UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND 

  

Personhood and Gender in a Traditional African Community 
 
 
 

By 
Vitumbiko Nyirenda 

 
 

Student Number 
1716658 

 
 
 

Supervisor 
Professor Edwin Etieyibo 

 
 

 
 

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, 

School of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy 
 

2024 



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DEDICATION 

 

I dedicate this academic project to my family, Joel, Margaret, Darlison, Roosevelt, Tiwonge, and 

Vynida, for the support and love shown to me. 

  



ii 
 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 

 

I remain grateful to Professor Edwin E. Etieyibo who has been my supervisor since I came to the 

University of the Witwatersrand. You have gone out of your way to ensure I had a successful 

academic life. You are a source of inspiration to me. Your assistance and guidance throughout the 

period of writing this dissertation means a lot to me. I cherish all your comments, advice, 

suggestions, and constructive criticisms. I have learned a lot from you.  

I also thank my colleagues in the Philosophy department and all the students who have been part 

of my journey. I have learned a lot from you. Special mention be given to Nellie Kalonje, Khondlo 

Mtshali for her unwavering support and the discussions we have been having in exchanging 

philosophical ideas.   

I also remain thankful to my dear parents, Joel and Margaret, for their parental love and guidance. 

Both of you assisted me immensely in becoming what I am today. In the same vein, I want to use 

this opportunity to express my regard and gratitude to my brothers and sisters, Professor Darlison, 

Roosevelt, Tiwonge and Vynida for their support. I will always appreciate you all. I would also 

like to acknowledge my partner, Ellen Kanyinji, for standing by me in everything. Your love will 

always be cherished.  

I thank my mentor, prophetess Fwasani, for her prayers and guidance in my walk of faith. 

Lastly, I am grate to the university and faculty for the financial support throughout the years of 

my study.  
 

 

 



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DECLARATION 

 

 

I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself and that the work has not been submitted 

for any other degree or professional qualification. I confirm that the work submitted is my own, 

except where work that has formed part of jointly authored publications has been included. My 

contributions and those of the other authors to this work have been explicitly indicated below. I 

confirm that appropriate credit has been given within this thesis where reference has been made to 

the work of others.  

The work presented in Chapter Three has been published in the South African Journal of 

Philosophy as Nyirenda and Sesanti, “Understanding Gender Identities in an African 

Communitarian World View” (42(3):176-191, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2023.2275231), as part of 

the special issue on gender in African philosophy. The chapter is written by me, Vitumbiko 

Nyirenda and the ideas expressed therein inform those expressed in the paper co-authored with 

Simphiwe Sesanti. I came up with the ideas and crafted the work into a published paper. Professor 

Sesanti, who was selected as a mentor for the special issue offered guidance and constructive 

criticism following the requirements of the special issue.  

 

Signature: …..………. 

Date: ………15 February 2024………. 

 

Ethics Clearance Number:  HRECNMW22/05/04 

  



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 ABSTRACT 

 

There is a common assumption that traditional African societies were gender-neutral and lacked 

hierarchical gender ordering. Proponents of this view argue that women in these societies held 

significant positions, challenging notions of subordination and oppression. They contend that 

women have historically been leaders, advisors to kings, queens, soldiers, and landowners. 

However, some scholars argue that this assumption does not reflect the lived experiences of many 

African women, who face discrimination and oppression by men and society. This perspective 

suggests a distinct conception of personhood, indicating that African communities are inherently 

gendered, which in turn shapes their concept of personhood. The primary claim is that personhood 

has often been presented in non-gendered terms, based on the general assumption of gender 

neutrality in traditional African communities. However, this does not align with the realities of 

these communities. This dissertation thoroughly explores the intellectual divergence surrounding 

various understandings of gender in African society and its relation to discussions on personhood. 

Regarding gender, I argue that in the African context, it is viewed as complementary, fluid, and 

relational, indicating healthy and positive gender relationships within the community. Concerning 

personhood, I argue that it is often presented in non-gendered ways. Those who fail to recognize 

this perspective often conflate modern social issues with the dominant values of traditional African 

communities. 

 

Keywords: Personhood, Sex, Gender Inclusivity, Complementarity, Fluidity, Relationality



 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .......................................................................................................................... ii 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................ iii 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 

a. Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
b. Problem statement and thesis ........................................................................................................... 6 
c. Limitations to the study ................................................................................................................... 9 
d. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 10 
d. Outline ........................................................................................................................................... 11 

CHAPTER ONE ....................................................................................................................................... 15 
PERSONHOOD IN AN AFRICAN CULTURAL WORLD VIEW ...................................................... 15 

1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 15 
1.2. Some considered African conceptions of personhood. .............................................................. 17 

1.2.1. The transcendental notion of personhood ......................................................................... 18 
1.2.2. The social notion of personhood ....................................................................................... 24 
1.2.3. The capacity-based notion of personhood ........................................................................ 31 
1.2.4. Personhood as personal identity........................................................................................ 39 
1.2.5. The situated-embodied agent view of personhood ........................................................... 41 

1.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 48 
CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................................... 50 
SOME CONSIDERED CONCEPTIONS OF GENDER IN AN AFRICAN CULTURAL 
WORLDVIEW .......................................................................................................................................... 50 

2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 50 
2.2. Some theoretical foundations .................................................................................................... 51 
2.3. The “complementarity” account of gender ................................................................................ 57 

2.3.1. Specialization .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
2.3.2. Relationality, difference and unity .................................................................................... 66 
2.3.3. Understanding complementarity ....................................................................................... 71 

2.4. The “fluidity” account of gender ............................................................................................... 78 
2.4.1. Making sense of gender fluidity ....................................................................................... 79 
2.4.2. Gender fluidity among the Igbos ...................................................................................... 82 



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2.4.3. Gender fluid identities:  female husbands and male daughters ......................................... 84 
2.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 93 

CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................................. 96 
A PROPOSED RELATIONAL ACCOUNT OF GENDER IN AN AFRO-COMMUNITARIAN 
WORLDVIEW .......................................................................................................................................... 96 

3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 96 
3.2. Problem of gender identity ........................................................................................................ 99 
3.3. Identity as a product of the community ................................................................................... 102 

3.3.1. Individualism vis-a-vis communitarianism ..................................................................... 103 
3.4. Personhood as personal identity .............................................................................................. 107 

3.4.1. Radical vis-a-vis moderate communitarianism ............................................................... 108 
3.4.2. Collectivist and constituted view of community............................................................. 110 
3.4.3. The primacy of the community ....................................................................................... 112 
3.4.4. A claim about identity ..................................................................................................... 115 

3.5. Understanding gender identity: A relational account ............................................................... 121 
3.5.1. Norm relevancy account, a brief view ............................................................................ 123 
3.5.2. Normativity and identity acquisition .............................................................................. 125 

3.6. Identity dilemma ...................................................................................................................... 131 
3.7. Virtues of the relational account .............................................................................................. 133 
3.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 137 

CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................................... 139 
PERSONHOOD AND GENDER IN AN AFRICAN CULTURAL WORLD VIEW ........................ 139 

4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 139 
4.2. Some Considered Conceptions of Personhood and Gender .................................................... 143 

4.2.1. Gender and the transcendental notion of personhood ..................................................... 144 
4.2.2. Gender and the capacity-based notion of personhood .................................................... 152 
4.2.3. Gender and the social notion of personhood ................................................................... 158 

4.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 185 
CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................................................... 187 
PERSONHOOD AND CHANGING VALUES: RECONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL NOTION OF 
PERSONHOOD ...................................................................................................................................... 187 

5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 187 
5.2. The social notion of personhood ............................................................................................. 190 
5.3. The problematic necessary conditions ..................................................................................... 191 

5.3.1. The primacy of the community ....................................................................................... 192 



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5.3.2. Rituals of transformation ................................................................................................ 201 
5.3.3. Seniority .......................................................................................................................... 208 

5.4. In search of new frontiers ........................................................................................................ 214 
5.5. Reconstructing personhood ..................................................................................................... 217 

5.5.1. Virtue as definitive of personhood .................................................................................. 219 
5.5.2. Acquisition of virtue and assignment of praise and blame ............................................. 222 
5.5.3. The primacy of community ............................................................................................. 228 
5.5.4. Loss and restoration of personhood ................................................................................ 231 

5.6. Implication on gender? ............................................................................................................ 232 
5.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 234 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 236 
a. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 236 
b. Recommendation(s) ..................................................................................................................... 243 

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 245 



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INTRODUCTION 

a. Background 

African philosophy as a discipline is concerned with many branches of philosophy that may range 

from metaphysics, ethics, logic, politics, aesthetics/art, epistemology, etc. In all these branches the 

subject matter ranges from causation, epistemic marginalisation, personhood, gender, democracy, 

justice, etc. In this dissertation, I am concerned with the distinct and overlooked relationship 

between personhood and gender. By “personhood” reference is made to the status of being a 

person. But what it means to be a person can be understood in metaphysical and normative senses. 

The metaphysical definition captures the nature of a human being given that in most African 

languages the word “person” captures a human being. For instance, of the different languages 

spoken in my country, Malawi, among the Chewa, “munthu” means a human animal, and the same 

goes for the Tumbuka where “munthu” points to a human being. Other languages such as the Akan 

“onipa” or Yoruba “eniyan” all capture a human being (Gyekye, 2010; Gbadegesin, 1998). 

