

**ISSUES OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION: THE CASE OF
ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON.**

By

**Anye Fru Emmanuel
Department of Political Studies**

**Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

Anye Fru Emmanuel

Professor Achille Mbembe

Date.....

Date.....

Dedication

To Shannon and Stacey, my little angels

To my departed parents and sister, Mama Beltha Ngum Anye, Papa Frederick Anye and my elder sister Beatrice Anye, who sacrificed all to sustain my survival, God rest their souls.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAC	All Anglophone Conference
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
ANC	African National Union
AU	African Union
BLCC	Bakweri Land Claim Committee
CAM	Cameroon Anglophone Movement
CATTU	Cameroon Teachers Trade Union
CDC	Cameroon Development Corporation
CNF	Cameroon National Federation
CPDM	Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement
CPNC	Cameroon Peoples National Congress
CRTV	Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation
CUC	Cameroon United Congress
CWU	Cameroon Welfare Union
CYL	Cameroon Youth League
FNU	Front National Unifié
FWCM	Free West Cameroon Movement
FPUP	Front Populaire L'unité et la Paix
FOL	First Official Language
GCE	General Certificate of Education
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFPRERLM	International Federation for the Protection of the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, linguistic and Other Minorities
KNC	Kamerun National Congress
KNDP	Kamerun National Democratic Party
KPP	Kamerun Peoples Party
KUNC	Kamerun United National Congress
KUP	Kamerun United Party
LEGCO	The Nigerian Legislative Council
MANC	Mouvement d'Action Nationale Camerounaise

MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NAB	National Archive Buea
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NHC	National Hydrocarbon Corporation
OK	One Kamerun
RFP	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SCNC	Southern Cameroons National council
SCAPO	Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation
SCYL	Southern Cameroons Youth League
SDF	Social Democratic Front
SOL	Second Official Language
SONARA	National Oil Refinery
SPLA	Sudanese People Liberation Army
TAC	Teachers Association of Cameroon
UC	Union Camerounaise
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
UNCHR	United Nations Commission for Human Rights
UPC	Union des Populations du Cameroun
POWERCAM	West Cameroon Electricity Corporation
WCDA	West Cameroon Development Agency

Abstract

This thesis concerns itself with issues of minority rights in the context of political liberalization and how political liberalization has triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. This thesis examines how Anglophone Cameroon was systematically reduced to a minority status and how the Anglophone elites are contesting this position.

The thesis begins with some historical considerations and moves on to discuss the various phases of colonialism, using historical material to respond to whether or not the seeds of the current conflict are to be found in the way in which colonialism was implemented in Cameroon. The colonial experiences of the Cameroons under the Germans, French and British have not only been the basis for the entity Cameroon, but have also made numerous contributions, negative and positive to the country's social, economic, demographic and political history.

Having considered the historical context, the thesis moves on to discuss the rise of Anglophone Nationalism both at home and abroad. The thesis argues that state policies between 1990 and 2000 led to the development of Anglophone nationalism and the formation of many pressure groups to fight for the autonomy of Anglophone Cameroon. However, because of the government's silence over the Anglophone problem, this thesis examines attempts to find a national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that goes beyond the question of national sovereignty.

In analyzing the virtual imagined communities of Anglophone Cameroon, this thesis suggests that cyber nationalism is an effective tool to create networks of resistance to government policies and practice. Anglophone virtual communities in cyberspace have used the Internet as a means to promote a counter discourse on human rights, economic development and democracy in Cameroon. In this regard, the Anglophone online nations have gone a long way to create a substantial impact on events in Cameroon by serving as an important source of information to the Anglophone people.

As a way of addressing the limits of the discourse on Anglophone nationalism, the thesis suggests that a lot has happened between the Anglophones and Francophones in terms of intermarriages, investment, migration and common lifestyle that the dichotomy between the two has become blurred.

Introduction and Background

Historically, Cameroon is a German creation. The territory was annexed in 1884. In the aftermath of World War I and the defeat of the Germans by the Allied Forces, German Cameroon was partitioned between Britain and France. France received four fifths of the country and Britain two separate areas bordering Nigeria.¹ Each colonial power proceeded to establish a separate and distinct system of government, a condition hardly favourable for later reunification. This division created the foundation of a future Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority in the country.² The British and French territories became mandates of the League of Nations until 1946, when their status changed to that of Trust Territories of the United Nations.³ The brief period of German colonization of Cameroon did not create a national awareness strong enough to evoke a sense of nationalism, but it left an indelible legacy and a common German past.⁴ The reunification sentiment in Cameroon was built on the desire to return to the status of the former German territory before World War I. This sentiment was first noticeable in French Cameroon and it gradually found its way into British Cameroon.

Politics in the 1950s in British Cameroons was centred on the question of secession from Nigeria and reunification with French Cameroon. John Ngu Foncha⁵ and his Kamerun

¹ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, California: University of California Press, p. 32.

² Awasom, N. F. (2000), "The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One?", *Africa Today* 47, 2: pp. 91-93.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John Ngu Foncha founded the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955 and became Premier of the British Cameroons on 1 February 1959. He held that position until 1 October 1961, when the region merged into a federation with Francophone Cameroon. From 1 October 1961 to 13 May 1965, Foncha served as Prime Minister of West Cameroon and Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. He

National Democratic Party (KNDP) favoured reunification with French Cameroon, while Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley⁶ and the Kamerun National Congress wanted the territory to enjoy a modicum of autonomy as a region in the Federation of Nigeria.⁷ The advocates of reunification won the plebiscite that was organized by the UN for British Cameroonians to decide either to join Nigeria or French Cameroon. British Cameroons went into a union of equal states with French Cameroon. After reunification of the two Cameroons, the task was to implement a policy of national integration to accommodate the differences existing between West Cameroon (former British Cameroons) and East Cameroon (former French Cameroon).

A major challenge facing Cameroon since reunification in 1961 has been to deal with the question of national integration. For national integration to succeed it must take cognizance of the differences inherited by the two Cameroons from their colonial masters. The process should be one of taking the good aspects of both parts and blending them. To the less tolerant Francophone⁸ Cameroonians, integration was synonymous with assimilation. The Anglophones were made to bear the burden of integration, as most of

held the latter title until 1970. In 1994, he led a delegation of the secessionist Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) to the United Nations to request its backing of the movement's drive for greater autonomy in Cameroon's two English-speaking provinces.

⁶ Emmanuel Mbela Lifafa Endeley helped form the Cameroon Youth League (CYL) in 1939. In 1944 he was a founding member of the Bakweri Improvement Union. He was a founder of the Cameroons National Federation (CNF) in 1949 and later served as its president. In 1951 Endeley was elected to the Eastern Nigerian Assembly in Enugu. He worked to have Southern Cameroons granted special regional status apart from Nigeria; when the Southern Cameroons Regional Assembly was formed, he was one of its first members. In 1953, Endeley joined John Ngu Foncha and Solomon Tandeng Muna in breaking from the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) to form the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), which advocated autonomy for Southern Cameroons. E.M.L. Endeley was the first Prime Minister of the British Southern Cameroons from 1954-1959.

⁷ Atanga, Lucien (1994), *The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a Linguistic Minority*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Amadu Bello University, Zaria, p. 71.

⁸ Francophone is used in this thesis to refer to French speaking Cameroonians while Anglophone stands for English speaking Cameroonians

the institutional changes affected the state of West (British) Cameroon more than it did the state of East (French) Cameroon. West and East Cameroon went into a federation on the basis of equal status. In 1972 the federation was dismantled and was replaced by a unitary state. This process actually reduced the English speaking Cameroonians to a minority in the country, contrary to the agreement at the Founban Conference that laid the groundwork for the reunification of the two Cameroons (a point I develop further in chapter one).

The wind of change that blew across Africa in the early 1990s saw widespread political disturbances across the continent. In 1990 President Paul Biya under considerable pressure, introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. This move led to the creation of various pressure groups in Anglophone Cameroon, to voice the long-standing grievances of the Anglophones. Anglophone movements such as Southern Cameroons Peoples' Organisation (SCAPO), Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and Free Ambazonia Movement were more vocal because of what they perceived to be a failed integration, in which the Anglophones according to some of the pressure groups were treated as second class citizens. Attempts by such Anglophone movements to dialogue with the government failed, partly because the government did not recognize that there was an Anglophone problem in Cameroon. Furthermore, some pro-government Anglophone elites, who had espoused the views of the government, saw the Anglophone problem as just one of the many problems that plagued the country.

In 2000 the government embarked on a process of decentralization, which it considers to be a delicate and complex issue that needs to be implemented gradually. On the contrary the leaders of the Anglophone movements saw decentralization as a desperate attempt by the government to silence the Anglophones in the face of mounting pressure from the Southern Cameroons nationalist movements.

Demographic and socio-economic background

The Republic of Cameroon lies at an important geographic and demographic crossroads. It divides the Niger and Congo river basins and shares the physical characteristic of both, with the culture of both regions mingling freely in the country. Cameroon is not only a transitional zone between two kinds of African boundary-making but is also the joint between West and Central Africa.⁹ Cameroon has been called ‘Africa in miniature.’ It is characterized by exceptional social and ethnic diversity. The country has more than 250 identifiable ethnic groupings.¹⁰ In addition, there has been significant migration of people from neighboring countries into Cameroon. This has been further complicated by large internal migrations in search of better opportunities for economic advancement.

Cameroon is located on the west coast of Africa, with Nigeria to the West, Chad and Central African Republic to the east, and Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea to the South. The country is located slightly north of the equator and has an area of 475,440 Square kilometers. In 2002, Cameroon had a population of 16,184,748 with

⁹Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, California: University of California Press, p. 1

¹⁰ John Mukum Mbaku (2005) *Culture and Customs of Cameroon*, London: Greenwood Press, p. 1

an average annual growth rate 2.36 percent. The birth rate is 35.66 births per 1,000 population.¹¹

Cameroon is made of up 250 ethnic groups, which form five major regional-cultural groupings: western highland (grassfield), who include the Bamileke, Bamoun, and several smaller groups in the north west (estimated to represent 38% of the population); (2) Coastal tropical forest peoples, who include, the Bassa, Douala and many smaller groups in the south west (12 percent); (3) Southern tropical forest people, who include the Beti, Bulu, Fang, and Pygmies (18 percent); (4) Predominantly Islamic peoples of the northern semi-arid regions and central highlands, who include the Fulani (14 percent); (5) the Kirdi or Islamic peoples of the northern desert and central highlands (18 percent).¹²

Cameroon is not only the meeting place of northern, western, and central geographic regions, it is also the confluence of three great African culture-areas: Guinea coast, Western Sudanic, and Congo. Represented in Cameroon are branches of people of Guinea coast, the Fulani and Arab peoples of the Western Sudan, and the Bantu speaking peoples of the Congo basin.¹³ Extensive group mixing during the last several hundred years has made it very difficult to produce an accurate classification of Cameroon's ethnic groups.

Cameroon's more than 250 ethnic groups speak more than 24 languages, which belong to either Chadic group of Afro-Asian stock or one of the many branches of the Congo-

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, California: University of California Press, p. 6

Kordofanian stock. From 1884 to 1916, German was spoken and used widely in commerce and trade. The post World War 1 partition of Cameroon into French and British zones of influence saw the demise of German and the introduction of English and French as official languages at reunification. The people who live in the North West and South West provinces speak Standard English, Pidgin English and their traditional languages. In the Northern Province either French or Fulfulde is widely spoken. In other parts of the country, French and local languages such as Douala and Ewondo are spoken. Pidgin English remains an important lingua franca, especially among people in urban centers throughout the country.

About two-thirds of Cameroonians live in rural areas, usually in villages or very small towns, and are engaged primarily in agriculture. In 1970, 85 percent of Cameroon's labour force worked in agriculture; by 1990, that percentage had fallen to 70. The service sector, at a little over 20 percent, is the second largest employer of labour in Cameroon.¹⁴ Most of the food crops are produced by women, while most men produce cash crops for export (cocoa, coffee, palm kernel, banana). Agriculture remains Cameroon's most important economic sector, accounting for 43.5 percent of the GDP in 1999. The most important cash crops are cocoa, beans, coffee, and cotton. Cameroon's industrial sector which include mining, manufacturing, construction and power, employed nearly 9 percent of the country's labour force in 1990 and in 1999 generated 18.6 percent of its GDP.¹⁵

¹⁴ John Mukum Mbaku (2005) Culture and Customs of Cameroon, London: Greenwood Press, p.19

¹⁵ Ibid

Generally, economic growth and development have not been as rapid as many Cameroonians had expected at reunification in 1961. However, many Cameroonians remain optimistic and believe that the solution to their economic problem lies in the democratization of the country's political system and the introduction of a market-centered economic system.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this research is to investigate the correlation between minority rights and political liberalization. I hope to chart the ways in which liberalization has triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The complexities of these claims reside in the fact that some are articulated around minority rights that can be accommodated within the framework of a single state form, while others are articulated around the right to self-determination. This study therefore, revolves around three main research concerns:

Firstly, in examining the nature of these claims, I will devote specific attention to those claims that posit an Anglophone identity based on a distinct colonial history.

The second area of inquiry will deal with the technologies of persuasion and dissemination, Anglophone claims in the public sphere and the ways in which Southern Cameroonians popularise their demands on the Internet.

The third area of inquiry deals with the limits of the discourse of Anglophone nationalism. In particular, I will examine the various ways in which Anglophones and

Francophones in Cameroon are similar and share more cultural traits than they can acknowledge.

Hypotheses

This study is framed around the following hypotheses:

1. During periods of political liberalization, identity claims aim not only at the acquisition of political rights, but also at increased access to resources.
2. In national communities which have undergone different experiences of colonial rule but which have nevertheless been brought under the umbrella of a single state, there is a strong correlation between minority rights and claims to the right to self-determination.
3. Different kinds of civic identity are the result of different forms of colonialism.

Rationale

The literature on democratic transitions in Africa has paid little attention to minority rights. When minority rights have been addressed, the focus has been on ethnic conflicts. Conflicts between ethnic, religious and national groups have always been a major threat to the modern state. Throughout the world, minorities and majorities have clashed over issues such as language rights, federalism and regional autonomy, political representation, religious freedom, education curriculum, land claims, and even national symbols such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays.¹⁶ In some instances, these conflicts have led to outright war. In the Third World and especially in Africa,

¹⁶Kymlicka, W. (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, London: Clarendon Press, p.1; Kymlicka, W. (ed.) (1995), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, London: Oxford University Press.

attempts to create stable political institutions are often undermined by violent nationalist and ethnic conflicts. Since the end of the cold war, ethno-cultural conflicts have been the most common source of political violence in Africa. This worldwide crisis has sparked a corpus of studies on conflicts between minority and majority, and has attracted international attention with the formation of international bodies such as the Minority Rights Group, which provides a voice for oppressed minorities at the United Nations Human Rights sessions.

Since the end of colonialism minority issues have precipitated violent conflicts all over the world: Biafra (Nigeria); Eritrea and Tigre (Ethiopia); Baluchis (Pakistan); Kurds (Iraq); Lebanon; the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.¹⁷ In Cameroon, Canada and Nigeria in particular, minority issues have gained ground as a subject of academic inquiry. They have also been a focus of activist and militant organization nationally and trans-nationally. Political liberalization in Cameroon in the early 1990s gave an opening to members of the Anglophone part of Cameroon to protest against their perceived marginalisation and to lay claims for self-determination and autonomy. The refusal by the government to discuss any related constitutional reforms forced some Anglophone movements, such as SCNC, SCAPO and SCYL, to adopt a secessionist stand. They presented the Anglophone community as an oppressed minority whose territory had been annexed by the Francophone-dominated state.¹⁸ French is a minority language in Canada. Until recently French speakers were the most poorly paid workers and their standards of living were the lowest in the country. The French Quebecois felt the only way to gain

¹⁷ Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States*, London: Pluto Press, p. 87.

¹⁸ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997), "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: pp. 207-229.

control of their destiny was to advocate that Quebec should separate from the rest of Canada. In 1990 the Ogoni minority in Nigeria formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to fight their economic and environmental exploitation. Anger at what they saw as the exploitation of their oil, without benefit to them or compensation for the damage done to their land and livelihood, led to a number of protests against the policies of the Federal government and the activities of Shell, the oil company that produces almost half of Nigeria's oil.¹⁹ These protests triggered violent and repressive responses from the Federal government, for which any threat to oil production is a threat to the existing political system.

Disciplines such as International Law, International Relations, Refugee Studies and the Anthropology of Minority People have dealt with issues concerning minorities. International law on minorities contains a number of provisions aimed at protecting minorities. The first international provision was put into place following World War I within the framework of the League of Nations. The Minorities Treaties empowered the League Council to receive petitions, conduct fact-finding investigations, and issue directives to those nations not in compliance.²⁰ Five states, Albania (1921), Lithuania (1922), Latvia (1923), Estonia (1923), and Iraq (1923) had to submit assurances on minority protection as a condition for admission to the League. The League's main failing was that the treaties on minority rights protection never became universal, which

¹⁹ "Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People" 18 March 2004. Accessed at <
<http://www.mosop.net/Archivesfiles/THE%20STRUGGLE%20FOR%20RESOURCE%20CONTROL%20IN%20PERSPECTIVE.doc>

²⁰ Pejic, Jelena (1997), "Minority Rights in International Law", *Human Rights Quarterly* 19, 3: p. 669.

thus led to discontinuity.²¹ The formation of the United Nations ushered in a new approach centring on individual human rights. The United Nations Charter makes some concession to minority groups, by acknowledging that the United Nations cannot remain indifferent to the fate of minorities. However, an agreement could not be reached because of the difficulty of adopting “a uniform solution to this complex and delicate question, which has special aspects in each state in which it arises.”²² The United Nations General Assembly requested the UN Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities to carry out a thorough study of the problem of minorities, in order that the United Nations would be able to take effective measures for the protection of racial, national, religious, or linguistic minorities.²³ It may be said that, to this day, the study of minority problems continues, while the effective measures for protection of minorities are still lacking.

In recent years the Internet has become a platform on which minority people articulate their marginalisation. As of now there are still few studies on cyber nationalism, in particular the way in which Diasporas link up with their countries of origin in order to affect local processes. A notable exception is Benedict Anderson’s “Long Distance Nationalism” ... The Internet has been used to great success in creating awareness of the plight of minority people. Articles and visuals have been made public through the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Capotori, Francesco (1985), “The Protection of Minorities under Multilateral Agreements on Human Rights”, in Satish Chandra et al.(eds.) *Minorities in National and International Laws*, pp. 218, 227 citing U.N Doc. A/Res/217 (III) C).

²³ Simon, Thomas. “Protecting Minorities in International Law”, *Pubblicazioni Centro Studi Per la Pace*, 13 May 2004. Accessed at <<http://www.studiperlapace.it>>

Internet that would not have been published in some countries. Chapter five of this study, explores cyber nationalism in an attempt to show how Anglophone Cameroonians have penetrated and exploited cyberspace as an alternative means for their communally based identity.

Considering the debate on the problem of minority people in the world today, scholars like Lapidoth and Ghai have argued that the question of minorities in the contemporary world poses a serious problem: on the one hand, regarding human rights, that of discrimination and oppression against minorities as members of a group; on the other hand, at the level of the state, whereby it claims it is an internal issue.²⁴ A key issue when dealing with minority problems has been to look at the difference between the dominant and minority groups. How do minority groups differ from the majority, and by which process have the minority groups been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination? Interestingly, most studies have followed a sociological pattern, whereby some scholars have articulated the nature of minority relationship with the dominant group on the basis of the differential treatment of minorities.²⁵ As an innovation to this research, this study explores the melting points between the minority Anglophones and the dominant Francophone in Cameroon to show that Anglophones and Francophones have more in common than they can acknowledge.

²⁴ Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington DC: United States Institutes of Peace Press; Ghai, Y. (ed.) (2000), *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press

²⁵ Dench, G. (1986), *Minorities in the Open Society: Prisoners of Ambivalence*, London: Routledge; Kegan Paul and Kurokawa, M. (ed.) (1970), *Minority Response: Comparative Views of Reactions to Subordination*, New York: Random House; Vander Zanden, J. (1972) *American Minority relations*, New York: The Ronald Press Company

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

What constitutes a minority?

There are many competing definitions of the term minority. Chaliand argues that only “groups who see themselves as different, ethnically, religiously or linguistically, and are concerned to preserve their special features should be described as minorities”.²⁶ He argues further that demands relating to the status of minorities would be meaningless if they were dominant minorities. Dominant minorities are minorities that though, they do not have a major demographic weight, nevertheless wield huge economic and political power. The white minority under apartheid in South Africa; the minority Sunni Arabs under Saddam Hussiem; the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi in Africa constitute such examples.

Francesco Capotori defines minority as:

a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and who, if implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religions or language.²⁷

From the premise above, the numerical inferiority of a minority is established by comparison to the entire population of a state. Thus, a group would remain a minority even though it may constitute the majority in a specific region of the state. Non-dominance does not only refer to political power, but economic, cultural, or social status. The sense of solidarity implies awareness by persons belonging to minority groups of the

²⁶Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States*, London: Pluto Press, p. 89.

²⁷ Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, p. 10.

same ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics that set them apart from the majority, and a desire to preserve those characteristics as central to their common identity. This definition has undoubtedly contributed to clarifying certain aspects of what constitutes a minority. Some international bodies have adopted this definition because it captures some of the concerns of minority groups. Such is the case of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on 21 February 1992.

For Jules Deschenes, a minority is “a group of citizens of a state, numerically a minority and not dominant in this state, with ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics different from those of the majority of the population, bound up with one another, animated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and aiming at de facto equality with the majority”.²⁸ The above definitions of minorities apply to minorities that want to continue to exist and be recognized as such, that feel themselves discriminated against or oppressed, and want their protection assured and their rights recognized.

Louis Wirth defines a minority:

...as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority in a society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group with higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status carries with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the society.²⁹

²⁸ Chaliand, G. (ed.) (1989), *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States*, p. 7.

²⁹ Wirth, Louis (1970), “Minority Problems”, in Kurokawa, M. (ed.), *Minority Response: Comparative Views of Reactions to Subordination*, New York: Random House, p. 34.

This definition contains three components: the minority group must be visible to others; it must experience differential and pejorative treatment; and its members must be aware of themselves as a minority group.

Wagly and Harris note the following concerning minorities:

(1) Minorities are subordinate segments of complex state societies; (2) minorities have special or cultural traits which are held in low esteem by the dominant segment of the society; (3) minorities are self-conscious units bound together by the special traits which their members share and by their special disabilities which these bring; (4) membership in a minority is transmitted by a rule of descent which is capable of affiliating succeeding generations even in the absence of readily apparent special cultural or physical traits; (5) minority people, by choice or necessity, tend to marry within the group.³⁰

From this definition it might be inferred that people do not choose to become a minority-group member and do not work to attain minority status, but rather membership in a minority group is ascribed at birth through the society's rule of descent. Consequently, one is a minority group member because one's parent(s) are a minority group members.

In order to develop a universal definition of minority, Dworkin and Dworkin³¹ took the definitions of Wirth, Young, Wagly and Harris, and added that of Gelfang and Lee on "differential power" to get a heuristic meaning of minority. They proposed that a

³⁰ Wagly and Harris (1976), in Dworkin, Gray and Dworkin, Rosalind (eds.) *The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations*, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, p. 5.

³¹ Dworkin, Gray and Dworkin, Rosalind (eds.) (1976), *The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations*, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, p. 15.

minority group is a group characterised by four qualities: “identifiability, differential power, different and pejorative treatment, and group awareness”.³²

Identifiability

Groups must be readily identifiable in order to ensure that an individual recognizes members of his or her own group and members of others. Without identifiability, group solidarity and differential treatment become difficult. What is often overlooked in minority-group relations is that there are more similarities than differences between people within the same society. In America skin colour is the central element of identifiability.³³ In Cameroon, salient criteria for identifiability between groups include: language, dress, food, folklore, cultural festivals, traditional political systems and other cultural factors. This research argues that language or even dress and food in Cameroon are not enough to distinguish Anglophones from the Francophones. The divide between English and French is not hermetic because if one cannot speak either English or French, one can nevertheless speak Pidgin English, which is used to divide and, at certain points, to unite the people. From a cultural and political point of view, Francophones do not identify themselves on the basis of the use of the French language but on the basis of ethnic or regional language. For instance, people identify themselves not as Francophone but as Bassa, Bulu, Ewondo and Muslims and this is how they articulate their political differences. In the days of President Amadou Ahidjo³⁴, if one asked the Southerners whom they were competing with, they would obviously say the Northerners. This

³² Ibid, p. 15.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Amadou Ahidjo was the first president of Cameroon from 1961 to 1982,

transcends the issue of language to that of regional groupings, whereby people feel more strongly attached to their region than to the language they speak.

Differential Power

Power is the actual use of resources to influence and control others.³⁵ When the majority in power controls resources, it also controls the life chances of the minority (their access to resources, jobs, education, wealth — even food and health care). In so doing, the minority will remain dependent on the majority in a colonial type of relationship. Cameroon is a bilingual country. In principle, all its citizens have equal chances, but in practice it is different. The Francophone majority controls all the resources to the disadvantage of the Anglophone minority. The French language is used as a powerful means of access to cultural capital. In this circumstance, one would need to compare what is offered in French and in English with regard to the media and information about opportunities. The research further examines the cabinet positions; governments of the provinces, generals in the military to determine the percentage of Anglophones in the government over a period. The above mentioned points are explored in detail in chapter two of this study.

Differential and Pejorative Treatment

Differential treatment, or discrimination, is what group members actually experience as a consequence of their minority status. It is this differential treatment that most directly affects the life chances and lifestyles of the individual minority group members and becomes the focus of minority protest and movement. Some Anglophone Cameroonians

³⁵ Lieberman, Stanley (1970), “Stratification and Ethnic Grouping”, *Sociological Inquiry* 40, 2: pp. 172-81.

feel that the Cameroon government has treated them unfairly, as they are being looked upon as second-class citizens. Because of this subordinate role some Anglophone pressure groups such as SCNC, SCAPO, SCYL and Free Ambazonia are today advocating for a separate state, where they will be able to control their own destiny. To highlight and understand the pejorative treatment of Anglophones, focus would be on language rights and the language used to interrogate people, language used in the public domain which deals with official documents and how often this happens, together with job opportunities.

Group Awareness

Group awareness refers to the perception of common goals that can be achieved only through cooperation rather than competition. However, if no individuals in a minority see themselves as being a minority and subjected to differential treatment, then minority status cannot be said to exist.³⁶ Minority members are aware of something that they have in common with others like themselves. The common traits that they share often form the basis of an in-group feeling, a sense of belonging distinct from the dominant group.³⁷ This study hopes to assess the forms of awareness within Anglophones in Cameroon and in the Diaspora. The colonial heritage of the English and French speaking Cameroonians differs. The legal and educational systems in Anglophone Cameroon are different from those of French speaking Cameroonians. All of these differences in institutions create an aspect of awareness amongst Anglophones in Cameroon. Arguably there are specific institutions like the university, media and associations that are political and apolitical,

³⁶ Dworkin, Gray and Dworkin, Rosalind (eds.) (1976), *The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations*, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, p. 21.

³⁷ Ibid.

which help to ignite the feeling of an Anglophone identity which is different from the Francophone.

Many people hoped that the end of the Cold War would lead to a more peaceful world; “instead, the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism has been replaced with an upsurge in conflicts between ethnic, religious and national groups”.³⁸ These developments may be related to the swift progress of modernization, urbanization, decolonisation, and even democratization. But it might well also be related to the processes of globalization and, of universalisation of norms, as evidenced by the global discourse on human rights. In the early 1990s, groups of indigenous populations increased their demands for recognition of their special rights. The various claims are based on four conceptual frameworks in the area of human rights: (1) the right to equality and non-discrimination; (2) the right of minorities to preserve and develop their own culture, religion and language; (3) the right of indigenous populations to preserve their traditions; and (4) the right of people to self-determination.³⁹

The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination

The primary aim of all individuals, including members of minority groups, is to achieve equality and non-discrimination. After World War II, something approaching a consensus existed in the international community with regard to the rights of ethnic minorities. Their rights were not different from general human rights, which were spelled out in detail in some major international legal agreements produced in the post-war era. Some

³⁸ Kymlicka, W. (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, London: Clarendon Press, p. 1.

³⁹ Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington D.C: United States Institutes of Peace Press, p. 9.

of these agreements include: the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Racial Discrimination Convention of 1965, which had obvious implications for minorities.⁴⁰ The first development in this direction was the provision included in Article 27 of the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. It reads:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.⁴¹

There are two setbacks in Article 27 above. First, by employing the word “in those States in which ... minorities exist,” this article leaves states the option of declaring that they have no minorities, thereby excluding its application to persons within their territory. Secondly, the rights in Article 27 are conferred on persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities but what about indigenous group? Are they entitled to the rights it provides? However, although the rights enshrined are fairly limited, it constitutes a beginning of sorts.

Minority questions were again discussed in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the meeting of Experts on National Minorities convened in Geneva in July 1991. The experts were of the opinion that “issues concerning national minorities are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not

⁴⁰ Watson, M. (1990), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism*, London: Routledge; Weinfeld, M. (1981) “Canada”, in Wirsing, R. (ed.) *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives*, USA: Pergamon Press Inc; Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

⁴¹ Pejic, Jelena (1997), Minority Rights in International Law, *Human Rights Quarterly* 19, 3: p. 670.

constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective state”.⁴² Of greater significance is the fact that ethnic minorities are aware of their rights and are exerting a lot of pressure on national governments in different parts of the world for greater recognition of minority rights.

The Right of Minorities to Preserve and Develop their Own Culture, Religion and Language

As mentioned above, general human rights, as listed in the Universal Declaration and elaborated upon in other instruments, are individual in nature and can be demanded by everyone: by persons belonging to minorities and by persons belonging to indigenous peoples. These human rights constitute the foundation of the traditional human rights system. They are based on the two basic principles set out in the Universal Declaration: Article 1, declaring that “everyone is born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and Article 2, stating that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind”.⁴³

The rights of persons belonging to minorities add to the foundation rights set out in the Universal Declaration. The specific rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities include:

the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion; to use their own language in private and in public, to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life and to participate effectively in decisions on the national, and, where appropriate,

⁴² Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, p. 13.

⁴³ “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 10 Feb 2005. Accessed at <<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>>

regional level, concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, to establish and maintain their own associations, to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other states to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.⁴⁴

As stated above, these rights may be exercised by persons belonging to minorities individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any discrimination. However, they are always the rights of individuals.

The Right of Indigenous Populations to Preserve their Traditions

Indigenous peoples are the disadvantaged descendants of those peoples that inhabited a territory prior to the formation of a state. The term “indigenous” may be defined “as a characteristic relating the identity of a particular people to a particular area and which distinguishes them culturally from other people or peoples”.⁴⁵ When, for example, immigrants from Europe settled in the Americas and Oceania, or when new states were created after colonialism was abolished in Africa and Asia, certain peoples became marginalized and discriminated against because their language, their religion, their culture and their whole way of life were different and perceived by the dominant society as being inferior.⁴⁶

Today many indigenous peoples are still excluded from society and are often even deprived of their rights as equal citizens of a state. Nevertheless they are determined to preserve, develop and pass on to future generations their ancestral territories and their

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Lapidoth, R. (1997), *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, p. 16.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p.18.

ethnic identity. Self-identification as an indigenous individual and acceptance as such by the group is an essential component of indigenous peoples' sense of identity. Their continued existence as peoples is closely connected to the possibility of influencing their own fate and to living in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.⁴⁷

The declaration of the right of indigenous peoples to full and effective enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental liberties enshrined in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights, and other international human rights instruments do indeed also protect the indigenous population. The declaration contained in Article VIII established that: "Indigenous peoples have the right to their own languages, philosophy, and concepts as a component of national and universal culture, and as such, states shall respect them and facilitate the dissemination thereof in consultation with the peoples involved".⁴⁸

The Right to Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination of peoples was embodied as a central purpose of the United Nations in its Charter in 1945. One of its aims was "... to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" 10 Feb. 2005. Accessed at <<http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/ga-Res98/Eres1591.htm>>

peace ...”⁴⁹ Minority groups have often relied on the principle of self-determination as espoused in the UN charter to seek for autonomy.

The resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, states: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”⁵⁰ In this light self-determination is therefore tied into aspects of life – political, economic, social, and cultural, and is ultimately about how we choose to live, and allow others to live together on this planet. On 7 February 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution regarding the “Universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination,” in which the General Assembly reaffirms “the importance, for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights, of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination” and welcomes “the progressive exercise of the right to self-determination by peoples under colonial, foreign or alien occupation and their emergence into sovereign statehood and independence”.⁵¹ Interestingly, since 1995 to present, these issues continue to be highly relevant as many groups of peoples around the world strive for the fulfillment of this basic right of self-determination.

⁴⁹ “UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 947th plenary meeting, 14 December 1960”, 20 April 2005. Accessed at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm

⁵⁰ UN General Assembly resolution 49/148, Universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, Forty-ninth session, 7 February 1995, 20 April 2006. Accessed at [http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/A.RES.52.113.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.52.113.En?Opendocument)

⁵¹ Ibid.

The Making of Minorities in Africa

This section focuses on the colonial legacy in Africa as a factor that continues to contribute to the perception, and the treatment of minorities. To secure their hold in many African territories, colonial administrators devised various models including direct rule. In this approach colonialists forged an alliance with particular local groups, and the effect of this policy was the deepening of existing social and geopolitical divisions, or the creation of new ones.⁵² Whether or not the divisions occurred by malevolent design, the effects are manifold. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi colonial policy engendered a habit of ethnicity that has prompted civil wars,⁵³ finally culminating in the genocide in 1990. Colonial penetration and the administration of the African land involved the demarcation of borders, which in itself contributed to a sense of geo-ethnicity.⁵⁴ During the early years of colonial rule, borders were not firm or well policed. This was true where territories were adjacent parts of the same colonial empire. The problem of borders increased with decolonisation, as colonial administrative lines were transformed into international boundaries that separated sovereign African states. Decolonisation was accompanied by an emphasis on group identities and solidarities, as individuals and groups sought to gain the greatest possible political and economic advantage during the transfer of power. In Chad and Sudan this led to a civil war.⁵⁵ Southern Cameroons was part of German Kamerun. When Germany was defeated in World War I and her territories divided among the victorious allies, Britain and France, Britain administered the Southern Cameroons as a League of Nations mandated territory and later on as a

⁵² Weinstein, Warren (1981), "Africa: Problems Relating to the Conflict Between State and Group", in Wirsing, G. Robert (ed.), *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives*, New York: Pergamon, p. 213.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Trustee Territory of the United Nations Organisation. In 1961 the Southern Cameroons voted in a plebiscite to join the former French Cameroons that had gained independence earlier in 1960 as the Republic of Cameroon. In 1961 the two states formed the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which was later changed in 1972 to the United Republic of Cameroon, and finally to the Republic of Cameroon in 1982. Throughout this process, the Francophones used their numerical strength to undermine the Anglophones. This is how the Southern Cameroons minority question came about, and the issue of their unfair treatment. This point is developed further in chapter three.

Types of Minorities

There are different types of minorities in the world. According to Louis Wirth, cited by Zanden, minorities can be classified as (1) pluralistic, (2) assimilationist, (3) secessionist, and (4) militant.⁵⁶

Pluralistic Minority

This is a group that desires to live peacefully side by side with the dominant group; it seeks to maintain its cultural identity against dominant group absorption. Switzerland is an example of a culturally pluralistic nation. A majority of Swiss speak a variety of German; about 20 percent speak French, 6 percent Italian and about 1 percent speaks Romansh. Within the various groups, there are differences in costume, dialect, and patterns of life, but the Swiss have learned to live harmoniously with their differences.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Vander, Zanden (1972), *American Minority Relations*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, p. 17.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Assimilationist Minority

This group expects to be absorbed within an emergent common culture that is the blending of divergent racial and ethnic strains. Through this process of fusion of the differing racial groups and cultural traditions, a new people and culture emerge.⁵⁸ A practical example of an assimilationist minority is the European immigrant groups within the United States. In America one hardly finds European immigrant groupings, whereas immigrant groupings from Asia and Latin America are more prevalent. At the early stages of reunification in Cameroon, scholars like Bernard Fonlon argued that Anglophones and Francophones should meld into a common culture, but the less tolerant Francophones wanted to assimilate the Anglophones. Consequently, the Anglophones resisted all attempts to lose their colonial heritage.

Secessionist Minority

The aim of this group is to achieve cultural as well as political independence from the dominant group. They want a separate statehood encompassing full political self-determination. This minority group believes that there can be no satisfactory coexistence between majority and minority groups within the context of a single society.⁵⁹ A strong emphasis is placed on the revival of the language, lore, literature and ceremonial institutions associated with the group's prior independence. Examples of such minority groups are the Irish, Czech, Polish, Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian and Finnish nationalistic movements that culminated in the establishment of independent nations at the end of World War I.⁶⁰ This study argues that in the Southern Cameroons one finds

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

organizations like SCNC, SCAPO, SCYL and Free Ambazonia advocating a secessionist strategy by fighting for a geographically distinct state for Southern Cameroons. The same situation applies to the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance and the Basque Party in Spain which have been advocating territorial independence from Senegal and Spain respectively.

Militant Minority

This group goes far beyond the demand for equality, or even cultural and political autonomy, and insists upon reversing the status quo. Domination over others is set as its goal, and this group is convinced of its own superiority. For example, the Sudeten Germans, aided by the Nazis, made claims upon the Czechoslovakian Republic.⁶¹

Minority Problems

In order to understand the nature and significance of minorities, one needs to look at their objective as well as their subjective positions. Minorities objectively occupy a disadvantaged position in society when contrasted with the dominant group. Minorities are excluded from certain opportunities: economic, social, and political. The members of minority groups are held in lower esteem and may be the object of contempt, hatred, ridicule, and violence. Their subordinate position manifests itself in their unequal access to educational opportunities and professional advancement.⁶² They are not free, as other members of the society to join the voluntary associations that express their interests. Like other minority groups around the world, some Anglophone Cameroonians claim that they have been marginalized economically, socially and politically. Economically the

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Vander, Zanden (1972), *American Minority Relations*, p. 34.

government of Cameroon has liquidated enterprises of importance to Southern Cameroons like POWERCAM, Cameroon Bank, and the Produce Marketing Board. The liquidation of these enterprises is to ensure the continued dependence of Anglophones on the majority-led government. Politically, the government has mobilised to crush any protest by Anglophone Cameroon movements. Activists of the Southern Cameroons National Council, Southern Cameroons People's Organisation and the Southern Cameroons Youth League have been arrested, detained and tortured, and others are in voluntary exile.⁶³

Minority Reaction to Dominance

This section explores how minority group members think and feel about their subordinate status. Confronted with discriminatory treatment by those in power, minority group members show various patterns of response to their condition. Some are eager to assimilate in order to lose their stigma, others seek equality with separation, and still others accept the status of inequality.⁶⁴ There are three patterns of minority reaction to dominance, namely: acceptance, aggression and assimilation.

Acceptance

Minority group members may come to accept their disadvantaged and subordinate status. Some minority group members feel that it is better to accept what cannot be changed or avoided. Others accept their fate out of a feeling that there is nothing else to do. Some

⁶³ Mukong, Albert (1998), "Minority Rights in the Cameroons: The Case of Southern Cameroons", A paper presented to the working group of the United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission on Minorities. Bamenda: Unique Printers, p. 14.

⁶⁴ Vander, Zanden (1972), *American Minority Relations*, p. 305.

accept the existing order, neither questioning it nor doing anything about it.⁶⁵ Southern Cameroonians for the past three decades accepted their subordinate position in the union with East Cameroon. The wind of change across Africa in the early 1990s ushered in some political openings to stand up against the unfairness and to demand their rights.

Aggression

Minority group members may respond to dominance by engaging in hostile acts against the system that is stifling them. In some circumstances this response leads to outright war with the minority fighting for self-determination.⁶⁶ In 1982 the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance demanded that the government of Senegal grant independence to the Casamance region. The refusal of the government to accede to the demand of the Casamançais sparked a two-decade-long conflict that led to killings, disappearances and torture of many people. In Spain the struggle of the Basque people to realise their right to self-determination has often sparked hostility towards Madrid. The *raison d'être* of Basque nationalism has always been separatist, and its expression has always been through violence.

Assimilation

Minority group members may attempt to become socially and culturally fused with the dominant group. Zanden argues that some minority group members may come to accept a large number of dominant group values by virtue of making the dominant group their reference group. That is, the group that provides them with their standards for evaluating behaviour. Since belonging to the minority group may produce disadvantages in meeting

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

various social needs, some individuals attempt to disaffiliate themselves from the minority and move outward to the dominant society.⁶⁷ Attempts by the government of Cameroon to assimilate the Anglophones have often been met with bitter reaction from Southern Cameroons. Ghai notes that “more than any previous age, ours is marked by ethnic conflicts. Responses to ethnic conflicts have ranged from oppression and ethnic cleansing to accommodation of ethnic claims through affirmative policies, special forms of representation, power sharing, and the integration of minorities”.⁶⁸

Literature on Political Liberalization

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 symbolised the collapse of one-party communist regime in Eastern Europe.⁶⁹ The collapse of communism had serious repercussions in East-Central Europe, Africa and Latin America. As the demands for democracy swept across Africa in the early 1990s, drastic changes affected states in sub-Saharan Africa. Frustrated by declining economies and the failure of incumbent governments to solve basic problems of socio-economic and political development, people from different social strata called for an end to authoritarian rule.⁷⁰ Ottaway argues that “if the strongest, best organized totalitarian systems could collapse completely, certainly Africa’s petty tyrants, presiding over weak states and fragile institutions had little hope for survival”.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Vander, Zanden (1972), *American Minority Relations*, p. 309.

⁶⁸ Ghai, Y. (ed.) (2000), *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

⁶⁹ Bratton, M. and De Walle, N. (1992), *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 105

⁷⁰ Ottaway, Marina (1997), “African Democratization and the Leninist Option”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: p. 1.

⁷¹ Ibid.

The early 1990s saw widespread political disturbances across the African continent. Transitions away from one-party and military regimes started with political protest, proceeded through liberalization reforms to competitive elections, and usually ended with the installation of new forms of regimes.⁷² Following a number of protests in Benin against long delayed scholarships and civil servants going for months without salaries, the government responded to the mass street protests by making some political concessions. The President of Benin, Mathieu Kerekou, announced a broad amnesty for political prisoners and released some 200 of them. The protesters demanded more by asking for an end to the ill-treatment of political detainees and a clampdown on corruption. In order to recapture the political initiative, the President accepted a return to multiparty politics and created a commission to prepare a national reconciliation conference, to which political and trade union organizations, religious associations and Beninois living abroad would be invited to discuss the country's future.⁷³ The Benin National Conference lasted 10 days. The conference was declared sovereign, the constitution suspended, the national assembly dissolved and plans for multiparty elections were adopted. A year later Benin held its first multiparty elections in 17 years and Kerekou was defeated in the elections. The lessons of the Benins' conference was not lost as Robinson commented that:

Between March of 1990 and August 1991, the rulers of Gabon, Congo Mali, Togo, Niger and Zaire faced the demands of pro-democracy forces and convened national conferences. During this same period, opposition groups in the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Madagascar, Burkina

⁷² Bratton, M. and De Walle, N. (1992), *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 98; Newbury, Catharine "Introduction: Paradoxes of Democratization in Africa", *African Studies Reviews* 37, 1: p. 1.

⁷³ Robinson, Pearl (1994), "Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of Politics" *African Studies Reviews* 37, 1: p. 55.

Faso, Mauritania and Chad began mobilizing campaigns to press their demands for national conferences. Outcomes have varied. In some cases the incumbent retained control by manipulating the conference proceedings, or by rigging multiparty elections. In other cases the opposition prevailed in the short run.⁷⁴

Although the national conference has been instrumental in the transition towards democracy, Ottaway argues that the conditions in Africa were not favourable for democracy as there was no strong opposition and civil society in existence.⁷⁵

In Cameroon, in 1990 President Paul Biya, under considerable internal and external pressure introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. He announced the advent of multipartyism, as well as a certain degree of mass communication and freedom of association, including the holding of public meetings and demonstrations.⁷⁶ As a result, several political parties, pressure groups and private newspapers were established in Cameroon, which began to express and represent Anglophone interest. This gave some impetus to the Anglophones to begin voicing their long-standing grievances by openly criticizing the Francophone domination of Anglophones. The first opposition political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), appeared in Anglophone Cameroon during the growing economic and political crisis and soon became the major opposition party in Cameroon. The leaders of the SDF turned the Anglophone region into a strong opposition. The impact of this on the Anglophone community was the development of Anglophone consciousness and action. Several Anglophone pressure groups were created by Anglophone elites to defend the interests of the Anglophones. These included, Free

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 56.

⁷⁵ Ottaway, Marina (1997), "African Democratisation and the Leninist Option", p. 9.

⁷⁶ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997), "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: p. 215.

West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), Free Ambazonia Movement, Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and Southern Cameroons Peoples' Organisation (SCAPO). All these pressure groups are fighting a common cause, that of defending the interests of the Anglophones in a Francophone-dominated state.

In Brazil political liberalization began as “regime initiated liberalization”.⁷⁷ In 1973 when the process of Brazilian liberalization began, there was no significant political opposition, no economic crisis, and no collapse of the coercive apparatus due to the defeat of war. Bolivar Lamounier argues that “it would be naïve to gloss over the tensions inherent in these changes, as if the actors were simply following a previously conceived blueprint”.⁷⁸ According to him, the government and the opposition found enough space to redefine their respective roles through several stages, since each perceived what it stood to gain from the continuity of the process. He stresses that:

The opposition was capable of extracting important concessions while at the same time organizing itself as a powerful electoral force. The government also benefited in many ways. Most importantly, it saw a gradual reduction in the costs of coercion ... In short the government could capitalize on the political benefits of an atmosphere of progressive “normalcy,” as if exchanging losses of legitimacy arising from discontent with its past for gains based on the increasing credibility of its intentions as to the future.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Stepan, A. (1985), *Democratising Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, London: Oxford University Press, p. xi.

⁷⁸ Lamounier, Bolivar (1995), “Inequality against Democracy”, in Diamond, L. et al (eds.), *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy*, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, p. 113.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

It is important to understand that what gave the Brazilian transition its special character was the fact that both the government and the opposition stood to gain from the liberalization. Alfred Stepan argues that “though the leaders of the military government may voluntarily begin a process of liberalization, the process cannot cross the threshold of redemocratization without the additional support of societal push or corporate pull”.⁸⁰ According to him the idea of government-led liberalization became greatly complicated as the people wanted a change. The government had hoped to carry out a gradual and carefully controlled liberalization but when its very legitimacy was challenged. The government and opposition were at loggerheads over human rights issues, the release of political prisoners, and insistence that the government should account for those that had disappeared.⁸¹ This led the government to embark on a series of arbitrary arrests and the torture of detainees.

In most processes of political liberalization, churches, lawyers’ associations, human rights organizations and the middle class do play a pivotal role in mobilizing the people. Political liberalization usually starts with the demands for respect of certain rights such as human rights and freedom of association, before it moves to a full-blown call for regime change. These demands by the people often lead to repression by the government, which can have an opposite effect. In some situations where the government reacts with harsh and repressive measures it provides the force to mobilize protests and, in some instances, repression can help to kill the protest. Having established an analytical framework on

⁸⁰ Stepan, A. (1985), *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, London: Oxford University Press, p. xi.

⁸¹ Ibid.

minority rights and political liberalization, focuss would be on the case study: The Anglophone Cameroon Minority.

The Anglophone Minority in Cameroon

The modern territory known today as Cameroon is a colonial invention by Germany. In 1884, Germany colonized Cameroon and carved out its boundaries, which extended far beyond its present territory, at that time encompassing northern Nigeria, part of Chad and The Central African Republic. The Germans were active colonizers, building schools, railways and plantations. During the period of German colonization there was no Anglophone state.

The divide in the Cameroon state can be dated from early 1916, when Germany was defeated in World War I. The Allied powers (Britain and France) reached an agreement on the division of Cameroon between them. France received four-fifths of the country and Britain received two separate areas bordering on Nigeria.⁸² As a result, a single nation was divided into three parts governed by two colonial powers—hardly a situation conducive to later reunification. This division created the foundation of a future Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority in the region.⁸³

In a United Nation's supervised plebiscite, British Northern Cameroon opted to join the independent Federation of Nigeria, and British Southern Cameroon decided to form a union with The Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961, called the Federal Republic of

⁸² Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, California: University of California Press, p. 32.

⁸³ Awasom, N. F. (2000), "The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One?", *Africa Today* 47, 2: p. 93.

Cameroon. By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political elite had hoped to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting their territory's minority status and cultural heritage. In such a union, each composite unit would be allowed to (a) retain its own institutions; (b) manage its own resources; and (c) maximize its values.

