing approach with that of Gaventa and Arnstein has deepened the understanding of the spaces and levels of participation of the Pan-African Civil Society within the AU-NEPAD. This chapter covers the AU-NEPAD and Pan-African Civil Society, discussing the making of Pan-African Civil Society within the context of a neo liberalised Au-NEPAD, and the Continental CAADP and APRM as a background to case study 2.

6.2.The AU-NEPAD and Pan-African Civil Society

As shown in previous chapters, the AU-NEPAD Constitutive Act emphasizes broad based citizens' participation and reaffirms the principle of African led and African driven development. To this end, the Act provides institutional arrangement for citizens' participation in the continental processes, being chiefly the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is the entry point for continental citizenry to engage in. In addition, as provision for African citizens' participation, the organs and other AU institutions provide rooms for organised civil society to engage in, mainly through formal invitation.

As Moyo (2007) points out, the African Charter on Popular Participation and Development (1990) provides for broad participation and all institutions of the AU shall include in their

treaties, protocols, rules of procedures, and strategic plans provisions for participation of civil society. In this regard, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and more so the treaty establishing the African Economic Communities (1991) make clear provisions for the inclusion of civil society in the programs of the AU. It is within this framework that ECOSOCC was established as the official platform for civil society engagement with the AU, which provides institutional room for civil society organizations to demand even more and effective inclusion.

More institutional spaces for civil society participation were established. For example, at NEPAD, a civil society desk and a think tank were put at the service of a civil society to contribute to NEPAD programmes and their implementation. At the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), there is provision of space for interfacing and engagement between governments and civil society, especially at the country level (Moyo 2007). Moreover, the Peace and Security Council civil society has begun work with civil society through research and informed advocacy. There are examples of clear involvement of the African civil society, such as the adoption of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa and the development of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, where the Gender Directorate of the AU championed the participation of civil society. Equally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) pioneered the involvement of civil society organisations as observers on AU structures and processes.

However, these examples are not enough to ease the way out of government driven and closed organisations. For example, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) stripped the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL) off its observer status. This decision prompted human rights advocates to raise serious concerns on the Commission's decision to withdraw the CAL's observer status at the AU Executive Council's directive. They point out that this decision is an indication of the strong political influence the member states have at the ACHPR by. The human rights advocates also highlight that this decision is an example of the Commission's bias towards certain civil society involvement in certain thematic issues over others and of the hostility that the Commissioners and the Commission, generally display to NGOs that work on sexual orientation and gender identity issues (Article 19, 2018).

ECOSOCC, being the only Organ of the AU comprising civil society representatives in its formal constitution, is the chief platform for formal engagement of AU with the Pan-African

citizens. The provision for participation is laid down under the membership conditions, which, according to several authors, are restrictive and discriminatory as they require African civil society organisations to comply with funding from own resources and require a certain level of formality.

AU/NEPAD initiated mechanisms for citizens' participation, including ECOSOCC, have proved to be working for the interests of the governments of the continent and not for the participation of African Citizens in the AU/NEPAD processes. One of the major fears is progressively crystallising: the African Governments are co-opting the spaces for civil society participation at country level and at the AU/NEPAD level mainly by inviting almost always the same organisations and leaving out many others. The criterion for the invitation is not widely discussed, which makes the Pan African Civil Society wonders why key critical organisations are never invited.

As pointed out by researchers, participation in the African Union processes is limited in scope and depth. Using the ladder of participation to analyse the level of participation of civil society in the AU-NEPAD processes, one finds that there is an asymmetric level of participation in the different processes; however, a general observation is that most of the processes indicate a lower level of participation from some types of stakeholders, mainly from those of Pan African Civil Society. A senior member of the Pan-African Civil Society said, "governments of the continent and the African Union itself restrict and co-opt civil society by arguing that national or continental civil society groups receive foreign funding, hence they are accountable to their funding sources, to ; while in fact, there are no alternatives sources offered or sponsored by the government… The AU and national governments raise all sorts of other reasons to justify the restrictive regulations and the closing of civic spaces. As a member of Pan-African Civil Society, I can understand some of the concerns, especially those genuinely linked to security, international terrorism, religious extremism, and other unlawful activities used by criminals to advance their agenda. However, these are exceptions. Most civil society actors are not related to any of these issues and are genuinely concerned with development of their countries and the continent at large. It is clear to us that these excuses are used to cover the real reasons, mainly their willingness to shut down legitimate voices who fight for more accountable leadership and participatory processes in African and within AU structures'' (PACIN 020).

It is said that the level of co-optation is very high as well as the level of tokenism, whereby most civil society organisations are only used to legitimise the decisions or policies enacted by the AU/NEPAD with little or no effective delegation of power. For example, an interview with a member of Pan African Civil Society sheds light on the issue of inadequate participation of civil society: "In Africa, critical voices are curtailed and the most qualified as well as representative members of the civil society are offered privileges by national governments at the expenses of their constituencies. In my country Kenya, for example, some CSO members are offered government positions which force them to be less vocal or critical and often some end up surrendering and joining the mainstream government discourse. There are other instances where government do not disclose key and strategic information in a timely manner to allow citizens to organise and prepare themselves for impactful participation" (CWR 014). In this sense, Pan African Civil Society seems clearly disempowered in these processes.

The Conference Report (2009) on The Fourth Citizens Continental Conference at the 12th African Union Summit noted that with the establishment of the Centre for Civil society Participation at AU (CCP-AU) with the mandate to facilitate links between CSOs and AU, some progress has been achieved. However, a major hindrance in the realisation of a strong link between AU and CSOs has been the lack of a mechanism to collate and disseminate information in discussions at conferences, as well as lack of ownership and a sense of not belonging to the AU among the broader spectrum of the African population (Conference Report on The Fourth Citizens Continental Conference at the 12th African Union Summit, 2009).

From 2008 to January 2019, CCP-AU organised citizens' continental conferences in the margin of the AU Summits, where citizens of all corners of the continent gather to discuss pressing issues around the agenda of the Summits. So far, 8 conferences were held. The outcomes of these conferences are geared towards echoing the voices of the African citizens around the pressing issues on the agenda of the African Union Summits or push for attention to specific issues concerning Pan-African Civil Society. For example, at the 8th Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 4-7 February 2019, the major issue was advocating for the implementation of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment that was adopted by the AU Summit, on 29 January 2018. At the January 17, 2009, Conference, the

main issue was the Situation of Peace and Security, Social Development and CSO engagement in Africa.

The aims of the continental citizens 'conferences are to engage in critical reflection on the current challenges, gaps and opportunities in addressing human rights in Africa with the aim to provide clear concise and coordinated recommendations from civil society, reinvigorate co-ordination and joint advocacy of civil society and enhance the networking of civil society by ensuring the inclusion of new organisations or more seasoned organisations working on the key policy areas.

Researchers agree with the existence of various barriers to effective people's participation within the AU-NEPAD processes, although legal and formal documents indicate the existence of institutional mechanisms for participation and most importantly the guiding constitutional acts provide for wide participation of all stakeholders as compulsory measure. It is argued that the praxis is far distant from what is proclaimed in the formal and legal documents. Some argue that most of the barriers are created by continental institutions and national government bureaucrats and politicians (Adedeji 2008; Akokpari 2008; Jager, 2004; Wiarda 2003).

Interviews with some senior AUC officers highlighted the perception of the African civil society as mainly contributing to improve policies; however, some are aliens advancing foreign agendas. For example, a senior AUC officer critically said, "We all know that most of the civil society organisations in Africa are more elitist; some are even the so called ´briefcase NGOs´, representing the interests of their donors and evidently they do not represent the grass-root as they claim to, therefore are not legitimate to reclaim their involvement in the AUC processes, although they are invited. To be honest I do not see why they are invited" (Senior officer at AUC 003). In fact, some officials from the AU argue that many civil society organisations are alienated from the people they pretend to represent. Instead, they have moved up and became elitist; therefore, they should not demand their participation on behalf of the ordinary and voiceless people.

On the other hand, a different AUC officer recognized the importance of citizens' involvement in all processes of the African Union. She highlights the fact that most of the AU guiding documents, including the Constitutive Act, stress the need to infuse African driven and African owned organisations into all AU processes. She argues, "I do believe that without the participation of all citizens of the continent, the outcomes of our processes should be far from

what the African people expect… I think, as all the provisions of the African Union state, the participation of citizens of Africa, as the main stakeholders, is of paramount importance. I do recognize, however, that there is still a lot to be done to ensure full participation, and the civil society organisations have a role to play in ensuring that… We should work in partnership to solve African problems" (Senior Officer at the Policy Department of the AUC 008).

The AU driven process to establish African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was one of contentious endeavours showing the divide and the huge differences between African countries and more importantly between the neoliberalised principles driven AU and the African citizens. Moreover, while citizens push for a total free movement of persons in Africa, the AU official stance is of massive divide, with some key State members opposing a free movement of people and goods. This is mainly due to high levels of domestic unemployment and the securitisation narrative associated with freer movement of persons and full transition to mobility of labour and services in Africa. It is still a deeply contentious issue for many African countries, making it difficult to implement a policy for this purpose.

A Pan -African Civil Society member once expressed her skepticism about attaining the objective of a full free movement in Africa, like many other parts of the world do, such as the European Union, West Africa, using a single passport and currency. She argued that "while having the political and economic interest taking precedence from social issues, the big giants of Africa will not make it easy to have a single currency or totally open borders and to share their wealth. You know why? Most of these countries are the front runners of neocolonial and neoliberal commandment. You know that the borders in Africa are all artificial, were all drawn from the colonial masters´ interest… So, they will defend these interests with all their strengths; I see no hope if the current leadership is still here and if their mindset does not change" (Senior Pan African Civil Society member PACS 023).

On a different note, interviews from the Headquarters of NEPAD and AUC have brought out the issue of mistrust between the AU bodies and the Pan-African Civil Society actors (Senior Leader of ECOSOCC 011 and Leader of ECOSSOC 017). In fact, from their perspectives, civil society organisations in Africa are advancing foreign interests rather than African citizens' agendas; therefore, they are not legitimate representatives of the African people, and are not different from the governments who are elected by the citizens (ECOSOCC 011 and ECOSOCC 017).

In the same vein, a NEPAD officer criticised Pan African Civil Society, "they always criticise heads of states for their long-term government, without democratic change, but if we look at the plethora of organisations in the civil society sector, the representatives are always the same. I have known some of them for more than 15 years; they do not implement the democratic principles they claim to use to criticise the governments, so where is the coherence? (Senior NEPAD officer 006).

She continues arguing that "how can AU or NEPAD dialogue with civil society that is dispersed, disunited? We can't speak with everyone at the same time. For example, you have small organisations siting everywhere in Africa. How can we speak with each one of them, where can we find resources and time to talk to them all? In fact, most of these small organisations are the ones close to the average citizens; but the big organisations, mostly siting in the big cities of our continent, with close contact with donors, other international organisations tend to monopolise the stage and call to their responsibility the representation of all others, without even consulting them. This is how I see civil society in Africa. If they continue disunited and opportunistic, I see no hope to truly influence AU!" (Senior NEPAD officer 006).

On the other end, civil society representatives also highlighted the issue of mistrust. They pointed out that while African Union Heads of States blame the west for funding civil society to disrupt their governments, arguing that the most vocal civil society organisations are funded, almost exclusively, by non-African donors, which, according to them, undermines the importance of local resources and shows that these CSOs are not connected to the constituencies they claim to be representing; hence they are not legitimate. CSO representatives wonder why the Heads of States question the CSO's funding level from external donors and they never question the funding level of their own government budgets that are supported heavily by external donors (PALU 007, PACIN 023, PACIN 020, CWR 014). This double standard underscores the idea of suppressing civil society participation as a sign of authoritarian leadership.

Interviewees have strongly noted that the reason the Heads of States have no right to close the participation of citizens in the AU processes is that the very Constitutive Act provides for their participation; it affirms that AU is a people driven organisation; citizens feel they must participate because the AUC budget fuelling the machinery of African Union comes from State

budgets. This means it is a taxpayer money. Therefore, the citizens have a right and duty to demand their participation. Civic spaces are the materialisation of a democratic principle for citizens to voice their views, hence contributing to the development of the continent.

''However, you observe that the AU Summits are mostly opened to only the Head of States, which is a matter of deep concern for the civil society. We have seen often memorandum telling us that the Summit is opened to only the Heads of States, and sometime stating that next Summit will be opened to all. However, at the last minute, you are informed that the Summit is closed. One wonders most of the times how are the invitation letters directed to specific organisations'' (Interview with Senior officer from PALU 007).

A senior member of the Pan- African Civil Society movement shared his concerns, "the space around AUC and AU Summit is shrinking; however, we as CS need to sit down and discuss this clearly, because there is no decision-making mechanism at AU's Summit…We might need to engage from country level, or with ministerial committees, then pass on to technical groups and expert meetings and so on. These may be spaces that are not shrank that much for civil society engagement with governments. It is upon us citizens and members of the institutions of civil society to take advantage of these windows and find ways to influence AU-NEPAD processes" (Interview with Senior Leader at SOTU 045).

''Just as an example, the Pan-Africanism is first and foremost a citizen driven initiative. Since the first meetings of the Pan-Africanist movement, only in the last 50 years or so it was made state and government thing, putting citizens out of the mainstream picture. This has been worsening in the last 20 years and much so during when Nkosazana Dlaminin Zuma was the chairperson. So how do we bring it back to the citizens? I think Pan African Civil Society shall drive this movement. Perhaps, as a civil society we need to reflect more on our own capacities and weaknesses to allow a strategic move toward influencing the return to a true Pan-African driven African Union'' (Interview with Senior Leader at PACIN 023).

He goes on reflecting on the role of Pan African -Civil Society and the strategies it needs to apply to engage meaningfully with the AU-NEPAD. He points out that as civil society they may need to look at the clear decision-making mechanism and thoroughly know the AU agenda, so to engage timely and consistently, rather than on adhoc basis at the Summit. They may need, he argues, to have a quality engagement with the different levels of decision making within the African Union; they should not concentrate only on the Summit, as at this level it is

very difficult, because most of the issues are already discussed and mostly a pre-approval is made. According to this senior PACS leader, coming to Addis Ababa around the Summit only is missing the point. "We need to still fight for the AU Summit as we value this, but focusing on this only, we are not going to make a difference. We need to make a case of why civil society is a key partner to the AU. We need to do our homework and sometime start at a single country level or region. We must be strategic" (Interview with Senior Leader at PACIN 023).

Participation of African stakeholders is one of the key principles of the African Union. For instance, the Constitutive Act of the AU in its provision in Article 4 states clearly that the Union shall function in accordance with the principles of (c) participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union, and (m), respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. However, as stated by some of the civil society interviewees there is a hostile environment for Pan-African Civil Society engagement with the U-NEPAD processes. This shows that, although the discursive and guiding documents of the AU-NEPAD say otherwise, the praxis of enabling civil society to engage in decision making processes at the AU-NEPAD is, however, still far from being widely enabling.

To address the issue of shrinking civic space in the continent, civil society movement is often and consistently looking for alternative mechanisms for their participation in the building of Pan African institutions under the African Union. Parallel to engaging with formal and invited spaces, Pan African civil society is now relying more and more on informal spaces for influencing the African Union. "We have realised that many civil society organisations at the Member state level are struggling to get through their government and influence country level policies as well as getting access to the African Union processes. Then we created the Pan African Civil Society Forum, which is evolving sharply to become the Pan African Citizens Network. This is a movement of the African Citizens and is now engaging directly with the African Union" (Interview with Senior Leader at PACIN 020).

The sentiment expressed by most of the Pan-African Civil Society representatives interviewed is that their organisations and networks cover all aspects of people's lives and social engagement in the continent regardless of the size or economic status of a given country. For them, this is a way to share knowledge, concerns, and views across the continent. Some have even stated that due to the Pan-African nature of their networks they manage to connect grassroots organisations and singular citizens from one country to another, making them feel

more connected than the formal AU-NEPAD institutions could do. One of the participants said, "due to the work we initiated in bringing organisations across the continent together by a form of networks, umbrella organisations, alliances, etc. we created a platform for even marginalised people in the outskirt of a given country to connect with likeminded people in another country. This makes them feel they have a shared destiny based on common issues facing their lives that are brought to their attention by a continental network of organisations such as ours. At the same time, we, as leaders of our organisations, in a given network start building a community of professional concerns and interests with each other. If we could continue this process, making it more inclusive, more systematic and deliberate, we could influence the way the AU-NEPAD is driven, and ultimately, we could better make our dream, the African we want, come through" (Interview with Ditshwanelo Senior Leader at PACINI052).

There is a generalized anger among Pan-African Civil Society actors that if they were more meaningfully involved in the decision making of the continental bodies, from the onset of any process, they would make a significant difference, by ensuring that the needs of grassroots actors are taken on board in those decisions, and that the cultural and social specificities of the various African groups are brought to the policy design and implementation.

From the AUC interviewees, a question of exclusionary definition of civil society was brought to the forefront. They think that by definition, involving some types of civil society organisation and leaving others is, in fact, fulfilling the Constitutive Act of the AU on citizens' participation. For example, one of the ECOSOCC interviewees argued that "by the AU Constitutive Act, civil society is inclusive of NGOs, Trade Union, Associations, media, etc.; however, when NGOs are not present in some events, they talk about no-participation, so to correct this, we need to come back to the definition of civil society as provided for in the African Charter and do justice" (ECOSOCC leadership 001). Another interviewee conceded, "Civil society participation in the AU is more structured than any other similar organs of the developed world. Look at the EU, UN or any other continental body, the only one that provides for civil society participation and has specific operationalisation mechanism is the AU. How the citizens are taking advantage of these mechanisms is another discussion. How do we use the legally provided space to enhance citizens' participation is the basic and fundamental question we shall answer. The African Charter provides for people centred Union. It is unique in that sense" (Senior Leader of ECOSOCC 011). Another ECOSOCC member concluded

"you guys have divorced ECOSOCC; however, we are still here for you! Accreditation is not a problem'' (Interview with senior Leader of ECOSSOC 017). In real effect, the above statements mirror the overall official discursive view of the AU leadership on the participation of Pan-African Civil Society in the AU affairs. There is a clear disconnect between the discursive statements of the AU officers and documents with the reality on ground, including the perceptions from the Pan-African Civil Society. Their pain is the use of divisive strategy to engage them and the exclusion of civil society in the affairs of the continent.

On the other hand, there is also the issue of civil society not doing enough to take advantage of the provisions for participation set out in most of the guiding documents. For example, ECOSOCC provides for 2 civil society members for each member state to fully participate, which is significant. The feeling is that the issue of 50% own funding as criteria is limiting the eligibility of civil society to be a member since Pan-African Civil Society organisations rely on external funding source at about 100%. However, this is a matter of how you think about it. It can be overcome using different ways. "Do CSOs use volunteers? Volunteers should be counted to calculate the percentage of funding for the organisation. So, in my opinion this funding threshold can be overcome by a clear and simple exercise demonstrating the assets African organisations have in their disposal, manpower being just one example" (Interview with a participant at Pan African Civil Society Conference, PACIN033). The opportunity given by ECOSOCC to bring in members of civil society from the member states is often missed, because some CSOs are not sending credible people with technical capacity to engage in these complex issues. "Some do not even know the policy process in their own country, and then they come to AU and just sleep", added another participant (Interview with a participant at Pan African Civil Society Conference, PACIN035).

In fact, talking with both sides of the divide makes sense to conclude that the issue of foreign funding is true; it is true for both the Governments and the civil society. It is part of the patronising development paradigm that is set for postcolonial Africa. It speaks even of the development aid that was promoted to ´take Africa out of poverty´ by the developed world in close collaboration with the African leaders, which turned out to make ´Africa to sink into poverty´ approach. It was part of the structural adjustment programmes that eroded all the ethical values of the African people, promoting bad governance, corruption, and general looting of national and continental resources… "What is worse is having our elites begging for

foreign support, to enrich themselves and come back to say civil society organisations should not get foreign support because that alienate them and advance neoliberal or western agendas rather than that of their constituencies ... This is the same colonial excuse; our leaders have mastered the tactics of the masters… The ECOSOCC should be the bridge to bridge where there is disconnect between the foreign support and the government, to make sure that the African voice prevails over the voice of the powerful elitist and frequently foreign interests" (Senior academic at the Pan African Citizens Conference PACINI 027).

Participants expressed their concerns about ECOSOCC becoming a government body that acts like other AU organs, which constantly advance member states' government positions at the expense of the citizens of the continent. One of PACINI members highlighted, "At ECOSOCC, we the citizens face the same obstacles as we do when visiting or trying to engage with any other organ. When you speak like them you are okay; when you have a different voice, then you are the enemy" (An interview with senior Youth leader at the Pan African Citizens Conference, PACINI 052).

Speaking with some youth representatives, it is found that most of them are disappointed at the AU. In fact, it is difficult for adult-based Pan-African organisations to engage with AU-NEPAD; it is easy to imagine the difficulties young people encounter to engage any AU-NEPAD institutions and to voice their concerns at the continental level. African Youth organisations across the continent work hard to bring the grassroots organisations' voices into the high-level policy making in Africa. Although the African Youth Commission engages in the AU-NEPAD processes, close to 95% of the youths do not know anything about the ECOSOCC or any other way they can engage in AU or NEPAD. A Pan-African Youth organisation that is recognised by AU was established; however, it is well known that it is highly bureaucratised like the AU itself. Thus, it does not represent the interests of the youths as such. This is really an AU baby person; they even have contact with the AU Heads of States forums (An interview with senior Youth leader at the Pan African Citizens Conference, PACINI 052 and senior officer of the African Youth Commission, AYC 051).

There is no formal, easy to access and widely known mechanism through which one can even try to engage with the AU organs, departments and other structure within the AU institutions. For you to be involved in AU, you must rely on personal networks and contacts. "I can tell you, even for us, who have been in this organisation for long , we struggle to get into the AU

premises, let alone the various organs themselves. We must use our personal contacts to be given permission to enter the building. You can't just say, 'I want to see, say the Gender Directorate' and you walk in. There is no way…So, if someone like me struggle, can you imagine how it would be for a member of a small association in a given country, who wants to directly engage in any AU operational structure. I think this is not the African Union Africans envisaged. That is why we started organising our parallel meetings around the AU Summits… Right now, we have this strategic approach recognised by the AU and we invite them to attend our meetings and interact with us. It is still new but is growing; it represents a hope for us to get around and influence AU's decision making meaningfully" (Senior leader of the Centre for Women´s Rights CWR 014).

Another Pan-Africanist interviewed shared his frustration with the way AU operates, looking at the way ECOSOCC struggles within the AU structure to have its own space as an AU organ. He argues, "I know ECOSOCC has been battling for so long, to get space and some freedom to operate, not through the CIDO, which is a directorate of the AUC, but through the ECOSOCC Secretariat in some ways. This makes it very hard for ECOSOCC to deliver on its mandate as an organ of the AU. This for me is an indication of the willingness or lack of it by the Heads of States… It may be the reason International NGOs operating in Africa are given better treatment than us" (A senior member of the IACSOF 013). An introspective look within civil society indicates challenges of capacity and limited resources especially for African civil society organisations which has led to International NGOs being more visible. Although there are provisions in the statutes of all these AU organs and institutions that open up for civil society's participation, civil society organisations still face challenges in accessing information, platforms and processes of the AU, as some of the research participants underscore.

An interesting perspective from one Pan-African Civil Society member is the self-reflection on the capacity and sometimes, willingness to influence the way AU operates, including the ECOSOCC. He said, "Most of us criticise the way AU and ECOSOCC operate and how people get involved; however, we do not have enough capacity or vision to build a real capacity to investigate, study all AU or ECOSOCC dossier and produce quality recommendations. We cannot advise them on what should be done, how they could involve more Africans citizens in the process. Sometimes, opportunities are given to us to participate, but we quarrel among ourselves to occupy these spaces without strategizing, and joining forces to really influence

these institutions. When AU or any other Pan-African Institutions see division among us, they take advantage of it and close these spaces, or co-opt whoever they know from civil society organisations" (Interview with a participant at Pan African Civil Society Conference, PACIN035).