Interestingly, the same word also carries normative connotations. Thus, the sense in which one has 

moral status. Therefore, to be “munthu”, “onipa” or “eniyani” also means to enjoy some level of 

moral respect. While the extensive and profound literature on personhood discussing how these 

concepts are fleshed out in African philosophy is impressive, the focus shifts significantly 

regarding gender. Gender as a subject matter in African philosophy is fascinating given that it is 

new compared to other subjects and such conceptual analysis is scant. Little has been written in 

the analysis of the nature of both gender identities and roles. 

 This gap opens great avenues for research in the academic field, exploring how gender is 

understood and conceptualized based on values embedded within the culture(s) of African people. 

To attest to the lack of African philosophy’s engagement with the subject of gender, one barely 



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finds articles on sex and gender in the discipline. In my academic journey, my first engagement 

with gender as a topic in African philosophy was during a summer school in 2020, at the University 

of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Following this was the 5th biennial conference 

organized by the African Philosophy Society at Gulu University, in Uganda, in 2023. The theme 

of the conference was “Gender Dimensions of African Philosophy”. It was at these gatherings that 

I found African philosophers expressing interest in engaging with the topic, but at the same time 

bemoaning the silence they have had on the topic. This is not to say that no work on gender has 

previously been done, but rather that the discipline lacks a deeper engagement with the topic 

compared to other topics mentioned above.  

Several reasons for the lack of scholarship on gender have been suggested. Some scholars such as 

Oluwole (1998), Oyowe and Yurkiviska (2014) argue that there is a general neglect of 

philosophical engagement of gender issues. Perhaps the lack of scholarship and negligence to 

discuss gender points to the fact that gender is not a problem for African philosophers as it is for 

other non-African philosophers. In other words, it is possible that of the many problems that inspire 

philosophical engagement on traditional (precolonial) African communities, gender did not make 

it on the list. I specifically mention and limit the strength of the claim to “traditional (precolonial) 

African communities” because one cannot ignore the obvious problem of gender in the current 

modern/post-modern African communities. Nonetheless, claiming that gender was not a problem 

for traditional African communities requires an understanding of the structure and values of 

traditional African communities themselves.  

Along this line of thought is Imbo (1998) who has argued that there is a general assumption that 

African traditional communities are assumed to be gender equal hence ignoring the structures of 



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oppression and marginalization of women.1 Traditional African cultural values tend to be (on a 

more general scale) gender inclusive (without discrimination)- hence more neutral, rather than 

gender oppressive. This may explain why gender does not come out as a big social problem 

(Oelofsen, 2018; Oyewumi, 1997, 2004). Scholarship on traditional African communities, 

extending back to ancient Egypt, suggests that women held important positions of power and 

privilege, a view that rejects any assumptions of subordination and oppression of women. Women 

were in top positions as pharaohs, advisors, queens, soldiers, landowners, etc., and were wealthy 

(Diop, 1974, 1981; Momoh, 2000; Nzegwu, 2004; Amadiume, 1987; Sesanti, 2016). This 

arrangement is different from patriarchal societies where women tend to be in a position of 

subordination and have strict gender roles (Sultana, 2012; Oyewumi, 2005). Diop (1974, 1981) 

and Amadiume (1987, 1997) argue that this does not reflect traditional African communities which 

were matriarchal and did not adhere to strict and rigid gender roles. 

However, some scholars have argued that this assumption does not reflect the lived reality of most 

African women who are discriminated against and oppressed by men and society (Oyowe & 

Yurkivska, 2014; Sanni & Ofana, 2021). But again, a proper analysis ought to make a distinction 

between the experiences of women in modern societies and those in traditional societies. As 

mentioned above, when it comes to traditional African societies, presumed matriarchal and 

heterarchical gender structures set by communities are inconsistent with the claims made as well 

as the general oppression of women, as evidenced during and after colonialism. Oppression and 

marginalization of women are associated with the imposition and assimilation of patriarchal gender 

 
1 By community, I refer to a group of people who share certain values, and norms or ideology in general. By traditional 
community, I use the word to refer to precolonial African communities. Note that I do not use the word tradition to 
refer to something backward or undeveloped, rather in a more general sense I point to established practices, values, 
norms and ideologies that people identify with as a true reflection of their identity. Precolonial societies, tend to reflect 
such values and norms, because they are societies that had a culture without colonial influence. 



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ideologies linked to colonialism and slightly prior to that, religion, especially Islam and 

Christianity (Nzegwu, 2004; Amadiume, 1987; Oyewumi, 2004).  

Arguments relatd to the above claims have been put forward by scholars who have pointed out 

how a Eurocentric vision distorted the representation of African cultures (Beattie and Middleton, 

1969, 169; Reiter, 1975, 49). These scholars such as Momoh, Amadiume and Cheikh Anta Diop 

have cautioned against the misleading nature of Eurocentric scholarship about traditional African 

communities. By Eurocentric scholars, I refer to those scholars who advance a worldview that is 

centered on Western civilization or a biased view that favors it over non-Western civilizations. It 

often involves interpreting histories, cultures, and social phenomena from a European or Western 

perspective, which can lead to the marginalization or devaluation of non-European societies (Blaut, 

1993; Momoh, 2000). Scholars who have opposed this Eurocentric vision have argued that much 

of what is known about traditional African societies is not entirely true. Eurocentric scholars 

misrepresented African societies as patriarchal with all the assumptions of oppression of women, 

yet most African societies are known to have been matriarchal. But this only shows that they were 

interpreting African cultures from a European perspective (Momoh, 2000; Amadiume, 2005; Diop, 

1987, 1989, 1991). I furnish the details of this claim in the second chapter. 

Nonetheless, granted that philosophers study the problems of their day, one may wonder why early 

philosophers who focused on traditional African communities - which, as shown above, did not 

have significant gender issues - still did not seem to engage deeply with gender, even in a positive 

light. I believe there is a reason for this negligence. Most scholars, especially those credited with 

the development of African philosophy, could not have deliberately ignored gender issues, rather, 

they were primarily concerned with establishing the legitimacy and existence of African 

philosophy in the face of claims that it did not exist. One could simply say that they were laying 



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the groundwork for the subject matter to be discussed by philosophers like myself. Nonetheless, 

this is not a sufficient reason, given that decades have passed since discussions of African 

philosophy came into the limelight. The scantness of gender issues even in modern times, sadly 

shows how philosophers have ignored W.E.B. Du Bois’s admonition and suggestion in his 1920 

work Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil, where he argued that the issue of gender would need 

immediate and urgent attention after the issue of racism. On this, Du Bois notes: “the uplift of the 

women is, next to the problem of the colour line and the peace movement, our greatest modern 

cause” (1920:172). While Du Bois recognized the double burden of discrimination faced by 

African American women and believed that true liberation could not be achieved without gender 

equality, his point can equally be applied to the African context, wherein after dealing with racial 

discrimination in philosophy, gender has become another problem, hence, it could be said that Du 

Bois’s call was not taken seriously.  

One would argue that this call would better be answered by the presence of female figures within 

the discipline.  Osha (2008) and Graness (2015) have pointed out the lack of women and/or female 

figures among the scholars accredited with the development of the discipline. The assumption is 

that if there were women figures, gender discussions would come into the limelight rather than 

depending on men who are already in a position of privilege. While there is a strong reason to 

believe in women amplifying their experiences with their voices, one cannot ignore the view that 

the problem of gender ought not to be discussed by women alone even if patriarchy to a great 

extent affects women more than it does affect men. Men can write about gender even when the 

victims tend to be women, but by adopting a certain attitude. This attitude is one addressed by bell 

hooks in her 1989 book Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black, where she addresses the 

ethical responsibilities of privileged groups writing about disadvantaged communities. She 



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stresses the importance of humility, authenticity, and proper representation, urging privileged 

writers to amplify the voices of marginalized people rather than speaking for them. hooks 

emphasises the need to understand power dynamics and practice solidarity by supporting and 

elevating silenced voices. As she puts it, “It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability 

to recognize, accept, and celebrate those differences” (hooks, 1989: 70). It remains unclear whether 

male philosophers could not have taken this attitude to write about gender issues or whether it is 

just a matter of preference in writing what one likes to borrow Steve Biko’s phrase or a matter of 

neglect (Oluwole, 1998; Biko, 2015).   

 

b. Problem statement and thesis 

What I have been presenting so far is the problem of gender in African philosophy but at the same 

time, the motivation for engaging with this topic. However, I do not discuss gender as a stand-

alone subject matter. In this dissertation, I seek to engage a conceptual understanding of gender in 

relation to personhood. Thus, the intention is to understand gender from an African cultural 

worldview and provide conceptual clarity concerning its relationship with personhood. My 

interrogation of the relationship between personhood and gender, within the African context also 

includes an analysis of the community in question. Thus, the relationship between personhood and 

gender takes into consideration whether one makes the argument from a traditional African context 

or a colonial and (post-colonial/neo-colonial) modern African context. In short, the dissertation 

titled “Personhood and Gender in a Traditional African Community”, explores profoundly the 

intellectual discord that exists in the various understandings of gender in African society and the 

relationship it has to discussions on personhood. Most importantly, it explores whether the 

relationship takes cognizant of the distinction between tradition and modernity.  