Unfortunately, many constraints were to make it impossible for such a federation to become a reality (points developed in chapter two). Instead, it soon became evident that the Francophone political elite preferred a highly centralized, unitary state as a means of promoting national unity and economic development. While the Francophone elite received strong support from the French during constitutional negotiations, the Anglophone elite was virtually abandoned by the British, who resented the Southern Cameroons option for reunification with Francophone Cameroon.⁸⁴ During the constitutional talks at Foumban in July 1961, the Francophone elite were only prepared to accept a highly centralized federation, regarding it as merely a transitional phase to a unitary state. Such a federation demanded relatively few amendments to the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cameroon.

In 1972, when President Amadou Ahidjo created a unitary state in blatant disregard of constitutional provisions, there was in reality little left of the federation, except perhaps in name.⁸⁵ To reduce the danger of any future united Anglophone action, Ahidjo then decided to divide Southern Cameroons into two provinces, albeit well aware of the

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

internal differences within the Anglophone community, between the coastal-forest people of South West Province and the grass field people of the North West Province.⁸⁶ What many regarded as one of the last visible symbols of the 1961 union was removed in 1984 when President Paul Biya abolished the appellation “United Republic of Cameroon” and replaced it with “Republic of Cameroon”, which was, significantly, the name of the Francophone part of the country when it became independent in 1960.⁸⁷

Southern Cameroonians saw the move of the government as an attempt to wipe out their identity as English speaking Cameroonians. However, this union failed to meet the aspirations of most Anglophones as they continued to feel increasingly marginalized in most sectors of the economy in the country. The grievances of the Anglophones against the Cameroon government are many. They range from the complaints against the violation of the unification agreements, through resentment towards annexation, to complaints of territorial neglect and the marginalization of Anglophones. Anglophone Cameroonians make up about 30% of the Cameroonian population, but their participation in government has never been more than 15%.⁸⁸ Worst of all some Anglophone Cameroonians feel that they are being treated as second class citizens in their own country. The state’s attitudes towards Southern Cameroons have resulted in the relative underdevelopment of the Anglophone region, which has not benefited substantially from its rich resources, particularly oil. Gradually, this has created an Anglophone

⁸⁶ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997) “The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: pp. 211-213.

⁸⁷ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands: (Afrika-Studiecentrum Series), p. 72.

⁸⁸ All Anglophone Standing Committee (1993), “The Buea Declaration”, Limbe: Nooremac Press, p. 10.

consciousness: the feeling of being recolonised and marginalized in all spheres of public life in their own country.⁸⁹

The minority English-speaking Cameroonians feel that they have been marginalized by the French speaking majority and wish to exert more control over their own affairs in the west of the country. The mainly French speaking authorities have long ignored the call for independence. It is this call for independence that led to the creation of the Southern Cameroon National Council – a pressure group that represents the aspirations of the Southern Cameroonians. Many English speaking Cameroonians suspected of belonging to the Southern Cameroon National Council and engaging in the organization’s activities have been arrested.⁹⁰

Methodology

This research is more qualitative than quantitative. Qualitative research does not reduce people’s words and acts to statistical data in the way that quantitative research does.⁹¹ Qualitative research pays attention to what subjects say, write and do. It attempts to assess their words and behaviour carefully, and pays attention to individual statements in order to carry out a more detailed interpretation and analysis.⁹² While statistical data is important in giving a bigger picture of a larger population, qualitative data will help explain more about the practices and behaviour of the population. A central feature of qualitative research is trying to experience the reality that others experience. “Qualitative

⁸⁹ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997), “The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 2: p. 214.

⁹⁰ Nfor Ngala Nfor, Vice Chairman SCNC, interviewed 20 June 2005.

⁹¹ Winberg, Chris (1997), *Learning how to Research and Evaluate*, Cape Town: Juta, p. 42,

⁹² Ibid.

researchers empathise with the people they study in order to understand how they see things and to learn from them, qualitative researchers try to see with the eyes of the researched and walk in their shoes”.⁹³ This research also seeks to understand how the Anglophones came to be constituted as a minority and the various means that they have been using to articulate their claims. In this research multiple methods of data collection are used to arrive at a deeper understanding of the ways in which Anglophones feel marginalized, and also of the melting points between Anglophones and Francophones.

RESEARCH SUBJECTS

The subjects for this study include Anglophone elites of different political affiliations, ethnic groups, social class, sexes and ages in Cameroon and in the Diaspora. I interviewed 15 Anglophone elites spearheading the Anglophone cause, 4 pro-government Anglophone elites and 3 Francophones. Besides semi-structured interviews, I collected 4 life histories of some Anglophone elites to show how their civic identities were developed under the British colonial rule in Cameroon. About 435 students in four state universities were asked to answer the questionnaires. The questionnaires were used to investigate the melting points between Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon.

Forms of Data Collection

Primary and Secondary Materials

To meet the demand of the research questions and hypothesis, the data collection techniques included archival library search, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and observation. The study made extensive use of secondary sources: books, monographs; journal articles and magazines; official circulars and publications by

⁹³ Ibid.

relevant players in the Anglophone struggle and governments' written responses to the struggle. Internet searches also constituted a huge invaluable source of data for this study.

Questionnaires

Both open-ended and closed questions were used to collect data for this research. Questionnaires are advantageous for this kind of research in that they save time, especially where there are many respondents.⁹⁴ The number of respondents who can be reached is quite high as compared to interviews.⁹⁵ Questionnaires are less expensive and require less skill to administer than an interview. Questionnaires can simply be handed to respondents with a minimum of explanation. Further, questionnaires can often be administered to large numbers of individuals simultaneously. It is usually possible to cover a wider geographical area and to obtain information from more people by means of questionnaires than by personally interviewing each respondent.⁹⁶

Open-ended and closed questions were prepared and administered to students at the following state universities: Dschang, Buea, Douala and Yaoundé I and II. The questionnaire was conceptualised around two central issues: lifestyle and the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. The questionnaire was divided into four major sections. Section one was aimed at obtaining data on the type of music and food that they like and about football in general. Section two focussed on the influence of Western culture on the youths. Section three dealt with language and the media and finally, Section four investigated their knowledge of the Anglophone question. Questionnaires were relevant

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Cohen, L. and Manion, L. (1980), *Research Methods in Education*, Kent: Croom Helm, p. 292.

⁹⁶ Selltitz et al, (1959), *Research Methods in Social Relations*, New York: Rinehard and Winston, p. 38.

to this research because they allowed the collection of some important data on aspects of Cameroonian response to the melting point between Anglophone and Francophone. The questions were also designed to provide information relating to the research questions of this project. A sample of the questionnaire is found in appendix one of this thesis.

A total of 435 questionnaires were administered in four state universities. However, the number of those returned was 368, thus making the percentage of total returns 93%. The questionnaires comprised 38 questions and all the questionnaires were delivered and collected personally by the researcher. It is regarded as distinctly advantageous to give questionnaires personally to subjects because the purpose of the study can be explained, and in some cases the questionnaires can be completed on the spot. This personal contact is considered significant in building better co-operation between the researcher and the respondent.⁹⁷

Semi-Structured Interviews

These are generally regarded by experts as the best form of interviews because the researcher can move beyond the prepared interview questions to spark off more informal discussion.⁹⁸ Semi-structured interviews provide “more opportunities for asking and probing” and the rate of return is good, as opposed to questionnaires where some (or even most) may not be returned. Another advantage of the interview is its greater flexibility because, in a questionnaire, if the subject misinterprets a question, there is usually little that can be done to remedy the situation. In an interview there is the possibility of

⁹⁷ Bell, J. (1987), *Doing your Research*, Buckingham: Open University Press, p. 85.

⁹⁸ Hyslop, John (August 2000), “Seminar Notes on Questionnaires”, Wits University: Unpublished.

repeating or rephrasing the questions to make sure that they are understood. “The interview is a more appropriate technique for revealing information about complex, emotionally laden subjects or for probing the sentiments that may underlie an expressed opinion”.⁹⁹ The kind of interview used in this research goes far beyond that of the semi-structured interview because the researcher also used life testimonies to develop a deeper understanding of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. (See appendix three and four for interviews and life history questionnaires).

Observation

Direct observation made for this research started in June 2005. The process involved spending some time around the university vicinity, in restaurants, in market places, in church and in nightclubs observing the interaction, activities and experience of Anglophones and Francophones living together. Visiting these places, taking down notes proved useful to the researcher in providing relevant information needed for this research.

The need to show whether Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon have more in common than they can acknowledge was one research aim, which this research seeks to answer. This necessitated the use of direct observation techniques on youths in Cameroon, taking into consideration the type of music they like, their dressing style and to see if they are being influenced by any Western culture. Directly observing the youths in the vicinity of the four state universities shed some light on how they are being influenced by the American culture of hip-hop and Rap.

⁹⁹ Selltitz et al, (1959), *Research Methods in Social Relations*, p. 41.

Qualitative research is regarded as being “multimodal in focus”¹⁰⁰ in that it uses a number of methods to gather data. The use of many methods is an attempt to get an in-depth understanding of what is being researched. The use of questionnaires, interviews and observation in this study is an attempt to “see” from different perspectives in order to make more informed comparisons, contrasts and generalizations about the aims and objectives of this research.

Analysis of Data

Archival library search consisted of sourcing data from books, journals, newspapers, magazines, communiqués, and material from the National Archive in Buea (NAB). Relevant literature from these sources was reviewed and analyzed with particular reference to what we are told about the Anglophone minority in Cameroon. How did the Anglophones come to be constituted as a minority? The research also looked at the processes by which the Anglophones have been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination and the radical demands made by the Anglophones for political autonomy. The primary and secondary materials used in the literature were useful in providing an historical context in chapter one and information about the development of Anglophone nationalism in chapter three.

The Internet provided an invaluable source of information and data required for this research, especially when examining how Anglophone Cameroonians have built virtual communities in cyberspace to propagate their nationalism. Finally, Internet sources were used to a large extent looking at how the Anglophone problem became internationalized.

¹⁰⁰ Denzin, K. and Lincoln, Y. (1994), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, p. 11.

I relied heavily on the Internet sources because nothing has been published regarding the above issues raised. However, some Internet sources were used to reinforce the data in the other chapters of this research.

The data collected from the questionnaires, interviews and observations were grouped according to the different themes of the research. Placing the raw data under various themes made the analysis of the data very simple.

Problem Encountered while Collecting the Data for this Research

I experienced some difficulties both with the questionnaires and the interviews. As concerns the questionnaires, they were initially designed in English, but while on the field I realized that respondents were both French and English. This prompted me to get a translator to translate the questionnaires for the French respondents (see appendix two for questionnaires in French). Furthermore, since the questionnaires were distributed randomly, some students whose first language was English tried to answer in French and vice versa, thereby making the data transcription a very cumbersome exercise. In some cases I discarded the questionnaires because of poor language and illegible writing. Another major setback was the fact that the way the Francophones write is quite different from the Anglophones; as such I had difficulties in trying to read what some of the students had written in response to the questions.

As far as interviews were concerned, I had to go through all types of scrutiny before interviewing some persons. A letter from my supervisor introducing me as a Wits student, who has been allocated some funding to complete a fieldwork research in

Cameroon was produced each time I approached a person to request an interview. Prior to my fieldwork research, I was cautioned by my supervisor to keep a low profile because the area I am researching in is a very sensitive issue. No doubt, the reaction I got from a couple of high profile personalities in government proved him right. In Bamenda, which is the capital of the North West province of Cameroon, I had no major problems speaking to people I had selected for interviews. Some of them took time off from their busy schedules, and granted me interviews. In the South West province, the story was different, as my requests to interview Dorothy Njeuma, the then Vice Chancellor of the University of Buea; Peter Mafamy Musonge, former Prime Minister and Dion Ngute, Minister Delegate in charge of Common Wealth at the Ministry of External Relations were all turned down. These people would have given me the government's perspective on the Anglophone problem in Cameroon.

Ethical Issues

Before embarking on the questionnaires and the interviews I explained to the participants the nature and the importance of my research. On this basis, I made it clear to the participants that they did not have to take part if they were unwilling and that the information obtained would be safeguarded and their identities protected, in the sense that their names would not be used when answering the questionnaires. The tapes used in recording the interviews were not labelled with names but rather with special codes to conceal identities. The questionnaires and the interviews contained both open-ended and closed questions to give the respondents the opportunity to freely explore their experiences to satisfy the aims and objectives of my research.

Establishing trust with respondents was a problem as respondents were often wary of discussing issues that could create trouble for them. Some of the people who granted interviews to me were extremely concerned that their names should not be mentioned in the research. Some people spoke to me and afterwards they were not quite sure of my intentions, and they kept seeking reassurance that this would not land them in trouble. I assured them that whatever information they had divulged would be used without mentioning their names.

Chapter Summary

The aim of the research is to understand how Anglophone Cameroon came to be constituted as a minority in the world and how it is being treated as a minority. It is important to examine the relevant literature on minority rights asking, what constitutes a minority? Various definitions of minority rights and their protection in international law are examined. Literature on political liberalization is examined to support the claim that liberalization ushered in renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The introduction also covers the methodology used in this research to satisfy the aims and the hypotheses of this research.

Chapter one explores the historical development in Cameroon from pre-colonial, colonial, mandate and trusteeship systems, finally culminating in the reunification of the two Cameroons. This chapter uses historical material to respond to the question whether the seeds of the current conflict in Cameroon can be found in the way in which colonial rule was implemented.

Chapter two traces the ways in which the new state has dealt with the question of national integration during the period of federation and how it deals with it currently in the unitary state. It asks what tools the government has been using and with what success? First, it examines integration in the following fields: economy and transport, institutions, legal systems, education and the promotion of bilingualism in general; secondly, it attempts to show that there were some visible cracks at the beginning as the government tried to carry out its policy of national integration of the two Cameroons. Southern Cameroonians had to bear the burden of the institutional changes because they were the minority. Thirdly, the chapter also examines integration in the unitary state and goes further to show that under the unitary state there are continuities with few changes to the government's policy of national integration. Today, Anglophone Cameroonians are clamouring for political autonomy because of a failed policy of national integration.

Chapter three explores the emergence of Southern Cameroonians nationalism. The first section traces the development of Anglophone movements in order to demonstrate that a lively political organization had come into being by 1945 largely due to British colonial policies in the territory. The second part of the chapter explores nationalism after independence and after political liberalization. The rest of the chapter explores the impetus and setbacks of the Anglophone movement from the early 1990s to the present day. And finally, it is argued that a certain dynamic of action and reaction took place as the state pursued more discriminatory and repressive policies against the Anglophones, and that the directions of the later Anglophone movements were critically conditioned by the policies of the state.

Chapter four examines the different ways in which the Anglophone problem became internationalized. The first part, explores the mechanism through which the Anglophone movements tried to enter into dialogue with the Cameroon government. The government's unwillingness to dialogue with the leaders of the Anglophone movement compelled the Anglophone political elite to seek other avenues to compel the government to act on the Anglophone question. The second part of the chapter focuses on the responses from the government and lastly, it examines the shift in an attempt to find a national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that goes beyond the question of national sovereignty.

Chapter five presents an in-depth discussion of the various virtual communities of Anglophone Cameroon found in cyberspace. The chapter begins with the reasons why Anglophones had to resort to this new technology as an instrumental tool to articulate their nationalism, as opposed to the older form of nationalism that requires proximity. The second section of this chapter explores the content of advocacy websites that propagate the ideal of political autonomy for Anglophone Cameroon. The final section of the chapter discusses a number of websites on Anglophone Cameroon that only provide information on the Anglophone struggle.

Chapter six focuses on the limits of the discourse of Anglophone nationalism, by showing that Anglophones and Francophones have more in common than they can acknowledge. Focus is on lifestyle issues such as Cameroon music, media, food, dress and fashion,

language and sports and finally Anglophone and Francophone views on the Anglophone question.

Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes the major arguments and findings of the thesis. It addresses the Anglophone problem within some broader issues regarding minority rights and political liberalization.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1 Introduction

In order to gain an insight into contemporary politics in Cameroon today regarding the Anglophone problem, it is critical to examine the various claims made by the government and the Anglophone movements based on colonial history. These claims can be understood only with a proper grasp of the colonial history of Cameroon and its cultural, ethnic, economic and political diversities. The reunification of the two Cameroons brought together peoples whose separate colonial experiences provided clear contrasts in language, law, administration, education and political style. The question one will attempt to answer is “what were the underlying reasons for such a union?” In the analysis, one needs to go back to the various phases of the colonial experience under the Germans, British and the French in the Cameroons and historical material will be used to ascertain whether or not the seeds of the current conflict are to be found in the way in which colonial rule was implemented in this area. The colonial experiences of Cameroon under the Germans, French and British have not only been the basis for the entity Cameroon, but have also made numerous contributions, negative and positive, to the country’s social, economic, demographic, and political history.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ DeLancey, Mark (1989), *Cameroon: Dependence and Independence*, London: Westview Press, p. 7.

This chapter focuses on the following historical considerations: pre-colonial developments in the territory; the colonial period, including the German protectorate, the mandate system, and the trusteeship period, and nationalism and reunification and lastly the Fomuban Conference that finalized the reunification of the two Cameroons.

1.2 Pre-Colonial Period

This part of the study seeks to account for some form of political and socio-economic cooperation that existed in pre-colonial Cameroon. Of interest would be the nature of political cooperation for people of Cameroon stateless system during this period. If some members of Cameroon stateless system did manage to establish substantial political communities, were they positively motivated to do so or simply compelled by circumstances? Scholars have written much about pre-industrial societies, according to Hobbes, life in pre-industrial societies was a war of all against all.¹⁰² Some studies emphasized the difficulty of defining leadership roles and the scope of political organization in pre-colonial societies.¹⁰³ But in a case where a community is threatened by another, it is obvious that it would shift from dispersed settlement into defensible settlements. Under such circumstances, several factors may encourage acceptance of chiefly authority, including the need for more effective mechanisms of conflict resolution and the necessity of organizing for a common defence.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Dillon G. [Richard](#) (1990), **Ranking and Resistance, A Precolonial Cameroonian Polity in Regional Perspective**, London: Stanford University Press. p.2

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p.6

Claude Meillassoux a neo-Marxists used a model of 'self sustaining agricultural society' to understand the elaborate stateless system of pre-colonial Africa by focusing upon effective structures of control within the kinship system. He attempts to understand these by portraying a local farming community as a highly competitive system in which elders base their dominant power upon control of economic resources and nubile women, as well as on alliance with peers in neighboring groups. According to Meillassoux, elders in pre-colonial African societies naturally tend to supervise both production and the family granaries in which the harvest is stored. This permits them to consolidate control over resources on a day-to-day basis. The elders also have monopoly over marriageable women. In case of war threats from neighboring communities, the elders would mobilize the people to fight back and ancestor worship helps to legitimate the powers of the elders.

As discuss above the aim is to dispel European argument that pre-colonial Africa stateless societies was a dark territory that its people were benighted and living in a state of anarchy and primitive barbarity before they were introduced to the light of civilization which colonialism brought. Before the coming of the Europeans there was no Cameroon as it is know today. What was known of the country was limited to the coastal region. The Arabs from North of Africa knew only the northern region of the country. On the eve of colonization there were basically two types of political organization operating in Cameroon. One was a centralized political organization in which there was a recognized ruler, this system of hierarchical chiefdom was found among the ethnic communities of the Bamileke and Bamum in the Western Province, the Tikar and Chamba fondoms of

the North West Province.¹⁰⁵ These chiefdoms were ruled by sacred rulers usually known as Fons to whom its members pay allegiance. The Fon presided over village gatherings and made final decisions in matters of war and peace. The welfare of the fendom depended on him and he was also responsible for and accountable to his people. In Adamawa, North and Kotoko exist a well established Islamic society ruled by the lamido who was a political and a religious leader.¹⁰⁶

The other was an uncentralised political organization with no one holding strong power at the centre. This system was found among the Beti, the Bassa-Bakoko and the coastal Bantu. The political and judicial control of these local lineage-based communities in some cases was in the hands of village head, officers of the clans, associations, secret societies and village council to whom political authority accrued as a consequence of those positions. The village or clan head was expected to organize law and order in the clan. His authority was never absolute and he acted only when there was a consensus of opinion on an issue.¹⁰⁷

Cameroon's economy on the eve of independence was largely subsistence. Cameroonians earned their living from the land. Agriculture was dominant and all other economic activities were centred around it. Animal husbandry was practiced in the north of the country. Livestock were kept for their meat, milk, cheese, butter and manure. Sheep were also kept for wool, Poultry were raised for food. Pigs were bred on a large scale in

¹⁰⁵ Fanso, V. G. (1989) *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: the Colonial and Post Colonial Periods Vol 2*, Macmillan: London. p. 2

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p.3

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

the forest region. Hunting and fishing were also important economic activities in the forest and coastal regions. The market-place was an economic as well as a social centre for the people. It was important not only as a place of buying and selling or exchange of goods, but also as a meeting place for relative, friends and traditional authorities.¹⁰⁸

Before Christianity and Islam was introduced in Cameroon. The people believe in several minor gods, good and evil spirits and powers such as ghost and ancestor, occupying the space between the divine creator and Man. It was strongly believe that ancestors were part of the living society and that they continue to maintain interest in the welfare of their descendants. The living communities used sacrifices as paths of communication and sharing between them and their ancestors.

The Cameroons entered modern history around the fifteenth century with the Portuguese exploitation of its Coastal region. In 1472, the Portuguese arrived on the island that was subsequently named Fernando Po. As they sailed into the Wouri estuary, they found a variety of prawns; they called the river Rio dos Cameroes (River of Prawns). It was by that name that Cameroon appeared on the first Portuguese map of the region.¹⁰⁹ As such, the Portuguese became active traders along the coast of Cameroon in ivory and gold and they did not undertake any extensive exploration of the Cameroons hinterland because of the hostility of the coastal tribes and prevalence of insect-borne diseases.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Ibid p. 4

¹⁰⁹ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 17.

1.3 The Colonization of Cameroon

The motive for the scramble for Africa appeared to be the acquisition of African territories as a means of acquiring national prestige, wealth and power. The lucrative slave trade to the Americas and the need for raw materials for the industrial revolution in Europe contributed to the struggle for and the establishment of Cameroon as a German colony in 1884.¹¹¹ Cameroon's geographical position was strategically important for the slave trade. With the slave trade boom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Dutch, Portuguese, French, English, Swedish, and Danish were active slave traders on the Cameroon coast.¹¹² It appears that the European traders made little effort to establish permanent footholds on Cameroon as most of them remained aboard their ships, just dealing with the coastal tribes that served as middlemen.¹¹³ The Calabar chiefs or the Bimbia and Douala merchants were typical examples of such middlemen. The earliest slaves to be exported were probably local criminals, but as the demand increased, people living on or near the coast began to penetrate further into the interior for deliberate or forceful capture of innocent people for sale as slaves.¹¹⁴

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain spearheaded the abolition of the slave trade. In 1827 it opened a garrison at Fernando Po to control the shipping of slaves from the Bights of Biafra and Benin.¹¹⁵ Britain used this advantage to encourage many British trading firms to set up trading posts on the Cameroon coast. It is during this period that the use of Pidgin English as a lingua franca along the West African coast began to

¹¹¹ Atanga, Lucien (1994), *The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a Linguistic Minority*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Amadu Bello University, Zaria, p. 45.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 17.

¹¹⁴ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, England: LongMan Group Limited, p. 43.

¹¹⁵ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 18.

spread.¹¹⁶ British influence and activities increased due to English missionary societies establishing missions on the Cameroon coast. By late 1844, the missionaries had purchased and established a church on a piece of land at Bimbia.¹¹⁷ In 1858, Alfred Saker purchased a piece of land from the King of Bimbia and established the Victoria Settlement,¹¹⁸ believed to be the first permanent settlement on the Cameroons coast. In 1842 the British consul, Hewett signed a treaty with two native kings on the Cameroons coast to encourage the legitimate trade in palm oil and ivory, on condition that slave trade stopped.¹¹⁹ With trade booming on the Cameroons coast, British and German traders cooperated well, but with the Germans acknowledging British supremacy on the Cameroons coast. However, the British saw in the French their principal rival because, by 1870, the French had established trading posts along the Cameroons coast from Malimba, Big Batanga and Campo.¹²⁰ This marked the scramble for the Cameroons proper.

Between 1877 and 1884, local chiefs along the coast of Cameroons showed their marked preference for the British by directing a number of requests for protection and annexation to the British government, either directly to London or to Consul Hewett in the Gulf of Guinea.¹²¹ The British were slow in reacting to the coastal chief's request for British protection. It was only in 1882 that Edward Hewett was instructed from London to prepare a report on the Cameroons about the kings, the people, and the trade in the territory. This was to enable the government to give the question of annexation full

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, p. 46.

¹²¹ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 20.

consideration.¹²² Hewett, in his report, recommended that treaties be made with the coastal chiefs, given the heavy French presence in the coastal areas. In late November 1883, Hewett's report was approved and in 1884 Hewett was dispatched with treaty forms for the native chiefs to sign, under instruction to keep the entire affair completely secret until the last of the treaties had been signed.¹²³ According to the British plan, Hewett was to proceed along the Nigeria coast with his treaty forms and Captain Brook, senior officer of the West African Fleet was to go to Big Batanga to have the pro-English kings there sign one of the treaties. While Brook was at Big Batanga he learned that a German gunboat, the *Mowe* was going to the Cameroons River and he immediately dispatched Lieutenant Moore on the *Goshawk* to Douala to ask the native kings not to sign any treaties until Hewett showed up.¹²⁴

Germans on their part had been preparing for the effective occupation of the Cameroons. German traders with interest in the Cameroons had succeeded in convincing the local kings that the "British were not to be trusted in word or deed and that their future lay with Germany".¹²⁵ On 20 June 1884, the German agents in Cameroon of the Hamburg firm of Woermann received instructions to inform the native chiefs that Germany wanted to annex their territory.¹²⁶ Dr Gustav Nachtigal, a well known German explorer and the German Consul General in Tunis arrived in Douala on 14 July 1884 and made treaties with the chiefs. Meanwhile, Hewett heard of the arrival of the Germans and immediately set sail for the Cameroons. But he arrived too late, on 19 July 1884, only to learn that the

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid, p. 21.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.


¹²⁶ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, p. 48.

Germans had signed treaties of annexation with kings Bell and Akwa on July 14.¹²⁷ Hewett's arrival on 19 July 1884 was not only greeted by the German flag flying in Douala but also with the installation of Dr Buchner as the imperial representative. The last obstacle to German control of the Cameroons was eliminated in 1887 when the British Missionary colony in Victoria, (the Baptist Missionary society), sold its holdings to the Basel mission after two years of negotiation.

¹²⁷ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 21.

Map 1

German Cameroons



German Cameroons (Source www.unimaps.com)

1.4 The German Protectorate

The Cameroons became a German protectorate in 1884. Negotiations between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other from 1884 to 1894 resulted in the formal creation of German Kamerun. In March 1894 Germany and France signed a treaty that gave the Cameroons its form and size until 1911.¹²⁸ Before the 1894 treaty was signed, “the only officially defined boundary between French and German territory was the Cameroons Southern one, running up the Campo River and ending at 15 degrees east longitude”.¹²⁹ However, there was still no precise definition of boundaries as the boundary was unmarked and it often caused confusion to trade and government. In a treaty between Germany and France in 1911, Germany agreed to give up its rights in Morocco to France and, in return, Germany obtained from France considerable territory in the French Congo. This increased the total area of the German Cameroons to 292,000 square miles with an estimated total population of about 2,650,000 people.¹³⁰ According to Rudin, after the 1911 treaty with France, “the colony spread out like a fan toward the east, touching the Tchad in the north-east and branches of the Congo in the South-east, and giving the impression of being not immovably into the African continent”.¹³¹ This 1911 treaty expanded German’s territory in the area by fifty percent.

German rule in Cameroon lasted only thirty years, from 1884 to 1914, and the name of the country under the German colonial rule was spelt Kamerun. Historical analysts like

¹²⁸ Rudin, R. Harry (1938), *Germans in the Cameroons: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism*, United States of America: Yale University Press, p. 102.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 85.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 102.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Edwin Ardener, describe this period between 1884 and 1914 as the “Golden Period”.¹³² This is because, under the Germans, the country was united, not as yet partitioned between the French and the British. Since then this partition has been a threat to national unity in present day Cameroon.¹³³ During German colonial rule, the country’s international boundaries were fixed, the foundations of its modern economic structures were laid, and most of its towns were established. This was manifested in basic transportation such as “the wharves and docks at Douala, Campo, Victoria and Kribi, a good number of bridges, roads and well constructed public and private buildings, many of which are still in use today by the Cameroon government”.¹³⁴

1.4.1 German Administration in the Cameroons

The German administration in the Cameroons was established by the German Colonial Constitution of 1886 - 1888. A system of government was introduced by the Germans in Cameroon which made the people dependent on the colonial powers for authority. The colonial administration was headed by a Governor who was responsible to the Colonial Office. According to the German Colonial Constitution, he had the right to legislate for the country, to collect and levy taxes and to administer the courts and the military forces.¹³⁵ He also had control over the courts of the colony and acted in person as the court of highest appeal in the Cameroons. Due to the size of the territory, the governor delegated some of his powers to local administrators for effective administration. The natives played a fairly large part in the administration of local affairs, for instance, the

¹³² Ardener, Edwin (1962), ‘The Political History of Cameroon’, *The World Today*, 18, 8: pp. 341-350.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, pp. 67-77.

¹³⁵ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroon: An African Federation*, London: Pall Mall Press, p. 33.

collection of taxes was in the hands of chieftains, who received a percentage of the amount collected.¹³⁶ In some matters native chiefs had the right to adjudicate disputes in native courts according to customary laws. German administrative duties included the establishment and maintenance of good relations with local chiefs in the area. They also “supervised work in the area of roads, health, education and missions, and also promoted trade and agriculture, including the study of climatic conditions”.¹³⁷

1.4.1a Courts

Courts were among the main institutions established by the German Colonial rule in Cameroon. Two sets of courts were established in the colony, one for whites and one for natives, in which German civil and criminal law and procedure was applied.¹³⁸ For the whites the court of first instance was the court of the administrative district presided over by a judge aided by two or four lay assistants. Punishment for whites in the Cameroons for the violation of law was rare. Whites sentenced to more than six months would serve their sentence in Germany, but in most cases they were asked to pay fines. For the Native Courts matters were handled by German officials assisted by interpreters. The use of interpreters was not just for the sake of translation, but also an attempt to respect native custom and law of the land. The penalties inflicted on blacks differed from those of whites. Whipping and other forms of corporal punishment, largely disliked by the local people were the common form of punishment for natives.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 187.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 35.

¹³⁸ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroon: An African Federation*, p. 35.

¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 202.

1.4.1b German Economic Exploitation of the Cameroons

The economic exploitation of the Cameroons was effected through trade and by plantation. Earlier trade was by barter, natives bringing products to the ships for exchange with the Europeans Cloths, trinkets, firearms, gunpowder, and liquor were the commodities they liked best. In exchange, they gave palm oil, ivory and palm kernels.¹⁴⁰ In 1907 the German government introduced money standard into the colony. It was only through this standard that natives could pay taxes, though the government often accepted ivory from natives in payment of taxes. The most productive source of colonial income came from levies on trade, chiefly from the tariffs imposed on imported goods. Exemptions from tariff payments were permitted on some goods such as those brought in by missionaries, machines needed on the plantations and in the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, and medical supplies.¹⁴¹

The Germans' focus on plantation in Cameroon was to make the colony produce commodities like cacao, tobacco, cotton and palm oil to meet German needs. The Germans also felt that the commodities obtained from natives by barter could be improved by plantations. The first plantation was set up in 1890 and by 1900 the number of planters grew rapidly. Palm oil and palm kernels were high export products of the Cameroons. In Germany, they were used in the manufacture of soap and candles. The Germans also made special efforts to produce cacao on a large scale to reduce the importation of cacao from Central and South America. In the period of German occupation of the Cameroons, rubber was the most important product of export from the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 223.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 248.

colony. The German government sought to maintain the continuous export of rubber from Cameroon by instructing the natives on how to open rubber plantations and how to tap rubber trees for latex without destroying them. Roads were also constructed to speed up the transportation of rubber to the coast.¹⁴²

The economic policy of the German colonial administration in Cameroon was determined largely by the economic interests of the German market. Germans invested in the opening up of plantations around Buea and Victoria; and the growth of these plantations led to improved transportation facilities. Though the plantation owners constructed some private roads, responsibility for building and maintenance of the public roads rested with the villages and tribes through which they ran.¹⁴³ The German government provided loan facilities for the construction of a railway to serve the private interests of the plantations. In 1906, a 160 kilometre privately owned off-rail track was constructed from Bonaberi to Nkongsamba. The government also constructed another railway intended to run from Douala to the Nyong River town.¹⁴⁴ This rail provided the basis for the country's inland transport. All these economic activities, such as trade, plantations and the development of transport, went a long way to develop the Cameroon's economy. Today, Cameroon's agricultural export comes from the plantations that were established by the Germans. The Germans stand accused of forcefully expropriating the indigenous lands of the Bakweri ethnic group for purposes of large-scale plantation agriculture without duly compensating the people. When the Cameroon government took over control of the plantations from the colonial masters, it became government land. So the indigenes of the land have taken the

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 267.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

government to court so that the government will compensate them for their land. (This section is further developed in chapter four).

1.4.1c Health

Health conditions during the German colonial rule were appalling, especially in the plantations. In spite of attempts made by the German government to fight diseases such as malaria, leprosy, smallpox, sleeping sickness and dysentery, the death rate of indigenes from these diseases was alarming.¹⁴⁵ By 1912 there were about twenty-nine German doctors in Cameroon; fifteen were attached to the military and nine to the civil administration. The remaining five were assigned specifically to deal with sleeping sickness.¹⁴⁶

1.4.1d Education

Education under German rule was largely controlled by the Christian missions but was closely supervised by the government. The government made sure that German was taught as a first foreign language. Some initiative was also carried out by the government in establishing a number of agricultural schools at Victoria, Dschang, and Yaoundé. The government also succeeded in operating four schools, in Douala, Victoria, Yaoundé and Garoua. On the other hand the missions operated 631 schools with some 40,000 pupils. In assisting the government in educating the indigenes, financial subventions were provided by the government to the missions to expand the German language and culture.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 38.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

1.5 Cameroon and World War I

With the advent of the First World War in Europe in 1914 between the Allies and the Central powers, a German attempt to exempt European African colonies from the war failed. In August 1914 Britain and France decided to jointly attack the German colony of Cameroon following their joint success in Togoland. In September 1914, the Allied forces captured Douala and the Germans were forced to retreat inland to Yaoundé where they established their capital.¹⁴⁸ To take complete control of Cameroon, the French proposed that Britain and France should establish a condominium (joint Anglo-French administration) in Cameroon. Both Britain and France agreed to establish a condominium by January 1915. The proposed condominium was never implemented because of fundamental differences between the British and the French regarding modalities of application and execution. Accordingly, the differences persisted as the war progressed and in 1916 the Germans surrendered and left the territory without the British and French having effectively established a condominium in the territory.¹⁴⁹ Shortly after the Germans were defeated, the Allied powers reached an agreement on the division of Cameroon between them. France received four fifths of the territory and Britain two separate areas bordering on Nigeria.¹⁵⁰ Each country proceeded to establish a system of government, which they had been operating in their colonies. The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 established a new system of mandate to deal with conquered colonies. By 1922, Britain and France agreed to undertake the administration of their part of Cameroon as a mandate from the League of Nations.¹⁵¹


¹⁴⁸ Ngoh, Victor (1996), *History of Cameroon Since 1800*, Limbe: Pressbook, p. 125.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 129.

¹⁵⁰ Le Vine, Victor, *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 32.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 35.

Map 2
Cameroon after World War 1



Cameroon after World War I, Source Rubin N. (1971:26)

1.6 The League of Nations Mandate System

When Germany was defeated in War World I, its colonies were seized and distributed among the allied and associated powers. It was said that “Germany badly administered its colonies and brutally repressed the revolts of the colonized peoples”.¹⁵² But the former German possessions were not to be annexed by the states that succeeded Germany. The League of Nations was to supervise the administration of the mandate territories. The “mandatory” powers reported annually on the results of their administration to the League. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations officialized the system of mandates.¹⁵³ Class A mandates were peoples capable of administering themselves on their own (these were mainly provinces of the former Ottoman Empire); they had to become independent. Class B mandates were mostly German colonies in Africa; they were to be administered by mandatory powers with full powers of legislation and administration. (The territory of Cameroon fell under the Class B mandates). Class C mandates consisted of Southwest Africa and German colonies in the Pacific.¹⁵⁴ These areas were sparsely populated and the mandatory powers were to apply their own laws, as if they were parts of their own territory.

1.6.1 Cameroons under British Mandate 1922 - 1939

British colonial policy in Africa was not different from that in British Cameroons. The primary objective of the British colonial policy was to maintain a long period of external

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 37.

¹⁵³ Zargbibe, Charles “From Bismark to Hitler, Germany and Africa” 24 April 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.asp/article>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

control over its possessions at a minimal cost to the crown.¹⁵⁵ Britain justified this policy by alleging that “the ultimate aim of British colonialism was self-government for the colonized territories”.¹⁵⁶ This self-government was to be instituted through a gradual process of increasing the degree of participation by the natives in the political decision-making process set up by the colonial administration.¹⁵⁷ What were the instruments for carrying out these policies? The British saw in Africa traditional institutions that suited their purpose¹⁵⁸ and where such institutions did not exist, they always tried to create them. The creation of warrant chiefs and legislative councils all stemmed from the concept of indirect rule. This was in pursuit of the British notion of recognizing and supporting the customary authorities in African societies, the chiefs and elders.¹⁵⁹

1.6.1a Indirect Rule

The Principles of Indirect Rule were most clearly presented by one of Britain’s greatest colonial administrators, Lord Lugard.¹⁶⁰ According to Lugard, the two most important administrative principles to employ when ruling alien peoples were ‘decentralization’ and

¹⁵⁵ Crowder, Michael (1970), “Indirect Rule French and British Style” in Markovitz (ed.), *African Politics and Society: Basic Issues and Problems of Government and Development*, New York: The Free Press, p. 59.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 60.

¹⁵⁸ Atanga, Lucien (1994), *The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a Linguistic Minority*, p. 51.

¹⁵⁹ Crowder, Michael (1970), “Indirect Rule French and British Style”, p. 61.

¹⁶⁰ Sir Frederick Lord Lugard was Governor General of the Colony of Nigeria from 1912 to 1919. He is the author of *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, which regards indirect rule in colonial Africa. In this work, Lugard outlines the reasons and methods that should be employed in the colonization of Africa by Britain. Some of his justifications included spreading Christianity and ending barbarism. Lugard pushed for native rule in African colonies. He reasoned that black Africans were very different from white Europeans. Therefore, natives should act as a sort of middle manager in colonial governance. This would avoid revolt because, as Lugard believed, the people of Africa would be more likely to follow someone who looked like them, spoke their languages, and shared their customs. The technique was employed successfully by European colonial leaders.

‘continuity’.¹⁶¹ Thus the role of the British officers in the colonies, except in such critical areas as taxation, military force and alienation of land, was to advise and not demand. The officers did not only have to use the indigenous institutions, which were foreign to them, they were expected to improve them by educating the chiefs without simultaneously destroying the authority of the traditional ruler.¹⁶² By making use of indigenous institutions and the authorities, the British officials could preserve continuity with the past, while at the same time laying the foundation for the progressive improvement of the indigenous society. On the contrary, “indirect rule with all its faults was not a system based on humanitarian motives; it was an administrative structure to perpetuate imperialism, instituted not because it was good for the people, but because it was cheap and practical”.¹⁶³

For administrative convenience, the British administered the two small separate areas they acquired after World War I in Cameroon as an integral part of Nigeria. Nigerian laws were applied in these areas. Northern Cameroons was divided administratively among the three Northern Nigerian provinces of Benue, Adamawa and Bornu, while the Southern part of Cameroons was administered as part of the Southern Province of Nigeria.¹⁶⁴ Throughout the mandate, the history of British Cameroons was intimately linked to that of Nigeria. Ruled as an appendage of Nigeria, British Cameroons did not receive the direct attention of the British administering authorities. Consequently, the

¹⁶¹ Collins, O. Roberts (1970), “Indirect Rule in Theory and Practice” in Collins Roberts (ed.), *Problems in the History of Colonial Africa, 1860-1960*, London: Prentice Hall, p. 83.

¹⁶² Akpan, Ntieyong (1970), “Epitaph of Indirect Rule” in Collins Roberts (ed.), *Problems in the History of Colonial Africa, 1860-1960*, p. 149.

¹⁶³ Collins, O. Roberts (1970), “Indirect Rule in Theory and Practice”, p. 87.

¹⁶⁴ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, p. 86.

economy of British Southern Cameroons remained centred on the plantations which the Germans had developed.¹⁶⁵ There was little government expenditure, either on social service or public works.

There were no roads linking British Cameroons and Nigeria. It took Cameroonians who had to go and attend secondary school in Nigeria eleven days to travel by sea from Mamfe to Calabar. It was a frightful experience for people from the grass field where there were no sea and canoe to undertake such a journey. Travelling from Eko (a border town with Nigeria) to Bamenda was also a difficult task as it took several days before one could get to Bamenda and the Nigerians who ran the transport system in those days were extortionist as they duped British Cameroonians travelling on that road. Besides, given the overwhelming presence of the Nigerians and their dominance in the administrative, economic, and social life of the territory created some problems between Cameroonians and Nigerians.¹⁶⁶

Administratively, British Southern Cameroons was placed under the authority of the Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Province of Nigeria, and a Senior Resident ran the affairs of the Cameroon province from Buea; there were four administrative divisions namely Buea, Victoria, Mamfe and Bamenda.¹⁶⁷ In line with its policy of indirect rule, a number of different local authorities were established based on traditional chiefs or on councils composed of village elders, and in some cases village chiefs were appointed in the administrative unit.¹⁶⁸ These local authorities were responsible for various aspects of local government under the supervision of district officers. They were in charge of operating courts, collecting taxes, and dealing with issues such as health and sanitation and roads.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Fon S.A.N. Angwafo III, Fon of Mankon, interviewed 21 June 2005.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroon: An African Federation*, p. 73.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 74.

¹⁶⁹ Mbuagbaw et al, *A History of the Cameroon*, p. 93.

The British colonial administration did not establish many schools in the British Southern Cameroons. Elementary education was in the hands of the Government Native Authorities and the missions.¹⁷⁰ Education in British Southern Cameroon was dictated by the British education policy for Nigeria. In 1926, the Nigerian Education Department regulations were officially implemented in Southern Cameroons.¹⁷¹ In 1927, vernacular was used as a medium of instruction in the first stages of elementary education. English language was to be used in intermediate, secondary and technical schools. All schools in Southern Cameroons were classified as elementary schools and the government was responsible for the general direction of all educational policy and supervised all institutions.¹⁷² The curriculum of the elementary schools included the teaching of Hygiene, Agriculture, Reading, Writing, Arithmetic and Religious Instruction.

1.6.2 Cameroon under French Mandate 1922 - 1939

French policy in Cameroon was identical to the system of administration they applied in the French colonies of Equatorial Africa in spite of its “mandated” status. Such policies included paternalism, assimilation and association, which were all products of direct rule. French rule in Cameroon during the mandate period can better be understood by looking at the French policies of assimilation, association and paternalism. Assimilation was a policy meant to “propagate among the natives the language, the methods of work and progressively the spirit and civilization of France”.¹⁷³ This policy aimed at assimilating France’s colonial subjects to the point where they would actually be Frenchmen

¹⁷⁰ Ngoh, Victor (1996), *History of Cameroon Since 1800*, p. 174.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 175.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 174.

¹⁷³ Collins, O. Roberts (1970), “Assimilation and Association and French Colonial Rule in Africa”, p. 162.

linguistically, culturally, politically and legally.¹⁷⁴ Paternalism was a policy advocated by critics of assimilation who wanted France to relate as a father to her African colonies.¹⁷⁵ They believed that “Africans did not have the equal capacity with Europeans to learn and progress”.¹⁷⁶ As such, France had the responsibility to provide Africans with an administration run entirely by French officials. It is said that in matters of administration, “the French officials need not seek the opinion of the Africans of the territory they were administering because the Africans could not know what was best for them”.¹⁷⁷ Under the policy of association Africans were to develop within the context of their environment and society. The French would maintain their control by ruling indirectly through the traditional authorities. Like the indirect rule practice by the British, association was practical, economical and effective.¹⁷⁸ The bases of these policies were that French colonies were part of France, and that French civilization was superior to African civilization.¹⁷⁹

1.6.2a Direct Rule

The French policy of assimilation as practised in Cameroon during the mandate was not different from the policy practised in the other African territories acquired after World War I. A major obstacle to implementing a full policy of assimilation in these new territories was that, for decades these territories had not had contact with the French or with French civilization. Besides, France lacked the financial resources to establish an

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Fanso, V.G. (1989), *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post Colonial Periods*, Vol.2, London: Macmillan Education Ltd, p. 65.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Collins, O. Roberts (1970), “Assimilation and Association and French Colonial Rule in Africa”, p. 162.

¹⁷⁹ Willard, R. Johnson (1970), *The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 74.

educational system to fully implement the policy of assimilation among the African masses.¹⁸⁰ In view of these circumstances, the assimilationists decided that “France should try to create in each colony Gallicized élite¹⁸¹ which would help to spread French civilization among their people and would some day be able to participate in the administration of their territory”.¹⁸² As the members of these élite acquired a certain level of French culture, they might individually apply for French citizenship. In practice, only a few individuals in each territory achieved the cultural level which qualified them for French citizenship and many chose not to apply. As such, assimilation was preserved as a constitutional fiction, and no serious attempt was ever made to undertake the massive work of social transformation which could make it a reality.¹⁸³ Thus the policy of assimilation was pursued on a very limited scale in Cameroon. However, difficulties in the implementation of this policy led to the development of the policy of association. Association, unlike assimilation, “sought the formation of a Gallicized élite who, as leaders of their people would remain within the framework of an African society and serve as a link between the French officials and their people”.¹⁸⁴ The distinction between the French policies of assimilation and association was blurred. By confusing the two doctrines, it was possible to combine those features of each which contributed to the perpetuation of French rule.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Gardinier, E. David (1963), *Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy*, London: Oxford University Press, p. 13.

¹⁸¹ These new African elites mastered French, learned to negotiate the colonial administration, and frequently went to France for advanced education in one of the liberal professions.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Le Vine, Victor, *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 89.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Paternalism as practised in Cameroon during the mandate, like on other French African subjects in neighbouring colonies, was subjected to a system of summary punishment administered by the French sub-district officer. This system of punishment was known as 'indigénat'. It permitted the "authorities to impose penalties on subjects without having to justify their action before any court of law".¹⁸⁶ The indigénat was used in French Cameroons to punish natives who failed to work on the railway, to pay their taxes within the three months of its levy, who had not kept an appointment with the local district officer or who had come late to work on a public project.¹⁸⁷ The use of these measures during the mandate helped in the construction of roads and railways, but it also led to some abuses by the French authorities. The long hours of work, sometimes unpaid, and under injurious conditions, led to some resentment amongst French Cameroonians.¹⁸⁸

Throughout French Africa, the legal system distinguished between Africans, referring to those subject to native law and customs as 'subject' and those Africans assimilated into French culture as 'citizens'. The citizens possessed the civil, political and judicial rights of persons of French origin, while the subjects had only their traditional rights. They could become citizens by showing evidence of having become Europeanized through education and through employment of a 'European Character'.¹⁸⁹ This meant that the system of dual status found expression in the courts and the legal system, as the citizens and the subjects were subjected to two different legal systems. For the citizen in French Cameroon a set of French civil, commercial and penal code laws were applicable. For the

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 99.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 100.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, pp. 90-91.

subjects there was a tribunal which followed procedures prescribed by local custom and “applied customary laws as long as they were not in conflict with the principle of French civilization”.¹⁹⁰

The most outstanding achievement of French colonial rule in French Cameroon was probably in the area of education. The main educational objective of the French colonial authorities was to spread the French language, culture and civilization.¹⁹¹ This objective led to a very extensive development of fundamental education in the territory. A highly centralized and rigidly controlled system of education was set up in Cameroon in which every aspect of the curricula, examinations and educational administration was modelled after the French system.¹⁹² Private education was controlled through regular supervision and inspection. Subventions were also given to mission and private schools aimed at bringing private education in line with public education and under the firm control of the French colonial administration.¹⁹³

1.7 The Trusteeship System

With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the mandate system under which the Cameroons was administered during the mandate came to an abrupt end. However, the League of Nations and the mandate were not officially replaced until the end of the war and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and its trusteeship

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 103.