Looking at what most of the interviewees said, it is easy to get to the conclusion that most of the AU-NEPAD processes use a neoliberal governmentality approach, that is, top down which allows less participation. Then, one wonders why the Pan-African civil society organisations are so quiet and accommodating these practices. It could be because the headquarters of the African Union is Addis Ababa, which was never an open society that allows non-state actors to flourish. Also, it is very difficult to enter Ethiopia due to visa restrictive measures. However, this is not the situation at the NEPAD headquarters, Johannesburg, South Africa, where there is a vibrant civil society. Why is it that the civil society organisations do not demand vigorously for their engagement, even in South Africa, which is the headquarter of NEPAD, APRM and PAP? Is this a demonstration of what Foucault (1995) called   obedient   and   useful   bodies of   individuals, who are docile? In fact, once Foucault stated that the form of power that is exercised through disciplinary techniques is applied to produce obedient and useful bodies   of   individuals. He argued that a body that constantly remains within specific power relations is not only affected by these relations, but also affects them. It may, perhaps, be assumed that Pan-African Civil Society organisations are not oppressed or passive; they play an active role within the power relations in   which   they   participate. They are being affected by the disciplinary power from which they are   controlled   and   shaped   through   specific practices used within the AU-NEPAD structures and processes.

For the question, 'which kind of ECOSOCC civil society organisations would like to see for us to have the African Union of the people and the `African Union we want?´ Most of the interviewees stated that they would like an ECOSOCC that is an efficient and effective citizen driven platform, accessible and welcoming to all African citizens; an ECOSOCC of the people of Africa, an organ that provides the necessary space for influencing the AU to balance Member States' interests with those of the African citizens; a transparent organisation led by the civil society. They want to see an ECOSOCC that is proactive and is always at the front line in communicating the voice of Pan African citizens. Most of them said that the AU they want is the one that would bring all African together, promoting inclusion and growing the

continent to become a relevant and key player. They want the AU that would promote good governance throughout, effectively manage African wealth, facilitate the mobility of Africans within the continent, and promote peace and security for all in order to allow every African in the continent or in the diaspora to explore his or her potential. In short, they want an African Union of the people of Africa that empowers its citizens.

It is interesting to note that some study participants are concerned that civil society organizations are not well involved in Agenda 2063[15]; they are not involved in setting up of the agenda itself, its indicators, governance structure. They do not participate in all the chain of the process. It is not only to participate at the implementation stage, where civil society is called to complement, as a form of seeking legitimacy. For example, civil society organizations have not succeeded in ensuring that their proposals of having free visa for African citizens to travel throughout the continent are considered.

As noted, in the previous chapter it is seen that Africans are not fully involved in the reforms of the AU architecture, namely the transformation of NEPAD into the African Union Development Agency. It is a state and government driven process. It is clear that the process as well as the final decision-making was made as business as usual by the Heads of States and Governments of the African Union, during the 31st Assembly, a Summit that was run without the participation of the civil society actors. This illustrates the genesis of the African Union top down governmentality, undermining the informal power relations, the bottom up power that can influence governance of the continent. This is in total opposition to the formal guiding principle of the agenda 2063 which reflects the African Union's vision to achieve an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens; it aims among other things to end all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and to prevent genocide (AU Vision)[16].

Below is a schematic representation of what the African participants of this research want.

---

[15] Africa´s Agenda 2063 was set out during the Golden Jubilee celebrations of the formation of the OAU /AU in May 2013 as part of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. It is the Africa's blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. As such is the continent's strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. It was adopted, in January of 2015, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the 24th African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
[16] Please refer to the African Union Vision at https://au.int/en/about/vision#main-content

Figure 1 A schematic representation of what the African Union people want
Source: Author´s own representation

Some of the interviewees also said that they want a Pan African Civil Society that takes initiative, a Pan-African Civil Society that spearheads the change they want to see, that puts matters of the development of the continent on their own hands. They want a civil society that can come together and solve complex matters, and make Africans to have a common voice and to be involved in the African Union. Most of the interviewees think that civil society organisations should see themselves as part of the solution. Thus, they should not just complain and wait for the AU or government at country level to open space; they should do what it takes to engage meaningfully with Pan African Institutions or governments to influence policy making at all levels.

For instance, a youth leader interviewed stated that the AU itself is full of a bunch of old leaders that are stuck in old systems of governance. Therefore, Pan African Civil Society should work hard to use its power to influence African Union for things to change. According to him, "African Union is very disorganised. We have several countries with leaders staying in power for more than 25 years in a row; some of them are way too old to hold a job that is highly demanding, such as the position of the presidency. Some of these leaders forcefully change or amend their countries' constitutions to allow them stay in power. We, as citizens, are the majority and we have the power to change things. The civil society needs to realise this and

use this power to bring the change we want How do you expect the AU to work as an effective organisation when it is a sum of all and each individual country's bureaucracies and malaise? The youths constitute the highest populations of Africa and are the hope of the continent. But they need good mentorship. Unfortunately, in the current arrangement, there are no mentors to mentor them, for them to be involved and start making the changes from within'' (An interview with a senior officer of the African Youth Commission, AYC 051).

AU-NEPAD shall consider the move of the youths as resistance to government, thus imposing its models on the citizens of Africa. This makes the Union a Union of the governments, not a Union of the people as envisaged by the ´Founding Fathers´, the Constitutive Act and every African citizen. Foucault sees this as "resistance to neoliberal governmentality in the form of 'counter conduct' by those who refuse to be governed like that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them" (Foucault 2007b:75; Foucault 2004:66-79). This can be seen as the source of power generated by resistance to the power of the powerful, the power that exists everywhere.

In summary, lack of coordination amongst civil society organisations, the crisis of legitimacy, the shrinking spaces within the AU architecture, weak financial, technical and organisational capacity within the civil society sector as well as within the AU structures themselves, limited human resources and infrastructure, protagonists and other factors challenge both the African citizens and their organisations to take full advantage of the existing as well as reclaimed spaces for participation. Therefore, for civil society organisations to be effective in their quest for inclusion and participation they should be well coordinated, form synergies, be agile and proactive in a timely and consistent manner, not on adhoc basis.

6.3. The Continental CAADP and APRM as a background to case study 2

6.3.1. The CAADP Process

The African Agriculture Development Programme is a framework of the African Union-NEPAD endorsed by the Second Ordinary Assembly of AU in Maputo on July 2003. Its specific aim is to create institutional and policy transformation in the agriculture sector in Africa, which would 'eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through Agriculture' (NEPAD-CAADP). To achieve this overreaching goal, African governments are expected to seek a 6

percent annual growth in agricultural productivity by 2015 and to increase the allocation of national budgets to at least 10 percent to the agricultural sector (The CAADP Maputo Declaration).

The CAADP process encompasses three distinct phases: the first one is where relevant stakeholders analyze the agricultural context of a given country, looking at the current and previous conditions; secondly a round table discussion needs to take place to agree on further agricultural development agenda and the signing of the CAADP compact containing key priorities and a roadmap for the implementation of the continent's agricultural development strategy, finally, the design and development of the continent's investment plans in view to operationalise the CAADP compact (Kemenyi, Routman and Westbury 2013). This is meant to be clearly linked to the national overall development plans and strategies.

The CAADP process guideline documents underline key principles for stakeholders' involvement, including participation of country level civil society, governments, donors, regional economic communities, the private sector, communities, and continental bodies.

In studying the current relationships between power, discourse and political institutions and practices in the African continent, most scholars found and defended that AU-NEPAD is one more of the imposition of the Western neoliberal drive and not an African thought and bred institution. It responds to economically powerful countries which are funding all the processes and offer allegiance to the developed countries of the west, perpetuating the power relations governing the development aid of the past (Abrahamsen 2003; Bond 2005; Lemke 2010, Abrahamsen 2005, Shivji 2011).

It is recorded that at the Second Summit of the African Union in Maputo the Heads of States of the African Countries adopted an integral policy framework for agricultural transformation, wealth creation, food security and nutrition, economic growth, and prosperity for all Africans. This framework was named the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and at the Maputo African Union Summit in 2003, CAADP was first declared as an integral part of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The African Agriculture Development Programme is deemed to be a continent-wide initiative within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. NEPAD is the strategic economic development framework of the African Union (AU). Hence, CAADP is in

the forefront of continental agriculture development. For it to be able to achieve its mandate and strategic objective the CAADP process is structured around five core functions, namely:

a.   Country processes for better investment programmes: The country process is the core of the whole of CAADP's intervention; it 'grounds' the CAADP's values and principles in each country's own processes and systems;

b.   Mobilising partnerships for investment: This core strategic function operate at different levels from national to global, and CAADP has been successful in mobilising resources and new partnerships;

c.   Pushing for commitments: CAADP uses several instruments at different levels to hold governments and partners accountable for their promises;

d.   Strategic thinking, positions, and scenarios for the future: CAADP aims to provide clear African positions on agricultural development issues, including monitoring of the 10% budget commitment, the 6% annual productivity target and peer review system between countries; and

e.   Advocating for change: CAADP has a major thrust on 'putting agriculture back on the agenda' using advocacy, lobbying and communication as major instruments.

Fig 3 Key CAADP Processes

Source: CAADP, 2009

Formal discourses believe that the principles and values such as: African ownership and leadership; accountability and transparency; inclusiveness; evidence-based planning and

decision making and harnessing regional complementarities, people-centeredness; private sector driven development; systemic capacity; and subsidiarity, peer learning and multi-sectarianism guide the implementation modalities in CAADP making it a distinctive framework under which African countries promote growth and sustainability of the continent's agriculture .

These are values and principles underlying the very essence of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is an African Union strategic framework for Pan-African socio-economic development; it is a vision and a policy framework for Africa. This is an initiative spearheaded by African leaders, to address critical challenges facing the continent such as underdevelopment and its marginalisation in the international market, hunger, depravation, and poverty.

At the beginning, the letter **P** on CAADP had prompted confusion between the meaning of NEPAD and its purposes. This is because, in fact, CAADP is much more than a programme. It is, according to the official documents, a policy framework. It is a Pan-African Framework with a set of principles and broadly defined strategies to help countries critically review their own situations and identify investment opportunities with optimal impact and returns. It aims to align diverse stakeholders´ interests around the design of integrated programmes adapted at the local level, hence its participatory breadth in nature. As a new light for the African Agricultural sector continent-wide, CAADP provides for an evidence-based planning process with knowledge as a key primary input and human resource development and partnership as a central factor. CAADP is a continental framework in scope; however, it only comes to life through integrated national and regional efforts to promote agricultural sector growth and economic development.

The NEPAD Agency's Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition thematic area and specifically CAADP Implementation Support Programme aim to catalyse transformation of Africa's agricultural systems and stimulate increased and sustainable agriculture performance in member states for effective contribution to achieving economic growth and inclusive development.

Legal documents of the African Union regard CAADP as a Pan-African Flagship Programme with the aim of improving economic growth and food security by addressing key policy and

capacity issues affecting the agricultural sector and by increasing governments' spending on agriculture by 10 percent and agricultural productivity by six percent in each country.

Several evaluation studies of CAADP at its 10th anniversary point out that it has brought significant improvements. For example, it is recorded that agriculture has risen to the top of the political agenda, in Africa, including its key development partners. At the celebration of the 10th Anniversary, 40 countries had signed a CAADP Compact and two thirds of those had formulated a National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) or a National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (NAFSIP), which is remarkable and needs to be celebrated. The evaluations also point out the fact that "although a positive trend towards achieving the 10% of public funds to agriculture could be noted, there remains a lot of scope for improvement under this indicator, even after ten years" (Report on Sustaining the Momentum of CAADP).

Looking at literature on CAADP, from the official documents to secondary studies one can sense the gap between the official discourse and the findings on the ground. Mostly, official documents describe a smooth process where all stakeholders are called upon to contribute. However, secondary information gives account of contentious dynamics even between and among AU structures, mainly NEPAD and the AUC. This is confirmed by empirical data on ground.

In his work, Moyo concludes, "although AU and its organs provide for civil society involvement in their activities, very little engagement actually takes place. AU and its organs have done a little to contact citizens and CSOs, except for a few departments like the Gender Directorate. AU institutions set up for civil society participation remain weak, and at times they are unwilling to involve civil society" (Moyo 2006:23).

Looking at the Guidelines on CAADP Country Implementation under the Malabo Declaration, it is evident that the reforms within the AU-NEPAD also included the CAADP framework. In this light a slight shift from the Maputo protocol to the Malabo Declaration shows a change from a Single-sectoral to a multi-sectoral approach. As a result, now we have the Malabo Declaration, which is wider than its predecessor, the Maputo Declaration. The shift is still seen as a great deal of the Maputo Declaration, that is, the Malabo Declaration continues to view CAADP as the main vehicle for the implementation of AU-NEPAD commitments in the Agrarian sector. However, the scope of the CAADP agenda was widened and it included a multi-sectoral reach.

Despite the shift in scope, CAADP guidelines are very silent in terms of the role of Pan African Civil Society in the continuum of the CAADP development. It is basically concerned with investments and agricultural growth, leaving out the process and the input of the African citizens. In fact, the guidelines were written mostly for those responsible for CAADP implementation at country level, such as CAADP Focal Points and CAADP Country Teams, Ministries of Agriculture, other agriculture relevant ministries, Ministries of Finance and Planning, with the strong belief that the guide is useful for the wider group of CAADP stakeholders including: i. Non –state actors such as farmers' organisations, commodity associations, civil society organisations, lobby and watchdog groups; ii. Commercial private sector interested in investing in agriculture; iii. Development Partners supporting CAADP country process; iv. RECs implementing the CAADP process at regional level and supporting the CAADP process at country level; v. NPCA and AUC-DREA coordinating the CAADP process from the continental level; and vi. Development Partners supporting CAADP at regional and continental levels. This clearly shows that the vast number of stakeholders are only brought into the CAADP process at the end of the spectrum, as end users; they are not part and parcel of the whole process from the beginning to the end.

The official institutions of the AU architecture are not only to be blamed for the issue of civil society engagement. It resonates the same reasons in both sides of the equation. Looking at the interviews with senior CAADP officers at NEPAD in Midrand and at AUC in Addis Ababa, one wonders why most of them blame the civil society actors for their lack of capacity to engage in the process of drafting the National compacts truly and genuinely as well as in the implementation thereafter. In the same vein, Pan African Civil Society organisations concerned with the agrarian sector blame the AU machinery for being government driven, for preventing genuine civil society participation, for considering them as aliens or not representing the endogenous views of the majority of the African population who make their living through agrarian sector.

The interviews with CAADP officers show the way the levels of CAADP (at NEPAD and at AUC) are structured to respond to their mandate. It is a common understanding that the Member States are sovereign; therefore, they are autonomous in policymaking around agriculture; however, they need to follow a continental framework. AUC coordinates all the

policy efforts and facilitates the mobilisation of resources to meet the aspirations of the continental body at country level.

The CAADP team at the AUC is composed of several experts/advisors, namely the Food Security and Nutrition, Market Access, Agribusiness, Agriculture and Climate Change, Technology and Innovation, Communication and Administrative. This team is structured around the former CAADP pillars. At NEPAD, there are only two staff, the CAADP focal point and the Food Security and Nutrition person. All the CAADP processes at NEPAD are supported by senior staff from different departments within the NPCA. According to the interviewees, this structure is too lean to respond to the demand of providing quality support and guidance to the 55 Members States.

In this context, there are several challenges in involving citizens at both levels of CAADP process, country and continental, as the continental body is still deeply government led and driven, with little meaningful participation of the African citizens. A senior officer at AUC said it all, "AU is political and diplomatic in nature; therefore, its processes are more within government offices. Even the population of the Members States does not know about AU. However, if you ask citizens in any Member State countries if they know anything about the developed North, the donor community, you will get the answer, 'Yes, I know. They give us money for project X, Y or Z'. This is the way our population sees AU in relation to other global policy makers" (interview with Senior officer at the Division of Policy Development at AUC 003).

It was constantly mentioned that the major issue with the AU processes in general and particularly the CAADP, is the capacity to implement the policies drafted and endorsed at continental level. It is interesting enough to find out that within the AU offices, some senior officers are conscious that the continental institutions have diverted from the initial vision of the forefathers and founding members of the OAU, and they are nowadays seeking different purposes. "I can assure you that this AUC is European driven; actually, it is money driven. The leaders of our continent go where there is money. They do not really care about their people. The generation of leaders who cemented the foundation of this continent had a voluntary spirit and they were concerned about the wellbeing of everyone in Africa; however, today, this is no longer the case…You know, Africa has talent and brain, but these people do not find place/space to thrive, and they are barred by the systems. As a result, African brains are shining

outside the continent, with no or little benefit for the African people" (Interview with a senior officer at the Gender Directorate at AUC 002).

Issues of conflict between the NEPAD based CAADP and the AUC based staff are very interesting . It seems to affect the capacity of AU-NEPAD to deliver a coherent leadership to the countries, in terms of their political and technical lead and guidance. It was clear from an AUC based staff that this apparent (or real) confusion of roles and responsibilities is undermining the capacity of both NEPAD and AUC based CAADP personnel. For instance, a senior officer expressed his disappointment thus, "Of course, the issue of how it works at both level (NPCA and AUC) is relevant. There is still a bit of confusion among people. This is because the CAADP framework was initiated by NEPAD with support from FAO. With the NEPAD integration process, it seems there is an overlap, which is creating some bottleneck in providing a coordinated and much needed support and guidance to the Member States. There is a collaboration between NPCA and AUC on CAADP, and AUC is leading. However, AUC has lost key staff members, namely the Director of the Division and the CAADP coordinator. And, the process of replacement is still slow" (Interview with a Senior Officer at AUC 008).

One of the major challenges is to get the citizens deeply involved in the CAADP processes. One of the reasons is the lack of information and ownership from the countries (including government high rank staff). For example, a senior officer from the Rural Economy Division of the AUC shared his own thoughts thus, "One thing that I can tell you is, there is no country who knows all these African Union policies. Taking CAADP as an example, if you go and ask your Minister of Agriculture to tell you something about it, he/she would not tell you a thing!" (Interview with a senior officer of the Rural Economy Division AUC011)

In addition, there is an imbalance in terms of real power between the Member States and AUC. While the countries have expertise and resources on the ground, AUC has no expertise (or at least enough to assist countries). Therefore, this makes it difficult for AUC/NEPAD CAADP staff to empower countries and lead the process with technical authority. Often, the interventions from AUC are more talks, no real impact in peoples' lives. They are irrelevant. Moreover, you wonder why Africa is still having famine and starvation despite the massive money spent on all the policies to eliminate hunger in Africa (AUC 011 and AUC 005).

This imbalance results in countries having their own policies that are not always and necessarily in line with these AU policies. "The question countries frequently ask us is: 'What

will AU bring to us? Is it money, knowledge?' The answer is always no! We tell them that there is no money for you; we will facilitate contacts. They would say, ' thank you very much. You can stay there"' (Senior officer at the CAADP Unity at AUC 005). In fact, as stated in the official documents, AU has been putting some effort to assist countries to develop their policies; however it is failing to deliver a concrete significant change in terms of agricultural productivity.

In the processes of drafting CAADP policies there are two areas of focus, namely, one, to review the National Agriculture Investment Plans and develop a second NAIP, where NEPAD leads, and AUC supports, and two, to prepare countries for biannual review: from the Malabo orientation, which is led by AUC with support from NEPAD. The lead of each process develops the guidelines and organises several and different forums to gather different voices. The principle is that all the processes should be country owned and must be widely consultative at country or regional economic community level. At AUC level, a partnership forum is organised with the private sector and focal organisations to strategize on how to work together. These forums are highly consultative, where the private sector, the youths, farmers, civil society organisations, farmers themselves, women are involved in these discussions. For example, one partnership forum may have around 300 delegates. At the final day of the forum a Communiqué is issued, and the recommendations are communicated to the countries for implementation.

However, a variety of interests may differ and may not be addressed at these forums. The most important thing is that the public interest should prevail over individual interests. The officers believe that national governments represent the public interest in the first place. Hence, if there are differing positions from the government and civil society, the government position prevails over the other stakeholders' positions as the one representing the public interest.

This process raises some fundamental questions, 'how are the stakeholders brought into these forums? What about government representatives who are not elected in their own countries? How do they represent the interests of their citizens? How are the representatives of civil society internally selected to be invited by AU? Whose interests do they represent. Answering these questions would shade some lights on the challenges facing citizens in their quest to fully participate in policy making at the AU-NEPAD level.

"One of the things you have to always consider is that most of the civil society organisations are perceived (and I can assure you, more often than not) as representing foreign interests. Most of the most vocal NGOs in different forums are only talking; they have no connection with the field. They do not do anything at all. Some are the so called 'briefcase' NGOs. Therefore, in organising these forums and before making conclusions, we must be very cautious not to include illegitimate voices in the policy making or any decision-making process within the CAADP. I am not saying all the CSOs are not to be trusted, because there are many NGOs that are genuine and doing a very good job from both sides". (Interview with a senior official at NEPAD 004)

Another senior officer at AUC added, "It is very important to ensure that arguments are based on evidence, so we have to carefully scrutinise all the organisations before we invite them. For example, many farmers' organisations are doing a very good job"[17].   Here   you know there is some confusion when you talk about private. Because to me, all these organisations are private: the farmers, women's groups, youth groups, for example are private. Farming is not a private business. We engage them and we provide some support to them" (Interview with a senior officer from the Agribusiness Department of the Rural Economy Division at AUC 001).

Interviewees have voiced their convictions that without the participation of civil society in the AU processes the outcomes would be different, that the implementation would suffer and would not properly address the concerns on the ground, because civil society is the one implementing all AU policies. Regarding AUC, the national governments are the ones implementing policies, while for the national governments the implementers are the farmers and the civil society at large. Hence AU expects the governments to cascade down and ensure ownership by the citizens of the Member States.

The accounts given by all these interviewees provide a clear indication of the struggling nature of the power relations within the institutional AU-NEPAD architecture, that tries   to determine who the Pan-African citizens are. The struggles of this Pan-African Civil Society are not, as

---

[17] He mentions a list of continental organisations. For example, the Continental farmer's organisation based in South Africa (Continental Farmers Association) Eastern Africa Farmers Federation based in Kenya, Southern Africa Farmers Association (SAFA) based in South Africa. There is one for Western Africa, I can't recall now.

Foucault will put it, "to attack the techniques that govern us; a form of power" (Foucault 1982, p. 329–331). Moreover, these struggles of the Pan-African Civil Society are a clear form of resistance that seeks to counterpoise the mainstream hegemonic disciplinary power of the neoliberal AU-NEPAD.

Foucault defends that the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much 'such or such'

an institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but rather a technique, a form of power. This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize, and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects'' (Foucault 1982, p. 782).

This is very revealing for the process of subjectivation of the Pan-African Civil Society organisation, as they struggle for their own making, trying to constitute themselves and build their own identity and knowing who they are, by exercising the power, through resistance in a regime of truth. Foucault sums it up, "there are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to. Generally, it can be said that there are three types of struggles: either against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way-struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission'' (Foucault 1982, p. 782).

6.3.2. The APRM Process

Governance of the continent is one of the key concerns identified by the Head of States of the African Union-NEPAD and resulted in setting up a specific mechanism to assess the level of governance and accountability among the Member States: the African Peer Review Mechanism. This is a mutually agreed programme, voluntarily adopted by the member states of the African Union, to promote and re-enforce high standards of governance (http://www.au.int/en/organs/aprm) viewed regularly.

The official documents indicate that the African Peer Review Mechanism is a New Partnership for Africa's Development's instrument for Member States of the African Union to voluntarily self-monitor themselves. In fact, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) emanates directly from the AU principles related to good governance and people's centred approach set out in the key guiding documents of the Union.

The African Peer Review Mechanism has its roots in the early 2000s, with prominent leaders of that time – Mbeki, of South Africa and Obasanjo, of Nigeria spearheading it, as well as the setting up of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). APRM was initiated in 2002 and established in 2003 by AU as part of NEPAD initiative. It has undergone tremendous transformation in parallel with all African Union and NEPAD. It is today transformed into a Specialised Agency of the African Union (AU). It, however, continues to be a voluntary tool by which African countries are meant, with the support of the APRM Secretariat, to diagnose their governance strengths and weaknesses in the political, economic, corporate, and developmental spheres, and develop and commit to remedies to ameliorate these ailments (SAIIA, 2018).

APRM Timeline
Author's own representation

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 by the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) as an instrument for monitoring performance in governance among Member States. APRM is a self-monitoring instrument, and its membership is voluntary.

By joining APRM, Member States agree to voluntarily and independently review their compliance with African and international governance commitments. Performance and progress are measured in four thematic areas: democracy and political governance; economic

governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development. The process starts with an expression of interest in membership by the AU Member State followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the country and the African Peer Review Forum, after which the review process begins.

Reviews include the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the private sector, civil society, and media. The first review is carried out within 18 months of a Member State joining the APRM and then every two to four years. Members can request a review outside of the usual framework, and the APRM can commission a review at the request of participating Heads of State and Government if there are signs of political and economic crisis. Each review leads to a national programme of action for the state concerned to address problems identified. A monitoring body prepares an annual report on progress in implementing the programme of action for APRM Forum of Heads of State and Government. Country review and implementation reports are made available to the public.

