x*
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
 African Studies Seminar Paper
 to be presented in RW
 4.00pm OCTOBER 1978
 Title: The 1913 and 1914 White Workers' Strikes.
 by: A. O'Quigley
 No. 072
72.
 The 1913 and 1914 White Workers' Strikes
 A. O'Quigley
 Introduction
 The gold mining industry on the Rand began in the lBSO's and by 1913 there were
 63 mines employing about 21 000 white workers and 200 000 black workers.
 Gold, the international money commodity, had a fixed price. This meant there was
 a certain constraint with regard to the costs of production because increases
 could not be passed on to the buyers. The gold bearing ore on the Rand was deep
 lying and of a consistent low grade throughout the Reef. Because of its depth
 large amounts of capital investment were required for its exploitation. This
 was provided by finance houses in Europe through whom groups of gold mining com-
 panies were controlled. The profitability of the industry was constrained by
 the fixed price, the low grade of the ore and the need for large scale capital
 investment. Because of this the industry depended on cheap labour.
 The problem of finding and maintaining a supply of cheap labour dominated the
 policies of the industry. In the early years the great majority of blacks lived
 in the rural areas subsisting as independent farmers or on white owned land as
 squatters, share croppers and wage labourers. The long process of detaching
 ( -black labour from the land to produce for white owned economic enterprises was
 partly achieved through the implementation of taxes by government which forced
 peasants to obtain cash. As far as the gold mining industry was concerned in the
 early years some blacks came voluntarily in order to obtain cash to buy European
 produced goods such as guns. But increasingly black labour was obtained by
 recruiters who worked for the gold mining industry. Various means were employed
 by recruiters to obtain black labour including debt inducement. The gold mining
 capitalists quickly realised that co-operation between them was necessary to
 prevent their competition driving up the price of black labour. Centrally con-
 trolling recruiting agencies were established which operated throughout Southern
 Africa. The gold companies also agreed not to pay black labour more than a certain
 wage. This policy of co-operation was supervised by the Transvaal Chamber of
 Mines (TCM) a centralised policy making body to which most gold companies
 affiliated (1). They also eventually realized that the partially proletarianised
 native of the labour force, which meant that it fluctuated with changes in labour
 migration patterns, although a headache for managers was actually an advantage for
 an industry based on cheap labour. It meant that very low wages could be paid
 because the migrants family and his future were provided for in the rural areas.
 (;' The black labour force thus obtained was lacking in a?y-experience of industrial
 life and was restricted to unskilled work. In order to develop the mines and
 carry out certain skilled mining operations the gold companies also needed a
 supply of skilled workers. These were not available in South Africa. Skilled
 miners from overseas were induced ?o come to the. Witwatersrand because of the
 relatively high wgges. Most of them originated in Britain. Skilled miners tended
 to be nomadic and some had experience of work in Australia, America and other gold
 fields throughout the world. These miners' brought to South Africa their trade
 union experience and soon established branches of British craft unions and an
 autonomous miners union (2). As in Britain the craft unions operated to restrict
 access to their trade to maintain the scarcity of skills, prevent dilution of
 1 See Rick Johnstone "Class, Race and Gold"
 2 See Elaine Katz 'A Trade Union Aristocracy' 1976 A.S.I.
- 2 -
 labour and keep up its price. The miners union also began as a union of skilled
 workers. For many years it was very weak perhaps partly because the workers at
 that time felt unthreatened by dilution and because their rates of pay were relatively
 high and partly because of their tendency to be nomadic and to see their 'home*
 as being in Britain where their families probably were. Apart from their tendency
 to migrate from goldfield to goldfield they were very mobile between mines on the
 Rand which militated against the development of strong trade unions.
 Because of their rates of pay,their momopoly of skills and their resulting bar-
 gaining power the TCM was anxious to free themselves from their dependency on
 the white workers. For many years they refused to recognise trade unions and tried
 to discourage and weaken them (3). In 1909, partly for strategic reasons, the
 TCM drew up an agreement with the engine drivers' union. They hoped this would
 prevent the engine drivers from participating in a white workers' strike. The
 engine drivers were critical for operations becasue the mining regulations res-
 tricted control of machines for hauling men to whites.
 As blacks became experienced in gold mining operations the TCM wanted to be able
 to substitute this labour for the more expensive white workers. Skilled whites
 were still necessary but where skills could be fragmented blacks could carry out
 some of the operations. As time passed the 'all-round' skilled miner was grad-
 ually replaced by a worker whose only qualification was the possession of a'blasting
 .certificate' (4) and whose main occupation was supervising the black workers.
 These new workers came from the ranks of newly proletarianised Afrikaners. This
 process had begun to become apparent by 1913. At this date 31% of white miners
 ?were South African born (5).
 The miners' trade union, the Transvaal Miners Association (TMA), tried to recruit
 these workers. As unskilled workers they were very vulnerable to replacment by
 blacks. As workers who saw their future and their children's future to lie in
 South Africa they were more concerned with maintaining a place for whites in the
 gold mining industry. Unlike the craft unions the TMA recruited unskilled workers,
 but only whites. Unlike the craft unions which tried to restrict access to the
 craft by means of trade union rules; apprenticeship, and agreements with the employers,
 the TMA tried to prevent black encroachment by legislative means. Partly because
 of the pressure of the white workers some mining regulations had been promulgated
 which restricted certain mining operations, such as blasting and hauling men to
 whites. The TMA tried to ensure that these regulations were complied with. In
 1910 the TMA had a membership not much greater than the craft unions although it
 had a much larger potential membership draw on. It increased rapidly after this and
 soon outpaced them (6).
 In 1913 the gold mining industry war the only industry of any size in South Africa.
 The value of gold produced in 1913 was ?37 372 949. This compares with ?17 248 834
 for all manufacturing industry (1911 figure). There were many industries which
 had been stimulated by the development of the gold mining industry. Craft unions
 had been developed in some of these industries whose membership included a large
 3 e.g. see evidence of Mining Unions to Economic Commission of 1925
 4 This was required by Mining Regulations. In the Transvaal only whites could
 obtain it.
 5 Select Committee on European Employment 1913. Evidence of Dr L.G. Irvine a
 member of the Advisory Committee of Miners' Phthisis Board.
 6 Year Book No 1 1910-16 p. 284
 Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
 and Joiners
 Amalgamated Society of Engineers
 S,A. Engine Drivers and Firemens
 Association
 Transvaal Miners' Association 1860 1800 2800 6700
 (Note the large increase in membership after the 1913 strike)
 1910
 720
 1568
 1150
 1911
 700
 1838
 1300
 1912
 1299
 1824
 1221
 1913
 1700
 2922
 1272
- 3 -
 proportion of the white worker employer in the industry (7). The infrastructure
 necessary for the growth of the gold industry was developed under state control.
 This included the railways which was the only other largescale employer of white
 labour. They employed 31,066 whites 5340 of whom were artizans and 16,518 of
 whom were running staff. Some of the artizans belonged to the craft unions. The
 Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) was a general railway
 union and all railway employees were eligible for membership.
 This is largely an emprirical study of the 1913 miners1 strike and the 1914 rail-
 way strike. I concentrate on events rather than analysis and would be glad of
 any help from people in the seminar. Although it is impossible to exhaustively
 state the causes for the 1913 strike I outline some of the factors I see as im-
 portant. These include the insecurity of white miners because of their fear of
 being replaced by black and their reaction to general labour condition including
 their insecurity of tenure and the occupational disease phthisis. The strike
 itself revolved around the question of the recognition of trade unions which the
 TCM refused to do. As far as the trade unions were concerned recognition by
 the controllers of the industry was an important first step in getting some
 control over the conditions of their labour. The TCM, as a representative of
 Imperial Capital, formulated policies that would allow for the fullest exploita-
 tion and therefore wanted absolute control of the industry. As already pointed
 out they wanted to free themselves as much as possible from dependency on white
 labour which was expensive and pushed up costs of production which it was essen-
 tial to minimise. The government at first played an inconspicuous role in the
 strike but when it rapidly escalated they attempted to repress it by force and
 many people were killed. The strike ended in a compromise with white labour.
 The government prepared legislation which would have led to the recognition and
 incorporation of trade unions. At the same time they prepared comprehensive re-
 pressive measures in the expectation that continuing unrest among white workers
 would lead to another strike. When the railway strike was called in January 1914
 Martial Law was immediately declared, there was a mass mobilization of troops and
 harsh repressive measures were enforced. The strike movement collapsed ignomi-
 niously. The proposed industrial legislation was not passed. I argue that the
 governments' actions in 1913 and 1914 must be seen in the context of an economy
 dependent on cheap black labour and unable to find a permanent role for white
 labour, which also led to extreme fear of White worker action leading to black
 unrest, and of a polity dependent on maintaining its links, as a peripheral state,
 with the Imperial power.
 1913 and 1914 were years of general labour unrest. There were also strikes by
 Indian and Black workers. I do not examine these strikes. But it is important to
 notice that, even though the employers and the government were unable to formulate
 any long term policy for white labour and responded repressively, as far as the
 Black and Indian workers were concerned the repression and use of violence by the
 state was far more naked.
 7 ibid 1910 1911 1912 1913
 United Operative Bricklayers' Society
 S.A. Typographical Union
 S.A. Operative Masons
 400
 437
 658
 300
 489
 642
 300
 986
 510
 300
 1121
 ?
- 1 -
 The Dispute Starts at the New Kleinfontein Mine
 The 1913 strike of white gold miners started as a local dispute on the New Klein-
 fontein mine and it was several weeks before it developed to become a large scale
 confrontation involving the whole mining industry.
 In May 1913 a new manager came to the New Kleinfontein mine. As was the custom at
 the time, he brought a number of miners from his old mine with him and a number
 of white workers on the New Kleinfontein left, 75 out of a total of 461 white
 workers. According to the manager 15 of these had been dismissed, the rest left
 voluntarily (1).
 The manager decided to reorganize the work of the underground mechanics. He dis-
 charged two mechanics and put two on the surface. As part of his policy he wished
 to alter the hours of work to correspond with those of white miners on the mine i.e.
 7.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. every day except Sunday, whereas previously underground
 mechanics had finished work at 12.30 p.m. on Saturdays. The men refused to work the
 new hours and left the mine on 10 May. The mechanics' trade union, the Amalgamated
 Society of Engineers, or ASE, posted notices on the mine forbidding their members
 to fill the places of the five underground mechanics who had left. The manager
 employed men who did not belong to the trade union to replace those who had left.
 The Inspector of White Labour warned him that under the Industrial Disputes Act
 of 1904 he should have given a month's notice of the intention to change the
 conditions of work (2) . In his evidence to the Witwatersrand Disturbances Commis-
 sion the manager admitted that he had acted summarily. He claimed that he made
 the change for reasons of efficiency although he did not know whether the sit-
 uation that had previously existed at the New Kleinfontein had caused any problems.
 He acted without finding out what the customary hours on the other mines were.
 Negotiations between the manager and the ASE officials, who wanted reinstatement of
 the men on the old terms, proved abortive. On 26 May the white miners on the Number
 2 shaft at the New Kleinfontein refused to go to work. The trade unions held a
 ballot of all the white workers at the New Kleinfontein and a strike was declared.
 On 28 May a strike committee was formed consisting of R. Haynes {Chairman) , J.T.
 Bain (Secretary), T. Matthews (Secretary TMA), T.A. Tole (V-President Transvaal
 Federation), D. Dingwall (Pres. of the S.A. Council of Boilermakers' Society),
 G.H. Kendall (Organizing Secretary of the ASE), J. Pender (Organizer of the Amal-
 gamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners), R. Waterston (Organizer of the Engine
 Drivers1 and Firemens1 Association), George Mason and D. Simons (3). .They were all
 trade union officials, none of them were employed at the New Kleinfontein mine.
 The strike committee demanded the reinstatement of the mechanics and a reversion
 to the old hours. Management refused to have anything""to do with the committee
 because they were not New Kleinfontein employees. Employees would, of course, not
 submit demands for fear of victimisation. ? Attempts at mediation by government
 officials proved abortive (4). The strike committee refused to consider any offer
 not made directly to them. After *the strike had begun the demands of the strikers
 1. Wits Disturbances Commission 1913 (henceforth called Disturbances Commission)
 Evid. of the manager, Bulman.
 2. MNW 253 mm 2896/14 IWL to secretary Mines and Industries 8.2.14
 3. Disturbances Colmission Report
 4. A discussion of these negotiations follows in the next section.
- 2 -
 escalated. One of the reasons for this was the confidence of the leaders that
 the men on strike were solidly behind them and the apparent strong sense of
 solidarity of the strikers. Strikers and their leaders wanted to muster support
 amongst other mine workers. To do this it would be necessary that the New Klein-
 fontein men be seen to be fighting on general issues and not only over the
 'domestic affairs' of the mine. Initially this support was necessary for finan-
 cial reasons but as time passed it became apparent that the general support of
 white mine workers would be necessary to overcome the intransigence of the
 management.
 The Transvaal Miners1 Association (TMA) Executive and the Federation of Trades,
 to whom the TMA were affiliated^were against a general strike but the strike
 committee was divided on the issue (5). The escalated demands included a de-
 mand for a Saturday afternoon holiday for all white mine workers and later a
 demand for an 8 hour day, bank to bank (6) . (Bank to bank means the time taken to
 get to the rock face and back to the surface is included in the 8 hour day) . The
 mining regulations restricted the hours of underground workers to 8 hours, face
 to face; in other words they were not paid for time taken to get to the face.
 On 7 June notices were posted up at the mine offering to revert to original hours,
 to reinstate all the strikers and to organize a committee to see if the Saturday
 shift could be started and finished earlier. Committee representatives would be
 nominated from among employees only, not trade unionists (7). The notice also
 said that all men who did not return to work by 11 June would be paid off and
 would not be taken back (8). As a result of this the New Kleinfontein employees
 held a ballot in which a large majority voted in favour of continuing the strike
 and voted in favour of calling a general strike of all mineworkers (9).
 On 11 June the management of New Kleinfontein restarted operations using strike
 breakers and began erecting fences around the property to protect them (10).
 The majority of the workers employed were new (11), which vindicates claims of
 the strike committee, put forward in opposition to press reports, that few men
 had returned to work (12). According to the strike breakers, they were offered
 50% more than the usual rate while the strike was on, permanent employment
 afterwards and complete protection (13). The management also issued notices of
 eviction on single and married strikers who lived on mine property (14).
 Op to the 11th Benoni, where most of the strikers lived had been absolutely
 quiet, the strikers had restricted themselves to peaceful picketing of the mine
 (15), but from this date onwards the atmosphere became increasingly tense.
 Violence, drunkenness,and destruction of property, including arson, increased(16).
 The strikers took action to try to prevent the operations on the New Kleinfontein
 continuing. Bands of strikers stopped supply wagons on the road and destroyed
 goods destined for the mine (17). The homes of scabs and relatives and freinds
 of scabs were attacked and many houses were burnt (18). On 26 June the police
 of Boksburg magisterial district asked for permission to close down licensed
 premises in Benoni because of the ^ alarming" increase of drunkenness in town and
 the increasingly ugly temper of the strikers (19). Scabs were assaulted occasion-
 ally they were only humiliated^but often the assaults were very brutal (20).
 Soon Benoni was 'festooned' with red - people flew red flags from their houses
 and wore red rosettes to indicate allegiance and ensure protection (21).
 The strike committee handed out permits to strikers and strike sumpathizers to
 protect their property (22). A firm which supplied bread before the strike to
 the New Kleinfontein mine were forced by the strike committee to promise that
 they would cease supplying New Kleinfontein personnel ( 23). This did not
 save them from having their premises burnt down (24).
 5. Disturbances Commission. Evidence of Acting I.W.L. 02133 re meeting of TMA on
 1.6.13 when Haynes J.F. Brown, Tole, Kendall, Matthews, Carbis and Tworaey said
 that strike must be confined to the New Kleinfontein.
 6. Disturbance Commission IWL 0.104. Under Secretary for Mines 0.301. Also MNW 253
 MM 2896/14 IWL to secretary mines and Industries 8.2.14.
 7. Report of Disturbances commission.
 8. ibid
 9 ihiH
- 3 -
 In view of the fact that the management refused to negotiate with the strike
 committee and the fact that with the employment of strikebreakers the mine was
 soon running successfully, the strikers made attmepts to induce the black mine-
 workers to join the strike (25). There were sporadic strikes of black mineworkers
 from 14 June which continued until after the white mineworkers had returned to
 work (26).
 On 16 June a deputation of strikers went to see the manager (27). The discussion
 resulted in a deadlock over the issue of the strikers' demand for the reinstatement
 of all the men. The manager said this was impossible because he had to consider
 the strikebreakers whom he had engaged. He also said that he would not consider
 taking part in any further negotiations (28).
 The Strike Spreads
 In this situation, with the mine producing successfully, the strikers decided
 that the only means of applying pressure available to them was to spread the
 strike. A group of strikers visited neighbouring mines. The Van Ryn mine balloted
 against a strike but were persuaded to join the strike by Trade union leaders,
 J.T.Bain and A. Crawford (30). According the police evidence Crawfore addressed
 the men asking those who support the New Klinfontein strikers to stand on one
 side, the scabs on the other (31). On 19 June the strikers went to the New
 Modderfontein. Here, too, the official ballot was against a strike, but the
 white workers came out on 21 June. On all these mines the engine drivers came
 out with the rest of the men. In previous strikes a lack of agreement between the
 engine drivers and the white miners had seriously weakened the strikes (32). On
 19 June the strike leaders Bain, Mason, Brown and Tole were arested for inciting
 to stike, a crime under the Industrial Disputes Act (Transvaal 1909) (33).
 10 Disturbances commission Evidence of IWL Q2 140 and Assistant Magistrate
 Boksburg Q861
 11 ibid. Evidence of IWL
 12 ibid. Annexure B8. Leaflet of Federation of Trades
 13 MNW 191 MM 2547/13 J. Laropert Solicitor to Minister Mines 26.7.13
 14 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q1614
 15 MNW 165 IWL Report May 1913
 16 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q1661, 528.
 17 ibid
 18 ibid Q1532
 19 'Justice1 165 Magistrate Boksburg to Secretary for Justice 26.6.13
 20 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence 0789
 21 ibid Also Assistant Magistrate C844 -W-
 22 ibid SAP Evidence Q2770, Exhibit B10 Annexures, "Transvaal Leader1 31.7.13
 23 ibid Evidence of G.M. Taylor
 24 ibid Q3694 onwards
 25 ibid Evidence of Assistant Magistrate and Resident Magistrate Boksburg and
 H.M. Taberer of the Native Recruiting Corporation Q8 49,979,1028.
 26 Discussed later
 27 Disturbances Commission Evidence of IWL $244-51.
 28 ibid
 30 ibid IWL Q256
 31 ibid SAP Evidence pl478
 32 Rand Daily Mail (henceforth RDM) 1.7.13, also Justice1 165 Colonel
  ruter,
 commissioner SAP to Attorney General 3.6.13.
 33 Disturbances Commission.SAP Evidence O427
- 4 -
 Although he had played a prominent part in persuading workers to strike Crawford
 was not arrested.
 According to the evidence of the manager of the Brakpan mines, on 20 June the
 workshop and surface employees on the mine passed a vote of censure on the strike
 committee for calling out the Van Ryn and New Modderfontein workers. On 21st the
 underground employees passed a resolution dissociating themselves from the vote
 of censure of the surface employees. This an interesting index of the difference
 in the way these two groups perceived their interests. On 30 June white workers
 on the Modderfontein B mine struck. Notices were immediately posted up ordering
 single men to vacate mine quarters by 2 July and married men by 7 July. Under-
 standably enough this caused a lot of bitterness among the men and the strike
 committee threatened to withdraw the pump men and allow the mine to flood if the
 notice was not withdrawn (35).
 In an attempt to stop bands of strikes going from mine to mine pulling out other
 workers the magistrate of Boksburg was authorized to issue an order prohibiting .
 gatherings of more than 6 people under Law No. 6 of 1894 of the Transvaal (36) .