¹⁹¹ Ihims, Jacabs (2003), *A Century of Western Education in Cameroon: A Study of its History and Administration (1844-1961)*, Bamenda: Unique Printers, p. 120.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

system in 1945.¹⁹⁴ Both the UN Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements laid down basic guidelines for the post-war administrative, political, economic and social development in the trust territories. The UN was determined to stop colonialism, and this was seen in the articles that established the trusteeship system. Article 76 of the Charter provided for “the progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territory towards self-government or independence”.¹⁹⁵

1.7.1 Cameroon under French Rule: The Trusteeship Period 1946 - 1959

France continued with its policy of assimilation and paternalism during the trusteeship period. Though France was reluctant to place French Cameroon under the trusteeship system, it finally did so in 1946. But the French government submitted to the United Nations General Assembly an agreement of trusteeship on 30 September 1946, which permitted “France to administer Cameroon as an integral part of French territory”.¹⁹⁶ Hence Cameroon became an associate state, as was enshrined in the French constitution of 1946. The French National Assembly, with few representatives from Cameroon, determined the management of affairs in Cameroon.¹⁹⁷

1.7.1a The Emergence of Party Politics

The French constitution of 1946 encouraged the formation of political parties in the colonies. The first indigenous party in French Cameroon, *Union des populations du Cameroun* (UPC), was formed in Douala in April 1948. The UPC called for “the

¹⁹⁴ Fanso, V.G. (1989), *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post Colonial Periods*, Vol. 2: p. 102.

¹⁹⁵ Murray, James (1957), *The United Nations Trusteeship System*, Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, p. 249.

¹⁹⁶ Gardinier, David (1963), *Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy*, p. 21.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

unification of the two Cameroons and complete independence under the terms of the United Nations Charter”.¹⁹⁸ The UPC soon appeared in the eyes of the administration as a party of agitators intent on disturbing the peace of the territory.¹⁹⁹ In 1955, the UPC was banned, following a bloody uprising in Douala and Yaoundé. In a move to address some of the problems raised by the UPC, the French National Assembly passed a law in 1956 which provided for “institutional reforms by decrees, the acceptance of political developments in French Cameroon and single Electoral College election to all assemblies in French Cameroon”.²⁰⁰

1.7.1b Education

Secondary school education facilities became available in French Cameroon during the trusteeship period. Technical and vocational school facilities were still not adequate to accommodate the growing number of people wanting to attend these schools. The French administration made no provision for the training of secondary school teachers. This situation resulted in total dependence on obtaining secondary school teachers from France.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, the most spectacular achievement of the French colonial administration in its part of Cameroon was in the field of education.

1.7.2 Cameroon under the British Trusteeship: 1946 - 1961

In the greater part of the British Trusteeship period in Cameroon, Britain continued with its policy of indirect rule. British Cameroons continued to be administered as an integral

¹⁹⁸ Ngoh, Victor (ed.) (2004), *Cameroon: from Federal to a Unitary State 1961 - 1972*, Limbe: Design House, p. 8.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ihims, Jacabs (2003), *A Century of Western Education in Cameroon: A Study of its History and Administration (1844 - 1961)*, p. 120.

part of Nigeria. This meant that all political and administrative arrangements introduced in Nigeria directly or indirectly influenced developments in Cameroon. It was also during the trusteeship period that British Cameroons witnessed some significant political and administrative changes, changing from its status as a province of the Eastern region of Nigeria to a separate entity within Nigeria.²⁰² British Cameroons was accorded some form of regional status only after 1954 when it acquired some legislative, administrative and budgetary autonomy from the Nigerian and British governments. Even then Northern Cameroons continued to be administered as an integral part of the three Northern Nigeria Provinces of Bornu, Adamawa and Benue.²⁰³

1.7.2a Constitutional developments in British Cameroons

Constitutional development in British Cameroon appears to have contributed its fair share to the country's present day situation. In 1946, the Richard's Constitution²⁰⁴ replaced the Clifford's Constitution of 1922. The Richard's Constitution fell short of granting a regional and budgetary autonomy for British Cameroons. After some criticism from British Cameroons and Nigeria, the Richard's Constitution was amended to provide for thirteen elected members of the Eastern Regional House, two of whom were to come from Southern Cameroons.²⁰⁵ In 1948, Sir John MacPherson had taken over from Sir Arthur Richardson as governor of Nigeria. He immediately introduced some reforms which increased political activities in Nigeria and Southern Cameroons. MacPherson's

²⁰² Fanso, V.G. (1989), *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post Colonial Periods*, p. 125.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Sir Arthur Richards ruled as Governor of Nigeria from 1943 to 1947, constitutional changes that he introduced in the colony were named after him.

²⁰⁵ Ngoh, Victor (1990), *Constitutional Development in Southern Cameroons, 1946-1961: From Trusteeship to Independence*, Yaoundé: CEPER, p. 86.

Constitution²⁰⁶ gave some hope to Southern Cameroonian nationalist struggles by increasing its representation in the Eastern Regional House.²⁰⁷ This constitution provided for thirteen members from Southern Cameroons. Although the MacPherson Constitution granted more seats to Southern Cameroons, it had major weaknesses: indirect Rule was still in existence and traditional rulers were still very powerful. The constitution granted neither regional nor budgetary autonomy to Southern Cameroons, which was still ruled as an integral part of Nigeria.²⁰⁸

1.7 The Emergence of Political Parties in British Cameroon

The trusteeship period in British Cameroons witnessed a great deal of political activity and the formation of political parties. Prior to the creation of political parties in British Cameroons, pressure groups such as the Cameroons Welfare Union (CWU), the Cameroons Youth League (CYL) and the Cameroons National Federation (CNF) were already in existence, spearheading the political agenda of the territory. It was only in June 1953 that the first real political party in British Cameroons, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) was formed. On 1 October 1954 British Cameroons became a quasi-territory with its own Executive Council and a House of Assembly. Endeley was elected leader of government business.²⁰⁹ Another party, the Kamerun People's Party (KPP), was also formed in 1953 by N.N. Mbile. In 1955, John Ngu Foncha and Augustine Ngom Jua, and some members of the KNC resigned from the party because the party was no longer advocating secession from Nigeria. They eventually formed the third political party in

²⁰⁶ Sir John MacPherson took over as Governor of Nigeria from Sir Arthur Richards in 1948. Reforms that he introduced were known as MacPherson's Constitution.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ NAB, File No. 4134/1/52, Reaction to Macpherson Constitution.

²⁰⁹ Fanso, V.G. (1989), *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post Colonial Periods*, p. 133.

Southern Cameroon known as the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). Other parties in Southern Cameroons worthy of mention were the One Kamerun (OK) and the Kamerun United Party (KUP).

1.6.8 Education

Britain did not do much in terms of education during the Trusteeship period. It opened only five government-sponsored primary schools in the entire territory.²¹⁰ As part of the tactics of the British colonial government to limit its direct involvement in education in the territory, it encouraged the opening and running of primary schools by what became known as Native Authority schools. As a result, the development of education in Southern Cameroons during the forty years of British administration did not go beyond the primary school level, except for teacher training institutions. On the eve of independence and reunification, there were only three mission secondary grammar schools and one government trade centre in British Cameroon.²¹¹ Britain's neglect of its territory and failure to open enough schools to accommodate British Cameroonians willing to study accounted for the sparsity of educated British Cameroonians, who at the eve of independence had acquired their education either from Nigeria or Britain.

²¹⁰ Ihims, Jacabs (2003), *A Century of Western Education in Cameroon: A Study of its History and Administration (1844 - 1961)*, p. 76.

²¹¹ Ibid.

1.7 Nationalism and Reunification

Nationalist sentiments were both evident in French and British Cameroons. The first noticeable sign was in French Cameroon and it gradually found its way into British Cameroons as it became a tool for political activism in French Cameroon.²¹² First steps towards the call in French Cameroon for unification of the two Cameroons started in 1948, with the formation of the *Union des populations du Cameroun* (UPC), a political party opposed to French colonial rule. The UPC called for the “immediate reunification of the two Cameroons and rapid progress towards complete independence under the terms of the United Nations Charter”.²¹³ In 1955 the UPC was banned because of its allegedly violent political agenda. Most of its leaders were forced to flee into exile. Some of them found safe heaven in British Southern Cameroons, and established their headquarters in Kumba where they continued with their party activities.²¹⁴ They soon ran into trouble with the Southern Cameroons government. In 1957 the UPC was banned by the British colonial administration and its leaders deported from Southern Cameroons. After the UPC was banned, a new party, One Kamerun (OK) was formed in Southern Cameroons by Nde Ntumazah, a former member of the banned UPC. The aim of this party was to continue the political agenda of the UPC. Support for the One Kamerun party came from the banned UPC members, because it favoured independence and reunification for Cameroon.²¹⁵ The government of Southern Cameroons banned OK not long after its formation.

²¹² Toh, P. Nja'ah (2001), *The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: The Prospects for Non-violent Transformation*, Bamenda: Quality Printers, p. 19.

²¹³ Ngoh, Victor (2004), *Cameroon from Federal to a Unitary State 1961 - 1972*, p. 8.

²¹⁴ Fanzo, V.G. (1989), *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges: The Colonial and Post Colonial Periods*, p. 133.

²¹⁵ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916 - 1960*, Yaoundé CEPER, p. 155.

In British Southern Cameroons some efforts were formed as early as 1939 to voice the dissatisfaction of the people because of the British neglect of their territory. These early nationalistic tendencies led to the founding of a number of pressure groups that finally led to the creation of political parties. The presence of the UPC in British Southern Cameroons invigorated the struggle for independence. In May 1949, a political conference of both French and English Cameroons was organized in Mamfe (British Cameroons). At the conference, the British were criticized for the lack of economic and educational growth in Southern Cameroons compared to that in French Cameroon, and demands were made for the transfer of the British territory to the French trusteeship.²¹⁶

It appears that the political conference of both British and French Cameroon elites ignited some nationalist feelings for unity between the two Cameroons. As a consequence, politics from the 1950s in British Cameroons was dominated by the question of seceding from Nigeria and reunifying with French Cameroon. Foncha and his KNDP favoured reunification with French Cameroon, while Endeley and the KNC - KPP alliance wanted the territory to gain its independence as a region in the Federation of Nigeria.²¹⁷ The differences between the Southern Cameroons leaders were carried to the United Nations when they had to present their case about the future of the Trust Territory. Due to the failure by both leaders to reach a consensus, the UN General Assembly finally decided that a separate plebiscite should be held in each part of British Cameroons. The UN decided that the plebiscite for Southern Cameroons would be held on 11 February 1961.

²¹⁶ Gardinier, David (1963), *Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy*, p. 62.

²¹⁷ Atanga, Lucien (1994), *The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the Alienation of a Linguistic Minority*, p. 71.

Foncha and his party began to campaign vigorously against joining Nigeria, by playing on local fears of Ibo domination from Nigeria—because the Ibos had come to pose an economic threat to indigenous Southern Cameroonians.²¹⁸ Endeley, the leader of CPNC on his part, undertook to convince the electorate by promising the people good administration and development. He also used the fact of terrorism in French Cameroon to scare voters. The advocates of unification won in the South and lost in the North. The results in the Northern Cameroons went in favour of union with Nigeria: 146,296 votes and only 97,659 voted in favour of the Cameroon Republic. In Southern Cameroons, 233,571 voted for union with Cameroon Republic and 97,741 went for union with Nigeria.²¹⁹ On the basis of the outcome of the plebiscite, delegates from Southern Cameroons finally met in Foumban in July 1961 to discuss the framework of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. These meetings eventually became known as the Foumban Conference.

1.8 The Foumban Conference

The Foumban constitutional conference was scheduled for 17–21 July 1961. In preparation for this conference political leaders from Southern Cameroons, Native Authority Councils, as well as traditional rulers held a convention in Bamenda in June. In their deliberations a common position was adopted for negotiations with the Republic of Cameroon. They agreed amongst other things to a “loose federation and a clear

²¹⁸ Ibid, p. 67.

²¹⁹ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 187.

distinction to be made between the rights of the state and that of the federation in order to preserve the local autonomy of the state and its power”.²²⁰

At the Fouban Conference, there were 25 delegates from the Southern Cameroons and 12 from the Republic of Cameroon. The delegates from the Republic of Cameroon presented the Southern Cameroons delegation with a constitution not different in character from the provisions of the Fifth French Republic of 1958, for deliberation. Southern Cameroons delegates “emphasized constitutional conceptions derived from the United States, Canada and Britain”.²²¹ Due to the poor bargaining position of the Southern Cameroons delegates, most of the proposals of the Bamenda Conference were simply ignored. Ahidjo, the then president of the Republic of Cameroon accepted those suggestions he could from the Southern Cameroons delegates and rejected those that were not in line with his preferred policy of establishing a strong central government.

Delegates from Southern Cameroons came out as loser, and were disappointed with the Fouban Constitutional talks because their request for “a quota of ministerial portfolios for Southern Cameroons and the bi-camera legislature which would have safeguarded regional interests in the federation was rejected by Ahidjo”.²²² Thus the constitution that was produced at Fouban did not take into account the aspirations of the people of Southern Cameroons. It created a highly centralized federal system with very limited

²²⁰ Ebune, Joseph (2004), “Making of the Federal System”, in Ngoh (ed.), *Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, Limbe: Design House, p. 67.

²²¹ Enonchong, H. (1976), *Cameroon Constitutional Law*. Yaoundé: CEPMAE, p. 84.

²²² Ebune, Joseph (2004), “Making of the Federal System”, in Ngoh (ed.), *Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary State 1961- 1972*, p. 69.

power being given to the states. The outcome therefore was an unbalanced union between the two Cameroons which weighed in favour of French Cameroon.

1.9.1 The French and British Approach to Colonialism Compared

Looking at the French and British colonial policies in the administration of their mandated and trust territories of the Cameroons, it appears the differences far outweighed the similarities. This accounts for the fact that, in spite of the reunification of the two Cameroons, both territories are still following their various colonial heritages. The question one would like to ask is how British and French colonial practices engineered such a deep penetration of attitudes and lifestyles in their former colonial possessions, to the point where attitudes still survive forty years after independence. To understand such attitudes in British and French Cameroon, the following section will examine some of the differences and similarities in their colonial practices.

1.9.2 The Role of Traditional Chiefs

The biggest difference between British and French colonial experience came in the treatment of the native population and in self-government of colonial possession. This can be seen clearly in the way in which the British emphasized the advisory role of British officials, while respecting the powers of the traditional authorities and the institutions by which they ruled.²²³ In British Southern Cameroons, the British met powerful local institutions headed by Fons and Chiefs and, where there were no chiefs, they created them. These local chiefs were used to implement colonial policies. Chiefs appointed as Native Authorities were empowered to collect tax revenue within their

²²³ Jua, B. Nantang, "Indirect Rule in the Post Colonial State" 6 December 2005. Accessed at <<http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Chilver/Paideuma/paideuma-Conclus-2.html>> Accessed 2006/12/6

jurisdictions for expenditure by the colonial Administrators on their advice.²²⁴ On the other hand, the French regarded the chiefs as petty officials in the colonial administration that had been retained for convenience rather than from any regard for their traditional authority and institutions of governing.²²⁵ This implies that the chiefs were subordinate to the French administrators. The chiefs in French Cameroon were agents of the administration and they did not administer an area which corresponded to a village or chiefdom.²²⁶ The French divided the area into logical administrative areas which often cut across traditional political boundaries.

The French system of administration reduced traditional chiefs to auxiliaries, and elevated Africans who learned French and accepted the French culture to an élite status. In the British territories the chiefs remained powerful figures, dispensing decisions and justice while the educated Africans were relegated by British officials to petty positions in the bureaucracy or were excluded from government.

1.9.3 Education as a Tool for Cultural Assimilation and Progress

Education was used as a powerful tool to transmit European culture to Africans. A further difference between the French and British is seen in the nature and role of education and language in their colonies. The French considered their language as the gateway to the French culture. In East Cameroon, the French discouraged the use of vernaculars in schools and French was imposed as the sole medium of instruction in all levels of

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Crowder, Michael (1970), "Indirect Rule French and British Style", p. 109.

²²⁶ Mbuagbaw et al (1987), *A History of the Cameroon*, p. 95.

education.²²⁷ The main educational objective of the French colonial authorities was the diffusion of the French language, culture and civilization. This objective led to a very extensive development of fundamental education in the territory. The French impact on the cultural values of Cameroonians was far greater than in other African territories they colonized, given the comparatively more extensive spread of formal education in Cameroon. As at the time of independence in 1960, Cameroonians were among the most numerous African student groups in French universities, and the attachment to, and competence in, French language and culture was greater among this group.²²⁸

Educational activities in British Southern Cameroon were largely neglected by the colonial government. English became the official language, in spite of the fact that the government encouraged the use of vernaculars in schools. Lord Lugard wrote “The object which education in Africa must have in view, must be to fit the ordinary individual to fill a useful part in his environment ... and to ensure that the exceptional individual shall use his abilities for the advancement of the community”.²²⁹ But Britain did not assume full responsibility of improving the educational facilities of its territory to equip the Southern Cameroonians. Instead, the colonial authorities resorted to a policy of local financing through taxation, school fees and education rating, all of which became too onerous for parents to bear.²³⁰ The British colonial administration could afford to open only five government-sponsored primary schools in the whole territory. More than ninety-five

²²⁷ Ihims, Jacobs (2003), *A Century of Western Education in Cameroon: A Study of its History and Administration (1844-1961)*, p. 120.

²²⁸ Willard, Johnson (1970), *The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society*, p. 82.

²²⁹ Lugard, Sir. F.D. (1923), *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, cited by Collins, O. Roberts (1970), “Indirect Rule in Theory and Practice”, p. 83.

²³⁰ Ihims, Jacob (2004), *A Century of Western Education in Cameroon: A Study of its History and Administration (1844 - 1961)*, p. 76.

percent of all educational institutions in the territory were in the hands of the Christian mission and, to an extent, the native administration.²³¹ Consequently, the development of education in Southern Cameroons during the forty years of British administration did not go beyond the primary school level. Higher education was available for Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria and was restricted numerically. Studies in Britain were possible only for a handful of scholarship holders.²³² This accounted for the scarcity of educated Southern Cameroonian elites at the time of independence, and this impacted negatively on their ability to negotiate the terms of the reunification agreement. As a result, they were manoeuvred by the delegates from French Cameroon into signing the reunification treaty without understanding its consequences.

1.9.4 Similarities between French and British rule

The French policy of association and the British policy of indirect rule were similar in that both maintained control by ruling indirectly through the traditional authorities. Under the French policy of association, Africans were to develop within the context of their environment and society. Association emphasized cooperation between the rulers and ruled and it respected the social and political institutions of the Africans. The British system of indirect rule was based on the system of letting the natives alone to develop in their own ways, and it rested on the recognition that people and their institutions were different and that these differences should be respected.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Fonlon, Bernard (1967), "The Language Problem in Cameroon: A Historical Perspective", in Smock, D and Bentsi-Enchill, K. (eds.), *The Search for National Integration in Africa*, New York: The Free Press, p. 196.


CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that under the Germans there was no distinction in Cameroon. It was only after the Germans were defeated in the First World War that Cameroon was arbitrarily divided into two unequal parts: The French Cameroons and the British Southern Cameroons. This division meant that the territory lost whatever unity it had achieved during the German protectorate. The two Cameroons under separate administration moved in different directions. This led to the development of two distinctly different Cameroons in culture, social, economic and political traditions.

The citizens of the two Cameroons had no choice but to imbibe the divergent French and British cultures and administrations that emerged. The British policy of indirect rule in Southern Cameroons, for all its faults, was much more preferred by the natives than any form of direct rule would have been. Politically, the British colonial administration provided a secured administrative and geographical framework within which the indigenous inhabitants were able to develop the sense of a common identity. The British also encouraged the participation of the people in local government and in councils, and prepared them for self-government. The British are also credited with implanting in the people of Southern Cameroons, through their policy of indirect rule, principles of personal dignity, integrity, self-reliance and self-confidence. Eventually, Southern Cameroonians imbibed the British way of life and administration, which they continue to appreciate to date. The French came to Africa on a civilizing mission and their aim was to make French Cameroon a part of France. They did not prepare their territory for self-government, as they pursued a policy of direct rule. The consequence of the French system of direct rule was the over reliance of the people of French Cameroon on France,

because they were never taught to do things for themselves. The French system worked well in French Cameroon as progress was made in education and health. Educational standards in French Cameroon were higher than in any other French colony in Africa, and some towns, like Yaoundé, Douala, Edea, Nkongsamba and Foumban, became rapidly urbanized. The difference between French and British attitudes towards the administration of their mandate and trust territories and the later reunification of the two Cameroons brought about a confrontation between the two different policies.

Map 3
Republic of Cameroon



Republic of Cameroon (Source Konings, P and Nyamnjoh, F 2003:3)

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDER FEDERALISM AND THE UNITARY STATE

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one covered the historical events that led to the Foumban constitutional talks and ultimately the reunification of the two Cameroons. The Foumban Conference laid the groundwork for the two Cameroons to go into a union of two states of equal status in a federation²³³ because of the differences in their political traditions and cultures. While Southern Cameroons hoped for the establishment of a loose federation with more power to the states and less power to the central government, French Cameroons favoured the establishment of a highly centralized federation for a reunified Cameroon.²³⁴ In spite of the disparities in the political values of the two systems, the constitution adopted at the Foumban Conference of 17 - 21 July 1961 by the delegations from the Republic of Cameroon and the Southern Cameroons, established a federation between the two territories. Article One of the federal constitution stated that “With effect from the 1st of October 1961, the Federal Republic of Cameroon shall be constituted from the territory of the Republic of Cameroon, hereafter to be styled East Cameroon, and the territory of the Southern Cameroons, formerly under British trusteeship, hereafter to be styled West Cameroon.”²³⁵ Thus, the Foumban Constitution established a federation that embraced two different political and cultural systems, one English and the other French. Taking this

²³³ Nfor, N. Nfor (2003), *The Southern Cameroons: The Truth of the Matter*, Bamenda: Unique Printers, p. 11.

²³⁴ Ngomba, Thomas (2004), “The Federal System in West and East Cameroon”, in Ngoh, V. (ed.) *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-197*, p. 77.

²³⁵ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroon, An African Federation*, p. 214.

view into consideration, it is not surprising that the operation of the federal system in East and West Cameroon was different.

The implementation of the federal constitution had far greater implications for the political process in West Cameroon than it did in East Cameroon. This was essentially because, at reunification, the inferior constitutional position of the Southern Cameroons placed it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Republic of Cameroon. As an independent state, the Republic of Cameroon made only minor institutional adjustments to absorb the Southern Cameroons, as the line between the institutions of the state of East Cameroon and those of the federation was quite blurred.²³⁶ For this reason this chapter assesses the various ways in which the Cameroon state has dealt with the question of national integration during the period of federalism and after so-called unification. The chapter looks at what tools the government has been using, and with what effect?

2.2 National Integration

Victor Le vine has written extensively on national integration in Cameroon.²³⁷ According to him, national integration is “most commonly understood either as a goal or as a process. As a process, its most important component is growth or development or both”.²³⁸ He argued further that the term national integration “applies most specifically to societies with considerable, politically salient diversities, be they ethnic, religious, or

²³⁶ John Mukum Mbaku, “Constitutional Federalism and the Party Policy Reforms in Cameroon”, cited by Ngomba Thomas in Ngoh Victor (ed.), *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, p. 78.

²³⁷ Le Vine, Victor (1975), “Political Integration and the United Republic of Cameroon”, in Smock, D and Bentsi- Enchill (eds.), *The Search for National integration in Africa*, p. 271.

²³⁸ Ibid.

cultural”.²³⁹ This explains the reason why the political leaders of Cameroon supported a policy of national integration because of the specific historical forces underlying the emergence of the Cameroonian Nation-state.

Bernard Fonlon is another scholar who has written about national integration in Cameroon.²⁴⁰ His study emphasized the semantic aspect of the word integration. He traced the origin of the word “integration” to the Latin adjective, ‘integer, integra, integrum’ meaning ‘whole’. Applying this to the Cameroon context, this wholeness or oneness implies the exclusion of division within the new Cameroon state.²⁴¹ This means putting parts—that is the Francophone and the Anglophone parts—together to form a whole. To him, Cameroonian integration is the oneness of a whole composed of parts. Fonlon made more sense in defining what integration meant for Cameroon than any other scholar who examined the concept:

Integration therefore means completeness, the absence of deficiency, it means oneness, the absence of division; it means harmony, the absence of conflict; it means health, the absence of diseases; it means vigor, the absence of languor, it means purity, the absence of corruption. Integration is a process of renewal, rebirth, and a new creation.²⁴²

According to Fonlon, Anglophones and Francophones should meld into a common new culture where there will be no cultural differences between them. Fonlon sought an emergence of a new culture, “For the union of a people is not complete until they have forged for themselves a soul, that principle of life and continuity, that unity of thought

²³⁹ Ibid, pp. 271-272.

²⁴⁰ Fonlon, Bernard, (1969), “The Language Problem in Cameroon: An Historical Perspective”, Victoria: Cameroon Times Press, pp. 25-49.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid, p. 27.

and feeling that only a common culture can give.”²⁴³ The one way to achieve this, he said, “is to create a new culture thoughtfully, methodically, diligently, from those which are met on the continent today”.²⁴⁴ Fonlon’s notion of a common culture never materialized because of the domination of Francophone over their Anglophone brothers.

Historically, Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon were two separate entities before reunification. During the forty six years of British and French colonial administration, the two states developed different patterns of communication within each area. Each maintained a seaport with considerable facilities at Douala and Victoria respectively. There were no roads linking both areas. Telephone and telegraph communications between the two areas were treated as international operations, which meant routing via London and Paris. Another major difference was seen in terms of the “currency and trading allegiance of the two states, which in turn required the existence of customs barriers; and the need for passports to travel across international frontiers”.²⁴⁵ Besides, the real obstacle to communication resulted from the use of different languages in government, administration and economic life.

France and Britain left their Cameroonian territories with well organized and relatively well-functioning systems of government. In both Cameroons, full-fledged administrative structures were created at both territorial and local levels, one following the British system and the other the French system of bureaucracy, making them separate entities.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Fonlon, Bernard (1964), “Will we Make or Mar?,” *ABBIA: Cameroon Cultural Review*, 5: pp. 11-12.

²⁴⁵ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun, An African Federation*, p. 159.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

It was the task of bringing the two systems together during reunification that caused federalism and integration to be thought the best policies to follow.

In looking at the ways in which the new Cameroon state dealt with the question of integration, the first part of this chapter focuses on national integration in key areas like the economic institutions, legal system, education, political integration and bilingualism. The second part deals with the unitary state and assesses whether there were continuities or ruptures in the policies of the unitary government in forging ahead with national integration.

2.2.1 National Integration during Federalism

2.2.1a Integration of Economic and Transport Sector

The first steps in the integration process were relatively minor efforts at standardization in the economic and transportation spheres, as a prelude to more far reaching changes. In 1962 the CFA franc was introduced as the federation's currency, replacing the Nigerian pound in West Cameroon. The CFA franc was made legal tender and was to be exchanged for the Nigerian pound at a rate of 692 francs to the pound.²⁴⁷ Despite some initial difficulties with the currency and the exchange rate, conversion of the currency was an extremely important feature of the integration of the two states as it united them into a single market.²⁴⁸ As for transportation, traffic was made to travel on the right hand side of the road throughout the country. Surveys were made for railways and roads linking East and West Cameroon. In April 1969 the Tiko-Douala road was inaugurated; this undoubtedly produced the first genuine feeling among East and West Cameroonians

²⁴⁷ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 325.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

that they were at last within easy reach of one another.²⁴⁹ Economically, the effect of the new road was felt as well. The movement of goods between Douala, the country's main commercial centre, and Victoria and Tiko became easy as customs barriers had already been lifted between the two federated states.²⁵⁰

2.2.1b Institutional Integration

The integration of the administrative systems of East and West Cameroon was done by reorganizing the territorial administrative system throughout the Federal Republic. The federal territory was divided into six administrative regions namely: Central-South, North, West, East, Littoral and West Cameroon. These were headed by federal Inspectors who represented the President of the Federal Republic in the respective regions.²⁵¹ The creation of these regions coincided with specific geographical areas with a view to promoting economic and social development.²⁵² The innovations introduced by the division of the territory into administrative regions restricted the powers of local officials for initiative and independent action in the federated states. The influence of the federal inspectorate and the federal government came to be felt increasingly after reunification. The federal inspectors of administration not only supervised, but coordinated the work of all federal officials and departments within the region:

They could establish their own rules and regulations within the framework provided by general executive powers and jurisdiction. They were charged with the maintenance of order, application of federal laws, and coordination and control of the activity of federal services. They could initiate an investigation into the activities of federal officials in their area.

²⁴⁹ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 161.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ngomba, Thomas (2004), "The Federal System in West and East Cameroon", in Ngho V. (ed.), *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, p. 88.

²⁵² Ibid.

They could carry out their task forcibly, if need be, with the help of the police and the armed forces. They became the liaison between local federal officials and federal ministries and bureaus. All correspondence from or to these officials was to be copied and sent to the inspector.²⁵³

The federal inspectors became a menace to the West Cameroon state. The difficulties which surrounded the introduction of federal control were felt to a far greater extent by the members of the West Cameroon government and the civil service than those of the East. In fact, state officials in West Cameroon found themselves in an increasingly embarrassing position as their services became more and more federalized.²⁵⁴ Many of them came to realize with dismay that they devoted more time to federal than to state affairs and this brought into question the autonomy of their state. This necessitated some protest from the West Cameroonians regarding the operation of the federal inspectors. In a secret memorandum to Ahidjo, the Buea government requested that the Prime Minister of West Cameroon be the sole representative of the President in the territory, and be empowered to oversee federal and state departments in West Cameroon.²⁵⁵ In effect, the Buea government wanted the post of federal inspector to be scrapped in West Cameroon. They decried the practice whereby Francophones who were ignorant of the political tradition of West Cameroon were the only advisers to federal ministers and that the federal inspector was always a man from East Cameroon. The government of West Cameroon was in a way exposing the difficulties inherent in the running of the Cameroon federation.

²⁵³ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 208.

²⁵⁴ Ngomba, Thomas (2004), "The Federal System in West and East Cameroon", p. 89.

²⁵⁵ Benjamin, Jacques (1972), *West Cameroonians: The Minority in a Bi-Cultural State*, Canada: Les Presses de L'Université de Montréal, p. 55.

2.2.1c Integration in the Legal System

In trying to harmonise the legal systems of the two states, “federal laws were passed that covered procedures for the Supreme Court of the Federation”.²⁵⁶ In each area, the federal system incorporated some element of the systems formerly operative in the two states, but this did not really integrate the two systems. There were some profound differences that continued to exist between the courts in the two states. West Cameroon remained attached to the wigs and gowns they inherited from the British. More important, the entire law of West Cameroon was still based on English Common Law principles.²⁵⁷ There was a marked difference in the Criminal procedure, as West Cameroon emphasized the innocence of an accused until he was proven guilty, while East Cameroon held that an accused was guilty until he was proven innocent. Another area of difference was in the recruitment of court staff. Judges in West Cameroon were either British or British trained, and judges in East Cameroon were either French or they were trained in France. The task of rationally constructing a new Cameroonian legal system out of the material of the previous ones remained French with relatively few innovations for the legal system in East Cameroon.²⁵⁸ The differences in the legal system in Cameroon existed until 2005 when a common penal code was adopted.

2.2.1d Integration in Education

The two Cameroons came to unification with different systems of education. West Cameroon came with a system based on the British system and East Cameroon with one based on the French model. Integration of the two systems meant education was a federal

²⁵⁶ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 304.

²⁵⁷ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 162.

²⁵⁸ Willard, R. Johnson (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 306.

responsibility. The federal constitution stipulated that secondary, technical and higher education were the responsibility of the federal government, while primary education remained under state control.²⁵⁹ Reforms were enforced from the centre and the first steps were made to harmonise the two systems by introducing a common timetable for a six year primary cycle. Before harmonization the standard West Cameroon primary education was eight years and that of the East six years. This was followed by the standardization of the entrance examination to the first cycle of secondary school throughout the federation. The examinations were alike in content, but administered in either French or English. This common qualifying examination for secondary schools increased pressure for full standardization of primary and secondary school programs.²⁶⁰ The second step was the harmonization of the secondary school syllabuses for languages, mathematics, history and geography. In spite of the fact that notable progress was made towards establishing a truly integrated system of education for the whole country, examinations and certificates continued to follow their colonial models. Today, not much has changed in the educational system, as the Anglophones and Francophones still write separate examinations from primary to high school.

Similar imbalances exist in higher education. In 1962, a Federal University was created in Yaoundé. The university was seen as a bilingual institution which would bring together and promote bilingualism in the new Cameroon State. Little was done to make the university bi-cultural as well as bilingual, as it remained substantially mono-cultural.²⁶¹ The language of instruction and the members of staff were mostly French, with the

²⁵⁹ Le Vine, Victor (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, London: Cornell University Press, p. 72.

²⁶⁰ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 301.

²⁶¹ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 167.

exception of the English Department in the Faculty of Letters. A few courses were taught on the West Cameroon legal system in the Law Faculty.²⁶² No attempt was made to teach in English and examinations were almost entirely in French, to the disadvantage of students from West Cameroon. The result was that a small number of West Cameroonian students alone became bilingual and neither students nor staff from East Cameroon bothered to learn or use English. Today the situation is different, as more Francophones have come to realize the importance of English and many of them have embarked on studying in English.

2.2.1e Bilingualism

The constitution of September 1961, which brought about the federation, stated that French and English were the official languages in the new state. French for the federated State of East Cameroon, English for that of West Cameroon, and both for such federal institutions as the federal government and its ministerial services, such as the Federal Assembly, the Federal Courts of Justice, the Federal University and the secondary schools.²⁶³ The federal government succeeded in creating a bilingual state, but the citizens were not bilingual due to the deep attachment of the two states to their colonial languages and cultures. Besides, the commitment of East Cameroonians to the French language ran deep because most of them were well trained in French. On the contrary, West Cameroonians had a less perfect knowledge of English because of the extent to which Pidgin English interfered with the acquisition of Standard English.²⁶⁴ Because of the numerical superiority of East Cameroon over West Cameroon, “many Francophones

²⁶² Ibid, p. 167.

²⁶³ Fonlon, Bernard (1969), “The Language Problem in Cameroon: An Historical Perspective”, in Smock, D. and Bentsi-Enchill, K. (eds.), *The Search for National integration in Africa*, pp. 198-199.

²⁶⁴ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 294.

made no effort to hide their own conviction that general knowledge of standard English in the West Cameroon was so rudimentary and the number who knew it well so small that, in effect, West Cameroon citizens would have to achieve monolingualism before the country could preserve bilingualism".²⁶⁵ The stance of the Eastern Cameroonians on bilingualism was further supported by the then Prime Minister Charles Assale who is alleged to have thought it preferable to rebuild the whole educational system of West Cameroon along the lines of the one in the East, since so few schools would be involved, than to try and harmonize the system.²⁶⁶ Reacting to the French influence and attitude towards the English language and their domination in the federation, Fonlon wrote:

Therefore, unless the East Cameroon leader and intellectuals, in whose hands cultural initiative lies, is prepared to share this authority with his brother from West of the Mungo, unless he is prepared to make the giant effort necessary to break loose from the strait-jacket of his French education, unless he will show proof of his intellectual probity and admit candidly that there are things in the Anglo-Saxon way of life that can do this country good, there is little chance of survival, neither for English influence, nor even for African values in the Federal Republic of Cameroon.²⁶⁷

Fonlon argued that in the Cameroon federation these two cultures are equal and that each of them stands to benefit from the other. But the attitude of the French Cameroonians towards the English language raised fears that West Cameroon would lose its cultural identity by being assimilated by the majority Francophones. Consequently, the behaviour of Francophones slowed the growth of bilingualism because the Anglophones feared being assimilated by the less tolerant Francophones.

²⁶⁵ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 292.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Fonlon, Bernard (1964), "Will we Make or Mar?", in *Abbia*, No. 5 cited by Williard, Johnson (1970), *The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society*, p. 292.

In trying to make its citizens bilingual, the federal government gave some degree of encouragement by permitting civil servants to take courses in a second language. Facilities for bilingual teaching were provided by UNESCO in Yaoundé and Buea to train bilingual personnel. The federal government also gave salary bonuses to those officials who had proficiency in the two languages.²⁶⁸ Some development did result from these moves, but bilingualism was far more in evidence among officials of West Cameroon than those of the East Cameroon or Federal governments.²⁶⁹ A major move towards making its citizens bilingual, particularly teachers, was the creation in 1963 of the Federal Bilingual Grammar School in Man-o-War Bay near Victoria in West Cameroon.²⁷⁰ A second was created a couple of years later in Yaoundé. The aim of these bilingual grammar schools was to produce Cameroonians evenly fluent and efficient in the use of both languages. But these bilingual schools did not succeed in creating bilingual Cameroonians because they lacked the resources to implement the policy fully.²⁷¹

2.2.2 Political Integration

The circumstances which led to the establishment of a single party at the federal level in Cameroon were influenced by the different trends of political developments in each state. Ahidjo's pronouncements on a single party do not differ greatly in this respect from those of many African leaders in the early sixties, "who justify the emergence of one-party states on the allegedly wasteful and disruptive effects of having too many parties within

²⁶⁸ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 299.

²⁶⁹ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 165.

²⁷⁰ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 299.

²⁷¹ Fonlon, Bernard (1969), "The Language Problem in Cameroon: An Historical Perspective", p. 200.

the body politic of an emerging state”.²⁷² When Ahidjo decided on the establishment of a single party, he did not desire to move immediately to a complete union of the two ruling parties (*Union Camerounnaise* in the East, and *Kamerun National Democratic Party* in West Cameroon). But he embarked on a gradual process by first emphasizing that the process of the realization of the goal of the single party should commence with the union of all parties in each state.²⁷³

2.2.2a Towards a Single Party System for East Cameroon

At the time of reunification and the declaration of federation in October 1961, Ahidjo’s *Union Camerounnaise* was already the majority party in East Cameroon. After having established and consolidated a political base in the north, Ahidjo was determined to increase his power and that of his party, the UC in the South. To achieve his aim, “he used a combination of tactics including intimidation, accommodation, coalitions, force, and divide and rule”.²⁷⁴ The goal of these strategies was to weaken the opposition forces as he used one southern opposition leader against the other; he acquired more power to face yet another Southern leader.²⁷⁵ Ahidjo’s influence and that of his party increased in the South as a result of the decision of two parties to join it. The first was Charles Assale’s *Mouvement d’Action Nationale* (MANC), and Assale was appointed Prime Minister of the state. The next party to follow was the *Front Pour l’Unite et la Paix*. Several party bigwigs were co-opted into the UC when their parties dissolved. Pierre Ninyim Kandem, a formal rebel leader, was made Minister of Health, and Victor Kanga

²⁷² Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p.144

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ettangondop, Mbu (2004) “*Federalism in a One Party State*” in Ngoh Victor (ed.), *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, p. 114.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

was appointed Minister of National Economy.²⁷⁶ It was not only the politicians who crossed the carpet to the UC but voters' preference as well. This was evident in a number of UC successes in the by-elections of June 1961 in Kribi.

The UC successes encouraged and gave the party leader a new confidence and determination. He was now prepared to assert the claim of the UC to be the only 'national party' in East Cameroun. From then on he was to use much tougher methods to secure the disappearance of other parties from the political scene. The first indication that Ahidjo was prepared to achieve his goal by every available means was witnessed in Yaoundé. In January 1962 the police forcefully dispersed UPC delegates before they were able to adopt a final resolution by the Commission of Inquiry on the death of Um Nyobe, and the election of their Secretary General.²⁷⁷ But this did not signal the end of the UPC or the demise of the rest of the opposition. The opposition leaders were united by the growing fear that Ahidjo was determined to eliminate them politically. As a result they joined together in April to form their own *Front National Unifié*, and in June issued an open letter attacking Ahidjo and alleging that he was intent on creating a dictatorship through the establishment of a one-party state.²⁷⁸ Their proposals were rejected by the UC on the grounds that they would only encourage the status quo; that is a multiplicity of political parties and, consequently, inefficiency and a negation of all actions.²⁷⁹ Opposition leaders were arrested and tried on charges that arms and ammunition had been found in their possession. On 11 July 1962, they were convicted of "inciting hatred

²⁷⁶ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 145.

²⁷⁷ Ettangondop, Mbu (2004), "*Federalism in a One Party State*", p. 115.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 116.

against the government and public authority, inciting conflict between ethnic and religious communities and disseminating news prejudicial to public authorities”.²⁸⁰ They were sentenced to the loss of their political rights, fined and imprisoned for three years. By the end of July 1962, Ahidjo had succeeded in planting a *de facto* one-party regime in East Cameroon. In 1965, the opposition in East Cameroon was so weak that it could not stand in the election for the East Cameroon Legislative Assembly. Thus, in less than four years, the single party was achieved for East Cameroon, by a process of intimidation and elimination. The stage was set for Ahidjo to pursue his goal of a unified national party for the entire federation and his attention was now on the political developments in West Cameroon.

2.2.2b Towards a Single Party System in West Cameroon

The West Cameroon party system disintegrated due to the fact that West Cameroonian politicians were power hungry and tried to outmanoeuvre each other in urging the implementation of a single party for West Cameroon. Each of the major political parties in West Cameroon did at one time or other oppose or support the idea of a single national party, depending on how it was going to affect their political fortunes. Moreover, the general political dissatisfaction in West Cameroon created conditions for Ahidjo to intervene in its internal politics.²⁸¹

At independence, Foncha’s Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) enjoyed a majority in the West Cameroon legislature over the Cameroon People’s National

²⁸⁰ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 146.

²⁸¹ Atanga, Lucien (1994), *The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the linguistic alienation of a minority*, p. 114.

Convention (CPNC) led by E.M.L. Endeley. To ensure continuity Foncha, after reunification, retained the office of the Prime Minister of West Cameroon while assuming the federal vice presidency. In 1962, Ahidjo and Foncha signed an agreement that neither the UC nor the KNDP would be active in the other's territory, and this created a formal alliance between the parties at the federal level. It appears that the KNDP was bent on dominating the West Cameroon political stage as Ahidjo had done in the East; that is, establish a single party regime in West Cameroon before embarking with the UC on the negotiation for a national party for the federation. The KNDP Secretary General remarked that:

The KNDP must dispel any illusions nursed and entertained by any persons that they will carry other groups of parties to meet the UC to discuss the formation of a National Party or that the KNDP will meet the UC bringing with them groups of other parties to discuss the subject.²⁸²

From this premise it was clear that Foncha did not want to unite the two parties, claiming that the only possible basis for such a merger was for the CPNC to dissolve and join the KNDP. The bickering continued between the KNDP and CPNC, but nothing fruitful came of it. The CPNC lost some support through the defection of some of its members in the House of Assembly, and the KNDP gained an overwhelming majority, securing all the seats in the election of the ten federal National Assembly seats.²⁸³ With the weakening of the political power of the CPNC, its leaders realized that they could revive their political fortunes only through championing the course of a single national party. In

²⁸² West Cameroon *Press Release*, No 1948, 16 August 1962, cited by Ettangondop Mbu (2004) "*Federalism in a One Party State*", p. 122.

²⁸³ Rubin, Neville (1971) *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 150.

the process the CPNC became the principal advocate in West Cameroon of the idea of a single party for the nation.²⁸⁴

The need to find a successor for Foncha as Prime Minister of the State of West Cameroon orchestrated the disappearance of party politics in West Cameroon, when his constitutional right to hold both federal and state office ended in 1965. In 1963 Foncha had apparently indicated that his future lay with the federal government as Vice President of the federation, the second most prestigious position in the federation. His decision produced a major contest for the vice presidency of the KNDP. Solomon Tangie Muna and Augustine Ngom Jua became the main contenders for the post of the vice president, while E.T. Egbe and Nzo Ekhah-Ngaky announced their intention to run for the Secretary-General position which had remained vacant since the death of Zachariah A. Abendong in July 1963. Foncha supported Muna and Egbe, but Jua and Ekhah-Ngaky won by a landslide. Consequently, Jua became the Vice President and Nzo Ekhah-Ngaky the Secretary-General respectively.²⁸⁵

The ambitions of Jua and Muna led to a split in the KNDP into two camps. The issue of who to succeed Foncha as Prime Minister was settled when Jua's camp amended the KNDP constitution so that the Vice President of the party became the party's candidate for the Prime Ministership following the president's departure from the House of Assembly. A fierce debate increased the gap between the two camps in the KNDP. To test the popularity of Jua's decision to amend the constitution, Foncha conducted a poll

²⁸⁴ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 267.

²⁸⁵ Mbile, N. (2000), *Cameroon Political Story: Memories of an Authentic Eyewitness*, Limbe: Pressprint. pp. 192-193.

amongst the delegates and the result showed that twenty-three KNDP parliamentarians supported Jua, while Foncha and six federal parliamentarians supported Muna.²⁸⁶ Accordingly, Foncha declined to submit Muna's name to the President and called on him to accept the party's decision. When Muna refused to do so, Foncha accused him of trying to split the party, and ultimately suspended him and seven of his supporters from membership of the party.²⁸⁷ After serious consultations with members of the West Cameroon House of Assembly, the House of Chiefs, all Secretaries of State, Federal Parliamentarians and Foncha himself, Ahidjo named Jua as the Prime Minister of West Cameroon.²⁸⁸ Meanwhile Muna and Egbe immediately formed another political party the Cameroon United Congress (CUC).

With the formation of the CUC, there were three political parties in West Cameroon at the time when there were talks of the formation of a single national party. Foncha's strategy of forming a single party in West Cameroon had failed. Jua started cooperation talks between his government and the opposition CPNC for the benefit of the West Cameroon electorate.²⁸⁹ After the formation of a coalition, the two leading political parties, the KNDP and CPNC, on 19 August 1965 pledged "... to work for the preservation of the existing parliamentary system and political institutions in West Cameroon".²⁹⁰ The CUC, after the formation of the coalition government became the

²⁸⁶ Atanga, Lucien (1994), "*The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the linguistic alienation of a Minority*", pp.105-106

²⁸⁷ Rubin, Neville (1971), *Cameroun: An African Federation*, p. 152.

²⁸⁸ Bayart, J. (1978), "The Neutralisation of Anglophone Cameroon", in Joseph Richard (ed.), *Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadu Ahidjo*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, p. 86.

²⁸⁹ Ettangondop, Mbu (2004), "*Federalism in a One Party State*", p. 128.

²⁹⁰ Atanga, Lucien (1994), "*The Political Economy of West Cameroon: A study in the linguistic alienation of a Minority*" p. 114.

principal advocate of a single national party in West Cameroon.²⁹¹ Their propaganda was aimed at winning favour from the UC.

The inability of West Cameroon political leaders to settle their differences gave some impetus to Ahidjo to take the initiative himself, and he did so in 1966 by summoning the leaders of the three West Cameroon parties to a meeting with the Prime Minister of East Cameroon and himself in Yaoundé. At the meeting Ahidjo decried the futility of the continuance of multiparty politics in a young nation like Cameroon. He revealed that it was his conviction that the Cameroonian nation and its people could better be served, and its limited human resources more effectively utilized, if the leaders agreed to work under the banner of a “parti Unifié”.²⁹² Within two days, Ahidjo secured the consent of the political leaders to dissolve all existing political parties in the two states and the creation of a new one to be known as the Cameroon National Union (CNU).

With the formation of a single national party, it was only a matter of time before the federal arrangement was discarded. The elimination of the West Cameroon political party system marked an end to political pluralism in Cameroon for decades to come. It was only with the new wave of democratic changes blowing across Africa that, against government opposition, a new political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was launched in Bamenda in May 1990, to reopen a space for political pluralism.

²⁹¹ Johnson, Willard (1970), *The Cameroon Federation*, p. 275.

²⁹² Ettangondop, Mbu, (2004), *Federalism in a One Party State*, p. 131.

2.3 National Integration in the Unitary State

The Federal Republic of Cameroon was dismantled in May 1972 and replaced by the United Republic of Cameroon. On the constitutional level, a unitary state replaced a federal one. The unitary constitution abolished the office of Vice President of the Republic; one unitary government replaced the three governments and one national assembly replaced the four assemblies.²⁹³ The unitary constitution established a centralized administration and retained a strong presidential system. The regions that were created in October 1961 were abolished and seven provinces were created, headed by governors. West Cameroon was split into two provinces namely, North West and South West.²⁹⁴ The unitary constitution brought to an end the separate identities of territories with widely differing political, social, administrative and cultural traditions.²⁹⁵ Under the unitary system, the successes of political integration continued in more or less the same pattern under the reign of then President Ahidjo, with some areas yet to be marched. This continued to present a challenge under the Biya's regime. The apparent failure of the highly centralized unitary state to achieve economic and national integration gave rise to renewed demands for the reintroduction of a federal system in Cameroon.²⁹⁶

Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul Biya who had succeeded Ahmadu Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in November 1982, unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed the change of the Country's

²⁹³ Ngoh, Victor (2004), "Dismantling the Federal System" in Ngoh V. (ed.), *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, p. 176.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Le Vine, Victor (1975), "Political Integration and the United Republic of Cameroon" in Smock, D. and Bentsi-Enchill, K. (eds.), *The Search for National integration in Africa*, p. 270.