At the 28th AU Summit held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2019 APRM received a boost in terms of its mandate amplifying it to cover the monitoring and evaluation of the AU 2063 Agenda in addition to its core function of monitoring good governance in the continent.

6.3.3. The APRM: Mandate, Purpose and Governance Structure

Mandate and Purpose

According to the official documents the mandate of APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic, and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. Hence, the primary purpose of APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building. The core guiding principle of APRM is that any review exercise carried out under the authority of the

mechanism must be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation (APRM 2003).

Within the reform process, AU mandated APRM with additional areas, namely, to track the governance aspects of the AU's 50-year development blueprint and Agenda 2063 and the UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals. In August 2016, the APRM Forum Heads of States adopted APRM as specialised agency of the African Union, formally integrated into the AU structures and processes. As such it has a focal point at AUC, siting at the office of the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

Governance Structure of the APRM

The Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was conceived to work as a voluntary partnership between government, civil society, and the private sector. Its aim is to address socio-economic problems, improve governance practices and strengthen laws and policies collectively and collaboratively. The key underpinning assumptions and the major philosophy behind the initiatives are to improve African Union governance by improving accountability of the AU to the African citizens. It is believed that, by working together, different stakeholders can address the most pressing issues pertaining to the African continent, there would be improved transparency, greater accountability, and good governance.

Between 2003 and 2014, the mechanism operated as an independent body under a memorandum of understanding signed by Member States. APRM was formally integrated into the AU system at its June 2014 Summit. The AU Assembly formally requested the AU Commission and APRM Secretariat to consult on how to give effect to this integration. (See Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.527 (XXIII). APRM structures are located at both continental and national levels.

The following three bodies are the structures at the continental level.

1)   African Peer Review (APR) Forum: a committee of all participating Member States' Heads of State and Government. The Forum is APRM's highest decision-making authority.

2)   APRM Panel of Eminent Persons: appointed eminent persons with the responsibility of ensuring the Mechanism's independence, professionalism, and credibility. Panel members are

selected and appointed by the Forum for a term of up to four years, except for the Chairperson who is appointed for five years.

3) APRM Secretariat provides technical, coordinating and administrative support services to APRM.

Management Structure at continental level

The Panel of Eminent Persons, according to the official documents, is the management structure of APRM at continental level. It comprises between 5 and 7 eminent persons, African citizens who have distinguished themselves in careers that are considered relevant to the work of the APRM, of high moral stature and have demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism. Heads of participating Member States appoint these candidates after a thorough scrutiny. Researchers consider the APRM process as the first African mechanism with strong potential as a tool to promote and strengthen good governance in the continent (Makara 2009).

In addition, the APRM is having special support agreements with three Africa-based institutions designated by the Forum as strategic partners: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa.

National level

The African Peer Review Mechanism's country guidelines direct member states to set up structures to facilitate effective implementation of the APRM. General practices have been to designate structures such as APRM national focal point, national commission or governing council, national APRM secretariat and technical research institutions.

6.3.4. Review process and country implementation

Accordingly, the APRM process has 5 phases: the first one is self-assessment, where engagement from the APRM secretariat and the country starts, and ground rules and a preliminary plan of action are agreed upon. This involves a study of the political, economic, and corporate governance and development environment in each country prepared by the APRM Secretariat. The second phase is the country review mission which involves the Secretariat country review team visiting the country where the Review Team carried out a wide-range of consultations with key stakeholders including both state and non-state actors; the third phase is

where the country's drafted review report is discussed and agreed on and also includes finalisation of the country plan of action outlining policies and practices for implementation. This implies the preparation of countries' reports by the Review Team based on both the preliminary studies and country-based consultations. This also allow responses to the report given by the governments concerned. The fourth phase consists of presentation and discussion of the country's review team's report and the plan of action at the APRM forum. Here the review team submits its report and the responses from governments to the Heads of State and Government, through the APRM Secretariat who are expected to consider and adopt the final report. Finally, the report is tabled to the AU Summit and is published (*APRM 2002, APRM 2003*).

The official documents indicate that the African Peer Review Mechanism is a voluntary compliance process amongst member states of the African Union who wish to avail themselves of the review process ((*APRM 2002, APRM 2003*). Moreover, the same official documents state that participation in the process is open to all member states of the African Union and that after adoption of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance by the African Union, countries wishing to participate in the APRM will notify the Chairman of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. This entails an undertaking to submit to periodic peer reviews, as well as to facilitate such reviews, and be guided by agreed parameters for good political governance and good economic and corporate governance.

The initial process of peer review started with only four countries, namely Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and Mauritius. These countries volunteered to start the process, which was a mutual learning one. The first countries to reach the final completion stage are Rwanda and Ghana, which submitted their reports for consideration and adoption by the APRM Forum (the highest authority on the African Peer Review). After these two pioneer countries, others followed including South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria and Algeria. This was an indication of the commitment of the African countries to the voluntary process of self-assessment and peer review.

In the first 3 years, that is from 2003 to 2005, a significant number of twenty-three countries signed the MOU on APRM, that is, they voluntarily underwent the peer review process. They are (in alphabetic order) Angola, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo,

Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

However, during the first decade, only 17 countries had the most solid, comprehensive and honest review, hence their reports were published. And this slow path in the past decade was reinforced by poor performance in the implementation. Most enthusiastic member countries have failed to implement the recommendations of the reports. More so, the commitment of the head of states started to fade away. Most of them delegated authority to their ministers; those who do not have the same political clout to attend the peer review mechanism's annual forums, which were held on the sidelines of African Union summits. This state of affair has weakened the APRM process; it has turned it into a technical exercise and uncritical review instead of a platform for honest and open discussion between African leaders about governance of the Continent.

Unfortunately for the African citizens, the enthusiasm of the first years has turned into a deception. Countries became reluctant in joining the APRM; thus, things went from bad to worse. To proof this, not a single state was reviewed between 2013 and 2016.

By mid-2007, at least 27 countries acceded to the APRM review process and by mid-2018 a total of 37 countries undertook or at least initiated the review. At the beginning of 2019, 38 AU Member States had joined the APRM by signing its Memorandum of Understanding. Seventeen (17) countries out of 38 have completed their self-assessments and have been peer-reviewed by the Forum, while three (3) countries (Djibouti, Chad and Senegal) have completed their self-assessment and are expected to be released at any time. Some countries such as Senegal, Mozambique and Kenya are in their second generation of APRM process.

The list of all countries undertaking the APRM processes is below:

Table 3. List of Countries adhering to APRM

Algeria	Cote d'Ivoire	Ghana	Mozambique	South Africa
Angola	Egypt	Liberia	Nigeria	United Rep of Tanzania
Benin	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Republic of Congo	Togo
Botswana	Ethiopia	Mali	Rwanda	Tunisia
Burkina Faso	Gabon	Mauritania	São Tomé and Príncipe	Uganda
Cameroon	Gambia	Mauritius	Senegal	Zambia
Chad	Kenya	Namibia	Sierra Leone	
Djibouti	Lesotho	Niger	Sudan	

Source: APRM

As APRM commemorated its 15th Anniversary on 9 March 2018, many actors began to understand that the APRM process is getting a renewal and revival since the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta became the sitting Head of the APRM Forum for two years´ term including the appointment of a new CEO, Professor Eddy Maloka of South Africa, and the launching of an ambitious strategic plan for 2016-2020 (the first in the APRM's history). This accelerated the desire of more countries to be reviewed and more new countries to join the APRM. However, over 15 years since the establishment of the APRM only 38 out of 55 countries adhered to the mechanism. This shows there is the need for more commitment to governance by the AU member states. Out of these only a handful of countries have completed the second wave of the APRM process.

The PRM process and African Civil Society

The APRM process is the premier governance and self-monitoring system. Most studies consider it to be a valuable opportunity for civil society engagement and a platform for CS to get key problems and solutions onto national agenda. It hopes to inspire a more open, collaborative national conversation on governance. However, it touches on very sensitive subjects; therefore, many governments fear the consequences of an unrestrained APRM debate and thus have significant incentives to want to control the process by appointing allies to the various peer review institutions (Herbert 2007). In addition, most of the studies consider only participation of national civil society at country level and there is very little reference to the making of Pan-African Society within the APRM continuum.

Morbi argues that during the first ten years of existence, NEPAD has had some very significant successes. And he points out the adoption of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as one of these remarkable successes, which is accordingly designed to candidly assess the continent's biggest problems, identifies needed actions and secure commitments from the country under review for fixing those problems (Morbi 2011:34). Hence, he underscores the role of the APRM in identifying the biggest issues and possible solutions and their categorisation into four focus areas: 1-Democracy and Good Political Governance; 2-Economic Governance and Management; 3-Corporate Governance; and 4-Socio-Economic Development (Morbi 2011).

According to Moyo, the APRM consultative process is one of the most inclusive mechanisms, particularly at the national level. The structure of the APRM and its principles provide reasonable space for various civil society and other stakeholders to interact with governments at national level on issues like democracy, transparency, human rights, poverty, and service delivery. There is provision for a national coordinating mechanism based on broad-based representation from all sectors of civil society and government. A panel of CSOs in the national process incorporates all non-governmental actors, including business and the media. In most cases, governments provide political leadership and then step back, leaving the national governing council to run with the process. Hence, in most countries, chairpersons of the APRM national review process are members of civil society. Undoubtedly, APRM presents unique opportunities to involve all sectors of government and civil society. However, there are

challenges regarding spaces provided by APRM, for example, around lack of information regarding civil society participation, representation, and full access in the review process. Ghana's review process showed how government can maintain a low presence and delegate critical duties to CSOs, but the South African and Kenyan processes showed how a government-driven and dominated process could lead to either co-option or the silencing of critical voices (Moyo, 2007).

The APRM and African Civil Society: Challenges and Opportunities

The inclusive nature of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) provides space for interfacing and engagement between governments and civil society, especially at the country level. Spaces for civil society are provided by the very nature of the review process at country level, which demands extensive consultations with all organised and unorganised citizenry. The review process cannot be legitimate unless citizens are involved. One of the reasons civil society organisations should be involved in APRM, especially the Secretariat is that in practice there are limitations in terms of the extent to which civil society and citizens are involved, even in the national processes. Some governments have tended to drive and dominate the process, resulting in co-optation or silencing of critical voices.

Senior officers at the APRM Secretariat in Johannesburg have given their own perceptions about the APRM processes, its challenges, and opportunities as well as the issues coming from the country level processes. For example, one of the officers interviewed commented, "Compared with most of the African Union initiatives, APRM is a heavily bottom- top organisation; it is different from NEPAD, AUC, and CAADP, etc. In principle, this gives APRM a much more grounded foot in the country's processes'' (senior office at APRM Secretariat-003).

However, most of the officers acknowledged that the APRM had faced several challenges since its inception in 2002/3. One of the challenges they pointed out is the fact that adherence to its mechanism is voluntary . This makes countries not to adhere to the process, leaving the secretariat with no mechanisms to forcefully implement the APRM process. They also highlighted the inability of the Secretariat to support countries in implementing not only the critical governance recommendations, but the whole issue of governance in each country.

The officers pointed out that it is difficult to support countries to implement the recommendations because the cost of the Secretariat support must come from them and it is their responsibility to mobilise resources. This is one of the key hindrances to the full implementation of the APRM process in addition to the lack of enforcement measures which could press the countries to implement the APRM the way stated in the legal constitutive documents (APRM 003). For example, ''when you arrive at a given country, you will find that most of the National APRM Unit members (mostly the government representatives) have other critical national responsibilities lying in their shoulders, hence they are not fully available to participate in the meetings. Additionally, when you plan to go to the field out of the capital city, you would find that national APRM unity has no resources to assign members to participate in these meetings, and so on… You see, funding the consultative process is also a huge challenge to our full operation" (senior officer at the APRM Secretariat 05)

There is a vast literature on APRM and leading civil society and governance experts from across the African continent who look at the critical role of civil society in the APRM; it draws lessons on how to both improve the engagement of civil society in the APRM, and how the APRM might better be integrated into the activities of organisations and communities striving to improve the quality of governance and development in African states (Masterson, Busia and Jinadu, 2010).

Researchers find that challenges of implementing APRM continent-wide are enormous; they include the very principle of voluntary self-review, which poses several limitations for enforcement and undermines the authority of the APRM Secretariat, lack of clear incentives other than being seen as a good country, lack of financing mechanisms for annual plans as most countries do not pay their USD $200,000 annual contribution, delay in publishing countries' reports after deliberation from the APRM Forum, lack of enforcement incentives for countries to implement the recommendations for improvement, aligning country priorities in terms of agenda with the Secretariat's priorities, etc. (Masterson, Busia and Jindu 2010; SAII 2018).

It is worth noting that the APRM endured a period of clear stagnation after its first impetus and momentum. However, after Professor Eddy Moroka, of South Africa took office as the Chief Executive Officer, a new dynamism was brought in, and a new strategy was developed. The APRM Secretariat's new 'Three Rs strategy' has begun to restore, reinvigorate and renew

the mechanism. Reviews have been re-started, there is greater innovation and energy around the APRM, and confidence is being rebuilt. Yet challenges remain: increasing political commitment, fostering civil society involvement, garnering sustainable funding, implementing action plans, and demonstrating value addition (SAIIA 2018).

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter has brought forward some key features of the making of the Pan-African Civil Society. Arguably, by using Foucault's governmentality approach and the theorising of power, power relations and resistance, one can draw the conclusion that within the AU-NEPAD and Pan-African Civil Society power relations, resistance and power are intertwined factors. Therefore, power and political struggles and social change sought by the Pan-African Civil Society are mainly based on resistance practices, which appear in different forms, such the techniques of the self, discursive resistance, counter-conducts, reverse discourse, contestation and antiauthority practices. However, it is evident that despite these struggles and resistance, the governmentality of the AU-NEPAD disempowers Pan-African Civil Society, by exercising their hegemonic power and authoritarian practices to impose top-down and government heavy policy and decision-making processes. This is a conclusion not easily attainable using the traditional classic governance framework, hence it constitutes a key contribution of this dissertation to the Pan-African Civil Society making under the neoliberalised AU-NEPAD arrangement.

The attempt to answer the underlying question of what the strategies of rule are used by the AU-NEPAD to constitute and contest Pan-African Civil Society is a hard one. However, a close look at the findings shows patterns resonating with the mainstream literature on African Participatory Governance. In fact, the mainstream literature speaks about the restrictive regulations and the shrinking space for civic engagement, and the national governments raising different reasons to justify this phenomenon. Nevertheless, most of this analysis is made from a classic governance framework, which emphasizes institutional power of the government over the governed. There is a clear gap in terms of analysis of power from a Foucauldian perspective to understand the different forms of power being played out and the technologies being used in

the exercise of self-government and the resistance produced by the power exercised over the governed as a disciplinary power.

In trying to address these gaps, the study used the Foucauldian discourse analysis and found that there is a clear disconnect between the discourse on citizens driven AU-NEPAD that emanated in most of the constitutive documents and the praxis of enabling civil society to engage in decision making processes. Though more can be drawn from the findings of this study, for example, it is reasonable to get to the conclusion that there is a clear tension and misrepresentation between the African Civil Society and the AU-NEPAD, throughout the spectrum of AU-NEPAD structures and processes. Moreover, the power relation between Pan-African institutions is a continuum of a regulated and unregulated battle characterised by co-optation based on ´divide and rule´ strategy and resistance. While on the one hand, the AU-NEPAD uses the Constitutive Act and all the provisions thereafter, to promote an African civil society participation in the AU-NEPAD processes. On the other hand, however, it is also clear that AU-NEPAD structures, based on the same instruments and other complementary dispositions, selectively discriminate Pan-African Civil Society in their involvement in policy making. The AU-NEPAD structures use the co-optation and divide-and-rule strategies to limit critical voices of the Pan African Civil Society. Using different techniques and strategies the AU-NEPAD has been contesting the legitimacy of Pan-African Civil Society, which makes one to wonder why. Arguably the answer is not hard to find. AU-NEPAD has, by all means, been playing its role as a neoliberal arrangement, but it needs civil society to legitimise itself as well as to comply with neoliberal commandments and be seen as a ´disciplined subject´ in the eyes of the promoters of neoliberal policies. However, it fears civil society who questions antidemocratic, dictatorial, and corrupt practices, and advances the views and rights of ordinary Africans. Hence, it uses the techniques of co-opting and dividing work well to weaken civil society. These techniques are used to perpetuate the existing institutional power relations that disempower citizens and reinforce the hegemony of the state and the private over the civil society. In other words, the prevailing relationship between the Pan-African Civil Society and AU-NEPAD reinforces the predicaments of the neoliberal global system.

There are restrictive regulations regarding citizens' involvement in formal spaces making the participation of Pan-African Civil Society hard. AU organs and institutions are far too bureaucratic and elitist. Only government officials of member states are granted access to the

AU headquarter in Addis Ababa; it is not the building of the African citizens. Although the visa issue to access Addis Ababa is improving, it is still prohibitive. To access AU organs or institutions one must depend on someone; it is not a formal institutional practice. Although the AU architecture is designed to advance neoliberal commandments of promoting human rights, the rule of law, the capacity of AU organs and institutions to engage African citizens is reduced, due to human resources constraints and an institutionalised lack of political will.

In some cases, civil society faces restrictive practices, even though there are legal frameworks that allow their operation. However, the informal powers or ´hidden and invisible powers´ (Gaventa 2005) make the participation of civil society hard. It is a discursive environment that encourages civil society participation, whereas the praxis tells the opposite. More so, civil society finds itself struggling within these environments.

The case study has clearly shown that there has been an emergence of a number of associations, networks, and other forms of interactions among NGOs in Africa in recent years. These organisations located in various African Union member states have been working either as truly Pan-African bodies or as country entities with concern on African development. The level of their size, maturity, and capacity to engage national, regional, or African processes vary greatly. It was also observed that there is an increasing trend towards economic regionalisation in Africa, which is leading organisations to work at the regional and continental level in order to effectively address most of the issues related to the AU-NEPAD, which are transnational in nature.

The empirical data highlight the struggle of Pan African Civil Society to engage with the AU-NEPAD architecture. Civil society faces external challenges related to shrinking civic spaces, and suspicious perception of their mission and interests, and scarcity of reliable external funding mechanism as well as internal challenges related to their capacity, heterogeneity, legitimacy, and competition over resources. Under this challenging environment, the making of the Pan African Civil Society is a reality; however, it must work hard to get through the government heavy controlled AU structures. The organisation of parallel and informal spaces to increase the number and quality of Pan African citizens' participation is a strategic move that is played together with the mainstream strategy of engaging directly with the AU organs, including the ECOSOCC at continental level or directly engaging government and their institutions at country level. This corroborates with the Foucauldian understanding of practices

of resistance, which can come from many different forms, mainly as a counter-conduct, discursive resistance, counter-discursive reversal, technology of the self, anti-authoritarianism movements, disobedience, etc.

The AU-NEPAD uses a top-down governmentality in total contrast with the bottom up process of Pan-African Civil Society that suffers from legitimacy deficit. It is fragmented and individualistic (competing with one another), they lack sustainable financing (dependent on external funding only), and the institutional environment within the AU-NEPAD structures and processes is not totally conducive to civic activity. It mostly shows a tendency of authoritarianism, expressed as domination through disciplinary power over the citizens in a clear top-down driven approach. The AU-NEPAD governance architecture provides for citizens' and stakeholders' participation as an institution-wide principle; however, the praxis and operationalisation of these principles are still far from smooth and consensual. This creates rooms for mutual suspicion (the Pan African Civil Society and the AU-NEPAD structures) leading to less participatory decision making within the AU-NEPAD. These are the major problems identified by this study in the making of Pan-African Civil Society and its role in the governance of the continent. Looking at the ladder of African citizens' participation, one can conclude that the participation of civil society within the AU-NEPAD processes covers completely the first 5 stages of participation, that is manipulation, therapy, consultation, and placation (these are stages of non-participation according to Arnstein), and slightly less on partnership. The last stages of genuine and meaningful participation - delegation and control of power - are far from being achieved, even for the APRM process at national level where some form of delegation through citizens´ forums is marginally achieved.

Where does African Civil Society stand within the political reform of the AU architecture for us to achieve the Africa we want in the next future? To answer this fundamental question, and subsequent questions, such as 'what constitutes Pan-African Civil Society in the context of liberalised Pan-African Institutions?', the data collected in this research are examined as well as the fault lines in the making of Pan-African Civil Society within the context of the AU-NEPAD process. By identifying the active fault lines, which helped to reveal the areas where major frictions might build up into a conflicting relationship between the Pan-African Civil Society and the AU-NEPAD, it is noted that the key features of power relations in the context of AU-NEPAD intersection with African civil society are the wide power dispersion and a

strong suspicious relationship between AU-NEPAD formal structures and the civil society at different levels (national-regional and continental), making it difficult to engage in a meaningful manner. This is in line with what Self (1985) highlights that there is a need for coordinated efforts to be effective and efficient in a context of power dispersion, otherwise the society becomes ineffective and inefficient.

To address these fault lines, 3 key areas of friction are looked into, namely Financing of civil society organisations to allow quality participation in policy and advocacy work; Constituencies, *endogenousation* and legitimacy; and Inclusion and partnerships, to allow a much needed coordination and ownership. Each one of these areas is elaborated below.

Financing of Civil Society Organisations (FCSO)

The research found out that, like in some countries in Africa, at the continental level, new policies and AU governing decisions and practices have been blocking the ability of Pan-African Civil Society Organisations (PACSOs) to fully participate in policy. They restrict the organisations from accessing foreign funding and participation spaces. This is through the divide-and-rule policies, where access to the formal participation spaces is selective based on sympathy and not criteria.

The only organ of the African Union that encompasses members of civil society in Africa is ECOSOCC, which is mandated by the African Union leaders to advance citizens' engagement in all African Union matters. Access to this organ is still restrictive. Civil society contests this organ because of its inability to democratically work towards advancing the mission emanated by the Constitutive Act of the African Union. In fact, this organ is co-opted and is working for the Heads of States. Although last developments are sending some signals of hope, with the establishment of the first Secretariat in Lusaka, Zambia, which is believed will likely give the much-needed autonomy and logistical boost to the functioning of ECOSOCC. In addition, the new leadership of the organ is working towards listening to the civil society. How this will turn around the co-optation and start delivering on its mandate is yet to be seen.

The membership of ECOSOCC is to some extent hindering full and meaningful participation of several Pan African Civil Society organisations, namely the funding criterion in which their basic resources should be at least 50% from own sources. This, in many cases, is beyond the capacity of many Pan-formal African Civil Society organisations, let alone the vast grassroots

organisations, constituting most of the indigenous societal groupings in Africa. It is consensual that the majority of vocal CSOs are heavily funded by international aid donors, leaving small room for organisations to qualify for membership. The question CSOs ask is 'why is this only meant for CSOs and not for AU-NEPAD itself and the governments of Member States?' It is widely known that most of African Governments' budgets rely heavily on external funding, mainly form the West (although in recent years, they get from China).

To gain some autonomy and the needed capacity to engage meaningfully and to counteract this situation, civil society in Africa is debating and working towards sustainability, including funding of Pan African Civil Society. This is now top of the agenda of the debate among PACSOs. The idea of indigenous funding is being debated, with some voices defending the African philanthropy approach to be one of the strategies used to resolve the funding woe. The sustainability debate goes far beyond the funding debate to touch complex and sensitive issues such as structural and systemic policy constitution and motivation. Whereas the later can be solved by finding reliable funding sources within and outside the civil society themselves, the former is deeply imbedded in the very nature of civil society in Africa; it speaks of the ownership of civil society, that is, who are the members of CS, how are the representatives elected, how is decision-making within the CS processed, whose voices and interests does the CS represent, etc. Underpinning all these concerns is the fundamental question of the legitimacy of the Pan African Civil Society. In other words, which constituency is Pan African Civil Society organisations truly representing? Is this the same they claim to be representing? The answers to these questions bring us to the second area of friction.

Constituencies, *Endogenisation* and Legitimacy (CEL)

The big contentious view of the AU-NEPAD neo-liberalised architecture that Pan African Civil Society organisations do not represent African interests as they are advancing western agendas for Africa brought a negative conceptualisation of Pan African Civil Society in Africa. Official AU discourse highlights and raises the issue of legitimate representation of the African citizens, by arguing that the governments of Member States are the only elected institutions to represent their citizens; therefore, they do not see Pan African Civil Society organisations legitimately representing the interests of their respective citizens. Firstly, they do not have constituencies; most of the organisations are either ´suitcase´ type of organisations or

undemocratic institutions themselves because they do not hold regular elective processes for their leadership; they have few group/clubs. Secondly, most of them are just accommodating a few number of illuminated individuals who take advantage of some dissatisfied African citizens and give themselves the responsibility of representing these citizens, or speaking on their behalf. Thirdly, most of these civil society organisations in Africa have no membership base within Africa and if they do, most of their funding comes from outside of Africa. This makes them accountable to these sources of funding, hence not accountable to their members or to African citizens. These arguments and the perceived or factual factors make Pan African Civil Society to be seen as not endogenous enough to speak on behalf of the people of Africa, and, eventually, not genuine enough to criticise AU-NEPAD processes and structures. Arguably, this delegitimises and disempowers Pan African civil society and is being used by the AU-NEPAD to contest the making of African civil society when it is convenient for them to avoid factual criticism.

