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Truncated 21st-century trajectories of progressive international solidarity

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ABSTRACT

What potentials exist for realizing a new internationalism consistent with the visions of Samir Amin, Africa’s greatest political economist and one of the leading Marxists of his generation? To answer requires tracing back several decades, to interpret Amin’s own strategy for establishing first, continental and then, global networks mixing radical scholars and activists. Many missteps were taken, among which were gaps between top-down intellectual formulations (and manifestos) and bottom-up strategic narratives (often lacking a coherent ideology). Because of these limitations, even Amin’s most opportune political networking faltered, proving unsustainable. On most such occasions, it was Amin’s own auto-critique that assisted his allies in developing more profound formulations. It is in these various initiatives to which Amin generously gave his time, energy, resources and political commitment that we can learn some of the most powerful lessons for future internationalism.

KEYWORDS

Samir Amin; the Bamako Appeal; Fifth Socialist International; World Forum for Alternatives; World Social Forum

Samir Amin, a leading scholar and co-founder of the world-systems tradition, died on August 12, 2018. Just before his death, he published, along with close allies, a call for ‘workers and the people’ to establish a ‘fifth international’ [https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples] to coordinate support to progressive movements. To honor Samir Amin’s invaluable contribution to world-systems scholarship, we are pleased to present readers with a selection of essays responding to Amin’s final message for today’s anti-systemic movements. This forum is being co-published between Globalizations [https://www.tandfonline.com/rglo], the Journal of World-Systems Research [http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75] and Pambazuka News [https://www.pambazuka.org/]. Additional essays and commentary can be found in these outlets.

1. Introduction: from high theory to African development to global geopolitical economy

The possibilities of progressive internationalism are exemplified by Samir Amin’s extraordinary networking, which was in many respects the world’s cutting edge in personal and institutional terms over the last half-century.1 Amin was born into a petit-bourgeois Cairo family in 1931 and educated in Paris during the 1950s. There, increasingly radicalized, he elaborated a unique, neo-Marxist theory of unequal exchange and super-exploitation to explain Third World underdevelopment. Amin’s
career was mainly based in Dakar, Senegal, where he first lectured in economic planning and then built Africa-wide organizations during the 1960s–70s, with a focus on non-capitalist, patriotic-developmental politics. Among his successes were the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, still the continent’s leading intellectual institution with 4000 members. He worked within the sometimes-heterodox offices of the United Nations, based initially at the African Institute for Economic Planning and Development (IDEP) in Dakar from 1963–79. He was fired by UN Economic Commission for Africa leader Adebayo Adedeji due to explicit pressure from the United States government, for pushing the institution too far leftwards (Amin 2006, p. 181).

Never flatfooted nor discouraged, though, Amin from the early 1970s built a preferred organizational vehicle: a network of likeminded institutes, the Third World Forum (TWF). His objective was to bring together intellectuals who were critical of conventional concepts of development … In April 1973, the Allende government in Chile invited us to organize a meeting in Santiago. I remember this as the date when the Forum really saw the light of day.²

The origins of a South-centric organic intelligentsia with global visions are to be found here, and through the 1980s, Amin’s TWF generated scores of books and other major publications. By the early 1990s, as neoliberal corporate globalization penetrated every part of the world, Amin re-committed to jumping scale to the global. In 1997 he established the World Forum for Alternatives (WFA) in Cairo. As Amin (2006, p. 195) put it, the WFA most opposed the pro-corporate, Northern-centric logic of the World Economic Forum and indeed first appeared on the international stage when it organized the ‘anti-Davos’ in January 1999, on the occasion of the annual elite conference at Davos. We were, of course, denied access to the holy precinct itself, but we took up position fifty meters away, on the other side of the snow-covered street in this beautiful winter resort. Our small group included a number of committed intellectuals and figures from mass movements in the five continents, chosen for their high degree of representativeness: the farmers’ organizations of Burkina Faso, Brazil and India; the labor unions of South Africa, Korea and Brazil; the neo-Zapatistas of Chiapas in Mexico; the activists of the World March of Women; the ‘Sans’ in France and the ATTAC group. Helped into Davos by Le Monde Diplomatique, we were there to say that it was we, not the club of billionaires, who represented the real world.³

The following February, the activist-oriented Peoples Global Action summit in Geneva cemented Amin’s role in linking theoretical, analytical, strategic and activist perspectives. There, his praxis approach to challenging world power combined with hopes for revived Third World nationalism in the Latin American Pink Tide that began at roughly the same time. The first major wave of coordinated protests against corporate globalization began in Geneva in mid-1998 (when the Multilateral Agreement on Investment was the target), Seattle in late 1999 (World Trade Organization), Washington and Prague in 2000 (World Bank and IMF), Gothenburg (European Union summit) and Genoa in 2001 (G8), and Durban and Johannesburg in 2001–02 (United Nations global conferences on racism and environment), to provide a few examples. In these sites, a strategic orientation emerged: the ‘globalization of people’ against the ‘globalization of capital’ (Bond 2003).