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In exploring the relationship between the two, I do acknowledge that gender is a complicated topic, 

and so presents another complication when relating it to personhood. One can distinguish between 

gender roles and gender identities. But whether one is talking about gender roles or gender 

identities, I work with the basic idea that one is dealing with how individuals relate to each other. 

That is, how individuals interact at the level of identification expressed as gender identity, or at the 

level of performance expressed as gender role without the implication that a particular identity 

entails a particular role. The point I seek to express here is that how individuals relate to each other, 

whether at the level of identity and role, the relationship can be positive or negative. The positive 

one is slightly obvious, as such, I comment on the negative one expressed as gender inequality or 

gender disparity. In society, this is expressed as problematic relations between members, that is, 

when one group, say women, faces oppression or is discriminated against by the other group, men. 

This kind of discrimination raises questions about moral equality, given the fundamental 

assumption that every person ought to enjoy some basic level of respect (Gosepath, 2015). The 

word “person” here is deliberately placed, it underlies personhood discussions and carries the 

connotation expressed in my background discussion above. To be specific, the discussion in this 

dissertation draws heavily on the normative conception in as much as I also allude to the 

metaphysical conceptualization. Therefore, the negative relationship, where a person is 

discriminated against or treated as unequal based on one’s gender, implies a violation of one’s 

personhood.  

The discussion here is pointing to the general view of the relationship between personhood and 

gender. Gender is in this case the contingent expression of personhood. The respect or moral status 

that an individual enjoys comes from the fact that one is a person in the first place, and not just 

because the person in question is gendered. Thus, one is respected as a person “who just happens 



8 
 

to be gendered” and not because one is gendered. This understanding, in my view, not only remains 

consistent with the folk psychological or “street” understanding of gender and personhood but also 

reflects a partial sense of how personhood and gender are related. Partial in the sense that it shows 

a loose view of the relationship where the two come together as shown so far or come apart as in 

this alternative view. An alternative view is that personhood and gender are not related. Here, one 

would be drawing on the claim that a person may be subjected to all kinds of harm, as a person, 

but without being disrespected in terms of one’s gender. Under this view, the discrimination itself 

would be based on the fact that one was not accorded respect as a person, without any 

presupposition of one’s identity or role. One can be a person with moral status even without a 

gender identity or role. Under this view, those who do not identify any socially constructed 

gendered identities and roles (at least in the community in question defines them) can argue that 

gender is entirely separate from one’s personhood.  

Additionally, there is another way of thinking about the relationship between personhood and 

gender, in a stricter way, this is the sense such scholars like Manzini (2018), and Oyowe and 

Yurkivska (2014) in the literature have presented the problem. I regard it as strict for one simple 

reason. Suppose under review is a normative conception of personhood, specifically, as Menkiti 

(1984) argues, personhood is something that is acquired. A strict view shows how one’s acquisition 

of personhood entails one’s gender. Thus, whether such acquisition would exclude other 

individuals within the society or include them but assign different degrees of moral status based 

on their gender. Under this view, having personhood or being a person of a certain degree of moral 

status can be understood as a result of or because of one’s gender. This sense of understanding 

personhood is that it is a gendered personhood. At this stage, I am not stating that this is the way 



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the scholars mentioned here seek to present personhood or analyse personhood, but I take this view 

to be an intuition of what comes from analysing their views to their best conclusion.  

In this dissertation, I explore the multifaceted ways in which the relationship between personhood 

and gender are related, but more importantly, guided by the above interpretations. One of the 

general arguments I advance is that personhood is not gendered.  

c. Limitations to the study 

It is important to state some limitations. It should be noted that in discussing the claims highlighted 

above, I am not presenting a feminist paper. I am not in any sense arguing for the sense in which 

African feminism can or should be understood. By “African feminism”, I consider a “feminist 

epistemology and a form of rhetoric that has provided arguments...that validate the experiences of 

women of Africa and of African origin against mainstream feminist discourse” (Western feminism) 

(Goredema, 2010, 34). Western feminism here refers to the epistemology and a form of rhetoric 

that has provided arguments that validate the experiences of women of Western origin, particularly 

white women. This is not to deny that part of the discussion may either draw on claims in feminist 

literature or impact how feminism is understood. According to the former, I merely adopt some 

claims from the available literature on African feminism to provide clarity to a conception of 

gender that I discuss in relation to personhood. Regarding the latter, as I indicate in my 

recommendations, in the last chapter, the discussion and the claims I put forward may certainly 

impact the conceptualization of African feminism. Thus, how relationships are framed between 

men and women, and where the flaming is dependent on an account of gender under consideration, 

may bring some insights into how feminism may be constructed or flamed on the African 

continent.  



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In any case, in this dissertation, I am merely looking at gender issues in general and proposing new 

ways in which gender can be understood. But in doing so, I draw heavily on personhood. The 

motivation is to provide clarity or interrogate claims that show personhood as gendered. Thus, 

while some chapters are dedicated to discussing some conceptions of gender, some chapters 

discuss new ways of understanding personhood in ways that avoid the “gendered interpretation”. 

Some chapters are dedicated to responding to arguments that have presented personhood as 

gendered.   

 

d. Methodology 

In my dissertation, I employ an “armchair analytic” approach. By “armchair,” I mean that the 

material or research discussed is not the result of conducting experiments or other qualitative 

methods of data collection. Instead, the main task has been the systematic review of argument-

based publications/research on personhood and gender, found in various databases, especially 

philosophical ones. The analytic approach involves a critical appraisal of these articles to 

understand their arguments and ideas. The goal is to use these arguments to develop and advance 

my philosophical ideas in a clear, precise, and logically coherent manner, which as Grayling 

argues, is the goal of philosophy (1996:15). In essence, and regarding my project this method 

involves a conceptual analysis of the concepts of “personhood” and “gender” and an exploration 

of the relationship between both. I believe that the armchair analytic methodology is well-suited 

to achieving my objectives of bringing clarity to the concepts of personhood and gender and their 

relationship. 

 



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I am aware that some researchers within the African philosophical discipline might question this 

methodology, viewing it as a seemingly Western method. However, this concern often stems from 

the perception that the analytic method is predominantly used by Western philosophers. This 

perspective overlooks the broader history of philosophy and assumes that Africans have a distinct 

method.2 The question then arises: do Africans have a particular or distinct method, or do they 

have and utilize various methods, including the analytic methodology? I support the latter view 

and I suspend the justification of this claim because it would take this discussion in a different 

direction. What is important is my belief that the use of the analytic method does not fundamentally 

affect the truth of the claims made in this dissertation. If the method distorts my arguments and 

conclusions, then it would warrant concern. However, I do not believe that this is the case here. 

What matters, at least for me, is the knowledge obtained and how it relates to the realities of one’s 

context. As pointed out above, the claims in this dissertation are not driven by the method itself 

but by my philosophical inclination to understand the concepts as they are used within the African 

context. It is the latter that drives the method chosen. 

 

d. Outline 

The dissertation is structured in the following way. In the first chapter, I discuss some conceptions 

of personhood. I use the literature in African philosophy and look at some of the conceptions one 

may find in the literature. I am not claiming I present an exhaustive list but a few of the ones I 

consider to be dominant in African philosophy and discussed by African philosophers. The aim is 

to provide a general understanding of personhood from the African cultural worldview.  

 
2 I have in mind Scholars who regard Westerners as the originators of Philosophy and its methods (see Allais, 2016).  



12 
 

Having discussed some conceptions of personhood in the literature, in chapter two, I turn to 

discussing some conceptions of gender. I consider the two dominant conceptions, gender 

complementarity and gender fluidity. I discuss these two because they represent various ways in 

which gender is discussed in literature. For instance, some scholars like Nkiru Nzegwu (2004) 

discuss the complementarity of the division of labour that is gender roles, in the African cultural 

worldview, a discussion that has implications on the understanding of the gender identity of man 

and woman. Another account of gender that I discuss is attributed to Ifi Amadiume (1987) who 

focuses less on complementarity but more on fluidity.  women can take on men's identities to 

perform gender roles ascribed to men. I argue that the conceptions of gender I discuss in the chapter 

could be cashed out or could be various interpretations of gender within a culture such that they 

are not mutually exclusive, at least, this is the sense I treat them in the chapter. 

In chapter three, following what I consider to be the limitation of the current conception of gender 

(the ones I discuss), I propose another conception of gender. Thus, drawing from one of the 

conceptions of personhood, personhood as personal identity as proposed by Molefe (2017, 2019), 

I argue that this conception helps understand gender identity in the Afro-communitarian 

worldview. This is what I call the relational account of gender. Under this account, I argue that 

gendered identities are essentially defined by the community. I employ a standard form argument 

that gendered identities are essentially defined by norms, norms are essentially defined by the 

community, and therefore gendered identities are defined by the community. Nonetheless, I argue 

that both the community and an individual have a role in the acquisition of the identity. In this 

case, I argue that identities are not entirely self-chosen nor wholly socially conferred but 

incorporate both aspects of the community and the individual. 