As a counter marginalisation, Pan African Civil Society needs to cultivate and establish clear democratic practices, which include regular elective processes for leadership change, establish check and balance mechanisms (accountability and transparency) with their constituencies and increase endogenous and sustainable financing. More so, PACS need to re-engage with their constituencies and promote membership culture within their constitutions. Implementing these measures, there will be high likelihood for citizens to see PACS organisations as a relevant actor for their development and they will regain their lost legitimacy. This process is termed *endogenousation*, that is, the process of bringing up endogenous resources, culture, knowledge, and power back to the centre of development in Africa. It is a closer concept to Africanicity (Africanness/Africanity, which emphasizes the civilisation past of Africans rather than the territorial and political nature of the continent), in contrast to Afrocentricity. However, *endogenousation* goes far beyond bringing the dimension of sustainability and an inner driven development mind-set into play.

In short, and borrowing from the conceptualisation of indigenous knowledge, *endogenousation* shall be termed as the process where "a common set of social practices based on the production and reproduction of norms, regulations, incentive structures, and sanctions (social institutions) *are put at the service of an inclusive and sustainable self-development*. These social practices are understood as expressions of specific values, which for their part, are understood by people

as rooted in their basic assumptions about what the world is composed of (ontology) and what one can know about it (epistemology)" (Rist 2011:123).

Inclusion and Partnerships (IP)

It was demonstrated that Pan-African Civil Society is not a homogeneous institution in size and complexity; there is an asymmetric distribution of Pan African Civil Society through the different geographies and within regional settings or country level. In fact, in a single country, there is a constellation of different categories of civil society organisations, with very differentiated capacities, maturities and vision of the country's development priorities, let alone in the region or continent, where there is an overwhelming challenge to get a grasp of the types and categories of civil society institutions to group them into.

In this context, inclusion becomes crucial, so that all strata of the civil society shall feel included and as part and parcel of the development endeavours of the continent. This calls on the need for partnership building among civil society institutions. Partnership can harness the potential of CS and enhance capacity building among organisations. It can address critical issues, such as reaching out to communities and constituencies, funding scarcity, links and engagement with government and AU structures at different levels, as well as building knowledge stream.

Finally, what is the implication of the concept of civil society in Africa for the globe? To answer this question, one has to conclude that the concept of civil society has gained different meanings and perspectives. Firstly, it is a descriptive and analytical framework used to explore the relationships between actors in society, including their functions and structures. It entails examining the scope and size of the civil society and its relations with the state institutions at country or continental level as well as its role in amplifying the reach out of state in delivering goods to the society or in policy monitoring and influencing. Secondly, it is a framework used to challenge the hegemonic and existing power relations. That is, civil society is an actor that challenges the mainstream existing powers, looking at the forms of resistance and power, providing alternatives or balancing it. Civil society as a concept is no longer preoccupied on taking over the state power; instead, it is focused on the ´counter conduct of the self´, creating alternative spaces which enable communal organisations. This harnesses endogenous

knowledge and power; that is, it brings up a particular, local and regional knowledge, making power an everyday thing. As Foucault emphasizes, it contributes to strengthening and elaborating on neoliberal governmentality. It also shows that using Foucauldian analysis as a tool, it crosses the cultural and political divide and can help to understand the power relations in both the Western civilisations and the non-western geopolitical contexts, such as the African geographies.

Pan-African Civil Society mainly complains of a continuous shrinking of civic space in the continent, at AU-NEPAD level as well as throughout the countries in the continent. To argument this tendency, governments, normally, raise concerns about national security, the rise of terrorism and religious extremism to justify the implementation of restrictive measures for civil society activities. However, some studies show that most of these measures are due to the need to shut down legitimate claims for fundamental human rights, democratic spaces and other economic and socio-political claims, and are a way to maintain the existing power relations and strict control over power. The idea of no-legitimate Pan-African Civil Society is crystalized with the funding argument, that civil society is funded by western countries and does not truly represent grassroots voices. The same western powers fund most of the African nations' budgets, including that of the AU-NEPAD. Of course, they started receiving funding from China in recent years.

Pan-African Civil Society summarized the key recommendations for the AU-NEPAD architecture, and these are highlighted in their ´African Union we want´ analysis of the African Union 2063 agenda. Mainly, civil society envisages an open, democratic, and transparent AU, that is, African leaders thriving to democratise African affairs respect human rights and the rule of law, being governed by democratising principles, and being accountable to the African people. They want a united and prosperous Africa as a strong global player; they want AU leaders to put Africa first, facilitate interaction and mobility for all Africans, promote peace and security for Africa as one and put Africa in the global market using its value addition. They want a people´s centred AU, that is, an AU that promotes broad-based and wide-ranging people centred governance of the continent co-owned by the African civil society, the private sector and the AU, promoting direct benefit for all African citizens.

Chapter VII

Case study 2: The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Remaking of African Civil Society in Mozambique

7.1.Introduction

This chapter discusses two AU-NEPAD policy processes at country level, looking at the making of National civil society and their role in domesticating these continent-wide policies. The use of Foucauldian governmentality analytical framework helps to zoom-in the technologies of rule and strategies used by the AU-NEPAD and the national government of Mozambique to promote and contest the making of African civil society. In addition, the use of Arnstein's Ladder of citizens´ participation and the power cube helps to deepen the understanding of the level of participation of civil society, the spaces for citizens' participation and the nature and types of power being played and negotiated. To accomplish that, the dissertation started by drawing a short historical, political, social, and economic pathway, and then discusses the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector, and the Governance and decentralisation, before discussing the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development programme (CAADP) and the Remaking of African Civil Society in Mozambique. Finally, it discusses the African Peer Review Mechanism (PRM) and the Remaking of African Civil Society in Mozambique and gives a short concluding remark for the chapter.

Historical, Political, Social and Economic Pathway

Mozambique is a country located in Southern East Africa, with a coastline of about 3,000 km along the Indian Ocean. Like many African countries, it is well endowed with natural resources. However, it still ranks very low in human development indicators as well as economic and governance indicators. Since Mozambique attained its independence in June 1975 from the Portuguese colonial rule, the country had undergone tremendous changes in societal structure and governance.

For the first 10 years after its independence, the country clearly followed socialist political, social and economic development pathway, with a one party state and focused on social justice. This period ended with the assassination of the first president of the nation, Samora Machel, in October 1986. This marked the up rise of neoliberal and capitalist forces through the introduction of market-oriented economy and privatisation of the economy. However, a prolonged civil war (16+ years) opposing the government led by FELIMO party to the RENAMO (National Resistance Movement), continued beyond the killing of the first president and had several consequences in the country's economy and social issues. It is worth noting that in 1992, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the government of President Joaquim Chissano and the leader of the rebel movement, Afonso Dhlakama. This paved the way for a new constitution that provided for multi-party democratic system.

The introduction of economic reforms led by the International Financial Institutions, chiefly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank started even before the democratic dispensation was introduced. In fact, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries´ Initiative (HIPC) was introduced by the World Bank, and in 1987, the IMF and World Bank led the introduction of a comprehensive Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). This was operationalized through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), that worked until 1990. The SAF was replaced by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) meant for a period of 5 years until 1995; however, it was renewed for a new 5 years' term ending in 1999. Then, it was replaced by a policy framework paper (PFP), named Economic Management Reform, that lasted between 1999 and 2002. These strategies were all based on the thinking that good planning and straightforward implementation of the plans was enough to make poverty reduction come true in Mozambique and in all developing countries as it did for most of the now developed countries in the 1950s and 1960s. All these policies failed to bring the desired development to the country. The failure to uplift or sustain the country has brought about a different approach to poverty reduction that the World Bank and the IMF have championed, namely, the Poverty Reductions Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The Bretton Woods institutions believed that these policies represented a hope to bring a desirable breakthrough in poverty alleviation in all developing countries, including Mozambique. Major improvements from the previous policies were a broad-based participation of all stakeholders, mainly national civil society that can meaningfully participate, through (1) information sharing, (2) consultation, (3)

joint decision making and (4) initiation and control of the policy making processes. This represented a considerable shift by placing emphasis on participation as an important tool for empowerment; hence, considering it as a central instrument of effective poverty alliviation policy making process. However, leading the deepening of the neoliberal driven development in Mozambique, it failed to bring about genuine development.

The Agriculture and Rural Development Sector

As early as 1999 a comprehensive agricultural programme was proposed and financed by the World Bank, the so-called Mozambique - Agricultural Sector Public Expenditure Programme Project (PROAGRI). Looking at the financing requirement underpinning the programme and the whole principles, it is not hard to reach the conclusion that this was a neoliberal driven initiative. For instance, PROAGRI's aim was to facilitate the financing of agriculture sector in Mozambique, with its focus on Market-Oriented Policy, that is, a. Policies and activities encourage competitive private sector initiatives in markets for agricultural markets, agricultural inputs and outputs; b. Appropriate actions taken to establish enabling environment for the development of competitive and efficient markets for agricultural inputs and outputs.

Although, it included a level of small holder farmers' consideration in a very subtle way. In essence, the focus of this policy programme was market driven. It is well illustrated with the following principle: "PROAGRI's contribution to food security objectives pursued through increased and quality of national food production; used to monitor food increased capacity for import, respecting principles of a liberalised market; emphasis on smallholders' development; access to and security of land and water rights, especially for smallholders are guaranteed" (PROAGRI proposal Doc:58).

According to the World Bank report, Mozambique's farming sector is composed by approximately 98% of peasant farmers, of which 89% are women (World Bank, 2012). In addition, the country is blessed with diverse natural resource, including water, strategic minerals, and oil and gas, as well as fertile and abundant land. The National Institute for Agrarian Research (INIA, currently known as IIAM) indicates that Mozambique is composed by 10 agro-ecological regions (INIA, 2000) with a total arable land of roughly 36 million hectares. According to the Central Bank of Mozambique, the agriculture sector has a key weight in the economy of the country, contributing 22.6% of the GDP in 2013 (Banco de Moçambique, 2014) and 20% of total exports (Vunjanhe and Adriano, 2015).

Two concomitant factors, the launch of the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2007, and the dramatic food price increase of 2007-2008 triggered by the global financial crisis, have propelled Mozambique to develop its Green Revolution Strategy. The main aim of the strategy is to improve agricultural productivity by increasing production areas and improving the utilization of commercial seeds and chemical fertilisers as well as investing in irrigation and mechanisation. The strategy for green revolution in Mozambique was associated with a wave of agribusiness, including the promotion of biofuels (Vunjanhe and Adriano, 2015). It is within this framework that the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP) arrived in Mozambique and provided impetus for the neoliberalisation of the Agrarian sector, whose first compact was signed in 2010. The development of key strategies and sectoral policies was part of this reform. Currently, the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA, 2011-2020) is the policy instrument, which is aligned with the country's regional and international commitments, in particular the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP). As clearly stated in this policy document, the focus is strategic identification of farming areas with greatest potential for economic development, and target key resources to these areas, in line with key CAADP targets. They include the increase in agriculture of 7% per year, and the budget allocation of 6%. The focus remains mainly on value chain and agro-industrial approach rather than addressing the structural issues which keep household farmers in poverty. The implementation of this policy is operationalsed through the National Agricultural Investment Plan (PNISA), corresponding to the CAADP National Investment Plan (NIP), which focuses on creating enabling environment for growth of agribusiness through the creation of large export corridors under major investments from the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (Vunjanhe and Adriano, 2015). Currently, Mozambique is fully entrenched in the CAADP process. A key question is, 'how is this process affecting the allocation of resource to agriculture?' Looking at its principles of inclusive participation, CAADP should bring in the civil society and media to the implementation of activities and the policymakers´ table involved in the agricultural sector in addition to their role of educating the public on the country's investment needs and policy processes. It is worth noting that with the Malabo Declaration the targets have changed considerable, and Mozambique is updating them in the national policies and strategies. Under this policy and respective investment plan several agrarian megaprojects were approved by the government.

For example, the ProSAVANA programme signed tween the Japanese Government and Mozambique is a Brazilian inspired project (from the PRODECER, a Japanese Project in Brazil). It is important to highlight that the large-scale allocation of land to global investors for plantation, agriculture, and forestry; and the established trade policies associated with powerful elites in the food trade business, together with deteriorating real terms of trade between agricultural output and (imported) inputs have been working as disincentives for increased production and diversification in smallholder agriculture (Weimer and Carrilho 2015).

Mozambique has experienced two different APRM processes. The country was among the first 9 countries to launch a process of peer review since the APRM process was launched in 2003, and it was the first Portuguese-speaking state to do so. This has given opportunity for other members of the APRM to comment on and recommend improvements to the standards of a country's governance practices in the areas of democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development.

The country had the first cycle which took very long time to crystallize and to yield the appropriate results. Many lessons were learned in terms of the processes, including the engagement of the different stakeholders. As a result, the second cycle of APRM in the country was improved in terms of deepening the participation of different stakeholders, although many members of the civil society have voiced their disappointment with the level of engagement for several critical events during the process.

The assessment of the first cycle of APRM in Mozambique showed that there is still a deep culture of an overlap between the interests of the ruling party and that of government and the private (Interwovenness). This has deep roots from the initial independence days, where a single party state was formed and no opposition parties were allowed, making it indistinctive the boundaries between party and the state apparatus. Hence, the entrenched Frelimo's interests (the ruling party since Mozambique gained its independence from the Portuguese colonisers in June 1975) more often than not surpasses the state´s interests, with insufficient pressure from civil society to hold the government and business accountable. This situation is well documented by an article, 'I Didn't Struggle to be Poor: The Interwovenness of Party, State and Business in Mozambique´ cited in the APRM Country Report in July 2010.

In fact, the report noted that the interwovenness of the party, government and business interest, that is, overlapping of political party officials, government officials and the business sector interests needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency if Mozambique wants to address the negative effects of these corrupt practices. The report suggests that Civil Society, the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons and the government must take additional measures, bearing in mind that Mozambique, like most of the other African countries, has a plethora of anticorruption policies and initiatives, though not implemented at all or very poorly enforced, in an entrenched culture of impunity and patronage (APRM Country Report in July 2010).

The launching of the second assessment report was an occasion to assembly some of the key stakeholders and hear the reactions of the government. At the ceremony, the President of the country expressed his commitment in carrying out initiatives to implement the recommendations presented by the report and expressed his acknowledgement and appreciation of the support from Civil Society and International Organisations on the process, which, according to his statement, have contributed to the high quality of the final product. The second report has seen the involvement of various stakeholders in the preparation of reviews, such as the Government and civil society actors, coordinated by the National APRM Forum, and supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with funding from several development partners.

Governance and decentralisation

As pointed out above, the official turn in the orientation of the country was possible after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 1992. This gave room to the first ever multi-party democratic elections in 1994 and the electing of President Chissano and a new parliament of 250 members in November 1994. Since then, regular democratic elections take place, although with localised conflicts emerging from contestation of the results. In 1998, the first municipal elections (for mayors and local assemblies) took place in 33 cities and small towns, which were home to almost 20 % of the people. Gradually, 10 more small towns were incorporated into the decentralisation process, making them 53 municipalities, elevating about a quarter of all citizens, having the privilege of local self-governance. Nevertheless, about 75 % of all Mozambicans were still governed by provincial and district administrations that are ultimately controlled by Maputo until 2019. Some analysts say that the largest change that the

entire decentralisation process has brought about thus far in Mozambique is the emergence of new local political elites formed by all three relevant parties (FRELIMO; RENAMO and MDM). These people have risen to the top despite their limited authority, financial resources, and qualifications, and they enjoy the status and wealth accumulation that comes with it (Weimer and Carrilho 2015).

In 2019, an adhoc constitution amendment was undertaken to accommodate disputes between the opposition and the siting government, allowing for the extension of local elections to the provinces; hence the provincial governors and their local assembly members were elected in October 2019 and sworn in, in January 2020.

The governance of Mozambique is characterized by a deeply rooted system of patronage and nepotism alike. There is evident lack of separation of power between the 3 state sovereign powers, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, including promiscuity with the private sector and a blurred distinction between state apparatus, the government of the day and the governing party. Notwithstanding the promiscuity between certain civic organisations with the State and governing party, Fourie (2016) considers it as the interwovenness of party, government, state machinery and business interests overlapping. The network of corruption that permeates all levels of society is now entrenched in the country; therefore, anyone who reaches the positions of power is expected to use these positions to get public funds, use them to enrich themselves, help family members, ethnic fellows, and friends. The political status quo generally allows the cultivation and exploitation of strong ties among the political elite, senior state officials and the business community (Fourie 2016). Moreover, using the governmentality analysis of this complex web of power relations provides for a much deeper understanding of the tensions that exist in negotiating space and influence over the development agenda of the country.

Professor Dennis Jett [18] gives some insights into Mozambique´s status of governance underscoring the issue by taking us to look at the corruption index, where Mozambique ranks 146 out of 180 countries in 2019. This means that the country has climbed 16 degrees of corruption in the last 10 years. This is attributed mainly to the last years of President Guebuza's reign , who is known for his business mindedness and unscrupulous eagerness for

---

[18] Dennis Jett is a professor of international affairs at Penn State University and a former career diplomat who served as the U.S. ambassador to Mozambique and Peru. His analysis is based on the Corruption Perceptions Index.

looting public resources. It was, indeed during his mandate of 10 years that corruption knew its peak.

Jett continues arguing that "corruption is made easy in a country as poor as Mozambique, where most of the people are subsistence farmers trying to scratch a living out of the ground. Because civil society is weak, the parliament and judiciary are fully under the thumb of Frelimo, and the press is largely government-run or thoroughly intimidated, leaders face little pressure to govern democratically or honestly". And he continues "Some of the money that does not find its way to bank accounts abroad will go toward paying for more weapons and more mercenaries to maintain Frelimo's dominance. As a result, the insurgency and terrorism in the north will remain. And the Mozambican people will be left to wonder 'which is more destructive, the cyclones which have frequently struck the country or their own government?'" (Jett 2019:3-4)

In analysing the history of governance in Mozambique, Monjane (2018) states that the country has experienced rapid changes in the political, social and economic spheres, and that has received a lot of attention in the last 20 years or so. In recent years, nevertheless, the economic growth has been stagnant, although the basic functioning of state institutions and the maintenance of essential services never ceased to depend on the "goodwill" of the international donor community, through foreign aid.

In fact, since 2016, the aid has become conditional when the IMF and other donors discovered a hidden debt of more than US $2 billion, contracted without following the right procedures, including the national Parliament seeking ratification. Some believe that these debts were contracted for military purposes, to protect the government from a militarised political opposition, which pressed for deep institutional changes, and the conflicts in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, which showed some signs of terrorist insurgency. In recent years, the current government succeeded in making this debt sovereign; however, it was contracted without the endorsement by the Parliament. In 2019, the Supreme Court declared the debt as illegal and instructed the government not to pay. However, the government is still paying it undermining the Supreme Court. The current deep economic and political crisis is partially attributed to these developments. The country is now literally controlled by the Britton Woods Institutions, which are clearly taking advantage of the country's vulnerability and impose all kind of conditionality, closer to or worse than the HIPC of the 1980s.

As a starting point to the case studies on CAADP and APRM in Mozambique is worth brining the words of one of the most prominent veterans of the struggle for independence, a convinced Marxist, Pan-Africanist, and Nationalist:

"… My son, this is not the country we fought for. We have come a long way, since we organised our first small student groups in the diaspora, mainly in Europe, building up our anticolonial temper and nationalism. Most of us left schools and universities and joined the liberation movements in Africa, most of them based in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Kenya. With support from other liberation movements and the few African countries already liberated, we decided that Unity was the weapon to overthrow the colonial and imperialist regime in Mozambique; therefore, we formed only one liberation movement, FRELIMO and we started our armed struggle. In our first liberated zones in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, we mobilised the population for a long struggle, but also preparing them to build a Nation called Mozambique, independent, with social justice and equality… I can tell you, Eduardo Mondlane, led the struggle with intelligence, preparing the liberation movement to take over the power, not to replace the colonial and imperialist regime and take their seat to continue exploiting our fellow citizens, no!" (An excerpt of an interview with a veteran who passed away recently).

This revealed his resentment towards the status of political, economic and social outlook of the country. It shows and reveals the frustration of some veterans with the way the country is driving its development, which according to this veteran, has clearly betrayed the dream of the liberation movement and failed the Mozambican people´s aspirations of a prosperous nations with its people living in dignity. He continues:

"We fought to take overpower and make it a people´s power to drive the building of our country…After the assassination of Mondlane, Samora Machel led us to gain our political independence, with the aim of attaining economic and social independence as a nation, a united nation of people. He led by example of how a leader should be, a true servant of the people, the first in sacrifice and last in benefits. He was killed before he could enjoy the dream that propelled us to fight. Today, I cry, my son…What sadden me the most, is that my fellow comrades are the ones at the forefront of looting the resources of this country, at the service of imperialism, capitalism and neoliberalism; they are exploiting our people (promoting the exploitation of man by another man), enriching themselves, stealing public money and building their economic empires abroad… The few of us still lucid enough are powerless to change this…The only hope is that the

youths can take this struggle and continue the struggle and fight for a total liberation of our country, now recolonised by our own people, the sell-out country…

(An excerpt of an interview with a veteran who passed away recently).

This interview was conducted in November 2019 and the veteran died in the month of February 2020, before he could see the youths realise the Mozambican Pan-African dream of building a strong nation, based on social justice, equality, and unity. Due to the relevance and timely significance of his statements, he is quoted at length, just to consolidate the background of the case study in chapter VII.

The discovery of the hidden debts (HD) confirms most of the statements of the veteran and the resentment of many other citizens. According to the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, initially a setback was noted during the period of the hidden debts (2013-2019). It was measurable in recognised indices of the quality of governance and of the political institutions that seek to sustain democracy, the Rule of Law and the quality of Justice in addition to a reduction in the quality of public financial management and a retreat in the fight against corruption in general. Mozambique is among the countries whose governance deteriorated most rapidly from2013-2017, the years in which the effects of the HD began to kick in.

For the case study and in trying to respond to the key questions of this study, the collected empirical data are discussed in this chapter to see if they do agree or disagree with the major literature review findings. In other words, the analysis of the data is trying to see if the practices on APRM and CAADP are speaking to the main guiding documents of the AU-NEPAD in relation to Pan-African civil society participation in the governance processes. That is, how well the institutions of governance of the AU-NEPAD are operationalising the main AU constitutive documents, and how is the mainstream discourse translated into the mainstream practices. In a related dimension, are the empirical data confirming or disconfirming the findings from literature review, pertaining to the participation of civil society in the African Union-NEPAD processes, which was said to be showing limited/compartmentalised understanding of power, mainly focusing on formal power, hence disempowering Pan African civil society. What do the empirical data tell us about hidden or invisible power or powers at the CAADP or APRM level? More so, what does the Foucauldian governmentality analysis of the empirical data tell us about the power relations between the Government and other stakeholders in negotiating power?

The empirical analysis has helped us to get more understanding on how the Pan-African civil society is constructed and deconstructed, what are the strategies it uses to engage with the CAADP or PRM in the processes of undertaking policy monitoring in the country, which mechanisms exist for national civil society participation in the governance of Pan-African Institutions through the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme as the key agrarian development policy framework, and the African Peer Review Mechanism as a prime governance mechanism of the Union.

7.2. The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the Remaking of African Civil Society in Mozambique

7.2.1.1. *The CAADP Process in Mozambique and National Civil Society*

As in many countries, the CAADP process in Mozambique had its own bottlenecks. It arrived in a period of intensive institutional and policy formulation and confusion (2004- 2010). It is a period where government was pressured to find sustainable solution for the latent agricultural crisis. Hence, several attempts were put forward, for example the PROAGRI, in its phase II which coincided with profound restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture that culminated with the creation of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (after 3 changes in about 3 years). After restricting the restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture as a result of the new government starting functions, several policy strategies for the sector were developed. These are (i) The Agriculture Sector Priorities (2006); (ii) the Agrarian diversification strategy; (iii) the green revolution strategy, GRS (2008); (iv) action plan for food production, PAPPA (2008). This context led to difficult environment for the implementation of CAADP in the first years of its attempt.