But just as global-scale economy and ecology became intertwined in social movements’ sensibilities and alliances, the George W. Bush era interrupted this process, as Washington declared war on Islam in 2001. The 9/11 terrorist attacks frightened organized labor’s leadership away from the global justice movements, in the process derailing the emerging alternative economic, social and environmental agendas. The Northern left prioritized mobilization against U.S. and European militarism, especially the Iraq War (albeit with ever-weaker anti-war rallies after 15 million rallied unsuccessfully in March 2003). The subsequent mass movements of the 2000s – however disconnected and
limited by their national bases – defended civil liberties in the internet era, advocated for climate policies, offered intense critiques of national financial elites in scores of ‘Occupy’ cities in 2011, and overthrew several local tyrants during that year’s global protest wave.

As for social movements that retained much of their strength in the Global South, the main potential site to regularly unify their politics was the World Social Forum (WSF), established in 2001 by Brazilian and French social democrats as a direct competition to Davos. But after starting with great potential, the biannual WSF became less relevant during the 2010s given its organizers’ reluctance to generate a tough ideology and organization fit for the times, in part because of the excessive influence of mild-mannered international NGOs and the general sense of ‘horizontality’ and over-valorization of micro-based struggles. There were, still, thousands of global-justice advocates adopting anti-war, anti-surveillance, anti-emissions and anti-finance targets, but the major multilateral institutions slipped out of the public eye, even though they were amongst the parties most responsible for implementing neoliberalism, austerity for the Global South and hedonistic capital accumulation for the Global North.

The 2008–09 world crisis was perhaps the best chance since the 1960s to reintroduce anti-capitalist internationalism, a politics sometimes misinterpreted as ‘anti-globalization’; after all, so much of it was based on globalizing people’s movements, against global capital. The 2000s called for a more sophisticated version of internationalism than had existed up until then, one suffused with a forceful decarbonization agenda, with feminism, with anti-racism/xenophobia, and with leadership from the South, and especially from workers, peasants and indigenous peoples (i.e. not from the typical middle-class intelligentsia who had become ambassadors and interpreters of anti-corporate globalization). But the movements were far too fragile to make the links that were anticipated by Amin (2018).

Moreover, elites still promoted ‘growth’, whether in the form of neoliberal-parasitic accumulation (especially in the financial, commercial and IT sectors) or global-credit-Keynesianism (fueled by Quantitative Easing monetary laxity, low interest rates and bailouts, such as advocated by the IMF’s managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn from 2008–11). When top-down strategies failed to solve global capitalism’s overaccumulation and environmental crises, and when the far right mobilized working-class Northern workers more effectively in ‘populist’ ways, Amin grew increasingly restless. In discussions in Dakar over the course of a week in January 2018, he told me of the ways he hoped future organizing of what he called a ‘new international front of the workers and the peoples’ might proceed (Amin 2018). But to do so meant coming to grips, he acknowledged, with three disappointing initiatives during the prior 15 years: the 2005–10 efforts to build a Fifth International at the World Social Forum – in Porto Alegre and Bamako, Mali – and through Venezuela’s political-party sponsorship at Hugo Chavez’s peak strength.