²⁹⁶ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2004), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 18.

name from “The United Republic of Cameroon” to “The Republic of Cameroon” in February 1984.²⁹⁷ President Paul Biya’s vision for the future Cameroon Republic is found in his description of communal liberalism as:

The dream of a united mankind, the establishment of a new political society, the promotion of an economy at the service of man, the emergence of a national culture sustained by ethnic cultures, the implementation of social justice and the development of the humane in Man are the many legitimate ambitions on which I based my action at the helm of the Cameroonian state.²⁹⁸

President Paul Biya’s vision for the future Cameroon society was to show that Cameroonians are one people with minor cultural differences and that a national cultural amalgamation would be built from the contributions of local cultures. To move towards this new cultural identity, he encouraged internal migration of Cameroonians in order to mix people. To achieve his aim, he used his powers of appointment to station bureaucrats outside of their places of origin.²⁹⁹ President Paul Biya had very lofty ideas for his future Cameroon society, but the practicality of his vision would prove him wrong, as most of his ideas did not succeed as he expected. The analysis below will show how Paul Biya tried to deal with the question of national integration in the unitary state.

2.3.1a Education

The unitary government under President Paul Biya continued to strive to harmonize the educational system. In 1983, barely a year after Paul Biya came to power, his government attempted to harmonise the Anglophone General Certificate of Education (GCE)

²⁹⁷ Hughes, Jeffrey (1999), *I Accuse: Ethnic Bloodbath, Massacre, Refugee Crisis*, London: Yuet Lai Publishing, pp. 149-150.

²⁹⁸ DeLancey, Mark (1989), *Cameroon: Dependence and Independence*, p. 73.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

Ordinary and Advanced levels with the Francophone Baccalaureate (BAC). The minister of National Education proposed a new group certificate GCE, saying that the group certificate would make the GCE look a little more like the BAC and this would help the Anglophones to gain admission into higher institutions of learning in Cameroon.³⁰⁰ When the news reached Anglophone university students, it immediately sparked a major riot. Anglophone students were determined to save the GCE from the assimilationist tendencies of the Francophone. There was some rioting in the two Anglophone provinces, demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the minister's decision. Some students even lost their lives in confrontation with the security officers.³⁰¹ The students decided to boycott classes and organized daily demonstrations until the proposed educational reforms were suspended by the government. In spite the fact that the government suspended the educational reforms it did not abandon its intention of assimilating the GCE. In 1989, Professor George Ngango, the then minister of National Education, attempted to introduce a new GCE reform scheme that would impose on Anglophones the Francophone structure of four years for the first cycle and three years for the second cycle. Fierce opposition and widespread demonstrations by Anglophone students and parents forced the government to stop the scheme. This new attempt to destroy the GCE made the Anglophones to lose confidence in the Biya regime.³⁰²

Besides, the fact that the government had made some attempts to model the GCE examination along Francophone lines without succeeding, it continued to manage the

³⁰⁰ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2004), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 70.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Nyamnjoh, Francis (1995), *The GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity*, Bamenda: Newlink Printing Division, p. 52.

GCE examinations poorly, leading to many irregularities in the conduct of the examination. Such irregularities included complaints about poor translation of examination questions, poor distribution of examination materials, frequent fiddling with the examination timetable and the non-payment of marking fees.³⁰³ In 1991, Anglophone parents and teachers gathered under the umbrella of the Teachers' Association of Cameroon (TAC) and threatened to boycott the marking of examination scripts if government failed to approve the creation of the GCE Examination Board. However, the government tricked the protesting teachers into marking the scripts. In March 1993, TAC made it clear that the June 1993 scripts would not be marked before the creation of a functional examination board as demanded. In response to the government's negligence, TAC went ahead and created an examination board in Buea in April 1993. The Minister of National Education quickly declared the board illegal.³⁰⁴ The teachers continued their protest until the GCE board was created on 19 October 1993, and its officials installed in Buea on 25 October 1993. This was a victory for the Anglophone community as a whole, and for the triumph of Anglo-Saxon culture in Cameroon, in particular. Granting the long sought after GCE Board for Anglophones was a way of President Paul Biya's government managing the differences between Anglophones and Francophones in the unitary state. But it would not be long before the government took total control of the GCE Board.

³⁰³ Jotanga, Jetyem (1997), *Cameroon: Aspects of a Democracy*, No publishers, p. 17.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 16.

2.3.1b The University of Yaoundé

With the scrapping of the federal structures, the Federal University, created in 1962, became the University of Yaoundé. The university was originally designed to accommodate about 10,000 students. However, the student population grew rapidly and the university soon became overcrowded and lacked the basic infrastructure needed to cope with the massive student population.³⁰⁵ Consequently, there was a fall in the academic standards and corruption was rife on campus. A student had to be rich or beautiful to get through successfully.³⁰⁶ Anglophone students in the university experienced many hardships as the university clearly remained a Francophone institution. Out of frustration, many of them abandoned their education. Some Anglophone students had to change their Faculty in a desperate attempt to graduate with a degree. For instance, some Anglophone students admitted to the Faculty of Science changed to Letters, to read English, because it was the only department where English was the medium of instruction.³⁰⁷ By the beginning of the 1990s, with the winds of change blowing over Africa, Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé were the first to voice their long-standing grievances.³⁰⁸ The stage was thus set for the violent explosion that was to occur later. The University of Yaoundé barely functioned from 1990 to 1993, with the university being repeatedly paralysed by student protests and unprecedented violent confrontations with the security forces. Pressure was brought to bear on the government to take action before the situation escalated. In 1993 the government yielded and

³⁰⁵ Konings, P. (2002), "University Students' Revolts, Ethnic Militia and Violence during Political Liberalisation in Cameroon", *African Studies Review* 45, 2: pp. 207-29.

³⁰⁶ Jotanga, Jetyem (1997), *Cameroon: Aspects of a Democracy*, No publishers, p. 93.

³⁰⁷ Nkwenti Simon, Executive Secretary General, Cameroon Teachers Trade union (CATTU), interviewed 30 July 2005.

³⁰⁸ Konings, P. (2003), "Anglophone University Students and Anglophone Nationalist Struggles in Cameroon", 20 October 2006. Accessed at www.p.7.

introduced some university reforms in which five universities were created with an Anglo-Saxon university for Anglophones in Buea. By creating a university for the Anglophones Paul Biya was trying to appease them. This can be interpreted in the light of Paul Biya managing the differences that exist between Anglophones and Francophones.

2.4.1 Bilingualism in the Unitary State

The Cameroon government continued with its bilingual policy in the unitary state by creating many “bilingual secondary and high schools” to cater for the bilingual needs of young Cameroonians. However, these were not bilingual in the tradition of the Federal Bilingual Grammar Schools of the 1960s. They were mostly two separate institutions – French and English using the same facilities, but not mixing. This did not solve the bilingual problem because the bilingual policy in Cameroon was implemented as individual bilingualism rather than state bilingualism. As such, many Cameroonians chose to be monolingual. This has deprived many Cameroonians of the liberty of expression in offices, courts, meetings and schools. This points to the fact that language planning in Cameroon has so far been inappropriate.

Language experts like Professor Bernard Fonlon recommended a bilingual policy for Cameroonians that would start from primary and proceed through secondary and high school to university. According to him, English and French should be taught at various levels in such a way that, after high school studies, the students should be able to follow courses in English and French at the University level.³⁰⁹ But the lack of political will on the part of the majority Francophones to foster bilingualism as recommended by Fonlon,

³⁰⁹ Fonlon, Bernard, (1969), ‘The Language Problem in Cameroon: An Historical Perspective, in Smock, D. and Bentsi-Enchill, K. (eds.), *The Search for National integration in Africa*, pp. 202-203.

led to inappropriate language policy in higher education, and over the years Anglophones have carried the burden of that policy.

The educational programs in higher institutions of learning to create bilingual Cameroonians have so far produced limited results because language has been a thorn in the flesh of students in higher education in Cameroon. As yet, no solution has been found to the problem.³¹⁰ In the University of Yaoundé, for example, there is a bilingual program intended to teach English to Francophones and French to Anglophones. The failure rate is so high that one can only wonder if the students have passed through a system which was allegedly meant to render them bilingual and prepare them for university studies in English and French.³¹¹ The answer here is simple: French and English are compulsory in all secondary and higher institutions in Cameroon, but students do not have the enthusiasm to learn the languages. Some students usually stay away during English and French lessons. They discover the consequence of not learning either official language only when they are confronted with the reality of bilingualism in the society at large.

Research conducted in higher education in Cameroon indicated that there is a problem with the language of instruction. Most of the students were dissatisfied with the use of their second official language (SOL) as a medium of instruction.³¹² The research also revealed that it rendered the acquisition of knowledge strenuous in the various subjects,

³¹⁰ Stephen, Jikong “Official Bilingualism in Cameroon: A double-Edged Sword” 3 March 2005. Accessed at <<http://www2.univ-reunion.fr/>

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

thereby leading to poor performance in examinations. This problem is compounded by the fact that students face difficulties in note-taking and translating from the SOL to the first official language (FOL). Most students complained that they did not understand lectures and ended up being frustrated by the system. The research points out that the lecturers also strained to make sense of the scripts of students who answered questions in the lecturer's SOL. Consequently, there can be no objective marking under such circumstances.³¹³

According to David Laitin, Anglophone students in most institutions of higher learning in Cameroon have lost their human rights in the freedom to choose the language through which to acquire vital knowledge. Anglophone students suffer unfairly by virtue of not knowing how to speak the dominant or politically preferred French language.³¹⁴ Research conducted by Dora Yila on the topic "The Translation of Some Public Examination Questions in Cameroon"³¹⁵ discovered many wrongly translated questions, leading to the failure of Anglophone candidates who sat the exams.

1. a). **French:** Sur un mécanisme, on a relevé les indications suivantes sur pièces
b) **English:** They have picked up from a mechanism the following indications on the pieces.
c). **Accepted version:** The following instructions were found on parts of an appliance.
2. a). **French:** Les adjuvants: définition, mode d'action, condition d'emploi
b) **English:** adjuvants: definition, methods of action, use conditions.
c) **Accepted Version:** Define a catalyst. How does it work? When is it used?
3. a). **French:** Quelle est la nature de la semence—fruit ou graine? Et vous le

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Laitin, David (2005) "A liberal Democratic Approach to Language Justice" in Kymlicka, W. and Patten, A. (eds.), *Language Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 113.

³¹⁵ Stephen, Jikong "Official Bilingualism in Cameroon: A double-Edged Sword" 3 March 2005. Accessed at <<http://www2.univ-reunion.fr/>

mode de dissemination.

- b). **English:** What is the nature of seed? Is it a fruit? How is it scattered?
- c). **Accepted Version:** What type of seed is it? A fruit or a grain? How is it planted?³¹⁶

Faced with this type of dilemma, Anglophone candidates are bound to fail because of the poor translation of the examination questions. Besides, the examination are marked by Francophones who do not know English really well. One can argue that in these situations, at least the examination questions had been translated, although in a bizarre manner. In other circumstances no translations were offered and the candidates were obliged to read the questions in French and answer in English. In an article in the *Herald Newspaper* (No 679) of Wednesday, 28-29 October 1998, titled “ENS Not for Anglophone Science Students,” the author accuses the government of doing everything to prevent Anglophones from gaining admission into the Department of Science in the Yaoundé School of Education. He was infuriated because no Anglophone had been admitted into the Department of Science in October 1998 entrance examination. He wrote:

If this is not a deliberate plot, why is that all the questions in the exams came in French? Yes, “Cameroon is bilingual” they would sing. Have the questions ever come exclusively in English? And when the unfortunate Anglophone candidate dared to plead even for some verbal translations, they were told in no uncertain terms to keep quiet.

A bilingual country? Any real Anglophone who still believes in that is living in a cloud cuckoo land. Bilingualism is a euphemism for Francophonising and impoverishing Anglophones. A clear one way traffic.

What makes the situation even more vexing is the fact that the Francophone hegemony just ploughs on, ignoring the long standing problem that faced generations of intelligent Anglophone students. Anglophone science students would have strings of A grades at the A-

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Levels and not be able to grope through the “Faculté des Sciences”
Unequivocally illogical!³¹⁷

The bitterness in this article reflects the state of mind and feelings of most Anglophones in Cameroon who have encountered language or communication problems as a result of the national bilingual policy. It is not only in the institutions of learning that Anglophones experience linguistic injustice, it also exists in the society at large.

In the public sphere French has become the most dominant and preferred language to English. This raises the issue of fairness because what becomes of Anglophone citizens who cannot speak French? Within the administration, French is the everyday working language of the state. Presidential decrees are always published in French; French takes precedence over English in administrative documents such as identity cards, birth, and death and marriage certificates and in most official documents.

In government offices in the capital many Anglophones face communication problems, especially the people who have never had any opportunity to learn French. For example, an Anglophone said he entered an office in Yaoundé and tried to obtain information from a government officer. When he spoke in English the officer replied in French. He told the officer that he could not speak French and the officer replied in French that “Puisque tu ne parles pas le Français et je ne parle pas l’anglais, c’est match nul” (Since you do not speak French and I don’t speak English, it is draw).³¹⁸ The Anglophone said he left the office confused and frustrated. Another Anglophone who came to Yaoundé to “follow up his papers” at the ministry of Territorial Administration said he entered an office and

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

spoke in English, and a Francophone gestured to another employee and shouted “Viola votre frère Anglo” (that is your Anglophone brother). This implies that had the Anglophone not been working in that office, he would not have been attended to. This experience reflects those of other monolingual Anglophones in government offices occupied by monolingual Francophones. On the contrary, when a Francophone encounters an Anglophone officer, the Anglophone will try, no matter how imperfect his French, to satisfy the Francophone. This indicates that Anglophones are more willing to learn French than Francophones are willing to learn English.

2.4.1a The Armed Forces

The linguistic dissatisfaction is also being felt in other areas of public life. French is the unique command language of the armed forces in Cameroon. As a result, all English-speaking conscripts into the army, the police and the gendarmerie are, therefore, required to learn French. The result of this policy is that Francophone conscripts in the armed forces have little or no knowledge of the English language, even though they are called to serve all over the country, including the English-speaking provinces.³¹⁹ The imposition of French as the unique language of command in the armed forces has also created a strange situation whereby English-speaking conscripts, after undergoing their basic training come out wishing to speak only French even to their close relatives. The result is that the armed forces do not consider themselves to be bound by the constitutional provision of bilingualism. French seems to have become the language of harassment and bullying. In Bamenda, the capital of the North West Province, a taxi driver stopped in a non-stopping zone to pick up passengers and a policewoman walked up to him and spoke in French and

³¹⁹ Susung, N. (1997), *The Crisis of Unity and Democracy in Cameroon*, No Publishers, p. 15.

the driver responded in English. The officer became infuriated and shouted at the driver that “Je ne comprends pas votre anglais la”, (I do not understand your English). In a stalled situation like this, one does not expect a taxi driver, who had no formal schooling, to speak French, but it should be obligatory for the officer, who is educated and employed by the state to at least speak English. However, since the provisions of the language of command do not require government security officers to speak English, they do not.

2.4.1b Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV)

In the state owned media, efforts were made with varying degrees of success, to reach both French and English speaking Cameroonians. With the advent of television some efforts were made to disseminate the news simultaneously in English and French through the use of two anchor persons, one English-speaking and one French-speaking. This eventually gave way to two news programmes that came at different times lots, one for the English audience and the other for the French audience. With regard to total transmission time on Cameroon Television, about 80% of the programmes are presented in the French language and 20% in the English language. This is so because it is presumed that French has a bigger audience than English. As concerns the distribution of airtime on the national radio, 70% is allocated for French and 30% for English.³²⁰ The situation is different with the provincial radio stations, as 80% of the programmes in the Anglophone provinces are in English and 20% in French.³²¹ The recent liberalization of

³²⁰ Abongwa Tantoh, Deputy Editor in Chief of Sports at the Cameroon Television, interviewed 5 September 2005 in Yaoundé.

³²¹ Bridget Che Formuyam, Chief of Programmes, Provincial Station in the North West Province of Cameroon, interviewed 25 June 2005.

the media industry in Cameroon has seen an up shoot of many private radio and television stations all over the country, and competition is intense among the stations. In the North West province alone there are about five private radio and two television stations, and in the South West province there are about four private radio stations and one television station. In all, there are nine private radio stations and four private television stations in Anglophone Cameroon alone. In a recent survey carried out by CRETES, an NGO based in Yaoundé, the private stations have a larger audience than the national stations.³²² Turning their backs on the national stations demonstrates that Anglophones have not been happy with the treatment of English programmes by the CRTV.

2.4.1c Cameroon Tribune

In the 1980s, in an attempt to manage the language differences in the official print media, the French *Cameroon Tribune* was published five times a week, while the English version was published once a week. The Anglophones felt cheated, because they could read the official tribune only once a week. The English language version was eventually upgraded to a bi-weekly as a concession to the English-speaking population. To bring about a full bilingual official newspaper, *Cameroon Tribune* was transformed into a bilingual daily newspaper. It is structured into five sections namely: politics, social, economy, culture and sports, with editorial assigned to each column. Government policy says that publication in the *Cameroon Tribune* should be 50% French and 50%

³²² Média 8, une production du CRETES, Yaounde Cameroon, 21 July 2005. Accessed at <www.cretescm.net>

English.³²³ But the difference in the size of the population between Francophones and Anglophones is reflected in the *Cameroon Tribune*. In terms of staff strength, more Francophones are employed than Anglophones. As a result, this makes it difficult to have proportional reporting. Besides, not much is published in the *Cameroon Tribune* about Anglophones; for instance, in a week less than twenty stories are published in English.³²⁴ Anglophone journalists working in Anglophone provinces are unhappy because they are not getting any job satisfaction as journalists. Most of them complain that their stories are not being published because the central editorial desk says their stories are not timely or they are stale.³²⁵ For instance, *Cameroon Tribune No 83491* of Monday 16 June 2005 published three stories in English, and one was a translation from French to English. The English stories put together cannot cover a page in the newspaper. This accounts for the reason why most Anglophones do not read the *Cameroon Tribune*.

2.5 Government Appointments

Some Anglophones argue that the strength of President Paul Biya's regime is that it has made Anglophones to cling more tenaciously to their identity as Anglophones. According to Bate Bissong an Anglophone writer, the CPDM government has helped Anglophones to realise that they have no future in Cameroon.³²⁶ As such, Anglophones have gone through the process of education, knowing that they are being treated as second class citizens. The government's doctrine of national unity and integration has not been implemented, if one looks at the political appointments in terms of quality and quantity.

³²³ Choves Loh, Permanent Representative of Cameroon Tribune in the North West, interviewed 13 July 2005.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Bate Bissong, a prominent Anglophone writer and Lecturer at the University of Buea, interviewed 20 August 2005.

The appointment of ministers, director generals, and provincial administrators such as Governors, Prefects and Sub-prefects, has always been to the disadvantage of the Anglophones. An Anglophone has never been appointed to head a strategic ministry such as Territorial Administration, Defence, External Relations, Education, Economy and Finance, or to the post of Secretary General at the presidency.³²⁷

Similarly, Anglophones have never been appointed to head lucrative corporations like the National Oil Refinery (SONARA), the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (NHC) or the Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV). In the diplomatic service, Anglophones are rarely appointed as ambassadors or high commissioners, even to English-speaking countries like Nigeria, Great Britain or United States of America.³²⁸ In government appointments Anglophones are seen only as possible assistants to the Francophones. For instance, out of 32 ministers in Cameroon, only 2 are Anglophones; there are 2 secretaries general in 32 ministries; there are 4 general managers of 50 public corporations; there are 2 army generals out of 25; there are 3 ambassadors out of 31; 6 senior divisional officers out of 58 and 12 divisional officers out of 268.³²⁹ From the above information it is evident that Anglophones are under-represented in the government. This accounts for the marginalization of Anglophones. But some Anglophone elites do not believe in political appointment as a measuring rod for Anglophone marginalization. To them, the lack of economic development and good road infrastructure in the Anglophone sector is more concrete evidence to marginalization.

³²⁷ *The Post*, No 0374 of Monday, 20 May 2004.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ *The Guardian Post*, No: 0050, Tuesday 15 July 2006.

2.6 Conclusion

Today, Anglophone nationalist movements are fighting for autonomy of the Anglophone provinces because of a failed integration process. Southern Cameroon chose of its own volition, to join East Cameroon in a union as equal partners. This implied that Anglophones and Francophones would be treated equally in the new state. However, the national government's policy of national integration and approach to managing differences between Anglophones and Francophones still presents a great challenge to the Cameroon state. This chapter has shown that the government succeeded in harmonizing the currency by replacing the pound in Southern Cameroon with the CFA and switching traffic from right to left in Anglophone Cameroon. But it failed to harmonize the educational system as the Anglophones resisted such attempts. The government has also failed in its policy of bilingualism because of its penchant for French.

Furthermore, in forging ahead with integration, the bilingual nature of the country poses a major threat to the existence of the unitary state. According to the Cameroon Constitution, the two official languages (English and French) have equal status, but Francophone policymakers have, over the years, undermined the English language and given the French language a dominant position. In spite of government efforts at promoting bilingualism, many Francophones still behave as though English is not an official language. The head of state himself has failed to demonstrate exemplary bilingualism because, in twenty five years of his rule, he has failed to address the nation even once in the English language. One can rightly argue that bilingualism in Cameroon is a window dressing policy. Most official documents concerning matters of state are issued only in French, leaving English speakers who do not master the French language

to grapple with language barriers. In Yaoundé, some government officials treat people with scorn when they express themselves in English, and any report to a minister in Yaoundé which is not written in French will not be attended to.³³⁰ So Anglophones are forced to write in French if they want a minister to attend to them. All presidential decrees appear only in French; little wonder that breaking news on CRTV is presented in French newscast. Thus, it appears some Anglophone Cameroonians are clamouring today for secession because of a failed integration.

Looking at the reunification of the two Cameroons from independence to the time when the federation was dismantled, one realizes that, in spite of the continuous growth in the influence of French Cameroonians in most spheres in the new state, Anglophone Cameroonians have succeeded in retaining a separate identity which has not been assimilated.

³³⁰ Nkwenti Simon, Executive Secretary General, Cameroon Teachers' Trade Union (CATTU). Interviewed 30 July 2005.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOPHONE NATIONALISM

3.1 Introduction

Literature on Cameroon before the First World War portrays that political development among Cameroonians was almost non-existent. The reason is that under the stern rule of the Germans since 1884, Cameroonians were denied the opportunity to develop a firm sense of national identity because of the repressive policies applied by the Germans. In spite of the harsh German rule in Kamerun, they maintained a colonial administration in the Kamerun that compared favourably with any other in Africa at the time.³³¹ When the Germans were defeated in World War I and, following their departure from Kamerun after it fell to the allies on 26 September 1914, Kamerun was partitioned between France and Britain. France obtained four-fifths of the total area and Britain obtained two disconnected pieces bordering on Nigeria. The departure of the Germans meant that the occupying forces were to provide the territory with a completely new administration to replace Germans.³³²

The partitioning of the territory into English and French spheres had some significant consequences for future political developments and a lasting effect on the construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities. The British and the French administrations pursued different policies of investment. French Cameroon for example, received substantial funds from France, resulting in a higher level of socio-economic development

³³¹ Le Vine, Victor (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, p. 6.

³³² Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 33.

of the area.³³³ The Southern Cameroons under Britain, in contrast, were neglected and continued to be backward compared to their French counterpart.

The first section of this chapter traces the development of Anglophone political movements in order to demonstrate that a lively political organization had come into being by 1945, largely due to British colonial policies in the territory. The second part looks at nationalism after independence and after political liberalization. The rest of the chapter explores the impetus and setbacks to the Anglophone movement from the early 1990 to present. It will be argued that a certain dynamic of action and reaction took place as the state pursued more discriminatory and repressive policies against the Anglophones and that the direction of the later Anglophone movements was critically conditioned by the policies of the state. However, the sudden intensification of the Anglophone movement in the early 1990s cannot be explained as being simply a response to state policies.

To better understand the events of the political upheavals in Cameroon in the 1990s, one must take into account global events happening at the time. For instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 symbolised the collapse of one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe.³³⁴ The collapse of communism had a serious repercussion in East-Central Europe, Africa and Latin America. As the demand for democracy swept across Africa in the early 1990s, drastic changes affected states in sub-Saharan Africa.

³³³ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 24.

³³⁴ Bratton, M. and Van De Walle, N. (1997), *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, p. 105.

Frustrated by declining economies and the failure of incumbent governments in solving basic socio-economic and political problems, people from different social strata called for an end to authoritarian rule.³³⁵ Cameroon was no exception as President Paul Biya was forced to yield to multiparty democracy. Ottaway argues that “if the strongest, best organized totalitarian systems could collapse completely, certainly Africa’s petty tyrants, presiding over weak states and fragile institutions had little hope for survival”.³³⁶ It is against this background that President Paul Biya of Cameroon introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. This saw the creation of many Anglophone pressure groups that began to voice the grievances of the Anglophones.

3.2 Background: Southern Cameroons Nationalism under Colonialism

When the British took over their own portion of Cameroon,³³⁷ it was attached to Nigeria in an administrative union. The British concentrated their interests more in Nigeria than on Southern Cameroons. This led to the gross neglect of the British Cameroons.³³⁸ The pace of social advancement in British Cameroons was slow. In the field of education, the British established few primary and Native Authority schools, which fell short of meeting the educational demand of the territory. Between 1917 and 1922 the number of government schools in the British Cameroons ranged between 5 and 10 and the number of teachers ranged between 11 and 15.³³⁹ As a result few British Cameroonians were

³³⁵ Ibid

³³⁶ Ottaway, Marina (1997), “African Democratisation and the Leninist Option”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 1: p. 1.

³³⁷ The part of German Cameroon that the British took was known as British Cameroons and later on it was named Southern Cameroons. So the name British Cameroons and Southern Cameroons are used interchangeably in this research, and refer to the former British Trust Territory.

³³⁸ Fon Angwafo III, S.A.N. Fon of Mankon. Interview, 20 June 2005.

³³⁹ National Archives, Buea (NAB) file No. 1926/4 Report on the Social Advancement in Southern Cameroons.

educated during the British colonial period. Below is the statistics of government schools and teachers in Southern Cameroons between 1917 and 1922.

Educational Statistics in Southern Cameroons

Year	No. of Government Schools in Southern Cameroons	Average Attendance	No. of Teachers
1917	6	279	11
1918	5	598	23
1919	10	614	19
1920	10	657	18
1921	7	465	18
1922	7	363	25

Table 1, Source: NAB, report to the League of Nations, 1926

Given the size of the territory, the number of schools was insufficient and the people of Southern Cameroons expected the British to do more in terms of creating more schools and training more teachers to accommodate the growing population willing to study. Between 1916 and 1926 the number of teachers ranged from 7 to 21 and most of these were pupil teachers. For instance, the whole of Mamfe Division with a population of 63,241 by 1926 had only one Native Authority School at Boja, with no good infrastructure and two inexperienced teaching staff. There was only one government school in Bamenda covering the entire region.³⁴⁰ The result of the limited number of schools was the high illiteracy rate amongst British Southern Cameroonians compared to French Cameroon.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

Besides education, health was another sector that suffered British neglect in Southern Cameroons. In 1927, the entire region of Southern Cameroons had only four medical officers, stationed in Kumba, Mamfe, Victoria and Bamenda.³⁴¹ The government native hospital was quite inadequate to handle the vast number of patients who went there for treatment. For instance, the medical officer for Victoria, Dr Sharp was also in charge of the Buea hospital, and by the end of 1927, he had single-handedly treated 958 patients and 8,761 out-patients.³⁴² The ratio of doctors to patients was very high and this led to high mortality rates in the mid 1920s. In the Bamenda Division there was only one medical officer, one dispensary and four nurses. Some areas like the entire Metta-Menemo and Bafut had neither a health centre, maternity facility nor a hospital, resulting in a high rate of infant mortality. According to the Metta-Menemo report of 1939, sixty percent of the total number of children born in 1924 died. Thirty two percent died at birth and 28% at early childhood.³⁴³ The table below indicates the doctor patient ratio in the year 1938 and 1939.³⁴⁴

Health Statistics in Southern Cameroons 1939

Area	Medical Centre	Medical Officers	Number of Patients	
			Treated 1938	Treated 1939
Victoria	2	1	23,350	18,492
Kumba	6	1	95,342	1,136,714
Mamfe	2	1	8,754	10,605
Bamenda	3	1	28,942	33,100

Table 2, Source: NAB Departmental Annual Reports and notes (1939)

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ NAB, Metta-Menemo Assessment Report No. 81.

³⁴⁴ NAB, Departmental Annual Report and Notes, 1939.

The statistics indicate clearly the extent to which the British administration neglected the health sector in Southern Cameroons. The health situation of the plantation workers was horrible and many of them died as a result of dysentery, pneumonia, typhoid and malaria, but the British administration did nothing to ameliorate the situation. This worsening health situation led the people to clamour for the social advancement of their territory.

Furthermore, the precarious economic situation of the Southern Cameroons before 1939 affected the living standards of the people. The economy of the region declined at an alarming rate, and Southern Cameroonians often complained that the British were generally not willing to invest significantly in the mandate.³⁴⁵ It was only in 1927 that an agricultural officer was sent to the territory to foster cocoa production in Kumba, to fuel British industries. The refusal by the British to initiate an industrialization program and their attachment only to agricultural development led many to accuse them of seeking to reduce Southern Cameroons to a permanent plantation colony, supplying the British industries with raw materials.³⁴⁶ Today, the majority of the people in the territory still depend on those plantations and rely heavily on agriculture for their livelihood.

Furthermore, between 1916 and 1939, the British made very little effort to build roads.³⁴⁷ The road system in Southern Cameroons was deplorable. There were a few graded roads, often disconnected by streams with bad bridges. Travelling in Southern Cameroons was a nightmare, as most of the distance was covered on foot. Travelling from Buea to

³⁴⁵ NAB file No. 1927/1 Annual Report on the Economy of the Mandate.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Endeley S.M.L, Paramount Chief of Buea. Interview, 5 August 2005.

Bamenda usually took 14 days, and 10 days from Buea to Mamfe. The economic legacy of the British rule in the inter-war years was poverty and underdevelopment. The result was disillusionment on the part of Southern Cameroons, making the comparison with French Cameroons, that was well-developed by the French colonizers.

The political situation of Southern Cameroons before 1939 was not different from the British neglect of the educational and economic policies in the territory. According to the Council of the League of Nations report 1937/5, British administrative policies reflected a lack of interest in Southern Cameroons. Since the territory was granted to Britain as a League of Nations Mandate, Southern Cameroons was administered as an appendage of Nigeria.³⁴⁸ The region, therefore, became a colony within Nigeria, governed by less experienced British officers. Consequently, Nigerian laws and customs were enforced in the territory without any regard for local or indigenous practice.³⁴⁹

The Nigerian Legislative Council (LEGCO), which was established in 1922 by the British Order in Council, came into operation in 1923. There were no representatives from Southern Cameroons in the Council because membership qualification was based on the fact that one needed a yearly income of 100 pounds sterling. Southern Cameroonians were poor and none met the financial qualification for membership. Thus, Southern Cameroons before 1939 was not represented in the LEGCO.³⁵⁰ Consequently, foreigners took decisions about the territory, and it had no budgetary autonomy. Before 1939, Southern Cameroons seemed trapped in a political and constitutional quagmire,

³⁴⁸ NAB 1937/5 Report of the League of Nations on Southern Cameroons.

³⁴⁹ Nyo'Wakai, retired Chief Justice, Bamenda. Interview, 10 July 2005.

³⁵⁰ DeLancey, Mark (1989), *Cameroon: Dependence and Independence*, p. 72.

and the few educated elites mobilized to intervene in the situation by educating the masses about their situation.

The level of political consciousness in Southern Cameroons was very low, largely because of the inadequate education provided by the British administration. Political activities remained restricted to a small group of literate individuals, and necessitated the formation of associations and groups by Southern Cameroonians to act as voices for the people. Pressure groups were formed to demand political, social and economic emancipation of the territory

There was some agitation against British colonial policies in Southern Cameroons and in the light of these agitations,³⁵¹ the Cameroon Youth League (CYL) was formed in Lagos on 27 March 1940 with its motto “Unity and Co-operation”.³⁵² Its founders were P.M. Kale and E.M.L. Endeley. It was modelled after the Nigerian Youth Movement. CYL was organized for the express purpose of promoting the interests of Southern Cameroonian solidarity. It was seen by many as the genesis of Southern Cameroons’ politics.³⁵³

The aim of the CYL was to uplift the territory politically, socially, economically and educationally. The CYL had the task of developing national consciousness in Southern Cameroons. To achieve this, its leaders used the political and socio-economic grievances of the people as crucial factors in awakening political awareness and national

³⁵¹ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 121.

³⁵² Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 199.

³⁵³ Kale, P.M. (1967), *Political Evolution in the Cameroons*, Buea: Government Printing Press, p. 50.

consciousness. Through the maximum use of the print medium,³⁵⁴ the founders of the CYL were politically nurtured in Nigeria and so derived the idea of using printed materials from Nnamdi Azikiwe.³⁵⁵ The CYL monthly newsletter generated some nationalist activity in Southern Cameroons. The newsletter helped to ignite the flame of nationalism and political consciousness of the need for a recognized status for the territory. The newsletter exposed the socio-economic and political neglect of Southern Cameroons by the British. They were also critical of indirect rule and the Native Authority system in which the British used non-literate native rulers in administration instead of the educated elites.³⁵⁶

In order to make its activities more effective and to involve the people, branches of the league were set up in key centres of both Southern Cameroons and Nigeria. Each of these branches had an executive to run its affairs. The executive was to report all its activities to the main body in Lagos. Members contributed money to enable the League to cope with its work. The branches helped to create a spirit of national unity and instil a sense of national consciousness in the hitherto politically dormant region.³⁵⁷ Between 1940 and 1942, the CYL leaders in Lagos met with the British colonial administrators to request a Cameroonian representation in the Legislative Council in Lagos or a separate Legislative Council for Southern Cameroons. Britain's refusal only fanned more agitation in the League. In 1942, as a result of the continuous agitation from Southern Cameroons, the

³⁵⁴ Boharian, Paul (1998), *Africa and Africans*, Illinois: Waveland Press, p. 17.

³⁵⁵ Azikiwe, Nnamdi was a veteran Nigerian politician who founded the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) which aimed at exerting pressure on the colonial administration to hasten political development in Nigeria and Southern Cameroons.

³⁵⁶ NAB, 1239/46/b/1951/2 Cameroons' Youth League Monthly Newsletter.

³⁵⁷ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 126.

colonial administration reluctantly allowed Southern Cameroons to have one seat in the Legislative Council.³⁵⁸

In 1944, Endeley and Kalle, together with L.M. Namme and Namaso N. Mbile took an active part in the formation of Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC).³⁵⁹ Out of this participation grew the first Southern Cameroonian interest in developing political organizations with an orientation peculiar to Southern Cameroons. The NCNC thus became an organized political group for agitations against the British colonial administration. Within the NCNC political framework, Southern Cameroons leadership played a significant role in pointing out specific issues affecting their Trust Territory.

Although the CYL had fought for a separate region and a budgetary autonomy for Southern Cameroons, it was never granted in the Richard's Constitution which had replaced the Clifford Constitution in 1946. The CYL leaders joined Azikiwe's political party NCNC, in a visit to London in 1947, aimed at criticizing the Richard's Constitution.³⁶⁰ As a result of their criticism, the constitution was amended to provide for thirteen elected members of the Eastern Regional House, two of whom were to come from Southern Cameroons. Thus, through their agitation within the NCNC party, Southern Cameroons succeeded in increasing their representation from one to two seats.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 126.

³⁵⁹ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 199.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 202.

This new representation was elective and it gave the opportunity for Southern Cameroonians to vote for the first time.³⁶¹

In 1948 Sir John Macpherson took over from Sir Arthur Richardson as governor of Nigeria. He immediately introduced some reforms which increased political activities in Nigeria and Southern Cameroons. Macpherson's Constitution gave some hope to Southern Cameroonian nationalist by increasing its representation in the Eastern Regional House.³⁶² The constitution made provisions for thirteen members from Southern Cameroons. Although the Macpherson Constitution granted thirteen seats to Southern Cameroons, it had four major weaknesses: indirect rule was still in existence; traditional rulers were still very powerful; the constitution granted neither regional nor budgetary autonomy to Southern Cameroons; and the region was still ruled as an integral part of Nigeria.³⁶³

3.2.1 The Emergence of Party politics in Southern Cameroons

In 1949 Endeley, Mbile and Kale founded the Cameroon National Federation (CNF) in Kumba, from Improvement Unions Associations (IUA) existing in large urban towns like Victoria, Kumba and Bamenda. Among its objectives were:

to assert the separate identity of Southern Cameroonians, unification in principle, removal of all frontier restrictions and regulations, teaching of English and French in schools in both Cameroons, and the constitution of an assembly which will enable the unity of all sections of the Trust Territory.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 127.

³⁶² Ngoh, Victor (1990), *Constitutional Development in Southern Cameroons: From Trusteeship to Independence*, Yaoundé: CEPER, p. 86.

³⁶³ NAB, File No 4134/1/52, Reaction to Macpherson Constitution.

³⁶⁴ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 203.

This was the first national organization which made an open appeal for the wider national issue of unification of North and Southern Cameroons. In this way the CNF gave new dimension to Cameroonian political agitation by making unification and reunification their central platform.³⁶⁵

In 1949, just six months after CNF was formed, a United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in Cameroon. The UN Trusteeship Council was organized in such a way that Visiting Missions were sent to the territory (Trust Territory) to get first-hand and on the spot information about the Trusteeship Territories.³⁶⁶ The CNF immediately made several petitions to the visiting Mission, among which were:

... a statement condemning the administration of Southern Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria which was not in the interest of Southern Cameroons. It also demanded that the two Cameroons, French and English be united as they were before 1914 and that the Southern and Northern British Cameroons be united as a distinct region of Nigeria under its own High Commissioner in Buea responsible to the Governor in Lagos. Alternative demands called for full independence from Nigeria, or direct United Nations Control of British Cameroons. They also made demands for the building of secondary schools and the expansion of trade and vocational schools in the Trust Territory.³⁶⁷

From the petitions made by CNF, it was clear that they did not have a clear program for Southern Cameroons. At one point they wanted to unite with French Cameroon, and at the same time they wanted full independence from Nigeria or United Nations control over British Cameroons. The response from the Visiting Mission reflected this confused

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 132.

³⁶⁷ NAB Vc/a 1951/2, Cameroon National Federation Petition to the Visiting Mission.

situation as the mission emphasized the need for a careful examination before considering any measures of socio-economic and political autonomy for the Trust Territory.³⁶⁸

This confused position of the CNF leadership led to a split in the organization in 1951. Endeley's anti-reunification sentiment alienated pro-reunification members like R.J.K Dibonge, J.N. Foncha and N.N. Mbile, who subsequently formed the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC). Besides its main objective of reunification, KUNC also advocated the abolition of customs barriers between the two Cameroons and an independent United Cameroon.³⁶⁹ The KUNC became a strong rival group to the CNF.³⁷⁰ The CNF began to decline because of the wider appeal of the KUNC with its motto of "Towards self-government or independence for a united Cameroon" for the Southern Cameroons. The year 1951 was significant in the Southern Cameroons nationalist struggle because main political issues such as reunification or joining Nigeria were first brought to light through the objectives of the CNF and KUNC. The year 1952 saw the second UN Visiting Mission and it was during this mission that the sharp political differences between the CNF and KUNC came out clearly. While KUNC asked for an independent, reunified greater Cameroon, the CNF asked for regional autonomy for Southern Cameroons within the Federation of Nigeria.³⁷¹ In spite of the confused situation in Southern Cameroons nationalism, reunification would later prove to be the most decisive element in the territory.

³⁶⁸ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 133.

³⁶⁹ NAB vb/b1951/1, Cameroon Unification Movement KUNC, pp. 1-7.

³⁷⁰ P.M. Kale, *Political Evolution*, cited by Joseph Ebune, (1990) *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 136.

³⁷¹ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 137.

3.2.2 Development of Southern Cameroons Politics, 1950 - 1960

One can argue that enough ground had been prepared for the formation and development of political parties in the Trust Territory to push ahead for the independence of Southern Cameroons. A number of political parties were formed and the first of these parties was the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) which was an amalgamation of KUNC and CNF with Endeley as its president.³⁷² Its motto was “Towards self-government or independence for a united Cameroon”, with the objectives of pressing for early reunification of the two Cameroons and to see the revision and amendments of the Trusteeship Agreement.³⁷³ The KNC enjoyed a lot of support all over the Trust Territory until, the leadership under Endeley wanted to incorporate some of the ideas of the defunct CNF into the party’s program. This led to some contradictions and controversies over the party’s strategy. In 1953, N.N. Mbile created the Kamerun Peoples Party (KPP) and invited P.M. Kale to head the party. According to Kale, he had broken away from the KNC because he was a lover of parliamentary democracy, and he saw the existence of KNC in Southern Cameroons as incompatible with democratic principles.³⁷⁴ The main aim of the KPP was regional autonomy for Southern Cameroons and secession from Nigeria.³⁷⁵ The KPP was opposed to the reunification stand of the KNC.

John Ngu Foncha, a member of KNC, found it difficult to cope with Endeley’s policies, particularly that on the future of Southern Cameroons. He decided to break away and formed his own party, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955.³⁷⁶ The

³⁷² Ibid, p. 143.

³⁷³ NAB, vc/b1953/1 Kamerun National Congress, 1953.

³⁷⁴ Kale, *Political Evolution*, cited by Ebune Joseph (1990), p. 146.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

objective of the KNDP was reunification of the two Cameroons.³⁷⁷ In 1955 the question of unification emerged as the main nationalist goal in the Southern Cameroons for two reasons. First was the formation of the KNDP with a program of complete secession from Nigeria and unification with French Cameroon. Second was the appearance of members of Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) in Southern Cameroons, following the party's abortive revolt in French Cameroon.³⁷⁸ Because the UPC had the same political ideologies as the KNDP, its presence in Southern Cameroons was a boost to the KNDP.³⁷⁹

Although the KNDP and UPC had similar political ideologies, they disagreed strongly on strategies for achieving reunification and independence for Cameroon. UPC wanted immediate reunification and independence, while the KNDP wanted a gradual approach in order to give enough time for the two Cameroons to study and adopt a concrete plan for such a landmark political shift.³⁸⁰ In 1957, the UPC was banned in Southern Cameroons by Endeley's government and its leaders were deported. Immediately after the disappearance of UPC, Ndeh Ntumazah, a Southern Cameroonian and a former high ranking member of the banned UPC formed a new party called One Kamerun (OK).³⁸¹ The aim of OK was to continue the activities of the UPC, and Endeley's government banned it not long after its formation.

³⁷⁷ NAB, *Secession Charter of the Kamerun National Democratic Party*, 1958, p. 11.

³⁷⁸ Le Vine, Victor, (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, p. 206.

³⁷⁹ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 154.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Le Vine, Victor (1970) "A contribution to the political history of Cameroon: The United Nations and the internal politics of decolonization. The termination of the British Cameroons Trusteeship", *Abbia* 24, (January-April): p. 76.

Elections conducted in March 1957 for the thirteen elective seats in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly showed that KNC had lost much of its support to the KNDP. The elections resulted in a narrow loss for Foncha (KNDP 5 seats, KNC 6 seats and KPP 2 seats). In order to put a strong force against the KNDP, the KNC and KPP decided to merge and form a new party called the Cameroon People's National Party (CPNC) in 1957. In January 1959, the KNDP won fourteen seats in the enlarged House of Assembly, while the CPNC took twelve. The stage was now set for the 1959 dialogue, conducted both at home and in the UN, to decide the ultimate fate of the entire British Trust Territory.³⁸²

After the January 1959 elections which brought the KNDP to power, the CPNC and KNDP appeared before the UN to present their case about the future of the Trust Territory. Prime Minister Foncha, on the platform of the ruling KNDP, called for the separation of the territory from the Federation of Nigeria before its independence. He also requested a short "post-plebiscite period during which Southern Cameroons would work towards "complete independence," and during which the possibility of reunification, in the form of federation would be explored by the governments concerned".³⁸³ The CPNC under Endeley made a request that Southern Cameroons should continue association with Nigeria as a fully autonomous region of the Nigerian federation.³⁸⁴ Due to failure by both leaders to reach a consensus, the UN General Assembly decided that a separate plebiscite should be held in each part of the British Cameroons.

³⁸² Le Vine, Victor (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, p. 25.

³⁸³ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroon: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 208.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

The UN issued a final communiqué stating that the plebiscite in Northern and Southern Cameroons was to be held on 11 February 1961. The questions to be put at the Plebiscite were: (a) “Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?” (b) “Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon?”³⁸⁵ Having laid the groundwork for the election, polling stations were created, registration of voters was carried out and plebiscite officials were appointed. Foncha and his party began to campaign vigorously against joining Nigeria by playing on local fears of Ibo domination, because the Ibos had come to pose an economic threat to indigenous Southern Cameroonians. Endeley on his part undertook to convince the electorate by promising the people good administration and development. The CPNC also spoke about terrorism in French Cameroon, to scare voters. The advocates of unification won in the South and lost in the North.³⁸⁶ On the basis of the plebiscite results, delegates from Southern Cameroons finally met in Foumban in July 1961 to discuss a framework for the Federal Republic of Cameroon under the so-called Foumban Constitution.

3.3 Southern Cameroons Nationalism before Political Liberalization

The Trusteeship over the British Southern Cameroons officially ended on 30 September 1961, when the Union Jack was lowered throughout the territory and the British Commissioner, J.O. Field, left the territory.³⁸⁷ On 1 October 1961, the two Cameroons were united, giving birth to the Federal Republic of Cameroon under a two-state system made up of West Cameroon (the former Southern Cameroons) and East Cameroon (the

³⁸⁵ Ebune, Joseph (1990), *The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916-1960*, p. 187.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Susungi, N. Nfor (1990), *The crisis of Unity and Democracy in Cameroon*, p. 73.

former Republic of Cameroon that had acquired independence from France). Some federal structures were put in place, the executive, the administrative and the security forces went immediately into operation. By July 1962, the federal legislature had come into being and Ahmadu Ahidjo became President, and Foncha the Vice-president of the Federation.³⁸⁸ The composition of the government, with John Ngu Foncha sitting in the largely ceremonial and powerless position of Vice-president, indicated that a marginalization of the Anglophones had begun.

Between 1962 and early 1966, President Ahmadu Ahidjo lobbied for a one-party system. Impatient with events in West Cameroon, Ahidjo, on 11 June 1966, invited the prime ministers of the two federated states and the leaders of the three political parties in West Cameroon to a meeting in Yaounde. At the meeting he decried the continuance of multiparty politics in a young nation like Cameroon. He revealed that the Cameroon nation and its people could be better served and its limited human resources more effectively utilized, if the leaders agreed to work under the banner of a one-party system.³⁸⁹ During the meeting there was general agreement to dissolve all existing political organizations and to create a new party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU). The Anglophone leaders could not fight back to maintain the multiparty system in West Cameroon because of greed and hatred amongst themselves.

The Cameroon federation survived for ten years (1962 - 1972). It was, in effect a step towards the establishment of a unitary system in the territory. Ahidjo's political ambition

³⁸⁸ Le Vine, Victor (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, p28

³⁸⁹ Ngoh, Victor (2004), "Dismantling the Federal System" in Ngoh Victor (ed.), *Cameroon from a Federal to a Unitary State 1961-1972*, p. 143.

was, ultimately, to establish a unitary state. This explains why he started with the establishment of a strongly centralized system of government and the one-party system.³⁹⁰ The Cameroon federation was according to Ahidjo, too expensive to run. To him, Cameroon had to finance four assemblies namely: the federal assembly, the East and West Cameroons assemblies and the West Cameroon House of Chiefs. The Cameroon people had to finance three governments namely: the federal, East and West Cameroon governments. The end result was that the cost of maintaining the federal system to him drained the country's coffers.³⁹¹ A referendum was set for 20 May 1972, and the successful campaign for a "yes" vote in favour of the elimination of the federal system was facilitated by Francophones using their numerical strength to vote favourably for a unitary system.