 In fact for several days no more miners did come out on strike. The strikers were,
 perhaps, waiting to see what effect their actions would have on mine management
 and the Chamber of Mines (TCM). The strike committee was divided on the issue.
 On the 28th of June the president of the TMA, Twomey, the secretary of the TMA,
 T. Matthews, and the president of the Federation conferred with the strike committee
 and warned them against spreading the strike any further (37). The officials
 primary concern was financial but they must have also been worried about the
 strike movement getting out of control.
 The strike committee made arrangements for a mass meeting of strikers in Benoni
 Market Square on 29 June. According to the police report the trade union officials
 intentions were to gather enough strikers together to attack the New Kleinfontein
 mine. It is not possible to prove or disprove this accusation. Calling a mass
 meeting was in itself no evidence of intent to incite violence. In most strikes
 such meetings are used by officials to maintain links with the strikers, to main-
 tain control and direction and prevent demoralisation and fragmentation of the
 movement.
 The meeting was contrary to the notice prohibiting gatherings posted on 20 June
 but General Smuts gave permission for it to be held after representations from
 Madeley, a Labour Party MLA, who promised that there would be no violence. Al-
 though the meeting was orderly at first, there was a sudden rush of the crowd
 toward the New Kleinfontein mine. Police reports on the actions of the strike
 leaders conflict somewhat. According to one report tfie"leaders did all they could
 to prevent the crowd going to the mine. According to another report J.T. Bain
 was prominent in urging on the strikers (38). The police had prepared for any
 crowd action and protected the mine with bayonets at the ready (39).
 35 ibid. Statement of Carl Davies Manager of Brakpan C29.
 36 ibid SAP Evidence Q439
 37 R.D.M. 1.7.13
 38 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q&01-22 Q1563
 39 ibid
- 5 -
 From 29 June the situation of confrontation escalated. The government obtained
 permission to use imperial troops almost 3 000 of whom were sent to the Rand
 from 30 June onwards (40). On the 1st July a band of strikers went to the
 Simmer Pan power station Germiston and had no difficulty in persuading the men to
 come out on strike (41). The white workers at the Rose Deep gold mine balloted
 and decided to come out if the Federation called a general strike. Bands of
 strikers were busy up and down the reef persuading the workers to join them on
 strike. On the 1st July a band of strikers and women marched from Benoni to
 Boksburg to call out the East Rand Proprietary Mines workers. There a verbal
 battle ensued, the mens1 leaders attempted to persuade the men to come out while
 the management attempted to persuade them to stay in, and George Farrar of the
 TCM motored from one mine to another of the group trying to persuade the men not
 to strike. Despite his efforts white workers in the four mines of the group struck
 work on the 2nd of July (42). An attempt was made on the 2nd July to blow up the
 steel standard carrying electric power to the Apex mine. If this had been success-
 ful it would have meant that there would have been no power for the Apex or
 New Kleinfontein mines or Benoni town (43), Considering the availability of
 dynamite to the strikers and the' vulnerability of goldmining plant it is perhaps
 surprising that this tactic was hardly attempted and instead the strikers stuck
 to the traditional tactic of calling on the support of their fellows.
 By the second of July the white workers on 20 gold mines, the Simmer Power Station
 and some on the Victoria Falls Power Company works had struck work - a total of
 nearly 5 000 workers. At this stage the TMA decided to re assert control of a
 developing movement. They resolved on a general strike without a ballot from the
 fourth of July. The Federation supported this call and pledged themselves to call
 out workers in other industries.With the TMA and the Federation taking official
 control of the situation the original strike committee was to disband (44).
 The TMA executive endorsed the tactic of the strike committee in sending bands
 of strikers round the mines but insisted there must be no violence and the pump-
 men must not be called out. This was in response to the actions of strikers -
 who had raided the Anglo Deep mine, seizing the special constables, destroying
 their warrants, and pulled out the pumpmen so that the mine was now flooding (45).
 By the 5th of July all mines were affected and 19 000 White workers were on
 strike (46). As the Rand Daily Mail wrote, the policy had achieved "amazing
 success" and had the "wholehearted" support of the men" (47).
 On the fourth of July all trade unions affiliated to the Federation were supposed
 to come out on strike. This included the Mason's Society, the Boilermakers,
 Engineers, Coopers, Painters, Blacksmiths, Carpenters and Joiners, Tailors,
 Typographical and Tramway Employees trade unions. Many of these worked on. the
 mines and had already come out, some joined on the 4th**of July and others were
 pulled out by strikers. The Federation also passed a resolution calling on the
 railway workers to support them, however they met with little response (48).
 40 'Correspondence Relating To the Disorders on the Witwatersrand between the
 Governor General and the Secretary of State1 - in DC 142 5115.
 41 RDM 4.7.13
 42 ibid 2.7.13
 43 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Chief Engineer New Kleinfontein Q6963
 44 RDM 2.7.13
 45 Disturbances Commission B20. Magistrate to Secretary for Justice 3.7.13
 46 ibid B4
 47 RDM 1.7.13
 48 'Justice' 193 3/18/12 Annual Conference of ASRHS Bloemfontein August 1913
- 6 -
 The Federation sent notification to the Town Clerk that they would not call out
 municipal employees engaged on "essential services" (49).
 Mass Meeting July 4th:
 The TMA called a mass meeting in Johannesburg on the fourth of July at 2 p.m.
 Strikers came in from all over the Reef, some of them on trains that had been
 specially provided. At 11 p.m. General Smuts notified the magistrate and police
 that the meeting was to be prohibited (50). People had already gathered in the
 market square when notices of prohibition were being posted up. The magistrate
 interviewed members of the strike committee, Matthews and Watson, and informed
 them of the ban. They promised to help the authorities (51). By 2 p.m. several
 thousand people had gathered- The evidence of witnesses to the Disturbances
 Commission is so contradictory it is impossible to trace a single thread of
 events. There was general agreement that the strike leaders spoke to the crowd
 and tried to persuade them to disperse but were shouted down (52). But there are
 many versions of what happened after that. From the number of police injured
 it is clear that evidence that missiles were thrown at them is correct though
 it is impossible to say at what stage of the rioting of the 4th and 5th of July
 this occured. Despite police evidence that they had been shot on before they
 retaliated by firing and that they continued to be fired on,out of 166 police and
 troops injured out 3 suffered bullet wounds (53). Out of 21 civilians killed
 on the fourth and fifth of July 20 died from bullet wounds.
 The troops were lined up in force around the square.According to the Rand Daily
 Mail and a solicitor who was sightseeing from a balcony the cavalry charged
 fiercely through the crowd with swords drawn. The police deny that any charge took
 place at all (54). The crowd did not disperse until they had been shot at by
 the troops. From then on the centre of Johannesburg was thronged with rioters
 until the early hours of the morning. The strikes "pulled out" the tramway men.
 According to police reports various strike leaders including Mary Fitzgerald and
 Ward addressed a meeting of the strikers in the evening and urged them to arm
 themselves to protect themselves from the police and troops (55). The crowd
 rampaged through Johannesburg looting gunshops. They burnt down the offices of
 the 'Star' newspaper and Park Station. They then proceeded to the Corner House.
 But the authorities had anticipated this move and the corner house was well protected
 by dragons. According to a ciD report the crowd threatening the Corner House
 refused to disperse even when several volleys were fired into the air, thinking
 that only blanks were being fired, so the dragoons fired into the crowd for two
 to three minutes (56). By 2 a.m. the town was more or less quiet again. The
 next morning, however, the crowd gathered again, this time around the Rand Club.
 This was protected by troops ready to fire on anyone wTio approached. Reinforce-
 ments armed with rifles arrived and occupied the Club. The crowd was ordered to
 disperse or force would be used. Several witnesses testify that the crowd refused
 to disperse, people shouting out that they would when the troops dispersed (57),
 The evidence is again contradictory. The police claim that they did not fire
 until fired on, other witnesses claiming the opposite (58). When the shooting
 49 Disturbances Commission. Evidence Town Clerk Q5667
 50 Resident Magistrate Q1164
 51 ibid pi170
 52 ibid Assistant Magistrate 01762
 53 ibid Deputy Commissioner SAP Q 2082
 54 Rand Daily Mail 5.7.13 Disturbances Commission Q 9300
 55 Disturbances Commission - evidence of SAP Q3140-3152
 56 Disturbances Commission - evidence of SAP C10 Q3069-3126
 57 Commission Evidence of A. Dunbar S. Steinwurtzel 06689
 58 e.g. SAP Q4212 Solicitor Q9317
- 7 -
 started the crowd fell back, some hid in doorways and recesses to keep out of
 the line of fire. People who attempted to reach the injured lying in the road-
 way and gutter were shot at by the troops (59). -
 Apart from the shoting and looting the town was in chaos. Because of the strike
 no trains were running and there was no lighting. General tJmuts and Prime Minister
 Botha after consultation with the Chamber of Mines on the terms they were willing
 to offer consulted the strike committee and draw up a truce agreement which provided
 for full reinstatement, compensation to victims of the rioting, compensation
 to the strikebreakers, no victimisation, and a provision for the Federation to
 submit to the Government grievances drawn up by the tradeunions. The Government
 decided to pay the strikebreakers one years pay and gave them a free railway
 ticket to any station in the union with police protection when they left the
 mines (60). The government appointed a magistrate to enquire into cases for
 compensation. The only people who would be considered for compensation would be
 (a) People who had no part in any unlawful acts on the fourth and fifth of
 July and were not spectators of these acts who had been injured through the use
 of firearms by the police or military (b) Dependants of people in category (a)
 who had been killed
 The Federation complained about the terms saying the scope of the enquiry was
 far less than they had been promised ((61).
 SECTION 2
 1913 Strike - Negotiation - The Attitude of the Management and Government Towards.
 Trade Unions and The Strike
 From the first the management of the New Kleinfontein mine refused to negotiate with
 the strike committee. As the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Dalrymple, wrote
 in a letter to the Inspector of White Labour, such a move would set a precedent
 which would affect the whole gold mining industry. (60). The recognition of
 trade unions was not only seen to involve an encroachment on managerial authority
 but would also constitute an encouragment to the white workers to become members
 . of trade unions. Dalymple was quite open to the commission of Enquiry in
 admitting that the mine would prefer to employ all non-union men (61).
 The Acting Inspector of White Labour, Steyn, part of whose functions included
 mediating in industrial disputes involving white workers, and the undersecretary
 f for Mines, Blundell interviewed Dalrymple on the 29th^gf May, the day after
 the strike commenced, showed him a telegram from Cape Town which indicated that
 the Minister wanted the management to yield on the question of hours and deprive
 the strikers.of their.excuse for striking (62). The implications of this being
 that the unrest ran deeper and the^ issues were wider than the immediately
 predisposing cause of the strike and that for management to yield this point
 would weaken the strikers' cause by undermining their moral position and decreasing
 public support. According to Steyn the chairman Dalrymple took the telegram to
 59 e.g. Disturbances Commission Evidence of Commercial Traveller
 60 MNW 238 mm 1779/13
 61 'Justice1 Box 164 3/541/13
 62 ditto I.W.L. Q 48-45
- 8 -
 show to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines (TCM). Later Steyn wrote to Dalrymple
 suggesting that the directors of the company should meet the strike committee and
 set a precedent for once and for all in the gold mining industry of conferring with
 trade union officials. Dalrymple wrote the mines department before placing Steyn's
 letter before his Board asking if Steyn's letter had been sent with the approval
 of the government. On the 8th June Blundell wrote and told Dalrymple that Steyn
 had gone further than authorized by the Minister - who wants the company to
 meet the employees accompanied by anybody elected by then, irrespective of
 whether or not they elect trade union officials (63). As the workers were almost
 bound to elect trade union officials Dalrymple did not feel that this demand was
 very different from that suggested by Steyn and wrote back that under no circum-
 stances would they meet trade union officials, adding cuttingly, that if the
 government thought this was the correct policy why did they not recognise the
 trade unions of government employees (64).
 At the end of MaVj with the strike only a few days old,the Minister considered
 the possibility of prosecuting the management for contravening the Industrial
 Dispute Act. However the Attorney General warned that it was useless to attempt
 a presecution as the act did not prescribe any penalty for contravening the
 relevant clause (65). A little while later the Commissioner of Police controlling
 the police forces in the area also suggested prosecuting the management and if
 there was no settlement after that it would be feasible to prosecute the strike
 "agitators" for inciting to violence and contravening the Industrial Disputes
 Act (66). No arrests were made until much later in June. The authorities at
 first^  no doubt^were wary of arresting strike leaders for fear of inflaming the
 situation particularly if no action was taken against the management who had
 initially contravened the act.
 In view of the refusal of the management to negotiate with the strike committee
 a number of people became involved in trying to reach a settlement including the
 TCM, the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the Deputy Mayor of Benoni and various
 government officials. The Deputy Mayor of Benoni had offered his services as a
 mediator from the beginning. After refusing Steyn's plea to meet the strike
 committee Dalrymple, in consultation with the TCM, sent a letter to the Deputy
 Mayor thanking him for his and setting out the terms on which they would agree
 to a settlement (67). They agreed to reinstate all the men and to revert to the
 old hours for the mechanics. However the strike committees demands had escalated
 to include the abolition of Saturday afternoon work for everybody. Anyway the
 strike committee refused to consider the offer sent via the Deputy Mayor because
 it had not been addressed directly to them.
 Towards the end of May talk of increasing the demands T o include a demand for an
 8 hour bank to bank became general in Benoni (68).When Steyn interviewed the strike
 committee on the 29th of May some of them put forward this demand. Bain asked Steyn
 to submit a proposal to the minister to pass a bill on an 8 hour bank to bank to
 prevent an industrial conflagation* (69). The Inspector did not do this. Instead
 he telegraphed the Minister suggesting that the government form wage boards to
 get over the problem of management refusing, to recognise trade union officials (70),
 63 Disturbances Commission Dalrymple Q7136
 64 ditto Exhibit - correspondence between Steyn, Dalrymple and Secretary for Mines
 65 ditto Evidence of Under Secretary Mines Q285. This clause provided for the
 giving of one month's notice before changes in wages or conditions could be
 implemented.
 66 'Justice' Box 165. ruter Commissioner SAP to Attorney General 3.6.13
 67 'MNW1 Box 165 'Labour Report' May 1913
 68 Disturbance Commission Steyn 0 298
 69 Disturbances Commission Steyn 0104-111
 70 ibid Q141
- 9 -
 General Smuts instructed the assistant magistrate of Benoni to write to Bain, sec-
 retary of the strike committee and offer his services as a mediator. The
 magistrate wrote, signed himself without his official designation and "made it
 very clear that my action in no way involved the Government" (71) . Clearly the
 Government was also wary of giving any overt recognition to the strike committee.
 Bain replied that the strike committee was always prepared to negotiate but only
 directly with management, not through an intemediary.
 After the white workers of the Van Ryn came out on strike on the nineteenth of
 June Bain, Mason, Tole and Brown were arrested under the Industrial Disputes Act
 for in incitement to strike(72)On the 21st when the New Modderfontein workers
 struck Dingwall and Kendall were arrested (73) . After the first arrests about a
 thousand people marched to the charge office and demanded the release of the strike
 leaders (74). There was some stone throwing but the crowd readily dispersed when
 ordered to (75). The leaders were allowed out on bail. The trial was postponed
 until the ninth of July, which fell after the strike settlement between the
 strike committee and Botha and Smuts. It is impossible to say what would have
 happened if these strike leaders had been refused bail for the course of the
 strike. I discuss later the militancy of the strikers and the reasons for the
 strike. One of these was the demand of the workers to have trade union leaders
 recognised. The detention of these leaders in jail may well have inflammed to
 situation and new leaders would have been produced. According to eome people's
 view the general strike was the result of intimidation of workers by mobs led by
 trade union leaders (76). When the cases come up for trial the men were released
 supposedly as part of the strike agreement but one can also assume that the
 authorities would have been cautious about proceeding with the prosecutions in
 view of the contriving unrest on the Rand (77) . Others whose trials came up to-
 wards the end of 1913 were not so fortunate. Sentences of form 2 to 5 years were
 passed on people accused of being involved in the burning of Park Station,
 shops in Benoni and of assaulting the police. (78).
 After the employers ultimatum on the ninth of June the Kleinfontein employees
 voted overwhelmingly to remain on strike (79). At this stage Bain believed that
 the men would return to work if the company would concede the stoppage of aj.1
 work at 12.30 a.m. on Saturdays. The Minister, when informed of this view; urged
 the directors of the company to adopt this way out but they replied that any
 material change in the working arrangements at the Kleinfontein would lead to a
 demand for similar changes at other mines (80).
 The Government did not play a conspicious role in negotiations or any actions to
 reach a settlement. They advised the company on ways out of the impasse but did
 not put pressure on them to accept the advice. Their ^initial concern was the
 effect the strike would have on the black workers on the mine who had no work
 because of the strike. With Ministerial approval the Director of Native Labour
 instructed the management of the mine on the day the strike began that all black
 workers must be paid in full and the time counted against the period of their
 contracts (81). The management of the company wanted to pay decreased rates and
 asked the Director of Native labour for his co-operation in persuading the
 black workers but he refused (82). At the beginning of July, when the strike was
 rapidly spreading, the Government took steps to prevent further recruiting of blacks
 for the Rand Mines. Telegrams were sent to Magistrates instructing them to re-
 fuse passes to blacks and to decline to attent contracts until the unrest on the
 Rand was over. The embargo on recruiting lasted until the fourth of August (83).
 71 'Justice' Box 166 3/541/13 Assistant Magistrate Benoni to Secretary Justice 26.6.13
 72 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q.472
 73 ibid Q.491
 74 ibid Q476
 75 ibid Q.479
 76 e.g. Disturbances Commission Steyn Q 235
 77 MNW Box 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
 78 'Justice1 192 3/35/14
 79 Disturbances Commission Report
 80 Disturbances Commission Exhibits A10, AlOa, N
- 10 -
 On the twenty second of June, after the strike had begun to spread. Smuts and
 Department of Mines representatives met representatives of the New Kleinfontein
 Van Ryn, New Modderfontein strike committee. The interview produced no fruitful
 results. The strike committee insisted that all the strikebreakers must be dis-
 missed, which the management refused to do on the grounds that they had obligations
 towards them, and Chat all police protection must be removed (84) .
 It was the employment of strike breakers and the states action in providing pro-
 tection for these strikebreakers that inflamed the situation. Despite their pro-
 testations the government clearly did not maintain a neutral position. As soon
 as the strike began extra police were drafted to Benoni. After the eleventh of
 June when strikebreakers were first engaged, police escorts were provided for
 vehicles coming into Benoni (85). Police escorted strike breakers in to the
 mines, sometimes as many as 80 police protected 40 strike breakers (86). As the
 strike spread all available police and SAMR were drafted to Johannesburg and the
 Reef. By the fourth of July the day of the fatalmass meeting in Johannesburg
 there were one thousand armed police in Johannesburg (87). On the thirtieth of
 June Smuts applied to the Governor General for permission to employ imperial
 Troops. At this stage the strike was beginning to spread rapidly. By the fifth
 of July nearly 3 000 cavalry and infantry had been sent to Johannesburg and the
 Reef (88) . Up to the fourth of July Smuts avoided the government or its forces
 - taking a central role. He permitted the meeting of the twenty ninth of June
 *? and seemingly only decided at the last moment to prohibit the meeting of the 4th
 July. The officer in command of the troops consulted the chief magistrate and
 the commissioner SAP in Johannesburg on the fourth July and decided to keep the
 troops out of view. When they heard that the meeting was banned they decided
 instead to line up the troops in a mass on the Market Square (89) . It seems
 that the government had hoped that the strike would not spread. The Union Defence
 forces were in the midst of reorganising and were not available in sufficient
 numbers to suppress the strike. When the strike spread so rapidly Smuts re-
 quisitioned Imperial troops. On the fourth of July when it was clear that a
 violent confrontation would be inevitable if the meeting was prohibited Smuts
 gave J.p. Fitzpatrick permission to organise an armed defence force of "leading
 citizens" (90).