### 2. The world left’s early 21st-century false dawns

Although global managers were losing confidence and legitimacy, the various nationally-bound left progressive opposition parties and social movements were not strong enough to provide genuine alternatives. The WSF proclaimed, ‘Another World is Possible!’ – a nebulous phrase indicative of the global left’s low confidence levels – but aside from a few sector-specific sector attacks on global corporate power and neoliberal multilateralism (of which three are described below), international civil society achieved little in this period. The Brazilian turn leftwards in 2003 under Workers Party leadership, and the more radical Latin American Pink Tide countries of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, also ebbed within a decade. The Brazilian Petrobras-financed WSF meetings and various
Caracas conferences sponsored by Chavez (where Amin played a leadership role) were ultimately of little use to the global justice movement. And the Latin American leftists’ carbon addictions and export orientation soon proved fatal once the commodity super-cycle peaked in 2011 and crashed in 2015 (e.g. oil’s fall from $120/barrel in 2011 to a low of $26/barrel five years later). Brazil witnessed especially intense social protest, initially from the left in 2014 after the Workers Party adopted more explicitly neoliberal policies such as increased public transport fares. And clampdowns on indigenous, environmental and community activists – generally of the left – were increasingly common there as well as in the Andes and Amazon. Ecuadoran activists, especially, fought a neo-caudillismo that often appeared anti-imperialist (e.g. in opposing Bretton Woods Institution dictates and giving safe harbor to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange) but that then substituted Chinese extractive corporates for their Western predecessors in sacred sites like the Yasuni Park.

Taking another false step, Amin often held out hope that social-democratic allies in Europe would join an anti-U.S. front, especially after 2003s fracturing of the imperial core over the Iraq War. The continent’s increasingly extreme uneven geographical development, dysfunctional currency, and subsequent immigration crisis offered other areas in which activists engaged in vital (if ultimately fruitless) campaigning. They soon found the balance of forces – whether in continental sites like the European Social Forum or in national settings – was becoming more skewed towards capital. Their efforts were inadequate to defeat the fascist tendencies that flowed from these two processes. Hopes that the frustrated working classes of Southern Europe might generate a more radical left were dashed, once in power, by the Greek Syriza and Italian Five-Star parties, and in Spain where Podemos appeared to hit its support ceiling at just over 20 percent in 2015–16. One potential exception, perhaps, is Great Britain: the Labour Party’s remarkable 2017 electoral comeback campaign behind Jeremy Corbyn and his Momentum movement attracted many pro-Brexit and former-UK Independence Party voters, although there, residual Blairite apparatchiks within Labour remain powerful. As divided as the Tories were over Brexit, they still held power during the crucial break from Europe in 2019.

As for the ‘emerging markets’ and semi-periphery, during the 2010s there was occasional rhetorical opposition to Western dominance over multilateralism from leaders of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) bloc. But these also proved illusory when it came to BRICS practices, which were not ultimately anti-imperial but instead better described as sub-imperial, insofar as they relegitimized the global corporate-dominated systems of financial, trade and climate governance (Garcia and Bond 2018). The BRICS would be considered skeptically by the world left, given ongoing totalitarian control of society in China (under Xi Jinping) and Russia (Vladimir Putin), and the rise of far-right regimes in India in 2014 (Narendra Modi) and Brazil in 2018 (Jair Bolsonaro), not to mention corporate power’s resurgence in South Africa in 2018 (Cyril Ramaphosa).

Through the anti-apartheid sanctions movement from the 1960s–80s, the latter country was one of the greatest cases of internationalist anti-corporate power. But from 1994, the pressure on Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress to achieve a democratic transition by adopting neoliberal economic policies soon generated far worse inequality, poverty and unemployment than during apartheid. Several generations’ worth of international solidarity were destroyed. Amin was as critical of post-apartheid South Africa (Bond 2018) as he was of the anti-systemic movements’ 1990s–2010s failures.

As he put it, three weeks before his death, in a call to reconstruct a new international, the world left would have to transcend
the extreme fragmentation of the struggles, whether at the local or world level, which are always specific and conducted in particular places and subject-matters (ecology, women’s rights, social services, community demands, etc.) The rare campaigns conducted at the national or even world level have not had any significant success in that they have not forced any changes of the policies being carried out by those in power. (Amin 2018)

However, there were exceptions to this unusually pessimistic assessment, and at least three community-rooted, globally-oriented campaigns from the early 2000s should be commended. First, health-care advocacy movements – led by South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign and followed by the International People’s Health Movement – protested and lobbied successfully to end multinational corporate pharmaceutical monopolization of patents on life-saving drugs, especially AIDS medicines. Life expectancy in countries with high HIV+ rates soared, e.g. South Africa from 52 in 2005 to 64 a dozen years later. Second, ‘water warriors’ – led by citizens’ movements in Cochabamba, Bolivia and Ottawa, Canada – were opposed to commodification of household water (as well as mega-dams, bottled water, water trading and similar causes), and they linked up internationally to oppose water privatizers (e.g. Suez, Biwater, Veolia, Thames) and to promote public water commons. Third, landless people worked through the global network Via Campesina – and especially the Brazilian Movement of Landless Workers – to give solidarity during land occupations and defense against corporate land grabbing.