According to Nuno Castel Branco´s assertion, interest in CAADP was not revived until 2010 that the GoM and some donors made consistent efforts towards the adoption of CAADP approach. He stresses the vision for the overall agriculture strategy for Mozambique as an agriculture-led growth and poverty reduction, focusing on family agriculture and small and medium farmers. The strategies were overly overambitious if compared with the CAADP requirements. For instance, the CAADP requirement of a 6% budget allocation was put up to 10% expenditure and an additional target of 10% sector growth. Nevertheless, the other pillars

and targets of the national strategic plan for the agriculture sector (PEDSA, in its Portuguese Acronyms) were closely aligned with the CAADP guidelines. It is within this context that in 2011 Mozambique signed its first Compact covering the timeframe of 2011 to 2020 (Branco, 2013).

All in all, the CAADP process arrived in Mozambique and encountered other neoliberal driven policies and initiatives. For example, the PROAGRI programme (phase I and II) focused its interventions in promoting the foreign invest flow at the expense of small holders driven policies of the first decade of independence. The introduction of IMF reforms forced the country to stop local processing and intensified the export of raw materials in favour of big foreign corporations; the example of the cashew industry is all elucidative.

The implementation of the national strategic plan for the agriculture sector (PEDSA) is governed by the National Agricultural Investment Plan (PNISA 2013-2017, its Portuguese acronyms). The investment plan gives prominence to the growth of agribusiness in the country through the creation of large export corridors under major investment from the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Contrary to a diversifying view of productive systems, the PNISA clearly focuses on the prioritisation of specific crops. It divides them into food crops - maize, rice, wheat, beans, cassava, tomatoes, potatoes, and sweet potatoes - and yield crops - cashew, cotton, tobacco, sesame, which are all traditional, and soya. The financial resources under the PNISA are disproportionately allocated to cash crops in comparison to food crops and their weight in the national diet (Vunjanhe and Adriano, 2015)

7.2.1.2. The National CAADP Process and Civil Society in Mozambique

Studies on the agrarian sector in Mozambique point out that the CAADP process initially was mostly state driven. In addition, CAADP related activities were few, showing disconnection between the national processes and the continental policy framework. Equally a very limited consultation beyond senior civil servants at key related ministries (ex., agriculture, water and roads) was reported. Even these fragmented activities were interrupted during and after the restructuring of Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security into Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2005-2007). After Guebuza was inaugurated as the new president of the country, with focus on big business and overall restructuring of the State apparatus, according

to his own image, added to a subsequent internal political struggle (Branco, 2013; Vunjanhe and Adriano, 2015).

Speaking with participants from different strata of the Mozambican society, including civil society members, the private sector and government officials, there is a sense that different perceptions of the process exist. While the government sees the process as smooth, although noting the lack of the much need funds for the government to implement key policies and the lack of technical/institutional capacity on the side of the civil society to meaningfully contribute to the process. On the other hand, private sector players consider the CAADP as a good move and important step towards creating AU enabling environment for business involvement, hence an ´agriculture´ based growth.

Several members of civil society groups working on agricultural related issues share the resentment that most of the policy processes within the sector are not inclusive, as most of them only come to know these policies when they are asked to implement. For example, the CAADP process is still unknown to many.

I have spoken to few people in Maputo, Sofala and Nampula provinces, and the number of participants with little to no knowledge about the CAADP process is impressive. For instance, a member of a rural organisation called AMIREMO, operating in the Northern Provinces and based in Nampula said, "I have never heard about that, but you mean PNISA? I have participated once in a meeting where the head of the provincial agriculture department was trying to get us to understand that there is a national policy guiding our sector and that we have to implement everything that comes in there; but that other one you are talking about is new to me. Is that replacing PNISA?" (Member of a local civil society organisation, AMIREMO 056).

However, speaking with a representative of a corporation working in the forest subsector, it was clear how informed he was and how he has been taking advantage of that information to grow his business. He argued "my company has been here since 2007, with the first approach to the country, and we have been fully operating since 2009. At the beginning it was not easy. We did not know the local environment and the operating ethics, but now we are fully integrated. We enjoy a great relationship with the government. We participate in almost every event and process that is related to our core business. Yes, we know CAADP and all the agricultural and investment policies. We are partners to the government. With CAADP

implementation the environment improved greatly" (Conversation with a high-ranking employee of Portucel 052).

Major agriculture players of the agriculture sector are the peasantry of the country, represented by its organised arm, the National Farmers Union (UNAC, in its Portuguese acronym), which is a union of several farmers' associations country wide.

Issues coming up from the interviews with civil society organisations active in agriculture highlight the key contentious debates. Small scale farmers and peasants' clamour for accessible and affordable credit and other financial support, which seems to be an apparent neglect of the agriculture sector by the state leadership; although at discursive level the government puts agriculture as priority. The fact is that by promoting big corporations, small scale farmers and peasants are losing their productive land. Examples are the ProSavana initiative in the Northern Mozambique. How is the current agricultural policy framework negatively affecting the smallholders is well summarised by a leader of peasants' association:

> "We, men, women and young people of the rural Mozambique do not know and question the meaning of mechanised/industrial agriculture that so much is spoken mainly in large forums, where smart dressed individuals get the audience stuck on beautiful, illustrated presentations and speaking a strange language, that we do not understand. These guys speak of huge investments, astronomic sums of money, but never speak to our heartfelt problems… and we suspect that this is the same extractives´ logic, of monoculture production on a large scale, with the aim of commodifying food and taking our land away from us... We reiterate our rejection of this agro-industrial model that depreciates the importance of peasant farming; we demand the unconditional implementation of food sovereignty as the only sustainable alternative for agrarian development in Mozambique in which we, peasants play an active and essential role" (Interview with representative of UNAC unity (UPC) in the Nampula province UNAC048).

In fact, the design, and negotiations around the ProSavana programme was kept in strong secrecy and strictly to the government and the Brazilian and Japanese corporations' knowledge, until the moment they wanted to start implementation. Civil society organisations had to fight tirelessly to get the voices of peasants and small-scale producers heard, and improvements were introduced, however very small.

The ProSavana programme was signed in 2011 between the government of Mozambique and the Government of Japan. It was meant to cover 19 districts in the northern provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. It covered around 11 million hectares, coincidently the most productive areas in Mozambique.

According to Catsossa (2017), due to the demand and criticism by various segments of Mozambican society, including academics, civil society organisations, peasant associations, national and foreign social movement "the programme was nationalised by the Mozambican government. ProSAVANA has changed from the ´Trilateral Cooperation Programme for the Agrarian Development of Tropical Savannas in Mozambique, to the ´Mozambican government's Programme with technical and financial support from the governments of Brazil and Japan´. This allowed the Mozambican government to escape all criticism from academics and national and foreign social movements, according to which ProSAVANA was a ´programme coming from outside the country´ and conceived from ´top down´ and that ´Mozambique was just a recipient´" (Catsossa 2017:392)

A research participant from the Rural Observatory (OMR, its Portuguese acronym) shared her experiences with the ProSavana programme "You know, this was a well organised programme between the government with foreign investors. They just wanted to tell rural Mozambicans that here there is a government programme to help develop your province; therefore, you have to leave your land to give place for the programme. We have found many small holders with government orders to move from their land promising a small compensation for them to go where they should start production in a different and far away land. As OMR we had to study the issue then designed strategy to address it. So, we mobilised other civil society players on rural and land issues, including international NGOs and donors. After having many organisations speak the same language of revolt and resistance, we approached the government at every level. We used media and face-to-face meetings, until we got to sit with government and business representative… We managed to slow the path with which the programme was being organized. Some mindset was slightly changed and a big movement protesting against ProSavana was established…There still a lot to be done, however" (Interview with a member of the OMR041).

From the point of view of small farmers and Mozambican citizens, this is not just a land theme, but a theme of life, of sovereignty. That is, sovereignty over land, food, and self-determination; therefore, over a democracy based on the rights of peoples.

Smallholders and peasant representatives share this resentment "Since we heard about the ProSavana Programme, we have noticed insufficient information and reduced transparency on the part of the main actors involved...We, peasants and smallholders, condemn the way ProSavana was prepared and are thought to be implemented in Mozambique, characterised by the reduced transparency and exclusion of civil society organisations throughout the process, particularly civil society organisations, and small scale farmers´ organisations. After a thorough analysis of ProSavana…We peasants, conclude that: ProSavanna is the result of a top-down policy, without, however, considering the demands, dreams and longings of the peasantry of this country ... Moreover, this goes far beyond a simple violation of the sovereignty of local farmers in the area where the programme is implemented…The project's approach is beginning to negatively influence Mozambican civil society itself and democracy at large. This is the result of the fact that although many civil society organisations are active in Mozambique, including several smallholder organisations, ProSavana programme promoters are choosing specific individuals from some specific fields or orientation to be involved in the process. We don't know how they are selected and invited and, more importantly, we do not know who they represent. For sure they do not represent us!" (Excerpts of a conversation in a group discussion with UNAC, UPC leaders and other rural issues-based organisations – GD034).

One of the participants in the group discussion privately shared his view after the meeting, "listen, I didn't want to raise this issue in the presence of some members. You know, here there is a law regulating the investments. According to this law any investor or any person wanting to have a piece of land must consult the community and community leaders. However, what is happening in practical terms is, if an investor arrives, he speaks with government officers (the bosses) in Maputo and in Nampula. The bosses just contact community leaders (mainly are part of the parties´ reach out strategy to communities) and tell them what do. There is no effective community consultation; everything is done without true community involvement. The consultation they do is highly politicised, and the ruling party is the one determining what and how it should be done. So, I think consultation is used to legitimise land grabbing in our

communities to favour all these transnational companies and high rank government officers" (A participant in the group discussion exercise GD031).

The civil society in Mozambique feels that there is no or close to none willingness of the government to act towards promoting policies that address the pressing issues facing small scale farmers and peasants. They stressed the fact that even a meeting or conference that is called for by civil society, the government does not participate, or if it does, it sends junior officers with no power to meaningfully engage in a productive discussion. "One of the biggest frustrations is the absence of the authorities in forums where we dialogue, present and propose constructive alternative programmes to the ones that only promote corporate business at the expense of small-scale farmers and local actors. The government does not take our concerns seriously" (Interview with Member of the Alliance for Food and Security and Nutrition AFSN051).

Towards the end of 2019, the decline of the ProSavana initiative was evident. However, until now there is no clarity on what is really happening with the initiative. "Is like the government has heard our cry for a just investment in our rural land and stopped the ProSavana; however, this is not the case. ProSavana is declining not because the government recognised the need for smallholder farmers to participate in decision-making process around land and investments or because civil society fought for the rights of peasants, including going to Japan to meet the Premier Minister and exposing the unfairness in the investment on ProSavana. This is a strategic and complex move towards a subtler intervention. I am sure is due to various factors, including the pressure from different critics as well as the fear to risk investing in a volatile environment with no security nor assurance of safe return. There is need to calm the criticisms, while the government and corporations establish their new strategy. We still need to be vigilant and follow this closely (A later interview with a member of the OMR041).

Most of the interviewees have voiced their concern around what they call survival for the peasantry in Mozambique and the future of the agriculture sector that puts the family sector in the centre of the agriculture development. "We demand an agrarian reform based on the facilitation of the means of production and productivity in the country, which urgently catches the phenomenon of land usurpation. We reiterate, once again, our rejection of Genetically Modified Organisms and any other initiative or form, which will make illegal the production, conservation and exchange of native seeds…We reaffirm our determination to strengthen the

struggle for the defense of our resources and make them each day the only way to produce food to feed Mozambican families, thus contributing to the real development of the country" (Interview with a Senior leader of UNAC 055).

Summing up, in much of the discussion it was evident that there is a discontent of key players of the agriculture sector with the way CAADP is being implemented in Mozambique. This is due to limited consultation resulting in policies that are far from addressing the genuine concerns of the majority.

The participants have expressed their vision that the leaders of Mozambique in conjunction with other African countries at the SADC region and the African Union level must join hands and start putting the people of the country, the region and Continent first and foremost and count on the African intelligence, while designing policies and programmes for Africa. They should thoroughly involve the African citizenry and they should work hard to find developmental alternatives that take into consideration local and African culture, practical experiences of the African small-scale farmers and peasants, as well as other contributors of the African economy. The leaders should take away the predominant corporations-based approach that only exploits African resources and labour, promoting a kind of neo-colonisation, expropriation and accumulation that perpetuate the status quo and deepen poverty for Africans.

7.3. The African Peer Review Mechanism (PRM) and the Remaking of African Civil Society in Mozambique

7.3.1. The APRM in Mozambique and National Civil Society

The guiding principle of the APRM processes is a wide participation of all actors, especially those from civil society and business. Therefore, the national process in Mozambique is bound by these principles, as such the country is required to create enabling environment for wide participation.

It was within the implementation of such principle that the Mozambican National APRM forum in coordination with some research institutions concerned with the governance of the country held the first ever all-inclusive conference in August 2007 to popularise the country´s APRM national self-assessment process. Looking at the fact that Mozambique was one of the first countries to register its interest to be peer reviewed at the launching of the APRM in 2003,

this conference was held several years after the kick-off of the process, showing how the engagement with civil society was only possible at a very late stage of the process. However, the conference was attended by more than 100 representatives of the different civil society organisations in the country, which shows the eagerness of the citizens in engaging with these processes.

The event was used not only to raise awareness of the civil society about the APRM process, but it was also used to gather ideas on how to proceed with the self-assessment. Civil Society representatives raised their concerns for being involved at this stage, and why they should have been part of the whole process from the onset. This would have allowed them to get more insights of the dynamics and therefore be able to input the initial discussions. The National APRM Forum considered this conference as a starting point which should be followed by similar events at lower levels (province and district).

Researchers on the Mozambique APRM process recognise that although civil society engagement was recognised to be holistic and inclusive; studies have shown the bottlenecks created by governments' unwillingness to fully engage civil society. This resulted in long delays during the process and in changing the structure of the National Technical Unit, comprising now 36 against the 58 members initially agreed on and being housed within the Ministry of Planning and Development and headed by a public servant (Mosse and Pohlmann 2011). Arguably, the lack of National Ownership of the APRM is one of the key features of the Mozambican APRM process. In fact, there is inadequate awareness country-wide about the APRM and the national project as a whole. This is more so in the design and implementation of the National Plan of Action (NPoA). The direct consequence of this is the compromising of the very principle of the APRM process (the broad-based participation, as stated in the guiding APRM documents) and its sustainability as a country project.

Although the guiding documents provide for wide stakeholders' participation, lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for stakeholders' involvement has been one of the major characteristics of the AU-NEPAD processes. Non-government actors have been struggling to participate and make their voices heard in the policy and decision-making processes within the AU-NEPAD. And Mozambique is not an exception to this rule. Researchers and the empirical data collected for this study agree on the lack of meaningful

participation of the national civil society in the process. The participatory process was not an all-inclusive as expected.

Some officers of the APRM national forum interviewed are proud of their accomplishments, although they recognise several limitations, namely funding constraints to allow a thorough and wide participation of different stakeholders at every layer of the Mozambican society, asymmetric power relations within the different levels of national governance resulting in different capacities and differentiated commitment amongst public officers, time limitation for all stakeholders to meaningfully engage in the forum and participate in the discussions, human resources limitation. "Though the process has been witnessing considerable challenges, it has seen remarkable advances attained since the first cycle…. Just for your information Mozambique is the first country in Southern Africa and the 3rd in the African continent to produce the 2nd Evaluation Report and this demonstrates the country's commitment to APRM" (interview with Senior officer at the National APRM Forum APRM037).

He continues, "this is not saying the process was all smooth! We had several challenges to complete all steps of the process; the funds were very limited and human resources as well. Time also constrained our ability to tour this country and to full comply with everything. But let me repeat it, we are proud of our results after all" (Senior officer at the National APRM Forum APRM037).

Mozambique was part of the first cohort of countries at the beginning of the APRM process in 2003. This cohort has seen Mozambique report to be evaluated in 2009, followed by successive progress reports in 2014 and 2016, when the first cycle was concluded. The government of Mozambique manifested its intention and interest to initiate a second cycle before the continental body. In the first semester of 2019 the National APRM Forum presented its first report of the second cycle, making Mozambique one of the handful countries to advance for its second wave of APRM process.

Many voices from the government and other APRM officers have said that the process of drafting the second APRM assessment report for the country was well conducted and they are proud of the work they have done. A member of Eminent Persons of the national APRM Forum clearly stated that "the country has made progress in democratic

openness, peace building, promotion of women's rights and social inclusion. Congratulation to Mozambique and its leadership for these achievements and commitment in enhancing governance, transparency and development" (Senior member of Diplomatic community and a member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons APRM048).

Moreover, reports from civil society and other non-state actors highlight the improvements observed from the first cycle to the second one. These actors recognise that as a form of implementation of the recommendations from the first wave, the process was relatively more advertised, hence it allowed more citizens not only to be aware but, most importantly, to participate in some stages of the data collection for the report and discussion of draft reports. However, the process is still lagging in terms of providing room and mechanisms for meaningful participation of all citizens.

Most of the civil society officers interviewed have shared their disappointment with the way the National APRM Forum is established and governed. Some have even went as far as considering that most of the civil society representatives within the forum are in fact members of the governing party, which makes it difficult for them to detach themselves from the natural pressure of the party of the day, and by extension detaching themselves from the pressure coming from the government to follow certain ways or to report in a certain fashion that is supportive of the government.

This resentment is well illustrated by the statement, "as a member of civil society I see this is an achievement because Mozambique is one of the few to be able to launch its APRM second report. It is a reason for celebration. However, I will only stop there, because the way the process is conducted is still very government driven. Just as an example the chairperson of our national APRM forum is a well-established academician. We commend Professor do Rosario, but he is a senior member of the governing party. What would you expect? Of course, his decisions are mostly censured by the party, where he, obviously, pays his allegiance. He needs to be loyal to his party and the government…We wanted this position to be given to a neutral person, a true member of civil society" (Interview with a senior member of Civil Society NCSM 046).

Mirroring this resentment, other several CS participants of the APRM process at country level have voiced their concerns in terms of the way the consultation process has been undertaken. It

only reaches out to few urban areas of the country. According to them, even these few urban centres do not get enough information before hand to fully participate. The invitations for the meetings are lately delivered to the public and the criteria for receiving such invitation are never discussed and clarified, leaving the CS organisations with no time and information to engage with their constituencies. The statement of a member of provincial platform of civil society organisations (FOPROSA) working on governance issues at the Sofala Province describes this perception, "I once participated in an APRM meeting here in Beira. It was meant to be a provincial meeting, but only people from Beira were in the room. No one in the meeting, except the members of the government had the meeting agenda and documents to be discussed. As a result, the participation was very poor, with only few people speaking. But even those who spoke, you could see that they had no complete knowledge of the topics being discussed'' (Member of the FOPROSA 022).

Some of the critical civil society organisations, such as the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), the Forum for Budget Monitoring (FMO), the Mozambican Movement for Debt Review (MMD), etc., have been trying hard to voice critical issues pertaining to good governance in Mozambique. However, they face tough challenges to get their issues across and for the government to consider them.

For instance, The Mozambican Non-Governmental Organisation, Public Integrity Center (CIP) is campaigning against the payment of $2 billion hidden debts, endorsed by the state in favour of companies created to enrich a few in the name of the masses, MAM, Proindicus and EMATUM, through which the debt was negotiated and conceded by foreign investors. The scandal emerged after a new government was sworn in, in January 2015. However, several years before, some few civil society organisations tried very hard to call the previous government to bring the issue to the public domain. This will be discussed later in this chapter. The following statement from a senior political analyst and member of civil society platform is all explicit:

> Since Guebuza came to power in 2004-5 and started to show his insatiable thirst for power and money, we started sharing our concerns with different actors, including the international development community, the general public and the government itself. You know what the response was, a cruel campaign to demoralise anyone who tried to say anything about what was happening… We were called ´the prophets of disgrace´ by the president himself and the mainstream discourse from his government and other sectors of

> the society. We were called crazy at the service of foreigners, sell out-souls and many other names…The reaction from the powerful government went even too far, by promoting assassinations/physical violence or intimidation with death threats for many academics, activists and political commentators who attempt to say anything along that line...It was a period of terrible psychological terror for many of us…And you know, after the new government came into power and the debts (as well as all the economic situation of the country) were discovered, everything we were defending came to light. The whole society and international community were shocked with the revelations after the discovery of the hidden huge debt contracted by the government of the day, undermining sovereign authorities within the country (including the Parliament). The country is in despair as you well know caused by the so-called hidden debt and many other looting of public money and resources (Academic and senior member of the Civil Society Platform for budget monitoring SC055).

The anger expressed by the participants of this study is in line with what the literature on Mozambique economic performance from 2004 to 2014 highlights. It is found there that the country enjoyed a massive support from the international development community, by portraying the country as an economic success and an example of sustainable transition to democracy; although the same literature notes that the economic growth did not trickle down and translate in actual improvements on the key development indicators, that is, did not result in lowering the level of poverty. It did, in fact, increase the asymmetries between the different social groups. Moreover, when President Guebuza was replaced in 2015, he left the country with an empty treasury, forcing the incoming government to operate under distress; which was exacerbated by the discovery of the hidden debts, just few years later. The period of Guebuza´s reign is regarded as the most violent and closed-up to the civil society activities ever since the multiparty and democratic system was established, yet the most clearly neoliberal driven government ever.

The same participant concludes:

> When this debt was discovered, the government lied to everyone, trying to cover up, and even converted this private debt into a sovereign debt, to be paid for by tax-payers´ money (the state budget) … But, because of the United States of America's intervention, the former Ministry of Finance is still imprisoned in South Africa waiting for extradition, either for the USA or to Mozambique for trial. It was only after that, the Mozambican Justice system started to run around trying to do something. It resulted in

the imprisonment of several high profiled government officers, including the Director of the State Intelligence Agency and the son of the former president. However, the real men on this looting are still walking around and even holding high rank positions in the current government…I think this is all indicative of what we can expect here. I am still very concerned with the direction we heading to (Academic and senior member of the Civil Society Platform for budget monitoring CS055).

This poses the question of balance of power in Mozambique. In general, institutions are weak; however, the disproportional distribution of power among sovereign institutions is surprisingly unbearable. On one hand, there is a super powerful government, led and controlled by a super powerful political party, that controls not only the political and social life of the country, but also the economic sector of the country. On the other hand, you find institutions with constitutional mandate to check-in and hold the government accountable which are weak and fighting over scarce resource for their own institutional survival and begging the government to have a say. To make things worse, there is a weak civil society, with limited capacity to truly influence the change of the status quo. In fact, as some interviewees pointed out, some civil society organisations are silently supporting the establishment by choice or convenience or because they are co-opted. Looking at the power relations established in this context, one can sense the disproportional distributing of disciplinary power among sovereign institutions and between these and the civil society. However, there is evidently some kind of resistance and counter-conduit, where non disciplinary power from the governed is exercised through discursive contestation and protest.

For instance, after the government made the hidden debts a sovereign debt, led by civil society organisations, a fight of the people of Mozambique started, mainly from Maputo based civil society organisations, not to pay the illegal and discovered debts contracted by the government through a highly fraudulent scheme involving international mafia in the financial market. This debt was used to finance illegal activities and senior government luxury and investments abroad. It was later however, converted into a sovereign debt by the current government, so to be paid though taxpayers´ money, as mentioned earlier in this chapter.

The Forum for Budget Monitoring, including its members (the Center for Public Integrity-CIP included), organised a national campaign "I won't pay the debt" to protest against the conversion of the debt and the consequent payment through national budget (using taxi-payers'

money and the hopeful revenue of the Gas discovered in the northern province of Cabo Delgado). The campaign was disbanded by police forces, the CIP office was seriously vandalised and some leaders were sent death threat. These vocal civil society institutions are often left out of the official engagement on policy debates, and they are ostracized and called opposition to the government.

A prominent leader of the Mozambican Debt Movement said, "It is painful to learn that we have been praised as an example of country which came from civil war and managed to recover at a point to establish a democratic country; nevertheless, the basic freedoms for us to speak are constantly violated. Is there a way you can understand how a government should undermine the legislative and contract an overwhelming debt, without the approval of the parliament, and then forcing it to recognise that debt as a sovereign…Today you can see former government leaders being imprisoned even by the United States of America in relation to that debt, so this is a very serious matter for civil society in our country… but we are still not allowed to freely demonstrate and hold the government to account in relation to that process…You can't be honest and criticise the government here; otherwise your life and that of your family will be endangered" (Interview with a leader of the MMD 051).