 After the strike had been suppressed and the government had negotiatied with the
 strike committee, the trade unions, through not officially recognised, had obtained
 a temporary defacto recognition. In terms of the strike agreement both sides
 agreed that there would be no victimisation. However soon after work recommenced
 the management complained that the strikers were refusing to work with certain
 ... men they called scabs. The government had only compensated strikebreakers
 '^ who had been brought in after the strike began. As far as the workers were
 concerned anyone who worked during the strike was a scab. Smuts and the Minister
 of Mines went to Benoni on the eleventh of July and pleaded with the Federation
 leaders to use their influence to get strikers to resume work with the scabs (91).
 After the strike the minister of Mines met representatives of the goldmining
 .81 'Native Affairs1 Box 5 mm 1870/13/F/2
 82 ibid
 83 ibid Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary for Justice 6,12.13
 84 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Commissioner SAP
 85 Commission SAP Q528
 86 ditto District Commandant SAP Boksburg Q1453
 87 ditto Commission SAP, Tuter, Q1371
 88 DC 142 file 5.115. Correspondence of Governor Relating to recent disorders
 89 Commission Evidence of O.C. 0.5651
 90 Commission Evidence of J.P. Fitzpatrick
 91 MNW 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
- 11 -
 companies who agreed to authorize managements to meet officials of the TMA if
 disputes occured. The employers agreed to do this pending legislation on the
 registration and incorporation of trade unions (93). After the strike the
 Department of Mines received deputations from the Federation and the trade unions
 and discussed proposed industrial legislation with them (94).
 Immediately after the strike the trade unions and the Federation achieved temporarily
 the recognition which they had sought.
 From the evidence of the manager and chairman of the board of directors of the
 New Kleinfontein and the Inspector of White Labour it is clear that the intransigence
 of the New Kleinfontein on the question of recognition arose from the knowledge
 that this would set a precedent which would affect the whole gold industry. How-
 ever this does not answer the question of why the gold mining industry should
 have been so anti-union at a time when management in the metropolis and in Western
 Europe after pressure and militant action from trade unions increasingly recognised
 trade unions and sometimes dealt solely through them. Part of the answer lies in
 the kind of capital which is invested in the colonies. It is invested in the
 colonies rather than the imperial nation because of the possibilities of the ex-
 ploitation of cheap labour. In order to attain this it is necessary that the cap^
 italists through the management maintain as much control over the labour force
 as possible so that it can be exploited as much as possible and deployed in the
 most profitable way. This is clearly what happened in the case of the gold
 mining industry of South Africa. As explained in the introduction this demanded
 an exceptionally cheap labour force.
 93 MNW 234 mm 1074/14
 94 'Justice* 178 3/1418/13 Reports of Secretary for Mines
 V *:
- 12 -
 SECTION 3
 Grievances Submitted by Trade Unions and the Employer Reply
 In terms of the agreement between the government and the trade unions of t:.e fifth
 o? July the Federation submitted a list of demands to the government on behalf of
 the white workers. There was an expectation that the government itself would in-
 troduce measures to effect some of the demands rather than risk a repetition of
 the riots of July. At the conference between the Government and the Federation
 from the 22nd to the 24th July the Federation representatives offered to drop all
 their demands if the government would call a general election (100). To make
 such a demand the Federation must have thought that confidence in the Government
 had been very much undermined. They must have hoped for a new government that
 would be more amenable towards trade unions and labour reform. The Government
 did not resign but instead using a well tried 'cooling' device offered to appoint a
 commission to investigate their demands.
 The demands forwarded by the Federation on behalf of the white trade union in-
 cluaea:-
 1. Introduction of 8 hour day
 2. Establishment of a minimum wage
 J
  3. Abolition of Sunday work
 4. Payment for public holidays
 5. The gradual abolition of imported, indentured labour
 6. Repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act
 7. Factory Act
 8. Repeal of Law No.6 of 1894 under which the magistrate had forbidden gather-
 ings of more than 6.
 9. Consolidation of mines' sickness and benefit societies
 10. Workmen's compensation act.
 11. 8 hour bank to bank
 12. Increased wage for mineworkers
 13. Establishment of fully indentured apprenticeship system.
 14. Abolition of piecework in all government departments.
 15. Permanent Railway Enquiry Board with equal representation of Administration
 and employees.
 16. Recognition of trade unions. (101).
 If all these demands could have been implemented it would have meant a change in
 the whole structure of industry in South Africa. The gold mining industry had
 been built up on and depended on a continuing supply 67, cheap blacks labour (102).
 Several demands echoed those which were being made in Europe - no Sunday Labour
 payment for public holidays and, most important, 8 hour day.
 The Government's reply was not what the Federation had anticipated. It conceded
 nothing. The reply agreed;
 1 0 0
  a/5/ P' C r e s w e 1 1 s P e e c h in House in reply to Smuts, against indemnity Bill -
 9/2/14 published .as "The Attempt to Crush Labour" - page 25.
 101 Government Gazett August 1913 p. 1213
 102 see Johnstone op. cit.
- 13 -
 1. To appoint a commission consisting of one representative of the mineworkers,
 one of the other workers, one of the mine owners and a chairman nominated by
 - the government to discuss.
 (a) 8 hour day
 (b) Industrial Dispute Act
 (c) Sunday work
 (d) Imported and indentured labour
 (e) Wage Board
 2. For railway and harbour workers a separate commission was proposed, composed
 of three members - one representing the white workers, one the administration
 and a chairman appointed by the government.
 3. As far as the other demands were concerned an opportunity must be given for
 representative bodies of employers to make representations to the government
 before any legislative stops could be taken.
 4. The mineworkers demands are for the mineowners to deal with (103).
 The gist of this reply is that no immediate concessions would be made and that any
 future concessions would depend on the strength of trade unions to force them.
 In their reply the TCM refused 8 hours bank to bank, and refused a wage increase.
 They agreed to 8i hours bank to bank, conceded 10 days holiday on half pay after
 twelve months continuous work underground or two years on the surface. As far
 as the mineworkers were concerned no doubt they were anxious to get any holiday.
 As far as the TCM was concerned the granting of a paid holiday is clearly good
 policy considering the health risks mineworkers ran and the benefits phthisis
 victims were entitled to under the Phthisis Act. On this score they also agreed
 to the demand from underground drill sharpener that a workplace must be sanitary
 and well ventilated (104). The TCM agreed to the recognition of trade unions
 but only on certain conditions. The unions must not have a fund for political
 purposes e.g. sponsoring parliamentary candidates, only mine employees would be
 allowed to make representations to the employers, trade unions can have no say in
 management or discipline i.e. hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, retrenching etc,
 and that any minority of employees can make representation to the management with-
 out going through the trade union.
 These terms of recognition would have limited the role of trade unions. One of
 the principle reasons for wanting the trade unions recognised and for wanting to
 be able to negotiate through full time officials was the fear of workers that
 any worker who asserted himself in making demands on submitting grievances would
 be liable to be victimised. The TCM insistence that <->piy trade unionsts who
 were employed by the mines could negotiate with management would have obviated
 this. If the last clause was followed and employers encouraged employees to
 ignore the trade union officials then the union would be weakened and find it
 difficult to unite the workers. The TCM refused to recognise the Federation,
 to whom most of the mining trade unions were affiliated. In the TCM opinion:-
 "The real cause of the strike is to be found in the desire of the Feder-
 ation of Trade Unions to be recognised by the mining industry as the
 sole medium for the settlement of disputes between employers and em-
 ployees. To this, the industry will not agree" (105)
 103 Government Gazette August 1913 p. 1213
 104 ibid
 105 TCM Annual Report 1913
- 14 -
 The Government offered similar terms for the recognition of the railway workers'
 union - the Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) (106).
 The demands of the trade unions were then sent via the Federation to the employers1
 organisations. The National Federation of Building Trade Employers agreed to
 several demands - such as the abolition of piecework, payment for public holidays,
 48 hour week etc. In fact, as they pointed out in their reply, most of the de-
 mands had already been conceded in the new working rules drawn up by the employers
 and the Federation in May 1913. (107). They still refused to implement a closed
 shop which had been demanded then-. The Master Tailors in their reply to the
 S.A. Tailors and Tailoresses Union agreed on the principle of a Factory Act and
 Wage Boards to determine minimum wages, they agreed on many demands including a
 48 hour week. The Master Bakers refused the demand for 8 hours and for El per day.
 But they agreed to restrict "kaffir" labour to making "kaffir" bread and general
 unskilled work. This would not have been much of a hardship considering a
 large proportion of the work would have been producing bread for the mines (108).
 The Master Printers agreed to increase pay to ?6 per week, but refused a 48 hour
 week, they also refused to increase overtime rates and refused 14 days paid
 holiday a year.
 The Federation did not achieve the results it had hoped for. The better organised
 workers obtained some concessions. But there was to be no legislative entrench-
 ment on 8 hour day, minimum wage, indentured labour, or the recognition of trade
 unions. They rejected the governments and the employers' replies as "inadequate"
 and threatened to call a strike to enforce them. The Federation refused to
 participate in the general commission offered by the Government. The Government
 instead appointed a commission to investigate the position of white workers, as
 far as wages, standard of living, hours of work and condition of work were con-
 cerned. This commission reported in January 1914 after the strike. The Railway
 Commission was formed towards the end of the year and did not report until the
 second half of 1914.
 106 Smuts "The Syndicalist Conspiracy in SA1 speech in house 4,5 February 1914
 107 MNW 192 mm 2583 13 National Building Employers1 reply 28.8.13
 108 ibid Replies of Master Tailors, Master Baker, Master Printer (all Transvaal)
- 15 -
 .. 1913 - The Military of the Strikers
 For the first two weeks of the strike there was general agreement amongst the
 strike leaders of the TMA and the Federation that the strike should be confined
 to the New Kleinfontein mine. No attempts were made at this stage to spread
 the strike. Strikers visited other mines to speak to the white workers about
 their grievances and to collect contributions to the strike fund (110). Amongst
 trade unionists there was some disagreement as to tactics leaders such as Crawford
 of the ASE, who espoused 'direct action1 as part of the struggle for socialism,
 urged the strikers to be militant, to sabotage and destroy machinery (111). The
 leaders of the TMA and the SA Engine Driver and Firemen's Association (SAED, FA)
 dissociated themselves from such tactics (112).
 After the New Kleinfontein resumed operations the strikers became more militant
 and persuaded the white workers on neighbouring mines, the New Modderfontein
 and the Van Ryn, to join the strike in sympathy. The trade union leaders were
 still divided. Prominent officials in the TMA, such as the" President, Tooney
 and the Secretary, T. Matthews, and the President of the Federation opposed
 this and warned against spreading the strike (113). Others, such as Bain,
 Crawford, Mason, Brown and Tole played a leading role in spreading the strike.
 D. Simons of the TMA had initially sided with the moderates but when the fence
 ,? -was being erected on the New Kleinfontein to protect strike breakers he was
 prominent in trying to induce the black workers to join the strike (114).
 On the second of July the moderates of the TMA decided to try to regain leadership
 of a movement which was outpacing them. According to T. Matthews, when the TMA
 met on the second of July to discuss the situation they received words from many
 parts of the Reef that the workers wanted to strike (115). A strike leader inter-
 viewed by the Rand Daily Mail said that "every mine in the Transvaal has its
 grievance. It is not a strike, it is a revolt. The men know that it is a
 sympathetic strike and that they are not being controlled or led, but that they
 are making a gigantic effort on their own. They are fighting practically with-
 out funds" (116).
 Lack of funds soon became an additional reason for the desperation and militancy
 of the strikers. They hoped for a quick, decisive vitory once all the white
 workers joined the strike and the gold mining industry was brought to a standstill,
 The banning of the meeting on the fourth of July, the shooting of strikers by the
 police and troops and the fact that, apart from the gold miners, few white workers
 /' joined the general strike were the proximate reasons f^jr. the rioting of the
 - fourth and fifth of July.
 110 Commission e.g. see evidence of Carl Davies Manager Brakpan mines
 111 'Justice' Box 165. SAP reporf Market Square meeting 26.5.13
 112 ibid
 113 RDM 1.7.13
 114 Commission Assistant Magistrate Boksburg
 115 RDM 2.7.13
 116 ibid
- 16 -
 In their evidence to the Disturbances Commission many witnesses state their belief
 that the events of the evening of the fourth of July, the burning of Part Station
 the Star office and the attempted attack on the Corner House were the actions .
 of "hooligans" (117). However, one must explain why, when Johannesburg was in
 uproar and the authorities had lost control of much of it, these targets were
 chosen and why hooligans should concentrate on raiding gunshops and not take ad-
 vantage of the lucrative opportunities for looting (118). The choice of these
 targets is an indication of the involvement of strikers'in the attacks. The
 strikers had reason to attack Park Station after their efforts to persuade the
 railwaymen to join the strike had failed. The strikers also had reason to attack
 the 'Star1 offices. In the words of the Rand Daily Mail>which the strike committee
 praised as the only paper which had given accurate reports of the strike. "The Star1 "is
 controlled as is the 'Leader* by those who have always exacted from editors and
 others the most implicit obedience ... There is always but one alternative for
 those who presume to question the wisdom and condemn the stupidity of the Chamber
 of Mines and that is the sack".
 The article goes on to explain how the TCH .had used various pressures to get the
 Mail to toe the line; and continued:
 "Let the public consider what sort of latitude they are likely to accord
 their own employees when this is the policy they pursue to those who are
 independent of them" (120)
 On the fourth of July in Market Square the crowd refused to listen to trade unionists,
 such as Morgan, who pleaded with them to disperse as the meeting had been banned
 He was hoQted down (121). After the truce agreement had been signed the strike
 leaders had great difficulty in persuading the waiting crowd to accept the terms.
 In the words of the Governor General ;
 "The police and the strike leaders we doing all they can to persuade the
 men to go home and return to work tomorrow" (122).
 At a mass meeting outside the Trades Hall W.H. Andrew, Mason, Dingwall and J.T. Bain
 spoke and urged acceptance of the terms. To shouts of disapproval Crawford ad-
 vocated calling off the strike for one month while grievances were being considered.
 Along with Kendall and Fitzgerald, Crawford then spoke against returning to work
 and instead called for a continuation of the strike until demands had been fully
 conceded (123).
 Unrest continued on the Rand. On the seventh of July there was a large meeting of
 non trade union men in Johannesburg (124). Waterston of the Engine Drivers Union
 and SALP, addressed them urging them to join unions. I&jndall and other speakers
 abused the strike leaders and said they had let down the non-union men by pulling
 them out and then accepting an agreement which was merely a bluff and achieved
 nothing for the men. The funeral of the people shot dead on the fourth
 and fifth was held on the seventh of July.
 117 Commission e.g. SAP 02561
 118 Evening Chronicl 12.7.13
 120 RDM 11.7.13
 121 Commission Magistrate Buckle 0172
 122 Governor General Correspondence relating to disturbances on the Rand 8.7.13
 123 The News 7.7.13 Published by SATU on behalf of Federation
 124 MNW 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
- 17 -
 According to a police report;
 "the crowd at the funeral has taken up an ugly attitude and many strikers are
 unwilling to accept the terras agreed to by their leaders" (125). .
 Unrest continued in Benoni, which had been the centre of the strike. On the sixth
 of July the railway station and several houses in Benoni were burnt down (126).
 On eighth of July the Officer commanding the military forces in Benoni decided
 that "no men should be withdrawn from any mine until strikers return to work as
 isolated attempts damage property still being made". On the 18th of July the
 Commissioner of police asked for 30 mounted police from SAMR to patrol Benoni
 throughout the night until further notice (127).
 The strikers returned to work after the funeral, perhaps dissatisfied with the
 agreement but with their unity broken, some favouring the agreement and some
 wanting to continue until specific demands had been conceded. Mines Department
 officials kept in touch with the situation and warned of the danger of the contin-
 uing unrest breaking out into another strike (128). As the weeks passed the
 lack of gains, considering the sacrifices of the strike, became apparent. The
 moderate leaders were anxious to retain the recognition they had temporarily
 received and did not want to display extremist tendencies. Government officials
 became alarmed at the growing importance of the "extremists" in the trade union
 movement and what they saw as the permeation of their views throughout the rank
 and file (129). In September there were several short stoppages of work on
 several mine some of them were due to the refusal of trade unionists to work with
 non-union men (130). In December the minister was warned that it was possible
 that the New Kleinfontein men would shortly strike demanding a"closed shop" and
 increased wages (131). On the thirtieth of December the Minister of Mines met
 officials of the TMA and warned them that the refusal of members to work with
 non-members was a breach of the July agreement. They claimed that they had tried
 to stop action against non-union men but were unable to stop it as the men felt
 so strongly on the issue (132). In his correspondance with the Minister from
 July onwards the Secretary for Mines insisted that the government must not relax
 the preparations it had begun in case of a further strike. In his view another
 strike would be the result of actions by "agitators" and that if sufficient force
 was used to "protect" the workers they would not feel intimidated and would feel
 safe in staying at work. (133).
 From his viewpoint the workers in 1913 were intimidated into striking by a minority
 of extremists. This provides the rationalisation for providing large forces to
 "protect" workers from strikers. One might argue that the presence of armed
 forces would intimidate the workers and discourage them from striking.
 125 SAMR 1028 305
 126 MNW 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
 127 SAMR 1028 305 18.7.13
 128 'Justice1 178 3/1418/13 Correspondence between Secretary for Mines and the
 Minister.
 .129 MNW 234 mm 1074/14 inspector Mines Pretoria to Government Mining Engineer 9.9.13
 ?Justice! 178 3/1418/13. Secretary for Mines to Minister 27.8.13
 130 ibid Secretary Mines to Minister 1.9.13 31.12.13
 131 ibid Secretary Mines to Minister 31.12.13
 Manage New Kleinfontein to Board of Directors 10.12.13
 132 ibid Secretary Mines to Minister 31.12.13
 133 ibid
- 18 -
 SECTION 5
 1913 - The Reasons for the Strike
 It is always very difficult to understand the exact constellation of circumstances
 that leads workers to strike. It is never sufficient to look solely at the
 proximate cause. Even in a strike like the 1913 one where the trade union formulated
 a long list of grievances one cannot say that this exhausts the reasons for the
 strike, m the background to any strike is the basic conflict between workers
 and capital. in the 1913 strike the autocracy of the TCM and the centralization
 or policy and control in the goldmining industry may have been important con-
 tributory causes.
 It is necessary to try to assess why the strike occured on the New Kleinfontein
 in the first place, why it spread as it did, and why the strike took the form
 that it did.
 Autocracy of ManaaemRni-
 ^ + . ^ ?
 n t h e N S W K l e i n f o n t e i n
  ^ose out of a change in working conditions
 that affected only a small proportion of the mineworkers. The underground and
 -surface workers struck as a result of the attempted abolition of a privilege of
 a few mechanics which they did not themselves enjoy. The action seems therefore
 to have been against the autocracy of the decision, made without notification,
 much less consultation. This view is supported by the refusal of the workers to
 go back to work after the managements' promise to return to the 'status quo ante1
 made m their letter to the Mayor of Benoni. The strike committee refused to
 consider the offer because the management had by-passed them and the workers
 followed the strike committee's instructions. Although this did not figure
 directly in the demands made there is a lot of evidence that employment on the
 mines was very unstable. According to the Economic Commission appointed by the
 government in September 1913, which reported on the seventeenth of January 1914,
 the turnover of men on the mines was very high and many of these changes were
 not made on the initiative of the men (134). Using Government Mining Engineer
 figures from January to June 1911 they show that of 22,180 white workers employed
 on 53 mines 17,7 54 changes of employment were made in that period, an average
 of 13.3% per month (135). Apart from the inclination of some sections of white ?
 miners to move about in their employment, particularly contractors who were
 always looking for good contracts (136), the main reasons for the instability was
 . the dismissal of workers considered inefficient and the frequent changes of
 management. When managers moved from one mine to another they usually bought with
 them a number of workers from the old mine and dismissed any excess workers
 from the new mine (137). Out of 58 managers in. office in August 1913 one had been
 appointed in 1901, one in 1903, one in 1907, five in 1909, fifteen in 1910, seven
 in 1911, eighteen in 1912 and ten in 1913 (138). According to the Inspector of
 Mines for the Boksburg district (which included the Benoni mines) underground
 workers were badly treated, being summarily fined or dismissed without trial and
 with no means of appeal (139). In demanding the recognition of trade unions the
 workers may have been attempting to obtain some control over conditions. In
 striking in 1913 the New Kleinfontein workers were reacting against summary treat-
 ment, the change of management may have acted as a catalyst in an inflammatory
 situation.