In contrast, the North’s left certainly witnessed regression. Amin (2018) was especially annoyed that, what in the 1960s–90s appeared as excellent sources of international solidarity, had faded by the 2000s:

The peoples of the Triad (USA, Western and Central Europe, Japan) have renounced international anti-imperialist solidarity, which has been replaced at best by ‘humanitarian’ campaigns and ‘aid’ programmes that are controlled by the capital of the monopolies. The European political forces that inherited left-wing traditions thus now support the imperialist vision of existing globalization. A new right-wing ideology has gained support among the people. In the North, the central theme of anti-capitalist class struggle has been abandoned, or reduced to a greatly incomplete expression – for the benefit of a so-called new definition of the left-wing ‘partner culture’ or communitarianism, separating the defence of specific rights from the general fight against capitalism.

Amin’s (2018) proposal for a New International is therefore grounded much more in struggles from the Third World:

That fragility comes in part because of social resistance when confronted with South governments’ capitulations to global capital. In 2001, the WSF was the vehicle for this resistance but by 2005, frustrations caused by the WSF’s failure to address ideology had risen to the point 19 international left leaders signed a Porto Alegre manifesto, an exercise repeated in 2006 under Amin’s leadership in Bamako. Neither were successful, nor was the 2007–09 ‘Fifth International’ call by Chavez, and the reasons are worth recalling.

3. Amin’s international manifesto authorship

The Porto Alegre milieu was, at peak in the early 2000s, an enervating biannual gathering of tens of thousands of local and international radicals (Conway 2012; Santos 2006; Smith et al 2014).
However, and in the new global movement’s greatest disappointment, just before the onset of the Iraq War, in February 2003 the WSF-catalysed protest of 15 million activists failed to change power relations. Two years later, Amin and 18 other leading left intellectuals felt it was necessary to offer more ideological coherence within the WSF process. In January 2005, they generated ‘twelve proposals for another possible world’,\(^4\) which in abridged form represented demands to:

1. Cancel the external debt of southern countries;
2. Implement international taxes on financial transactions, foreign direct investments, consolidated profit from multinationals, weapons trade, and activities causing large greenhouse effect gas emissions;
3. Progressively dismantle all forms of fiscal, juridical and banking paradises;
4. All inhabitants of this planet must have the right to be employed, to social protection and retirement/pension, respecting equal rights between men and women;
5. Promote all forms of equitable trade, reject all free-trade agreements and laws proposed by the World Trade Organization, and putting in motion mechanisms allowing a progressive upward equalization of social and environmental norms;
6. Guarantee the right to for all countries to alimentary sovereignty and security by promoting peasant, rural agriculture;
7. Forbid all type of patenting of knowledge on living beings (human, animal or vegetal) as well as any privatization of common goods for humanity, particularly water;
8. Fight by means of public policies against all kinds of discrimination, sexism, xenophobia, antisemitism and racism and fully recognize the political, cultural and economic rights (including the access to natural resources) of indigenous populations;
9. Take urgent steps to end the destruction of the environment and the threat of severe climate changes due to the greenhouse effect, resulting from the proliferation of individual transportation and the excessive use of non-renewable energy sources;
10. Demand the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the removal of troops on all countries, except when operating under explicit mandate of the United Nations, especially for Iraq and Palestine;
11. Guarantee the right to access information and the right to inform, for/by all citizens;
12. Reform and deeply democratize international institutions by making sure human, economic, social and cultural rights prevail. This implies incorporating the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation into the decision-making mechanism and systems of the United Nations.

Nearly all of these ideas correlated to actual struggles underway, but nowhere in the manifesto were such campaigns recognized (even with lip service), much less offered statements of solidarity or much-needed linkages to parallel campaigns. Grassroots activist parallels were found in ideas such as decommodification, commoning, international solidarity, ‘deglobalization’ of capital, activist empowerment and the like. If such conceptual threads tying together concrete activism had indeed been referenced, for example, the final sentence above would have been omitted: there was a general sense in the radical movements that these U.S./EU-controlled multilaterals could not be reformed and acted far too readily as tools of imperial capital. Instead of ‘fix it’, the call against imperialism’s global economic governance was to ‘nix it’.\(^5\)

Could Amin and the 18 other authors have drawn on the ongoing activism to reflect that militancy, instead of parachuting down a dozen manifesto statements? Fragmentation of the radical
movements was certainly a barrier to finding a coherent fusion. Yet one WSF document drafted two years earlier – the January 2003 Call of Social Movements (endorsed by 153 organizations from all corners of the earth) – and the periodic gatherings of these movements (whether at the WSF or within their particular sectors) would have been the basis for a universalizing manifesto, but one better grounded in campaigning at personal- and household-levels, on shopfloors, in communities and at national, regional and global scales.