3.3.1 Action and Reaction: the Cameroon Government's policies and the Pattern of Southern Cameroons Nationalism

It appears that the Francophone-dominated government's policies stimulated the rise of Southern Cameroons nationalism. The unconstitutional referendum of 20 May 1972 had as its sole aim the scrapping of the federation established in 1961. Considering that the federal nature of the Cameroonian state was the only viable assurance for the preservation of the identity of English speaking Cameroonians, one would have imagined that Anglophone political elites would have opposed this blatant violation of the constitution, but there was no resistance to the referendum.³⁹² This can only be understood in the light of the failure of most Southern Cameroons politicians to put the

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Ikome, Francis (2005), "The Anglophone Political Elite and the Marginalisation of the English Speaking Minority in Cameroon" (unpublished paper), p. 16.

interest of Southern Cameroonians above their narrow-minded personal interest. This paradox still exists today amongst Anglophone elites struggling for the liberation of Southern Cameroonians.

The assimilationist policies of the Francophone majority in Cameroon were both reactive and provocative. Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul Biya, who had succeeded Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in February 1982, unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed a change in the country's name from "The United Republic of Cameroon" to "The Republic of Cameroon," the name the French East Cameroon had adopted at independence from France in January 1960.³⁹³ The Anglophones now argued that by changing the name, French Cameroon had chosen to secede from the union by going back to the name it had at independence. As such, Francophones lacked the constitutional base from which to continue ruling the former Southern Cameroonians. The new name appeared to deny that the Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct entities. The Anglophone political elite did not take the name change passively, as it was seen as an attempt by the Francophone-led government to assimilate Anglophones.

In 1985, a prominent Anglophone lawyer and activist Fon Gorji Dinka published "The New Social Order" in which he demanded the immediate proclamation of an independent Anglophone state, which he called the Republic of Ambazonia.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ Hughes, Jeffrey (1999), *I Accuse: Ethnic Bloodbath, Massacre, Refugee Crisis*, pp. 149-150.

³⁹⁴ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 73.

... by reviving the old Republic of Cameroon, which the Fouban accord had submerged in order to create a Federation with Southern Cameroon-on-Ambas, the Republic of Cameroon had irretrievably seceded from the union. So unless a new accord is included so as to create a basis for a Union between the two states, any claim, by the Republic of Cameroon to govern Southern Cameroons on-Ambas, would simply mean annexation pure and simple.³⁹⁵

Many Anglophone political elites in Cameroon bought his idea for an independent Anglophone state, and secessionist demands re-emerged in Anglophone Cameroon in the mid-1980s. The Anglophone secessionist demand was strongly opposed by the Cameroonian government. Fon Gorji Dinka was arrested and imprisoned without trial until January 1986, earning him the status of a martyr for the Anglophone cause.³⁹⁶

Reacting to the state of affairs in the mid 1980s, a number of memoranda were submitted to the Cameroon government by Anglophone political elites expressing Anglophone resentment about their region's loss of autonomy. These memoranda were illustrated with a multitude of examples of the recolonisation of their region by the Francophone-dominated state:

Once more, we respectfully seize this opportunity to draw your attention to our memorandum ... concerning the humiliating and revolting colonial status that is gradually but systematically being imposed on the English speaking Cameroonians by the administration ...³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Dinka, Gorji (1985), "The New Social Order" reproduced in Mukong, A. (ed.) (1990), *The Case for Southern Cameroons*, Uwani-Enugu: Chuka Printing Company Ltd, pp. 98-99.

³⁹⁶ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 73.

³⁹⁷ Memoranda submitted by Anglophone elites reproduced in Mukong, A. (ed.) (1990), *The Case for Southern Cameroons*, p. 63.

The aim of the memoranda addressed to the Head of State and the international community was to draw attention to the injustices inflicted upon the minority English speaking Cameroonians by the ruling CPDM government. In the period 1985 to 1990, however, the number of Anglophone petitions and memoranda addressed to the government declined due to the fact that the Biya government stepped up repression because of the deteriorating economic and political situation in the country.³⁹⁸

Shortly after reunification on 1 October 1961, many attempts were made to integrate the two basically different systems of education that the unified Cameroon inherited at independence. All these attempts failed because the French and English speaking Cameroonians believed that their various systems of education were the best. Integration to the French speaking Cameroonians was synonymous with the assimilation of the English speaking Cameroonians. Against this background, the Anglo-Saxon educational system inherited at independence was regarded as the last frontier by Anglophones.³⁹⁹ Replacing it with the Francophone system inherited from France would have meant the complete assimilation of English speaking Cameroonians. For example, in 1983, a first attempt was made to introduce a new group certificate Cameroon GCE scheme for Anglophone schools nationwide by a National Education ministerial circular. The reasons according to the minister, were to make the GCE look a little more like the Baccalaureate (BACC),⁴⁰⁰ and to help Anglophones gain admission into the higher institutions of learning in Cameroon. Many English speaking Cameroonians became suspicious of the

³⁹⁸ Takougang, J. and Krieger, M. (1998), *African States and Society in the 1990s: Cameroons Political Crossroads*, Oxford: West View Press, p. 167.

³⁹⁹ Nyamnjoh, Francis (1995), *The GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity*, Bamenda: News link Printers, p. v.

⁴⁰⁰ Baccalaureate is the English equivalent of the GCE Advanced Levels.

government's plan to modify the GCE. There was a general outcry and massive protest by Anglophone Cameroonians in all sectors of the society.

The fight against the assimilation of the GCE became the peoples' fight. Parents, teachers, students, churches, cultural, and political associations and the totality of the English private press all joined the fight, each in their own way and to the best of their ability.⁴⁰¹ It was the fight for the survival of the English speaking minority in Cameroon's educational system. Initially, the government thought it could outsmart the people and used all manner of tricks to break the concerted front. The government finally yielded to the Anglophones' demand, the circular was dropped and the two systems of education maintained. It is clear from this point that a people united behind a just cause are unbeatable. The defence against the assimilation of the GCE was a lasting, emotionally compelling cause that every nationally conscious Anglophone ardently supported.⁴⁰²

3.4 Southern Cameroons Nationalism after Political Liberalization in the 1990s.

The wind of change that blew across Africa in the early 1990s also affected Cameroon. In 1990 President Paul Biya, under considerable internal and external pressure, introduced a limited degree of political liberalization. He announced the advent of multipartyism, as well as a certain degree of liberalization of mass communication and freedom of association, including the holding of public meetings and demonstrations.⁴⁰³

As a result, several political parties, pressure groups and private newspapers were

⁴⁰¹ Nyamnjoh, Francis, *The GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity*, p. viii.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (1997), "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: pp. 207-229.

established in Cameroon. Some began to express and represent Anglophone interests. This gave some impetus to the Anglophones to begin voicing their long-standing grievances by openly criticizing the Francophone domination of Anglophones.

The Social Democratic Front (SDF), the first opposition political party, was launched in Anglophone Cameroon, during the growing economic and political crisis. It soon became the leading opposition party in Anglophone Cameroon and nationwide. “The leaders of the SDF helped to turn the Anglophone region into a veritable hotbed of rebellion, organizing several confrontations with the regime in power”.⁴⁰⁴ The impact of this on the Anglophone community was the development of Anglophone consciousness and action. Several pressure groups were created by Anglophone elites to defend their interests, such as Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), The Ambazonia Movement, Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), Southern Cameroons People Congress (SCPC), All Anglophone Congress (AAC), The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) and the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC). All these pressure groups were fighting for a common cause – that of defending the interest of Anglophones in a Francophone-dominated state.

The emergence of a new generation of political elites in Anglophone Cameroon in the 1990s, helped to challenge policies and the strategies of the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM), the ruling party. Chief among the new personalities were: Ni John Fru Ndi, Chairman of the SDF; Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, former Chairman of the Southern Cameroons National Council; Simon Munzu, Fon Gorji

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

Dinka, founder of the Republic of Ambazonia, and Carlson Anyangwe, one of the founding fathers of the SDF. These personalities were revered in Anglophone Cameroon but were hated within the ruling circles of the state.⁴⁰⁵

Another important political element worthy of mention is that by the 1990s, a large Anglophone emigrant community had formed beyond the borders of Cameroon, chiefly in America and Europe. The Anglophone emigrants played a big role in the development of nationalist politics back home. The way the Anglophone Diaspora linked with members back home through their letters and return visits widened the horizon of their fellow comrades back home to continue with the struggle. Of equal importance was the financial support sent home from abroad, destined for the support of nationalist political activities.

3.4.1 Anglophone Writers as another Voice in the Liberalization of Anglophones

Cameroon writers of English expression only started writing about the marginality of the Anglophones in the 1990s; yet they have been instrumental in raising the Anglophone consciousness. Many reasons have been advanced for the absence of creative writers in Anglophone Cameroon, amongst which are the kind of education they received under the British.⁴⁰⁶ Because British Cameroons was administered as a mandatory and later as a trust territory under the British, the British colonial administration was in no hurry to establish schools. The fact that elementary and secondary schools were so few and

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Lyonga, N. and Butake, B. (1980), *Cameroon Literature in English: An Appraisal*, Yaoundé: published privately, p. 4.

parents asked to pay fees that many could not afford led to a high rate of illiteracy. Consequently, those who had any type of higher education were few indeed; and it is thus no surprise that none of them had any motivation for creative writing. There was also a complete absence of publishing opportunities in Southern Cameroons mainly because the territory was not thickly populated as was the rest of Nigeria. Publishers or printers preferred to establish their businesses where opportunities abounded.⁴⁰⁷ These are some of the reasons for the lack of literary creativity in Southern Cameroons between the sixties and eighties.

The absence of social justice and equal opportunities for all in Cameroon and, more especially for Anglophone Cameroonians, gave birth to protest writing in Anglophone Cameroon in the 1990s. But one can argue that in spite of the injustices perpetrated against Anglophones by Ahidjo, few Anglophone writers protested, while the majority was blinded by financial reward.⁴⁰⁸ The bitterness exhibited in later Anglophone Cameroon writing was consequent upon the social injustices perpetrated against Anglophones by President Paul Biya's new deal.⁴⁰⁹ Several Anglophone writers have articulated the Anglophone problem in their writing. The Anglophone writers chosen as an illustration are Babila Mutia, Epie Ngome and Bate Besong because their works articulate the aspirations of the Anglophones.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 6.

⁴⁰⁸ Lyonga, N. et al. (eds.) (1993), *Anglophone Cameroon Writing*, Bayreuth African studies 30: Weka No.1: p. 155.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 158.

Babila Mutia's *Before this Time Yesterday* is the recreation of the "before", "yesterday" and "today" of the Republic of Cameroon. The play takes readers back to the time of the struggle for independence, and then comments on the evolution and the political imbalances that beset the actions and motives of its characters. Nothing has changed as Mutia asserts through one of his characters, Abassa:

What was a flag and national anthem when our people had no political and economic freedom? ... The kind of independence the colonialists gave us was one without the right to control our destiny ... Nothing has changed Sango. Look around the country, has anything changed? It is still the same men, the same partnerships collaborating with the imperialists ... But this time the exploitation has become more vicious. Yesterday and today, it's still the same faces ... Ours is a lost generation.⁴¹⁰

Babila Mutia points out that the problem in Cameroon, especially as it concerns Anglophone Cameroon, has to do with government's intolerance and the absence of political will to ignite some hope in Cameroonians. It is within such a background of marginalisation and deprivation that Babila Mutia laments that "Ours is a lost generation".⁴¹¹

Epie Ngome's play, *What God has Put Asunder*⁴¹² chronicles and incorporates the political and economic manoeuvres, the betrayals, deceits and exploitation of the Anglophones in the union as he attempts to explain the past, which continues to affect the present state of Cameroon. The characters in the play are Weka (symbolically representing West Cameroon), her husband, Garba, whom she married reluctantly (representing East Cameroon), Louis, her husband's mentor and chief consultant on all

⁴¹⁰ Mutia, Babila (1995), *Before this Time Yesterday*, Yaoundé: Editions Nouvelles du Sud, pp. 33-36.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Ngome, Epie (1992), *What God has Put Asunder*, Yaoundé: Pitcher.

issues (representing France), her guardian at the orphanage, Rev. Gordon (representing the British trusteeship over Southern Cameroons), and the officiating priest at the wedding, Rev. UNOR (representing the United Nations at the Plebiscite).⁴¹³ Garba's neglectful but exploitative attitude towards Weka represents the attitude of the Francophone leadership towards Anglophones. The author attacks the domineering Francophone influence over the minority Anglophone population of Cameroon. This play has contributed to educating the Anglophones about their situation in the unitary state.

According to Koning and Nyamnjoh,⁴¹⁴ Bate Besong's *Beast of No Nation* is a bitter indictment of the Francophone exploitation of the Anglophones who are reduced to 'night soil men' (slaves). The major problem of the night soil men in *Beast of No Nation*⁴¹⁵ is that they want professional identification papers which their leaders do not want to issue; yet these leaders grow fat out of the toil of the night soil men. They steal and embezzle money and transfer it into coded accounts overseas. The exploited Anglophones are demanding their civil rights or what the author calls their 'identification papers'. The author believes that the Anglophones will have their freedom or perhaps a nation of their own, or death.⁴¹⁶ From this premise, Anglophone Cameroon writers come across as another voice in the battle for political and economic liberalization of the Anglophones and through their works they have been able to create some awareness amongst the Anglophones.

⁴¹³ Ambe, Hilarius (2004), "The Anglophone-Francophone Marriage and Anglophone Dramatic Composition in the Cameroon Republic" in Marsden, P. and Davis, G. (eds.), *Towards a Transcultural Future: Literature and Human Rights in a Post-Colonial World*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, p. 76.

⁴¹⁴ Koning, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2004), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, P. 142.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

3.4.2 State Policies and the Development of Anglophone Nationalism in the 90s

State policies between 1990 and 2000 thus contributed substantially to the development of the Anglophone nationalist movement that had previously been small and elitist. In March 1993, Augustine Kontchou Kouomegni, the then Minister of State in Charge of Communications and also government spokesman, informed Cameroonians that a national forum on constitutional reform would be held from April to June 1993.⁴¹⁷ In response to this announcement, some Anglophone elites, such as Simon Munzu, Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad and Carlson Anyangwe – convened an All Anglophone Conference (AAC) from 2-3 April 1993 in Buea, the former capital for Southern Cameroons, “For the purpose of adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reform and of examining several matters relating to welfare of ourselves, our posterity, our territory and the entire Cameroon nation.”⁴¹⁸

The AAC turned out to be a landmark in the history of Anglophone Cameroon nationalism. It brought together over 5,000 members of the Anglophone elite and almost all Anglophone associations and organizations were represented.⁴¹⁹ After two days of deliberation, the conference issued the Buea Declaration which stated that:

In 1961 the people of Southern Cameroons through a UN supervised plebiscite decided to enter into a political union with the people of The Republic of Cameroon whom they consider as their brother. Their

⁴¹⁷ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 86.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

aspiration was to establish a two states federation of equal status. In 1972, all this was disregarded. Not only did the Francophone majority impose their will, fraudulently, on the Anglophone minority, but they also brought to an end the equality of status between the two founding components of Cameroon. The imposition of the unitary state in Southern Cameroons in 1972 was unconstitutional and illegal.

The unconstitutional and illegal imposition of the Unitary form of government was aimed not only at dismantling the institutions of Anglophone State (legislature, Government, House of Chiefs, Judiciary, Police, etc), but also at exploiting their economy, within the years of the union between the Anglophones and Francophone in Cameroon. The Anglophones have been disenfranchised, marginalized and treated with suspicion and their participation in national life has been limited to non-essential function.

Anglophones are systematically discriminated against in the admission of students into profession schools and other institutions of higher learning, notably the National School of Administration and Magistracy (ENAM) where the Anglophone section has been abolished. Anglophones have virtually been excluded since its inception from such institutions as the Ecole Nationale Superieure Polytechnique, the Institute International des Assurances, the School of Survey and the Business Administration School in Douala.

That the only redress adequate to right the wrongs done to Anglophone Cameroon and its people since the imposition of the Unitary state is a return to the original form of government of the reunified Cameroon.

That to this end, all Cameroonians of Anglophone heritage are committed to working for the restoration of a federal constitutional and a federal form of government, which takes cognizance of the bicultural nature of Cameroon.⁴²⁰

The Buea Declaration denounced many of the injustices suffered by Anglophones in the hands of the Cameroon government. Following the publication of the Buea Declaration, Anglophones were awakened from slumber. The AAC became the main Anglophone organization responsible for the defence and representation of general Anglophone

⁴²⁰ "Buea Declaration" (1993), A memorandum cataloguing most of the prejudices said to be suffered, in general by Anglophone Cameroonians in their union with Francophones, Limbe: Nooremac Press, pp. 7-30.

interests. On 26 May 1993, the Anglophone Standing Committee submitted a federal draft constitution to the technical committee appointed by the Head of State.⁴²¹ The government's silence on the AAC constitutional proposal led some Anglophone organizations like Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and Free West Cameroon Movement (FWC) to adopt a secessionist agenda. The two major Anglophone options emerging in the process of constitutional reform were a choice between the demands for a return to the federal state or outright secession from the union with the Republic of Cameroon.⁴²²

As a follow up, a second All Anglophone Conference was held in Bamenda from 29 April to 1 May 1994. The conference reviewed all the futile attempts of the Anglophone Standing Committee to enter into negotiations with the government about a return to the federal state. The Bamenda Proclamation insisted that the Anglophone Council should first “seek and secure constitutional talks between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon on the basis of the federal draft constitution”.⁴²³ However, should the government persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful constitutional talks within a reasonable time, the Anglophone Council should “proclaim the revival of the independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone territory and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and preserve the independence”.⁴²⁴ Therefore, the adoption of the name Southern Cameroons National Council showed that the aim of the struggle had

⁴²¹ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 87.

⁴²² Ibid, p. 89.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

always been and remained “to restore the autonomy of the Southern Cameroons territory and to put an end to their annexation by French Cameroon.”⁴²⁵

3.5 The SCNC and the Struggle for Autonomy

"Anglophone" identity is rooted in the shared experience of the British colonial administration. This is best expressed in the creation of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) in 1994. By appealing to the experience of British colonialism, Anglophone political activists have tried to construct a common identity which articulates their distinct colonial past. Their political agenda is also clear from the outset - regional separation. In this sense, the SCNC came to be the first organization with a mass following, focusing on the issue of injustices against Anglophones. By advocating political separation, it only adds a threatening overtone to current concerns about the future survival of Cameroon as a nation.

In this light, the SCNC has created structures in most parts of Anglophone Cameroon and has succeeded in transforming Anglophone organizations from elitist to mass movements, by raising the consciousness of the Anglophone people about their region's subordinate position within the Francophone-dominated unitary state, and by mobilizing them for action in its pursuit of secession.⁴²⁶ As part of its sensitization campaign, the SCNC organizes frequent meetings throughout the Anglophone territory to make the population aware of the activities of SCNC's goals, programmes and strategies.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Ibid, p. 99.

In 1997, there was a spate of terrorist attacks in six towns in the North West Province of Cameroon. In Jakiri Kumbo,⁴²⁷ unidentified gunmen shot and killed a gendarme⁴²⁸ officer on duty. A similar attack in Kumbo resulted in the burning down of the residence of the District Officer. In Bamenda, the Gendarmerie Brigade commander was shot dead by unknown gunmen. Meanwhile, similar raids were carried out in Bafut, Mbengwi and Oku.⁴²⁹ In reaction to this unexplained spate of violence, the authorities slammed a dusk-to-dawn curfew on the whole province. The rural population was subjected to all sorts of inhumane treatment at the hands of soldiers. Men were arrested, tortured and thrown in jail, some were even shot, and for weeks the people were traumatized. While government struggled to assemble evidence that would incriminate the SCNC, a considerable number of SCNC activists were arrested and imprisoned in Yaoundé. Some died while in detention and others were not brought to trial until 1999, when they were charged with criminal offences rather than treated as political prisoners.⁴³⁰

The SCNC chairman, Henry Fossung, who had gone into hiding after the terrorist attacks in the North West Province, publicly denied any SCNC involvement, but his denial came after hundreds of SCNC members had been arrested. His lack of commitment to the struggle cast a shadow of doubt on his leadership.⁴³¹ It was under these circumstances that Justice Frederick Alobwede, who was then a member of the High Command Council of the SCNC, took over the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in Buea on

⁴²⁷ Jakiri Kumbo is a town in Anglophone Cameroon where secessionist tendencies are prevalent.

⁴²⁸ A gendarme is a military officer charged with police duties among the civilian population.

⁴²⁹ Jotanga, Jetyem (1997), *Cameroon: Aspects of a democracy*, p. 89.

⁴³⁰ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 104.

⁴³¹ Mr Nwanicha, Executive Secretary General of Ebong's faction of SCNC, interviewed, 20 July 2005.

30 December 1999, proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC).⁴³² Ebong was arrested and detained in Yaoundé. The SCNC rallied behind him and he was nominated chairman of the SCNC and first head of state of the FRSC. Having proclaimed the statehood of the FRSC, a constituent assembly met in Bamenda in May 2000 and adopted resolutions on the type of government for Southern Cameroons. They settled on a presidential and federal system of government, a coat of arms, a flag, a motto, anthem and the name of the nation.

The flag has nine stripes, (white and blue) with a thirteen-star circle and a dove carrying a star in its bill. The white stripes stand for transparency, the blue represents fertility and agriculture, which is the backbone of the economy. The thirteen stars represent the thirteen counties of Southern Cameroons, or what the present government calls divisions. The dove stands for freedom because it is flying freely, and the star that the dove carries in its bill represents the possible creation of another county.

The coat of arms has two birds with two spears tied in the middle. One of the birds is an eagle and the other is called *Bonaventura turanka*. The eagle is a unique bird and found in the Forest Zone of Southern Cameroons. The *Bonaventura turanka* is found in the Grass- fields Zone of Southern Cameroons. It is a unique bird because it produces the 'red feather' which is a symbol of authority. The two spears with a scale of justice represent the fundamental aspects of freedom and justice. As the people of Southern Cameroons fight to gain freedom, they will not destroy the cardinal issue of human rights.

⁴³² Ibid.

The motto of the SCNC is ‘the force of argument and not the argument of force’; it means that the SCNC is committed to resolving the Southern Cameroons case through peace. This has been exhibited through its numerous appeals to the government for dialogue since 1993, to which the government has a deaf ear. The national anthem is called ‘Freedom land’, and it calls on all Southern Cameroonians to defend their land. These new developments gave some impetus to the Anglophone struggle.

3.5.1 Setbacks in the Anglophone Struggle

From 1997 on, the SCNC appeared almost to dissolve into separate strains. The united front policies from AAC that had bound them together through the years came to a standstill as a direct consequence of the general loss of momentum of the Anglophone struggle.⁴³³ The resignation of the founding fathers from the SCNC was a big blow to the struggle as it created a forum for a power tussle within the organization. The first SCNC chairman, Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, left for the US on the pretext that he was sick. He stayed in the US for one-and-a-half years, leaving the movement without a leader. Due to his nonchalant attitude towards the struggle, Augustine Ndangam, who was vice chairman, was made acting chairman until mid-1996, when a meeting was held in Buea to look for a replacement. In the elections, the two candidates contesting were Prof. Kofele Kale and Ambassador Henry Fossung. Prof. Kale won by a landslide. However, when he was about to be installed he said ‘having just returned to the country’ he did not want to be chairman of the SCNC, which was a pressure group. He chose to militate in

⁴³³ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 104.

the SDF, to the disappointment of the SCNC members who had voted for him. The runner-up in the election was Henry Fossung, and the chairmanship was handed over to him.

Ambassador Henry Fussong was to serve a one-year mandate to complete the term of Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, which was initially four years (1993 to 1997) and to conduct fresh elections in April 1997 to obtain a complete mandate for himself. Some SCNC members claim he did not conduct the elections in 1997 because he was afraid that he would lose, since he had lost the first election.

In 1997, following the terrorist attack in the North West Province by unidentified gunmen, Henry Fussong went into hiding. In 1999, the South West Province, in accordance with the constitution of the SCNC, in an election in Tiko decided to pass a vote of no confidence on Henry Fossung. He was replaced by Ndoki Mukete, who was at that time the provincial coordinator of the SDF. Fussong's removal was unconstitutional but he was removed all the same as SCNC chairman because he was allegedly not working for the interests of Southern Cameroonians.

Ndoki Mukete became the new Chairman of the SCNC. He was acclaimed by everybody; he was active and vocal. Little did the other SCNC members know that he would soon be bought over by the government. When the program for the proclamation of the Southern Cameroons independence in December 1999 was drawn up, Ndoki Mukete had to proclaim it, but he had been bought over by the government and awarded a post at

Cameroon National Football Federation (FECAFOOT). He was given the budget to take the National Team to Ghana for the African Zones eliminator for the World Cup in 2002.⁴³⁴ He came out clearly and told the people that he would not make the proclamation. Out of desperation Justice Ebong went ahead and made the proclamation on Radio Buea. Ndoki Mukete resigned and the SCNC met in Bamenda and unanimously proclaimed Justice Ebong as the chairman of SCNC and the first president of Southern Cameroons, to prevent him from being tortured and killed by the government. While Ndoki Mukete was still chairman of SCNC, Henry Fusuong created his own faction and kept calling himself the chairman. So now there were two factions in the SCNC.

When Justice Ebong was arrested and imprisoned, Nfor Ngala Nfor, former chairman of the SDF Constitutional and Political Affairs Committee was made vice chairman of the SCNC and the acting president of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC). Martin Luma was voted as the new chairman of the SCNC, while Ebong was still in prison. Ebong's followers continued to recognize him as the chairman of the SCNC. Thus, there were three factions in the SCNC. The government also created its own SCNC faction to work against the Southern Cameroons struggle. Currently, there are about four factions in the SCNC, with each faction claiming to be the authentic SCNC. The infighting and bickering within the SCNC and other Anglophone movements have greatly weakened the course of the Anglophone struggle for self-determination. However, in spite of the split within the SCNC, the nationalist movement is far from dead. The Southern Cameroons was admitted as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in The Hague. The SCNC and SCAPO also took the

⁴³⁴ Mr Nwanchia, executive Secretary General of Ebong's Faction of the SCNC, interviewed 20 July 2005.

Southern Cameroons case to the United Nations and to the Africa court in Banjul, the Gambia.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Political movements in Southern Cameroons in the mid 1940s appeared to mobilize the masses for political action against British colonial rule, but it was premature because national consciousness had not yet been sufficiently diffused to create a firm basis for such a movement. The outcome of the 1961 reunification and the subordinate position accorded to Anglophones was a perfect time for the Anglophones to voice their dissatisfaction, but Anglophone elites did not protest – instead they were competing for power. In 1972 a referendum was carried out that dismantled the federal system of government adopted before reunification. Again no Anglophone voice was raised against the scrapping of the federation. In 1984, President Paul Biya single-handedly changed the name of the country from the United Republic to a Republic, without the consent of the citizens, thereby effectively seceding from the union with Southern Cameroons. This sparked some fear about a government plot to assimilate the Anglophones by denying the bi-cultural nature of the country.

In the mid 1980s, Southern Cameroons nationalism had arisen out of the primordial impulse to preserve and defend the Anglo-Saxon educational system and the GCE examination, against being assimilated, and to create an Anglo-Saxon university for Anglophones. The new elites that fought for this had motives reaching beyond the defence of the educational system. This became more compelling when seen against the backdrop of economic and political marginalization of the Anglophones. The new elites

resurrected some awareness amongst the Anglophones against a government increasingly determined to crush any sub-national group.

The early 1990s saw the birth of many Anglophone pressure groups fighting for the restoration of the state of Southern Cameroons. Running through all the facets of the Southern Cameroons movements by 2000 was a strong element of elite competition. The emerging Anglophone political elite, driven by different interests won the confidence of the masses. Unfortunately, due to their egoistic and selfish natures, they abandoned the people after raising some hopes in them that they would be liberated.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM

4.1 Introduction

As shown in Chapter three the Anglophone problem has been in the limelight since the mid 1980s. Among the many possible avenues available to Anglophone leaders to explore, in a bid to dialogue with the government on the problem, leaders of the Anglophone movements have privileged the following: petitions, motions, and memoranda, presentations in court, rational arguments, letters and even calls for open debate with the government on the Anglophone problem. The government's unwillingness to dialogue with the leaders of the Anglophone movement, branding them as terrorist groups, made the Anglophone political elite seek other avenues to compel the government to act on the Anglophone question. In response to the government's intransigence, the Anglophone elites decided to take their case beyond the boundaries of Cameroon.

This chapter examines the different ways in which the Anglophone problem became internationalized. The first part, explores the mechanism through which the Anglophone movements tried to enter into dialogue with the government. The second part focuses on the responses from the government and lastly, the chapter examines the shift in an attempt to find a national solution to the Anglophone problem to a shift that goes beyond the question of national sovereignty in the following: a) The Bakassi dispute, b)

Southern Cameroons People's Organisation taking the Anglophone case to a High Court in Abuja, c) Southern Cameroons National Council and the United Nations, d) Southern Cameroons People's Organization taking the Anglophone case to the African Court, e) Admission of Southern Cameroons as a member of Unrepresented Nations Peoples Organization, f) The Bakweri Land Claim Committee in the African Court, and g) the 1992 Victims of the Post-presidential Election Violence in the African Court.

Historically, it is not strange that the Anglophone elites in Cameroon took their case to the international community, because this was a strategy that they employed during the British colonial period. A number of petitions and constant visits were made to the UN by Anglophone elites concerning British neglect of their territory. These petitions were made in the form of presentations before United Nations in New York or whenever there was a visiting UN Mission to the Trust Territory. For example in 1946, the Richard constitution⁴³⁵ which replaced the Clifford constitution did not adequately cater for the aspirations of the leaders of the Cameroon Youth League (CYL). This led the CYL leaders joining Dr Azikiwe's political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in a visit to London in 1947, which aimed at criticizing the Richard Constitution.⁴³⁶ Three years later, the United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in Cameroon and Anglophone leaders immediately made several petitions to the Mission. Among these were a statement condemning the administration of Southern Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria which was viewed as not being in the interest of Southern

⁴³⁵ Sir Arthur Richard was governor of Nigeria from 1943-1947, the reforms that he introduced were known as the Richard's Constitution.

⁴³⁶ Ngoh, Victor (1990), *Constitutional Development in Southern Cameroons: From Trusteeship to Independence*, p. 86.

Cameroons.⁴³⁷ In their presentation to the Mission, they made demands for the building of secondary schools and the expansion of trade and vocational schools in the Trust Territory and also called for independence from Nigeria, or direct United Nations Control of British Cameroons.⁴³⁸ In January 1959 the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the Cameroon Peoples National Congress (CPNC) appeared before the UN to present their case about the future of the Trust Territory.

Since the early 1990s, the pattern of petitions has change drastically. Petitions against the new state are different from those earlier petitions against colonialism. The reason for this is that during colonialism the number of educated elites in Southern Cameroon was very few compared to the elites in the new state. The aim of the petitions against the new state has been to draw the attention of the UN and the international community to the injustices inflicted upon the minority English speaking Cameroonians by the ruling government. Judging from history one can rightly say that the Anglophone elites believe that by making their plight known to the international community, it can intervene to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons.

4.2 Anglophone Movements' Attempts to Dialogue with the Government.

In March 1993 about 5,000 Anglophones met in Buea for the All Anglophone Conference, “for the purpose of adopting a common Anglophone position on constitutional reforms and of examining several other matters related to the welfare of

⁴³⁷ NAB Vc/a 1951/2, Cameroon National Federation Petition to the Visiting Mission.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

ourselves, our posterity, our territory and the entire Cameroon Nation”.⁴³⁹ The decisions arrived at during the congress became known as the ‘Buea Declaration’. The Buea Declaration called for a return to the federal state and pointed out some grievances against Francophone domination in the unitary state. Unfortunately, the Buea Declaration never received government attention.

In May 1993 the Anglophone Standing Committee established by the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) submitted a draft constitution, which would provide for major political, financial and fiscal autonomy for the two federated states. This committee legislated that there would be the usual separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and a senate, as well as a national assembly for each federated state; and a rotating presidency for the Federal Republic.⁴⁴⁰ At the meeting of the technical committee on constitutional matters, the government rejected the Anglophones’ federal constitutional proposal. In expression of their anger, the Anglophone representative at the constitutional deliberation walked out of the consultation. Thereafter the Bamenda Conference in 1994⁴⁴¹ which became known as the All Anglophone Conference II (AAC II) was convened.

The Bamenda Conference reviewed all the futile attempts of the Anglophone Standing Committee to enter into negotiations with the government about a return to the federal state. The conference resulted in the Bamenda Proclamation which insisted that the

⁴³⁹ *The Buea Declaration* (1993), Limbe: Nooremac Press, p. 8.

⁴⁴⁰ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh F. (1997), “The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35, 2: p. 219.

⁴⁴¹ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 88.

Anglophone leaders should first “seek and secure constitutional talks between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon on the basis of the federal draft constitution which was submitted by the Anglophone Standing Committee in May 1993”.⁴⁴² In line with the Bamenda Proclamation, the Anglophone leaders were committed to restoring the federation of the two states so that Cameroon should remain as an entity respecting the various colonial identities of the two Cameroons. The proposed federal constitution was translated into French so that there should be no problem in understanding the proposed constitution. Unfortunately, the government treated all their calls and appeals with disdain. There has been no acknowledgement from the government of the many petitions submitted by the Anglophones.⁴⁴³ This has led the Anglophones to resort to what is called the ‘zero option’, which states that:

Should the government either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful constitutional talks or fail to engage in such within a reasonable time, the Anglophone Council shall so inform the Anglophone people by all suitable means. It shall, thereupon, proclaim the revival of the independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone territory of the Southern Cameroons and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Territory.⁴⁴⁴

The zero option, adopted by the Anglophone leaders, means that they are determined to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons. The Anglophone leaders are no longer prepared to dialogue with the government, as they claim that since 3 April 1993 the government has never responded to any of the correspondences, resolutions, petitions,

⁴⁴² “The Bamenda Proclamation” issued by the All Anglophone Conference meeting in the Second Session at Bamenda from the 29 April to 1 May 1994, 18 Feb. 2005. Accessed at < <http://www.southerncameroons.org> >

⁴⁴³ Nfor Ngala Nfor, Vice Chairman of the Southern Cameroons National Council, interviewed 11 August 2005.

⁴⁴⁴ *The Bamenda Proclamation*, 18 Feb. 2005. Accessed at < <http://www.southerncameroons.org> >

proposals, suggestions and pleas that have been addressed to them on the issue of constitutional reform by the people of Southern Cameroons.⁴⁴⁵

4.3 Cameroon Government's Response to the Anglophone Problem

The Cameroon government has been indifferent to the Anglophone problem. Initially, the government said that there was no problem in Cameroon. Now the government has acknowledged a problem but claims that the problem can be solved “in-house”. However, instead of addressing the problem, it has resorted to intimidation, corruption, and repression as a way of forcing Anglophones to abandon their resistance and struggle for independence.⁴⁴⁶

Members of Anglophone movements are frequent victims of government repression. For example, in 1993 the All Anglophone Conference was scheduled to be held at the University of Buea, but the government refused permission. The Catholic Church gave permission for the use of their hall at the Mount Mary Clinic in Buea.⁴⁴⁷ Also in 1994 the government attempted to obstruct the organization of the All Anglophone Conference in Bamenda (AAC II) by claiming that the Anglophones had come together to declare secession as an excuse for repression.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁵ “Official Statement of the People of Southern Cameroons on the Constitutional Consultative Committee”, 18 Feb. 2005. Accessed at www.southernCameroons.org/1994SCPCOnConstitutionalCommitte.html

⁴⁴⁶ Nfor Ngala Nfor, National Vice Chairman of the Southern Cameroons National Council, interviewed 11 August 2005.

⁴⁴⁷ “The Untold Story of the All Anglophone Conference”, in *Cameroon Life*, 2, 8, May 1993: pp. 11-12.

⁴⁴⁸ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 137.

In response to Anglophone demands, the government has used divide and rule tactics with considerable success splitting Anglophones by capitalising on the cultural and ethnic differences between the North West and South West provinces.⁴⁴⁹ It has succeeded to a large extent at playing them against each other. For example, in response to the South West complaint about the alleged North West domination, South Westerners were appointed into key positions in government.⁴⁵⁰ Furthermore, “the government has sought to use its allies among the Anglophone ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elites for the defence of the Unitary State, in exchange for rewards in the form of appointments”.⁴⁵¹ These pro-government Anglophones tend to blame leaders of various Anglophone movements for their calls for federalism or secession and for leading “hostile campaigns at home and abroad to foster division and hatred among Cameroonians”.⁴⁵²

The government, in its attempt to neutralize Anglophones, hires Anglophones to fight their fellow Anglophones. The government has, therefore, used its cohorts within the Anglophone group to challenge claims of Anglophone marginalisation. These cohorts talk instead of “self-marginalisation”, and invite their fellow Anglophones to assert themselves as fully fledged Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibility as Francophones.⁴⁵³

The government also campaigns against the Anglophone attempts to remember October 1, the day they got their independence from Britain. Anglophone elites argue that every

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 111.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

year, French Cameroon celebrates January 1, the day they got their independence from France. During the celebration, epaulettes and medals are awarded to soldiers. But on October 1, the same soldiers are sent to oppress Southern Cameroonians and prevent them from celebrating their Independence Day. By celebrating January 1 and suppressing October 1, the government distorts history by implying that January 1 is the day both Cameroons became independent.⁴⁵⁴ In this light, since 1993, October 1 celebrations, organized by some Anglophone movements to mark their Independence, have often been met with violent disruption by the security forces. The government suspects that Anglophones would declare secession and independence. Furthermore, leaders of Anglophone movements are constantly being harassed and at times detained without trial for long periods. Some have been forced into exile.⁴⁵⁵ Rallies and demonstrations by Southern Cameroonians have been banned, press censorship by the administrative authorities, seizures of newspapers, intimidation and imprisonment of Anglophone journalists have all continued unabated.⁴⁵⁶

The government also uses stigmatisation and criminalisation of the Anglophone movements as a means of countering them. The government does not only claim that the SCNC is illegal, it is also a terrorist organization, whose actions are provocative. According to Dion Ngute, Minister Delegate in the Ministry of External Affairs in Charge of Commonwealth:

⁴⁵⁴ Nfor Ngala Nfor, National Vice Chairman of the Southern Cameroons National Council, interviewed 11 August 2005.

⁴⁵⁵ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 137.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

The SCNC is an illegal entity, this is the reason why the government cannot initiate dialogue with it. For any group to be legal in Cameroon it must notify the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation and file for authorisation. SCNC did not do that. It is acting against the African Charter.⁴⁵⁷

The argument given against the government's view of the SCNC by the Anglophone leaders is that the SCNC is a nationalist movement and nationalist movements need no recognition from the state before they can operate. According to them what is illegal today, like the SCNC, will be legal tomorrow, like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) in Zimbabwe, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan. They argue that Kofi Anan's coming to Cameroon in 2001 where he urged the government to dialogue with the SCNC was ample recognition of the activities of the SCNC.⁴⁵⁸ What is interesting here is that in spite of the government branding the SCNC as a terrorist movement, it has gone ahead and created its own faction of SCNC with which the government purports to have a dialogue in connection with the Southern Cameroons Case.⁴⁵⁹ The pro-government SCNC faction was barred from the African Court because they went there to play down the case against the Cameroon government. Besides, the SCNC is in a no-win situation with the government. The government determines what is illegal or legal therefore, as long as the government wants it the SCNC will remain illegal.

⁴⁵⁷ Yembe, F. Martin (2005/09/28), "Incompetent Anglophone Stooges Defend their Post" Accessed at <<http://www.thepostnewline.com>>

⁴⁵⁸ Nja'ah Peter Toh (2001), *The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: The Prospect for Non-violent Transformation*, p. 82.

⁴⁵⁹ *The Post* No 0675 of 16 May 2005.

Judging from the various mechanisms that the government has employed to undermine the activities of the various Anglophone movements, one can rightly say that it has not been a complete success because it has only succeeded in raising the anger and national consciousness of some Southern Cameroonians.

4.4 Anglophone International Campaigns

The Anglophone problem became internationalized when the Southern Cameroons National Council embarked on a diplomatic offensive, while the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) privileged the legal procedures in putting the Anglophone problem to the international community. The architects of reunification with French Cameroon (Foncha and Muna) and some prominent Anglophone leaders visited the United Nations and the United Kingdom in 1995 to publicise the Anglophone plight. The visit to the UN and UK by these leaders ignited some hope in the Anglophones that the international community would one day come to the aid of Anglophones.

4.4.1 Bakassi Dispute

In 1916 during World War I, Britain and France invaded German Kamerun. At the end of the war, some German territories were divided between France and Britain by the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations placed them under British and French mandate.⁴⁶⁰

The boundary between British and French mandated Kamerun was defined by the Franco-British Declaration of 10 July 1919, drafted by Viscount Milner, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Henry Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies.⁴⁶¹ In this agreement Bakassi and the rest of what became known as "British

⁴⁶⁰ Le Vine, Victor (1964), *The Cameroons: From Mandate to Independence*, p. 33.

⁴⁶¹ Nfor, N. Nfor (2003), *The Southern Cameroons: The Truth of The Matter*, Bamenda: Unique Printers, p. 19.

Cameroons" were placed under British mandate and administered as an appendage of Nigeria.

In 1962 the government of Tafawa Balewa⁴⁶² exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroon acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was not Nigerian territory. In January 1966 Major General Ironsi came to power in Nigeria. He committed his government to respecting all prior international agreements made by the Balewa government.⁴⁶³ In July 1966 Lt. Col. Gowon⁴⁶⁴ came to power in Nigeria. He too committed his government to respecting all prior international agreements made by the Ironsi and Balewa governments. On 1 June 1975, Gowon and Ahmadou Ahidjo signed the Maroua Declaration for the partial extension of the 1971 maritime boundary. Maps from that period showed Bakassi Peninsula in Cameroon.⁴⁶⁵

On 29 July 1975, General Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Mohammed.⁴⁶⁶ One of the first acts of Mohammed's regime was to begin to question the foreign policy decisions made by General Gowon, including the offshore maritime border with Cameroon.⁴⁶⁷ What transpired in 1981, 1994 and 1996 created tension between Cameroon and Nigeria. General Sani Abacha's⁴⁶⁸ moves to formally create an

⁴⁶² Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1912-1966) was the first prime minister of independent Nigeria, serving from 1957 to 1966.

⁴⁶³ Omoigui, Nowa "The Bakassi Story" 13 June 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.dawodu.com/bakassi3.htm>

⁴⁶⁴ General Yakubu Gowon was the head of state (Head of the Federal Military Government) of Nigeria from 1966 to 1975.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ General Murtala Ramat Mohammed was a military ruler (Head of the Federal Military Government) of Nigeria from 1975 until his assassination in 1976.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

administrative setup in the Bakassi Peninsula and all the military clashes between Nigeria and Cameroon, forced the government of Cameroon to take the Bakassi dispute to the International Court of Justice.

In 1994 the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) heard motions brought between the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon to adjudicate the land and maritime boundaries between the countries. The dispute has become known as the Bakassi dispute. It is so named because of the western maritime boundary which begins at lands-end on the Bakassi Peninsula, which is purportedly rich in natural resources and oil. The ICJ awarded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon on 10 October 2002, basing its decision on a 1913 document between the colonial powers, Britain and Germany.⁴⁶⁹ The Nigerian government was sceptical about the ICJ ruling and the then President Olusegun Obasanjo said “there is no victor and no vanquished in the Bakassi ruling and I never pledged to respect the ruling”.⁴⁷⁰ This implied a stalemate in the Bakassi dispute. Taking advantage of the situation in Bakassi, a group of Southern Cameroons elites filed an interpleader summons to the ICJ and the international community to have them intercede in the larger independence issue with the nation of Southern Cameroons. In a petition to the international community, Southern Cameroons elites wrote that, “following the ICJ ruling of October 2002, Bakassi does not belong to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. However, in stating that the sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula belongs to “Cameroon”, the

⁴⁶⁹ Gumne, K. 2006 Jan. 21, “Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict”, 3 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?id=5614>>

⁴⁷⁰ Odusile, W. 2004 Nov. 16, “Bakassi: I Never Pledged to Respect Ruling – Obasanjo”, 20 Jan. 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/10/26/20021026news01.html>>

ruling fails to state which “Cameroon” it is referring to. This ambiguity lies at the core of the present stalemate which the commission has, so far, been facing”.⁴⁷¹

We the people of the former United Nations Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration have maintained that the tabling of the Bakassi dispute to the International Court of Justice by La République du Cameroun gave rise to the need to examine our long-held position that there was never an agreement entered into between La République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons to form a union in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 1608 (VX) of April 1961. This failure was not due to any fault of the people of the Southern Cameroons. It was rather as a result of the mistaken view of the Government of President Ahmadou Ahidjo that there was no need to have such an agreement.⁴⁷²

The argument raised above by Southern Cameroons elites is that failure to implement the UN General Assembly Resolution 1608 (VX)⁴⁷³ of April 1961, in the absence of a legally binding agreement between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon, means that the Southern Cameroons is still, under international law, a separate legal entity from the Republic of Cameroon and, therefore, the legitimate interlocutor in the Bakassi dispute. As long as this basic fact is ignored, there can never be peace in the Bakassi Peninsula.⁴⁷⁴

They argued further that Southern Cameroons had an internationally recognized border with French Cameroons, as defined by the Anglo-French boundary declaration signed on

⁴⁷¹ Gumne, K. 2006 Jan 21, “Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict”, 3 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?id=5614>>

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ UN Resolution 1608 (XV), paragraph 5, of 21 April 1961, required that a “Treaty Of Union ” between the Governments of the Southern Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun, with the United Kingdom as Administering Authority of the Southern Cameroons Trust Territory, be worked out before 1 October 1961. The treaty was to protect the interests of both the Southern Cameroons and La Republique du Cameroun. Unfortunately the treaty was never worked out.

⁴⁷⁴ Gumne, K. 2006 Jan 21, “Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict”, 3 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?id=5614>>

10t July 1919. This was followed by an actual boundary treaty between British Cameroons and French Cameroons, signed on 9 January 1931, describing all the boundary pillars from Northern Cameroons to the last pillar No. 138, from which the line runs 35° west of true south to the Atlantic Ocean.⁴⁷⁵ Anglophone elites argue that such a union treaty between French Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons does not exist. This implies, therefore, that the Anglo-French Treaty of 9 January 1931 still defines a valid international boundary between the Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon.

These issues raised by Southern Cameroons elites concerning the Bakassi dispute are vital in the struggle for the restoration of the statehood of Southern Cameroon. The following proposals were tabled on behalf of the people of Southern Cameroons, by the elites, to the international community to serve as the basis for obtaining a permanent settlement of the Bakassi conflict:

The Southern Cameroons should be accepted as a third party to any talks regarding the demarcation of the boundary between Nigeria and its eastern neighbour, starting from Kombon at the Southern border of Taraba State to the Atlantic Ocean.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun shall accept the independence and sovereignty of the Southern Cameroons (Republic of Ambazonia) as part of a tripartite arrangement to be signed by all parties under the United Nations.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria and La République du Cameroun shall both withdraw their respective troops to their borders inherited at the time of their independence; In the case of La République du Cameroun it shall

⁴⁷⁵ Under international law it is a principle universally recognized that if two sovereign entities living within internationally recognized borders wish to join together to form a new sovereign entity, the borders of the new sovereign entity can only be recognized under international law when the union is evidenced by a union treaty which should be ratified by both parties and registered with the United Nations.

withdraw its troops to positions to the East of the Mungo River as defined in the Anglo-French demarcation agreement signed on 10 July 1919 by Mr Henry Simon the French Secretary of State for Colonies and Lord Milner the British Colonial Secretary which was followed by an actual boundary treaty between British Cameroons and French Cameroons, signed on 9 January 1931; this is the international boundary of La République du Cameroun when it became independent on 1 January 1960. In the case of the Federal Republic of Nigeria it shall withdraw its troops out of the Bakassi Peninsula.⁴⁷⁶

Leaders of the Anglophone movements such as SCAPO and SCNC are trying to use the dispute between two sovereign nations (Nigeria and Cameroon) to achieve their aim of drawing the international community to intervene and restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons.