 134 Economic Commission UG12 1913 p. 39
 135 ibid
 136 Contractors comprised about one eighth of the total number of white workers in
 June 1913. UG12'14 para. 106.
 137 UG12M4 p. 40
 138 ibid
 139 MNW 234 mm 1074/14 Inspector Mines report.
- 19 -
 Once the New Kleinfontein began operations successfully the strikers had to try
 to spread the strike to have any hope of success. By this stage apart from the
 issue of reinstatement of the men and a reversion to their former hours of work
 other issues had been raised. As far as trade unionists were concerned the atti-
 tude of the management, presumable sanctioned by the TCM, had brought to the fore
 the question of the position of trade unions in the industry and the autocratic
 methods generally employed in dealing with the white workers, although the TCM
 were not anti trade union because of inherent antipathy and had pragmatically
 recognised the Engine Drivers Union. The TMA also raised the general question of
 hours and was demanding an 8 hour bank-to-bank. This was a change that the TMA,
 ASE and ASCJ had been pressing for many months, now they saw an opportunity to
 push the issue and mobilize support for the New Kleinfontein strikers around it.
 (140). The Inspector of White Labour, the Secretary for Mines and others put the
 blame for the spread of the strike on Bain, Crawford.and other trade union
 officials whose only concern they believed was to have trade union and the Federa-
 tion recognised (141). Of course trade union officials had an interest in having
 their union recognised as negotiators. But mineworkers did also when employment
 was so unstable and management authoritarian they feared victimisation if they
 attempted to seek redness for grievances. According to the Inspector of White
 Labour's evidence the miners were anxious and determined that the management
 should meet their representatives (142).
 Phthisis
 The question of the reduction of hours was bound up with a general reaction of
 workers to exploitation and also with the problem of phthisis. From 1912 on-
 wards the state had taken measures to cause a reduction in the incidence of
 phthisis. According to the evidence to a commission in March of a member of the
 Medical Advisory Committee of the Miners' phthisis Board up to the end of 1912
 the incidence of deaths from phthisis had not decreased but by 1913 it showed
 signs of declining (143). In his evidence to the same commission the Government
 Mining Engineer talks about a shortage of white miners due to the phthisis scare.
 (144).
 At a meeting of the strike Committee in Benoni on the 1st July the chairman R.
 Haynes, spoke about phthisis and the TMA's determination that when operations
 restarted the trade unions must organize and ensure that the incidence of the
 disease is reduced to a minimum'(145). In his evidence to the Disturbances
 Commission a miner D.P. Roux, who had helped to mobilize the'dutch*speaking
 workers, said that phthisis and the-general danger of the work due to the indiffer-
 ence of the management about safety, were the reasons for the strike (146).
 It seems that, although it was not explicitly stated, the incidence of phthisis was
 one of the grievances of the workers and forms part of the general background of
 their distrust of management?and resentment at the way they were treated. From
 140 MNW 109 mm 823/12 Inspector of White Labour to Secretary for Mines
 . 141 Commission Q 235
 142 ibid O 160
 143 Select Committee on European Employment 1913. Evidence of Dr L.G. Irvine ?-950
 144 ibid. Evidence of R.N. Kotze 2 Q282
 145 RDM 1.7.13
 146 Commission D.P. Roux Q 6779
- 20 -
 ?"TdS government had called on Afrikaners to scab on the white
 = ' ? s s
 They are still going down, "and they will keep on going down until they die
 because there is nothing else but starvation in from of them^f they do nit"
 (147)
 5.3 Long Hours '
 q U e S t i
 ?
 n
  ?
 f
  hours generally was concerned many mine workers felt
 resentfurof tntr ^ Tf the" ? ?
 After the stride of ^ H * T"" T ^ d ? l n g l l l e g a l ? V e r t i m e underground (150).
 the reasons for\hf ? -v fSpec*ors o f M i " " were asked for their opinions on
 IZ " ! . s t r l k e- Several of them mentioned long hours. They criticised
 crtticis^Vf t e m f ? r p t h i s r e a s o n calli"9 it "voluntary sweating". They also
 large sums of ^ C 3 U S e ?* *"? di S S a t i s f a c t i?" ? caused among other workers when
 the ttlTtLl I ??e made by contractors and criticised this also because of
 ?ZL ? ^ engendered in the contractors by the uncertainty of their living
 ~ : ^
 6 y r a d e M f "a96S' in ?th? ???ths they migh/come out in deb?' ,15!).
 workers anH ^ conditions on the mines and discourage rivalry between
 overtime so '??*?**'?'***<>***'*** fc"de unions demanded enhanced rates for
 overtime so that employers would try to depend on overtime as little as possible
 5
  *
 4 Insecurlty because of Encroachment by Black Lahnnr-
 In their evidence to the Mining Industry Board of ^ F t h e AEU, the Boilermakers
 and tlTTU]&erSl ?B R e d u c t i o n W o r k e r s' ^e Building Workers industrial Snion '
 reasonef*?
 alf-ted Society of Woodworkers in a joint meMorandum v?rote that t ^
 u n d e r a ? ? l l x t a^ c y a n d s P r e a , d ? f the 1913 strike was the insecurity of white
 underground workers whose jobs were being steadily encroached on by black workers
 hill' E c o n o m l c Commission of 1914 claimed that in industry generally there
 constant Z7 ^ f ^ T ^ ?f Whites bv "lack ??^rs, but! nevertheless "a
 l^frf f ? d l sP l a c e m e n t " Prevelant" (154). m his evidence to the
 of h i ^ r tS1?,n H' R ? S S S k i n n e r' a director of the ERPM spoke about the ability
 nhani ?, c e r t a i n classes of work restricted to whites such as rock drilling,
 changing and tamping holes, hoisting engines. He also said that in the past five
 years the practice of putting one white miner on to 2,3,4 or even 5 drilling
 147 SC 1913 Evidence of J.T. Bain Q 3821
 148 ibid Q 3815
 149 Economic Commission UG 12M4 para 118
 150 MNW 109mm 823/12 IWL to Secretary Mines 22.2.13
 151 MNW 234 mm 1074/14 Inspector Mines reports September 1913
 152 UG 12-14 para 124
 153 Mining Industry Board 1922 Memoranda
 154 UG 12-14 p. 65
- 21 -
 * machines had increased so that in effect the black man ended up actually running
 the machine and the white merely supervised (155). In his evidence Kotze the
 Government Mining Engineer, said that the number of machines had greatly in-
 creased in the past five years but the number of machiners had remained steady (156),
 In his evidence RB Waterston said that actual replacement of whites by blacks
 had occured mainly in unskilled occupations but that blacks were learning white
 men's skills. For example a hauling engine driver, while suppossedly responsible
 for the upkeep of other engines which blacks drive, in fact has too much to do
 and the blacks actually not only drive the engine, but also look after the boilers
 and manage the haulage (157) Waterston said that the tendency was for the semi-
 skilled black, under white supervision, to do work formerly done by whites (158).
 Another reason for the strike, also unstated, would seem to have been general un-
 rest among white miners caused by the insecurity they felt because of their lack
 of control of the industry and the TCM policy of using more cheap black labour.
 When the trade unions submitted grievance and demands to the employers they all
 included a demand for increased wages. This had never been at the centre of the
 struggle. Even so the increase in the lost of living between 1910 and 1914 of
 10% without a compensatory increase in wages may have been a contributory factor
 to the industrial unrest (159).
 6. The Railway men in 1913
 The Federation of Trades had hoped that the railway workers would join the general
 strike. They had grievances of their own and some favoured joining the strike
 (160). When the strike was officially over unrest continued among the workers in
 Gerraiston, a railway centre (161). A deputation of about 1 000 railway workers
 went to the Governor General's residence on the 5th July to discuss grievances
 (162). On the sixth July a meeting of railwaymen in Pretoria voted not to return
 to work until after the funerals (163). According to the Evening Chronicle after
 the strike the membership of the ASRHS increased rapidly. By the eleventh of
 July it had 1 000 members in Pretoria and 6 000 members throughout the Union (164).
 Rumours of an inpending railway strike persisted throughout July (165).
 . As government employees the railway workers were in a peculiar position. Their
 terms of employment were governed by Act of Parliament. A discussion of the posi-
 tion and grievances of the railwayraen follows later*
 The railwaymen did not strike. But there were signs of closer co-roperation be-
 . tween them and the Federation. After the government's reply to the grievances
 \ submitted on behalf of trade unions by the Federation TIelegates the Federation
 and the ASRHS confered and passed the following resolution:-
 "That this meeting of delegates views with disgust the attitude adopted by
 the government towards the workers of South Africa and refuses to accept
 their suggestions, but will*rely upon our industrial and political organi-
 sation to remedy our grievances,and that no general strike be called at
 the present juncture", (166).
 155 SC13 Q 355
 156 ibid O_ 2292-6
 157 ibid Q3975
 158 ibid Q 3987
 159 Mining Industry Board volume 3. T. Matthews evidence,quoting Director of
 census statistics.
 160 'Justice' 193 3/18/14 Report of Annual Conference of ASRHS 18,19,20 August 1913
 161 Governor General Correspondence Relating to the Disturbances on the Rand
 162 ibid
 163 'The News' 7.7.13
 164 Evening Chronicle 11.7.13
 165 SAMR 1028 305
 166 MNW 166 Labour Report August 1913
- 22 -
 Thus the Federation admitted that grievances still existed but the organi
 of White workers was ineffective to remedy the situation. After the stri
 trade unions concentrated on strengthening their organisations. The TMA
 organisers to Vereenigirig. Witbank and Natal (167). The Federation held
 ganda meetings at various places on the Reef, at which they generally adv<
 greater organisation, but at which some leaders, such as Crawford, Ander:
 Livingstone, Nicholls, spoke of the need for the workers to form an army <
 own and meet force by force (168).
 7. Government Response to the 1913 Strike -Repression
 The Government had been granted permission to use Imperial Troops statione
 South Africa to control "the strike and suppress the disturbances. This le
 the shooting of workers at the behest of a "Boer" government, politically
 controversial act for the Imperial Government to sanction. The Union Gove
 was warned that they must not depend on being able to use these troops aga
 similar circumstances. The Governor reassured the Secretary of State in B:
 "I intend formally to draw the serious attention of Ministers to the
 lessons of last week. lam sure they realise, as you do, that Imperial Tr<
 are not retained in South Africa to do the work which since June 30th they
 had to perform" (169).
 (? As soon as the 1913 strike was formally over the Minister of Defence sent :
 structions to the Commandant General of the Active Citizen Force ordering 1
 prepare a scheme for mobilising DRA commandos "so that say 5 000, 10 000,
 armed and mounted men could be assembled and marched on the scene of disoi
 on the Witwatersrand and especially Pretoria" (190). The Commandant was re
 that "though endeavors would be made to move commandos by rail the assumpti
 be that the railways would not be available and that all movements of comma
 would have to be by road" (171).
 The Government wanted to ensure that not only would armed forces be efficie
 called up but also that they would be efficiently co-ordinated and deployed
 the end of July 1913 a scheme had been devised whereby the Union would be d
 into twelve Control areas. In the event of another strike each area would
 under the control of SADF officer who would be responsible for co-ordinatin
 the government forces in the area, for controlling the movements of civilia
 in the area and for censoring newspapers and post (172). Instructions were
 to the control officers that "every step which it is possible to arrange pr
 to calling out the forces should now be taken by DSO's in as unobstrusive a
 as possible" (173). A draft proclamation calling on all citizens to help tl
 Q forces of the Crown to maintain law and order was dra*?. up and instructions
 sent to magistrates on procedure for the enrolment of Special Constables (1".
 167 'Justice1 192 3/35/14
 168 'Justice' 178 3/1468/13 SAP .reports on labour meetings
 169 Correspondence relating to the disturbances on the Rand
 170 DC 39 file 765, Under Secretary Defence to Commandant General ACF
 171 ibid
 172 DC 39 file 765. Mayor Collyer DS0. General Staff to Commandant Genera
 24.7.13
 173 ibid
 174 G.N.L.B. I l l 1643/13 Minister of Defence t o Magistrates 24.7.13
- 23 -
 Following discussions with the Minister of Mines the Secretary for Mines suggested
 a scheme for the rapid recruitment of Special Constables, In the event of a
 crisis he suggested that the commissioner SAP could communicate with 5-6 well
 known residents who would be able to call on about 500 other experienced
 "gentlemen" who could do police duties while the police were occupied with strike
 duties. He pointed out that the chief, merits of the scheme were that it could be
 achieved silently, quickly and effectively (175). The idea was very similar to
 J.P. Fitzpatrick's 'defence force1 of 600 formed on the fourth of July out of a
 meeting of "leading citizens" (176).
 One of the chief fears of the government was the effect another strike and rioting
 might have on the black workers. The fears about the effect of strikers on black
 workers were well grounded considering their strike in 1913. As the Inspector
 of Mines said: "what they learned in a week last July might in the ordinary way
 have taken them fifteen years to learn" (177). Accordingly plans were drawn up
 for the removal of black workers from the corrupting scenes of a white strike to
 their rural homes. The Native Recruiting Corporation and the Witwatersrand Native
 Labour Association, who were responsible for recruiting most black mineworkers,
 co-operated in the scheme (178).
 Also in response to the reaction of blacks to the strike the Government appointed
 . the Native Grievances Commission. The reasons for doing so are explicitly ex-
 ^ .pressed in a emeorandum on the strike drawn up by the Native Affairs Department:-
 "Certain leading delegates to the South African Native Congress had been
 present in Johannesburg and on the Reef during the disturbances. The
 disabilities under which natives were working formed one of the subjects
 discussed at the meeting of the Congress. Simultaneously with these
 gatherings the demands of the white miners were being formulated for sub-
 mission to the government by the Federation of Traders. Having reason to
 believe that this lead would be followed by certain native agitators and
 realising how lamentable it would be were the government to be placed in
 the position of having to make concessions to natives as a result of de-
 mands being formulated in respect of known grievances the Director re-
 commended that such a move be anticipated and that a commission be appointed"
 (180).
 7.1 Economic Commission 1914
 C
 Similarly in an attempt to allay unrest the Government appointed a commission to
 investigate the position of white workers. The Economic Commission (UG 12'14)
 .reported on the seventeenth of January 1914. It generally opposed Government
 A
 -* interference in industry. It recommended a factory acT.'to regulate conditions of
 labour in factories, and it recommended legislation providing for one day off a
 week for industrial workers. It opposed the colour bar, the setting of minimum
 175 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines to Minister Mines
 176 Commission. Evidence of J.P. Fitzpatrick
 177 UG12'14 para 95
 178 GNLB 114
 179 NA 5 mm 1870/13/F2 Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary Justice 6.12.13
 180 NA 208 210/14/F473
- 24 -
 wages and the contract system on the mines. The Commission recommended legislation
 to encourage the development of voluntary conciliation boards on which employees
 would be represented by trade union officials and which would be responsible for
 negotiating wages and conditions. The legislation they envisaged would have gone
 further than the 1909 Act so that it would have explicitly recognised the role of
 trade unions in industry and would encourage the development of standing Conciliation
 Boards, but it did not go so far as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 in
 that it favoured recognition of trade unions but it did not propose legislation
 which would encourage trade unions and thus it did not envisage the legislative
 enactment of voluntary agreements and their possible extension to the rest of the
 industry, both of these are provisions of the 1924 Act.
 7.2 Government Reaction - Co-option
 Following the strike, in the light of reports by government officials closely in
 touch with the trade union movement, the government considered legislative measures
 to ensure industrial peace.
 In September 1913 the Secretary for Mines and Industries forwarded reports of
 the Inspectors of Mines on the industrial crisis of 1913 in which they suggested
 reasons for the dispute and ways of averting another in the future (182). The
 Inspectors for Johannesburg, Boksburg and Pretoria were unanimous in their
 f -.opinion that trade unions should be given legislative recognition. The Inspector
 for Krugersdorp differed. He was worried about "the effect upon the native - the
 true labourer of this land - when he hears of the government recognition of trade
 unions ... Will he not also demand some of the fruits of such legislation" (183).
 His report also claimed that legislative recognition of trade unions in Britain
 had led to more strikes and "labour tyranny". In his notes on this report the
 Government Mining Engineer pointed out that "recognition" implies "regulation" and
 that the whole report basically represented the attitude of the mine owners.
 The Inspector of White Labour had suggested that trade unions should be given
 statutory recognition by inserting a clause in the Factory Bill of 1911 (184),
 but opposition to such a move in 1911 was as strong as in 1913. The 1914 Eco-
 nomic Commission reported that they had "met with many employers who seem
 strangely averse to have any dealings with trade union officials" (185).
 Amongst some sections of the mining industry oppositions to trade unionism per-
 sisted even after several years of formal recognition which began in 1915 (186).
 In the aftermath of the 1913 strike the reasons for recognising trade unions
 became more urgent. As already pointed out the government was becoming con-
 (,-" cerned at the ascendancy of the "extremist"elements i%?the labour movement and
 the permeation of these views into the rank and file. The Government Mining
 Engineer in a letter to the Minister of Mines pointed out that labour legislation
 must recognise this position and :-
 "as you have already stated:, it must be our objectto attempt to drive a
 wedge between the bona fide workman and the class of persons holding these
 views" (187)
 182 MNW 234 mm 1074/14
 183 ibid Inspector of Mines Krugersdorp to Government Mining Engineer 9.9.13
 184 MNW 51 Inspector White Labour to Secretary Mines 30.5.11
 185 UG 12'14 p. 88
 186 MNW 395 mm 2762/17 Secretary Mines and Industries to IWL. 1,11.17
 187 MNW 234 mm 1074/1-4 GME to Minister of Mines Sept 1913
- 25 -
 The Economic Commission of 1914 was explicit about how the recognition of t
 unions could help to achieve this:-
 "Trade Onion organisation is impossible without officials, and offici
 being of influence in their trade unions are the natural persons to
 bring into negotiations with employers. Moreover, the official is ir
 likely to take the business point of view, and examine the situation
 calmly, than the workman who has some personal grievance rankling ir
 mind. Finally, it's certain that, recognised or not, labour organis
 will continue among white men. All experience proves it, our experi
 proves also that organisation in the open, made sober by recognition
 a very different thing from organisation which has to fight against
 tempt or antagonism, and may be compelled to keep its organisation s
 It is the latter form of organisation which is so pecularly liable t
 foster extreme and even revolutionary doctrines"(188).
 The advanced views of the Economic Commission of 1914 are apparent in its n
 mendation of the recognition of the Federation of Trades. As they pointed t
 even the most liberal employers were wary of the Federation. The Coramissioi
 that such fears were unfounded and the Federation if recognised would act a;
 second line of defence against industrial war" (190)
 Towards the end of 1913 a bill "to provide for the registration and regulat:
 trade unions "was introduced (191). This provided for the official registry
 of trade unions. Trade unions must supply to the registrar the name of the
 the names of officers, address, details of funds and what they are used for
 Under clause 7 (1) any branch of a trade union could apply for registration
 separate union. This clause would tend to lead to a strengthening of local
 autonomy in trade unions and prevent the development of powerful centralized
 organisations and makes it less likely that a strong officialdom would devel
 and become entrenched. Clause 9 provided for the possibility of amalgamatio
 two or more unions in the same trade or industry but stipulated that the con
 at least two thirds of the whole membership of each trade union must be obta
 The Act prescribed penalties for any attempt to intimidate people to join un
 and made trade union officials liable for any illegal acts of the union.
 This bill must be seen in the context of the other labour legislation introd
 in the wake of the 1913 strike, particularly the proposed Industrial Prevent
 Bill. This bill would have superceded the 1909 Industrial Dispute Act, whic
 applied to the Transvaal. Of this act the Inspector of White Labour had sai'
 "generally speaking, this Act, for all intents and purposes, has been .
 dead letter on our statutes" (193).