The following year, in January 2006, the 9000-word Bamako Appeal followed, at a gathering just prior to the decentralized WSF (which took place in Mali’s capital). Amin guided a group of intellectuals and strategists who generated much deeper principles, long-term objectives and immediate action plans. The unifying language included a call for ‘internationalism joining the peoples of the South and the North who suffer the ravages engendered by the dictatorship of financial markets and by the uncontrolled global deployment of the transnational firms’.

But the peoples of the world were not simply suffering ravages, they were fighting back. To be sure, in its nearly 9000 words, the Bamako Appeal did make (very occasional) reference to such campaigning. But drawing on these struggles occurred in an overly general way (by the ‘anti-globalization movement’) or in technicist form, in which massive movements like Via Campesina (mentioned just once) were directed to play institutional roles ill-suited to their militancy.

If the main problems with the Porto Alegre and Bamako manifestos were lack of connectivity to active struggles and a failure to comprehend – much less specifically link, including ideologically – the dots between these, then the opposite problem hampered Chavez’ 5th Socialist International. At 2009–10 gatherings Fuentes (2009) expressed a desire for ‘a space for socialist-oriented parties, movements and currents in which we can harmonize a common strategy for the struggle against imperialism, the overthrow of capitalism by socialism’. The core group included left parties in power: the Movement for Socialism from Bolivia, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front from El Salvador, the Sandinista National Liberation Front from Nicaragua and the PAIS Alliance from Ecuador, along with the Proposal for an Alternative Society from Chile, the New Nation Alliance from Guatemala, and the Socialist Alliance from Australia.

This project was not only based in parties; in the Anglophone world it was promoted actively by Michael Albert of the Z Communications network, an entrepreneurial activist who was expert at linking networks both through the formidable U.S.-based platform of radical writers he had assembled – at one point using TeleSUR in Caracas as their base – and, from 2003, the ‘Life After Capitalism’ project within the WSF. But after an April 2010 gathering hosted by Chavez, the International’s momentum was quickly lost, particularly because the larger European parties and those from the old Soviet Third International tradition were ultimately uninterested – or in some cases were specifically hostile to the competition. Chavez’s death in 2013 and the end of the commodity super-cycle also terminated that project.

4. Conclusion: the value of manifesto demands as movement stepping stones

One lesson we might draw from the lacunae in Amin’s earlier internationalisms was not necessarily one he agreed with in 2018, when formulating the call for further networking under the banner of a new international. At least one convincing theory of social change, propounded by Vicente Navarro (1993), takes as a premise Amin’s analysis of capitalism’s limits, and also suggests making the sorts of demands Amin and his allies have done for decades – most of which are entirely reasonable (not loony-left fantasies), in terms of logistics, technology, administration, and fiscal and financial resources. At that stage, the differential character of reformism – ‘reformist’ or ‘non-reformist’, to
use André Gorz’s (1967) framing – are immediately evident. At the stage where the social movements push harder for transformative (non-reformist) demands, the capitalist system refuses to concede these (in Navarro’s case, single-payer national health insurance) for a simple reason: it seeks to retain prevailing class power relations intact. And it is then that a more durable radical politics presents itself, as social struggles waged below hit the ceiling of what is possible under capitalism.

What the 19 Porto Alegre signatories, the Bamako Appeal authors and the Chavez 5th International strategists failed to do, was ground their analysis in that era’s leading social movements’ politics, including concrete struggles which then – and today – desperately needed international solidarity, networking and institution-building (Sen and Kumar 2007). Those politics sometimes generate parallel demands to those of the left intelligencia, but not always. Indeed often the geographically-localistic, sectorally-narrow and urgent character of local social struggles cuts against the grain of the universal, longer-term approach that Amin advocated. It’s a long-standing problem, as Frantz Fanon (1967, p. 186) remarked: ‘For my part the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.’

And there, finally, is where Amin’s project should be celebrated, and joined: in comparing notes about the diverse ideas, experiences and most importantly, concrete struggles that are in play across the world. From there, the principles, analyses, strategies, tactics and alliances of the global left become clearer. It is only in this process that an ideology suitable for the century is capable of being forged.