13 
 

In chapter four I discuss arguments that have presented personhood in gendered ways. These are 

claims made by scholars such as Manzini (2013), Oyowe and Yurkivska (2013), among others. 

Their accounts present an understanding of personhood as gendered and biased. In response to this 

view, I argue for a conception of personhood that is not gendered. Based on Menkiti (1984), I argue 

that personhood is not based on gender but on seniority. This chapter relates personhood and 

gender by providing conceptual clarity concerning how personhood ought to be understood. I argue 

that the conception of personhood that has been called into question is based on traditional African 

communities, communities that took seniority as the organizing principle and not gender. To show 

the main problem for the accounts, I argue that the accounts conflate sex with gender. Personhood 

is based on seniority, and it considers sex differences because they serve a purpose in the 

structuring of rites of passage which are necessary for the achievement of personhood. I argue that 

the accounts by the scholars named above have merit but only when understood to be inspired by 

the modern African cultural context where gender seems to be central in the organization of society, 

an influence of colonialism and unchecked patriarchy. 

Following observations in chapter four, I argue that scholars find the traditional account of 

personhood problematic because it fails to account for some post-colonial social problems. I argue 

that the claim that presents personhood as gendered and biased is one of the many claims. Given 

this, I argue for a secular account of personhood. Thus, I distinguish between the precolonial 

(traditional) account of personhood and the modern account of personhood; I attempt a 

reconstruction of a modern account of personhood. However, the construction does not seek to 

draw a very distinct account of personhood than the one discussed in the dissertation, in chapters 

one and four, but rather, I reconstruct an Afro-communitarian account of personhood that maintains 

the relevance of virtue and the primacy of the community but excludes some of the themes that 



14 
 

were found problematic by scholars in the fourth chapter, such as rites of passage and by extension, 

seniority.  

In the very last section, I offer my conclusion to the paper and recommendations for future 

research. Thus, I restate some of the conclusions I have drawn in the paper, as well as make a 

general conclusion. Under recommendations, I propose some areas of research that would be 

beneficial in developing African Philosophy, especially under the topic of gender. Furthermore, I 

show the impact of the research and the claims made in the development of African feminism in 

particular and African Philosophy in general. I also show the sense in which the research would be 

beneficial in developing policies regarding gender.  

  



15 
 

CHAPTER ONE 

PERSONHOOD IN AN AFRICAN CULTURAL WORLD VIEW 

 

1.1. Introduction 

Personhood is a robust and widely discussed concept in moral and political philosophy. The 

English Cambridge Dictionary defines personhood as the status of being a person. But this 

meaning is rather secular and begs the question of what it means to be a person.  Answering this 

question is not an easy task in Philosophy and one needs to be clear on what concept has been 

adopted and what conception articulates the concept. But in making this statement, I bring another 

problem into the mix. Thus, it will help the reader to take a detour and explain the concept-

conception distinction. According to Adam Swift, the concept refers to the “general structure or 

perhaps the grammar of the term,” whereas a conception is a “particular specification of the 

concept” (Swift, 2006, 11). One can also appeal to Hardimon’s (2003) concept and conception 

distinction. For Hardimon (2003), when philosophers disagree, they have a reasonable 

disagreement, insofar as they disagree upon the same thing, whatever that is, that is a concept. The 

concept is the core meaning of the term they are trying to articulate.  The different perspectives 

they have on the concept, are conceptions. 

To offer an example of the above, personhood as a concept carries various meanings.  There are 

differences when the term is used in legal, metaphysical, or ethical (morality) studies. Personhood 

as a moral term or normative concept picks out beings that are worthy of moral consideration or 

beings that can be said to have moral status or dignity (Menkiti, 1984; Gyekye, 1997; Ikuenobe, 

2016; Behrens, 2013; Molefe, 2019; Metz, 2012). In articulating what it takes to have moral status, 

different conceptions of personhood arise. Some conceptions ascribe moral status based on the 



16 
 

possession of capacities, some on the achievement of virtue, possession of a body and 

embeddedness in a community, etc. As a metaphysical concept, to be a person or to have 

personhood does not spring from questions about moral status but questions about the nature of 

the “being” a person is, as part of the things that make up the world, or the structure of the world. 

It touches on the question of the nature of being or existence, in this case, a being’s existence as a 

person. Various conceptions frame what kind of being a person is. To be a person would mean to 

be a biological being, a spiritual being, a being endowed with intelligence, rationality, memory, 

will, sentience, an initiator of action, etc. (Singer, 2009; Hughes, 2001; Chappell, 2014; Sapontzis, 

1981; Kittay, 2009). While the metaphysical and normative deal with different questions, the two 

are not mutually exclusive. In some instances, metaphysical concepts that establish the sense in 

which an individual is a person are used as conditions for personhood in the normative sense. For 

instance, the Kantian view has it that one is a person in virtue of having rationality, but in some 

instances, rationality becomes the condition, not that which defines personhood but a condition to 

acquiring virtue, a view that defines personhood in the normative sense, in a different context, such 

as the Menkitian view of personhood (Toscano, 2011; Molefe, 2019; Sapontzis, 1981; Darwall, 

1977; Menkiti, 1984; Ikuenobe, 2017). Personhood as a legal concept is mostly found in academic 

disciplines of law. To be a person is to be a being that can be a subject and object of law. The basic 

idea is the legal status of persons, and this may include corporations, animals, natural objects, 

artificial intelligence, and foetuses. By legal status, the question is mainly about the rights and 

obligations owed to persons within the confines of the law (Kurki, 2019). The discussion is centred 

on the question of whom or what counts as legal person(s) and under what grounds they qualify as 

legal persons. 



17 
 

In this chapter, the focus is on normative and metaphysical personhood. Additionally, it is 

important to note that in discussing personhood, I am not discussing the persistence question, the 

question about personal identity, that is, necessary and sufficient conditions that determine whether 

a “thing”, a person, remains the same over time (Orson, 2007). I believe the persistence question 

is a secondary question given that it specifies the conditions under which a being remains a person. 

Instead, my focus is on a primary question, what makes a being a person in the first place, 

normatively and metaphysically?  Furthermore, given that there are various conceptions of 

personhood, in this chapter, I limit myself to African conceptions of personhood.  The basic idea 

is to understand the various ways through which personhood is understood within the African 

context and later relate these conceptions to gender by appealing to values that flame gender 

relations.  

1.2. Some considered African conceptions of personhood. 

In African philosophy, several scholars such as Menkiti (1984), Gyekye (1995), Etieyibo (2020), 

Molefe (2017), Chimakonam, 2022), and Behrens (2013), have discussed several normative and 

metaphysical accounts of personhood. These conceptions are not an exhaustive list of all there is 

in the literature on African philosophy but merely include the ones I am aware of. Secondly, by 

stating that they are found in African philosophical literature, I do not mean that they are only 

applicable to African people, but (I) are discussed by African philosophers in articulating some 

African concepts, and (II), they are dominant in the African cultural context. The second option 

does not limit the conceptions to the African context but also allows for the universalisation of 

these concepts even when they start from a particular position. Nonetheless, in discussing these 

concepts, I will be referring to other non-African philosophical traditions.  



18 
 

Of the many conceptions one may find in the philosophical literature, I limit myself to discussing 

the inherent or transcendental conception of personhood, the capacity-based notion of personhood, 

the metaphysical view of personhood, the body or situated-embodied view of personhood, 

personhood as personal identity and lastly the social-notion view of personhood (Menkiti, 1984; 

Gyekye, 1992; Behrens, 2013; Molefe, 2017; Etieyibo, 2020). It is the claims from some of the 

conceptions that I discuss in this chapter that I use to develop and discuss accounts of gender in 

the next chapters. 

1.2.1. The transcendental notion of personhood 

The first notion of personhood to be discussed is the transcendental notion of personhood, also 

known as the inherent notion of personhood (Etieyibo, 2020). It is a metaphysical notion of 

personhood given that it deals with the nature of beings that “persons” are. It focuses on persons 

as constituted by certain ontological features which distinguish them from non-persons. For most 

accounts found in the African philosophical literature, persons have physical, quasi-physical and 

spiritual features (Wiredu, 1992; Gyekye, 1992; Gbadegesin, 1998; Kaphagawani, 2004). The 

basic view is that to be a person is to be a human being and vice-versa. The task of a sympathizer 

of this view is to account for what it means to be a human being or show the sense in which a 

human being is different from a non-human animal. 

While the above presentation provides a general overview of this conception of personhood, I now 

turn to some philosophers who have offered various views on what it means to be "human." The 

views discussed in this section are primarily from scholars who have engaged with this concept 

within the African cultural worldviews of the Akan and the Yoruba (Wiredu, 1992; Gyekye, 1997; 

Gbadegesin, 1998; Kaphagawani, 2004). Despite focusing on these two West African cultures, the 

similarities across different African cultures mean that these views can often be applied more 



19 
 

broadly across the continent. However, the challenge of comparative work lies in the fact that there 

is little to no written literature in some African cultures. As a Tumbuka from Malawi, I 

acknowledge the lack of written work on this view of personhood in my own culture, which 

highlights the need for further philosophical exploration. Nonetheless, I find the presentations by 

Wiredu and Gyekye to be resonant with what is commonly understood about the Tumbuka. 