 188 UG 12f14 p. 88
 190 UG 12'14 para.90
 191 MNW 421 mm 1649/18 C62 (2) '14
 192 ibid Clause 4 (1)
 193 MNW 543 mm 3431/20 IWL to chief IWL 17.12.20
- 26 -
 The Bill was intended to be more far reaching and strict in its provisions than
 the 1909 Act (194). The intention was to stop sympathy strides and make general
 strikes impossible (195). To achieve this some interesting provisions were in-
 cluded in the act. Section 7 aimed to restrict strikes by isolating them and
 removing the principle cause of rioting. To achieve this it forbad picketting
 and made it illegal for employers to introduce strike breakers. The bill pro-
 hibited a strike until one month after a Disputes Board had reported on the dis-
 pute and it was to be compulsory to ballot all employees and obtain a majority
 before a strike could be called. A new clause was later inserted under which at
 any time during the course of a strike on the application of five employees the
 registrar of trade unions could call for a ballot the results of which would be
 published in the Government Gazette and national newspapers and sent to the em-
 ployers and trade unions. Under Section 43 it was illegal for light, power, water
 or sanitary employees to strike and illegal for.anyone to strike if this might
 endanger life on expose valuable property to injury (e.g. in the case of a mine
 strike it would be illegal to prevent pumping services). The penalty for in-
 fringement of these provisions was a maximum of two years hard labour. If a
 trade union transgressed the Act all officials' were liable.
 The most novel clauses compared with the 1909 Act, were those providing for the
 establishment of standing conciliation boards in any industry. The boards were
 to consist of equal number of employer and employee representatives. The bill
 implicitly recognised trade unions by allowing for the representation of employees
 1
  by trade union officials of a registered trade union or by a representative
 elected by a ballot of all employees (196).
 In September 1913 the parliamentary draughtsmen were urged to hurry with the bill
 because the Minister considered it urgent and wanted it in a form to put before
 Cabinet (197). On the 26th of January the Chamber of Mines wrote to the Secretary
 for Mines and Industries:-
 "the recent general strike offers additional reasons necessitating the
 passing of Acts dealing with these questions and I am therefore directed
 to urge that this legislation be proceeded with in the coming session".
 The letter went on to urge an amendment to the trade union bill making it com-
 pulsory to register (198). The Transvaal Coal Owners Society wrote to the Sec-
 retary for Mines and Industries supporting the bill and demanding heavy penalties
 for strikes, intimidation and violence, inciting to strike and "go-slows" (199).
 Organisations of labour were not so enthusiastic. Protest meetings in May 1914
 of the labour Party and the trade unions passed resolutions condemning the In-
 . dustrial disputes Bill and the Riotors Assemblies Bill (discussed below) (200).
 However, the Industrial Disputes Bill and Trade Onion Bill were not passed. They
 had been merged into one bill the Industrial Dispute and Trade Union bill and
 passed through two readings in the House of Assembly and were then referred to
 select committee. The Bill was revised in select committee and referred to a
 committee of the whole House for amendment. It re-emerged as the Industrial
 Disputes and Labour Bureaux Bill with clauses on the registration of trade unions
 removed (201). The Bill however failed to get through Senate before the end of
 the session and was not reintroduced in the next session.
 194 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines and Industries to Secretary Justice
 12.12.13
 195 MNW 217 mm 4256/13 Secretary Mines and Industries to Secretary Justice 19.9.13
 and 22.9.13
 196 This clause was disliked by some employers. The Johannesburg Chamber of
 Commerce for example wrote to the Secretary for Mines and Industries on the
 second of May 1914 demanding that representatives should always be chosen by
 full ballot of employees.
 197 MNW 217 mm 4256/13 Secretary Mines and Industries to Secretary Justice 19.9.13
 198 ibid. TCM to Secretary Mines and Industries 26.1.14
 199 ibid 22.1.14
 ?0D MNW 717 mm 42S6/13 Petition t^ ^ -o?-nnr r^ n*?-=i ?. ?/?/<io v<??,?*._.. ^ "~ -- ?
- 27 -
 till J I clauses xn the trade unions and industrail disputes bill dealina
 with strxkes and preventing picketting the Government also considered more genera1
 measures to prevent a reoccurance of the rioting of July 1913. In their demand I
 lllT^T T% ^ V913 Str?ke thS t d l i L ^^included a dLand for the ^
 I K me6ting Of the 4th ? f Julv haa >*en P?-
 P u b l f ^etings and Disturbances Bill drafted at the end of 1913 would
 / ? f 1 8 9 4 b U t W ? U l d l t S e l f h a v e m ? r e effectively enforced its
 Sfted a f / ^ r ^ r aPPliCable to the ->?le ""i?n (202). The Bill was re!
 drafted after the strike of January 1914. It was passed in July 1914 as the Rioton,
 Assemblies Act. Under this Act any Magistrate acting under authority of the
 peace is in ? ? T ^ t O P r ? h l b i t ^ gathering, if he t h i n k s ^ public
 III LI dang"' "nd Ca" Prevent access to suc" * P^ce. The act governs the
 act t L n " y ^ a t S a U t h o r i t i e s gainst illegal gatherings. Chapter 2 of the
 the fan* \ P T l b l t S Pickettlng- L a b ? " party efforts to have an amendment to
 1906 ani'n ^ " " " f O l l ? W t h e e X a m p l e o f t h e B " t i s ? Tr^de Dispute Act of
 oi.L . 9 a Peaceful picketting, were unsuccessful. The Bill also included
 clauses to prevent the intimidation of people in order to get them to join a
 f ? 1 M - T h \ b i 1 1 ?!?? Prided for the liability of all trade union officials
 " * "T ^ ^ ^ " p r o h i b i ted the breaking of contracts by
 ^
  emplo
 *
 ees
 - " ?
  A c t a
 ^ ? Provided for the deportation of ?un-
 o a P P e a l S b y m e m b e r S f r o m a 1 1 actions of the House the Act
 *
  P S a C e
  P r e s e r v a t i o n Ordinance of 1902 which conforced
 ? ^ P??ers of arrest and detention for three weeks without access to the
 courts of people suspected for treason or sedition. The leaders arested in
 T r n ^ r ^ ^ " ^ U n d e r t h ? S o r d i " a " ? . The Act also provided that, if
 T y- T determines that it is necessary, offenders may be tried by
 Criminal Court, not by jury. (203).
 for thTwh9*7 S U " e S S f u l s t r i k e o f 1 9 1 3 ? ? not lead to many legislative gains
 fo ^ K workers. Their demand for the repeal of the 1894 Act was acceeded
 to only because and far more repressive measure was passed in its place. Some
 ? < r ? r femands l e d t o discussion between the Mines Department and trade
 union officials but few of them were passed.
 A private members' bill, backed by the labour party, which envisaged the setting
 up of wage boards for each industry equally representative of employers and em-
 ployees in the industry which could determine a minimum wage for each industry
 was introduced in February 1914. Haggar of the Labour Party had in fact asked ?
 the government to consider the formation of wage boards before the strike in May
 II K ? ^ been agreed to- flfter discussion in the house in February 1914the bill was withdrawn.
 One of the workers' demands in 1913 had been for.a Factory Act. A Factory Bill
 was introduced in 1913. Soon after Union the government had considered introducing
 legislation controlling factories. In 1911 the Inspector of White Labour drafted
 a tactory act and commented that ttie passing of such a measure and the setting up
 of wage boards would help solve the problem of industrial disputes (205). The
 Il PM 1699/18 Under Secretary for Mines and Industries to CIWL 2.4.18
 203 PM 1/1/H9 Notes on Riotous Assemblies Act by Law Adviser
 204 Diamond Fields Advertiser 17.1.14 PM/1/1/108
 205 MNW 51 IWL Report 1.5.11
- 28 -
 1913 Factory Bill drew considerable criticism from employers. At first the act
 proposed a basic SO hour week for all adult males (though many exceptions were
 made e.g..for seasonal work, continuous process industry etc). After protests this
 was altered to a 54 hour week (206). The bill not only proposed restricted hours
 it also stipulated work conditions, provided for the registration of factories,
 numbers of employees and work done in the factories. The act contained provisions
 attempting to prevent evasion by the worst sweating employers the "putters-out"
 to home workers (207) . In drawing up the legislation the mines department made
 full use of studies of similar legislation in other countries and discovered
 that rather than having an adverse affect industry had flourished under such
 legislation (208). However, this bill also failed to pass.
 Immediately after the 1914 strike a very harsh bill somewhat euphemistically
 called 'The Workroens' Protection Act' was introduced (209). This made it an offence
 to interfere with any person to induce them to strike. This was intended to
 prevent 'pulling-out'. It would be an offence to "interfere" with anybody in an
 attempt to induce them to join a trade union. It made it an offence to enter
 premises and interview workers about their conditions or terms of employment.
 "Interference" had a wide definition and included the use of "opprobious epithets"
 i.e. like the word scab. Breach of contract was to be a criminal offence for
 essential service workers or where it was liable to lead to loss of life or damage
 to machinery. The bill made it illegal for trade unions to punish a member who con-
 {;-, tinued working during a strike by fines, removal of privileges or explusion. The
 bill, if enforced, would have made it extremely difficult for trade unions to
 maintain and control their membership and would have made expansion almost im-
 possible. The bill was not passed but various clauses were merged into the Riotous
 Assemblies Act.
 Two measures which had been demanded were passed. The Workmen's Compensation Act
 provided compensation for accidents at work whether or not the employer was
 personally negligent. The Act applied to all workers except black mineworkers. It
 did not provide compensation for industrial disease (210). The Act consolidated
 the various acts of the provinces. It was passed in July 1914. The other act
 was the Workmen's Wages Protection Act, passed in June 1914. In terms of this act
 workmen could apply to the principal (i.e. the person on whose behalf work has
 been done) as soon as his wages fall due. The intention of the Act was to cover
 ? those cases, numerous is the building industry for example, where the contractor
 did not have sufficient money to coyer the workers' wages or disappeared without
 paying them.
 By the end of 1914 the government had still not evolved a long term strategy for
 (.'".* dealing with white workers. The measures which had h^en introduced to regulate
 the position of trade unions had not been passed. The only legislation which
 dealt with the relations between employers and white workers the 1907 Act, although
 criticised as a "dead letter" remained. The Industrial Disputes and Trade Union
 Bills were not reintroduced. Posgibly this was partly due tocontinuing opposition
 to the recognition of trade unions among some sections of mining capital (211).
 206 MNW 238 tern 1230/14 IWL to Secretary Mines and Industry 20.1.14
 207 MNW 214 mm 4163/13 Secretary Mines and Industry to Chamber of Commerce Cape
 Town.
 208 MNW 238 mm 1230/14 and mm 4163/13 IWL Report 20.1.14 also Report of Professor
 of Sociology from USA
 209 PM 1/1/108 29.1.14
 210 PM 1/1/14 1/1/108 The Act was amended in 1917 to provide for lead poisoning
 and mercury poisoning.
 211 UG 12'14 p. 88
- 29 -
 Perhaps also the measures no longer seemed so urgent after the defeat of the ex-
 tremists in January 1914 and the blows to trade unionism inflicted then. As the
 Secretary for Mines and Industries ideologically expressed it immediately after
 the Government victory in 1914; "it is very desirable that the Government should
 not depart from its industrial programme of legislation, as many people would, I
 think, like it to do now that it has won a victory over the extremists. It seems
 to me more important than ever that the government should adhere steadily to the
 programme which it has set before itself in the country. In order to avoid the
 accusation of being vindictive" (212). However, it was apparently no longer
 necessary to "adhere" to its programme and the Government continued in its former,
 established programme of tolerating trade unions but granting them no special
 position in industry and society. Both government and employers no doubt felt
 safer now that the Riotous Assemblies Act was on the statutes and they had means
 to control trade union activities because officials were now liable for transgressions
 by trade union members of the Act (213). As far as.the white workers were con-
 cerned the attempts to obtain a 48 hour week minimum wage, paid holidays, pro-
 hibition on Sunday Work and an apprenticeship system by legislative means had failed.
 212 MNW 217 mm 4256/17 Secretary Mines and Industry to Transvaal Coal Owners1
 Society 23-1-14
 213 see. TCM AR xlvii
 ('-?
Abbreviations used
 ASE Amalgamated Society of Engineer
 (Later called AEU - Amalgamated Engineering Union)
 ASRHS Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants
 DC Archive of the Secretary of Defence
 Disturbances Commission Report and Evidence of the Witwatersrand Disturbances
 Commission C7112
 DRA District Rifle Association
 Federation Transvaal Federation of Trades
 I.W.L. Inspector of White Labour
 ?Justice1 Records of the Department of Justice
 MNW Records of the Department of Mines and Industries
 NA Records of the Native Affairs Department
 PM Records of the Prime Minister
 R.D.M. Rand Daily Mail
 SAMR Records of the South African Mounted Riflemen
 SAP South African Police
 SAR South African Railways
 TCM Transvaal Chamber of Mines
 TMA Transvaal Miners Association
8. Further Unrest after the 1913 Strike
 ( ? " ?
 In December 1913 there was a strike of engine drivers on the coal mines of Natal.
 After negotiations they agreed to return to work. Some increase in pay had been
 granted but the demand for decreased hours was not conceded (214) . Later in
 December the Natal branch of the TMA struck work with the authorization of the
 Johannesburg executive after management had refused to reinstate four TMA officials
 who had been dismissed. The strike continued until after the railway strike of
 January 1914. After a dead-lock had been reached in negotiations the TMA sent an
 official, McKerrall, down from the Rand on 1 January 1914 to help resolve the
 dispute. According to the Inspector of White Labour, McKerrall was extremely
 belligerent and uncompromising. McKerrall claimed to be in contact with Poutsma,
 the General Secretary of the railway workers' union ASRHS, and said that if the
 owners did not accept the TMA ultimatum, which included immediate reinstatement
 of the TMA men, then the railwaymen and the white workers of the Witbank colliery
 would strike in sympathy (215). There is evidence of government fears of this
 strike spreading to the gold mines on the Rand. (216) .
 In October 1913 thousands of Indians, led by Gandhi, took part in a passive resistence
 campaign against the E3 tax imposed on them.
 The campaign took the form of courting arrest, by means of illegal marches for example
 A mass march took place from Natal into the Transvaal, from which Indians were
 prohibited. By the end of October the action had spread to the coal mines (217)
 and by 28 October over 3000 Indians were on strike (218) . As usual employers and
 government officials refused to believe that the Indians had any good reason or
 any serious desire to strike. They did so only because of "intimidation" by
 agitators. (219) In an ingenious move the authorities arrested "ring leaders"
 and sentenced them to hard labour
  an{a had t n e mine compounds proclaimed to be
 jails and so forced the Indian labour force back to work under police supervision (220)
 214 MNW 238 mm 1295/14
 215 ibid
 216 DC 1154 5422 Lieutenant Colonel SAMR to o5O Pretoria 7.1.14
 \
By the end of November Indians in the factories of Durban and Pie termar it zburg
 and on sugar estates had joined the strike (221). By the beginning of December
 large numbers of strikers had returned to work. Even so, there were then over
 17 000 workers still out (222). According to the chief magistrate of Durban,
 the use of armed force to suppress the strike (it was also alleged that
 prisoners in jail were flogged) was not to intimidate the workers and break
 the strike but, 'predictably1,to prevent "agitators" intimidating them into
 striking. He is very candid on the reasons for the many,arrests. These were
 "necessary to show to the natives that there existed at hand the necessary
 force to handle any number of strikers " (223).
 The strikes gradually petered out. and, resorting to already familiar tactics,
 the government appointed the Indian Enquiry Commission on 11 December 1913.
 9. The 1914 Railwaymen's Strike.
 In October 1913 when the threat of 'industrial action* on the Rand had receded
 somewhat the Minister of Railways, Burton, issued circulars on the necessity
 to retrench labour in the railway workshops (224). On 24 December the railway
 administration announced that in the interests of economy it would be necessary
 to retrench even more labour (225). Eventually 673 workers were retrenched.
 9.1. ;Another Commission of Enquiry
 At the time that these retrenchments were announced the Railway Commission of
 Enquiry into railwaymen's grievances was in session. This had been appointed
 under the agreement of 4 July in terms of Section 21 of the Railway Act of 1912.
 The Commission was enquiring into (a) Introduction of an 8 hour day (b) A
 minimum wage for white adult employees of 8s per day (c) Revision of local
 allowances (d) Abolition of piecework (e) Better payment for salaried staff (f)
 Extra payment for overtime (g) Severity of punishment (h) Decentralisation of
 shop management. The chairman was C.G. Ward, appointed by the government.
 There were to be two other members, one appointed by the administration, the other
 by a ballot of all railway employees (226). The ASRHS, after deliberating on
 whether or not they should ignore the commission, decided to recommend the rail-
 way workers to vote for H.J. Poutsma the General Secretary as their representative
 (227). He was elected in October 1913 (228).
 217 'Justice* 180/4/572/13. Natal collieries to Minister Interior 20.10.13
 218 ibid. Attorney General to Secretary Justice 23.10.13
 219 ibid. Chairman Joint Meeting of Natal Sugar Association and Coal Owners Society
 U.: to Minister Justice 8.11.13
 220 ibid. Governor General to Secretary of State 19.14^13
 221 ibid. Chief Magistrate Durban to Justice Department 24.11.13
 222 ibid. General Lukin Control Officer to Defence Department 2,12.13
 223 'Justice* 181 4/627/13. Report of Chief Magistrate Durban.
 224 Smuts op. cit. p. 18
  4
 225 Creswell op. cit. p. 23
The government had feared a railwaynien's strike after the 1913 strike but none
 ? took place. The commission became the focus of the railwaymen's interest and
 hopes. When retrenchments were announced talk of a strike to halt retrenchments
 and obtain redress for long standing grievances spread.
 g.2 Background to the Railway Strike
 Several commissions had examined the grievances of the railwaymen. p.epeatedly
 their recommendations had been ignored. In 1910 the Commission noted that the
 recommendations of the 1907 Commission not been implemented (229).
 The 1910 Commission noted the extreme antipathy of the General Manager of the
 Central SAR, William Hoy, later General Manager of the SAR, to trade unions or
 any form of consultation with the men; they quoted from among statements made
 by him;
 "If you try to meet them the whole lot will combine against you".
 "The moment I meet them they are not satisfied until they have got my
 hands and my feet and my whole body". (230)
 Bearing in mind this attitude the proviso at the beginning of the Commission's
 report is not surprising:
 , ? "At the very outset your Commissioners wish to place on record the great
 fear of the whole staff who gave evidence that their evidence would in-
 evitably cause them to be victimised". (231)
 In this connection the Commissioner reported on two "coincidences" (232) which
 occurred when he was taking evidence at Volksrust and Waterval-boven, Members
 of the railway CID visited both places at the same time he did.
 Despite the recommendation of the 1912 Commission on Railway Grievances (233)
 that the administration should allow railway workers to be represented by the
 ASRHS if that was what the workers wanted it was not until after the 1913 strike
 that the administration even considered recognizing trade unions.
 One of the most oft repeated complaints to all the commissions was the severity
 of punishment meted out for offences. The 1910 Commissioner recommended that
 an appeal board by instituted (234). The 1912. Commissioner considered that the
 proceedure laid down by the 1912 Railway Act whereby appeal could be made to the
 General Manager and then, if no solution was forthcoming, to the Railway Board,
 was sufficient. (235) The ASRHS wanted an Appeal Board instituted with equal
 ;. representation of employees. (236). After the 1913 Strike the railway workers
 put forward this demand again and an Appeal Board was instituted which was
 eventually given legal recognition in the Railway and Harbours Strike Service
 Amendment Act of 1914. (237). Even so the complaint about the severity of
 punishment still remained. Under the 1912 Act employees who "deserted", were
 disobedient, negligent etc. were liable to dismissal with loss of all superannuation
 contributions. (238). When the 1912 Act was being debated in the House this
 clause had been called "downright robbery" (239). The 1912 Commission recommended
 226 Government Gazette 15.8.13
 227 'Justice1 193 3/18/14 Annual Conference ASRHS August 1913
 228 Government Gazette 11.10.13
 229 Report of Commission of inquiry into complaints of CSAR Staff 190 p. 103
 230 ibid. p. 110
 231 ibid. p. 2
 232 ibid. p. 3
 233 UG 64'12 p. 135
 234 1910 Commission p. 56
 235 UG 64'12 p. 130
 236 'South African Railway and Harbour Servants Review 1/3/12
 237 PM 1/1/19 Notes of Law Adviser on SAR Strike Amendment Act
 238 UG 64'12
 239 'Natal Mercury' 3.2.12
- 4 -
 that a worker should only be liable to forfeit contributions for fraud or dishonesty
 (240).