4.4.2 Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization in the High Court of Abuja, Nigeria

The Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO) was formed in 2001 in Bamenda, North West Province of Cameroon. The main aim of this organization was to examine the international legal representation of the Southern Cameroons' case for secession.⁴⁷⁷ The Anglophone elite found that the situation in Southern Cameroon was such a legitimate case that they decided, as a state, to embark on international litigation for the restoration of the statehood of Southern Cameroons. In February 2002 twelve Southern Cameroonians, acting under the initiative of SCAPO filed a lawsuit against the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Attorney General of the Federation at the Federal High Court in Abuja, in a quest for self-determination.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁶ Gumne, K. 2006 Jan 21, "Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict", 3 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?id=5614>>

⁴⁷⁷ Mr Augustine Ndangan, Vice President of SCAPO, interviewed, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

A preliminary hearing of the case took place on 27 February 2002, during which the Federal Government of Nigeria raised preliminary objections to the lawsuit. The preliminary objections were filed on the grounds that: the federal high court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs are foreigners; Barrister Bebu from the Attorney General's office stated that the fact that the plaintiffs gave Bamenda as their address indicates that they are clearly non-Nigerians; the suite is an invitation to the Federal Government of Nigeria to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cameroon; the international Court of Justice is the right forum to hear cases of such magnitude.⁴⁷⁹

Arguing the case on behalf of the Federal Government, Barrister Bebu questioned whether the Federal Government of Nigeria could be properly compelled by the court to take up the case of the Southern Cameroonians at the International Court of Justice and at the United Nations. He argued that since the claim does not arise from any contractual obligations entered into by the Nigerian Government or its entities, the case should be thrown out. He further argued that the plaintiffs' case raises a number of questions such as: why had the plaintiffs chosen Nigeria as the country to take up their case for self-determination? Why had they not approached any other African country?⁴⁸⁰

In reply Barrister Oyetibo, the Southern Cameroonians' defence counsel, objected to the questioning of the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the plaintiffs were

⁴⁷⁹ Gumne, K. 2002 Oct 1, "An Open Letter to the UN Secretary General by SCAPO", 20 October 2005. Accessed at <<http://www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/radio.htm>>

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

foreigners. He argued that a foreigner is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to obtain judicial relief if the relief is within the laws of Nigeria and the claims disclose the cause of action. He further argued that article 20 of the Banjul Charter on Human Rights⁴⁸¹ gives all peoples the right to self-determination and article 20(3) gives the right to all peoples to seek the assistance of the member states to obtain that self-determination.⁴⁸²

In her ruling, Justice Rosaline N. Ukeje, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, stated that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction in the matter and that Section 251⁴⁸³ of the 1999 constitution confers that jurisdiction. She further stated that the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, which was ratified by the Federal Government of Nigeria, strengthens the belief that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction. On these grounds, the preliminary objections of the defendants were dismissed and the date for hearing the substance of the case was set for 4 March 2002.

⁴⁸¹ African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Article 20 All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community. 8 Jan. 2006. Accessed at <http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.htm.

⁴⁸² African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 20(3). All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural. 8 Jan. 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html >.

⁴⁸³ Section 251 of the constitution dealing with jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies; and citizenship, naturalisation and aliens, deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, extradition, immigration into and emigration from Nigeria, passports and visas; Provided that nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.

When the hearings resumed on 4 March 2002, the defendants (the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Attorney General), having failed in their bid to throw out the case on the basis of the arguments presented during the preliminary objections, found themselves with a weak legal basis to argue against the substance and merit of the lawsuit. Consequently, negotiations between counsels to the plaintiffs and the defendants led to an agreement to pursue a course of action, which is summarized in the following schedule issued as the final ruling of the court by Justice Ukeje:

- a) Whether the union envisaged under the Southern Cameroons Plebiscite 1961 between La République du Cameroun and Southern Cameroons legally took effect as contemplated by the relevant United Nations Resolutions particularly United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1352 (XIV) of 16th October 1959 and United Nations Trusteeship Council Resolution 2013(XXIV) of 31st May 1960;
- b) Whether the termination by the Government of the United Kingdom of its trusteeship over the Southern Cameroons on 30th September 1961 without ensuring prior implementation of the Constitutional arrangements under which Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun were to unite as a federal state was not in breach of articles 3 and 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Southern Cameroons under British Administration approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13th December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1352 of 16th October 1959, 1608 of 21st April 1961, the United Nations Trusteeship Council Resolution 2013(XXIV) of May 31 1960 and Article 76(b) of the Charter of the United Nations;
- c) Was the assumption of sovereign powers on 1st October 1961 and the continued exercise of same by the Government of La République du Cameroun over the Southern Cameroons (after termination by the Government of the United Kingdom of its trusteeship over the territory) legal and valid when the Union between the Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun contemplated by the Southern Cameroons Plebiscite 1961 had not legally taken effect?

- d) Whether the peoples of Southern Cameroons are not legally entitled to self-determination with their clearly defined territory separate from La République du Cameroun?
- e) Whether it is the Southern Cameroons and not La République du Cameroun that shares a maritime boundary with the Federal République of Nigeria;
- f) Whether the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall take any other measures as may be necessary to place the case of the peoples of the geographical territory known as Southern Cameroons for self-determination before the United Nations General Assembly and any other relevant international organizations.⁴⁸⁴

When the Anglophone elites took the Southern Cameroons case to the High Court in Abuja, Nigeria, little did they know that the outcome of the litigation would redefine both local and international jurisprudence. This is a landmark case in African history because it shows that it is possible for non-Nigerians to file such a case in a Nigerian court and be given a fair hearing. What is interesting in this case is that the struggle for self-determination in Southern Cameroons is being fought in the law court instead of in an open battlefield. Some observers have argued that the position of SCAPO is an asset to the Nigerian government in her defense of Cameroon to lay claims to the oil-rich Bakassi which is located in Southern Cameroons.

4.4.3 Southern Cameroons National Council and UNPO

Another body which has helped to internationalize the Anglophone case is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in The Hague. From inception in 1993 the Southern Cameroons National Council embarked on a mission to resolve the Anglophone problem through diplomacy. In December 2004 the Southern Cameroons

⁴⁸⁴ Gumne K. 2006 Jan 21, "Comprehensive Road Map for the Settlement of the Bakassi Conflict", 3 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/indexbakas.php3?nid=5614>>

was admitted as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO). The UNPO is an international organization of “Nations, Peoples and Minorities striving for recognition and protection of their identity, culture, human rights and their environment”.⁴⁸⁵ UNPO member nations and people are bound by the UNPO Covenant:

to uphold the principles of self-determination of all nations, peoples, democracy and rejection of totalitarianism, internationally accepted human rights standards, promotion of non-violence and the rejection of terrorism as an instrument of policy, and the protection of the national environment. Its members are indigenous peoples, occupied nations, minorities and independent states of territories that have joined together to protect their human and cultural rights, preserve their environment and to find non-violent solutions to conflicts which affect them.⁴⁸⁶

UNPO provides a legitimate and established international forum for members to present their grievances at the international level. It was founded and designed to fill the gap left by today’s international system and institutions. The UNPO has proven to be a strong force for peace and understanding, justice and human rights in many parts of the world because founding members like Armenia, Estonia, Georgia and Latvia are today independent, and member nations of the United Nations, and are now supporting members of the UNPO.

SCNC, leaders in presenting their case for the admission of Southern Cameroons as a member of UNPO, based their arguments on the fact that Southern Cameroons had a distinct colonial history. They argued that it existed firstly as a League of Nations Mandate and, secondly, as a Trust Territory of the United Nations under United

⁴⁸⁵ “Covenant establishing the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation”, 13 March 2006. Accessed at <http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=01&par=212>

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

Kingdom administration. Thirdly, they argued that Southern Cameroons became self-governing with an elected executive government and legislature in 1954 and that through constitutional evolution, the Southern Cameroons attained a ministerial form of government and a bicameral legislature in 1957. By 1960, Southern Cameroons was gearing for full independence, but independence was granted by joining either Nigeria or French Cameroon. The two-state federation of (equal status) which the UN sponsored between Southern Cameroons and The Republic of Cameroon only resulted in the latter annexing of Southern Cameroons. The Republic of Cameroon's initial acceptance of the federation was a mere political ploy to execute its hidden agenda of occupying the Southern Cameroons.⁴⁸⁷

To qualify for membership of UNPO, people affected must share a common history and cultural heritage. The struggle of the people must be geared towards the protection of their basic human rights and the safeguarding of their environment. UNPO's mission is:

To empower the dispossessed, the disenfranchised to gain autonomy and participate in decision making within the nation-state to which they belong or in the case of a people, who through annexation and foreign occupation, have lost their nation, nationality, legal and legitimate place within the community of sovereign nations, to regain their sovereign independence.⁴⁸⁸

Southern Cameroons' application for membership into UNPO was granted on the basis that their territory had been annexed by The Republic of Cameroon. The admission of

⁴⁸⁷ "Press Briefing following the Admission of Southern Cameroons into UNPO under the Chairmanship of Chief Ette Otun Ayamba – National Chairman of SCNC", *The Southern Cameroons News*, No 15 of Friday 04 Jan. 2006.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

Southern Cameroons as a member of UNPO has opened doors that were previously closed to them as an annexed and colonized people. Through UNPO, Southern Cameroons has been able to address certain organs of the UN concerning the plight of the peoples of Southern Cameroons by letting the international community know of the situation of Anglophones in Cameroon.

4.4.4 Southern Cameroons National Council and the UNCHR

The participation of leaders of the Southern Cameroons National Council at the 61st session of the UNCHR was made possible by their admission as a member of UNPO and the support they received from the International Federation for the Protection of the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities (IFPRERLM), a New York based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) enjoying observer status with the UN. Their mission to the UNCHR was to “create some awareness that a former United Nations Trust Territory, the Republic of Cameroon, in gross violation of international law and United Nations Resolutions, has annexed, colonized and occupied, the Southern Cameroons, another former United Nations Trust Territory”.⁴⁸⁹ In the submission made by IFPRERLM, on behalf of Southern Cameroons, they argue that the Mandate and Trusteeship Agreements were binding international instruments, which created objective border regimes. They argue that “it defined territory under international control”, and to define “a territory means to define its boundaries” and a boundary established by treaty acquires a permanent character.⁴⁹⁰ From the League of Nations’ perspective they argued

⁴⁸⁹ “The UN Vetted Document and Presented by Nfor N. Nfor to the 61st Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights; at Geneva”, *The Southern Cameroons News*, Wednesday 30 March, 2005, which Provoked the Government’s Representative to React on Thursday 31 March 2005.

⁴⁹⁰ “NGO focuses on the Rights of a People to Self Determination and Its Application to people Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation in Southern Cameroons”, 6 March 2006. Accessed at < http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=59&par=2211>

that it is a fact of history and international law that there were two separate Cameroons, with international boundaries, two separate cultures, two separate colonial histories, two separate Trusteeship Agreements and two separate peoples. According to them, the present exercise of sovereignty by The Republic of Cameroon over Southern Cameroons should be recognized as a form of colonial rule. Therefore, decolonisation of the Southern Cameroons is the central issue. The people of Southern Cameroons cannot lose their right to self-determination by virtue of the takeover of their territory by the Republic of Cameroon.⁴⁹¹

To justify their arguments they alluded to the fact that in Africa there are two Congos and three Guineas, which are different in background, historically, culturally and legally, because of their colonial heritage, have maintained their respective and distinct personalities. Therefore, they see no justification why the two Cameroons should be together for the mere reason of commonality of name when, in reality, they are different. They concluded by saying that the people of Southern Cameroons believe that their right to self-determination is to restore the Southern Cameroons which existed as a “UN Trust Territory under the British Administration, became a self-governing entity in 1954, adopted its constitution in 1960, attained independence on October 1, 1961 and went into a UN-sponsored federal union with The Republic of Cameroon as equal partners.”⁴⁹² Furthermore, they argued that what the Republic of Cameroon did to Southern Cameroons is what Ethiopia did to Eritrea, the consequences of which constitute part of the sad history of the abusive use of state sovereignty. The people of Southern

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

Cameroon seeks international understanding, support, intervention and mediation to end the occupation of Southern Cameroon by The Republic of Cameroon.⁴⁹³

The delegation representing the Cameroon government at the UNCHR was headed by Cameroon's Ambassador to Switzerland. In exercising their right of defense, they registered their objections to the claims of the SCNC stating that Cameroon is a country in which many groups, ethnic, religious and linguistic cohabit, since its independence in January 1960.⁴⁹⁴ Historically, they argued, the referendum of 1961 consecrated the attachment of that Anglophone part under the mandate of Britain to the state of East Cameroon which is inhabited mostly by Francophones. This was organized under the supervision of the UN which recognized the results. The delegation added that, through consultation and consent, the political forces of the nation decided, after the referendum of 1972, to go from a federal to a unitary state, now made up of two Anglophone provinces and eight Francophone provinces.⁴⁹⁵

Cameroon, as a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), argued that it, "holds firmly to the principles of the inviolability of borders as stipulated in the charter of the OAU, non-negotiable under any circumstances, over territorial integrity".⁴⁹⁶ They argued that the Cameroon government intends to establish throughout the national territory, economic, social and cultural rights for all its citizens without exception. The Cameroonian law on decentralization, which is being executed with some rigour, throughout the entire national territory, would give a greater

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ "Right of Reply by the Cameroon Government", *The Southern Cameroons News*, No. 16 of Wednesday, 13 April 2005.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

degree of autonomy to the ten provinces. They concluded their argument by appealing to the commission not to open its doors to a “secessionist and terrorist” organization like the SCNC that wants to destabilize the peace that reigns in Cameroon.

In reply to the submission made by the representative of the Cameroon government, the Southern Cameroons delegation, under the auspices of IFPRERLM, expressed amazement at the statement by the government delegation concerning “its commitment to respect human rights”, as well as “its declaration that the full realization of the civil and political rights of peoples are intimately linked to the enjoyment of economic and cultural rights, including the right to development”.⁴⁹⁷ On the contrary, as evidenced by the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Sir Nigel Rodley, Cameroons’ track record includes gross human rights abuses and obstructions to social and economic development in Southern Cameroons.⁴⁹⁸

Contrary to the government’s claim that all citizens enjoy the right to development, the Southern Cameroons delegation highlighted the fact that, prior to Southern Cameroons joining East Cameroon, it had three airports, two seaports and a river port.⁴⁹⁹ Consequently, to ensure that Southern Cameroons continues to rely on East Cameroon for economic development, all have been closed. For example, Besongabang Airport has become a military barracks and Bamenda Airport is to become an air force base to keep

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ “Southern Cameroons: Visit by the Special Rapporteur to Cameroon Sir Nigel Rodley”, 13 Oct. 2005. Accessed at <http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=59&par=2248>

⁴⁹⁹ Nfor, N. Nfor, National Vice Chairman of SCNC and Spokes Person for the southern Cameroons Delegation to the UNCHR, interviewed 12 August 2005.

Anglophones in check.⁵⁰⁰ The SCNC leaders argue that Southern Cameroons, carved into two provinces of the Republic of Cameroon, does not even have a road linking the two provinces. Thus, to travel from one Anglophone province to the other, one must go through The Republic of Cameroon's territory due to the abandonment of the roads that previously existed in the Anglophone territory.⁵⁰¹

To reduce Southern Cameroons to economic dependency on the Cameroon government, the government closed down several industries set up by successive governments of Southern Cameroons, such as Cameroon Bank, West Cameroon Development Agency and the West Cameroon National Produce Organization. Workers of these industries were retrenched without compensation.⁵⁰² Furthermore, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), whose profits, by the law of 1947, were to be used for the development of Southern Cameroons, is in terrible decline and has been listed for privatization. Already, the tea estates of Ndu and Tole have been sold at a give away price to a baron of the CPDM ruling party.⁵⁰³ The consequences of this sale, both to the workers and their families, have been devastating. Many have been retrenched without due compensation and salaries have arbitrarily been reduced. Despite the fact that Southern Cameroons accounts for 70 percent of the GDP, due to the presence petroleum, it does not enjoy more than four percent of the investment budget, and foreign investors are discouraged from investing in Southern Cameroons.⁵⁰⁴ Southern Cameroons leaders

⁵⁰⁰ Mukong, Albert (ed.) (1990), *The Case for Southern Cameroons*, Uwani-Enugu: Chuka Printing Company, p. 23.

⁵⁰¹ Chia, Ngam (1990), *The Path to Social Justice*, Bamenda: Mimeo, p. 19.

⁵⁰² Clovis, Atatah (2002), "Southern Cameroons Economy: From Good, To Bad, To Ugly," *The Post* (October 11) p. 4.

⁵⁰³ Nfor. N. Nfor, National Vice Chairman of SCNC and Spokesperson for the Southern Cameroons delegation to the UNCHR, interviewed 11 August 2005.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

ask how, given this picture of underdevelopment, it can be said that the government is committed to the respect of the economic rights of their people and their rights to development?⁵⁰⁵

In trying to dismiss the argument of the Southern Cameroons delegation to the UNCHR in English, the Cameroon government's representative made his presentation in French. This confirmed the existence of two Cameroons – one Anglo-Saxon in nature, and the other Francophone in nature, and that the Francophone-led government with its assimilationist tendencies has always presented Cameroon within the international community as a French-speaking African nation, to the disadvantage of the minority English-speaking people. By putting the Anglophone problem in the international arena, the Anglophone leaders were pushing for the recognition of the injustices to the Anglophones.

4.4.5 Southern Cameroons at the African Court

The African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights are handling three vital cases from Anglophone Cameroon against the government of Cameroon. First is the Southern Cameroons case for self-determination, second; the victims of 1992 post-presidential election violence, and lastly, the Bakweri Land Claim Committee, demanding compensation from the government.

In 2003 a group of Southern Cameroonians, acting under the umbrella of the SCNC and SCAPO, took the Southern Cameroons case to the African Commission of Human and

⁵⁰⁵ “NGO focuses on the Rights of a People to Self Determination and its Application to people Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation in Southern Cameroons”, 6 March 2006. Accessed at < http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=59&par=2211 >

Peoples' Rights. The complainants were represented by Prof. Carlson Anyangwe, as Lead Counsel, and the law firm of Akinlawon & Ajomo of Lagos, Nigeria, as plaintiff. In their submission to the African Commission they complained that the rights accorded to peoples under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights have, for the people of the Southern Cameroons, been suppressed by The Republic of Cameroon (the Respondent State) through domination and colonization in violation of the Charter.⁵⁰⁶

Southern Cameroons' submission was presented in two parts. The first part was titled "The Facts" in which they drew heavily on history as their departure point. They started their argument by describing the territory of Southern Cameroons and locating it within the context of Africa and the world:

The Southern Cameroons has a surface area of 43,000 sq. km and a current population of about 6 million people. It is thus demographically bigger than at least 60 UN and 18 AU Member States, and spatially bigger than at least 30 UN and 12 AU Member States. Located in the 'armpit' of Africa, it is sandwiched between Nigeria and Republique du Cameroun like a wedge between West Africa and what in effect is still French Equatorial Africa. It has frontiers to the West and North with Nigeria, to the East with Republique du Cameroun, and to the "South with the Equatorial Guinean Island of Bioko. The borders are well attested by international boundary treaties. The natural resources of the Southern Cameroons include oil, gas, timber, coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, oil palm, rubber, wildlife, fish, medicinal plants, waterfalls and a wide variety of fruit and agricultural produce.⁵⁰⁷

From this premise, they claimed that the territory later identified as Southern Cameroons was originally British from 1858-1887. It was ceded to Germany and subsequently incorporated into the German protectorate of Kamerun, which had been acquired earlier

⁵⁰⁶ The Banjul Communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/200.

⁵⁰⁷ The Banjul Communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/2003. Dr. Kevin Ngwang Gumne and Others; Acting on their Behalf and on behalf of SCNC/SCAPO and the Southern Cameroons Versus La Republique du Cameroun.

in 1884. The same territory that had been ceded in 1887 by Britain to Germany was captured by British forces in September 1914 soon after the outbreak of World War I. It later became known as the British Cameroons, consisting of two separate parts, the Southern Cameroons and the Northern Cameroons.⁵⁰⁸

As concerns the boundary of Southern Cameroons, the Lead Counsel for Southern Cameroons argued that an Anglo-French treaty of 1916 (the Milner-Simon Declaration) defined the international boundary between the British Cameroons and French Cameroon. This territorial delimitation was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922 when the two territories were separately placed under the Mandates System.⁵⁰⁹ The territorial alignment was further confirmed by the Anglo-French Treaty of 9 January 1931, signed by the Governor-General of Nigeria and the Governor of French Cameroon. The Southern Cameroons was thus under British rule from 1858 to 1887, and then from 1915 to 1961, a total period of nearly 80 years. British rule left an indelible mark on the territory of Southern Cameroons, leaving to it an Anglo-Saxon heritage. That is, the language, educational, legal, administrative, political, governance and institutional culture and value systems are all English-derived.⁵¹⁰

The Southern Cameroons was under international tutelage with the status of a class 'B' territory,⁵¹¹ first as a British-Mandated Territory of the League of Nations from 1922-1945, and then as a British-administered United Nations Trust Territory from 1945 to

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Class B mandates were mostly German colonies in Africa: they were to be administered by mandatory powers with full powers of legislation and administration.

1961.⁵¹² One of the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, as stated in Article 76 (b) of the UN Charter:

To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement.⁵¹³

Anglophone elites argue that, according to the trusteeship agreement, Southern Cameroons was to be prepared for self-government by the British, but up to 1960 the Southern Cameroons, though under international tutelage, was administered by Britain as part of her nearby colonial territory of Nigeria. But its distinct identity and personality, separate from Nigeria, remained unquestionable. UN Resolution 224 (III) of 18 November 1948 protected the Trust Territory from annexation by any colonially-minded neighbour.⁵¹⁴

In 1954 Southern Cameroons became a self-governing region within Nigeria and gradually asserted its distinct identity and its aspiration to statehood through increased political and institutional autonomy. The people of Southern Cameroons therefore legitimately expected to be granted full independence in 1960, given the fact that this region had been self-governing since 1954. The Anglophone leaders argued that:

⁵¹² Ngoh, Victor (1990), *Constitutional Developments in Southern Cameroons 1946 -1961: From Trusteeship to Independence*, p. 58.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ The Banjul Communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/200.

Basic self-government institutions were in place: a Government headed by the Premier as Leader of Government business; a bicameral parliament consisting of a House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs; an Official Opposition in parliament; a Judiciary headed by a Chief Justice; a Civil Service; and a police force. The system in place was a democratic and accountable dispensation; a Westminster-type parliamentary democracy. In 1959 when the term of office of the incumbent Premier came to an end peaceful free, fair and transparent elections were organized. The opposition won and there was an orderly transfer of power to the incoming Premier. Consistently with the parliamentary system of government the out-going Premier became Leader of the government.⁵¹⁵

From these premises Southern Cameroons seemed to be heading towards independence with functionary government apparatus in place, but on 13 March 1959 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1350 (XIII), recommending the holding of a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons instead of the granting of independence. This was followed by another General Assembly resolution, 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 1959, ordering a plebiscite to be held in the Southern Cameroons “not later than March 1961”.⁵¹⁶ The people of the Southern Cameroons had to choose to ‘achieve independence’ by the two dead-end alternatives of ‘joining’ Nigeria or Republic of Cameroon.⁵¹⁷

A signed and published agreement between the Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon provided that in the event of the plebiscite vote going in favour of “achieving independence by joining” Republic of Cameroon, the following would be the broad terms of joining:

⁵¹⁵ The Banjul communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/2003: Dr. Kevin Ngwang Gumne and Others; Acting on their Behalf and on behalf of SCNC/SCAPO and the Southern Cameroons Versus La Republique du Cameroun.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

- a) The Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon would unite to create a Federal State to be called the 'Federal United Cameroon Republic', outside the British Commonwealth and the French Community;
- b) The component states of the Federation would be the Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon, legally equal in status;
- c) Each federated state would continue to conduct its affairs consistently with its colonially-inherited state-culture, with only a limited number of subject matters conceded to the Union government;
- d) The Federation would have a bicameral Parliament consisting of a Federal Senate and a Federal National Assembly; and
- c) Federal laws will only be enacted in such a way that no measures contrary to the interests of one state will be imposed upon it by the majority.⁵¹⁸

Judging from the above, the agreement between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon was just window dressing, as most of the terms of the agreement were not implemented. If the terms of the agreement had been implemented as signed by both parties, it is unlikely that the Anglophones would have had a case against the government.

On 25 September 1961 the Queen of England issued a proclamation declaring that the British Government "shall as from the first day of October 1961 cease to be responsible for the administration of the Southern Cameroons."⁵¹⁹ The British Government withdrew its personnel from Southern Cameroons, and the territory was left defenceless, as it had no military force of its own. The Republic of Cameroon moved in its military forces without the agreement of the Government of the Southern Cameroons. On that same day the Cameroon Federation came into existence.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

The Cameroon Federation lasted a mere ten years. During those years the people of the Republic of Cameroon systematically increased their domination of the people of Southern Cameroons. This domination manifested itself in several ways: The Southern Cameroons had only a small presence in all three branches of government – executive, legislative, judicial – and therefore could not take or influence any policy decision; the military and police have always been entirely French in training and language of command and have always been a Republic of Cameroons’ institution.⁵²¹

Twelve years after the dismantling of the federation, President Paul Biya, who succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo as president of the United Republic of Cameroon in February 1982, unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed the change of the country’s name, “The United Republic of Cameroon” to “The Republic of Cameroon”, (The name the French East Cameroon adopted at independence from France in January 1960).⁵²² The new name appeared to deny that the Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct entities (English and French). The Anglophone political elite did not passively accept the name change, as it was seen as an attempt by the Francophone-led government to assimilate them.

The second part of their submission to the African Commission was titled “the human rights violated by the respondent state”.⁵²³ In this submission, they argued that a people dominated by another people are necessarily a colonised people. Domination means

⁵²¹ Susungi, N. Nfor (1990), *The crisis of Unity and Democracy in Cameroon*, p. 15.

⁵²² Hughes, Jeffrey (1999), *I Accuse: Ethnic Bloodbath, Massacre, Refugee Crisis*, pp. 149-150.

⁵²³ The Banjul communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/200.

control, power or authority over somebody or something. The domination of the people of Southern Cameroons by the people of The Republic of Cameroon violated article 19 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' rights.⁵²⁴ Evidence of that domination of the people of Southern Cameroons includes the armed occupation of the territory for over forty years; the total control of its economy and resources; the imposition of a foreign administration; the imposition of foreign administrators; the imposition of an alien law and legal system; the abolition of the Southern Cameroons parliament and government; the confiscation of all means of expression from the people and the imposition of direct rule from the colonising state.⁵²⁵

The Anglophone leaders argued in their submission that Southern Cameroons lies in ruins: fragmented, underdeveloped and under the complete political, economic and military control of The Republic of Cameroon. The people of Southern Cameroons have been dispossessed of their wealth and natural resources. Furthermore, natural resources from Southern Cameroons such as oil, gas, tea and oil palm are exploited by the government for its exclusive benefit, without any significant benefit accruing to the Southern Cameroons.⁵²⁶ Its people are banned from holding any meeting to discuss matters that affect them as a people. Individual human rights abuses committed by The Republic of Cameroon in the territory of Southern Cameroons are gross, massive,

⁵²⁴ Article (19) African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights "All peoples shall be equal. They shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another".

⁵²⁵The Banjul Communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Communication No. 266/2003. Dr. Kevin Ngwang Gumne and Others; Acting on their Behalf and on behalf of SCNC/SCAPO and the Southern Cameroons Versus La Republique du Cameroun.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

extensive and unremitting.⁵²⁷ This is reliably attested to by victims, the press, local human rights NGOs, international human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, US State Department reports and documentation of the UN Commission on Human Rights, especially Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture.⁵²⁸

They concluded their argument at the African Commission by saying that Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroon have always been two separate countries with firmly established international boundaries. Each has always had a separate state, culture (law, language, education and administrative system); a separate colonial history; a separate Mandate/Trusteeship agreement; a separate independence day; a separate people with a separate vision; a separate people with a separate way of life; a separate people with no common or similar cultural heritage; and a separate people with a separate aspiration. The Southern Cameroons is legally not a part of The Republic of Cameroon because The Republic of Cameroon did not attain independence with Southern Cameroons comprised within its territory.⁵²⁹

4.4.6 1992 Victims of the Post Presidential Election Violence at the African Court.

The “Bamenda victims of democracy” whose properties were burnt have never been compensated nor cared for. The government’s lack of concern for the victims led them to drag the government to Court. When the case first went to court in 1996, the victims sued

⁵²⁷ “Southern Cameroons: Visit by the Special Rapporteur to Cameroon Sir Nigel Rodley”, 13 Oct. 2005. Accessed at <http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=59&par=2248>

⁵²⁸ The Banjul communiqué: 37th Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication No. 266/2003.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

the government as the organizer of the election.⁵³⁰ According to court proceedings, the victims and the government made their submissions and the government apparently claimed innocence as to who destroyed their properties. In their submission, the victims established that their properties were destroyed by militants of the Social Democratic Front Party, who were angry that the ruling party had rigged the election. As a result, the SDF militants targeted those who supported the ruling party in the opposition stronghold and burnt their properties. Before the victims took their case to the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights, the case had been at the Supreme Court in Yaoundé for five years and the government had been tight-lipped about the case. The implication of taking their case to the Africa Court was to show that, as Anglophones, the government of Cameroon discriminates against them.

The rule that “a state should be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic legal system before its international responsibility can be called into question at the international level”⁵³¹ has been assumed to exist as a principle of customary or general international law in such conventions as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. Frustrated by the government’s inability to look into their plight, the 1992 victims of the post-presidential election violence took their case to the African Court. The victims argued at the African

⁵³⁰ Ngafor, Albert, President of the Association of the 1992 Victims of the Post Presidential Election Violence, interviewed 23 July 2005.

⁵³¹ Trindade, Cancado (1985) “The Application of the rule of Exhaustion of local Remedies in International Law”, *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 34, 1: pp. 208-210.

Commission that all efforts to invoke available internal remedies had failed, that all domestic remedies had been exhausted, and therefore that the case was admissible.

In their oral submission before the African Court they argued that it was because they were from Anglophone Cameroon and specifically from the North West Province that the government did not want to compensate them.⁵³² The North West Province, with its capital in Bamenda, is a stronghold of the main opposition party, the SDF. Part of their submission was that the government did not really care much about Bamenda because it is controlled by the opposition. The victims quoted three instances to demonstrate the government's lack of care for the people in Bamenda. First, the Lake Nyos gas disaster that killed thousands of people in 1986. The survivors are yet to be fully resettled and provided with appropriate socio-economic amenities. The Lake Nyos survivors are living in abject poverty because they are from Bamenda.⁵³³

The second instance referred to victims of the Nsam fire disaster that happened in February 1997 in Yaoundé. These people went to fetch petrol after a train derailed and were burnt to death. The state has continued to look after their children and has even built houses for some of the victims. Besides, the Nsam disaster is observed on national television every year. The argument here is that the government compensated the Nsam victims because they were Francophones. But the political victims of the 1990 post-presidential elections violence whose properties were destroyed because of democracy, who died defending the ruling party and the nation, were never compensated. The victims argue that, for the party to allow them to go to court to reclaim their rights is

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Ibid.

marginalization of the Anglophones.⁵³⁴ The victims argued that they were soldiers in the battlefield in support of the government, so they should not be the people complaining. But the government has abandoned them in their misery because they are from Anglophone Cameroon.⁵³⁵

Third, to support the contention that the government does not care about the Anglophones, the victims argued that the Head of State Paul Biya donated food aid to the Northern Province of Cameroon because of drought, hunger and some destruction by elephants. The government responded quickly because it happened in the Francophone part of Cameroon. If the drought and hunger had happened in Anglophone Cameroon the government would not have reacted, because the Anglophones are a forgotten people.⁵³⁶

When the victims made their submission at the African Court the government was apparently contacted, and it responded that the case was unfounded, because they had paid the victims. But the court insisted that the government prove that it had paid the victims. However, the government could not come out with any evidence to show that the victims had been paid. The primary judgment was that the government was guilty of organizing elections, and not providing any security to its citizens, and that it was their responsibility to make sure that lives and properties were not destroyed. The government was ordered to compensate the victims of the 1992 post-presidential election violence.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

4.4.7 The Bakweri Land Claims Commission at the African Court

The Bakweri Land Claims Commission (BLCC) was created in 1946 to fight for the restitution of, and compensation for, indigenous lands of the Bakweri ethnic group of Cameroon, forcefully expropriated by the Germans in the late 19th century for the purpose of large-scale plantation agriculture. In 1947 these plantations were leased to the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) by the British colonial government, over the objections of the Bakweri Land Claims Commission, which felt that the Bakweri had not been sufficiently involved in the creation of the CDC, and that in the process, their needs had simply been ignored by the British. Today, the BLCC is continuing its struggle, this time against the Government of Cameroon, which is currently privatizing the CDC without taking into account long-standing Bakweri claims to CDC-controlled land.⁵³⁷

When the Bakweri became aware, at the end of World War Two, that the British Government intended to sell off previously-owned German lands, they created the Bakweri Land claims Commission. The main purpose of the Commission was to reclaim all the lands that had been expropriated by the Germans. In the very first letter from the BLCC (*Letter No. BLC/2/1 of 18 June 1946*), Chief Gervacius Endeley of Buea informed the residents in Buea of the creation of the Commission, which he promised "shall continue to fight as long as the Bakweri people live".⁵³⁸ This was the first in a long series of petitions that were sent to the colonial authorities in Enugu and Lagos, Nigeria, the

⁵³⁷ Mola Njoh Litumbe, Secretary-General of the Bakweri Land Claims Commission, interviewed 5 July 2005.

⁵³⁸ "Bakweri Chiefs: At the Forefront of the BLCC Struggles; 50 years of BLCC Protest", 1 Feb. 2006. Accessed at <http://www.bakwerilands.org/50years_protest.htm>

British Government in London, and the Trusteeship Council in New York. After the independence and reunification of the Cameroons, the Bakweri Land Claims Commission continued its campaign for restitution and compensation through an impressive number of memos, position papers, and petitions to successive Cameroonian governments.⁵³⁹

Almost 110 years after the brave people of Buea, led by their fearless leader Kuva Likenye, stood up to the German army,⁵⁴⁰ over half a century since the BLCC began its campaign to reclaim Bakweri ancestral lands, another generation of the Bakweri has taken up the mantle for justice and historical rectification in Fako Division. Led by a revived and more determined BLCC, the people of Fako division are today taking their case for land compensation and restitution to the Cameroonian people, and the international community. They are insisting that at a time when the Cameroon government is determined to sell off the Cameroon Development Corporation (which controls practically all of the German expropriated lands), the hundred-year-old claims of the Bakweri, which began to be expressed in an organized and coherent manner after the Second World War now, be taken into account.⁵⁴¹

Frustrated by the Cameroon government's ongoing plan to privatize the CDC, the BLCC leaders decided to take their case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. In September 2002, the BLCC filed a complaint under Articles 55, 56

⁵³⁹ Mola Njoh Litumbe, Secretary-General of the Bakweri Land Claims Commission, interviewed 5 July 2005.

⁵⁴⁰ "Bakweri Armed Resistance to German Colonialism 1891-1894", 1 Feb. 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.bakwerilands.org/pdf/bakresistance.pdf#search='Contrary%20to%20widelyheld%20beliefs%20that%20the%20Bakweri%20made%20no%20effort%20whatsoever'>> Accessed 1 February 2006

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

and 58 of the African Charter⁵⁴² on Human and Peoples' Rights concerning the violation of the land rights of the indigenous people of the Fako division, and it is registered as Communication 260/2002. The Bakweri people feel that the government does not want to compensate them for their land because they are Anglophones.

The BLCC in their submission to the African Commission drew a lot from history. They argued that more than 300 square miles of land currently occupied by the CDC, virtually all of Fako's division's most fertile land, was forcefully and brutally expropriated from the Bakweri people without compensation by the German colonizers. In 1947 these plantations were leased to the CDC by the British colonial government. In 1960 the British colonial administration ceded power to the government of Southern Cameroons, which has now been succeeded by the government of the Republic of Cameroon.⁵⁴³ The Bakweri people are angry because under the terms of the lease of these lands to the CDC, the latter was required to pay annual ground rent for the benefit of the disposed indigenous natives. The native Bakweri have never been paid any part of these rents, and with privatization looming on the horizon, the Bakweri resolutely refuse to recognize any privatization of the CDC that does not take into account the just, long-standing and legitimate rights of the Bakweri over their land.

⁵⁴² African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted, June 27, 1981 8 Feb. 2006. <[http://www.africanunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Banjul%20Charter.pdf#search='African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%27%20Rights%2C%20adopted%20June%2027%2C%201981'](http://www.africanunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Banjul%20Charter.pdf#search='African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%27%20Rights%2C%20adopted%20June%2027%2C%201981'>)>

⁵⁴³ "BLCC Submissions to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the Case against the Government of Cameroon", 3 April 2006. Accessed at <http://www.bakwerilands.org/kofele_kale.htm>

In response, the Government of Cameroon argued that the BLCC case be thrown out of court because the BLCC has no right to speak on behalf of the Bakweri. The Government of Cameroon further argued that the BLCC did not exhaust local remedies, as all the actions the BLCC took certainly did not correspond to remedies mentioned by the African Charter.⁵⁴⁴

In his oral submission, the head of the Cameroon government's delegation, Dr Dione Ngute,⁵⁴⁵ wondered why the Bakweri wanted to be treated differently from other Cameroonians. He was referring to the Bakweri and BLCC demands that land rents and royalties be paid to the indigenes of Fako for the exploitation of their indigenous lands. In asking the question the minister was simply expressing the government's view that the CDC lands were "government land" and that consequently, local communities could not lay claims to the revenue generated from the exploitation of the land in question. The government of Cameroon seems to be claiming, via its resistance to Bakweri land claims, that it neither recognizes nor applies the Universal Principle of Derivation whereby a "percentage of the revenue accruing from the exploitation of natural resources in a given region is shared among the communities from which this revenue accrues".⁵⁴⁶ Hence Dr Ngute's statement about the Bakweri wanting to be treated differently from other Cameroonians

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Deputy Minister of External relations in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs is an Anglophone who the Government uses to defend its stand against the Anglophone problem at the African Court.

⁵⁴⁶ "Government Double Standards: Land Rents, Royalties and the Bakweri Land Problem", 3 April 2006. Accessed at < <http://www.icicemac.com/nouvelle/index.php3?nid=5203>>

In order to disprove the minister that the government is playing a double standard game when it comes to the compensation of indigenous natives whose lands are being exploited for national purpose. Allusion was made to the fact that on 20 January 1994, the Cameroon Parliament passed Law No 94-1, which regulates Cameroons' forestry activities. This law was followed by decree No. 95/531/PM, which detailed the implementation of forestry regulations.⁵⁴⁷ The 1994 law incorporated the Principle of Derivation (the same principle which the government has refused to apply in the case of the CDC) and instituted the Annual Forestry Royalty (AFR) which is an area tax paid by logging companies. According to the law, 40 per cent of logging royalties go to the local councils where the logging is taking place, 10 per cent to the village communities adjacent to the exploited area and 50 per cent to the state. According to the government, the portion of the AFR allocated to local communities is supposed to be used to build roads, hospitals and schools, provide other social amenities, alleviate poverty and raise living standards.⁵⁴⁸

So, contrary to the claims of the head of the Cameroons' delegation to the African Court to defend the government against the BLCC, the Principle of Derivation is alive and well in Cameroon, but is only applied in selected regions of the country. While some communities deserve to be paid royalties for the exploitation of national lands and resources, others do not. One can argue that the Bakweri people are being denied basic rights because they are Anglophones that other communities, particularly those of the South, Centre and Eastern provinces enjoy because they are Francophones. This explains

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

why only a handful of favoured local councils and communities received royalties, while in close to 50 years of protest and activism, the people of Fako have not received a single penny from the billions of Francs that the CDC has been paying annually to the national treasury as land rents.

However, after examining the written and oral submissions of both parties, the Commission concluded that the government's argument had no historical or legal basis and then rejected the government's call that the case be thrown out for insulting the Cameroon judiciary. The commission's findings were again at odds with the government's position that the UN had already resolved the matter, and concluded that the "BLCC had presented compelling evidence with regards to the lack of independence of the Cameroon judiciary".⁵⁴⁹ As a result, the Commission referred the matter to mediation, as the next phase, and recommended that the BLCC and the Government of Cameroon "settle the matter amicably".⁵⁵⁰ The Bakweri Land case is used in a broader context to show how the Anglophones are being marginalized in the unitary state.

4.5 Conclusion

The Anglophone problem in Cameroon is championed by the SCNC and SCAPO, who have taken up the Anglophone issue not only with the Cameroon government but with the international community. In their attempt to internationalize the Anglophone problem, the elites appealed to different juridical arena. They appealed to a court in

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

Nigeria, which is a national court, The African Commission of Human and Peoples' Right and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In the various appeals Anglophone leaders are making use of national and international law to make a case for secession, which the state does not want to grant. However, their main aim is to have their problem put on the international agenda

As this chapter has shown, the various courts that Anglophone leaders approached in the international arena to garner moral support for claims that Anglophones in Cameroon are a victimized minority community granted admissibility of their case. The judgment in the case against the government of Nigeria was a major victory for the people of Southern Cameroon as the Nigerian Federal High Court ruled that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be compelled to place before the ICJ and the UN General Assembly and ensure diligent persecution to the conclusion the claims of the peoples of Southern Cameroons to self-determination and their declaration of independence. The outcomes of the various Anglophone cases have boosted the Anglophone movements and the Anglophone national sentiments.

CHAPTER FIVE

CYBER NATIONALISM: THE IMAGINED ANGLOPHONE COMMUNITY IN CYBERSPACE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides working information and definitions of “cyberspace”, “virtual communities” and “nationalism”. The review consists of an in-depth discussion of the Anglophone nation and national activities on the Internet. It focuses on all the Anglophone pressure groups found online, paying particular attention to their activities, their goals and their achievements. The chapter argues that, though silenced within Cameroon, Anglophone voices can still be heard virtually on the Internet. Perhaps due to the Cameroon government’s restrictions on public protest and a state-controlled media, only a few Anglophone voices, critical of government policies, can be heard in the country.

Today, with the help of technology, the new global economy dominated by information and communication technology has created opportunities for these previously suppressed voices to emerge. These swiftly evolving information and communication technologies and networking infrastructures are playing an expanding role in supporting emergent nations in cyberspace.⁵⁵¹ This chapter investigates how Anglophone Cameroonians have penetrated and utilized cyberspace as an alternative means for their communally based identity as Anglophones. Cyberspace now abounds with web pages portraying the flag

⁵⁵¹ December, J. (1997), “Communities Exist in Cyberspace”, 12 August 2005. Accessed at <<http://www.december.com/cmcmag/1997/feb/last.html>. Accessed 2004/8/12>

and emblem of the Anglophone state, and proclaiming their mission to serve its citizens. The succeeding section critically examines the following aspects of cyber-nationalism:

5.2.1 Conceptualizing Cyberspace

A major question one needs to consider is what constitutes cyberspace. One of the problems which beset analysis of cyberspace is the difficulty of clarifying what exactly is described as cyberspace. The term ‘cyberspace’ itself hints at a ‘space’ being created where none previously existed.⁵⁵² There are many competing definitions of cyberspace. Some view it as a “fictional construct; others as imaginary, but in development; yet others as real and present. Some equate cyberspace with virtual reality, others with electronic storage and transmission of information, or with computer-mediated communication, or with communication over computer networks”.⁵⁵³ Some see cyberspace as an individual conceptual space, others as a product of social interaction. Some describe cyberspace as in no sense a physical entity: “It isn’t a thing; it isn’t an entity; it isn’t an organization. No one runs it. It is simply Everyone’s Computers, connected”.⁵⁵⁴

Beniger argues that cyberspace does not consist only of material things like people and their computers connected to the internet. To him, cyberspace has “two major nonmaterial components: relationships among individuals and the cyber cultural contents

⁵⁵² Strate, L. et al (eds.) (1996), *Communication and Cyberspace: Social Interaction in an Electronic Environment*, United States: Hampton Press, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁵³ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 51.

of their heads, that is, the sense of belonging to cyberspace”.⁵⁵⁵ Rheingold on his part defines cyberspace as “the conceptual space where words, human relationships, data, wealth, and power are manifested by people using CMCs (computer mediated communications) technologies”.⁵⁵⁶ Beniger and Rheingold’s definitions of cyberspace fit the context of this research in the sense that cyberspace has been used by Anglophones in Cameroon to strengthen their relationship and sense of belonging as a cultural, political entity and to create a sense of consciousness among its members in the Diaspora and at home.

As the development of cyber culture breaks through the physical boundaries of all information in all places and at all times, cyberspace will become a more embracing culture. Thus Barlow’s⁵⁵⁷ notion of cyberspace is nothing less than;

... the promise of a new social space, global and sovereign, within which anybody, anywhere can express to the rest of humanity whatever, he or she believes without fear. There is in this new media a foreshadowing of the intellectual and economic liberty that might undo all the authoritarian powers on earth.⁵⁵⁸

Barlow fights to defend free speech in cyberspace. According to him, all Internet users are “free to roam, establish their own virtual communities, are all equal and unimpeded

⁵⁵⁵ Beniger, J. (1996), “Who Shall Control Cyberspace?” in Strate, L. et al (eds.) *Communication and Cyberspace: Social Interaction in an Electronic environment*, p. 51.

⁵⁵⁶ Rheingold, H. (1993), *Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, p. 5.

⁵⁵⁷ John Perry Barlow a former lyricist for the American band the Grateful Dead, a cattle rancher has been at the forefront of Campaigning for civil liberties on the Internet.

⁵⁵⁸ John Perry Barlow “A Cyberspace Independence Declaration”, 12 June 2006. Accessed at <http://www.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration.txt>

by the agents of the states”.⁵⁵⁹ Anglophone elites in the Diaspora have established a number of virtual communities and discussion forums in cyberspace wherein its members are free to chat and share ideas about their struggle. It is because of this easy access to cyberspace that Benedikt describes it as:

a place, one place, limitless; entered equally from a basement in Vancouver, a boat in Port-au-Prince, a cab in New York, a garage in Texas City, an apartment in Rome, an office in Hong Kong, a bar in Tyoto, a café in Kinshasa, a laboratory on the moon.⁵⁶⁰

In effect no one controls cyberspace, and it is regarded as the medium through which concepts of emancipation, empowerment and the transcendence of physical subjugation are explored.⁵⁶¹ This chapter shows how new technology such as the Internet may be used as an effective agency of political resistance.

5.2.1a Internet

The Internet is a worldwide network of large and small interconnected computer networks around the globe. The Internet began in 1962 as a computer network for the US military and, over time, has grown into a global communication tool of many thousands of computer networks that share a common addressing scheme.⁵⁶² Unlike online services, which are centrally controlled, the Internet is decentralized by design. Each Internet computer, called a host, is independent.⁵⁶³ Its operators can choose which Internet services to use and which local services to make available to the global Internet

⁵⁵⁹ Loader, Brian (1997), *The Governance of Cyberspace*, New York: Routledge, p. 4.

⁵⁶⁰ Benedikt, M. (ed.) (1991), *Cyberspace: First Steps*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 1.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid, p.30

⁵⁶² Kahin, B. and Keller, J. (eds.) (1995), *Public Access to the Internet*, United States: Library of Congress Cataloging, pp. 34-37.

⁵⁶³ Ibid, p. 37.

community. There are a variety of ways to access the Internet. Most online services, such as America Online, offer access to some Internet services.⁵⁶⁴

The Internet is a strategic research site which enables the study of fundamental social interaction in cyberspace. It provides a level of access to the details of social life through online interaction,⁵⁶⁵ such as electronic mail (email) and discussion lists, Text chat, World Wide Websites. For the purpose of this study, use will be made only of the email and discussion lists, because they are the most popular forms of interaction among Anglophone Cameroonians at home and abroad.

5.2.1b Email and Discussion Lists

Email and discussion lists are the oldest and most popular forms of interaction on the Internet.⁵⁶⁶ Email allows one to send a message directly to another person or, in an email discussion list a message sent to a group address is then copied and sent to all the email addresses on a list. When people direct a series of messages and responses to the list, a discussion group develops. This is the most common form of interaction on the Internet, and a discussion group contains thousands of members. Internet politics have taken many new forms, from cyber-nationalism, where groups around the globe advocate self-determination for their brothers and sisters⁵⁶⁷, to cyber-democracy where various forms of direct representation and advocacy of people's interests can occur.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁴ "What is the Internet?" 17 March 2004. Accessed at <www.ola.org/student_services/definitions.php>

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Smith, A. and Kollock, P. (1999), *Communities in Cyberspace*, London: Routledge, p. 45.

⁵⁶⁷ Anderson, B. (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso, p. 5.

⁵⁶⁸ Hill, A. and Hughes, J. (1998), *Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 34.

5.2.1c Virtual Communities

One of the most promising types of new cyber communities is the “virtual national community”.⁵⁶⁹ This section investigates how Anglophone Cameroonians at home and in the Diaspora have penetrated this new virtual social space of cyberspace. It looks at virtual communities in general, and focuses on online political activities of virtual ethnic and national communities of Anglophone Cameroonians at home and in the Diaspora.