Furthermore, it is important to note that while the views discussed pertain to the Akan and Yoruba, 

I do not claim that this presentation is an entirely accurate descriptive account of Akan culture. 

Within the Akan community, disagreements exist over the correct translation and 

conceptualization of personhood (Kaphagawani, 2004). 

1.2.1.1. Being “human” among the Akan 

The first view under the transcendental notion of personhood to be discussed comes from Wiredu 

and Gyekye who were writing on the Akan cultural worldview (Wiredu, 1996; Wiredu & Gyekye, 

1992). Wiredu’s and Gyekye’s views have been central to conceptualising personhood in the 

African context (Kaphagawani, 2004). According to the Akan, the word for “person” is onipa, and 

does not have a specific translation, it either refers to a biological human animal or a particular 

status an individual occupies in a community. By “status” here I am referring to moral status, a 

view I will discuss under the normative notion of personhood.3 The non-specificity of translation 

shows the richness of the concept as well as the various ways Akan understand personhood. In any 

case, under the transcendental notion of personhood, the concern is about onipa as a “biological 

human being”. For Wiredu, onipa has several distinguishing features and the major ones include 

mogya, sunsum, okra and nipadua (Wiredu, 1987, 160-161). While Gyekye agrees with Wiredu 

 
3 There are different views regarding status, Wiredu (1992) supports Menkiti (1984) in arguing that it is a status given 
to an individual upon achieving moral excellence, or what has been referred to as true humanity. Gyekye differs from 
Wiredu in arguing that it is a status one is born with (Gyekye, 1995)). 



20 
 

on onipa as having a nipadua, which is translated as the biological human body, their disagreement 

is over the nature of the other entities (Kaphagawani, 2004).  

To start with Okra, For Wiredu, okra is a life-giving entity, the innermost self, the essence of the 

individual person and is “quasi-physical” in nature, neither a completely spiritual nor a completely 

physical substance (Wiredu, 1987; Kaphagawani, 2004). This okra is understood as the 

okrateasefo, which translates to English “living soul,” a translation that Wiredu might not agree 

with in so far as the English “soul” refers to something purely non-physical and the translation is 

influenced by the Christian tradition (Kaphagawani, 2004, 332-333). But as a life-giving entity, it 

shares meaning with the Christian view of the breath of God. The “breath of God” from the 

Christian point of view is associated with the “spirit”. Translating okrateasefo as the living soul 

might not necessarily capture what the “spirit” is from the Christian point of view because of the 

distinction Christians make between spirit, soul (as mind) and body (1 Thessalonians 5:23; 

Hebrews 4:12; Job 21:25; Psalms 84:2). Nonetheless, okra as “soul” among the Akan and “spirit” 

among the Christians have a similar function, the life-giving function (Genesis 2:7). As Wiredu 

(1995) states, the presence of the okra in a person means that a person is a living being and its 

absence means death.  

Different from this view is Gyekye’s belief that the okra is a divine or spiritual entity, and it is 

purely spiritual in nature (Gyekye, 1995, 85). Gyekye’s version aligns with the English translation 

of the nature of the soul. Gyekye argues that Wiredu is wrong to think the okra is quasi-physical 

because such a view fails to explain the Akan belief in life after death (Gyekye, 1995). Among 

many African cultures, it is believed that death is only a limitation to physical life and not spiritual 

life. They believe that after death an individual who lived until old age and had a morally upright 

life becomes an ancestor, a spirit being. Hence, life continues even after death (Mbiti, 1970; 



21 
 

Kaphagawani, 2004). But one would understand Wiredu’s (1987) motivation for translating the 

okra as quasi-physical because this translation is better at capturing how the okra interacts (acts or 

is acted upon) with nipadua. The two would interact if they shared certain properties. On the other 

hand, Gyekye’s (1995) motivation would be about the consistency with other beliefs about life 

after death. Nonetheless, I share Kaphagawani’s sentiments that what is important is not so much 

about the disagreement on the nature of okra, but rather what the presentation tries to achieve with 

respect to showing the ontological features that make up onipa (Kaphagawani, 2004).   

Apart from the okra, the second important element is the sunsum, which Wiredu understand as 

symbolic of someone’s personality. It is believed to originate from the father. Unlike the okra, the 

nature of sunsum is questionable given that it is presented as mortal. It dies when the possessor or 

person dies, therefore it is not spiritual (Wiredu, 1987; Kaphagawani, 2004). On the other hand, 

for Gyekye, the sunsum is a spirit (spiritual) and immortal and comes from the Supreme Being. 

The sunsum is spiritual because as something responsible for personality, traits such as courage, 

gentleness, etc., these traits “are psychological, not sensible, or physical” (Gyekye, 1995; 

Kaphagawani, 2004, 333). Nonetheless, both Gyekye and Wiredu agree on the function of the 

sunsum, as that which is responsible for a person’s personality (Wiredu, 1987; Gyekye, 1995).  

The third entity that makes up an onipa is the mogya. This is translated as blood and according to 

Wiredu, mogya enters a human being at conception. It is believed to originate from the mother; 

therefore, it is not just any blood but one that is the same as the individual’s mother. For Wiredu, 

it is partially material. On the other hand, Gyekye (1995) is not explicit about this feature of onipa. 

Nonetheless, given the importance of kinship relations, not only is the mogya an important feature 

in placing the individual within the lineage, but its linkage with the mother features nicely with 

the view that the Akan are a matrilineal group.  



22 
 

Lastly, as mentioned above the two scholars share one uncontroversial part of a person, nipadua, 

translated as the human flesh or body. The nipadua constitutes the physical body and all there is 

to it (Kaphagawani, 2004). It is not clear how to describe this feature because it is intuitive among 

many but at the same time, one would wonder if there were anything essential to the body, whether 

it’s the parts that make it or its shape (see Sapontzis, 1981). All these features together are what 

define a human being qua person among the Akan. 

1.2.1.2. Being human among the Yoruba 

A similar but slightly different view from the Akan comes from Gbadegesin (1998) who writes 

about the Yoruba conception of personhood. Like the Akan’s duo meaning, the Yoruba word for 

“person” is eniyani and it refers to a biological human being as well as a status human beings 

acquire with respect to their character. That is, it has both ontological and normative meanings. 

According to Gbadegesin, it is the normative dimension of the concept that is more dominant 

among the Yoruba than its counterpart ontological dimension (Gbadegesin, 1998). As I mentioned 

above, the focus of this section is on a person as a human being. Among the Yoruba, eniyani is 

made up of four major ontological features, “ara”, “okani”, “emi” and “ori” (Gbagedesin, 1998; 

Kaphagawani, 2004, 333).  

The first ontological feature to discuss is ara, which translates to the English word “body”. It 

represents the human biological body with all the external and internal organs. According to 

Kaphagawani, the Yoruba do not bother articulating the nature of the body as definitive of 

personhood because it is obvious to them that the body is not all there is to a human being 

(Kaphagawani, 2004).  

The other important feature is emi. This is difficult to translate because there are disagreements 

over its nature the common view seems to be its function, as a as a life-giving entity. It is that 



23 
 

which gives life to a “lifeless” physical body. It is this function of quickening a lifeless body that 

I liken the emi to the Christian view of the breath of God or what is referred to as the spirit of the 

person (see my biblical references above). Among the Yoruba, it is not clear whether it is a 

standalone entity as a natural thing or whether it is merely a force influencing various human 

behaviours or activities (Kaphagawani, 2004; Gbadegesin, 1998). 

-Moving on, another important entity is the okan. Gbadegesin provides two conceptions of the 

okan. In one sense, the okan is interpreted in physicalist terms as referring to a physical human 

organ, the “heart” in English. The same biological organ that is responsible for pumping (or 

circulating) blood in the human body. Another sense captures “consciousness”, the centre for 

“psychic and emotional states” (Gbadegesin, 1998; Kaphagawani, 2004, 334). According to 

Gbadegesin (1998), this latter translation is not surprising considering the usage of the English 

word “heart” as a euphemism when expressing one’s emotional state (also see Garcia, 1996, for 

similar usage). As a figure of speech, its meaning is contextually defined by the intentions of the 

speaker (see Grice, 1989, on speaker meaning). For instance, an individual who utters the 

statement “my heart does not agree with this,” could simply be expressing the proposition “I have 

a bad feeling about this”, or similarly, an individual may state “my heart is weak” to mean “I lack 

courage” to convey an emotion of “fear.” Therefore, the Yoruba view of okani is that it is a physical 

organ or that which stands for consciousness or emotional states.  

Another element that constitutes an eniyani is ori. According to Gbadegisin, ori has two natures. 

On the one hand, it refers to the physical human head and on the other hand, it is a spiritual head 

responsible for human destiny. The matter gets more complicated when it comes to the actual 

conceptualisation of destiny given the various views among the Yoruba (Makinde, 1985; 

(Gbadegesin, 1998; Balogun, 2007; Majeed, 2014). As Kaphagawani (2004) points out, the 



24 
 

disagreement over which conception is correct is not important to a non-Yoruba like me. What is 

important is the recognition of the richness of Yoruba’s views about human beings given the 

various conceptions.  