 Employee representatives to all the commissions asked for the establishment of
 an 8 hour day. The commissions generally reported that for a service such as the
 railway service it would be impossible to have an 8 hour day for all workers. They
 all agreed that the hours at work of employees should be reduced "as much as possible"
 The 1910 Commission mentioned people working up to 18 hours at a stretch (241).
 The 1914 Commission calculated the average number of hours of running staff for
 a month they obtained figures of 302.4 (Cape Town) 284.6 (Kimberley) 307.3
 (Port Elizabeth) 304.3 (East London) 304.1 (Bloemfontein) 307.1 (Durban) 306.3
 (Johannesburg) 293.3 (Pretoria). This gives an average of about 73 hour per
 week. (245). The ASRHS argued that the introduction of the 8 hour day would
 mean the employment of unemployed people and greater efficiency which would mean
 that it would not result in increased costs (246) . The 1914 Commission recommended
 that wherever possible the hours of work should be reduced to 8 per day and that
 the Administration should investigate ways of reducing hours. (247) The Adminis-
 tration had already introduced a 48 hour week for artizans. (248).
 In accordance with their demand for reduced hours the ASRHS asked for enhanced
 rates for overtime (249). The 1910 Commission found that workers were actually
 paid a lower rate for overtime. Their pay was calculated on the basis of a
 substantive rate plus a daily district allowance according to the area they lived
 in. Overtime was paid on the substantive rate (250). The 1912 Commission re-
 commended the payment of time and a quarter for weekday overtime and time and a
 half for Sunday overtime based on the substantive rate of pay (251). In their
 minority report the employees representatives recommended the same rates but
 based on the consolidated pay (252). On the 1st of January 1913 overtime rates
 were introduced, for artisans only, based on the substantive pay rates (253) .
 In their evidence to the commission the trade unions were unanimous in their
 demand for the abolition of 'piecework' in the workshops. The system existing was
 not, strictly speaking, piecework. It was a bonus time system. A time was
 calculated for every piece of work. The worker was paid a bonus if he completed
 a piece in less time. Trade unions claimed that this system led to numerous
 unsatisfactory results. They said that the rates tended to be based on the rate
 of the youngest most efficient men, which acted against the interests of older
 workers. They said that the system led to sweating, shoddy work, to competition
 between the men and a tendency to drive the rates down and prevented the proper
 training of apprentices because men did not have time to attend to them. (254).
 The 1910 Commission agreed with the trade unions and recommended the abolition
 of 'piecework*. (255). The 1912 Commission said that,-*although the opinion of
 the men at every centre they visited was unanimously against 'piecework', they
 thought that insufficient evidence had been given of alleged abuses and decided
 not to recommend its abolition. They did recommend various safeguards to
 prevent competition leading to rate, cutting and bad work. (256). The 1914
 Commission also reported against the abolition of piecework and made recommendations
 to safeguard the men from rate cutting (257).
 240 UG 64*12 p. 120
 241 1910 Commission p. 104
 245 1914 Commission p. 26
 246 1914 Comrassion Minority Report J.M. Nield p. 102
 247 ibid. p. 98
 248 ibid, parag. 12
 249 ibid p. 100 ?
 250 1910 Commission p. 103
 251 UG 64*12 p. 61
 252 ibid p. 67
 253 1914 Commission p. 100
 254 UG 64*12 p. 78
 255 1910 Commission p. 51
 256 UG 64*12 p. 84
 257 1914 Commission p. 99
- 5 -
 ?The ASRHS wanted the whole basis of organisation of the staff in the railway
 service altered. They wanted the regulation of pay, conditions and discipline
 to be governed by Parliament. Under the 1912 Act the General Manager was given
 the right to make regulations governing pay, conditions etc. They also wanted
 clauses in the Act, which empowered the Administration to discipline workers for
 offences even after they had been found innocent by a criminal court, to be
 deleted (258),
 The 1912 Commission considered grievances of individuals and groups. It made
 hundreds of recommendations on anomalies of pay, hours, conditions, pensions etc.
 in the different services in the provinces before Union The 1912 Railway Act
 was supposed to iron out the differences. One of the demands of the railway workers
 after the 1913 strike was for the implementation of the recommendations made by
 the 1912 Commission (259). Changes made, by the 1912 Act and the continuance of
 anomalies was one of the sources of grievance felt by the railway workers in 1914.
 As government employees the railway workers were not immune to the fluctuations
 of the capitalist economy. For a start the South Africa Act explicitly stated
 that the railways must be run on "business principles". Even without this
 Stricture the railway administration could hardly have run the railways in such a
 way as to impede the profitability of private industry in the country, especially
 not the revenue producing gold mining industry. As the Commission in 1910 pointed
 .-.out, all the grievances of the worker arose from the aim of the Administration
 to run the railways at the lowest possible cost (260) .
 Even so, as Government employees, whose terras of employment were governed by Act
 of Parliament the railway workers faced peculiar difficulties in organizing. The
 1912 Railway Act (which consolidated the Acts governing railway workers in the
 various provinces) provided for pension and sickness funds. For employees taken
 m to the permanent staff the act supposedly gave security of tenure- except for
 negligence, transgression of regulations etc. One of the focal points of
 organisation of working class people has been to provide those social needs which
 the capitalist system has denied them. Trade unions often began as benefit
 societies and this remained a major part of their function. For railway workers
 the problems of providing for sickness, unemployment and old age were catered
 for by act of parliament. The 1912 Act gave the Administration power to make
 regulations on the wages and conditions of employment of railwaymen. The organ-
 isation of railwaymen therefore directly focussed on the question of conditions of
 employment.
 258 'South African Railway and Harbour Servants Review1 1.3.12 alsoNurahs'
 circular to senate 12-2-23 in Private Secretary of Colonel c^esswell
  Box2
 259 MNW 192 mm 2578/13 ^'
 260 1910 Commission p- 108
 261 'Justice1 214 3/372/15. ASRHS General Secretary Frank Nettleton to Minister
 Justice 22.4.11
 262 Economic Commission 1925 v 8 Evidence of W. Moore. Nurahs Genearal Secretary
 Q24.597 . J
 263 'Justice' 214 3/372/15 Frank Nettleton to Minister 22.4.11
 264 'Railways and Harbours Gazette1 quote^ in RDM 1.7.13
- 6 -
 out at different
  rPnfrpe ?,?*- *. ? airrerent section of railway workers spread
 were a g g r a S by the complex gradingtho??i?1 " ^ ?f railway line the difficulties
 By 1925 there were over S r J ' Y ^ i n s t i t u t e d by the Administration,
 been created which led J r i ^ S / " ? 3 ?? m P l e X f i n e l y d i V i d e d hi?archy had
 ?- fear of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ? S S S ^ S 4 i
 t o o p p o s e
 in a? article in their magazine on t^ ( 2 6 3 )
 contribution was
 (265).
 S U P P
 ?
 r t
  ?
 f toe workers. Their
 when he opened their annual conference.
 with one another S ^ n Sulv
  19A f
 Onion, was formed^fL fseSon'spl t
 union was a v d
 Bloemfontein ^
 discussed. The conference vr?*-or? < n
 that if it was necessary all the ASRHS members would
 hour per day rather than retrench any T
 *"? U a l266
 267 S^^n
 268 'Justice' 193 3/18/14 Annual Conference ASRHS.
 ?^ 69 'Justice1 178 3/1468/13
 270 ibid. Meeting Railways square 7.1 14
 271 ibid
 to co-operate
 (267). The new
 to the new union was
 f a c r i f l c e one
 import August 1913 ASRHS
 t t M l i
- 7 -
 It is difficult to determine why the 1914 strike occured precisely when it did.
 Up to the end of 1913 there was no official correspondence amongst the unions
 about a strike nor were any preparations made (272). As late as the 29th of
 December the General Secretary of the ASRHS, Poutsma, was preparing for a
 resumption of the tour of the Grievances Commission of which he was a member.
 The strike began on the eight of January. Not until the 5th of January were the
 secretaries at the centres who had been notified of the impending visit of the
 Commission notified of the concellation by the chairman (273). The Federation
 were not notified of the likelihood of a strike until the sixth of January (274).
 On that date the ASRHS held a mass meeting in Pretoria Town Hall at which they
 resolved that "having heard the Governments motives for the retrenchment now
 taking place" they would strike from the eighth (275). On the seventh Poutsma
 addressed a mass meeting of about 400 railwaymen at Braamfontein who unanimously
 decided to strike (276). On the same day Poutsma addressed a meeting in Market
 Square Pretoria at which about 1 000 people were present (277). At this meeting
 Kendall the organizing secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE)
 promised full support if the ASRHS struck solidly. He also said that the ASE
 would want to put forward their own demands including one for the abolition of
 piecework. In support of the railwaymen the building workers of Pretoria at a
 meeting on the eleventh of January attended by about 1 000 people decided to
 strike. The Typographical Union and the Bakers Union followed suit (278).
 The TMA announced on the thirteenth that their ballot had resulted in a
 ... majority in favour of striking (279). The railwaymen at Pretoria formed a strike
 committee and notified other centres that they must come out on strike.
 The ASRHS executive had not made the most basic preparations for a strike. They
 had made no attempt to discover the attitude of the non-union mean and to see' if they
 would support a strike. The ASRHS membership was estimated at 15 000 out of a
 total of over 30 000 white workers on the railways (280). No attempt had been
 made to ballot trade unionists at the various centres. The secretary of the
 ASRHS at East London was horrified on receiving notification to strike. He said
 they had no idea of an intention to strike,and consequently, had made no preparation^
 they had no strike committee, no funds, no organisation. He said that the men at
 his centre were very bitter about not being consulted. They decided not to strike
 but to wait for a proper ballot of the membership and he concluded his letter to
 the Pretoria Strike Committee "disgusted we are and I think disgusted we will
 remain" (281). The General Secretary replied in very mild tones with little
 attempt to persuade the centre to come out and little sense of urgency about the
 situation (282). One can assume that a similar reaction of disgust was felt at
 other centres at the autocratic methods of the Executive. According to the Magis-
 trate at Volksrust the men there also refused to strike and were very indignant
 ? at being ordered out without consultation and against the wish of the majority.
 In fact they all struck work on the ninth of January (283).
 272 'Justice1 193 3/18/14 SAP report on records of ASRHS, TMA Engine Drivers etc
 273 ibid
 274 'Justice1 192 Rough Minute Book of Transvaal Federation
 275 'Justice' 192 3/35/14 SAP report
 276 RDM 7.1.14
 277 'Transvaal Leader1 7.1.14 Also 'Justice1 178 3/1468/13 SAP Report
 278 'Diamond Field Advertiser' 17.1.14
 279 ibid
 280 'Transvaal Leader' 7.1.14
 281 'Justice1 192 3/35/14 . E. London Secretary Tp Poutsma 8,1.14
 282 ibid. General Secretary to Secretary E. London 12.1.14
 283 "Justice1 191 Magistrate Volksrust report.
- 8 -
 After consulting Poutsma,the TMA executive, the South African Council of the ASE
 and the Federation Executive held a General Committee meeting on the eleventh
 (284). They discussed what support should be given to the railway workers. The
 TMA representatives opposed a general strike on the grounds that they had not
 got the finances to support the workers. (285). The Executive of the Federation
 was also split. Some of them favoured caution after a report from Mason on the
 organisation of the railwaymen in which he said that he thinks "Poutsma mis-
 calculated things" (286). However, others, including Walmsley, Bain, Crawford
 and Kendall favoured immediate practical support. The Federation Executive de-
 cided on the eighth that the decision on a general strike must be left to the
 General Committee meeting of the eleventh, but, even so, they formed a strike
 committee straight away. The G.C. meeting on the eleventh decided to hold a
 ballot of members to decide on whether to call a sympathy strike. The G.C.
 recommended the members to vote for a strike. The number participating in the
 ballots were small only a few thousand. The ASE, the Amalgamated Society
 of Carperters and Joiners and the Masons Society ballot resulted in a large propor-
 tion in favour of a strike. The Federation called a general strike from the
 fourteenth of January. The'Pretoria Strike Committee had asked for moral and
 financial support and they condemned the Federation in calling a general strike
 and said this would not help them and was only likely to defeat their ends (287).
 When the Federation passed its motion in favour of a general strike as far as they
 were concerned control of the strike has passed to them. On the ninth of
 January Poutsma and other leaders were arrested. The Federation passed a res-
 olution saying it would not consider negotiation with the government until these
 men were released (288). Several days later the Pretoria Strike Committee and
 the Federation were still bickering about who would participate in negotiation
 with the government. The Pretoria Strike Committee said they deplored the general
 strike and wanted the final say in all decisions. The Federation countered by
 saying they called the general strike after Poutsma had asked for support (289).
 However, the government had made its preparation and had no intention of nego-
 tiating (290).
 One may ask how did the leaders manage to misinterpret the situation so completely.
 Why did the Federation leaders presume that they could call on workers to support
 the strike? Why did Poutsma and the Executive Committee of the ASRHS think that
 a strike would be supported with so little preparation? Part of the problem in
 assessing this is the problem of understanding what the feelings and reactions
 of the white workers actually were.
 Under Martial Law, imposed on the fourteenth of January, the press was strictly
 censored. When the Transvaal Chronicle transgressed the limits they were
 threatened with closure. (291). The Editor had written about the daily
 suppression of truth about the strike in the press, the arrest of peaceful
 citizens and called the official reports of the railway administration on the
 strike "deliberate untruths" (292). Several years after the strike, in 1917,
 284 'Justice1 192 Rough Minute Book of Federation
 285 ibid
 286 ibid
 287 'Justice1 193 3/18/14 SAS report on ASRHS papers
 288 'Justice1 142 Minute Book of Federation 10.1.14
 289 ibid
 290 details given later
 291 'Justice' 193 3/69/14 Editor of'Transvaal Chronicle1 to Govenor General
 15.1.14
 292 ibid
- 9 -
 * when the Pretoria building worker went on strike the trade union officials refused
 to give any interviews to the press because of the false information printed in the
 press in 1914 and, in particualr, the report that the Durban workers had resumed
 work a week before they had (293). It makes it more difficult to trace the
 reactions in different centres when the press is clearly even more unreliable
 than usual.
 I think one can say that the trade union leaders acted the way they did anticipating
 another lands lide strike as in 1913. As Didsbury, one of the members of the
 Executive of the Federation said^on the ninth of January the leaders of the Fed-
 eration must make a decision otherwise the rank and file would take action first.
 (294). The trade union leader actions were partly due to pressure from some
 sections of the rank and file. Partly they were also due to incompetence and
 arrogance. The most striking failure of the trade union leaders was in their utter
 miscalculation of the attitude and actions of the Government.
 9.3 The 1914 Strike and The South African Defence Force
 Since July 1913 the Government had been preparing for another confrontation with
 the white working class and the trade unions. On the sixth of January while
 the Federation was deliberating on what action to take in support of the rail-
 wayraen the Minister of Defence, Smuta,contacted the magistrates and controlling
 ( '.officers to be prepared for the enforcement of the Martial Law control system (295).
 On the seventh Government troops occupied the station and railway workshops in
 Johannesburg, Pretoria and Germiston. After the ASRHS call for a general strike
 from the eighth the government called out the commandos.On the thirteenth of
 January the Minister of Defence informed the controlling officer for Johannesburg
 that the Martial Law proclamation would be signed at midnight if the Federation
 decided on a general strike and that the Government Gazette proclamation had already
 been signed bearing that date. (296).
 In 1913 the Government had been caught by surprise by the sudden spread of the
 strike. The only local forces available were either strikers or sympathetic to the
 strikers (297). Apart from this problem the defence forces were in the midst of
 rearrangement in terms of the 1912 Defence Act. The government was forced to
 call on imperial troops. But, as previously stated the imperial Government
 warned them that these troops were not stationed in South Africa for this purpose.
 Formation of A South African Defence Force
 The union Government had been organizing their own defence force for some years.
 In the London Colonial Conference of 1907 emphasis had been laid on the importance
 of military co-operation between Britain and the colonies in order to lighten
 the British weapon-load (298). The size of the British garrison had been sys-
 tematically reduced and by 1909 there were only 10 000 troops stationed in
 South Africa (299). Volunteer organisations which underwent yearly military
 training were built up. When one considers that the Anglo-Boer war had only
 finished in 1902 it is clear that the development of a Union Defence Force was
 a fraught political issue. The governing party after Union the South African
 party, was an amalgamation of the Afrikaner parties of the provinces. There
 293 RDM 11.5.17
 294 'Justice' 192 Federation Minute Book
 295 DC 169 8/7164
 296 DC 172 7232 General Smuts to control 13.1.14
 297 DC 142 5115 Governor General to Secretary State 4.7.13 ?
 298 'Militaria'v.i/3 1969 p. 8 "
 299 ibid
- 10 -
 ? were tensions within the party on the question of the imperial connection. This
 was clearly demonstrated by the Nationalist secession in 1913 and the rebellion of
 prominent Defence Force generals in 1914. Smuts and the Imperial faction were
 loyal to the Empire and were anxious that there should be no question of the
 defence force being built up as a force for rebellion against the Empire. As
 the commander of the Imperial Forces in South Africa put it;
 "Politics would have no place in the South African army, and Mr Smuts
 knows perfectly well the curse this has been in the other Colonial forces".
 (300).
 As Smuts himself said:-
 "We want an organisation that shall not be Boer or British, but a South
 African army ... Do your duty in a broad national spirit". (301).
 The Defence Act was passed on the 14th of June 1912. (302). The period from
 then until the 1st of July 1913 was for the demobilisation of the old volunteers
 and the organisation of the new permanent force, the South" African Mounted Riflemen^
 and the Active Citizen Force (ACF). All white males between the ages of 17 and
 21 were compulsorily registered and liable to be called up for the ACF which in-
 volved initials period of training and camps and drilling at regular intervals (303)
 The Act also provided for the formation of Defence Rifle Associations with which
 /"volunteers could register, receive a rifle and be liable for call-up by
 Government proclamation.
 In terms of the Defence Act the Imperial troops were on loan to the Union
 Government until 1914 when a decision would be taken on their withdrawal (304).
 The Union and the Imperial Governments were aware of the likelihood of these
 troops being withdrawn as the prospect of a European war loomed. It was im-
 perative that the South African state was capable of defending itself. With
 the threats of invasion from German S.W. Africa, white strikes and rioting and a
 black rebellion it was also necessary that this capacity was demonstrated, which
 was one effect of the governments actions in the 1914 strike.
 The Imperial Government regarded the gold mining industry as a priority industry
 in the war (305). Therefore they were concerned that there should be no
 reoccurance of the strikes by black and white workers in 1913. By their actions
 in 1914 (described in detail later) the Union Government indicated that they
 also would not countenance any strike. Smuts and the Imperial faction saw their
 political future to lie as much in Imperial support for their future as in;
 popular support at home. They would have agreed with the sentiment expressed in
 (. the 'Star':- ^ .
 "South Africa stands or falls by the Empire as a whole, and the battle of
 South Africa might be fought in the Mediteranean or in Belgium". (306)
 300 ibid p. 20
  t
 301 ibid p. 28
 302 ibid p. 30
 303 ibid p. 34,35
 304 ibid p. 44
 305 PM 1/1/14 Prime Minister to President TCM 7.5.18
 306 Quoted in 'Militaria' vi/3 1969 p. 17
- 11 -
 As the President, Steyn, expressed it:-
 "Ministers venture to express the hope that the provisions of the bill will
 indicate to His Majesty's Government their earnest desire to establish
 in the Union a defence system suitable to the needs and resources of the
 Union and one which can play an adequate part in the defence resources
 of the Empire" (307).