The frustrations spelled out by the participants of this study refer to the technologies of rules used within the Mozambique governance context and are indicative of the state of the impact of the power imbalance existing between the government and civil society and among state institutions, which allows for impunity of the government post holders. They also refer to the incapacity of civil society to use its power to critically hold government accountable and truly influence policies and practices of government.

Coming back to the APRM process, which is considered as one of the battlegrounds, where government and civil society forces play out their cards to get their points heard and taken into the final policy dispensation, one might think that the APRM is a more country led (owned or domesticated) process than CAADP process. Also, the APRM process is more appealing to the people interviewed, perhaps more organised or institutionalised than its peer CAADP. However, the general perception of the civil society interviewees is that although some improvements are noticeable, there are a lot of things to be done to allow their full participation. There are still several obstacles and institutional barriers that need to be overcome for   their participation to be achieved.

Most of the difficulties for civil society engagement maybe attributed to weak capacity of the government to fully promote a participatory process, both in terms of resources allocation and technical capacity of the officers to deal with this kind of exercise. This has also to do with the mind-set of government in the country. The government wants to be in total control of the outcomes of the report, translated in a type of lack of political will to facilitate an open and participatory process throughout. On the other hand, civil society in Mozambique is still weak and disconnected; they compete amongst themselves over leadership and scarce resources rather than combining efforts and promoting the voices of their constituencies. Thus, they are unable to come together as one voice to advocate for their positions. What is more, the ones that are engaged with these complex processes lack technical capacity to bring in valuable contributions backed by concrete evidences   and thorough research which builds solid knowledge, for them to influence the outcomes of the reports.

7.4.**Conclusion**

The chapter has discussed two AU-NEPAD policy processes, the Comprehensive African Agriculture programme, and the African Peer Review Mechanism and the making of civil society

The analysis of the Mozambican governmentality in the context of domestication of AU-NEPAD policies and the making of national Pan-African civil society has shown a nuanced dynamic. The hegemonic domination of the government over civil society is evident from the study on Mozambique. Hence, this chapter argues that, though the constitution and other legal documents in Mozambique provide for civil society engagement with government at all levels, the praxis and operationalisation of these provisions are still far from smooth and consensual. The practical governmentality of the Mozambican context is that of a disciplinary power practiced in a top-down approach. The counter-conduit and resistance created by disciplinary power of the state produce few vocal civil society actors, however divided and disunited. This is demonstrated in the way civil society is engaged in the CAADP and APRM processes at country level. The participation of civil society in Mozambique is shown to be at information, manipulation therapy, consultation placation and partnership, classified in accordance with the Ladder of citizen´s participation.

The balance of power in the Mozambican landscape is one of the major concerns. In fact, the study has identified that the government system itself in Mozambique presents an imbalanced power relation between the three powers, where the executive overpowers the legislative and the judiciary. This in turn overshadows the independence of the sovereign organs, creating an environment in which corrupt practices are not addressed and a climate of impunity reigns. It is within this environment that the making of civil society occurs. In general, civil society is disempowered, weak and disunited.

The exercise of horizontal powers by civil society is weakened by the lack of unity within the civil society, the fight for protagonist engagement facilitates the divide-and-rule strategy used by the government, by co-opting members of civil society, who legitimise government top-down process in the name of civil society. Critical organisations mainly are left out of the debate on sensitive issues.

The findings of this case study speak to the findings from the case study 1. In fact, using Arnstein's analytical framework it can be shown how the participation of Pan African civil society has performed throughout the different stages of the ladder, within the two different case studies. In the first three stages, classified by Arnstein as non-participation, all the means proposed by her are used to inform and manipulate the citizens around the issues at play, either at continental level or at country level. However, the 4th and 5th stages (Consultation and Placation) start to show some differentiated means for bringing people to the decision-making process. The APRM process still uses all the available methods and means of public involvement, while the AU-NEPA continental level uses the lesser variety of means to involve non-state stakeholders. Lesser and lesser means are applied in all the two cases as we move into the 5th and higher stages, classified by Arnstein as where a true participation starts. As we reach the 7th stage (delegation of power), only the APRM process uses at least one means to involve civil society actors, and the 8th stage where there is a level of power control, that is to say citizens (the powerless) can start enjoying a level of power and decision making; this is what Arnstein classified as true participation. Unfortunately, none of the case studies show any deliberate effort to engage citizens, to allow citizens to gain total and meaningful power in decision making process. It is critical to think that when the level of complexity for participation increases, the AU-NEPAD processes take little effort to use a more diverse

amount of means and techniques to convey the information to educate citizens so that they exercise their right to participate and influence the outcomes of policies at country and continental level.

Arnstein´s framework lends a great deal of analysis to the Foucauldian governmentality analysis as it allows researchers to look deeper into the level of participation from each single actor and see where each stand in terms of the meaningfulness and power sharing, hence the likelihood of influencing the outcomes of the policies. On the other hand, the Powercube analysis lends a different perspective to power analysis, which helps to understand why certain actor is not fully engaging or participating in policy processes, as it explains the position of the actor towards the power holder; more so, it explains the reasons some actors shall prefer or are forced to reclaim and invent their own spaces of participation, hence exercising their rights and the power over and with other actors including the power holders (chiefly the government). This is in line with the ideas developed by Foucault, on one hand, the use of techniques and procedures designed to govern the conduct of both individuals and populations at every level of life, not just the administrative or political level, and on the other hand the juxtaposition of "governing the self" and the "governing others", where one witnesses the encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self.

Looking at the Ladder of citizen's participation, one can conclude that the participation of civil society within the AU-NEPAD processes covers completely the first 5 stages of participation, that is manipulation, therapy, consultation, and placation (these are stages of non-Participation according to Arnstein), and slightly less on partnership. The last stages of genuine and meaningful participation - delegation and control of power - are far from being achieved, even for the APRM process at national level where some delegation through citizens´ forums is marginally achieved. Below is a summary of participation in the three case studies according to the ladder of citizen´s participation.

Table 3. Stages of PACS participation using the Ladder of Citizen's Participation

Case study \ Stages	Manipulation Therapy	Information	Consultation Placation	Partnership	Delegation	Control
AU-NEPAD at Continental	Press releases Advertising	Public information Campaign Meetings	Key Interest groups contacts Meetings Public hearings	Advisory Committees	-	-
CAADP Mozambique	Press releases Advertising	Public information Campaign Meetings Circulation of proposals	Key Interest groups contacts Meetings Public hearings	Policy Communities	-	
APRM Mozambique	Press releases Advertising	Surveys Policy Communities	Key Interest groups contacts Meetings Focus groups Public hearings	Advisory Committees Policy Communities	Citizens' forums	

Source: Author own analysis based on Arnstein´s Ladder of Citizen's Participation

Chapter VIII

Conclusions

It is argued throughout the dissertation that the technologies of rule used by AU-NEPAD to promote and contest the Pan-African civil society reinforce neoliberal continental driven development and disempower civil society. This argument is in line with the mainstream literature on African Participatory Governance. In fact, the mainstream literature speaks about the restrictive regulations and the shrinking space for civic engagement, and the national governments raising different reasons to justify this phenomenon. Nevertheless, most of this analysis is made from a classic governance framework, which emphasizes institutional power of the government over the governed. The framework of analysis of power does not allow one to understand the different forms of power being played out and the technologies being used in the exercise of self-government and the resistance produced by the power exercised over the governed as a disciplinary power. To address these gaps, the study used the Foucauldian discourse analysis. In particular, it allowed to demonstrate that there is a clear disconnect between the discourse on citizens driven AU-NEPAD emanated in most of the constitutive documents and the praxis of enabling civil society to engage in decision making processes. Furthermore, the study has demonstrated that there is a clear tension and misrepresentation between the African Civil Society and the AU-NEPAD, throughout the spectrum of AU-NEPAD structures and processes. More so, the power relation between Pan-African institutions is a continuum of a regulated and unregulated battle characterised by co-optation based on ´divide and rule´ strategy and resistance. While on the one hand, the AU-NEPAD uses the Constitutive Act and all the provisions thereafter to promote an African civil society participation in the AU-NEPAD processes. On the other hand, however, it is also clear that AU-NEPAD structures, based on the same instruments and other complementary dispositions, selectively discriminate Pan-African civil society in their engagement in policy making. The AU-NEPAD structures use the co-optation and divide-and-rule strategies to limit critical voices of the Pan African civil society. Using different techniques and strategies the AU-NEPAD has been contesting the legitimacy of Pan-African civil society, which makes one wonder why it is so. Arguably the answer is not hard to find. AU-NEPAD has been playing its role as a neoliberal arrangement. It needs civil society to legitimise itself as well as to comply with

neoliberal commandments and be seen as a ´disciplined subject´ in the eyes of the promoters of neoliberal policies. However, it fears civil society organisations that question antidemocratic, dictatorial and corrupt practices, and advance the views and rights of ordinary Africans. Hence, they use the techniques of co-opting and dividing work well to weaken civil society. These technologies are used to perpetuate the existing institutional power relations that disempower citizens and reinforce the hegemony of the state and the private over the civil society. In other words, the prevailing relationship between the Pan-African civil society and AU-NEPAD reinforces the predicaments of the neoliberal global system.

In the process of civil society making in Africa, within a heavy top-down governmentality, civil society finds itself facing hostile environments for their operation. Some legal and restrictive provisions are enforced in the AU-NEPAD and in some countries to restrict civil society from engaging in the decision-making processes resulting in a reduced space for civic activities. In some cases, civil society faces restrictive practices, even though legal frameworks exist that allow their operation. However, the informal powers or ´hidden and invisible powers´ (Gaventa 2005) make the participation of civil society hard. Continent-wide there is a formal discursive environment that encourages civil society participation, whereas the praxis tells the opposite. More so, civil society finds itself struggling within these environments.

In summary, the use of the three analytical frameworks helped to unpack and understand the power dynamics being played out in the journey of Pan African civil society making in the intersection with the AU-NEPAD. Pan African civil society is participating in the process of establishing the AU-NEPAD, however it is being disempowered by co-optation, delegitimisation and closing spaces for their full and meaningful participation.

The study has shown that there has been an emergence of several associations, networks, and other forms of interactions among NGOs in Africa in recent years. These organisations located in various African Union member states have been working either as truly Pan-African bodies or as country entities with concern on African development. The level of their size, maturity, and capacity to engage national, regional or African processes vary greatly. It was similarly observed that there is an increasing trend towards economic regionalisation in Africa, which is leading to the necessity of organisations working at the regional and continental level in order to effectively address most of the issues pertaining to the AU-NEPAD which are transnational in nature. In fact, widespread concern on the shrinking of civic spaces and disempowerment of

civic movements has induced the formation of linkages of like-minded organisations across national boundaries in Africa, in attempt to joining hands to work together to solve common concerns. However, they are disunited and less strategic. As shown in Chapter V, some of the more outstanding Pan-African civil society organisations involved in regional networking include the following: the Centre for Citizens Participation on the African Union (CCP-AU), currently known as the Pan-African Citizens' Network (PACIN), the Pan-African Lawyers Association (PALU), State of the Union Coalition (SOTU) under the Oxfam Pan Africa Programme, the African Youth Commission, just to mention a few. These networks of organisations are trying in their own right to link the largely autonomous activities of grassroots and citizens' movements throughout the Continent and propose a people driven and centred vision of an alternative future of a united Africa socially, politically, culturally and economically integrated; indeed, exercising alternative power relations with the institutional AU-NEPAD architecture.

The empirical data highlight the struggle of Pan African civil society to engage with the AU-NEPAD architecture. Civil society faces external challenges related to shrinking civic spaces, and suspicious perception of their mission and interests, and scarcity of reliable external funding mechanism as well as internal challenges related to their capacity, heterogeneity, legitimacy and competition over resources. Under this challenging environment, the making of Pan African civil society is a reality, however it has to work hard to get through the government heavy controlled AU structures. The organisation of parallel and informal spaces to increase the number and quality of Pan African citizens' engagement is a strategic move that is played together with the mainstream strategy of engaging directly with the AU organs, including the ECOSOCC, at continental level or directly engaging government and their institutions at country level. This corroborates with the Foucauldian understanding of practices of resistance, which can come from many different forms, mainly as a counter-conduct, discursive resistance, counter-discursive reversal, the technology of the self, antiauthoritarianism movements, disobedience, etc.

In short, the research has widely confirmed the idea shared by several studies and authors that in Africa, there certainly exists a Pan-African civil society, although critically heterogeneous in their capacities and endowment in resources, missions and objectives, field of work, perceived or factual closeness or distance to the decision-makers, legitimacy and interests, democratic

and undemocratic etc. The findings offer a theoretical overview of civil society as contesting actor particularly in Mozambique and in Africa at large and outline the construction of concepts of civil society latency, defiance and co-construction around power and competitive authoritarianism, through a theoretical framework that draws on the Foucauldian analytic framework, complemented by the Gaventa and Arnstein frameworks.

In this sense, Pan-African civil society is actively seeking to contribute to improve the enjoyment of rights and the living standards of African citizens, as well as bringing the continent to the global market as a key player, although contesting the neoliberal nature of the AU-NEPAD architecture. In fact, this bottom-up process of Pan-African civil society is in total contrast with the AU-NEPAD top down neo-liberal governmentality. However, the study has also concluded that, like other past studies , Pan-African civil society organisations as a whole lag behind in terms of their capacity to engage deeply with the AU-NEPAD, suffer from legitimacy deficit, are fragmented and individualistic (competing with one another), they lack sustainable financing (dependent on external funding only), and to worsen this the institutional environment within the AU-NEPAD structures and processes is not totally conducive to civic activity. It mostly shows a tendency of authoritarianism, expressed as domination through disciplinary power over the citizens in a clear top-down driven approach. Moreover, the AU-NEPAD governance architecture provides for citizens' and stakeholders' participation as an institution-wide principle; however, the praxis and operationalisation of these principles are still far from smooth and consensual. This creates rooms for mutual suspicion (the Pan African Civil Society and the AU-NEPAD structures) prompting for less participatory decision making within the AU-NEPAD. These are the major problems identified by this study in the making of Pan-African civil society and its role in the governance of the continent.

The study identified active fault lines in the making of Pan-African civil society and found some areas where major frictions might build up into a conflicting relationship between the Pan-African civil society and the AU-NEPAD. The key features of power relations in the context of AU-NEPAD intersection with African civil society are the wide power dispersion and a strong suspicious relationship between AU-NEPAD formal structures and the civil society at different levels (national-regional and continental), making it difficult to engage in a meaningful manner. This is in line with what Self (1985) highlights, a need for coordinated

efforts to be effective and efficient in a context of power dispersion, otherwise the society becomes ineffective and inefficient.

As a way of addressing these fault lines, three different approaches are recommended, being one on the financing mechanisms for civil society organisations to allow quality participation in policy and advocacy work. As the existence of new policies and AU governing decisions and practices has been blocking the ability of Pan-African Civil Society Organisations (PACSOs) to fully participate in policy, often through restrictions on access to foreign funding and restrictive participation spaces, through the divide-and-rule policies, where access to the formal participation spaces is selective based on sympathy and not criteria, to overcome these , it is recommended that the AU-NEPAD and the Pan-African civil society should develop a wide-ranging funding avenues, with special focus on indigenous funding based on the African philanthropy to reverse the dependence on western financing, on one hand; while on the other hand, the Pan-African civil society should endeavour to unite by exploring all the strengths each actor can bring in to the common voice. With this Pan-African civil society shall strengthen the establishment of reclaimed spaces, while increasing their engagement with the AU-NEPAD organs to influence them from within the system. The second finding is the lack of legitimacy, which creates a suspicious environment when engaging with the governments and the AU-NEPAD processes The AU-NEPAD considers the Pan African civil society organisations as not representing genuine African interests, but that of their founder, the western countries. Thus, they are considered as not legitimate. Additionally, the AU-NEPAD sees Pan-African civil society organisations as not democratic, because most of them do not have regular elective processes to alternate their governance structures, promoting an elitist club of jut few illuminated members of the civil society. Therefore, it is recommended is for Pan-African civil society to improve their engagement, first and foremost, with their constituencies. They should establish clear and concrete feedback mechanisms, which allow them to reconnect with the grassroots. It will allow the Pan-African civil society to get all their advocacy agendas, in a process known as *endogenousation*, explained in Chapter VII. This shall be complemented by improvement of their internal institutional governance and representation, by democratising their processes, including holding regular elective processes, and improving their transparency and accountability.

Thirdly, looking at the power dispersion and asymmetric distribution of Pan African civil society through the different geographies and within regional settings or country level, the potential of Pan-African civil society should be harnessed by promoting a much inclusive approach and building partnerships among the wide-spectrum of civil society, as well as enhancing capacity building among organisations. This will make all civil society organisations to feel they are part and parcel of the development process and recognise that their interests and those of their constituencies are considered and their voices are heard.

Finally, what is the implication of the concept of civil society in Africa for the globe? By answering this question, the dissertation contributes to knowledge, by concluding that the concept of civil society has gained different meanings and perspectives, firstly as a descriptive and analytical framework to explore the relationships between actors in society, including their functions and structures. That is, examining the scope and size of the civil society and its relations with the state institutions at country or continental level as well as its role in amplifying the reach out of state in delivering goods to the society or in policy monitoring and influencing. Secondly, it is a framework used to challenge the hegemonic and existing power relations. That is, civil society is an actor that challenges the mainstream existing powers, looking at the forms of resistance and power, providing alternatives or balancing it. Civil society has a concept is no longer preoccupied on taking over the state power, instead it is focused on the ´counter conduct of the self´, creating alternative spaces which enable communal organisation. All this allows for harnessing endogenous knowledge and power, that is, bringing up a, local and regional knowledge, making power as an everyday thing. As Foucault emphasizes, contributing to strengthening and further elaborating on neoliberal governmentality. It also shows that using Foucauldian analysis as a tool, it crosses the cultural and political divide and can help to understand the power relations in both the Western civilisations and the non-western geopolitical contexts, such as the African geographies.

However, the research was compromised by some limitations. The study wanted, at some point, to establish a clear line of comparison between the continental processes (AU-NEPAD) and country specific policies (CAADP and APRM) approaches to civil society making, using Foucauldian governmentality analysis. However, these studies currently do not exist, at least to the author's knowledge, and it was not easily attainable in the scope of this study. Hence,

future research is needed and should focus on deepening the analysis of the technologies of rule and power relations between national level civil society making and the continental Pan-African civil society making in the context of building the African Union and NEPAD. Additionally, the research should produce more empirical data to combine with the available literature to better navigate through the theoretical implications of the analysis of the Pan-African civil society making in the global conceptualization of civil society. Hence, there is need for a much deeper and thorough study on the implications of the Pan-African civil society making to the global conceptual civil society and the policy implementation thereof.

Chapter IX

Bibliography and Annexures

9.1. Bibliography

Primary: Minutes of meetings, policy documents and speeches

African Development Bank and African Development Fund (1999); Cooperation with civil society organizations policy and guidelines, Johannesburg.

African Governance Architecture Framework," 5. 17Ibid., 1–31

African Solutions: Best Practices from the African Peer Review Mechanism. 2017.

African Union 2003a. Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Adopted at the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Maputo, Mozambique, July 2003. Assembly/AU/Decl. 8 (II).

African Union 2003b. Decision on Integration of NEPAD into the Structures and Processes of the African Union. Adopted at the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Maputo, Mozambique, July 2003. Doc. EX/CL/60 (III).

African Union 2004a. Strategic Framework of the African Union Commission 2004–2007, Final Draft, March 2004.

African Union 2004b. 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–8 July 2004.

APRM (2011); Republic of Mozambique: APRM Country Report N°11.

African Union Commission (2015) Agenda 2063. The Africa we want. Final edition published in 2015© African Union Commission ISBN: 978-92-95104-23-5

Assembly/AU/Res.1(XVI) 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, January 30–31, 2011, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, accessed February 27, 2019, https://au.int/sites/default/fles/decisions/9645.

AU Commission (2004); Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union Volume 2: 2004 – 2007 Strategic Framework of the Commission of the African Union May 2004.

AU Document, see www.oau-oua.org Constitutive Act of the African Union. 11.

AU-NEPAD (2003); Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). ISBN 0-620-30700-5.

AU-NEPAD (2009); Revision of the AU-NEPAD African Action Plan 2010-2015: Advancing Regional and Continental Integration in Africa. Together through Shared Values. Midrand, south Africa.

AU-NEPAD (2009); The AU-NEPAD African Action Plan 2010-2015: Advancing Regional and Continental Integration in Africa. Together through Shared Values. Midrand, south Africa.

AU Summit Conference report on The Fourth Citizens Continental Conference on the 12th African Union Summit held in Addis Ababa on January 2009.

AU (2000); Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 11 July 2000 - Lome, Togo.

AU-NEPAD (2016) Guidelines: CAADP Country Implementation under the Malabo Declaration.

CAADP (2003); The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, Newsletter Issue 4.

CCP-AU (N/A); Civil Society Briefing Notes: 001. Regional Integration. AU Organs and Institutions, Challenges and Opportunities.

GdM (2013). Fórum Nacional do Mecanismo Africano de Revisão de Pares Relatório de Progresso Sobre a Implementação do Programa Nacional de Acção do Mecanismo Africano de Revisão de Pares (MARP) 2010 -2012.

Decisions, Declarations and Resolution' Assembly/AU/Dec.332–361(XVI)," Assembly/AU/Decl.1–3(XVI),

Government of Mozambique (GOM) (1987); Construamos o Futuro com as Nossas Mãos, Maputo.

GOM (2001); Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-2005) (PARPA): Strategy Document for the Reduction of Poverty and Promotion of Economic Growth, Maputo: GOM.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2003); 'Republic of Mozambique: poverty reduction strategy paper', *IMF Country Report No. 03/98*, Washington, D.C: IMF.

Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) (1995); *The Poverty Reduction Strategy for Mozambique*, Maputo: MPF.

MPF *et al* (1998); *Understanding Poverty and Well-Being in Mozambique: The First National Assessment (1996-97)*, Maputo: MPF.

NEPAD (2001); The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), OAU, Abuja, Nigeria, October.

NEPAD (2001); The Constitutive Act of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

NEPAD (2002); The New Partnership for Africa´s Development (NEPAD): declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance, Rome, Italy.

NEPAD (2009); The AU-NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF): Seeing African People as the True Resource. Midrand, South Africa.

NEPAD (2008); Zonal Workshops and National Conference on Culture and NEPAD organized by the National Commission on Culture in Collaboration with the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and NEPAD, Accra.

NEPAD (2005); African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework: Governance, Peace and Security Programme. Midrand, South Africa.

NEPAD (2002); Declaration from Civil Society NEPAD Meeting. Durban South Africa

OAU - The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980-2000). Reprinted by the OAU P.O Box 3243 Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

OAU Document (2004): Vision of the African Union and the Missions of the African Union Commission (Final Draft) March 2004. Prepared by the Office of the Chairperson of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

SAHO, (1 885); General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885. https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/general-act-berlin-conference-west-africa-26-february-1885 (consulted 28 Dec 2918).

The World Bank (N/D); A Tapestry of Hopes: How NGO/Civil Society Field Stuff in Africa Promote Participation, Inclusion, and the Social Agenda, Poverty Reduction and Social Development Department Unit, Africa Region, Washington DC.

The World Bank (2000); Consultation with Civil Society Organizations: General Guidelines for World Bank Stuff, NGO and Civil Society Unit, Social Development Department, Washington DC.

The World Bank (2005); Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations: External Affairs, Communications and United Nations

Affairs Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network Operations Policy and Country Services Network, Washington DC.

The World Bank (1996); The World Bank's Partnership with Nongovernmental Organizations, Participation and NGO Group, Poverty and Social Policy Department, Washington DC.

The World Bank (1999); Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Adaptable Program Credit in the Amount of SDR 21.7 Million (US$30 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Mozambique in Support of the First Phase of an Agricultural Sector Public Expenditure Program (PROAGRI). Report No: 18862 MOZ. Africa Rural Development. Operations 1. Africa Country Department 2. Africa Region

World Bank (2004); Can Africa Claim the 21st Century, The World Bank, Washington.

Secondary: Books and articles

---------------, 2002, 'Elite habituation to democracy in Mozambique: the view from parliament, 1994-2000', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol.40 No.1: 61-80.

Aart, J. (2002); Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance.

Abrahamsen, R. (2005); Blair's Africa: The Politics of Secularization and Fear. Alternatives: Global. Local, Political. Sage Publications.

Abrahamsen, R. (2006); Development Policy and the Democratic Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa – Journal: Conflict, Security & Development. Vol 1 (p.79-103), Issue 3. Taylor and Francis

Abrahamsen, R. (2004); The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance. Third World Quarterly. Taylor and Francis.