Given the above view of personhood, there are of course interesting implications when it comes 

to healing, that is, whether healing is all about the physical body or something more than the 

physical given that human beings are made up of both the physical and spiritual. Another 

implication could be on transhumanism, that is, if a human being is both physical and spiritual, 

what ought to be the actual focus of transhumanism and why? That is, what is it that is transcending 

the human, the physical or spiritual? In this dissertation, my focus is on gender. In Chapter Four, 

I discuss the implication of this view of personhood on gender, under the said chapter, I discuss 

the genderwhat it means to be a man or woman by appealing to the transcendental notion of 

personhood. I reserve this discussion for chapter four.   

1.2.2. The social notion of personhood  

The other notion of personhood common in the literature of African philosophy is the social notion 

of the person (Etieyibo, 2020; Kaphagawani, 2004). Unlike the above view of personhood, this 

view is mainly normative, that is, it deals with the question of moral status. This notion of 

personhood has been given different labels. Menkiti (1984) calls it the maximalist conception of 

personhood. Etieyibo (2020) calls it the social notion of personhood. Molefe calls it “personhood 

as a moral virtue (Molefe, 2020). Behrens (2013) calls it the agent-centred notion of personhood. 

Regardless of the various terminologies, the most basic premise of this view of personhood is that 

to be a person is to achieve virtue or moral wisdom (excellence). This implies personhood is 

something that is acquired. In accounting for how individuals achieve or acquire virtue, I consider 

three basic themes, the primacy of the community, that is, the community’s role in conferring 



25 
 

personhood onto individuals, the necessity of rites of passage and obligations to the community, 

and lastly, the time factor, that is, the role of seniority (Wiredu & Gyekye, 1992; Masaka, 2019; 

Menkiti, 1984, 2004; Etieyibo, 2018, 2020; Nyirenda, 2019; Molefe, 2018, 2020).   

1.2.2.1. The primacy of the community 

There are several ways of understanding the primacy of the community in relation to this view of 

personhood. On the one hand, one would understand personhood as that which is conferred onto 

individuals by their communities. The community plays a vital role under personhood such that 

Menkiti (1984) takes the community as the prescriber and catalyst of norms. It is the community 

that sets the norms necessary for personhood and offers the space for individuals to pursue virtue.  

It is in acting in ways that align with communal norms that individuals acquire personhood. Here, 

one would think of personhood as being a non-starter outside the community. Another way of 

flaming this view is to state that the community has epistemic primacy. It is that which knows what 

is best for individuals, morally speaking. Menkiti (1984) sees the community as that which gives 

individuals moral knowledge. Individuals are born as blank slates but come to acquire moral 

knowledge as they participate in the moral life of the community (rituals of transformation). That 

is, it is the community which gives individuals moral wisdom. 

On the other hand, the primacy of the community would be understood in a more literal sense, that 

is, the community as having ontological primacy over individuals. Menkiti distinguishes between 

two kinds of communities, communities that are products of individuals; and communities that are 

ontologically prior to individuals such that individuals are products of their communities (Mbiti, 

1970; Menkiti, 1984). There is a sense in which one would frame the ontological primacy of the 

community. According to Gyekye (1992), part of the meaning of the primacy of the community is 

that individuals are born into a community and cannot exist and develop outside the community. 



26 
 

To support this statement, Gyekye cites some Akan maxims. One of the maxims states that “when 

a person descends from heaven, he descends into a human society”, or onipa firi soro besi a, obesi 

onipa kurom (Wiredu & Gyekye, 1992, 105). That is, one’s life begins in the context of the 

community, and by implication, it is sustained by the community. Another maxim is that “one tree 

does not make a forest”, which, according to Gyekye, illustrates the self-insufficiency of the 

individual (Wiredu & Gyekye, 1992). For Gyekye (1992), it is incomprehensible to think of an 

individual as prior to the community because that would require that the individual exists and 

develops on her own. However, individuals are not self-sufficient, and so the existence of a lone 

individual is almost impossible. Individuals are born in a community of others such that “others” 

are part of how individuals define their identities, goals and aspirations (Gbadegesin, 1991; Metz, 

2017). The community is more of the beginning and end of the individual. Other scholars such as 

Okot p’Bitek (1998) express this view in strong terms by stating that “humans are not free, and 

because they are not born free, they are everywhere in chains”, that is, the chains of the community 

(Etieyibo 2020, 61). Even upon death, persons are never free, their spirits are still venerated by the 

community as ancestors, which illustrates an endless cycle of human beings moving from one kind 

of community to another (Mbiti, 1970; Menkiti, 1984, 2004). Rianna Oelofsen (2018) shares the 

same view and argues that an analysis of the individual in the African context cannot ignore the 

community. She likens this to Martin Heidegger’s (1996) “being” and the “world” where the two 

are inseparable. The basic idea here is that personhood is impossible without the community.  

1.2.2.2. The rituals of transformation  

I have highlighted above that this notion of personhood takes personhood as an achievement, 

different from the capacity-based or the transcendental notion of personhood based on the 

possession of certain capacities or certain ontological features (Gyekye, 1997; Menkiti, 1984; 



27 
 

Behrens, 2013).  Achieving personhood or becoming a full person is understood normatively as 

an evaluation or normative judgement of one’s character, a judgement that may be positive or 

negative (Gyekye, 2010; Gbadegesin, 1991, 27). An example of a positive judgement is something 

like “una umunthu” (in Tumbuka) meaning “you have personhood” or “you are a person.” This 

expresses the thought that an individual’s actions are consistent with moral ideals and standards 

set by the community. A negative judgement comes with denying the individual her personhood 

(Menkiti, 1984).  

Now the important question is what it takes to achieve or fail at personhood. Menkiti’s account 

presents personhood as a journey or an ontological progression from “it” to “it”, that is, an “it” of 

childhood to an “it” of collective immortality or as per Etieyibo’s suggestion “it-it” (Menkiti, 

1984; Etieyibo, 2018). Along this journey, individuals are to attend various rites of passage. 

Menkiti mentions several of them including name-giving ceremonies, puberty rites of passage, 

marriage, procreation, and death. According to Menkiti, when an individual is born, such an 

individual is a mere dangler, without any sort of personhood. An individual’s birth may be 

followed by a name-giving ceremony. The naming ushers the individual into the process of 

personhood by making an individual a member of a community. According to Etieyibo, “When 

one says that X is a person what that involves is to suggest that X has been named and such naming 

both picks out that person as a particular person and imposes on one so named certain obligations” 

(Etieyibo, 2020, 66). I take Etieyibo to refer to obligations about personhood, and it is the 

successful carrying out of such obligations that individuals attain personhood. For Menkiti (1984, 

2004), names impart membership into a community.  That is, being given a name means that one 

is incorporated into a community. This is supported by the fact that the loss of names means loss 



28 
 

of personhood and the loss of any connections one had with the living community, such is the case 

with the nameless dead (Menkiti, 1984).  

This then raises an interesting question about an individual that does not have a name. Menkiti 

calls an infant with no name an “it” and argues that there is no personal pronoun attached (such as 

“he” or “she”) because they are like mere objects. He argues that even when such a child dies, the 

family would say “We rushed the child to the hospital, but before we arrived it was dead,” a claim 

that shows ontological difference between the infant and the grown person (Menkiti, 1984, 173). 

Furthermore, he argues that infants are not given elaborate or ritualised burial ceremonies, 

ceremonies associated with adults or those who are persons. Some scholars have identified 

problems with this characterisation of infants. For instance, Matolino argues that the usage of the 

word “it” is misplaced because this word has no moral significance in the English language, a 

claim that Molefe contested (Matolino, 2011). According to Molefe (2017), Menkiti ought to be 

interpreted in ways that he uses the pronoun “it” normatively and not in terms of conventional or 

dictionary meaning.  

After being given a name, and as the child grows, the child is supposed to carry out certain 

obligations required for personhood. From childhood to adulthood, there are rites of passage 

individuals must go through, these include (but are not limited to) birth, naming, adolescence, 

marriage, childbearing, death, etc (Menkiti, 1984, 2004). It is through rites of passage that 

individuals gain the moral knowledge necessary for excellence in conduct or virtue (Eze, 2018; 

Turner, 1969). For instance, in some communities, when boys or girls reach puberty, they are taken 

to various excluded places where they are given instructions on issues of life.4 These ceremonies 

 
4 Communities may differ with respect to whether they are taken to an uncle’s house, a forest, a mountain, etc. The 
methods and places of seclusion might be different but the very tradition of separating them from their family and 
bringing them back is shared by several cultures and has among other things moral significance for the community. In 
the modern (post-colonial) times, initiation ceremonies are still practiced. What has changed about them has been the 



29 
 

remain relevant as vehicles for instruction on gender roles, responsibilities, marriage, respect for 

elders, duties to strangers, the sick and the elderly (Munthali & Zulu, 2007). Because of their 

usefulness in bridging the gap between childhood and adulthood, societies tend to expect every 

adolescent to attend these ceremonies such that failure to attend is interpreted as a failure to fulfil 

one’s duty as a male or female member of the community. After puberty rites come other adult-

based rites of passage such as marriage, procreation, and death. In general, at each rite of passage, 

there are duties and moral instructions that are passed onto the young; and only through successful 

completion of attending these rites of passage and others during adulthood such as marriage, 

childbearing, etc. can individuals earn the status of being called persons (Menkiti, 1984; Gyekye, 

2010). 