 The Union Government was still faced with the problem of promoting the enthusiasm
 and loyalty of the Afrikaner population for military service in a defence force
 which was an adjunct of the Imperialist Army. As the evidence to the 1914
 Commission on the Rebellion indicates there was a lot of opposition amongst
 Afrikaners to becoming 'British Soldiers'. The initiation of the defence force
 instituted under the 1912 Act occurred in 1914. The first action of the burgher
 forces was against the 'uitlander' urban workers with their alien ideologies.
 The Government wanted to use the opportunity to engender enthusiasm amongst the
 citizen forces for the task of defending the union and wanted to consolidate
 these forces.-
 On the fifteenth of January instructions were sent to all commanding officers:-
 "You should arrange with the Senior Officers of the Permanent Force ....
 to get in touch with the commandants of the commandos and ask them to
 ('? invite all members of their commandos to enrol as members of Defence
 Rifle Associations".
 Those who enrolled were allowed to keep the rifles issued to them as long as they
 remained members of the DRA (308 ).
 The reports of the control officers after the 1914 strike are mainly concerned,
 not with the strike, but with details of mobilisation, food and supplies. The
 control officer for the Eastern Transvaal area reported that:-
 "Beyond the rapid mobilisation of Defence Force commandos ... no points
 occur to me upon which a report can be furnished (309)
 A control officer For the Cape District reported:-
 "The succesful employment of the Defence Force on strike duty has not only
 put their organisation to a practical test but has also demonstrated, to
 the public in a forceable manner their real utility for war purposes and,
 whatever the cost has been, it has been amply repaid by the general feeling
 of security in the community thereby engendured" (310).
 9; -The Martial Law Control System of 1914 ^ .
 Martial Law came into effect on the fourteenth of January. The controlling officers
 had previously drawn up plans, in consultation with local railway officials, for
 the defence of the railway system and the docks. (311). The armed forces prevented
 strikers from making any contact with those who continued working and were sufficient
 to prevent subotage or violent demonstration by the strikers (312). On the
 307 ibid p. 27
 308 DC 168 1/7164
 309 DC 169 8/7164
 310 ibid
 311 DC 169 8/7164 Report of Control Officer
 312 ? ibid
fourteenth most railway lines and bridges were guarded by troops. As an example
 of the scale of mobilisation; 1798 armed troops and police guarded the railway
 workshop and docks in Cape Town, on the twelfth a commando of 300 was sent to
 Germiston, 300 to Springs, on the fourteenth 190 armed men were sent to Waterval
 Boven, 240 armed men guarded the railway station, bridge and power station at
 Vereeniging, 50 armed men were sent to each mine in Witbank (313). Apart from
 troops and police "reliable" citizens were enrolled as special constables and
 armed to replace police called up for strike duty. The Government ensured that
 the Forces mobilised were treated with respect. Every day of the strike arrests
 were made and fines of ?5 to ?10 imposed for such offences as "swearing at"
 "booing" or even "scowling" at burghers (314) .
 Numerous strikers were arrested under the Preservation of Peace Ordinance of 1902
 which permitted the authorities to arrest and hold incommunicado those suspected
 of sedition. On the tenth Poutsma and Nield of the ASRHS and Waterston (secretary
 of the Labour Party) were arrested (315) . On the fourteenth two members of the
 TMA Executive were arrested in Natal. On the fifteenth "hundreds'Vere arrested in
 Benoni (316). The whole of the Pretoria Strike Committee was arrested while they
 were involved in discussing the strike with the Mayor of Pretoria (317). The
 Johannesburg strike committee was arrested after the Government had refused another
 offer of the Executive of the Federation to negotiate a settlement. Instead the
 Trades Hall was surrounded and a field gun trained on it and the controlling
 s- officer was instructed to arrest every man in the Trades Hall "using most drastic
 measures to do so if, after warning, the persons in that building refuse to give
 themselves up without violence" (317). On the sixteenth several strikers at
 Breyton Collieries were arrested and also two leaders of the Labour Party, Kent-
 ridge and Boydell. On the seventeenth 56 strike leaders in Volksrust and the
 Bloemfontein strike leaders were arrested (318). On the same date 62 people were
 arrested in the Labour Party offices in Johannesburg for contravening the re-
 gulations stipulating that no more than 6 people can be at a gathering (314).
 . Martial Law regulations gave the authorities wide powers and imposed impossible
 restrictions on the strikers. The regulations forbad picketting, any attempt to
 induce workers to strike, any interference director indirect with employees or
 relatives of employees of the railways, power station etc. It was prohibited
 to use insulting language threats or "objectionable epithets". It was illegal to
 be on railway premises or lines unless one was working there or had obtained a
 permit (320).
 The Government did not intend to rely on these regulations merely as a deterrant.
 They intended to enforce obedience to them. A telegram was sent by the control
 /?' officer for Pretoria to the officer in charge at Witbank on the thirteenth :-
 "The Minister desires most particular precautionshaken to protect collieries
 of Witbank and requires that a guard of 50 men determined to shoot if any
 people try to interfere with the working of the collieries or .pull out
 the men working there" (321).
 ?
 On the same day he sent a telegram to all officers after receiving a wire from the
 Minister of Defence Smuts:-
 "Excess greatest possible severity. Keeping all strikers off railway and
 running premises. Don't hesitate to shoot if they attempt enter after
 warning or on apparently malicious intent. The names of persons attempting
 to interfere with running staff to taken and reported here" (322).
 313 DC 168 8/7164
 314 'Diamond Fields Advertiser1 24.1.14
 315 ibid 17.1.14
 316 'Justice* 193 3/84/14 DC 1/7164
 317 ibid
 318 ibid
 319 'Diamond Fields Advertiser' 24.1.14
 320 DC 172 7232 'Regulations'
 321 SAMR 1084 215/4/3
 322 ibid
Martial Law regulations were sent to Magistrates for posting up in prominent
 places. New notices were issued and modifications of the regulations made as
 the authorities saw fit. On the sixteenth a notice posted up offering a reward
 of ?25 for reporting cases of unlawful possession of explosives. A notice forbid-
 ding the sale of alcohol was posted on the twenty third. A permit was required
 to sell petrol or any inflammable material. A curfew was imposed and it was
 necessary to obtain a permit to be out after dark. The regulation on explosives
 was altered so that anyone found in unlawful possession of explosives would be
 liable to be brought before a military tribunal and sentenced to death. Any-
 body found near any public building, railway premises, power station, telegraph
 installation etc must come forward with his hands raised and would be liable to
 arrest. If he refused to come forward the Government forces could shoot him.
 The regulations were extremely wide ranging and open to various interpretations
 according to the predeliction of the controlling officer,Complaints of harsh
 enforcement in Bloemfontein led to revealing correspondence between General
 Smuts and the controlling officer there. Smuts questioned him about 3 regulations
 promulgated in Bloemfontein (323): the first of these stated that no striker could
 leave his home without special permission. The controlling officer justified this
 .in terms of regulation 15 which allowed him to regulate the movements of any
 person. The second forbad the display of red flags. The controlling officer justi-
 fied this in terms of Regulation 21 G which prohibited acts liable to prejudice
 good order. The third made it an offence to assist any striker, directly or
 indirectly, in the form of food, money etc. Smuts replied to these justifications
 agreeing to any promulgation the controlling officer made as long as it did not
 conflict with those published in the Government Gazette. He instructed the
 controlling officer to withdraw the second and third regualtions when he judged
 they were no longer necessary. These regulations were enforced where possible.
 For example, arrests were made of strikers found in the streets of Bloemfontein
 The authorities also endeavoured to break the strike by preventing communication
 between workers, by arresting leaders, and by isolating areas where the strike
 was strong.. Under the regulations public meetings were prohibited and generally
 congregations of strikers attempting to meet together were dispersed (325). Some
 meetings were prohibited and the authorities used the opportunity to obtain the
 names of leaders from police spies sent to the meetings (326). The controlling
 officers were responsible for censoring all communications and newspapers. The
 editor of the Transvaal Chronicle was reprimanded for articles in his paper and
 warned that he must submit all copy to the control officer. On the eighteenth
 the plant of the 'Strike Herald1 was seized. In order to isolate Pretoria,
 where the strike war most strongly supported, and prevent communication between
 strike leaders the staff officer in Pretoria instructed the editor of the 'Pretoria
 News' to insert in his paper of the fourteenth the following notice:- "It is
 notified for general information that the Pretoria - Johannesburg roads are closed
 to travellers not in possessions of a permit".
 Cables, which had been sent from England, for the information of the South African
 public on protest meetings in England condemning the S.A. Government's actions,
 were suppressed. In a letter of thanks to the Government censor for his diligence
 General Smuts wrote:-
 "were those messages now published apart from effect they would have on
 the strikers and labour sumpathizers their effect on English and
 Dutch speaking citizens now supporting the Government might have in-
 calculable consequences seeing that they would be regarded by the majority
 of people not well informed as representing general view of public in
 United Kingdom". (327).
 323 DC 172 7232 General Smuts to Controlling Officer
 324 'Diamond Fields Advertiser' 24.1.14
 325 DC 168 1/7164 Report of Control Officer
 326 ibid
 327 DC 169 7/1/64
- 14 -
 . The Government, through its regulations, censorship and the armed forces repressed
 any murmur of dissension. Any possible focus for organization of strikers or
 mobilization of support was made impotent. Public meetings were prohibited,
 trade union and labour party leaders arrested, trade union offices ransacked and
 all their documents removed. (328). For the same reasons the riqhts of local
 authorities were curtailed. For example, the Pretoria Town Council had to specially
 request the permission of the controlling officer to call a special meeting for
 the twentieth of the Town Council to discuss the industrial crisis. The controlling
 officer gave permission providing that nothing was said which might promote
 "dissaffection or ill-feeling" and that no discussion must take place in relation
 to the Governments action in the strike. No members of the public were allowed
 to attend and the only report permittted for press publication was to be an
 official communique drawn up by the control officer. (329).
 As one would expect with the incompetence of leaders and the weakness of trade
 union organisation on the one hand the autocratic methods of the Government on
 the other, the strike was a total failure.
 9.5 1914 Strike - The Worker's Response
 Railway workers had every reason not to respond to a call for a strike no matter
 what the circumstances. They were governed by the Railways and Harbours Service
 (".-.Act of 1912, which prohibited striking with penalties of up to ?50 and/or six
 months with or without hard labour. More importantly the strikers forfeited
 pension rights, lost all their contributions to the sick fund and lost holiday
 rights. For those workers housed by the Administration they risked ejection from
 their homes.
 Apart from this, on the sixteenth the Chief Mechanical Engineer at Salt River
 informed the strike committee that no active participant in the strike would be
 allowed to return to work (330). On the same day the Manager warned strikers
 not to use "opprobrious epithets" to non-strikers or they would be dismissed
 immediately (331). The workers must have been aware that a blacklist was being
 drawn up. This was done on the instructions of General Smuts on the thirteenth when
 he wired control officers:-
 "Government desire police to be very careful to take names and full parti-
 culars of individual railway employees who have been in any way ringleaders
 or threatened violence or been conspicuous in pulling out other employees" (332)
 The railway workers were aware that the compiling of a black list was not an
 empty threat. One of their grievances was the discrimination practised against
 f people who had been black listed for trade union activities in the past. In
 December 1914 the General Secretary of the ASRHS petitioned Prime Minister Botha
 asking for the position of 500 men who had been blacklisted and dismissed to be
 reconsidered (333). As late as 1926 the railway unions complained about the
 continuance of victimisation of men active in the 1914 Strike (334) .
 The strict censorship of the press makes it difficult to assess the number of
 workers who struck not to mention the feelings of the rest of the workers. The
 newspapers generally used figures from the report of the General Manager of the
 railways. As a rejoinder to the Administrations claim that the strike was poorly
 supported the Transvaal Federation published their own bulletins until their press
 was seized (335). Just as the capitalist press distorted in their own interests
 so did the trade union press in an attempt to rally support and prevent
 demoralisation. The records include a few magistrate's reports which are probably
 328 'Justice1 193 3/82/14
 329 DC 1154 5422
 330 'Diamond Fields Advertiser1 24.1.14
 331 ibid
 332 SAMR 1084 215/4/3
 333 PM 1/1/34
 334 P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y t o Colonel Creswel l S e c r e t a r y AEU t o F H.P Creswe l l 24 .2 .26
 335 In the Johannesburg Africana L i b r a r y
- 15 -
 reliable (336). The reports of the controlling officers do not give very full
 information on the numbers of workers who struck or which sections struck. They
 are a useful source for assessing the workers' feelings although they have to-be
 treated with a certain circumspection because the officers have an interest in
 exaggerating the possible support for the strike and the importance of the effects
 of their actions. In his notes on the Railways and Harbours Strike and Service
 Amendment Act the law adviser wrote that the strike was well supported in the
 railway workshop in Pretoria and Johannesburg and later spread to the workshops of
 Natal, OFS and the Cape but that generally the running staff remained at work (337) .
 It seems to have been the case, as one might anticipate, that the strike was
 most fully supported by railway workshop employees. These were well organised,
 most of them belonging to the craft unions. They were skilled and therefore
 not easily replaceable and therefore felt more secure in striking.
 The strike seems to have been most fully supported in Pretoria and Bloemfontein.
 In Pretoria there were nearly 1 000 white workers employed in the railway workshops,
 the large majority struck on the eighth. Some running staff also struck work. (338) .
 On the eleventh the building workers of Pretoria voted to strike. In retaliation
 the National Federation of Building Trade Employers resolved that in future they
 would only negotiate with trade unions which consisted solely of building trade
 workers (339). On the sixteenth the troops completely cordoned off the railway
 - premises in Pretoria to prevent strikers contacting workers (340). On the nine-
 teenth the white workers in the municipal workshop (pta) struck in sympathy with railway
 workers (341). Despite reports of a return to work in other-centres most
 Pretoria strikers did not return until the Minister gave notice on the twenty-second
 that all employees must return by the twenty third or they would be considered as
 having retired (342).
 The strike was at first well supported by the railwaymen in Blce/mfontein. All
 the workshop staff, 300 men, struck on the eighth and tried to persuade the
 running staff to join. On the eleventh when they read a message from the general
 manager that the men in other centres wanted to return to work they treated the
 claim with contempt and tore up all the messages (343) . On the twelfth the
 strikers gained control of the station and stopped trains going through. The
 authorities regained control and operated a reduced service (344). On the fifteenth
 a demonstration of strikers who wanted to hold a meeting to enrol rupport was
 dispersed when the control officer threatened to use force if they refused (345).
 Some workers returned and by the fifteenth there was a full service operating
 through Bloemfontein (346). By the seventeenth all the strikers had returned
 except 36 whose names were posted up as not wanted. This included all the leaders (347)
 v - The response to the strike in other areas varied. Frowthe eighth the strikers
 controlled waterval Boven and cut all the telegraph wires. Troops arrived on the
 13th and trains began operating from here on the 14th (348).
 336 'Justice1 191 ?
 337 PM 1/1/19
 338 diamond Fields Advertiser' 17.1.14
 339 ibid Most building workers belonged to craft unions which included workers
 in other industries
 340 ibid 24.1.14
 341 ibid
 342 ibid
 343 ibid :
 344 DC 164 Report of Control officer
 345 'Diamond Fields Advertiser' 17.1.14
 346 DC 168 1/7164 Report on situation
 347 'Diamond Fields Advertiser1 24.1.14
 348 SAMR 1084 215/4/3
- 16 -
 On the 10th all the railwaymen at Breyton railway centre, Ermelo and Zeerust
 and some of the railwaymen at Pieterburg struck work (349). As far as the Cape
 was concerned the greatest support was from the railway workshop employees.
 According to the General Managers' report even so only 310 out of 1420 workers
 struck (350). By the sixteenth all the workers at the Cape had returned except
 for 43 men at the Salt River works whom the management did not went back (351).
 There was no strike in Port Elizabeth. The authorities permitted one meeting there on
 the 14th at which local members of parliament and members of the Provincial '
 Council spoke. They acknowledged the workers' grievances but condemned the
 strike (352). Over 400 railway workers and some building workers struck in
 Durban. The building workers did not return until the 25th of January - the
 last to return (353).
 The General Strike call by the Federation was only supported by a few unions.
 9059 workers struck on 54 gold mines, 43 957 shifts were lost (354). The gold
 mines were fully protected by troops to prevent reoccurances of the 1913 events.
 In 1913 55 gold mines had been affected. 19 000( workers were affected and 69 665
 shifts were lost (355). The 1914 figures indicate a considerable amount of
 support considering the difficulties involved in striking. By the 15th of
 January all the gold mines on the Reef were operating. Over 400 workers struck
 at Premier Mine, 70.remaining at work. They were all dismissed and replacments
 ^ . found (356). All the white workers at the Cornelia Mine at Viljoens Drift struck
 on the fifteenth. In Johannesburg the Typographical Union also struck in sympathy
 which prevented the publication of several newspapers. The 'Transvaal Leader1
 immediately declared itself a non-union shop (357). Neither SATU workers nor the
 workers at Premier Mine were affiliated to the Federation yet they responded to
 the strike call.
 Without leadership, unable to communicate and unable to use strike tactics like
 picketting and mass meetings to maintain a sense of purpose and solidarity it is
 surprising that the strike continued as long as it did. It indicates a large
 degree of militancy and sense of grievance. As soon as leaders were arrested
 the focus of demands was shifted on to a demand for their release. The strike
 committee attempted to rally the workers on this point. In spite of the fact
 that the press and the government called the strike leaders "dangerous syndicalists"
 no attempt was made in their propoganda to suggest using anything other than
 constitutional means. They did not urge the workers to use force or sabotage but,
 rather, thry urged passive resistance. A leaflet issued by the Federation on
 the fifteenth and signed by the SALP leader F.H.P. Creswell said:- S??Ji-
 "The Government declared Martial Law, imprisoned leaders, they are trying'to
 ,.;. terrorise you back to work
 Do not be terrorised into working ?*??*?
 Do not be provoked into violence
 Keep cool stick together and sit tight (358)
 349 'Justice' 191 Magistrate Volksrust.DC 168 1/7164 "Report on situation
 350 DC 168 1/7164 Cape Manager SAR report
 351 DC 169 8/7164 Control Officer report
 352 ibid
 353 ibid
 354 TCM AR 1914
 355 ibid, also Disturbances Commission
 356 Diamond Fields Advertiser 31.1.14
 357 ibid 17.1.14
 358 Leaflets in Africana Library Johannesburg
The ideology of the Federation is clearly expressed in another propoganda
 leaflet. It is not exactly syndicalist.
 "Whether South Africa is to be a free country, or a country of forced
 labour terrorised by Government rifles at the dictation of a slave
 driving oligarchy; a country in which industrial or political opponents are
 to be crushed by Martial Law ... You, by keeping up the struggle are the
 truest patriots. You, by keeping solid, are the real nation builders. Yours
 is a war, not against the community but for it. You are battling for
 genuine FREE LABOUR, not for scab protection, but for conditions that will
 make this country attractive to all the world, a land of the free, a land
 that men can love as their home. It is Liberty itself that is at stake" (359).
 Even expressed in such militant style these sentiments are clearly compatible
 with 'liberal capitalism'
 The reports of the controlling officers give an insight into the effect the
 Government's measures had on the strikers. According to the Controlling Officer
 for the Pietermaritzburg area;
 "The proclamation of Martial Law had a wonderful effect on strikers, who
 imagined we Would adopt most drastic measures there under ...
 Any sign of picketting was at once arrested ... In Durban picketting was
 attempted but proved a failure owing to the constant patrolling carried out
 by troops, and my distinct orders that any interference with workers would
 C-\ not be tolerated" (360).