Jones defines a community as “a bounded territory of sorts (whether physical or ideological); but it can also refer to a sense of common character, identity, or interests as with the ‘virtual community’”.⁵⁷⁰ Howard Rheingold defines “virtual community” as “social aggregations that emerge from the Internet when enough people carry those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace”.⁵⁷¹ Rheingold sees virtual community as a folksy place where anyone can drop in, have a friendly chat, receive some advice about a problem, argue politics, and interact with other people who might otherwise remain strangers.⁵⁷² In the discussion forum of The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, Anglophones all over the world discuss issues about their struggle and how to further their cause.

⁵⁶⁹ Rheingold, H. (1993), *Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, p. 16.

⁵⁷⁰ Jones, S. (ed.) (1997), *Virtual Culture: Identity and Communication in Cybersociety*. London: Sage Publications Ltd. p. 39.

⁵⁷¹ Rheingold, H. (1993), *Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, p. 5.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

In trying to answer the question, ‘what is the real interest driving a virtual community?’ Jones writes that Rheingold wants people to believe that “the need for human association and a sense of belonging are so strong that people will seek to build communities of interest in cyberspace because they might not be able to build them elsewhere”.⁵⁷³ However, it appears this is not the only reason. The Anglophone situation in Cameroon for example, is being reinforced by the government’s silence over the Anglophone problem. Virtual communities serve as models for future efforts of physical community and ideological building.⁵⁷⁴ How true this is to the Anglophone situation is a major focus of this chapter. In addition, communities within cyberspace appear to emphasize a shared belief in the principles of free speech, individualism, equality, and open access – the same symbolic interests that define the character of American democracy.⁵⁷⁵ Some of these communities can be purely instrumental in nature, that is, they may never extend beyond talking to one other; or they may promote action, manifesting themselves in real political action, such as educational or political causes. The virtual communities of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora are instrumental in the sense that they do not only manifest themselves in political action but they also offer scholarship to aspirant Anglophones to further their education in the hope that they will be the leaders of the Anglophone nation in future. For instance, on the web page of the US-Southern Cameroons Foundation, it is stated that:

⁵⁷³ Jones, S. (ed.) (1997), *Virtual Culture: Identity and Communication in Cybersociety*, p. 50.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 10.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 45.

The Foundation also encourages Southern Cameroonians to train in diverse areas because we believe that the new country would undoubtedly benefit from such training. In a few selected cases, we have offered scholarships to Southern Cameroonians, especially the children of victims of oppression by the Cameroon government.⁵⁷⁶

There are also other websites that recognize the importance of education and encourage Southern Cameroonians to study. The Formujoh's Foundation, www.tffcam.org, based in the United States of America is maintained By Dr Formujoh Christopher. This foundation also offers scholarships to Anglophones both at home and in the Diaspora, to further their education. Another prominent scholarship site for Anglophones is www.Fonlon-nicols.org. This website is maintained in honour of a prominent Anglophone intellectual, Dr Bernard Fonlon. Anglophone virtual communities are instrumental in promoting the Anglophone identity.

5.3 Nationalism

Benedict Anderson has argued that the print language laid the bases for national consciousness, which created the possibility of a new form of imagined community – the “nation”.⁵⁷⁷ Firstly, language created unified fields of exchange and communication. Secondly, language creates a power different from the older administrative vernaculars.⁵⁷⁸ Anderson argues that the end result was a fundamental re-organization of the way the world's peoples were divided. And thus began a global transition to an era of nationalism and increasing internal homogeneity within a global system of nation states.

⁵⁷⁶ “About the US Southern Cameroons Foundation” 22 March 2004. Accessed at <<http://www.us-scf.org/>>

⁵⁷⁷ Anderson, B. (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, pp. 44-45.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.⁵⁷⁹ According to him, a nation is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.⁵⁸⁰ Anderson writes that people are ready to die for their nation because “nations inspire love and often profoundly self-sacrificing love”.⁵⁸¹ He explained further that poetry, prose, fiction, music and arts, which are the cultural products of nationalism, clearly show this love in thousands of different forms and styles. Examples of these are the national anthems sung on public holidays or theme songs of struggle sung during periods of struggle. In such singing there is an experience of simultaneity, and people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody.⁵⁸² Therefore “nationalism” is an ideology as well as loyalty to or action on behalf of the nation.⁵⁸³ Under nationalism, this chapter discusses online Anglophone nationalist groups whose primary mission is pertinent to the political and national development of the Anglophone State.

5.4 Cyber Nationalism: Virtual Voices of Opposition in Anglophone Cameroon

Anglophone Cameroonian elites in the Diaspora and at home maintain a plethora of websites and online activities that take a primarily negative view of the Cameroon government’s policy in the region. Although not all of the pressure groups advocate

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid, p. 141.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Lowell, W. Barrington (1997), ‘Nations’ and ‘Nationalism’: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science, *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30: pp. 712-716.

independence or separatism, a vast majority of them do press for radical change in the region. In general, these websites can be divided roughly into those that are mainly informational-based and others that are politically active advocacy sites. However, whether informational or advocacy, nearly all the websites of the pressure groups are critical of the government policies in Anglophone Cameroon.

The situation of the Anglophone elites involved with the struggle is often one of dispersion, having been forced away from their homeland for military, political or economic reasons. Anglophone elites in the Diaspora have created institutions in cyberspace that will help sustain the Anglophone nation. Examples are the home pages of The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, The Republic of Ambazonia, and the Southern Cameroons Youth League. These are the most hyperlinked sites in the virtual Anglophone state that include documents, articles, maps, anthem, emblems, geography, coat of arms and the history of the Anglophones in Cameroon. They also have the names of an interim government in exile and the daily running of the state. Anglophone Cameroonians in the Diaspora involved in the struggles for independence have benefited from the ability to form "virtual communities."

Kurt Mills in a Listserv discussion on International Relations and National Sovereignty writes that:

The most obvious impact of communications technology is that it makes possible new kinds of communities, or at least provides the possibilities for a certain level of cohesion among a dispersed community which may be necessary for any kind of movement to form and assert itself. Alongside this, it creates new centers of authority, relocating authority away from traditional authority structures that is the state toward more


ambiguous and fluid confluences and loci of authority. Thus, dispersed communities can form and remain cohesive a lot easier with the advent of telephones, the Internet, e-mail, communications satellites.⁵⁸⁴

Therefore it is these dispersed communities and such communications capabilities that might aid emergent nations in various ways to seek independence, by being able to exchange information and strategize. By doing so the number of people capable of participating in the struggle may be expanded through communications technology, such as discussion groups. Southern Cameroons forms a clear example of a situation where, both economically and technically, access to the Internet from within Cameroon itself is extremely limited, but through the Anglophone elites in the Diaspora working in partnership with Southern Cameroonians at home and various supporters around the world, a vital cyberspace community is being established to further the purposes of the people of Southern Cameroons.

There are a number of organizations and websites working for the independence of Southern Cameroons based in Paris, Washington DC, Munich, Abuja, London, Johannesburg and New York. Below are the most hyperlinked sites of the home pages in the virtual Anglophone Cameroon nation. These advocacy sites openly promote international support for Anglophone Cameroon. These sites and the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) take a strong and critical stance against the Government of Cameroon. They try to put the plight of the Anglophone Cameroonians before the international community, and their goal is to advocate outright independence

⁵⁸⁴ Kurt Mills, (Department of Government and International Studies, University of Notre Dame) in the International Relations and National Sovereignty Listserv discussion group (int-rel-nat-sovereignty@maibase.ac.uk), 19 April 1995. Accessed 2005/4/5

for Southern Cameroons. The interim Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons is found on <http://www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info>. The following is the representation of the name, the flag and the coat of arms of the interim government of Southern Cameroon



This online nation of Southern Cameroons⁵⁸⁵ offers a wide variety of services and activities to its people. One service of significance is the access to informational resources, which are invaluable for those people engaged in the struggle. The data storage function of the web allows the user to select from among a variety of articles, documents, and documentary videos, the constitution of Southern Cameroons, and links to other websites carrying information on Southern Cameroons. It creates a high degree of awareness amongst Anglophone Cameroonians and focuses on action against the Cameroon government.

⁵⁸⁵ “Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons” 16 March 2004. Accessed at www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/

Judging from the influence of the Internet one can argue that it has transformed the nature of community and identity amongst Cameroonians. The new medium has affected the peaceful coexistence between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians. The Cameroon government finds itself challenged by the sub-nationalism of Anglophones in Cameroon. Through the Internet, Anglophone nationalists have found a means of propagating their message to the Anglophones and sympathizers at home and in the Diaspora using the Radio Free Southern Cameroons broadcast over the internet.

The people of Southern Cameroons have a number of grievances against the Cameroon government. Some of the grievances range from discriminatory state policies, to uneven development and attempts to erase their distinctive identity as Anglophones in favour of forced French assimilation. In 1999 Anglophone nationalists declared independence after seizing the provincial radio station in Buea, but this secession attempt was ultimately suppressed and the leaders fled in exile.



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[About National Chairman of SCYL Ebenezer Derek Mbongo Akwanga, Jr.](#)

[National Songs](#)

[Constitution-Orders in Council](#)

[International Boundary](#)

[Between Southern](#)

[Cameroons and La](#)

[Republique du Cameroon](#)

[Freedom Land Foundation](#)

www.southern

[cameroons.org](http://www.southern)

NEW!!!

<http://www.un.org/issues/>

[m-decol.asp](http://www.un.org/issues/)

[m-decol.asp](http://www.un.org/issues/)

It is important to point

out that this site helps to create an online

Southern Cameroons community and it is actively engaged in the construction of an Anglophone national identity based on a distinctive colonial history.

This site includes news about the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons and the interim government that oversees the affairs of the Anglophone state. It has links to the United Nations Human Rights Commission website, which contains links to several articles and websites concerning Southern Cameroons (www.Southerncameroons.org,) that contain links to articles concerning issues of human rights and territorial freedom of Southern Cameroons.

The host of the Southern Cameroons website is interested in recruiting concerned Anglophones to their cause and in providing resources and support to their ideological allies. The owners of this site have invested in building collectivity, in bringing Anglophones together to try and effect change. In their attempts to inspire Anglophones to action, this site frequently gives information about human rights abuses in Southern Cameroons.



Victoria County



Victoria Beach



**Fako Mountain
(Chariot of Gods)**



**Prime Minister's Lodge,
Buea**



**Touristic Lake Oku and
Attractions in Bamenda**



**Southern Cameroon's
Patriotism**

The Southern Cameroons website attempts to represent a whole country. It gives information about the political and economic situation of the country and it displays a map of Southern Cameroons. There are a number of tourist attractions in Southern Cameroons that are found on this web page. It carries visuals of the Victoria Beach, a tourist site in Southern Cameroons that attracts a lot of tourists to that part of the country. There is also Mount Fako, which is the tallest mountain in West Africa and the Prime Minister's lodge in Buea and Lake Oku in Bamenda.

What is interesting on this site is the combination of text and images that lead the reader to information about a particular location.

This site provides a history of the Southern Cameroons National Council and its activities, a review of its social and political background, accounts of its notable exploits and goals, as well as information on its political and ideological aims.

The mountainous and coastal terrain of Southern Cameroons is graced with waterfalls, fast flowing streams and thick forests. Southern Cameroons has a lot of attractions to actualize the dream of an adventurer or tourist. Besides the scenery, the hospitality of the people of Southern Cameroons is appreciated by many visitors to that part of the country.

Map 4


Southern Cameroons

Educational System: Anglo-Saxon

Population: 6 million (approx.)

Landed Area: 43,000 sq. km.

Natural Resources: Crude Oil, Timber, Coffee, Cocoa, Tea, Bananas, Oil Palm, Wildlife, Fishing, Medicinal Plants, Tropical Forests, & Waterfalls



On this web page found on the home page of the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, different perspectives and strategies are employed in this heated and vibrant representational battle in the cyber texts about Southern Cameroons. This

web page represents a microcosmic view of the political and economic situation in Southern Cameroons. By giving distinction to the Southern Cameroons map on the homepage, the Anglophone elites attempts to demarcate the struggle along territorial lines. According to some Anglophone elites, they would like to see a clear boundary for Southern Cameroons as it existed in the 1960s.

5.4.1 The Content of the Southern Cameroons Website

The Southern Cameroons website has information about Southern Cameroons public symbols such as Code of independence, history, the UN and Southern Cameroons, National songs and the international boundary between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon.

5.4.1a Code of Independence

The Independence Code of Southern Cameroons lays down the checks and balances for the smooth running of the country. It anticipates and defines principles, attitudes and conduct for guaranteeing and protecting the people's full rights to pursue life, liberty and justice. The Code poses and answers such questions as 'How does the Interim Government work?', 'What is its mission?', 'How does it differ from other previous independence efforts?' And it also explains what every single Southern Cameroonian can do for his or her country's independence.

5.4.1b Coat of Arms



On the Southern Cameroons' Coat of Arms, one finds two birds. One is the eagle found in the forest zone, a bird unique to the region. The other is the Bonaventure Turaka which is found in the grass field region of Southern Cameroons –a bird unique to the region, which is now becoming extinct. So Southern Cameroonians are going to make it a duty to protect the birds which produce the 'red feather' which is used to recognize prominent elders in the society. Between the two birds are two spears held together by a scale of justice. This implies that, while they are fighting to gain independence from the shackles of annexation, they will not destroy the fundamental issue of human rights.

5.4.1c The Flag of Southern Cameroons



The Flag of the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons consists of thirteen stars, which represent the thirteen counties that make up Southern Cameroons, which the present government calls divisions. The dove represents freedom, and it carries a star in its bill representing the possible creation of another county. The white stripes on the flag stand for transparency, while the blue represents agriculture and fertility, which is the backbone of the economy of Southern Cameroons.

5.4.1d Historical Evolution

The historical evolution traces the history of Southern Cameroons from 1916 when German Kamerun was partitioned, between Britain and France. In 1922 these two regions became mandates of the League of Nations and, after the Second World War they became United Nations Trust Territories. The French sphere, was administered in association with the French Equatorial African colonies.⁵⁸⁶ The British sphere was divided into Northern and Southern Cameroons. The former was administered as an integral part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, while the latter was administered as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria until 1954, when it became a quasi-autonomous Region of Nigeria, which was transformed into a full Region of the Federation of Nigeria in 1959. Thus, in political and administrative terms, the two British sectors and the French sphere had little in common with each other.⁵⁸⁷

5.4.1e National Songs

The wording of the song below is significant in the struggle. It calls upon God Almighty to defend their sovereign land and to break every shackle of fear and give them the courage to fight for their rights. The following excerpt from the Southern Cameroons Anthem portrays the patriotic nature of the song,

O'er the vales from shore to Ako
From the surging waves of Amba Bay,
from the rocks and hills of Buea,
to the heights of Kilum Mountain
Let Africa's voice, in freedom song,
Rise to sublime heights and magnify

⁵⁸⁶ "Historical Evolution of Southern Cameroons" 16 March 2004. Accessed at www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

Thee our God and great defender.
Grant us in the end to bequeath
in peace and unity
a heritage whole and undefiled.⁵⁸⁸

The song covers the entire Southern Cameroons region as it praises the values of the region from the shores of Ako to the Waves of Amba Bay, and the grass field and forest regions of the country. They imagine that one day Southern Cameroons would be among the nations that are proud and free of their heritage.

5.4.1f The UN and Southern Cameroons

The Southern Cameroons are arguing a case before the United Nations regarding the non-execution of the UNO Resolution 1608 (XV), & 5 of 21/04/1961, on the Future of the Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration. According to Southern Cameroons leaders, no Treaty of the Union between the then Government of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon was worked out.⁵⁸⁹

The UN resolution required that a Treaty of the Union between the Governments of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon with the United Kingdom, as the Administering Authority of Southern Cameroons Trust Territory, be worked out before 1 October 1961.⁵⁹⁰ The Treaty was to protect the interests of both Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon. The Southern Cameroons territorial assembly and the parliament of the Republic of Cameroon should have ratified the worked-out Treaty; and the Treaty should have been registered and a copy deposited with the Secretariat of the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, in application of Article 102 (1) of

⁵⁸⁸ “National Songs of Southern Cameroons” 16 March 2004. Accessed at www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/

⁵⁸⁹ “The UN and The Southern Cameroons” 16 March 2004. Accessed at www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/


⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

the United Nations Charter. They argue that this was never done, and it is for this reason that Anglophones feel that their territory is being recolonised by French Cameroon.⁵⁹¹

Map 5

5.5 The Republic of Ambazonia Sovereignty Society

(AMBASOS)



Source www.ambazonia.org

The Ambazonian Sovereign Society website⁵⁹² is another advocacy website in which Anglophone Cameroonians propagate the idea of secession. The members maintaining this website are more radical in their approach to the struggle than those of The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons. They have adopted a new name Ambazonia – for the Ex-British Southern Cameroons. Members of Ambazonia Sovereign Society point out that where the West African coastline meets the Southern African coastline, is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean called Amba Bay. They argue further that

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² “The Republic of Ambazonia Sovereignty Society” 16 March 2004. Accessed at <www.ambazonia.org>

Geography identifies the territorial zone around Amba Bay as Amba Zone.⁵⁹³ From the appellation Amba Zone, they derived the name ‘Ambazonia’. They do not want to have anything to do with Cameroon, because the successive governments in Cameroon have always played down the Anglophone problem. They want a society in which Anglophones will determine their own destiny.

According to the website, the Ambazonia Sovereign Society seeks nothing but justice, peace, and happiness for Anglophones in Cameroon. They argue that “the people of Ambazonia are not Cameroonians, have never been Cameroonians, nor shall they ever be Cameroonians”.⁵⁹⁴ They propagate the idea that Anglophones should work hard to adopt their pre-independence identity of Ambazonians.

Ambasos⁵⁹⁵ argue that though the change of name is expensive, it is imperative to let people identify Anglophone Cameroonians as Ambazonians. Ambazonia, according to them, will enforce their patriotism. They argue that “should one expect Bangladesh to still be called East Pakistan because they were once part of East Pakistan when the British were ruling them? Should it have been proper for Eritrea Republic to call itself North Eastern Ethiopia at the height of its struggle”?⁵⁹⁶ It is for these reasons that the name Ambazonia, created a long time ago, was accepted by a group of Anglophones at home and abroad way back in September 1988 as the name designating the former British Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ A short form of Ambazonia

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

In the virtual space of the Republic of Ambazonia, members in the Diaspora have formed a political party, Ambazonia Liberation Party (ALIP) to fight and restore their sovereignty, dignity and independence from what they refer to as “the occupation and subjugation of Anglophones in Cameroon by the government”.⁵⁹⁷ Many Ambazonians welcome the formation of the Ambazonia Liberation Party. One concerned Anglophone in the Ambazos discussion forum remarked, regarding the formation of the party, that he hopes the leaders:

... have made the leap from the "force of argument" they started in 1985, and which has yielded no fruits for our people, and do what other liberation movements in history have demonstrated. Freedom is won on the battlefield, first and foremost. That is the greatest recognition and identity we can give ourselves - to fight for what we know is right, just and the truth!⁵⁹⁸

Anglophone Cameroonians in the struggle for self-determination are beginning to realize that freedom is never handed over on a plate of gold but fought for. Pioneers in the Anglophone struggle have always used the slogan “force of argument,” meaning they have been trying to solve the Anglophone problem in Cameroon through peaceful means, which has yielded no fruits. The present generation has decided to change the slogan and has adopted “argument of force” which implies they are prepared to use force to achieve their freedom.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

5.6 The Discussion Forums of Anglophone Communities in Cyberspace

The electronic communities produced by the diasporic people are indeed imagined connections that are articulated over the medium of the Internet, a tool to imagine the group affiliation. For the purpose of this study a discussion of some of the postings on the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Ambazonia sites will be observed on a random basis to explore some of the emergent issues that appear in cyberspace. This section discusses the way in which the community deals with the issues that are important to its members. The postings are those of members of the community who are actively participating in producing discourse by reading and responding to texts that appear in the Internet space. The postings in the discussion forums also become an indicator of the community of the people who are active users of this network. The majority of Anglophone Cameroonians who use this newsgroup are in the United States, with a handful in Europe and other parts of Africa, including a few in Cameroon. Those in the Diaspora have been forced to move to a new geographic space either for political or economic reasons.

It is important to note that each message sent to the discussion forum contains the author's information and a subject line that summarizes the theme of the posting. Based on this, it is possible to identify how the discussions proceed through a discursive process in which members interact with each other, contributing opinions about issues, and collectively imagining their virtual community. The subject line of each message helps to identify the themes of the discussion. This has made it possible to classify the messages into four main categories namely: general, independence, federalism and the best name to adopt for Anglophone Cameroon.

5.6.1a General Posting

This category of messages is primarily informational. A majority of the messages are of an introductory nature, whereby a member informs the others that he/she has just joined the community. Another general posting is when members use the network to try and locate someone who they expect is also a member of the community. Some members use this network to announce the birth of a child to the community and others to announce the death of a member. Although these messages do not address specific issues, they affirm the communal spirit that gives an indication of the way in which the community has evolved. While on the Internet, when one encounters a message that relates to a college association back in Southern Cameroons like Bali Old Boys Association or Ex-Bishop Rogan College, there will be an effort to re-establish contacts in the virtual community with former class or schoolmates. This particular use of the network is common practice across a large number of groups in virtual space.

5.6.1b Independence

In this category, members raise an array of opinions. A good number of members in the virtual community advocate independence. To them, it is only independence that can solve the Anglophone problem in Cameroon. Justice Ebong, one of the leaders of the SCNC factions, posted the following:

The International Community may seem to believe that before a people are emancipated there must be bloodshed, the peoples of the Southern Cameroons are now not for appeasement but should put on their armours for good or for bad in the self-defence of their territory, patrimony and peoples; because everyday we live in bondage, complicates further the dignity of our future generations. The deviant actions of La République du Cameroun cannot consume our identities. They will only strengthen and harden the resolve of our peoples for a good fight. Let us harness our

energies and resources as we stride forward in unison to victory, freedom and independence.⁵⁹⁹

This message calls on Anglophones in Cameroon to fight for the self-defence of their territory that has been recolonised by French Cameroon. The recolonisation of Anglophones by French Cameroon is said to have produced a nightmare of authoritarianism, corruption, and the gross abuse of power. Similar messages permeate the discussion forum.

5.6.1c Federalism

In the Anglophone struggle in Cameroon, while the majority advocate independence, some Anglophones still feel that federalism is the answer to the Anglophone problem.

One Nsoh Christopher posted the following in the discussion forum:

As an immediate reaction this morning, I just want to reiterate the fact that I stand very firm for a federation. Just to give a rough overview of the Mount Mary Conference, speaker after speaker stood up for a federation which was acclaimed by almost everybody who was there. Even Dr Foncha and Dr Endeley did not change their prophecy. They still supported the federation strategy.

Innocent Nyabekong responded with the following:

I'd like to say the rhetoric about "federation" and "all Cameroon is suffering" has been heard from the likes of Mr Nsoh for nearly a decade. Mr Nsoh and his kind of people live in this illusion of "federation"; terminology that La République du Cameroun never uses. Nsoh and Co. probably know the concept a lot better than the regime of La République. I want to draw Mr Nsoh's attention to the Cameroon Constitution of 1996 that does not even recognize/mention the Southern Cameroons.

I did not study history but you did. However, whereas you anchor your call for federation on the "marginalization or domination of the English-speaking Cameroonians", I understand the conflict differently. I conceive it in terms of righting a wrong done to a people; a people with a history and a territory unjustly treated at independence to accede to

⁵⁹⁹ Republic of Ambazonia Discussion Forum (Freeambazoniz) 20 September 2004. Accessed at <www.ambazonia.org>

“independence by joining”. What does this concept mean for you? The 1961 federation was only a step in the wrong direction.⁶⁰⁰

Nsoh Christopher responded with the following posting:

Dear Prof. and others,
After a long reflection yesterday and a meeting that ended this morning at 3 am in Berlin, we have decided to support the cause for independence of the Southern Cameroons and no more a federation. We realized, a divided front can never win a struggle. Since everything about federation was pushed away by the government of La République, We should use our energy to sensitize each and every English speaking Cameroonian to see the need for independence.⁶⁰¹

This exchange illustrates the way in which opinions are developed and disseminated on the discussion forum as claims are made, refuted and substantiated by members of the group. Interestingly, one realises that the initial position taken by Mr Nsoh on federation changed, as other members of the group challenged him. He became an advocate of independence for Southern Cameroons.

5.6.1d What Name to Adopt for Anglophone Cameroon

There are two schools of thought whenever it comes to what name to adopt for Anglophone Cameroon. One thought strongly believes that Southern Cameroons is the right name to adopt, while the other advocates a name change to Ambazonia. Below are some of the points advanced by each school to support its claim:

One school of thought, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) believes the name Southern Cameroon is the right name to be used in identifying Anglophone Cameroon. They posted the following:

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

... Anglophone Cameroon case is based on truth, found in documented evidence, available at the United Nations and on all previous bilateral agreements which they signed with the United Nations, the government of Cameroon and foreign partners. Changing the name only adds confusion and frustration to those willing to understand the Anglophone problem. It is absolutely unnecessary to change the name at this point in time. The name Ambazonia, I don't know where it comes from and only a referendum would create a legal base if need be, which I don't see to change the name of our country.⁶⁰²

A member of the Ambazonia group responded with the following posting:

Please note that SCNC cannot be an emancipationist entity as clearly defined by its own activities where it has as of this morning more than 6 factions. Also, note that what all our people back in the colony want is their freedom, and this can not happen when confusion reigns through pan-Cameroonism.

Reason why we must insist on the Republic of Ambazonia becoming the beacon of hope for our abused people. Ambazonia has a well-documented track record on how we can recover our lost independence. It starts when we know that we have rights. It starts when we believe in these RIGHTS.

Please do not reject the powers of a people knowing their RIGHTS. Can we say that our people know that they are not and have never been Cameroonians? If so, how can we best symbolize this act of rebellion against our Cameroonian colonizers? Does the act of calling ourselves 'Southern Cameroonians' the best tactical action we can afford given that there exist alternatives if not, the chance to seek better symbols of differentiation?

A member of the SCNC discussion forum responded with the following:

I wish to assure you that the People of Southern Cameroons feel more intimately related to the SCNC (politically and diplomatically) than they do with Ambazonia. This is a fact, and should serve as a fertile reminder to you that the Ambazonia movement still has to win the hearts of the people of Southern Cameroons. In fact, I would want to be the first in Europe to have a Southern Cameroonian National ID.

Keberry John of Ambazonia Sovereign Society posted the following:

Having the name Ambazonia does not necessarily mean that conservative persons cannot use the old names, for their own purposes, academic research or for sentimental reasons, so long as they are in inverted commas or explained as a footnote. The Cameroons ... are confusing and *démodé*. If one were to insist on calling Zimbabwe today Southern Rhodesia even at the time of Chimurenga it would have been considered by activists as an insult. Further, one would need the attention of a

⁶⁰² Ibid

psychiatrist if one were to call Germany nowadays Prussia, Sri Lanka-Ceylon, France - Gaul, Gulf of Guinea - Slave Coast.⁶⁰³

This exchange demonstrates the way in which each group believes strongly in its position. The Southern Cameroons National Council claims that Anglophone Cameroon is better called Southern Cameroons, the name used by the architect of reunification, while the Ambazonians offer a more pragmatic analysis of the change of name, judging from history. The differences between the two schools of thought often lead to some antagonism between their various members.

Louis Egbe posted the following to the forerunners of Ambazonia:

What is the difference between an Anglophone and a Francophone? As a Black person, you continue to preach colonial ideas and hate. Were you in Versailles or Berlin? Besides, nationality is not by force. If a person prefers to Uncameroonise/de-africanise, he/she can take up a new nationality rather than spread false stories about Ghanaians being “expelle” from Cameroon. Or go to Cameroon, take up arms and fight an aimless war. And what is this colonial "Ambazonia" all about?

Justice Mbuh, an Ambazonian, responded by posting the following:

Louis,
Sorry to disappoint you very badly and you can take it any way you want. Yes, it is colonial mentality when it serves your sterile version of “Cameroun” well and there is no difference between an 'Anglophone' and 'Francophone' when it comes to you attempting to deny our people their rights to be free of oppression worse than what they experienced under colonial mentality? That is why you guys of whatever origins in Cameroon who now wear the Anglophone mask would never ever get it until it finally surfaces one day in your eyes like bright sun shine, before you will get it. Does it dawn on you that Southern Cameroons has virtually

⁶⁰³ Ibid

been destroyed by Cameroun? Or you want to deny that too, so as to say there is no difference between an Anglophone and/or Francophone?⁶⁰⁴

This exchange indicates the animosity that exists between the members. The intensity of the first posting and the ridicule in the response show that this type of exchange is commonplace in the discussion forum. Often the argument is taken to a personal level and others are being labelled as blacklegs if the moderators do not support their ideas. In the forum, when one comes up with a contrary idea, that person is seen as a government agent and his posting is not disseminated to the other members

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

5.7 The Southern Cameroons Youth League Website



This is the homepage of the Southern Cameroons Youth League.⁶⁰⁵ The author, Akwanga Ebenezer, puts his picture on the homepage in a military uniform. The author does not only share his views of liberating Southern Cameroons, he presents a fascinating imagined community of Anglophone Cameroon, with a map and some sensational information on Anglophones. This is an advocacy website for the liberation of Southern Cameroons as the author states:

The Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) was created with the unique mission of using all available civilised means, including force, to bring freedom to the suffering and persecuted people of the Southern Cameroons. To act as a forum where the voices of the stakeholders in the struggle for freedom and the vision of their country of tomorrow can be properly represented.⁶⁰⁶

The message is clear: the Southern Cameroons Youth League was created “to bring freedom to the suffering and persecuted people of Southern Cameroons”.⁶⁰⁷ Their argument for independence is based on the fact that “The Southern Cameroonians are being recolonised and deprived of their rights to function as full citizens in the Republic of Cameroon.”⁶⁰⁸ This does not go down well with the Youth League, who are more

⁶⁰⁵ “The Southern Cameroons Youth League Homepage” 15 May 2005. Accessed at www.scylforfreedom.org/scylindex.htm

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

militant in their approach to the Anglophone problem in Cameroon than the SCNC, and are calling for total and unconditional independence for Southern Cameroons.

Looking at the online activities of the Southern Cameroons Youth League, its nationalism is clearly visible on the Internet. The Youth League's web pages abound with graphic materials that are often gruesome; pictures of shooting, torture, Anglophone activists in jail, and Anglophone martyrs and corpses are prominently displayed. Freedom songs are heard on some of its web pages, especially those with pictures of those who have died fighting for the liberation of Southern Cameroons.

5.7.1 Contents of the Southern Cameroons Youth League Website

The contents of the Southern Cameroons Youth League website include; the Flag, coat of arms, anthem, map, history, news and politics.

5.7.1a The Flag



The Southern Cameroons Youth League Flag is made up of four distinct colours with the following signification:

Black - Signifies the remembrance of the Martyrs of the Struggle.

Green - Signifies the growth and maturity of The Youth League in the Southern Cameroons struggle.

White - Signifies the search for a permanent positive peace (PPP).

Red - Signifies the ultimate sacrifice (freedom at all cost).



5.7.1b The Logo

The Southern Cameroons Youth League Logo contains two chained hands signifying bondage, with a divine scissors to break the chains of annexation by French Cameroon. According to the Youth League leaders, Anglophones have been living under bondage for four

decades and the time has come for the chain to be cut. This chain would only be cut through blood and fire, not by speeches as it is claimed by others.



The Southern Cameroons Defence Force (SOCADEF) is the military wing of the Youth League. SOCADEF's objective is to defend the people and territory of the Southern Cameroons, which have been marginalised since 1961. Accordingly, taking up arms is the only path of the brave, the only true answer to many years of suffering and agony, to decades of barbaric and brutal persecution and hardship from successive French governments in Cameroon.

5.7.1c The Anthem

The anthem of the Southern Cameroons Youth League calls on the youth to rise up and act now, because Anglophone political elites have failed them. Below is the wording of the anthem:

Arise! Oh Youths of the Southern Cameroons,
The time to act is now.
Awake to serve your Fatherland,
Awake to Service true.

Not a call to betrayal,
Nor a call to treason,
But a call to true Nationalism.

Refrain:
For those who will give all;
To fight a Cause for freedom.
The Southern Cameroons Youth League;
For TRUTH and FREEDOM.⁶⁰⁹

The wording of the anthem is directed specifically at the youth, and is aimed at creating a kind of awareness in them to rise and defend their nation.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

5.8 Informational Websites on Southern Cameroons

Having discussed the various advocacy websites on Southern Cameroons, the rest of the chapter focuses on websites that provide information and analyses of Southern Cameroons. These include: www.ambazonia.indymedia.org, which is maintained by Valentine, a prominent Anglophone activist. The owners of this site state clearly that Ambazonia is non-hierarchical and consensus-based. Ambazonia is a collection of persons and groups interested in reporting news and information about issues in Ambazonia (Ex-British Southern Cameroons), Africa and the world as a whole:

We think that when all humanity is informed and has access to news it will be easier to deal with the problem of demagoguery. Demagoguery has made it possible for oppressions to go on in lots of places around the world without opposition. We are against hate of any sort, which includes hate based on; ethnicity, skin colour, country of origin, religious background, sex, and political opinion. We are open to all. You can join Ambazonia and participate in making decisions or you could simply just use our facility to bring your information to the public. You can join our mailing lists.⁶¹⁰

This site also includes useful articles on Southern Cameroons history and culture, and directs readers to other links to the region. There are many websites linked to Southern Cameroons, human rights issues: www.nationbynation.com/Cameroon/Human.html, www.state.gov, www.ambazonia.indymedia.org and www.usci.gov/text. These sites publish articles and images of subjugation, persecution, wanton arrest, detention, and extra-judicial execution of Southern Cameroonians. A number of Anglophone organic intellectuals are building websites that feature their works in general and articles on Southern Cameroons. The following websites are maintained by Anglophone

⁶¹⁰ <http://lists.indymedia.org/mailman/listinfo/imc-ambazonia-contact>. Accessed 2005/02/5

intellectuals: www.gobata.com, www.batebesong.com, www.gagwane.com, www.martinjumbam.com, www.nyamnjuh.com, and www.fonlon.org. The growing demand for independence by some Southern Cameroonians has translated into a proliferation of separatist literature, numerous protests and riots. In response to this trend, the Cameroon government has exercised widespread tactics of repression, stifling public expression and most forms of political dissent in Southern Cameroons. Many Southern Cameroons activists or militants have been jailed, and some executed.⁶¹¹

Besides the Internet sites providing information on Southern Cameroons, there are also civil society organizations like the US-Southern Cameroons Foundation, the Human Rights Defense Group and Formujoh's Foundation. Despite government efforts to regulate them, civil society organizations in Anglophone Cameroon engaged in advocacy have created networks of resistance to government policies and practice and have used the Internet as a means to promote a counter-discourse on human rights, economic development and democracy. These organizations provide resistance to government by providing alternative sources of information counter to the government position, by using the Internet to avoid government control and also to mobilize citizens for collective action. These NGOs maintain Internet websites to keep their readers informed of developments and protest in Southern Cameroons. For instance, the US-Southern Cameroons Foundation can be found on www.us-scf.org, its mission is to serve as a source of ideas, projects and strategies to finalize the restoration of independence of the

⁶¹¹ Nfor Ngala Nfor, Vice Chairman SCNC, interview July 2005

Southern Cameroons, preferably those that utilize civic and legal strategies and as a nursery for institution-building.⁶¹²

The US-Southern Cameroons website is maintained by a group of Anglophone Cameroonians based in America. It is non-profit making, dedicated to promoting relations between the United States and Southern Cameroons, as well as facilitating the emancipation of the people of Southern Cameroons. The US-Southern Cameroons Foundation welcomes members irrespective of national origin, race, creed or political ideology, as long as they share the goal of liberating the Southern Cameroons.⁶¹³ This site also has links to other websites about Southern Cameroons.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the various activities of Anglophone online imagined virtual communities. These communities provide elements of complete representation of the Anglophone state including symbols, map, history, news and politics. The webmasters of these imaginary Anglophone states try to cover every aspect of life on their websites. Symbols like the flag, coat of arms, anthem, history and tourist sites are visible. Important issues like atrocities committed by the government against innocent citizens are given prominence. The Southern Cameroons map is used to show what belongs to their country and what does not belong to them, and it clearly marks out the boundary between the Republic of Cameroon and the Southern Cameroons before reunification in 1961. The aim of these imaginary Anglophone communities is to reconstruct a true nation and to preserve the identity of Anglophone Cameroonians.

⁶¹² “The US-Southern Cameroons Foundation” 5 Feb. 2005. Accessed at <www.us-scf.org>

⁶¹³ Ibid.

Most Internet sites about Southern Cameroons get their funding from advertisements, subscriptions and small donations from concerned Anglophones supporting the Anglophone struggle. Many of the sites use the Pay Pal System. Although these sites have limited funding, those maintaining the sites make sacrifices to keep the struggle going. The Anglophone online nations have gone a long way to creating a substantial impact on events in Southern Cameroons, by serving as an important source of information to the Anglophone people. Therefore it has helped to link like-minded individuals and raise consciousness about issues that were often inaccessible to the general Anglophone public. It is clear that there are more than just Internet organizations involved in separatist activities in Southern Cameroons, as seen in the previous chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE ON ANGLOPHONE NATIONALISM IN CAMEROON

6.1 Introduction

Over the decades Anglophone nationalism has been built on the premise that Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians are different linguistically, culturally, politically and socially. Anglophone nationalist leaders have based their arguments on the fact that, because of a failed integration, Anglophone Cameroon should become a separate entity from Francophone Cameroon. However, Anglophone nationalist leaders have failed to realize that since the reunification of the two Cameroons, so much more has taken place between the communities in terms of intermarriage, investment, migration, and lifestyle issues that the dichotomy between the two has become blurred. This chapter explores the limits of the discourse of Anglophone nationalism, by showing that Anglophones and Francophones have more in common than they can acknowledge. The focus is on lifestyle issues such as Cameroon music, media, food, dress and fashion, language and sports, and finally Anglophone and Francophone views on the Anglophone question.

This chapter focuses on students' data in four state universities in Cameroon and interviews of some prominent Anglophone elites. The questionnaires and interviews attempted to gather information about the respondents' general attitude towards lifestyle issues. The questionnaires administered to Francophone students were translated into French, to ensure that they understood what the researcher wanted. The first section of

this chapter deals with data from the questionnaires that provided responses to specific research questions. The second section deals with data from interviews. The total number of respondents was officially 435. However, some students did not respond to some questions, hence the total number of responses would range from 435 to 395.

6.2.1 Music

Cameroon's strategic position in Africa is boosted by the perception that it is a centre for the production, consumption and dissemination of African popular music.⁶¹⁴ Its musical landscape is diverse, with many different local genres; Bikutsi and Makossa being the most popular in urban areas. Makossa originates from a Douala dance called Kossa. Bikutsi emanates from Yaoundé. It is the traditional dance of the Beti people. Besides Makossa and Bikutsi, local musical genres from other ethnic groups like the Bamiléké and Foulbé have also developed.⁶¹⁵ Anglophone Cameroon has not succeeded in producing any popular music genre. However, local genres like "Bottle Dance"⁶¹⁶ and "Moninkim"⁶¹⁷ respectively are popular among Anglophones, because it is their indigenous music heritage.

Under the music category open-ended questionnaires were designed to gather information from respondents about the type of Cameroonian music they liked to listen to and why. Interestingly, many respondents chose Makossa, Bikutsi and Bendskin. Anglophone

⁶¹⁴ Fuh Divine "Quand La Femme se Faché: Popular Music and Constructions of Male Identity in Cameroon", 10 June 2006. Accessed at

< <http://www.unibas-ethno.ch/veranstaltungen/dokumente/Papers/Fuh.pdf> >

⁶¹⁵ Nyamnjoh, F. and FoKwang, J. (2005), "Entertaining Repression: Music and Politics in Postcolonial Cameroon", *African Affairs*, 104/415: pp. 251 - 274.

⁶¹⁶ This type of music is the most popular in the North West province of Cameroon, an Anglophone province. It is called bottled dance because the main instrument is a bottle and two spoons and a guitar

⁶¹⁷ Is also a traditional music of the people of the South West province, another Anglophone province.

respondents chose Makossa more than their Francophone counterparts, though Makossa is a music genre from Francophone Cameroon. Anglophones gave reasons for liking Makosso such as its rhythm and the dancing style. Moreover, Anglophones chose Makossa because they do not have any popular music from their area which is recognized nationally and abroad. Analysis of the questionnaires suggests that Francophones tended to choose between Makossa, Bikutsi and Bendskin, giving their reasons based on the fact that it is music from where they come from (village of origin). For instance, most respondents in Yaoundé chose Bikutsi because it is indigenous to the area, likewise Bendskin from Western province and Makossa from Douala. Although Makossa is sung in Douala, it is often punctuated with Pidgin English and French. Observing Anglophones in nightclubs and parties proved that, although most Anglophones do not understand the Douala language, they are able to appreciate Makossa. This shows that music in Cameroon serves as a tool that blurs the difference between Anglophone and Francophone, because when it comes to dancing and enjoying Makossa, one cannot distinguish between an Anglophone and a Francophone. At variance were a few respondents from Anglophone Cameroon who chose “Bottle Dance” and “Njang”, because it helps to promote their culture.

6.2.2 Influence of Western Culture

What kinds of things do fashion and clothing say about the youths in Cameroon? Are there any real differences between the youths in Cameroon, when it comes to the way in which they appreciate western cultures? Respondents were asked to name and explain the western culture that has impacted most on Cameroonian youths. Most of the respondents said it was the American culture. Today American culture often sets the pace

in modern style because new technologies, such as motion-pictures and television, and the mass media have revolutionized American culture by making it available to the masses.⁶¹⁸ As such, Europe and the world are essentially consumers of American popular culture. At present, America is the dominant cultural source for entertainment and popular fashion, “from the jeans and T-shirts young people wear to the music groups and rock stars they listen to and the movies they watch”.⁶¹⁹ The American lifestyle is often associated with clothing, electronic gadgets, and other products, as well as with leisure time.⁶²⁰ The media exemplify this success with the most glamorous models of consumption: Hollywood actors, sports figures, or music celebrities. This dependence on products and on constant consumption defines modern consumer society everywhere. Americans have set the pace for this consumer ideal, especially among young people, who have helped fuel this consumer culture in the United States and the world.⁶²¹ American entertainment is probably one of the strongest means by which American culture influences the world.

Today in Cameroon one observes that many people have access to relatively inexpensive satellite dishes to view American Cable News Networks and MTV, the 24-hour US music video channel. Youths in Cameroon are not left behind, as they are also gripped by the influence of the American hip hop culture. This can be seen from their style of dressing, the music they listen to and the manner in which they walk and talk. Hip hop culture includes verbal language, body language, attitude style and fashion, and increasingly

⁶¹⁸“The US Culture,” 24 October 2006. Accessed at < www.5ka.ru/41/8441/1.html>

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

political activism.⁶²² Hip hop artists comment on numerous subjects such as AIDS, unemployment, crime and social change in America, the Caribbean and Africa.⁶²³ In so doing, the youths learn how these issues play out in their countries and the realities of the situation. Many youths like hip hop because it is the music of need, arising out of the streets, reflecting the hard core realities of urban ghettos.⁶²⁴

Amongst other things, Anglophone and Francophone youths in Cameroon have in common a love for rap and hip hop style. They mimic the fashion and style in which hip hop artists' dress, by wearing oversized trousers which display the waistband of one's underwear, and they often walk as if they were limping. Judging from the students' response, Cameroonian youths are imitating hip hop artists, to the extent of injecting Black slang into their conversations. Most of them idolize rap artists such as the late Tupac Shakur and the Notorious B.I.G., Ice Cube, and Will Smith. Some said they would like to be like the megastar entertainer Michael Jackson.

6.2.3 Food

Situated in Central Africa, Cameroon has an area of 475,440 square kilometres (183,568 square miles). It has four geographical regions: the western lowlands, the north-western highlands, the central region, and the northern region.⁶²⁵

⁶²² Redmond Robert, "Interconnection of Hip-Hop and Rap to African and American pop culture" 17 Oct. 2006. Accessed at

<://www.chatham.edu/PTI/2004%20units/The%20Essentials%20of%20African%20Culture/Redmond%20unit.pdf>

⁶²³ Ibid.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Neba, Aaron (1987), *Modern Geography of the Republic of Cameroon*, New Jersey: Neba Publishers.

The colonial masters came to Africa with foodstuffs. Their influences are reflected in the presence of some foods, as well as in the preparation of some dishes. The Portuguese arrived in Cameroon in 1472, and brought with them such crops as hot peppers, maize (corn), cassava (a root crop), and tomatoes.⁶²⁶ The Germans (1884) and, later, British and French (1916), also came with foodstuffs. However, for the most part, Cameroonians continue to prepare their own traditional foods.⁶²⁷ The staple foods eaten by the people of Cameroon vary from region to region, depending on the climate, and what is grown locally.

Staple foods eaten in the north are corn, millet, and peanuts. In the south, people eat more of root crops such as yams and cassava, as well as plantains. In both north and south regions, the foods are cooked, then pounded with a pestle until they form a sticky mass called *fufu*, which is then formed into balls and dipped into tasty sauces.⁶²⁸ The sauces are made of ingredients such as cassava leaves, okra, and tomatoes. The vegetable most typical in the southern region of Cameroon is *ndole*, which is made of boiled, shredded bitterleaf and peanuts, and can be cooked with fish or meat. *Bobolo*, made of fermented cassava shaped in a loaf, is popular in both the south and central regions.⁶²⁹

Cultural contact between the inhabitants of the various regions in Cameroon has made it possible for Cameroonians to eat a variety of dishes irrespective of where they are located. Visiting a restaurant in the city of Douala or Yaoundé for example, one is likely to find major dishes like plantains and ndole, fufu corn and vegetables, Achu and

⁶²⁶ Iodowu, K. E. (1976), *Auntie Kate's Cookery Book*, Cameroon: published privately.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

kanda,⁶³⁰ waterfufu and eru, koki and ripe plantains and cocoyam and vegetables. Dishes such as waterfufu and eru,⁶³¹ koki and ripe plantains, Achu and kanda and ekwang are staple foods from Anglophone Cameroon. They have gradually become very popular amongst Francophones. From Francophone Cameroon, dishes like roast fish and bobolo, plantains and ndole, mbongo chobi, and nkwi are household names in Anglophone Cameroon. When it comes to food in Cameroon, one can hardly distinguish an Anglophone from a Francophone.

Students were further asked what types of Cameroonian foods they like to eat and why. In response, most of them chose waterfufu and eru, plantains and ndole, ekwang, mbongo chobi and roasted fish and bobolo, not because these are meals coming from their region but because these dishes are delicious and they taste good. In effect, some of the students were not influenced by the fact that the dish was a staple meal from their village but because of the nutritional value of the food. Interestingly, many Anglophones chose dishes like plantain and ndole, mbongo chobi, and roasted fish and bobolo, which are meals from Francophone Cameroon. Likewise Francophone respondents also chose dishes like waterfufu and eru, koki and plantains and ekwang, which are staple food in Anglophone Cameroon. This shows that Cameroon is blessed with a variety of dishes that Cameroonians can choose from, irrespective of where they come from.

⁶³⁰ Achu is produced from pounded cocoyam, a popular root crop in West Africa and Central African-region. The sauce is normally yellowish in colour, heavily spiced and often accompanied with a lot of meat and sometimes vegetables and mushrooms.

⁶³¹ Water fufu and Eru is produced from fermented cassava, another popular root crop in the sub-region. After fermenting the cassava, it is then prepared as porridge, and served with some specially prepared vegetable known as 'Eru'.

6.2.4 Football

Football in Cameroon is regarded as a source of national pride, unity, peace and stability. Consequently, the government invests a lot of resources to foster the game. Over the years, the Cameroon government has given immense support to the national football team.⁶³² The reasons for this support include passion for the game and the need to see the national team succeed. The existence of four football schools in Buea, Douala, Maroua and Yaoundé has undoubtedly contributed to the development and progress of Cameroon's football.⁶³³

Cameroon has an impressive record of five appearances at the World Cup finals. It was the first African country to reach the quarter finals in Italy in 1990. Cameroon is four times African champions and the leading football nation in Africa. Cameroon's football success in particular has served as a major unifying factor for an often divided country.⁶³⁴ Adding his voice to the unifying power of football, FIFA President Joseph Blatter said "Football is more than just kicking a ball. In a vicious, crazy world, football can contribute towards restoring a positive atmosphere and positive energy."⁶³⁵ The following discussion about Cameroon football appeared on the Cameroon football forum (Camfoot):

Football is one of the few things that truly unite Cameroonians. When the players are on the pitch, nobody thinks of where they come from, but only how well they do on the pitch.