1.2.2.3. Seniority 

When it comes to personhood, time is an important asset, and for Menkiti (1984), personhood is 

attained in time. Menkiti (1984) sees personhood as something that is attained as one grows older. 

He makes a distinction between the elders and the young. He sees elders as full persons than the 

young (all things considered). What makes a difference between adult human beings and the young 

is the underlying assumption that this difference reflects differences in moral knowledge. It is 

undeniable that (again, all things considered) the young cannot have the same experience as the 

adult. The adults have attended various rites of passage and through time have acquired the relevant 

experience and knowledge necessary for personhood. Menkiti alludes to this when he cites an Igbo 

proverb “What an old man sees sitting down, a young man cannot see standing up.” This means 

that adults are seen as having a moral vision greater than that of a young person (Menkiti, 1984, 

 
removal of harmful practices such as improper circumcision as well as changes regarding the time they are conducted 
and duration. Changes to time came with crushes with the school calendar. 



30 
 

173).5 Thus, for Menkiti (1984), there is a correlation between moral growth and physical growth. 

This does not mean that anyone older is necessarily morally excellent, it is in such special cases 

that a senior member of the community would fall short of the ideals of personhood, such that the 

young person would become morally better than the senior in question (Wiredu, 1992; Eze, 2018; 

Chimakonam, 2022). 

Given this view of achievement of personhood and failure, Menkiti also highlights how 

personhood can be lost (Menkiti, 1984, 2004). Loss of personhood should not be strange to a 

defender of the capacity-based view of personhood. That is, if personhood means having a certain 

capacity such as rationality, those who develop mental illnesses and end up having a diminished 

rationality would be said to have lost their personhood (Sapontzis, 1981; Hughes, 2001; Moody, 

2003). Under Menkiti’s personhood, loss of personhood is associated with loss of names. The main 

point is about incorporation. Losing a name means one is no longer part of the community. But 

what it means to lose a name is not a matter of name change but something to do with the lack of 

a referent of a proper name. This lack of the referent of the name comes when no living member 

of the community can remember the name in question (Menkiti, 1984). That is, no one is the direct 

bearer of the name nor remembered as the direct bearer of the name. A being (spirit being) is called 

the nameless dead or collective immortal (Mbiti, 1969; Menkiti, 1984, 174-175). These are beings 

that were ancestors, but because the living generation of the community has forgotten their names, 

they move from ancestral hood to collective immortal. Unlike ancestors who save a moral function, 

because they are part of the community and still have their personhood status, the nameless dead 

are not members of the community and have no personhood (Menkiti, 1984). Just like babies with 

 
5 In Malawi among the Chewa, (commonly found in the central region) there is a similar proverb, “akulu akulu ndi 
m’dambo mozimila moto” which literally translates to “elders are a pool of water that extinguishes the fire.” Meaning 
that elders are a source of wisdom for issues of life. This proverb speaks to the wisdom elders have that cannot be 
found among the young, hence the young must rely on elders for guidance. 



31 
 

no name are an “it”, these beings are also an “it”, but scholars like Etieyibo (2018) suggest that the 

nameless dead be referred to as an “it-it”. This double hyphen suggests that the nameless dead 

have moral force, something newborn babies do not have. The former’s deeds have now become 

part of the tradition of the community, a contribution that newly born babies have not made 

(Etieyibo, 2018).  

The above-detailed discussion of Menkiti’s (1984) view of personhood is meant to show what the 

social notion of personhood is. In the next chapters, I will discuss how this view of personhood 

would relate to gender. I will consider some of the objections that have been raised against 

Menkiti’s (1984, 2004) view of personhood, and some responses in the literature, as well as 

consider my intervention, including a reconstruction of this view of personhood in ways that 

account for modernity.  

1.2.3. The capacity-based notion of personhood 

Another notion of personhood dominant in African philosophical literature is the capacity-based 

notion of personhood. Unlike the transcendental notion of personhood which identifies human 

beings as persons, this notion of personhood distinguishes between a person and a human being 

(Behrens, 2013; Molefe, 2019). Central to this notion is the view that all persons are human beings 

but not all human beings are persons. The possession of capacities distinguishes human beings 

who are persons from non-persons. But like the social notion of personhood above, it has also been 

presented as a normative account of personhood. Thus, when interpreted morally, those who are 

persons in virtue of having capacities are morally considerable or are said to have moral status 

(Behrens, 2013; Oyowe, 2014; Molefe, 2017). In this chapter, I look at three conceptions, namely, 

the capacity for rationality (Gyekye, 1992), the capacity for sympathy (Molefe, 2019), and the 



32 
 

capacity for the community (Metz, 2011); more importantly, how having these capacities make 

someone morally considerable. 

1.2.3.1. Gyekye’s capacity for rationality 

One of the capacity-based notions of personhood in the African philosophical literature comes 

from Gyekye (1992). I consider Gyekye’s (1992) view to be inspired by some individualist views 

such as the Kantian view of personhood, according to which, to be a person is to have rationality 

(Korsgaard, 1986; Menkiti, 2018). For Kant, especially in his humanity formula, a human being 

who is a person has rationality, and ought to be treated as an end and not merely as a means. Under 

this view, personhood is something inherent in individuals because they are born with the said 

capacities, and thus, individuals have inherent value (Korsgaard, 1986). Gyegye’s (1997) view of 

personhood is presented as a critique of Menkiti’s view of personhood presented above. However, 

in the critique, Gyekye (1997) seems to endorse Kantian individualism by citing capacities such 

as rationality and autonomy as the basis for moral status or personhood. Gyekye’s (1997) view is 

individualist because it renders the community as less important for personhood. The individual 

qua individual is a person without the intervention of the community. He uses this view to object 

to one of the basic views stated above, that personhood is acquired through the attainment of moral 

excellence or achievement of virtue and conferred by the community. According to Gyekye 

(1997), personhood is not something individuals achieve but something they are born with. Gyekye 

considers individuals to be born with autonomy; hence they have inherent value or intrinsic worth 

(see Korsgaard, 1983, 2005). For Gyekye (1997), individual autonomy is the possession of a will, 

“a rational will of one’s own, that enables one to determine at least some of one’s own goals and 

to pursue them and to control one’s destiny” (54). Gyekye sees the community as (having) 

instrumental (value) in the realization of an individual's goals. Furthermore, respecting autonomy 



33 
 

allows individuals to question and distance themselves from their communities. This implies that 

he sees Menkiti's view of personhood as something that cannot give individuals the freedom to 

question their culture (Gyekye, 1997; Chimakonam, 2022). 

The point of contention for Menkiti and Gyekye is the power that the community has. Gyekye 

(1997), does acknowledge that the individual “needs society and all that it makes available for the 

realisation of the individual’s potential, and for living a life that is most worthwhile” (Gyekye, 35). 

This is in line with the view that he sees individuals as necessarily social and the community to 

hold some primacy, but only in the moderate sense. He sees Menkiti as giving the community too 

much power, and this can lead to trumping of individual rights. Thus, he tries to provide a 

conception of personhood that would balance individual rights and one’s duties to the community. 

For Menkiti (1984) rights are secondary to duties. This means the possession of moral worth for 

Gyekye does not necessarily (only contingently so) require the community, personhood is 

something individuals are born with by having the necessary capacities, that is, rationality and 

autonomy. Since they are capacities that individuals are born with, individuals have inherent and 

intrinsic value that cannot be sacrificed at the altar of the community.  According to Gyekye, it is 

by recognizing this value that individuals have that they can fully realize and express their 

individuality (Gyekye, 1997, 40). In this case, personhood has nothing to do with participating in 

rituals of transformation, what gets transformed is social status and not personhood.  

Furthermore, even with seniority, Gyekye (1997) argues that it is not the case that seniority entails 

moral excellence. He states that “surely there are many elderly people who are known to be wicked, 

ungenerous, and unsympathetic: whose lives, in short, generally do not reflect any moral maturity 

or excellence. In terms of a moral conception of personhood, those kinds of elderly people may 

not qualify as persons” (Gyekye, 1997, 49).  Nevertheless, Gyekye agrees with Menkiti that some 



34 
 

individuals who display morally reprehensible behaviour may not be recognized as persons, but 

such an individual does not lose her rights as a human being (Gyekye, 1997, 50).  Gyekye sees 

personhood conceived in terms of moral achievement as something important but not in ways that 

should be detrimental to individual rights.  

1.2.3.2. Metz’s capacity for community 

Another attempt to develop a unique notion of personhood based on capacities from the African 

context is from Thaddeus Metz. My reading of Metz’s paper shows that he did not specifically 

intend to present a unique theory of personhood. I consider his motivation to be a discussion of 

dignity in the African context vis-a-vis human rights. But I still find Metz’s discussion important 

to personhood and can be interpreted as a notion of personhood given that his views seem to answer 

a question of moral status, cashed out in terms of dignity (Metz, 2012). That is, it shows beings 

that have dignity and those that do not. Metz grounds his idea of dignity in his theory of Ubuntu. 