 The report of the control officer for the Cape Western district is worth quoting
 in full. At the beginning he details the sending of troops to Salt River works,
 the railway station and the docks,-
 "In my opinion this sudden display of force had a great moral effect upon
 the situation in Cape Town and uncoubtedly prevented a large proportion of
 men from striking who would otherwise have done so, whilst it doomed the
 strike to certain failure from the outset; furthermore it actually
 weakened the ranks of the strikes as about 195 men called up for duty with
 the Defence Force were drawn from the Salt River works and included some hot-
 headed young mechanics who were in sympathy with the strike. I was criticised
 a good deal at the time for making this move, but I am perfectly satisfied...
 that this display of force contributed more than anything else to the
 complete and speedy victory of the forces of law and order. Railway officials
 who previously were anything but loyal suddenly found themselves filled
 with a determination to stand by Government
  at all costs but it is
 difficult to go forward when a bayonet is firmly pressed against ore's
 breast, and it is equally difficult for labour agitators to organise a
 (\ succesful strike when the certainty of its failjjre is dominant in the
 minds of the would-be strikers. I have not the least doubt that had this
 strong measure not been taken a very much larger number of railway and
 other trade unionists in Cape Town would have struck work and the strike
 would have been of much longer duration, the strong force at my disposal
 made it possible for me to guarantee that no intimidation, direct or in-
 direct would be allowed and that workmen who desired to pursue their calling
 would be given the utmost protection possible. The failure of the strike
 in Cape Town had also a very considerable moral effect upon the railway
 service elsewhere in the Union" (361).
 The other control officers give little information on the course of the strike
 and concentrate on details of mobilization, arrest of leaders and the mobilization
 of "leading citizens" as special constables.
 359 This leaflet was signed by Geo Kendall organiser of the ASE and Chairman of
 the Acting Executive of the Federation.
 360 DC 169 8/7164
 361 ibid
SECTION 10
 Reasons for the Government's Actions in 1914 Strike
 According to their own rationalisation the action taken by the Government was
 necessary because the South African state was threatened by a "syndicalist con-
 spriacy" (362). The strong measures taken were necessary because of the threat to
 established law and order.From this view point the workers were protected from
 intimidation by dangerous syndicalists. To ensure the future safety of the
 workers on the 26 of January these "syndicalists" were removed from jail and deported
 to England (363).
 10.1 The Syndicalist Conspiracy
 Syndicalism was a doctrine of the left.of the labour movement in Europe and
 America - more voluble and talked about than widespread or effective. Like
 communism, its aim was to transfer the control of the means of production to
 the working class the trade unions were to be the means of mobilization of the
 working class and the basis of the social and political structure of the future
 ,, . socialist state. The synditalists differed from the right and left wings of the
 ' 'labour movement in their abstention from political involvement. The fight
 against the bourgeois state was to be confined to the industrial arena whfe they
 advocated go-slows, industrial subotage and strikes to rally their forces and
 wear away the enemy, the utimate battle for control being the aeneral strike.
 Communist ideology was certainly important amongst the working class of the ad-
 vanced capitalist world though it is difficult to determine the role of specifi-
 cally syndicalist ideology. Smuts, and most others of his class, did not dis-
 criminate between working class ideologies. Any movement against the existing
 state or advocating a general strike was called syndicalist.
 In his evidence to Parliament on the syndicalist nature of the strike Smuts'
 'proof largely consisted of quotes from the speeches of the leaders. The
 speeches were collected from police and newspaper reports of trade union meetings
 from the beginning of the 1913 strike. In their speeches the leaders were in-
 doubtedly militant. For example;-
 A.Crawford speaking to the workers at Benoni - 26-5-13 -
 "Now Mr Waterston has just told you that the engine drivers are coming out
 tonight. Perhaps they will leave their engines well oiled. I said 'perhaps \
 If I was an engine driver I would oil the engines with sand. And if I
 v understood anything about electrical work I wouTd create difficult short
 circuits ... Militant workers must recognise that these things cannot be
 done by peaceful methods ... you must act deeds, not words and according to
 the new strike philosophy every man must be a law unto himself" 364).
 >
 G. Mason speaking to the workers 1.7.13
 "No scab had a right to live as long as there was a rope long enough to
 hang him or a pool of water deep enough to drown him". (365).
 362 As in Smuts speech to Parliament on the Indemnity Bills after the strike
 363 DC 168 6/7164 Report of Deputy Commissioner SAP. Nine trade unionists were
 deported - J.T. Bain, H.J. Poutsma, A. Watson, G.W. Mason R. Waterston
 W.H. Morgan, D. McKerrall, A. Crawford, W. Livingston.
 364 'Justice' 165 SAP Report
 365 R.D.M. 2.7.13
- 2 -
 After a general strike had been called, the 'Worker1 the organ of the Labour
 Party in an article on the third of July wrotet-
 "War has been declared ... We can still be constitutional, that is, avoid
 common crime like murder or arson: but now it is war, the shoe has got
 to be made to pinch everywhere as tight as it will go, until they cry for
 mercy and really, once it is war, the things usually called murder, arson
 destruction of property and so on, become the principle occupation of armies,
 and there is no reason in principle,but only in tactics, why they should
 not be included in the various forms of acute pressure which have to be
 exercised in "industrial war" (366).
 From the police compilation of speeches Crawford, Mason, Bain, J.F. Brown, Water-
 ston, G. Kendall, Carbis, McKerrall, and J. Clarke were all liable to be charged
 with at least one of the following: inciting to violence, inciting workers to
 strike, attempting to reduce the police from other duty, inciting black workers
 to break their contracts (367). After the 1913 strike these leaders held propoganda
 meetings at which they often spoke of the need to arm in the face of the threat
 from the state, though sometimes some of them, particularly Crawford, concentrated
 on the need to organise strong trade unions (368).
 During the 1913 strike the Federation assumed some of the functions of government.
 ('? In Benoni passes were issued to those who supported the strike which was necessary
 to ensure immunity from attack. The Federation also attempted determine which
 municipal service they would allow to operate. They called on various municipal
 employees to strike but 'permitted' some essential service employee to remain at
 work. (369).
 In August 1913 a deputation from the Federation interviewed the Secretary for
 Mines who discussed impending industrial legislation with them (379). They
 told him that they were not interested in a trade union act because trade unions
 have forced all the recognition they want. They went on to say that the Govern-
 ment imposes its will by force and the Federation as the Government of Labour
 would also impose its will by using the forces at its disposal if its demands
 were not granted. The Federation representatives claimed they could call on
 the white workers whenever they wanted.
 All this evidence in an indication that militant trade unionists were becoming prominent.
 This is what one would expect in a situation where trade unions are not given re-
 cognition by government or employers. There is no evidence of plans to take over
 control of the state. Some of these trade unionists supported the labour party
 ( and hoped for realisation of some of their demands by constitutional political
 means. Others hoped to realise their demands by putting pressure on the state
 and employers by the use of the strike weapon. One must distinguish between
 the words and deeds of the trade union leaders. Although towards the end of the
 year in their speeches some leaders, notably Livingston and Mason, advised
 workers to arm themselves, when the Trades Hall was evacuated no weapons were
 found (371). in January 1914 when the Defence Forces were called up the Strike
 Committee issued the following notice:-
 "The Committee grants permission to all members of the union defence Force
 who may be called upon to do so to report themselves as desired by the
 authorities. The committee recommend that no member should decline to report
 if requested" (372)
 366 'The Worker' 3.7.13 Annexures and Evidence of Town Clerk
 367 'Justice' 192 3/35/14 ;?
 368 ibid
 369 Disturbances Commission Amixuren and Evidence of Town Clerk 0 5667
 370 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines to Minister Mines 27.8.13
 371 'Justice' 193 3/84/14 DC 168 1/7164
 372 Quoted in 'Militana1 1/3 1969 p. 71
- 3 -
 During the strike the papers of the ASRHS Pretoria and trade union papers at the
 Trades Hall Johannesburg were seized. A government official was appointed to
 sort through these papers and report on the strike plans of the trade unions. ..
 He found nothing of a seditious nature (373). He has also requested to find
 evidence for Smuts to use in his speech on the Indemnity Bill of plans by the
 leaders to form a provisional Government.The only document remotely connected
 with taking on government functions concerned a suggestion at a meeting to
 from a Provisional Council for Public Safety in case of danger from blacks (374).
 Part of the aim of the government was to isloate the "extremists" from moderate
 elements in the labour movement. Accordingly the Minister of Defence objects
 when the control officer informed him of the arrest two labour party leaders.
 Dreswell and Boydell, for conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice and wanted to
 know what offence they had committee because the governments policy is to allow
 "considerable latitude to the utterances and attitudes of labour members of
 parliament and so long as they use the usual claptrap of the party and do
 not advocate syndicalist methods the government does not wish to exercise
 its powers of arrest" (375).
 However, as the defence of the deported leads by Creswell is Parliament and the
 mass protest meetings shows the"moderates"did not set up such an absolute division
 between themselves and the so-called syndicalists (376). When Creswell and
 ; loydell arrived in Cape town, after being released from prison, they were met by
 an enthusiastic crowd of about 5 000. In their speeches to the crowd the labour
 leaders condemned the government's actions in the strike and the deportations (377).
 Although they advocated militant tactics there is no evidence that any of the
 'syndicalists' had any part in the dynamiting and sabotage of the railways. The
 controlling officers draw up a list of 39 such cases during the strike period,
 an index of the fairly easy availability of explosive and the frustration of
 the workers to whom more usual strike methods were closed (378).
 The strike was ineptly organised, the strike leaders depending on spontaneous
 enthusiasm due to the militancy of some sections of workers rather than labourious
 perparation and hard work. There is no evidence of any plan to usurp government
 authority. This does not mean that Smuts and his like were completely insincere
 in there talk of a syndicalist conspiracy. They feared and detested socialists and
 saw them as alien,describing them as "foreign agitators". (379). In fact, all
 the men deported in 1914 were foreign born - 5 were Scottish, 2 English, one
 Australian and one dutch.
 ( "Jmuts wanted vengence for the humiliating experience ofrHiis agreement with the
 "foreign agitators" July 1913. In his own words;
 "I admit freely that it was one of the hardest things I have done in my
 life to put my name on a document together with that of Mr Bain and the
 others" (380).
 I believe a genuine fear of syndicalism and a desire to redress humiliation played
 a part is determining the action taken by the Government in 1914. I have also
 suggested various reasons in the section on the Defence Force. I explore other
 factors below including the overriding consideration - the black population.
 373 'Justice' 193 3/82/14 Deputy Commissioner SAP to Secretary Justice 11.1.14
 374 'Justice' 193 3/18/14
 375 'Justice' 191 Smuts to control 16.1.14
 376 Creswell op. cit. The debate on the Indemnity Bill was the longest ever in
 Parliament up to that date due to the
 377 'Diamond Fields Advertiser1 31-1-14
 378 DC 168 7/7169
 379 e.g. Speech by John X Meriman, Stellenbosch, 'The Strike and its Lessons'
 published Cape Times 5.8.13
 380 Quoted in 'Die Randse Staking van 1914 J. Ploeger p. 64 'Militaria' 1/3 1969
_ 4 -
 1?-2 Black Peril
 "The native question is the most serious one for South Africa, and in regard
 to the industrial unrest it is the greatest problem that we have to face" (381)
 The extent of the mobilisation and the forcefulness of the actions was a precau-
 tionary measure in case of black unrest and also intended as an object lesson to
 the blacks.
 During the 1913 strike white miners and some leaders had attempted to induce
 blacks to strike - either through persuasion or intimidation. Pickets at the
 New Kleinfontein had tried as early as the eleventh of June to get blacks to
 strike for more pay (382). In his evidence the General Superintendent of the
 Native Recruiting Corporation H.M. Baberer claimed that blacks who struck on the
 fourteenth of June told him they were afraid to go down because of threats by
 white workers to blow them up under ground. (383). He claimed that;
 "at one time- it was difficult to know whether the natives would not go on
 to the side of the strikers" (384) . On the twenty third of June, four days
 after the white workers, the black workers on the Van Ryn struck work, on
 the third of July 600 blacks at Driefontein and many at the New Comet struck
 work. There were disturbances and rioting at Wolhuter, City Deep and
 ,-. . Crown Mines until the 9th July. On the eighth of July a total of nine
 ? thousand blacks struck at the City and Suburban,Meyer and Charlton, Village
 Main Reef and Village Deep. On the ninth of July the black workers at
 Modderfontein B refused to work. In all these cases workers were forced
 back to work at the point of b yonet (385) . According to the Native
 Grievances Enquiry a serious crisis was^narrowly averted. If the blacks
 had come out when police and troops were occupied with white rioters there
 was a risk of a serious outbreak possibly spreading all along the Reef (386).
 The authorities believed that these strikes were partly to be explained by the
 actions of white workers threatening the blacks but they also believed blacks were
 imitiating white worker methods in the hope of gaining increased wages and other
 concessions themselves.
 "During the strike the natives had not only been interested spectators of
 the methods employed by the European strikers but some had actually followed
 their lead in fomenting dissatisfaction urging natives to strike and
 picketting and threating those who did not comply with the demands" (387) .
 Apart from the fear of the effect on blacks consciousness of the sight of whites
 striking and whites fighting one another there was another concrete fear;
 V"' "All of them (black mineworkers) want more pay a"nd most of them are under
 the impression that the employment of force by European miners during
 the riots of last July resulted in the latter obtaining their demands" (388)
 The viability of the gold mining industry,the basis of the economy, depended on
 cheap labour as already explained in the introduction. The gold mines could not
 continue operation if forced to concede wage increases to the mass of the workers (389)
 The government feared that the effect on blacks of seeing inter-white disputes
 would be to lessen their respect for white authority. They wanted to control blacks
 381 Merriman op. cit.
 382 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Assistant Magistrate Boksburg and
 Resident Magistrate Boksburg Q849-63 Q 81028
 383 ibid. TabererQ.6833-6853
 384 ibid Q6853
 385 NA 208 210/14 F473
 386 Native Grievances Commission UG 37*14 parag. 482
 387 NA 208 210/14 F473
 388 Native Grievances UG 37'14 parag. 474
 389 see Johnstone R. 'Class Race, and Gold'
- 5 -
 by mean of black respect for white superiority, "moral persuasion" rather than
 "fixed bayonets". (390). The reason given by the magistrate reporting on the
 Premier Mine riots for the violence then shown towards whites was the fact that
  :
 their authority had been undermined (According to the inspector reporting on the
 Jagfontein Riot of the (391) ninth of January the animosity towards Whites in
 authority was due to;
 "the far reaching spirit of unsettlement in the relations between labour
 and authority which was predominant at that time. . There can be no doubt
 that doctrines as to the supremacy of labour and the power of numbers have
 invaded the native compounds and for the present it is sufficient I think
 to regard the new development as a symptom more of class than of race
 antagoraisms ? it is certainly not pleasant to conjure the picture of
 conflict precipitated by the agitations of labour when aggravated by deep-
 rooted antipathies of race and colour" (391A).
 Part of the governments policy towards blacks was to maintain the control of
 "customary rulers" over them. However, the chiefs were dissatisfied because of
 the Land Act which restricted the areas of land to be available for blacks
 to purchase. The editorial in Ilanga Lase Natal of the thirteenth of June 1913
 said that sending representatives to England to appeal for redress of repressive
 laws was useless and that all the chiefs should band together and order all the
 people to strike which would be a more effective weapon than attempting a rising
 (392).
 On the 1st of January 1914, following the strikes of Indian workers 300 black
 workers at the Natal Navigation Colliories struck work for increased pay. They
 returned to work on the 3rd. On the second 700 blacks at Glenco . Colliories Natal-
 struck work demanding increased pay. They returned on the fifth (393).
 At this time of general labour unrest and the undermining of the established
 control mechanisms the government felt the need to asset its repressive capacity.
 In an attempt to forestall unrest amongst the black gold workers during the white's
 strike the Prime Minister issued a notice to be read to all the mine workers. He
 told them that the strike was between the government and its servants and had
 nothing to do with the blacks. If the strike spread to the mines the black workers
 will be paid anyway and there we many armed men Johannesburg to deal with
 anyone committing acts of violence and any disobedience will be severly dealt
 with.. The message and the force available was effective and there were no
 strikes by black during the white workers* strike of 1914. According to an
 officers report;
 "Natives are quiet and appear cowed by the presence of the burghers" (394).
 The force available in 1914 was also seen as necessary in case of any breakouts of
 blacks from their compounds. During a successful strike by white miners blacks
 have no work to do. During the New Kleinfontein strike the manager arranged to
 keep blacks occupied reopening roads, cleaning etc. (395). In the long term it
 would be difficult to keep the 200 000 blacks on the Rand gold mines active.
 390 'Native Grievances' parag. 480
 391 NA 208 210/14 F473 Rose-Innes, to Acting Attorney General 27.12.13
 392 NA 207 98/14/F473
 393 SAMR 1028 305 Lieutenant Colonel SAMR to DSO.
 394 SAMR 1084 215/14/3
 395 MNW 240 mm 10505/14 New Kleinfontein Co. Ltd. to Chairman, Board of Director
 27.1#. 14,
 391A NA 208 220/14/F473 inspector OFS Labour District to Director Native Labour
 21-3-14
J - 6 -
 Horrific possibilities were imangined especially if there was a shortage of food
 as well. In regard to the 1913 strike the Governor General wrote:-
 "Had authority not been maintained no hold on mine boys could have been re-
 tained. Reduced to idleness, massed in compounds and brought to starvation by
 railway stoppages, only too probable with electric cables cut, they would have
 broken box and the horror of the situation can hardly be exaggerated. Then every
 kraal in South Africa would have heard of the white man's impotence". (396)
 In a similar vein the organiser of the citizens "defence force" in 1913 J. Fitz-
 patrick said;
 "Those of us who know anything of the uncivilised native out of control,
 know that if the attempt to turn loose 200. 000 savages on a town without
 light and water were allowed to succeed this place would have been such
 a hell upon earth as no-one has ever seen" (397).
 The government were also aware of the disruptive effects a strike has on recruiting.
 As already stated, during the 1913 strike the Government prohibited recruiting.
 During the 1914 strike they warned companies that they would cancel the blacks con-
 tracts and repatriate them at the companies' expense if they did not pay the
 workers during the period of the strike (398). In August 1913 the Government
 relaxed the prohibition on the recruiting of blacks but the recruiting organisa-
 tion complained that recruiting was very slow, few blacks volunteering because they
 (?" feared that the white workers would strike again (399).
 After the riots on the Jagersfontein the magistrate suggested the formation of a
 volunteer corps by white employees in case of reoccurances. The undersecretary
 for Defence warned that this was contrary to the provisions of the Defence Act
 1912 but it was possible for white employers to form "Defence Rifle Association
 and thus obtain rifles,alternatively, they could be sworn in as special constables
 under the Police Act and form a regular crops - uniformed, discipline and drilling
 (400). Similarly the magistrate for Ladysmith applied to have white employees
 at Elandslaagte sworn in as special constables, the same as the white employees
 at Ballengleich in case of further Indian strikes (401).
 This role for white workers vis a vis the black was much more satisfactory to
 the white polity which felt threatened by any dissension within the ranks of the
 'superior race*. In Smuts' words;
 "This is not a country where we can allow a state of anarchy to prevail.
 We are a small colony in a Dark continent. Whatever divisions creep in among
 the whites are sure to be reflected in the conduct of the native population,
 and if ever there was a country where the white population must ever be
 (?-.,. watchful and careful and highly organised and i^ iady to put down with an
 iron hand all attempts such as were made on the present occasion, that
 country is South Africa. The Government felt that and has acted accordingly"
 (402).
 396 Correspondence relating to disturbance on the Rand
 397 Disturbances Commission. Evidence of J. Fitzpatrick
 398 NA 207 98/14/F473 secretary NA to Native Affairs Dept. Johannesburg 8.1.14
 399 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines to Minister 18.9.13
 400. 'Justice' 266 5/26/14 Under Secretary Defence to Secretary Justice 18.2.14
 401 'Justice1 184 4/744/13 24.12.13
 402 Quoted in 'Militaria'v 1/3 1969 p. 85