Notes

1. In prior years, models for this internationalist anti-capitalist networking included Berlin-based communist Willi Münzenberg, or subsequently – albeit in military-charismatic mode – Che Guevara. For a review of forty years of efforts by Amin’s networks and similar institutions, see the survey by William Carroll (2016) of what he termed Transnational Alternative Policy Groups, under a rubric Amin exemplified: ‘expose, oppose, propose’.

2. Allies whom Amin brought to the TWF were a mix of revolutionaries, independent leftists, communists and socialists, dependencia-nationalists and social democrats, including Latin Americans Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enrique Iglesias, Juan Somavia, Enrique Oteiza and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova; numerous Africans including Claude Ake, Justinian Rweyemamu, Ismail Abdallah, Lamíné Gakou, and from Algiers the Applied Economics Research Centre; and from Asia, Paresh Chattopadhay, Amiya Bagchi, Lau Kin Chi, Ramkrishna Mukerjee, Kien Theravat, Suthy Prasartset, Ponna Wignaraja, Paul Lin, Gamani Corea and George Asniero. His closest comrades in Dakar included Lily Bayoumy, Bernard Founou and Cheick Gueye, and in Cairo, Mamdouh Habashi and Helmy Shawary. Among Northern sponsors was Swedish prime minister Olaf Palme, a fact which assisted fundraising from ‘various institutions in Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy, as well as the EU and the UN University’ (Amin 2006, p. 182). His main English-language publisher was Monthly Review Press but he also published recent books in a Fahamu (Pambazuka) series headquartered in Kenya, as well as French and Arabic publishing houses.

3. Amin (2006, p. 195) continued:

The Davos organizers, like the narrow-minded Swiss authorities, were so furious that it was impossible to produce the surprise a second time round. Hence the idea of a World Social Forum, on a different scale, for which Porto Alegre seemed a natural choice because of the considerable resources that the Brazilian Workers Party could mobilize for it there. The success of Porto Alegre I, in January 2001, did not feature on the front pages of the major Western newspapers. The enemy’s chosen strategy was to boycott the whole initiative.

4. The signatories were Aminata Traore and, revealing a formidable gender bias, 18 men: Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Eduardo Galeano, Jose Saramago, Francois Houtart, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Armand

5. To that end, a push for a Third World debtors’ cartel – as had been proposed by Fidel Castro, Julius Nyerere and others two decades earlier – came from leading Southern Hemisphere Jubilee movement activists, at the same time a World Bank Bonds Boycott was gathering pace, what with city councils in major U.S. cities (even San Francisco, unanimously) withdrawing their municipal funds from Bank securities. Their effort, truncated in the mid-2000s (due largely to funder fatigue), was to start a ‘run on the Bank’ (Bond 2003).

6. Indeed from 2004, the WSF moved between Porto Alegre and Mumbai, Caracas, Karachi, Bamako, Nair-obi, Belem, Dakar and Tunis (twice), before even trying Montreal in 2016, but the novelty and energy wore off over time.

7. To illustrate, the ten points entailed strategies:

   (1) for a multipolar world system founded on peace, law and negotiation
   (2) for an economic reorganization of the global system
   (3) for regionalizations in the service of the people and which reinforce the south in global negotiations
   (4) for the democratic management of the planet’s natural resources
   (5) for a better future for peasant farmers
   (6) to build a workers’ united front
   (7) for a democratization of societies as a necessary step to full human development
   (8) for the eradication of all forms of oppression, exploitation and alienation of women
   (9) for the democratic management of the media and cultural diversity
   (10) for the democratization of international organizations and the institutionalization of a multipolar international order

8. In South Africa, as noted, the Treatment Action Campaign had just months earlier turned the corner on AIDS by compelling governments to acquire generic drugs and provide them through public health system. Activists also successfully demanded that a UN Global Fund be set up to supply such medicines and strengthen public health systems in the cases of AIDS, TB and malaria.

9. The Appeal remarks on the need to get agriculture away from WTO control by entrusting the international regulation of agricultural trade to an institution of the United Nations, possibly the Food and Agricultural Organization. In particular, by reforming its organization on the tripartite model of International Labor Organization, which would associate to this regulation the representatives of agricultural trade unions (International Federation of Agricultural Producers and Via Campesina) beside representatives of the agro-alimentary firms (which act already in the shadows on the governments negotiating with the WTO) and of the national states.

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Notes on contributor

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