⁶³² Abongwa Tantoh, Deputy Editor in Chief of Sports CRTV, interviewed 5 September 2005.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Ibid

⁶³⁵ Blatter, S. Joseph "Visions of Football" at the Munich exhibition centre in Germany, 9 Oct. 2006
Accessed at <<http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com/06/en/050728/1/47ei.html>>

Soccer brings the feel-good factor in a country like Cameroon with hardly anything going right, only soccer is there to talk about. Treating a soccer player who dies on duty as a hero could bring a lot political gain to the person in power.

The national team is the only thing that Cameroonians can be proud of. The Indomitable Lions are a source of national identity and pride. Cameroon today is seen as a football nation and hence Foe's death, live on TV and defending the national colours affected us a lot more than those killed in Bakassi. All of these are used by politician for their own end.

Football is one of the few good things our country has now. Even if it is just for one or two hours, people can sit together and forget about any differences they might have.⁶³⁶

This shows that, while football acts as a unifying factor all over the world, football in Africa, particularly in Cameroon, is a personal and social healing factor, which is deeply ingrained in the psyche of the nation and individuals.⁶³⁷ According to Simon Mol, a Cameroonian soccer analyst, "Football is a fundamental cultural element in Cameroon".⁶³⁸ Above all, many Cameroonians have realized that a career can be made in the game, and hundreds have left the country to play professionally abroad.

Questions were put to students about their idol in the national team, what sports they practise or watch on TV and the club that they support in the Cameroon league. More than three quarters of the students chose the Barcelona (Spain) forward, Samuel Eto'o as their favourite player in the national team. Consequently, one discovers that Anglophones and Francophones share the same passion when it comes to supporting the national team.

⁶³⁶ Tande Dibussi "Football and the Burden of Patriotism in Africa", 9 Oct. 2006. Accessed at < <http://www.dibussi.com/>>

⁶³⁷ Mol Simon "Football in Africa is a Personal and Social Healing Factor", 9 Oct. 2006. Accessed at < http://www.simonmol.com/2006/06/simon_mol_footb.html>

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

But some patterns of ethnicity and regionalism emerged when the respondents had to choose the local club that they supported. Competition between football clubs at the national or local level is frequently seen as a dispute between ethnic groups or clans. The reasons the respondents gave for supporting particular clubs are that these local soccer clubs are based in their provinces and they know some of the players in person.

6.2.5 Language

Cameroon has about 250 indigenous languages⁶³⁹ and colonialism only added two, that is, English and French. The unification of the two Cameroons and the adoption of an official French and English bilingual policy in 1961 gave rise to the main distinguishing linguistic markers: Francophone and Anglophone Cameroonians. This distinction has helped to create, more than solve the linguistic deadlock in which many Cameroonians find themselves today. In the area of education, two systems exist in Cameroon: the Anglophone system of education based on the Anglo-Saxon model and the Francophone system based on the French model. The policy of bilingualism has been more on paper than in practice because the demographic distribution of Cameroonians along the lines of the official languages put in place by colonialism resulted in more French speakers.⁶⁴⁰ French basically became the source of cultural capital, to the disadvantage of English.

⁶³⁹ Echu, George (1999), "Colonialism and Linguistic Dilemmas in Africa: Cameroon as a Paradigm (Revisited)", in: *Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy*, XIII/1, 2: pp. 19–26.

⁶⁴⁰ Anchimbe, Eric A. (2005), "Anglophonism and Francophonism: The stakes of (official) language identity in Cameroon", in *Alizés: Revue Angliciste de la Réunion* 25/26, pp. 7-26.

Although the coexistence of Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon has not produced any significant sociolinguistic conflicts, it is clear that each of these communities builds identity boundaries around them that exclude the other.⁶⁴¹ The residential patterns in Yaoundé also show a tendency for these groups to stick together. For instance; Melen, Obili, Biyem Assi, and Mendong are occupied predominantly by Anglophones. In Douala, Bonaberi is predominantly occupied by Anglophones. The tendency to regroup around one of the official languages has spread among the Anglophones and spurred them to the creation of certain religious, cultural, and educational projects.⁶⁴² The Anglophone community has therefore constructed churches and schools in which English is the medium of interaction. For instance, in Yaoundé one finds the Presbyterian Churches of Bastos, Etoug Ebe, Nsimeyong, Ekounou, and Soa; the Roman Catholic Churches of Mvog Ada and Nsimbog; the Baptist Churches of Etoug Ebe and Nkondengui.⁶⁴³ The Anglophone Community is not, however, homogenous because within it emerges some trends of cultural and ethnic regroupings among the diverse ethnic groups that make up the community. This results in the organization of monthly meetings, which have a profound impact on the coexistence of these groups. The monthly meetings, for instance, provides Anglophones with the chance to sustain their culture and identity and also the unique opportunity to improve on their economic well-being. This kind of regrouping further strengthens the Anglophone-Francophone dichotomy and makes each group more conscious of the differences that exist between

⁶⁴¹ Ambe Stephen (2006), "Cultural innovations in Cameroon's linguistic Tower of Babel", 17 Oct. 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.unibas-ethno.ch/veranstaltungen/dokumente/Papers/Fuh.pdf> >

⁶⁴² Ibid.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

them. The English language is a powerful tool that unites Anglophones in spite of the cultural diversity and political animosity that exist between Anglophones.

Students were asked what languages they speak at home, school, market and with friends. Most of the respondents, both Anglophones and Francophones, said they speak French and English while at school and at home they speak indigenous languages with their parents. Discussions in market situations and with friends are informal and most of the respondents said they speak either French, English, Pidgin English or Francanglais (a mixture of French and English), depending on the person they are interacting with. What was most interesting was that Pidgin English and Francanglais are used more widely in informal settings. Cameroon Pidgin English is widely used, not only in the Anglophone provinces but in several major towns and cities of the Francophone provinces. In short, Pidgin is not just a lingua franca of the English-speaking population, but a language that has a national dimension. Pidgin is used in churches, in market-places, in motor parks, in railway stations, in the street, as well as in other informal situations. In fact, this 'no man's language' is very present in the daily socio-economic lives of the people, a role it began to play as far back as the colonial period. Besides, Francanglais is also becoming very common amongst youths in Cameroon. In spite of the fact that language is one of the factors that Anglophone nationalism is built on, the wide use of Pidgin English and Francanglais tends to blur the difference between an Anglophone and a Francophone.

6.2.6 Media

For decades the Cameroon media has been under tight government control, until 1990, when the government introduced a law on the “Freedom of Social Communication”.⁶⁴⁴

The new law facilitated the process of starting a newspaper and led to the proliferation of private newspapers in Cameroon. However, broadcasting was still a state monopoly until April 2000 when the government authorised private radios and television stations to operate.⁶⁴⁵ In spite of the relaxed media law, the government still reserved the right to censor and even suspend or seize newspapers that were deemed “radical”. Arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists without trial continued unabated. The relationship between the government and the private press is marked by mutual distrust. This shows that the government is still intolerant of dissident views.⁶⁴⁶ *Cameroon Tribune*, the bilingual daily, is the official newspaper and is the voice of the government. Major regular private papers include: *Le Messenger*, *LaNouvelle Expression*, *L’effort Camerounais* and *Mutations*; and in English, *The Herald*, *The Post*, *The Guardian*, *The Weekly Post*, *The Sun* and *The Eden*. These private newspapers are often sympathetic with the opposition. The media in Cameroon, both audio-virtual and print, has a powerful influence on the perception of the hermetic divide between English and French. An attempt was made to find out if youths in Cameroon read certain newspaper and why.

Questionnaires were administered to Anglophone and Francophone students to find out what newspapers they liked to read and why. The researchers’ interest was to establish if Anglophone and Francophone students are interested in reading the same papers and

⁶⁴⁴ Nyamnjoh, F. (2006), *Africa’s Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging*, Pretoria: UNISA Press, p. 57.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

why. Most Anglophone students chose English newspapers and the Francophones chose French papers. This shows that in spite of some common grounds in language, language divides Cameroonians to a large extent. This is a reflection of the linguistic heritage of both communities and the Herculean task is to transcend these divides.

The liberalization of the audio-visual media less than six years ago, like the print media, resulted in an upsurge of private radio and television stations all over Cameroon. Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) has been the sole audio-visual medium in Cameroon for decades and has often been seen as the mouthpiece of the government.⁶⁴⁷ This led to some ill feelings towards CRTV among progressive Cameroonians. Anglophones are even more frustrated with CRTV because 80% of the programmes are devoted to the French language and only 20% to the English language.⁶⁴⁸ This is because it is presumed that French has a bigger audience than English. By opening up the audio-visual media to competition, thus bringing to an end the state monopoly, Cameroonians were given the choice to watch as many TV stations as they liked. For instance, Bamenda has five private radio stations: Afrique Nouvelle, Abakwa FM, Hot Coffee, Community Radio, and Cameroon Baptist Convention, and it has two private TV stations, Afrique Nouvelle and Abakwa TV. They also receive signals of other private TV stations from Yaoundé and Douala.

The popularity of CRTV has greatly declined amongst youths in Cameroon as most of them choose to listen or watch stations other than CRTV. Students were asked the type of programmes they liked to watch on CRTV. Anglophone and Francophone students said

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 120.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

they liked watching soapies and news on CRTV. An example was given of soapies like *Passions* though broadcast in English and *Monica Bavaria* in French. Francophones and Anglophones liked watching both soapies. This shows that in spite of the language barrier some Francophones watch programmes in English and vice versa. As concerns international television and radio stations that they like to watch and listen to, most of them chose: BBC, CNN, VOA, BBC Africa, RFI and Channel 'O', because these stations are objective in their reports on global issues and they play good music.

6.3 Anglophone Divide on the Anglophone Problem

Anglophone Cameroonians are divided over the path to follow in resolving the Anglophone problem. They are at a crossroads as to what they really want. There are factions that advocate outright secession with an agreement as to the sharing of assets belonging to each side. Another group stands for federation. Within this group that supports federalism, there are those that support Federation with two States, two Prime Ministers and two governments/ legislatures, as it was before unification in 1972. There are also those who support federation with ten autonomous States with elected Governors, State Assemblies and a Central Federal Government. Lately, the Cameroon government has been talking about decentralization. A group of pro-government Anglophone elites is strongly in favour of decentralization. Anglophones do not seem to have a clear platform for their struggle; there is too much in-fighting and definitely no strategy.

A major weakness in the discourse of Anglophone nationalism is that Anglophones are not united. There is little unity and solidarity between the North West and South West.

The divide is fuelled by competition between Anglophones for appointment. This leads them to discredit their fellow Anglophones. For instance “a minister or general manager from the North West or South West is made to understand that he owes his appointment to the disappointment of another Anglophone and that he must derail all signs of solidarity among Anglophones”.⁶⁴⁹ In the “South West there is the worst form of tribalism that is going on, worse than the divide between the North West and South West. The South West, for example, suffers from tribal tribalism and the North West suffers from tribal regionalism”⁶⁵⁰ and, because of this, each one wants to stay in his own camp.⁶⁵¹ According to former Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, Anglophones should stop having a complex: when an Anglophone is appointed, that Anglophone should target a post in the Republic, not a post to be occupied by a South Westerner or a North Westerner. According to him, it is envy, egotism and position that blind Anglophones. He has always blamed the Anglophones for being short-sighted when the government appoints a North Westerner, or a South Westerner. He advised that Anglophones should use the Republic as their yardstick and not fellow Anglophones.⁶⁵² The lack of solidarity among Anglophones has not helped in putting the Anglophone problem on the national agenda because those who are supposed to speak out on the Anglophone problem do not do so. The moment Anglophone elites are co-opted into the system, they start thinking that they are part of the system and to them discussing issues affecting the Anglophones make them feel that they are being disloyal and unpatriotic.

⁶⁴⁹ Nyamnjoh, F. (1990) “Cameroon: A Country United by Ethnic Ambition and Difference” *Africa Affairs*, 98, pp. 101-118.

⁶⁵⁰ Ngwane George, delegation of Culture South West, interviewed, 20 August 2005.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² Simon Achidi Achu, Former Prime Minister of Cameroon, interviewed, 9 July 2005.

Anglophone nationalist movements are also divided. If Anglophone nationalist movements stop their divisive attitudes and learn to work as one people, they will make a significant impact in presenting their case. However, there are about six Anglophone nationalist groups fighting for the independence of Southern Cameroons. As such, the debate over who will be president ignites a new war amongst the Anglophones. The Southern Cameroons National Council is the worst thing that ever happened to the Anglophone struggle, wherein everyone fights to be a leader of a faction.⁶⁵³ There is always a hidden agenda, and any group recognizes only their own people that they would want to form a government with. If not, why do they not have a united front for the Anglophones? And because of these internal divisions their case is greatly weakened.

6.3.1a Independence for Anglophone Cameroon

The Cameroon constitution clearly states that Cameroon is “one and indivisible”.⁶⁵⁴ Politicians in their discourse on national integration constantly remind the people that Cameroon is one. When one hears politicians claim Cameroon is indivisible, it is obvious that they would not tolerate any separatist tendencies. In attempts to defend the indivisible state of Cameroon, the government has been cracking down on the leaders of the Southern Cameroons National Council and the Southern Cameroons Youth League. Some Southern Cameroons activists have died in solitary confinement in Kondengui prison in Yaoundé. Anglophones involved in the struggle have been stigmatized and given all sorts of names: terrorist, secessionist and enemies in the house. However, the leaders of the Anglophone struggle argue that they are not terrorists. According to them, terrorists do not go to the courts to look for justice, but they go looking for ammunition to

⁶⁵³ Ngwane George, interviewed 20 August 2005

⁶⁵⁴ The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 96 - 069 18 January 1996.

fight.⁶⁵⁵ I think the Anglophone leaders choose the courts as a most preferred way to fight for their course rather than going to war because of the consequences of war. But some Anglophone elites in government argue that those who think of going to war are dreaming. If Anglophone leaders want war: Who will fight the war? Where will they get money? Where are the experts and where will they begin? Do they know what a war is? Where will they run to? First of all Anglophones are poor, they do not even have the resources and the people are suffering. The wealth of the Anglophone people is their land and that is why the people do not think of going to war, because they can afford to put food on the table. So thinking of going to war would destroy the little resources and further impart hardship on the people.

Besides, some hope that by going to war the United Nations would intervene to aid the Southern Cameroons and restore their sovereign national independence. The following Resolution was adopted by the VII General Assembly of the UNPO on 26 June 2005:

... calls on the UN Security Council and the General Assembly to, as a matter of urgency and prevention of violent conflict, adopt a resolution on appointment of a peace keeping mission for the former British Southern Cameroons with a UN administrator and peace keeping force to effect the peaceful withdrawal of the Republic of Cameroons' colonial administrators and occupation forces and the organization of democratic elections for the Southern Cameroonian people to freely elect their leaders; an act which should lead the admission of Southern Cameroons into full membership of the UN.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵⁵ Augustine Ndongam, Vice President of Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation, interviewed 15 June 2005.

⁶⁵⁶ "UNPO Resolution on the Former UN Trust Territory of British Southern Cameroons adopted by the VII General Assembly of the UNPO on 26 June 2006", 13 March 2006. Accessed at <<http://www.unpo.org>>

This position is strongly supported by the Southern Cameroons National Council and the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization leaders who have opted to use non violent means to solve the Anglophone problem, by engaging in diplomacy, political action and a legal battle with the government. But these Anglophone leaders fail to understand that the UN had closed the Southern Cameroons case long ago, and that it would not be possible for the UN to revisit the issue.

6.3.1b Federalism

Some Anglophone elites argue that it would be unrealistic now for Southern Cameroonians to accept federation, because federation was what they opted for during the Buea All Anglophone Conference in 1993. During the conference they called for the restoration of the two-state federation, which was the initial option that brought the two Cameroons together. However, the government rejected their proposal. Anglophones were committed to restoring the two-state federation so that the Federal Republic of Cameroon would remain an entity, respecting the two colonial identities of the Cameroons; but the Cameroon government did not listen to their appeals.⁶⁵⁷ Furthermore, many submissions were made and Anglophone elites even went to the extent of proposing a federal constitution and translating it into French so that the government would not have a problem understanding what they wanted. But they were treated as inconsequential people and, since then, it has been a question of repression. The government's failure to respond to demands inviting them for dialogue led them to adopt what is called the "zero option",⁶⁵⁸ to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroon. Some

⁶⁵⁷ Nfor Ngala Nfor, National Vice Chairman of SCNC, interviewed 20 September 2005.

⁶⁵⁸ "Zero Option" was adopted during AAC II in which the Anglophone movements pledged not to dialogue with the government any more since the government refused to heed their call for dialogue.

Anglophones argue that it was a golden opportunity for the government to take them at their word. But since the government was silent and the struggle has moved to a point where the idea of sovereign independence for Southern Cameroonians is uppermost in the minds of the Anglophones, that position is irreversible.⁶⁵⁹ However, a group of Anglophone Cameroonians believe that federalism can solve the Anglophone problem, be it a two-state or ten-state-federation. According to them, a federal system of government in Cameroon will ease the pain of English-speaking Cameroonians because Anglophones will be autonomous, and they will not have to worry about marginalization through a centralised form of government.⁶⁶⁰

In a federal system, each state will have its own government and that government would have its own budget and would take responsibility for the development of its own area and would employ its own civil servants. Then the federal government would have its own functions by taking care of federal subjects like custom officers, foreign affairs, currency, defence and higher education. The rest of the ministries would be carried out by the various states at their own level. It is the hope that the road map can help solve the problems the Anglophones are facing today. Because if you have your own physical and developmental policies and you carry them out the way you think your own state should be, you will have no cause to grumble.⁶⁶¹

Federalism is a concept that, to a large extent can solve the Anglophone problem because it is what was in place from 1962 to 1972, before the Cameroon government dismantled it under the pretext that it was too costly to manage. But today the government views federalism as being synonymous with secession, which is why the government would prefer decentralization to federation.

⁶⁵⁹ Augustine Ndangam, Vice President of SCAPO, interviewed, 15 July 2005.

⁶⁶⁰ Nicolas Ade Ngwa, Provincial Secretary General for the SDF party in Bamenda, interviewed 20 June 2005.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

6.3.1c Decentralisation

Decentralisation is enshrined in the January 1996 Constitution. It states that “The Republic of Cameroon shall be a decentralized state ... the ten provinces shall become regions”.⁶⁶² But it has taken the president more than six years to start talking about it because, to him, decentralisation is a delicate process fraught with risks to national security and so it must be approached slowly and carefully.⁶⁶³ The argument the Anglophones are making is that President Paul Biya is just playing for time, and that he would likely come up with a decentralization project that is not decentralization at all. This happened with democratisation and human rights where the President promised, delayed, and raised high expectations of Cameroonians. Then what he offered at the end was contrary to the people’s expectations. Some Anglophones, especially those of the opposition, argue that decentralisation will not solve the Anglophone problem; it will rather make the situation more complex because, with decentralisation, there is the possibility that regions will be merged and this will surely ignite the situation. Concerning fears surrounding the merging of regions, pro-government Anglophone elites argue that, though the law gives the President the upper hand to merge regions, he cannot merge regions without consulting the people of the regions. However, if the law on decentralisation is applied properly, it is going to benefit all Cameroonians and will greatly help in the development of the country.

Pro-government Anglophone elites believe that decentralization can help solve the Anglophone problem. According to them, Anglophones should fight to have the

⁶⁶² The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 96 - 069 18 January 1996.

⁶⁶³ *The Herald Newspaper* No. 608, 27 Sept. 2002.

government implement the 1996 constitution, instead of fighting for secession. They argue that decentralization will be good for the Anglophones because there will be regions, where Anglophones will do things their own way. There will be healthy competition, such as, the cleanest and most well organized region. And which is best governed? In such a situation there will be “Anglophonism” in the South West and North West and nobody would take away their various judiciary and educational systems. On the contrary, the leaders of some Anglophone movements see decentralization as a desperate attempt by the government to silence the Anglophones in the face of mounting pressures from Southern Cameroons nationalist movements for independence.

6.4 Anglophone and Francophone Views on the Anglophone Problem

As already shown in the previous chapters, most Anglophones claimed to be marginalized in the unitary state. They tend to blame the Francophone-dominated government for their predicament. Besides, there are some Anglophones who believe that Anglophones should fight hard to assert themselves in the unitary state rather than complain. On the part of Francophones, some of them do not seem to understand why Anglophones are crying out about being marginalized. To them, the Anglophone problem is just one of the problems facing Cameroon today.

6.4.1a Anglophone View

The Anglophone views expressed here are mostly those of the people who support the status quo, because those of the opposition have been documented earlier. Prominent Anglophone Cameroonians such as the former Prime Minister Achidi Achu, Chief Samuel Liffafa Endeley, paramount chief of Buea, and Fon Angwafo III of Mankon, have acknowledged that there is an Anglophone problem, but to them what Cameroon needs at the moment is peace, justice and democracy. They urge all Anglophones to fight and assert themselves in the Republic. According to Simon Achidi Achu:

The situation of the Anglophone is not so bad that they would want to separate. It is not what you are that matters but where you are because where you are you make your environment.⁶⁶⁴

To him, it would not be possible for Anglophones to go back to their identity as Southern Cameroonians after so many years of cohabitation in the unitary state. He further questions what is wrong with Anglophones exerting their ability by going to the heights. If Anglophones are lazy the Francophones will beat them at their own game. Some Francophones have come to realize that Anglophones have a good system of education and many of them are sending their children to study in Anglophone schools. What does that say about the inferiority complex of the Anglophones, if Francophones are sending their children to study in English? Looking at the student population in the University of Buea, an Anglo-Saxon university, the Francophone population is steadily increasing, so Anglophones should sit up and face the reality of the situation rather than resigning themselves to fate and complaining.

⁶⁶⁴ Simon Achidi Achu, Former Prime Minister of Cameroon, interviewed, 9 July 2005.

Interview results suggest that some pro-government Anglophone elites want to maintain the status quo. They argue that in the age of globalization, they need a big market to succeed in business. And to be able to have a big market they must come together. They argue that looking at the world today:

Asia is coming together, South America is coming together, Europe is coming together and Africa is still trying to come together. They believe that they are better off asserting themselves in a bigger society than just in Southern Cameroons.⁶⁶⁵

To them, the time for micro states has long gone by; Anglophones should fight to assert themselves in the unitary state. They argue that even in Southern Cameroons the people are not united, for instance, in the South West, a Bayangi man does not want to see a Bakweri man. In the North West a Bali man hates a Mbatu man. So within the Anglophone community there is a split between the Anglophones. So there is no situation where one is going to have a perfect harmony amongst people, so long as people are human beings.

Anglophones and Francophones have lived together since the reunification in 1961, and a lot has happened in terms of mixing between them. There has been much intermarriage of Francophones and Anglophones; exogamy, endogamy, and meetings in church, there has been such interaction that to split the community would be difficult. Another major problem is that many Anglophone elites, who have worked in cities like Yaoundé and Douala, have made these places their home and have built houses there. They only return to their place of origin to visit their families. For instance, if all Anglophones are asked to

⁶⁶⁵ A Pro-government Anglophone elite, interviewed, 5 September 2005.

leave French Cameroon and many Anglophones have invested there and vice versa, imagine the chaos that this would cause.

According to Professor Bole Butake, a prominent Anglophone writer and critic of the government “the problem that Anglophones have is a singular problem which other most Cameroonians are facing today”.⁶⁶⁶ He further says that when one looks at it closely, one will find that it is a general situation that is facing the entire country. For instance, if one looks at the South Province where President Paul Biya comes from, one will find that it is much more disadvantaged than the South West, which is a province in Anglophone Cameroon. To him, “the problems that Anglophones are facing are basically due to mismanagement of the whole economy and the wealth of Cameroon to the disadvantage of everybody”.⁶⁶⁷

According to Bole Butake, Anglophones are complaining a lot more for the simple reason that they had known better days, when they compare their situation today with the glorious days of Southern Cameroons. Butake believes that if the government was managing things properly the Anglophones would have no reason to complain. He further asks why is it that the Anglophone problem became so acute when Paul Biya came to office. When Ahidjo was president, although he was repressive, he tried to maintain some balance in terms of regions. But if one looks at the situation now one will

⁶⁶⁶ Bole Butake, Head of the Dramatic Art Department, University of Yaoundé I, interviewed 4 September 2005.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

find that most of the new recruits in the public service are from the Beti clan or village where the president comes from.⁶⁶⁸

Butake insinuated that if President Paul Biya had a vision for Cameroon,

I do not think Cameroon would be where it is today. The government does not want to democratize because it knows that if it does it would never win a single election in Cameroon. If it decentralizes, all the powers at the centre would no longer be there.⁶⁶⁹

As such, Bole Butake believes that it is not separation that would solve the Anglophone problem in Cameroon but democratization and decentralization.

6.4.1b Francophone View

Like some Anglophone elites in government, some Francophones feel that there is no Anglophone problem in Cameroon. They try to equate the Anglophone problem with that of any problem that Cameroon is facing. This shows how ignorant some Francophones are of the history of the political union between Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon.⁶⁷⁰ According to Celestin Monga, a Francophone intellectual:

There is an Anglophone problem in Cameroon. But let me say that there is also a kirdi problem in the north, a pygmy problem in the east, those are some of the forgotten people of our country.⁶⁷¹

He further says that there is general hardship in Cameroon and everybody is feeling the pinch.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid

⁶⁷⁰ Koning, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 153.

⁶⁷¹ Monga Celestin, "The Anglophone problem in Cameroon" interviewed by Kenjo Jumban in *Cameroon Life*, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1992, p. 6.

What difference is there between a cocoa farmer from Sangmelima, a coffee farmer from Bamenda and a cotton farmer from Maroua? The Betis, as a group, have reaped no particular benefit from the Biya regime! Twenty kilometres outside Yaoundé and you have no tarred road, no school, and no dispensary. The money stolen from our treasury does not serve to finance public investment where Biya comes from. It is stolen and stashed away in a Swiss bank account.⁶⁷²

To him, the acute problem facing Cameroon today is one of mismanagement and embezzlement. He believes that a well thought out federal or decentralized system could go a long way to resolving many of the major problems Cameroon is facing today, and the Anglophone problem is certainly one of them.

From questionnaires administered to Anglophone and Francophone students about the Anglophone problem, it was found that some Anglophone students were ignorant about the Anglophone problem. This was similar to findings from Francophone students. Some Francophone students were very angry in their response when asked about the Anglophone problem. For instance, one student wrote:

There is no rubbish as the Anglophone case. What they claim is what nearly all Cameroonians claim, even some Beti people. The problem is who is an Anglophone? Once you provide the meaning of that word then we will proceed. Are we Anglophones because we speak English? You should be very cautious when handling a linguistic problem. Do you want to solve the so called Anglophone problem or you want to find out how we behave when confronted with English and French in our society.

This student appears to be appropriating the discourse of the government on the Anglophone problem. His response necessitates a follow up. It was found that the student

⁶⁷² Ibid.

was from the Central Province (Yaoundé). He was a master's student in English language at the University of Yaoundé I. His response opened up a whole new discourse on the Anglophone problem, about what will become of Francophones who have done all their studies in English. For instance, there are many Francophones from Western Province who have settled in Anglophone Cameroon for decades and their children are more comfortable with English than French. These people consider themselves as Anglophone, but they will oppose the Anglophone independence in spite of the fact that Anglophone leaders promised to give them Anglophone nationality. Some of them even said that if the Anglophone problem is to be decided through a referendum they will vote against it because they will neither be Anglophones or Francophones. This is a very complex situation that needs some careful planning on how to deal with it.

According to a Francophone student “Anglophones are the cause of their marginalization because they are the ones who chose to join us.” Another student said “How can the Anglophones say that they are being marginalized when they have the Prime Minister and other ministerial posts in the government?” According to another respondent, “the Anglophones are the ones marginalizing themselves, no anybody is marginalizing them”.

Another student wrote:

The Anglophones do not have a case. Their struggle is a manipulation of some selfish Anglophone leaders who are preoccupied by their vested interests than the well-being of the Anglophones. As a patriotic Cameroonian, I could not agree with the independence of Anglophones but if they want war in our beloved country, I would prefer them to be independent.

This student is from Douala and she is reading Journalism and Mass Communication in the University of Buea. Her response suggests that she has been reading about the Anglophone struggle. Like any other Francophone, she dismisses the Anglophone problem and accuses Anglophone leaders of selfish interests, as does the government. Responses from the questionnaires suggest that most of the Francophone students believe that Cameroon is one and indivisible. As such, they would not like to see an independent Anglophone Cameroon.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with students' data and interviews with some prominent Anglophone and Francophone elites. Data analysis revealed that, in spite of some minor differences between Anglophones and Francophones, similarities between the two far outweigh their differences. Besides, Anglophones are not united as one people in the fight for their recognition as an autonomous state. That enmity is not there, where an Anglophone would say "I would rather die than mix with a Francophone". Anglophones and Francophones live like brothers and sisters. Furthermore, the Francophones are not prepared to see an independent Anglophone Cameroon.

Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to investigate the correlation between minority rights and political liberalization. The study also aimed at showing how liberalization has triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon. The reunification of the two Cameroons in 1961 brought together peoples whose separate colonial experiences provided clear contrast in language, law, administration, education and political style. A policy of national integration was put in place that went a long way to reducing the Anglophones into a political and cultural minority. Though the Anglophone elites do not see the Anglophones as a minority, it is clear that they have been reduced to a minority status as the Anglophone question clearly fits within the context of minority consideration in international law. Today, Anglophone leaders argue that they are not a minority but a people that have been annexed and recolonized by the majority Francophones. Anglophones say that the situation they are experiencing now is not what they anticipated when they decided to join their French brothers in East Cameroon.

The hypotheses made in the introduction are as follows:

1. During periods of political liberalization, identity claims aim not only at the acquisition of political rights, but also at increased access to resources.
2. In national communities which have undergone different experiences of colonial rule but which have nevertheless been brought under the umbrella of a single state, there is a strong correlation between minority rights and claims to the right to self-determination.
3. Different kinds of civic identity are the result of different forms of colonialism.

How political liberalization triggered renewed claims to rights in Anglophone Cameroon was one central focus of this research. The research found that liberalization ushered in more claims to rights for Anglophones, and some of these rights were articulated around minority rights that can be accommodated within the framework of a single state form, while others were articulated around the right to self-determination. The research found that those Anglophones who articulate their rights to be accommodated within a single state have tended to stress increased political participation and better access to the state's economic goods and opportunities. This can be achieved through a federal system of government or a well implemented system of decentralization and democratization. Those who articulate around the right to self-determination argue that because of a distinct history, and the second class citizenship accorded to them, they pressed for more radical demands, which went unheeded, and this has developed into separatism.

The research indicates that the Francophone dominated government in its attempt to erase the bi-cultural and bi-jural nature of Cameroon and claiming that Cameroon is one triggered fear amongst the Anglophones about the government's intention of assimilating them. The research found that there is a strong correlation between minority rights and the claims to the rights to self-determination because Anglophones are being treated as a minority by the majority Francophone in the unitary state, as opposed to when Cameroon was a two state federation with equal rights to both states. As a result, Anglophones are fighting for self-determination because of a failed policy of integration that was only put in place to reduce them to a minority.

The study indicates that Cameroon was a German creation and under the Germans Cameroon was “one”, that is, there were no Anglophones or Francophones. The present day conflict in Cameroon came about when the Germans were defeated during World War I and Cameroon was partitioned between Britain and France. Each colonial power undertook to administer their portion of Cameroon according to their colonial policies. Today, there are two kinds of civic identities existing in Cameroon as a result of the separate forms of colonial administration implemented by Britain and France. The portion of Cameroon that was colonised by France believe in their French identity as French speaking Cameroonians (Francophones), while the other portion colonised by Britain also holds strongly to their identity as English-speaking Cameroonians (Anglophones). The distinction between the majority French and minority English Cameroonians plays itself in the daily running of the country to the disadvantage of the minority Anglophones. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the research has shown that Anglophone and Francophones have more in Common than they can acknowledge, each group still believes that their colonial heritage is better than the other. The research found that this attitude of each group sticking to their colonial heritage as the best has led some Cameroonians not wanting to implement policies that would benefit all Cameroonians.

Frustrated with the treatment that Anglophones have been receiving from the government, attempts were made by some Anglophone movements to dialogue with the government. As a consequence of the government’s silence over the Anglophone request, leaders of the Anglophone movement adopted some radical approaches to fight for the autonomy of Anglophone Cameroon. To understand the frustrations of the Anglophones, the study has examined the circumstances that made them vote in favour of reunification,

and the ways in which they were subsequently marginalized in the union. It has also been appropriate to examine and analyze the various ways Anglophone leaders have privileged putting the Anglophone problem on the national and international scene. The concluding section of this thesis provides a summary of the major findings.

This research reveals that a range of factors both internal and external influenced Southern Cameroons to vote in favour of a union with East Cameroon. Internally, the British neglect of their territory played a greater part in pushing the Southern Cameroonians towards reunification. First, their territory was joined to Nigeria in an administrative union. The British concentrated their interest more in Nigeria than in Southern Cameroons, and this led to the gross neglect of the British Cameroons.⁶⁷³ Second, the pace of social advancement in British Cameroons was slow. In the field of education, the British established few primary and Native Authority schools, which fell short in meeting the educational demand of the territory. Besides education, health was another aspect that the British neglected in Southern Cameroons. The health situation of the plantation workers was horrible, and many of them died as a result of dysentery, pneumonia, typhoid and malaria, but the British administration did nothing to ameliorate the situation.

The precarious economic situation of the British Cameroons affected the living standards of the people and the refusal by the British to initiate an industrialized programme and their attachment only to agricultural development led many to accuse them of seeking to reduce Southern Cameroons to a permanent plantation colony. The road network in

⁶⁷³ Fon Angwafo III, S.A.N. Fon of Mankon, interview, 20 June 2005.

Southern Cameroons was deplorable; the British administration did very little with regards to the development of road infrastructure. There were a few graded roads, often disconnected by streams with bad bridges. The economic legacy of the British rule in Southern Cameroons was the phenomenon of poverty and underdevelopment. The result was disillusionment on the part of Southern Cameroonians, compared to French Cameroon that was well developed by the French colonizers. When the opportunity came in 1961 the Southern Cameroonians voted to secede from Nigeria and join East Cameroon.

The Ibo factor also played a major role in influencing the Southern Cameroonians to vote in favour of reunification with East Cameroon. After 1945, there was an influx of Ibos to Southern Cameroons. They occupied important positions in the civil service, such as teachers, clerks, postmasters, administrators and nurses. They also controlled the business sector, buses and taxis. Their dominant position in the Southern Cameroonian economy was strongly resented by the local population.⁶⁷⁴ The injustices suffered by Cameroonians at the hands of the Ibos contributed to their hatred for Nigeria in general. Some politicians capitalized on the growing dislike and fear of the Ibos to influence the people to join East Cameroon. Arguably, had the attitude of the Nigerians, especially the Ibos been generally friendly, Southern Cameroonians would not have voted massively for unification with East Cameroon.

⁶⁷⁴ Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon*, p. 38.

Another factor that encouraged the idea of unification was the formation of a radical national party in French Cameroon in 1848, the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (UPC). This party stood for immediate independence and reunification of the two Cameroons. Furthermore, the appearance of the UPC's members in Southern Cameroons following the party's abortive revolt in the French Cameroon⁶⁷⁵ simply boosted the political ideas of reunification and independence of a united Cameroon in Southern Cameroons.

Externally, the United Nations did not offer the Southern Cameroonians a third option in the UN-organized plebiscite. The UN was faced with three options from the Southern Cameroons regarding the status of the territory. Firstly, there was a strong desire among the people of Southern Cameroons to reunite with French Cameroon, though there was some opposition to this view. Secondly, some of them stood for independence within the Federation of Nigeria and thirdly, others opted for an independent Southern Cameroons. But unfortunately, the UN overlooked the stand of the third option and selected the two alternatives, which gave Southern Cameroonians the choice of achieving independence by either joining the independent Federation of Nigeria or Republic of Cameroon. In the UN-organized plebiscite the Southern Cameroons voted to join the independent Republic of Cameroon. To some Southern Cameroonians, the UN's failure to take into consideration the aspiration of the people to become independent was an error on their part, and that was when things started going wrong for the Southern Cameroonians.

⁶⁷⁵ Le Vine, Victor, (1971), *The Cameroon Federal Republic*, p. 206.

The research findings showed that Anglophone Cameroonians have been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination because of their minority status. The dominant French language has been used as a power tool to achieve cultural capital to the disadvantage of the Anglophones who could not speak French. These research findings raise the question of unfairness suffered by virtue of not knowing how to speak the dominant or politically preferred language. In most instances, Anglophones are forced to speak a language that undermines their social mobility and disables their participation in public institutions.⁶⁷⁶

The research also established that having exhausted all the local remedies to dialogue with the government over the Anglophone problem, leaders of Anglophone movements decided to take their case to the international community in an attempt to find a solution to the Anglophone problem. The thesis found out that various Anglophone movements fighting for the liberation of Anglophones are committed to resolving the problem through peaceful means. A movement such as SCNC is involved in a diplomatic offensive in presenting the Anglophone case before the international community. SCAPO is involved in a legal battle by making presentations in court, especially at the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, about the legality of the Anglophone case in international law.

The research findings show that the government has used various strategies to neutralize the Anglophone movements. Some of these strategies include: stigmatization, criminalization, arrest, torture and detention without trial. The government often arrests

⁶⁷⁶ Laintin, David (2003), "A Liberal Democratic Approach to Language Justice" in Kymlicka and Patten (eds.) *Language Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anglophone leaders, detains and releases them without charge, undermining the judicial system in Cameroon. In a country governed by law, citizens cannot be arrested and then released without being charged. Moreover, the government has created its own SCNC faction which which it purports to be engaged in dialogue.

This research also showed that new technologies of persuasion have helped to reinforce the claims of a sovereign Anglophone nation. It found that due to the Cameroon government's restrictions on public protest and a state controlled media, Anglophone voices critical of the government can still be heard over the Internet. Anglophone Cameroonians at home and in the Diaspora have penetrated this new virtual social space of cyberspace and have created institutions in cyberspace that sustain the Anglophone nation. The various virtual imagined communities maintained by Anglophone activists take a primarily negative view of the Cameroon government's policy in the region.

The researcher observed that the online nation of Southern Cameroons⁶⁷⁷ offers a wide variety of services and activities to its people. One service of significance is the access to informational resources, which are invaluable for those people engaged in the struggle. The most hyperlinked sites in the virtual Anglophone state are The Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons, The Republic of Ambazonia and the Southern Cameroons Youth League. These websites present an imagined Anglophone nation in cyberspace with documents, articles, maps, anthem, emblems, geography, coat of arms and the history of the Anglophones in Cameroon. It also has the names of an interim

⁶⁷⁷ "Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroons", 16 March 2004. Accessed at <www.fdrsoutherncameroons.info/>

government in exile and the daily running of the imagined Anglophone state. These websites on the Anglophone struggle openly promote international support for the Anglophones in Cameroon.

The thesis has argued that in spite of the fact that Anglophone nationalism has been built on the differences that exist between the Anglophones and Francophones, the researcher observed that they have more in common than they can acknowledge. Since the reunification of the two Cameroons, so much more has taken place between the Anglophone and Francophone in terms of intermarriages, investments, migration, and lifestyle issues that the dichotomy between the two has become blurred. The findings show that Anglophone and Francophone youths tend to enjoy the same music and food, and they are influenced by the American culture of hip hop. The thesis found that, in spite of the fact that language is one of the factors that Anglophone nationalism is built on, the wide use of Pidgin English and Francanglais tends to blur the difference between an Anglophone and a Francophone. Language use in Cameroon functions as a tool to divide as well as unite the people. Again Anglophones and Francophones tend to watch the same programmes on television, irrespective of the language in which the series is broadcast.

The thesis also found that the government always presents Cameroon to the international community as a French-speaking country because of its penchant for Francophone countries. It is argued that, in spite of the fact that in the constitution of Cameroon French takes precedence over English, Cameroon is neither a French speaking nor an English

speaking country, Cameroon is a bilingual country. Britain and France were their colonial masters, so Cameroon must exploit this dual colonial heritage to its advantage.

A further observation of the research was that the Anglophones are not united in the path to follow to achieve their aim of fighting for Anglophone autonomy. There are factions that advocate outright secession for Anglophones, while other groups stand for federation, and within these groups that support federalism, there are those that support federation with two states and others want ten states federation. Pro-government Anglophone elites are in favour of the government's policy on decentralization. The analysis of the data has revealed that in spite of some minor differences between Anglophones and Francophones, the similarities between the two far outweigh their differences.

The thesis has argued that the Anglophones are not being marginalized by the majority Francophone but by the ruling CPDM oligarchy, though it can be argued that the CPDM oligarchy has a Francophone majority, with most of them being from the Beti clan. It was observed that many Francophones are not happy with the way the present government is managing the affairs of the country. Even in the South province, where President Paul Biya comes from, not everyone is happy, because the government is only favouring people who are from the Beti clan. There is a general discontent because of mismanagement of the economy and the wealth of Cameroon to the disadvantage of everybody. It was noted during the research that Francophones are even more critical of the Biya's regime, and they want a change.

Appendix One

Student Questionnaires

Name (optional) _____ University _____

Town _____ Gender _____ Age _____

1. What kind of Cameroonian music do you like to listen and why.

2. Which Two Cameroonian artists do you admire the most and say why.

3. Name two types of foreign music you like and say why.

4. Which Western culture has an influence on the Cameroonian youth? Explain.

5. Mention two foreign artists you admire the most and say why.

6. What languages do you speak at home (mark an X)

- a) Pidgin English
- b) English
- c) French
- d) Indigenous languages

7. What are the languages you speak at school? _____

8. What are the languages you speak in the market place. _____

9. What languages do you speak with your friends and say why.

10. Why do you study English?

11. Why do you study French?

12. Which of the two official languages in Cameroon do you like to speak and why.

13. Why do some Francophone parents want their children to study in English?

14. Do you know of some Anglophone parents who want their children to study in French and why.

15. What kind of traditional dress are the most used in Cameroon? Describe briefly.

16. Do you like to dress in traditional regalia (clothes) and say why.

17. Under what circumstances do you dress in traditional clothes?

18. Do you like to dress in a modern fashion and say why.

19. If you had enough money what would you wish to wear and why.

20. What brands of shoes do you like the most and why.

21. Which brands of clothes do you like the most and why.

22. What sports do you practise and why.

23. What sports do you watch on TV and why.

24. What soccer team in the Cameroon league do you support and why.

25. Who is your idol in the Cameroon national team and why.

26. What Cameroon newspapers do you read and why.

27. What CRTV programs do you like to watch and why.

28. Which private TV stations in Cameroon do you like to watch and why.

29. What Cameroon radio programs do you like to listen to and why.

30. Which private radio stations do you like to listen and why.

31. What other international TV and radio stations do you like and say why.

32. What type of Cameroonian dishes do you like to eat and say why.

33. Which other local Cameroonian dish do you like and why.

34. Are there any cultural differences between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians? Mention three.

35. When and where did you first learn about the Anglophone problem in Cameroon?

36. Do you think the Anglophones have got a case for their struggle and say why.

37. Do you like Anglophone Cameroon to be independent and why?

Appendix Two

Questionnaires destinés aux élèves

Nom _____ Ecole _____

Ville _____ Sexe _____ Age _____

1 Quel type de music camerounaise préférez vous? Pourquoi?

2 Nommer deux musiciens ou artistes camerounais que vous aimez beaucoup et dites pourquoi.

3. Donner deux genres musicaux étrangers que vous aimez et dites pourquoi.

4 Quelle est la culture étrangère qui influence les jeunes ? Expliquer.

5 Nommer deux artistes étrangers que vous admirez. Pourquoi?

6 En quelle langue exprimez-vous à la maison?

- a. Le pidgin
- b. L'anglais
- c. Le français
- d. Les langues vernaculaires

7 En quelle langue exprimez-vous à l'école? _____

8 En quelle langue exprimez-vous au marché? _____

9 Quelle langue utilisez-vous pour causer avec vos amis? Pourquoi?

10 Pourquoi apprenez vous l'Anglais?

11. Pourquoi apprenez vous le Français

12 deux langues officielles en usage au Cameroun, quelle est celle que vous préférez? Pourquoi?

13 uelle est la raison pour laquelle certains parents francophones veulent que leurs enfants fréquentent l'école anglophone?

14 Y a-t-il des parents Anglophones qui souhaitent que leurs enfants fréquentent l'école francophone? Pourquoi?

15 Quelle est la tenue traditionnelle que l'on porte beaucoup au Cameroun? Décrire brièvement.

16 Aimez-vous vous habillez en tenue traditionnelle? Pourquoi?

17 A quelle occasion vous-vous habillez en tenue traditionnelle?

18 Aimez-vous vous habillez en tenue moderne? Pourquoi?

19 Si vous en avez les moyens que souhaitez vous mettre comme vêtements?
Pourquoi?

20 Quelles marques de chaussures préférez-vous le plus? Pourquoi?

21 Quelles marques de vêtements préférez-vous le plus? Pourquoi?

22 Quels sports pratiquez-vous? Pourquoi?

23 Quels sports regardez-vous à la télévision? Pourquoi?

24 Quelle équipe de football supportez-vous dans le championnat camerounais?

25 Quelle est votre idole dans l'équipe nationale du Cameroun? Pourquoi?

26 Quel journal camerounais lisez-vous? Pourquoi?

27 Qu'est-ce que vous aimez regarder à la CRTV? Pourquoi?

28 Quelle chaîne de télévision privée du Cameroun aimez-vous regarder? Pourquoi?

29 Quels programmes de la radio camerounaise aimez-vous suivre? Pourquoi?

30 Quelle chaîne de radio privée aimez-vous suivre? Pourquoi?

31 Quelles autres télévisions et radio international aimez-vous? Pourquoi?

32 Quels mets camerounais aimez-vous manger et Pourquoi?

33 Quel autre met camerounais aimez-vous, Pourquoi?

34 Existent-ils des différences au niveau culturel entre Anglophones et francophones du Cameroun? citez trois.

35 Quand et où avez-vous entendu parler du problème des Anglophones au Cameroun?

36 Est-ce que les Anglophones ont raison de protester contre la marginalisation?
Pourquoi ?

37 Souhaiterez-vous que les Anglophones du Cameroun soient indépendants?
Pourquoi ?

38 Quel est l'effet de la protestation des Anglophones dans votre vie?

Appendix Three

Life History Questionnaires

Early Life History

Let's go back to your early life and some background questions.

1. What is your earliest memory as a Southern Cameroonian?
2. Can you tell me about your mother? Let's start with her name.
3. When was your mother born and where?
4. If you inherited a characteristic from your mother, what do you think it would be?
5. Now let's talk a little bit about your father. What's his name?
6. When was your father born and where?
7. If you have a characteristic from your father, what would that be?
8. How did your parents meet?
9. How many children are there in your family? Can you tell me a little about your siblings?
10. When's your birthday?
11. What are your siblings doing with their lives?
12. Tell me about your parents' schooling.
13. What opinions did your parents have about work?

Questions Related to your Educational Experiences

1. Tell me about your schooling. What schools did you attend?
2. How would you describe yourself as a student in your early life?
3. If you were recognized for one strength in your early education, what was that strength?

4. During your school years was there any adult who gave you any special encouragement?
5. How do you think your identity as an Anglophone Cameroonian affected your educational experiences?
6. What were you interested in studying at the beginning of your undergraduate years?

Questions Related to your Work History

1. Can you tell me something about your work experience? When did you start working for pay? What sort of work did you do?
2. How do you think your cultural background affected your work experience?
3. How did you hear about the Anglophone problem in Cameroon?

Summary Questions

1. What would you say is your strongest personal attribute?
2. What have you done that has given you the greatest sense of accomplishment?
3. What one thing would you do differently in your life?
4. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Thank you!

APPENDIX FOUR

Interview Questionnaires

1. What demands have been made by the Anglophone minority to the government?
2. How does the Cameroon government deal with the Anglophone minority problem?
3. What are the processes by which the Anglophones have been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination?
4. What are some of the problems in the struggle?
5. Why is that the Anglophones are divided?
6. The Anglophone problem has been in the limelight for some time now, what have they achieved?
7. How did the Anglophone come to be constituted as a minority?
8. What is the context of the Anglophone minority struggle, is it only language or what other cultural factors are taken into consideration?
9. What are the internal variations in Anglophone Cameroon after reunification in terms of development?
10. How do Anglophone Cameroonians measure themselves as a group?
11. How do the Anglophones articulate their rights claims?
12. How are the Anglophone elites organized? What are the intra-elite competitions?

13. Do you often travel abroad? Where do you go to and why?
14. How did the British succeed in constructing the civil identity of British Cameroon as Anglophones?
15. Do you have any idea how the Anglophone problem can be resolved?

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