Abrahamsen, R. (2003); African Studies and the Postcolonial Challenge. Royal African Society. African Affairs.

Abrahamsen, R. (2000); Disciplining Democracy: Development discourse and Good Governance in Africa. Zed Books.

Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Economic liberalization and democratic erosion. In Disciplining democracy (p. 112-137). London UK; New York, NY: Zed Books.

ActionAid, (2004); Rethinking participation: questions for civil society about the limits of participation in PRSPs: ActionAid International Uganda and ActionAid International USA Washington DC.

Adebajo and H. Scanlon (eds.); A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and United Nations. Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media and the Centre for Conflict Resolutions.

Adedeji, A. (2008); NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga-Muvumba and T. Muruthi (eds); The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jaca.

Adedeji, a. (2007); Democracy and Development: A Complex Relationship, in Khabele Matlosa, J. Elklit and B. Chiroro (Eds), Challenges of Conflict, Democracy and Development in Africa. Johannesburg, EISA.

Adejumobi, S. Olukoshi, A. O. (2008); The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa. Cambria Press. New York

Adésínà, J.O (2006a); Development and Challenges of Poverty: NEPAD, Post-Washington Consensus and Beyond in J.O Adésínà, Y. Grahan and A. Olukoshi (Eds.). Africa and Development- Challenges in the New Millennium: The NEPAD Debate. Dakar, London, New York and Pretoria: CORDESIA, Zed Books, and UNISA Press.

Adésínà, Jo, Grahan, Yao and Olokoshi, A. (2006); Africa and Development: Challenges in the New Millennium – The NEPAD Debate, CORDESIA Dakar in Association with Zel Books London and New York, and UNISA Press, Pretoria; Zed Books and Unisa Press.

Adogamhe, P. G. (2008) PAN-AFRICANISM Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development. African Review of Integration Vol.2 No.2, July 2008.

African Media, in Kareithi and N. Kariithi (eds.), Untold Stories: Economics and Business Journalism in African Media. Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press.

African views African Voices (1992); Transitions to Democracy in Africa." National Research Council. 1992. *Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2041.

AfriMAP, Afrodad and Oxfam (2007); Towards the People Driven African Union Current Obstacles and New Opportunities. Report on African Network on Debt and Development. Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa and Oxfam Gb. London.

AFRODAD, Oxfam, and AFRIMAP. (2007). Towards a people-driven African Union: Current obstacles and new opportunities. Pretoria, South Africa: Authors.

Aguirre Jr., A., Eick, V. and Reese, E. (eds.) (2006); "Introduction: Neoliberal Globalization, Urban Privatization, and Resistance." Social Justice Vol. 33, No. 3.

Agyeman, O. (2013); *The Failure of Grassroots Pan-Africanism: the case of the All-African Trade Union Federation*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 392pp.

Ajulu, R. (2001); Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a Globalising World Economy: The Struggle for the Soul of the Continent. Review of African Political Economy, N° 87:27-42

Akokpari, J. (2008a); Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa; in Akokpari, J.; Ndinga-Muvumba, A. and Murithi, T. (eds.), The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jacana.

Akokpari, J. (2008); 'Problems and Prospects of Regional Integration in Africa' in A. Adekunle et al (eds.) Civil Society and Regional Integration in Africa Nairobi DPMF

Akokpari, J. (2014); The AU-NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa. Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(3) 243-263.

Alden, C. (2001); Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Alemayehu, S. A. (20016); Pan Africanism as a Conceptual Basis for the African Unity. https://mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2016/04/07/pan-africanism-as-a-conceptual-basis-for-the-african-unity/. Accessed March 18 2019.

Alexander, J. (1997) The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas about Authority. Africa, 67(1): 1-26.

Amah, O. E. (2019); Globalisation and Leadership in Africa: Development and Challenges for Future. Palgrave Macmillan. Springer Nature Switzerland

Amate, C. O. (1987); Inside the OAU; Pan-Africanism in Practice.

Amin S. (1972); Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10.4 (December 1972): 505.

Amin, S. (990); Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World. London, New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.

Amin, S. (1997): Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Andrews, N. et al (2013); Africa Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Exploring the Multi-Dimensional Discourse on Development. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Annan, K. A. (2000); 'We the Peoples': The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, New York: United Nations

Anonymous (2017); Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism. A neoliberal regency?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/436061 Accessed September 07 2019

Antunes, S. and Camisão, I. (2018); Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory. University of Évora and Mino. Portugal.

Armstrong, D. at al (2007); International Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D., Farrel, T. and Maiguashca, B. (2003); Governance and Resistance in World Politics. Cambridge University Press.

Arnstein, S. (1969); A Ladder of Citizen Participation, JAIP, Vol. 35 pp. 216-224.

Article 19 (2018); ACHPR: Withdrawing Coalition of African Lesbians' observer status threatens civil society participation. https://www.article19.org/resources/achpr-concern-with-decision-to-withdraw-coalition-of-african-lesbians-observer-status/ Accessed, 25 February 2020.

Ayers, A. J. (ed.), (2008), Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory

Azikiwe, A. (2010); Five decades after its 'year'. Africa still struggles against imperialism. Pan-African News Wire.

Bankie, B. F. & Mchombu K., eds. (2008); Pan-Africanism African Nationalism: Strengthening the Unity of Africa and its Diaspora, Trenton, New Jersey: The Red sea Press.

Behr, H. and Heath, A. (2009); Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz, and Neo-Realism. Review of International Studies, 35(2): 327–349.

Bell, D. (ed.). (2008); Political Thought in International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bertocchi, G. (2015); The Legacies of Slavery in and out of Africa. Preliminary. University of Modena and Reggio Emilia and IZA.

Bieler, A. (2014); The Anarchy Problematique and Sovereignty: Neo-Realism and State Power. andreasbieler.net/wp-content/files/Neo-realism.pdf. 07212014.

Biggs, T. J. N. and R. Fisman, (1999); *Structure and Performance of Manufacturing in Mozambique*, RPED Paper. Washington, D.C: World Bank.

Bishop, P. (1999); Representative Democracy and the Place of Participation. Canberra

Bishop, P. and Davis, G. (2002); Mapping Public Participation in Policy Choices. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 6 (1): 14-29.

Boahen, A. A. (1985); Africa and the Colonial Challenge, in Boahen AA (ed)- General History of Africa: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, Vol II, Paris: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, pp 1-18.

Bond, P. (2002); Fanon's Warning: A civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development. New Jersey and Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc.

Bond, P. (2005); Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalisation in South Africa. University of Kwazulu-Natal Press-South Africa Bulletin of Public Administration, 94: 12-16.

Bond, P. (2005); Elite Transformation: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in South Africa. The University of Kwazulu-Natal Press – South Africa.

Bond, P. (2012); Critical Essays on South African Sub-Imperialism Regional Dominance and Global Deputy-Sheriff Duty in the Run-up to the March 2013 BRICS Summit-

Bongmba, E.K. (2004); Reflections on Thambo Mbeki's African Renaissance; Journal of Southern African Stucies; Vol 30, N°2 (June 2004): 291-316.

Bordner, B. (1997); Rethinking Neorealist Theory: Order Within the Anarchy. Research and Writing. http://www.brucebordner.com/Neorealism.html, 07212014.

Botha, P. (2000); The Challenges of an African Renaissance in the 21st Century, in E. Moloka and E. Le Roux (eds.); Problemitising the African Renaissance. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Branco, N.C. (2013); CAADP and agrarian options for Mozambique: contribution for a political economy. International Conference on the Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa. Pretoria (South Africa), March 18-20, 2013.

Bratton, M. (1989); The Politics of Government-NGO Relationship in Africa; World Development, Vol 17, issue 4.

Brighenti, A. (2016) Antonio Gramisci´s Theory of Civil Society. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Bruce, J., 2007. Land Use Rights for Commercial Activities in Mozambique, Paper produced by Nathan Associates Inc. for review by the United States Agency for International Development.

Brutus, D. (2005); Leafdrift. Edited by Lamont B. Steptoe. Camden, N.J.: Whirlwind Press, 87.

Bull, H. (1962); International Theory: The Case for Traditional Approach. World Politics, 18(3): 361–377.

Bunwaree, S. (2008); NEPAD and its Discontents, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga-Muvumba and T. Murithi (eds.); The African Union and its Institutions. Johannesburg, South Africa. South Adfrica: Fanele and Jacana.

Burchill, S. et al (2009); Theories of International Relations, Fourth Edition, Pelgrave Macmillan, UK.

Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (1991); Politics and the Study of Discourse: The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Byanyima, W. (2008); Africa and Gender Equality: Priority for the AU, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinda-Muvumba and T. Murithi, The African Union and its Institutions. Johannesburg, South Africa: Fanele and Jacana.

Cabral, A. (1966, 1969); The Weapon of Theory', in Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle, London: Stage I, pp. 73-90.

Cabrita, J. M. (2001); *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology (2006).

Carbone, G. (2005) Continuidade na renovação? Ten Years of Multiparty Politics in Mozambique: Roots, Evolution and Stabilisation of the Frelimo-Renamo Party System. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(3): 417-42

Carmody, P. (2007); Neoliberalism, Civil Society and Security in Africa. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan.

Carmody, P. (2011); The New Scramble for Africa. Polity Press.

Castel-Branco, C. N. (2014); 'Growth, capital accumulation and economic porosity in Mozambique: Social losses, private gains', Review of African Political Economy, 41, S1, 2014, pp. S26–S48.

Catsossa, L. A. (2017) Discursos e realidades do agronegócio**:** do PRODECER no cerrado brasileiro ao ProSAVANA no Corredor de Nacala em Moçambique. Dissertação (Mestrado em Geografia), UFGD, MS, 2017

Chabal, P. (2002): The quest for good government and development in Africa. Is NEPAD the Answer?, in: International Affairs 78, 3, 2002, 447-62.

Chakrabarty (2000) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference /The American Historical Review 106(4)

Chandhoke, N. (1995); State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory, New Delhi, Sage Publications.

Chatterjee, P. (2004); The Politics of the Governed. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chatterjee, P. (2011); Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy. Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Cheru, F. (2002); Debt, Adjustment and the Politics of Effective response to HIV/AIDS in Africa. Third World Quarterly 23:2. 299-312

Cheru, F. (2006); Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa: What has Worked Well So Far? What Needs Changing? Routledge. Third World Quarterly, Vol 27 N 2, pp 355-376

Christian Aid, (2001); Ignoring the experts: Poor people's exclusion from poverty reduction strategies, Christian Aid Policy Briefing prepared in partnership with INESC, RedeBrasil, Mozambique Debt Group, LINK, CEDLA, UNITAS, London: Christian Aid.

CIVICUS (2012); State of civil society, CIVICUS.

Clayton, A. (1996); NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies, Intrac, Oxford.

Cohen, J. L. and Arato, A. (1992); Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Cohen, J. and Arato, A. (1992); Civil Society and political theory: Studies in contemporary German social thought. Cambridge, MIT Press.

Cohen, J. and Uphoff, N. (1980) Participation's place in rural development: Seeking clarity through specificity, *World Development*, 8: 213-235.

Cornwaal, A. and Brock, K. (2005); What do Buzzwords Do for Development Policy? A Critical Look at 'Participation'. 'Empowerment' and 'Poverty Reduction'. Third World Quarterly Vol 26.

Cox, R. (1999); "Civil Society at the turnoff the millennium: prospects for alternative order"; Review of International Studies 25(1): 3-28.

Craig, D. and Porter, D. (2006); Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction, and Political Economy. New York and Lodon: Routledge Curran, Z (2005) The role of evidence and the impact on policy choices: PPA Synthesis Study. Overseas Development Institute, London.

Davis, J.A. (1962) American Society of African Culture (Eds.), Pan Africanism Reconsidered. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

De Matos, F., T. (2009) O poder local em Moçambique: descentralização, pluralismo jurídico e legitimação. Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento.

De Sousa Santos, B. (2006) The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique. Law & Society Review, 40(1): 39-75.

Death, C. (2013) Governmentality at the limits of the international: African politics and Foucauldian theory. Volume 39, Issue 3.

Davie, G. (2012) "After a General Strike." Waging Nonviolence. N.p., 2 May 2012. Web. 18 Nov. 2012. <http://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/05/after-a-general-strike/>.

Dele, O. (2009); Conference Paper, Indiana University Bloomington. http://hdl.handle.net/10535/1430, viewed 29/02/2014.

Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B. C. (2001); Realism", in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to Internasional Relations. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B. C. (2005); Realism", in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

EISA (2003); Conference report on: Strengthening Democracy through NEPAD: The Role of African Civil Society, Johannesburg, South Africa.

EISA (2007); Civil Society and the APRM. Johannesburg South Africa.

Ekeh, P. (1998); "Civil Society and the Construction of Freedom in African History". Keynote Address to Wilberforce Conference on Civil Society in Africa, Central State University, Wilberforce, Ohio, 1998.

Eldredge E.A. (2018); Pre-colonial Political Institutions: Relevance for Contemporary Africa. In: Oloruntoba S., Falola T. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Ellis, E.D. (1980); The pluralistic state. The American Political Science Review, vol. 14, no. 3, Aug., pp. 393-407.

Esan, O. (2004); African Media and the New Partnership for Africa's Development Agenda for Africa's Emerging Democracies. Africa Media Review, Vol. 12, N° 2:41-56

Fayemi, A. K. (2009); Towards an African Theory of Democracy Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK). Premier Issue, New Series, Vol.1 No.1, June 2009, pp.101-126.

Ferguson, A. (1767); An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1723-1816).

Flyvbjerg, B. (1997); Habermas and Foucault: thinkers for civil society. Department of Development and Planning- Aalborg University, Denmark.

Foucault, M. (1998); Technologies of the Self. Lectures at University of Vermont Oct. 1982, in Technologies of the Self, 16-49. Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Foucault, M. (1991); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison. London, Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1997b); 'The Birth of Biopolitics', in Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. by Paul Rabinow, New York: The New Press 1997, pp. 67-71.

Foucault, M. (1978); The History of Sexuality: The will to Knowledge. London, Penguin. Vol. 1.

Foucault, M. (1988); 'Technologies of the Self' (A seminar with Michel Foucault at the University of Vermont, October 1982), in: L. H. Martin, H. Gutman, P. H. Hutton (eds.), and Technologies of the Self. A seminar with Michel Foucault, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Foucault, M. (1982a); The subject and the Power, in Hurbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester, pp.208-26.

Foucault, M. (1992) [1984]; *The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality: Volume Two.* Tr. R. Hurley. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, pp. 10-11.

Foucault (1972) [1969]. *The Archaeology of Knowledge.* Tr. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, p. 193.

Foucault, M. (1967); On the ways of writing history. In (1998). *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology. The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984*. Volume Two. J. D. Faubion. (Ed.). Tr. Robert Hurley and others. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Allen Lane, Penguin, p. 284.

Foucault, M. (2004); *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978.* Paris: Gallimard Seuil, pp. 294, 282.

Foucault, M. (1982); "The Subject and Power," Critical inquiry, vol. 8 (Summer 1982), 785.

Foucault, M. (1972); *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, edited by R. Sheridan (1995). Routledge. London.

Foucault, M. (1972- 1972); POWER/KNOWLEDGE**.** *Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 Edited by* COLIN GORDON

Fourie, J. (2016); 'I Didn't Struggle to be Poor': The Interwovenness of Party, State and Business in Mozambique. SAIIA. Policy Briefing 147 January 2016. Wits University

Fowler A. (2012); Measuring Civil Society: Perspectives on Afro-Centrism. International Institute for Social Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands123 Voluntas (2012) 23:5–25 DOI 10.1007/s11266-011-9239-8. Sprinter Publishing.

Gallagher, M. (2008); Foucault, Power and Participation. The International Journal of Children's Rights. Volume 16: Issue 3.

Galli, R. E. (2003) Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces: Land and Governance in Mozambique. Oxford, England: Lexington Books.

Gane, M. (2008); Foucault on Governmentality and Liberalism: The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978—1979 by Michel Foucault, trans. Graham Burchell Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 346 Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977—1978 by Michel Foucault, trans. Graham Burchell Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 401.

Gasu, J. (2010); Africa's Development Renaissance: the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a Facilitator, Paper to the Conference on the Renaissance of African Economies, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 2010, Department of Social Political and Historical Studies Faculty of Integrated Development Studies, University for Development Studies Wa Campus, Ghana.

Getachew, A. (2019); Worldmaking after Empire: *The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination. Princeton Press.*

Gaventa, J. (2016); Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis. *IDS Bulletin* Volume 37(5): 23-33 Institute of Development Studies.

Gaventa, J. (2005) Reflections on the Uses of the 'Power Cube' Approach for Analyzing the Spaces, Places and Dynamics of Civil Society Participation and Engagement. CFP evaluation series 2003-2006: no 4. Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

Gaventa, J. (2003); Power after Lukes: a review of the literature, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Gee, J. P. (1991); A linguistic approach to narrative. Journal of Narrative and Life History, 1(1), 15–39.

Gera, W. (2018); Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries. The Crux of The Crisis: A Governance Analysis of Philippine Underdevelopment. University of the Philippines Cebu.

Gerlach, L. P. and Hine, V. H. (1970) People, power, change: movements of social transformation. Bobbs-Merril. Michigan University.

Germinno, D. L. and Gramsci, A. (1990); Architect of a New Politics, Louisiana Press University.

Greenberg, S. (2008); The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa: A review of John S. Saul. Transformation Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa. N65 pp195-200.

Greenstein, R. (2003); State, Civil Society and the Configuration of Power in Post-apartheid South Africa. Centre for Civil Society Research. University of the Witwatersrand. Johannesburg.

Gumede, W. (2017) The Democracy Deficit of African Liberation Movements turned Governments, Politikon, Vol 44, No 1, pages 1-22.

Gundigan, E. (2008); Conceptions of Hegemony in Antonio Gramsci's Southern Question and the Prison Notebooks. New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry. Vol 2, N°1 pp45-60.

Habermas, J. (1966) Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Hall, John A. (1995); Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison; Polity Press.

Hall, J. A. (1995); In Search of Civil Society, in J. A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society Theory, History, Comparison, Cambridge: Policy Press, pp 1-31.

Hanlon, J., 1984, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, London: Zed Books.

Hann, C. (ed.) (1990); Market Economy and Civil Society in Hungary, London: Frank Cass.

Hann, C. and Dunn, E. (1996); Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, European Association of Social Anthropologists, Routledge, London and New York.

Hansma, T. (ed.), 1993, *The General Agreement of Mozambique*, Amsterdam: African-European Institute.

Härdig, A. (2015); "Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa," Democratization, Vol. 22: No. 2 (2015): 1131-1153.

Harvey, C. (1996); Constraints on the Success of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa. MacMillan Press and St. Martin Press Inc.

Harvey, D. (2005); A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press.

Hassan, H. A. R. (2008); The State and Civil Society in Africa: A North African Perspective. Contra Relatos desde el Sur. Apuntes sobre África y Medio Oriente (Año IV nos. 5 y 6 diciembre 2008). CEA, Centro de Estudios Avanzados, UNC, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

Hearn, J. (2007); African NGOs: ¿The New Compradors? Institute for Social Studies

Hearn, J. (2017); The 'uses and abuses' of civil society in Africa.

Held, D. and Mcgrew, A. (2007); Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide. Polity Press, Second Edition.

Hegel, F. (1821); The Philosophy of Rights" (1770-1831).

Henriksen, T. H. (1976); People´s War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Vol 14, Nº 3. Pp. 377-399. Cambridge University Press.

Herbert, R. and Gruzd, S. (2008); The African Peer Review Mechanism-Lessons from The Pioneers. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

Herbst, J. and Mills, G (2012); Africa's Third Liberation: The New Search for Prosperity and Jobs. Penguin Books.

Hickel, J. (2012); A Short History of Neoliberalism (And How We Can Fix It). http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article 07212014.

Hnyder, G. H. (2002); Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security – A Review Essay. International Security. Vol. 27, N°1, Pp 148-173.

Hoare, Quntion & Smith and Nowell, G. (1971); Introduction. In Antonio Gramsci. Selections from Prism Netbooks. pp. xvii–xcvi. New York: International Publishers, p. xxx–xxxi.

Hobbes, T. 1994 (1660), Leviathan, Edwin Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett.

Hume, C. (1994); *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, Washington, D.C.: The US Institute of Peace Press.

Ikenberry, G. J., Mastandumno, M. and Wohlforth, W. (2011); International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity. Trustees of Princeton University

Iheriohanma J. (2010) Governance, Leadership Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: An Explorative Discourse P. M. European Journal of Social Sciences – Volume 12, Number 3 (2010) 409 B. 1526

Ikome, F. N. (2007); From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa's Development: The Political Economy of Africa Regional Initiatives. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue.

Irish Examiner (February 02, 2019) "In God's name? The politicisation of religion and potentially deadly consequences"

https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/views/analysis/in-gods-name-the-politicisation-of-religion-and-potentially-deadly-consequences-901762.html

Isaacman, A. and Isaacman, B. (1977); Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa, c. 1850-1920. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1977), pp. 31-62. Boston University African Studies Centre.

Isichei, E. (1997); A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press

Jacques, G. and Lesetedi, G. N. (2005); The New partnership for Africa's Development-Debates, Opportunities and Challenges. South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa and the Southern African Universities Social Sciences Conference

Jahed, M. and Kithatu, A. (2007); *NEPAD: a Five-Year Review in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2006/7*. Johannesburg, South Africa: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

James, C. L. R. and Kelley, R (2012). *A History of Pan-African Revolt.* PM Press. Print

Jenkins, R. (2001); *Mistaking "Governance" for "Politics": Foreign Aid, Democracy and the Construction of Civil Society*; Birkbeck College, University of London

Kapitonenko, M. (2009); *Globalization, Nation-State and Global Security Arrangements*. EuroPolis. Institute of International Relations. Kiev

Keane, John (1998); Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions; Polity Press, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK

Keane, J. (ed.) (1988); *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, London: Verso

Keane, J. (2003); *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge University Press, UK

Keet, D. (2006); *The Character and Role of Trade Within NEPAD: Critical Challenges and Questions* in J.O. Adésínà, Y. Graham, and A. Olukhoshi (eds.), Africa and Development-Challenges in the New Millennium, The NEPAD Debate. Dakar, London, New York, and Pretoria: CODESRIA, ZED Books and UNISA Press

Keet, D. (2002); *The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Unity and Integration within Africa? Or Integration of Africa into the Global Economy?* Occasional Paper No. 35 Braamfontein, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue

Kifle, H. et al.-eds. (1997); *A New Partnership for African Development*: Issues Parameters. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute

Kihika, M. (2009); *Development or Underdevelopment: The Case of Non-Governmental Organizations in Neoliberal Sub-Saharan Africa*. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences Vol 1, No 3, 783-795, Brock University, St Catharines, Ontario, Canada

Kimenyi, M. S., Routman, R. and Westbery, A. (2013); *CAADP at 10: Progress Toward Agricultural Prosperity*. Policy Paper. Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings

Klein, H. (1999). The Atlantic Slave Trade. UK. Cambridge University Press 234 pp. Vol 76, N°1

Kohout, F. (2003); Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation. International Political Science Review, 24 (1), 51-66.

Kohout, K. (2003); Work on International Political Science Review: Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics. Vol. 24, No. 1 pp. 51-66

Kornegay, F. (2008); *The African Union and its Institutions.* South Africa: Fanele and Jacana

Krippner, G. R. (2011); Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Kumar, K. (2007); *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*. Vol. 48, No. 3 (2007), pp. 413-434

Kratochwil, F. and Mansfield, E. D. (2006); *International Organization and Global Governance: A Reader*. Pearson Longman Education. Second Edition

Kyed, H. M. and Lars, B. (2006) New Sites of Citizenship: Recognition of Traditional Authority and Group-Based Citizenship in Mozambique. Journal of Southern African Studies, 32(3): 563-81.

Landsberg, C. (2007); *South African and the Making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki's Progressive African Agenda*, A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji, and C. Landsberg (eds.), South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era. Scottville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu Natal Press

Landsberg, C. (2008); *The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD*, in J.Akokpari,A. Ndinga-Muvumba and T. Murithi, The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jacana

Lapavitsas, C. (2013); The financialization of capitalism: 'Profiting without producing'. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Larner, W. (2005); Neoliberalism in (Regional) Theory and Practice: the Stronger Communities Action Fund in New Zealand. Geographival Research. Vol. 43. Issue 1

Lawrence and Wishart (1971); *Antonio Gramsci*, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. ISBN 0-85315-280-2, p.lxxxix

Lee, R. (2011); *Mozambique must Implement Policies*

Legum, M. (2005); *How New is this Partnership?* , in NALEDI (2004). Building Alternatives to Neo-Liberal Globalisation- The Challenges Facing NEPAD. South Africa: African Labour Research Network and NALEDI

Lesufi, I. (2006); *Towards a Critique of the Political Economy of NEPAD*, in M.S. Smith (ed.); Beyond the African Tragedy: Discourses on Development and the Global Economy. England and USA: AShgate

Linklater, A. (1990); Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Lioramonti (eds); *Civicus Global Survey of the State of Civil Society –Comparative Perspectives*. USA: Civicus and Kumarian Press, Inc.

Lorenzini, D. (2018); Governmentality, subjectivity, and the neoliberal form of life. Journal for Cultural Research. Issue 2: How Capitalism Forms Our Lives. Vol 22

Luke, T. W. (1982); Angola and Mozambique: Institutionalizing Social Revolution in Africa. Vol. 44 Nº 3. Pp. 413-436.Cambridge University Press.

Lumke, T. (2010); *Foucault, Governmentality and Critique: Rethinking Marxism*: A journal of Economics, Culture and Society. Routledge. UK

Mackenzie, J.M. (2005) The Partition of Africa 1880–1900. Published in the USA by Methuen & Co. in association with Methuen, Inc. 733 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Mackinnon (2000); *Managerialism, governmentality and the state:* a neo-Foucauldian approach to local economic governance. Political Geography

Maimela, D. (2013); Pan-Africanism of the 21st Century – Challenges and Prospects. The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation | ISSUE 71

Magbadelo, J. O. (2018); *African Affairs*, Volume 117, Issue 469, 1 October 2018, Pages 711–712, Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society

Makara, S. (2009); *The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Search for a Democratic-Development State in Africa*. University of Makerere, Uganda.

Malisa, M. and Nhengeze, P. (2018); Pan-Africanism: A Quest for Liberation and the

Pursuit of a United Africa. Genealogy 2018, 2, 28; doi:10.3390/genealogy2030028 www.mdpi.com/journal/genealogy.

Maloka, E., ed., (2002); *Africa's Development Thinking since Independence*: A Reader. Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa

Maloka, E. (2006); *NEPAD and its Critics,* in J.O. Adésínà,Y. Graham, and A. Olukhoshi (eds.), Africa and Development-Challenges in the New Millennium, The NEPAD Debate. Dakar, London, New York, and Pretoria: CODESRIA, ZED Books and UNISA Press

Mamdani, M. (1996); Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Manning, C. (1998); 'Constructing opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as political party', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.21 No.1: 161-189.

Marx, K. (1967); Letter to Puge: Writtings of the Young Man on Philosophy and Society, trans and ed. L.D. Laston and Guddat

Masterson, G., Busia, K. and Jinadu, A. (2010) Peering the Peers: Civil Society and the African Peer Review Mechanism Eds

Mathews, K. (2005); *Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and New Pan Africanists*, in J. *India International Centre Quarterly*. Vol. 31, No. 4 (SPRING 2005), pp. 143-155

Akokpari, A. Ndinga- Muvumba and T. Murithi, The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jacana

Mbete. B. (2008); *the Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects*, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga- Muvumba and T. Murithi, The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jacana.

McGlinchy, S., Watters, R. and Scheinpfug, C. (2017) International Relations Theory. International Relations Publishing. Creative Commons. CCBY-NC 4.0. ISBN 978-1-918014-20-8 (eBook).

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006); *Structural Realism*. 05. IRT – Chapter 04. gxg, P 71

Melber, H. (2010); The Legacy of Anti-Colonial Struggles in Southern Africa: Liberation Movements as Governments. Paper presented to the Conference on Election Processes, Liberation Movements and Democratic Change in Africa Organized by IESE and CMI Maputo, 8-11 April 2010

Melber, H. (2009b); 'Governance, Political Culture and Civil Society Under a Civil Liberation Movement in Power: the case of Namibia', in Nuno Vidal with Patrick Chabal (eds), Southern Africa: Civil Society, Politics and Donor Strategies. Angola and its neighbours. Luanda and Lisbon: Media XXI & Firmamento, 199-212.

Melber, H. (2009a) 'Southern African Liberation Movements as Governments and the Limits to Liberation', Review of African Political Economy, no. 121, 453-461.

Melber, H. (2005); 'Liberation Movements as Governments: The Unfinished Business of Decolonisation', in Jeanette Minnie (ed.), Outside the Ballot Box. Preconditions for Elections in Southern Africa 2005/6. Windhoek: Media Institute for Southern Africa Melber, H. (2003b); Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa. The unfinished business of democratic consolidation. (ed.) Cape Town: HSRC Press 2003b

Melber, H. (2002); From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa. African Sociological Review, 6,(1),2002 pp.00-00. *The Nordic Africa Institute Uppsala, Sweden.*

Melber, H. (2002): The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) -

Old Wine in New Bottle? in: *Forum for Development Studies*, Nr. 1, 2002, pp. 186-208.

Mensah, J. (2008); *Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa. Contestations on the Embattled Continent*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Migdal, J. et al (eds); State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge/New York. Cambridge University Press

Miller, N.R. (1983); Pluralism and social choice. The American Political Science Review, vol. 77, no. 3, Sept., pp. 734-747.

Mingst, K.A. (2008); *Essentials of International Relations*, Fourth Edition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London.

Mindzie, M. A. (2015); Citizen participation and the promotion of democratic governance in Africa. GREAT Insights Magazine, Volume 4, Issue 3. April/May 2015.

Mojane, B. (2018); How is Mozambique doing, 43 years after its political independence? https://www.pambazuka.org/democracy-governance/how-mozambique-doing-43-years-after-its-political-independence.

Moore, D. (2007); *Sail on Ship of State: Neoliberalism, Globalisation, and the governance of Africa*, in D. Moore (Ed.); The World Bank: Development, Poverty Hegemony. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1946); Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mosse, M. and Pohlmann, J.F. (2011); *The APRM Process in Mozambique,* Open Society Foundations. AfriMap/OSISA.

Motsamai, N. (2003); *Conference report on: Strengthening Democracy through NEPAD: The Role of African Civil Society* prepared by EISA, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Moyo, S. (2006); *Africa's Agrarian Transformation: The Efficacy of the NEPAD Agriculture Strategy*, in J.O. Adésínà,Y. Graham, and A. Olukhoshi (eds.), Africa and Development-Challenges in the New Millennium, The NEPAD Debate. Dakar, London, New York, and Pretoria: CODESRIA, ZED Books and UNISA Press.

Moyo, B. (2007) Civil Society and the African Union Architecture: Institutional Provisions and Invented Interfaces in The African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa. Cambria Press: New York. P.275-296.

Moyo, B. (2008) 'The relevance of the African Union and NEPAD in the era of interdependence (integration)' in *India-Africa Relations: Emerging Policy and Development Perspective.* Mumbai: Academic Excellence Publishers.

Msellemu, S. A. (2013). Common Motives of Africa"s Anti-colonial Resistances in 1890–1960. The Dar Es Salaam University College of Education. Journal of Social Evolutions & History. Volume 12.

Mueller, M. L. et al (2007); *Democratizing Global Communication?* Global Civil Society and the Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society.

Murithi, T. (2005); The UN Peace building Commission and the Evolving AU? NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework, in A. Adebajo and H. Scanlon (eds.), A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations. Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media and the Centre for Conflict Resolution.

Mtasa, C. (2008); A Critical Appraisal of the African Union-ECOSOPCC Civil Society Interface, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga-Muvumba and T. Muthiri, The African Union and its Institutions. South Africa: Fanele and Jacana.

Muroyi, R.; (2018); Why Pan-Africanism has dismally failed Africa. Newsday pp. 285-286.

Mwangi, S. (2008); NEPAD: 'A New Development Paradigm for Africa? In A. Adekunle et al (eds.) Civil Society and Regional Integration in Africa Nairobi DPMF.

M'buyinga, E. (N/D); Pan Africanism or Neo-colonialism? The Bankruptcy of the O.A.U. Translated by Michael Pallis. Centre for Consciencist Studies and Analysis (CENCSA). Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London Nl 9DN.

NALEDI (2004); Building Alternatives to Neo-liberal Globalisation – The Challenges Facing NEPAD. South Africa: African Labour Research Network and NALEDI.

Naraya, D. et al (2000); The Voices of the Poor. Can Anyone Hear Us? The World Bank Group.

Ndegwa, S. N. (2004); The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGO and Politics in Africa.

Ngwane, T. (2005); *Should African Movements Support NEPAD?* in NALEDI 2004. Building Alternatives to Neo-liberal Globalisation – The Challenges Facing NEPAD. South Africa: African Labour Research Network and NALEDI.

Ngwane, T. (2011) Civil Society Protests in South Africa: The Need for a Vision of Alternatives. University of Johannesburg, 2011.

Nicholson, M. (2002); *International Relations: A concise Introduction.* 2nd Edition revised, Expanded and Updated Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Nkrumah, K. (1963); Africa Must Unite, London: PANAF.

Nkrumah, K. (1965); Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Heinemann.

Nkrumah, Kwame (1961); I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology. London, Heinemann.

Nkrumah, K. 1963, 1998); Africa Must Unite, London: PANAF.

Nkrumah, Kwame (1970); Conciencism. Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation (1964). New York, Monthly Review Press.

Nölke, A., Heires, M. and Bieling, H. J. (2013); The Politics of Financialization. competition and change, Vol. 17 No. 3, August 2013, 209–18.

Nyerere, J. K. (1966, 1968); The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist, in J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.207-217.

Nyerere, J.K. (1997); 'Africa Must Unite', edited excerpts from a public lecture delivered in Accra to mark Ghana's 40th Independence Day anniversary celebrations, United New Africa Global   Network, http://www.unitednewafrica.com/Africa%20Unite.htm   Accessed   on December 21 2018.

Obadare, E. and Adebanwi, W. (2016); Governance and the crisis of rule in Africa: Leadership in transformation. (eds.). Palgrave Macmillan. New York ISBN 978 1 137 56357 6.

Okoth, A. (2006); African Nationalism and the De-Colonisation Process: [1915-1995]. Nairobi [u.a.: East African Educational Publ. Print].

O'Laughlin, B. (1995); Past and Present Options: Land Reform in Mozambique. *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 22, No. 63 (Mar., 1995), pp. 99-106.

Olowu, D. (2003a); African Governance and Civil Service Reforms in N. van de Walle, N. Ball & V. Ramachandran Eds Beyond Adjustment: The Institutional Context of African Development New York, McMillan, pp. 101 – 130.

Olowu, D (2003b); 'The Crisis in African Public Administration' in B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre Eds Handbook of Public Administration, pp.503 – 513.

O´Meara….

Oram, J. and Doane, D. (2017); Why Shrinking Civil Society Space Matters in International Development and Humanitarian Action- Enabling Environment Solidarity. Foundations and INGOs. European Foundation Centre. Open Society Foundations.

Orji, N. (2009); Civil Society, Democracy and Good Governance in Africa. CEU Political Science Journal.

Ottesen, H. (2010); NEPAD's Contribution to Democracy and Good Governance in Africa, International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden.

PADEAP (N/D); Pan Africanism Today. PADEAP - Education for Empowerment

http://www.padeap.net/who-we-are/pan-africanism.html   Accessed February 26, 2020

Patton, M.Q. (1980); Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California.

Paul, T. V. (2012); *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation*. Cambridge University Press.

Perez, A., F., Gueye, S. P. and Yang, F. (2005); Civil Society as Democratic Practice; Cultural Heritage Change Series VII, Seminars on Culture and Values, Volume 22. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication.

Pesek, M. (2011); Foucault Hardly Came to Africa: Some Notes on Colonial and Post-Colonial Governmentality. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

Pheko, M. (2005); New or Old Partnership for African Women? in P. Bond (ed.), Fano's Warning – A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Treton and Asmara: Africa World Press.

Plehwe, D., Walpen, B., and Neunhöffer, G. (2006); Neoliberal Hegemony. A Global Critique. Routledge/Ripe Studies in Global Political Economy. London and New York.

Policy Brief (2017) http://ccpau.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/01_Policy-Brief-Nov16.pdf

Powell, R. (1993): 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', in: D. A. Baldwin (Ed.) Neorealism and Neo-liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press.

Powers, P. (N/Y); The Philosophical Foundations of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. Thompson Rivers University.

Prempeh, E.O.K. (2006); Against Global Capitalism – African Social Movements Confront Neoliberal Globalisation. England and USA: Ashgate.

Pocock, J. G. A., 1975. The Machiavellian Movement: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Political Tradition, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Prashad, V. (2007) The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World. New York: New Press and New Delhi

Prentis, E. L. (2013); Competitive Markets Economies. Self-regulating Markets VS Economic Stability and the Pradox of Change. Journal of Business, Economics & Finance. Vol 2.

Rabinow, P. editor (1991); The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's thought, London, Penguin.

Radice, H. (2008); Gramsci and Neo-Gramscianism: To what purpose? On Ayers, A. J. (ed) (2008), Gramsci, Political Economy, an International Relations Theory.

Randriamiro, K.P. (2006); NEPAD, Gender and Poverty Trap: The Challenges of Financing Development in Africa from Gender Perspective, in J.O. Adésínà,Y. Graham, and A. Olukhoshi (eds.), Africa and Development-Challenges in the New Millennium, The NEPAD Debate. Dakar, London, New York, and Pretoria: CODESRIA, ZED Books and UNISA Press.

Ranis, at al (2006); Globalizations and the Nation State: The impact of the IMF and World Bank, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York.

Rebelo, P. and Kaarhus, R. (2003); CSOs and SWAPS: The role of civil society organizations in the heath sector in Mozambique Noragric, Centre for International Environment and Development Studies, Agricultural University of Norway.

Reynolds, P. (2002); African Union replaces dictators' club. BBC News Online world affairs correspondent.

Riessman, C. K. (1993); Narrative analysis. London: SAGE Publishing.

Riessman, C. K. (2002); Analysis of personal narratives. In J. F. Gubruim & J. A.

Rist, S. et all (2011); Endogenous knowledge: Implications for sustainable development. ResearchGate,

Rose, N.; O'Malley, P. and Valverde, M. (2009); Governmentality: Legal Studies Research Paper. The University of Sydney.

Rose, N. (1999); Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, N. (1996); Governing 'Advanced' Liberal Democracies. In N. Rose, Andrew Barry and Thomas Osborne (eds.) Foucault and Political Reason. London & Chicago: UCL Press.

Rose, N. and P. Miller. (1992); Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government. In British Journal of Sociology 43 (2): 172-205.

Rosenberg, J. (1994); The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, Verso, London.

Russell, G. (1990); Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

SAHO (N/D). The Fight Against Colonialism and Imperialism in Africa. South Africa History Online. https://www.sahistory.org.za/ Accessed March 19, 2019.

SAIA (2018) The African Peer Review Mechanism at 15: achievements and aspirations, South African. Policy Briefings African Initiatives, Democracy & Human Rights, Governance. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-african-peer-review-mechanism-at-15-achievements-and-aspirations/ Assessed March 9th 2019.

Sandbrook, R. (N/Y); Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism in the Third World.

Sandbrook, R. (1993) The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery

SAT (2007); African Civil Society Organizations and the Pan African Parliament Consultative Dialogue: Report on building effective mechanisms for civil society engagement with Pan African and Regional Institutions, Johannesburg.

Satgar, V. (2019); Racism After Apartheid-Challenges for Marxism and Anti-Racism (eds). Wits University Press Johannesburg, 2001. South Africa.

Saul, J. and bond, P. (2014); South Africa. The Present as History. From Mrs Ples to Mandela & Marikana. James Currey. NY and Jacama Media. Johannesburg.

Saul, J.S. (1997); Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy in Southern Africa. Review of African Political Economy. Vol 24 N72. Zaire, South Africa: Moving Forward? pp. 219-236Taylor and Francis.

Saul, J. S. (2005); The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa. Toronto, Durban, New York and London: Between the Lines, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Monthly Review Press, The Merlin Press.

Saul, J. S. (2007); "The Strange Death of Liberated Southern Africa," in Decolonization and Empire. Delhi, London and Johannesburg: Three Essays Collective, Merlin Press, and University of Witwatersrand Press.

Savoia, P. (2012); Foucault's Critique of Political Reason: Individualization and Totalization. Revista de Estudios Sociales No. 43 rev.estud.soc. • ISSN 0123-885X • Pp. 208. Bogotá.

Scholte, J. A. (1999); Global Civil Society: Changing the World? Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper No. 31/99

Seddon, D. (2018); RoAPE Project on 'Popular Protest, Social Movements and Class Struggle in Africa', RoAPE.net 2017-2018.

Seddon, D. and Becker, H. (2018). Africa's 1968: Protests and Uprisings Across the Continent. Review of African Political Economy.

Sewell, W. H. (2005); Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation. University of Chicago Press.

Sewell, W. H. and Evans, P. (Forthcoming); "The Neoliberal Era: Ideology, Policy, and Social Consequences", in Peter Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era.

Shepperson, G. (1962); Pan-Africanism and "Pan-Africanism": Some Historical Notes. Clark Atlanta University. Vol. 23, No. 4 (4th Qtr.1962).

Shilimela, R. (2004); NEPAD and the African Civil Society: How can civil society be mobilised within the NEPAD framework?

Shillington, K. (2005); History of Africa, Revised 2nd Edition. Palgrave Macmillan

Shilomboleni, H. (2018); African Green Revolution, food sovereignty and constrained livelihood choice in Mozambique, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des études africaines, 52:2, 115-137,DOI: 10.1080/00083968.2018.1483833.

Shivji, I. G. (1986); Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania, London: Heinemann & James Curry, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.

Shivji I. G. (2005); The Changing Development Discourse in Africa. Vol. 31, No. 4

Shivji, I. G. (2009); Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, Nairobi & Oxford: fahamu books.

Shivji. I. G. (20009) Accumulation in an African Periphery: A Theoretical Framework, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota.

Simala, K.I. (2010); Pan-Africanism and Language Question: Re-reading African Cultural and Intellectual History. AJIA-Vol 6 nos.

Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds.) (1996); International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sogge, D. (2004); Civil Domains in African Settings: Some Issues. A discussion Paper for the HIVOS Africa Consultation, 7-9 June, Arhusha, Tanzania.

Söderbaum, F. (2004); The Political Economy of Regionalism. The Case of Southern Africa, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Söderbaum, F: (2007); Regionalisation and Civil Society: The Case of Southern Africa, in: New Political Economy 12/3, 319-337.

Söderbaum, F. (2009); Comparative Regional Integration and Regionalism, in: Landman, Todd/Robinson, Neil (eds): The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics, London: SAGE, 477-496.

Söderbaum, F. and Shaw, T. M. (eds 2003); Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Söderbaum, F. and Taylor, I. (eds 2008); Afro-regions: The Dynamics of Cross-border Micro-regionalism in Africa, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Southall, R. (2013) Liberation Movements in Power: Party State in Southern Africa. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Pietermaritzburg

Southall, R. and Melber, H. (2009); A New Scramble for Africa: imperialism, investment and development. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Southern Africa Trust (2007); Establishing a Civil Society Support Mechanism with PAP, the NEPAD and the APRM, Research Report, Johannesburg.

Stake, E.R. (2006); Multiple Case Study Analysis, the Guilford Press, New York & London.

Suchs, J. D. (2005); The End of Poverty: How we can Make it Happen in our Lifetime, Penguin Books, London.

Suleiman, E. (1999); 'Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe' in L. Anderson Ed. Transitions to Democracy New York, Columbia Press, pp. 141 – 167.

Tar, A. U. (2008); The Politics of Neoliberal Democracy in Africa: State and Civil Society in Nigeria. International Library of African Studies. I.B. Tauris & Co ltd.

Thorsen, D. E. (2009); The Neoliberal Challenge. What is Neoliberalism? University of Oslo.

USAID (2011) The 2011 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Report for the Middle East and North Africa

Vasquez, J. A. (1998); The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neo-traditionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

VeneKlasen, L., and Miller, V. (2002); A New Weave of Power, People and Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation, Oklahoma City, World Neighbours

Verwey, L. (N/A); NEPAD and Civil Society Participation in the APRM. Ocasional Papers. http://www.idasa.org.za.

Vunjanhe, J. and Adriano V. (2015); Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional em Moçambique: um longo caminho por trilhar, Textos para Discussão, Centro de Referência em Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (CERESAN).

Waltz, K. N. (1995); Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, in Charles W. Kegley (ed.) Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. Martin's Press. PP.67-82.

Weaver, O. (1996); The Rise and the Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Steven Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 149–185.

Weber, C. (2001); International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. Routledge. London and New York.

Weimer, B. and Carrilho, J. (2017) Political Economy of Decentralisation in Mozambique Dynamics, Outcomes, Challenges. Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), Maputo.

Weimer, B. (ed.), 2012: Moçambique: Descentralizar o centralismo – Economia política, recursos e resultados, Maputo (IESE). (In Portuguese)

Weiss, T. G. (2000); Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges. Third World Quarterly, 21:5, 795-814.

Wendt, A. (1987); Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics International Organization, 46: 391–425.

West, H. (2005) Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

West, H. and Scott, K-J. (1999) Betwixt and between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique," African Affairs, 98(393): 455-84.

Whitehead, Ann (2003); Failing Women, Sustaining Poverty: Gender in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers- Report for the UK Gender and Development Network, GAD, London.

Williams, J. (2005); Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory, International Relations, Sage Publications.

Williams, M. C. (2005); The Realist Tradition and the Limit of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, M. C., 2007. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, M. F. (1998); Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Witt, S. W. (2006); Changing Roles of NGOs in the Creation, Storage, and Dissemination of Information in Developing Countries. Saur.

Wolfensohn, J. D. (2001); The Challenges of Globalization: The Role of the World Bank. Berlin.

Zeilig, L. (2007); Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: I.B. Tauris & Company. pp. 360

Yassin, E.A. (1994): The Organisation of African Unity after Thirty Years. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London.

Yom, S. (2005); "Civil Society and Democratization: Critical Views from the Middle East," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9: No. 4 (2005):14-33.

Yom, S. (2016; Understanding the Arab Spring: One Region, Several Puzzles, and Many Explanations," Government and Opposition, Vol. 51, No. 1.

9.2. Annexures – List of Research Participants

List of Participants

Institution	Code
APRM Headquarters	APRM005
NEPAD Headquarters	NEPAD006
NEPAD Headquarters	NEPAD004
RECIF	IACSOF013
African Fertilizer Foundation	AFF021
AUC Headquarters	AUC011
Build Peace and Development	PACIN009
CEPO-South Sudan	PACINI057
Walk Media Communication	PACIN044
CEPO/WMF South Sudan	PACIN005
Hurisa-South Africa	PACIN012

Civil Society Forum - Mozambique	NCSM046
Padare-South Africa	PACS006
Ministry of Education - Mozambique	GoM021
Cashew Institute	CS055
Helvetas - Mozambique	AFSN051
FAO-NEPAD	NPEAD006
Ditshwanelo – The Bowtsana Centre for Women´s Rights	PACINI052
APRM Headquarters	APRM003
Human Rights Commission	CWR014
NEPAD Headquarters	NEPAD021
Ministry of Agriculture-Mozambique	GoM011
South Africa Government	GoSA009
Ministry of Education - Mozambique	GoM003
South Africa Government	PACINI020
Gender Links	CSO34
ECOSOCC country member	ECOSOCC017
Ministry of foreign Affairs	GoSA014
Ministry of Agriculture - Mozambique	GoM006
National APRM Forum Mozambique	APRMN011
CCP-AU/PACINI and PALU	PALU007
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Mozambique	GoM018
AUC-Food Security and Nutrition	AUC008
SOTU - Kenya	SOTU045
National APRM Forum	APRMNat037
AUC-Civil Society Division	AUC056
UNAC - Mozambique	UNAC048
AUC CIDO	AUC021

CAADP-AUC	CAADP024
NEPAD Headquarters	NEPAD
AUC- Forestry and Land Management	AUC007
Veteran - Mozambique	VetMop066
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Mozambique	MoG003
FOPROSA	FOPROSA022
Ministry of Culture and Tourism	GoM058
UNAC - Mozambique	UNAC 055
AUC-Agribusiness Policy	AUC
CCP-AU/PACINI	PACINI027
AUC-ECOSOCC	ECOSOCC001
FAO-NEPAD	NEPAD014
National APRM Forum	APRMNat051
AUC- CS Division	AUC005
AUC-Food Security and Social Protection	AUC15
CAADP-AUC	AUC002
AUC-CIDO/African Citizens Directorate Organisation	AUC011
AMIREMO	AMIREMO056
Mozambique Rural Observatory	OMR041
FAO-GIZ	AFSN053
Panafricanist and Human Rights expert	PACINI027
Aga Khan	NCSM046
Portucel	Portucel052
Group Discussion	GD 031 and GD034