However, an account of Ubuntu can be traced back to his earlier works where he presented Ubuntu 

as a moral theory. According to Metz, Ubuntu is grounded in his interpretation of what he calls 

harmony, and harmony is defined by two concepts, shared identity, and goodwill (Metz, 2017). 

Shared identity in simple terms is a matter of having a common identity and goals with a particular 

community. Goodwill is more of an attitude and actions that seek to promote the interests of others. 

For Metz, the capacity for Ubuntu qua shared identity and goodwill justifies moral consideration. 

Thus, the capacity for Ubuntu means the capacity for community (or to commune with others). To 

have dignity, therefore, is to have the capacity for community. It is in virtue of this capacity that 

one has moral status or intrinsic value. As I mentioned above, focusing on capacities that are in 

individuals makes the value intrinsic. In light of our discussion on personhood, it means that one 



35 
 

is a person (has personhood) if and only if the individual can share an identity with others and have 

goodwill for them (Metz, 2012).  

However, Metz’s theory was not well received by some scholars. Oyowe comments on this critique 

by doubting whether there is such a thing as a capacity for community. For Oyowe, what is seen 

as a capacity for community could be an effect of capacity for deliberative choices, such that, the 

choice to commune with others is one among the many choices that individuals make (Oyowe, 

2014). According to Oyowe, 

the so-called capacity for community appears to hinge heavily on the Kantian 

capacity for autonomy or voluntary decisions. This is evident in Metz’s description 

of that capacity…as Metz conceives it, the capacity for community upon which 

dignity is based is in his view closely tied to the capacity for autonomy or 

deliberative judgment. This leads naturally to the problem of which one is doing 

the work for Metz’s conception of dignity…it is impossible to imagine that there 

are people who possess Metz’s capacity for community independent of the capacity 

for deliberative choices…Kant’s capacity for autonomy…is doing the important 

work in Metz’s account (Oyowe, 2014, 342). 

For Oyowe, the capacity for community is based on the capacity for autonomy. This means that 

what makes picks as the basic capacity is not basic at all. This means that an attempt to come up 

with some essential feature of a human being that captures the communitarian values fails. 

Oyowe’s view of bringing the Kantian capacity as basic renders Metz's theory redundant (Oyowe, 

2014). 

A similar view that appeals to capacities but is somewhat different and presented as a critique of 

Metz comes from Ikuenobe. Ikuenobe’s view is that the focus of the African cultural worldview 



36 
 

is not the mere possession of capacities for harmonious living but the use of such capacities. It is 

how individuals use the capacity to promote love, friendship, positive identity, and active solidarity 

that has value. In other words, it is about actual relationships or actively participating in communal 

life, and not merely possessing the capacity (Ikuenobe, 2017; Oyowe, 2014). Unlike Metz, who 

develops an account of dignity from his theorisation of a moral theory of Ubuntu, Ikuenobe’s view 

is inspired by the social notion of personhood discussed above, where the individuals need to 

actually pursue a moral life and develop other regarding virtues and not merely have the capacity. 

Ikuenobe sees capacities not as having intrinsic value but only instrumental. He only considers 

them necessary for some other value (Ikuenobe, 2006).  This is what distinguishes Ikuenobe and 

Metz in terms of how they characterize what is valuable.  Ikuenobe’s (2017) account allocates 

value in relationships and capacities are merely instrumental, hence the capacities do not have 

value in themselves, and individuals who possess them do not have intrinsic value, their value is 

extrinsic. Metz’s (2012) view locates value within the individual because he accords capacities 

with value and so individuals have intrinsic value.  

I have stated that Ikuenobe sees capacities are instrumentally for the promotion of the relationship. 

This means that it is the relationship that has the utmost value. Since Metz sees individuals as ends 

in themselves, Metz’s view would mean that whether one acts in ways that promote social cohesion 

or not, the mere possession of capacities places the individual under moral consideration. This 

view is better in that it is consistent with the view that dignity is usually seen as a static quality, 

one that you either have or not (Metz, 2012). It is easy to understand why this is the basis of rights 

as something that you have as a human being regardless of one’s functionality. Ikuenobe’s (2017) 

view implies that dignity admits of degrees depending on how one’s capacities are being used. In 

other words, dignity as based on the social notion of personhood means that it follows the same 



37 
 

principle of personhood which states that personhood comes in degrees, some have more of it and 

others have less of it. This view would make it difficult to be the basis of human rights because it 

would mean rights can be achieved in terms of degrees. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize 

that interpreting Ikuenobe’s view in this way is a disservice to the view because the foundation of 

his view of dignity, which is the social notion of personhood, takes duties to be primary and rights 

as secondary (Menkiti, 1984; Ikuenobe, 2017; Molefe, 2019). Therefore, what matters in this 

context is a question of moral status as a function of one’s duty to promote harmonious living and 

less of a question of rights. 

1.2.3.3. Molefe’s capacity for sympathy 

Another notable scholar Motsamai Molefe developed an account of the capacity-based notion of 

personhood, but his view was presented as a critique of Ikuenobe’s (2017) view above. Molefe 

(2019) critiques Ikuenobe by arguing that the account excludes the mentally disabled and infants 

from the question of moral status. According to Molefe (2017), the mentally disabled and infants 

cannot use their capacities as demanded by the account. This means that they do not have a dignity. 

Failure to recognize their dignity would subject them to harm and a violation of their rights. 

Molefe’s (2017) methodology is different from Ikuenobe's in that he develops an account of 

dignity by appealing to capacities and Ikuenobe looks at the actual use of those capacities. For 

Molefe (2017) the value an individual has the capacity, the capacity for sympathy. Sympathy is 

the basic virtue that leads to all other-regarding virtues such as compassion, love, friendship etc, 

which are captured in African communitarianism, in general, and personhood, in particular. He 

captures the idea of personhood in terms of sympathy, thus, “to possess personhood is to be 

sympathetic” and to be sympathetic is to possess all those virtues listed (Molefe, 2020, 55; Wiredu, 

1996). Furthermore, to be sympathetic is to have the ability to hear and listen to others. Hearing 



38 
 

and listening are understood as having a moral sense (Molefe, 2020; Menkiti, 1984). This means 

to feel for others, not only to recognize their presence but to be moved by their presence.  

While the above view would also exclude infants and the mentally disabled, Molefe (2019) invokes 

the idea of potentiality, and this is where infants and the mentally disabled differ. He argues that 

infants have partial moral status because they have the capacity potentially. But with regards to 

the mentally disabled and (with the inclusion of animals), Molefe argues that do not have the 

capacity and so are not subjects but objects of sympathy. As objects of sympathy, they have lower 

moral status (Molefe, 2019). It is not clear to me what makes a being qualify as an object of 

sympathy given that one would extend the same to a host of all other beings. At the same time, it 

is not clear to me that animals do not feel sympathy for their young such that they can also be 

subjects of sympathy. Molefe’s theory much as he desired to extend it to non-human animals, 

seems to be very anthropocentric (Singer, 1972; Saponztis, 1981). Nonetheless, according to 

Molefe, what is central is the capacity for sympathy but to be both an object and subject of 

sympathy seems to give one higher moral status, or dignity. To lack possession of capacity means 

to be merely an object of sympathy and to be in this position is to partial moral status (Molefe, 

2019).  

From the foregoing, I have managed to present the capacity-based notion of personhood. I have 

discussed different views from different scholars and how the scholars respond to each other. I 

have argued that the capacity-based notion of personhood is a view that seems to be shared by 

scholars from the African and Western tradition. Since the dissertation is on gender, I will discuss 

in chapter four how the capacity-based notion of personhood would respond to gender.  



39 
 

1.2.4. Personhood as personal identity 

Just like the transcendental notion of personhood, there is another metaphysical account, 

personhood as personal identity presented by Molefe (2017). I classify it as metaphysical because 

it is not concerned with the evaluation of the character or actions of individuals, instead, it seeks 

to provide a view of identity as a product of the community. Under this framework, the community 

is necessary for the formation of individual identity.  I will not go into details about this view of 

personhood at this stage because I have developed it further in Chapter Three, as a basis for a 

relational account of gender identity. In this section, I will focus on some of the major views 

Molefe discusses. 

The notion of personhood as a personal identity for Molefe (2019) comes from his analysis of 

Menkiti’s view of personhood. In the analysis, Molefe argues that there is a conception of 

personhood that is implicit in Menkiti’s (1984) presentation, and he appeals to Menkiti’s 

discussion of Mbiti’s (1969) views about personal identity. Menkiti discusses Mbiti’s view about 

the primacy of the community, and by extension how the community produces the individual. 

According to Mbiti, in the Afro-communitarian context, an individual understands her identity as 

a product of the community. This is reflected in his dictum, “I am because we are, and since we 

are therefore, I am” (Mbiti, 1969, 170). What the dictum shows is that the community holds some 

primacy over individuals and the community makes or produces identity, by implication, it means 

that without the community identity is impossible. Menkiti (2004) flames this view by appealing 

to the notion of the extended self (in Chapter Three, I have adopted the notion of the relational self 

to express the same idea). According to Menkiti (2004) “…in the absence of others, no grounds 

exist for a claim regarding the individual’s standing as a person. The notion at work here is the 

notion of an extended self” (324). The question now is about what Menkiti means by extended 

self and how this is captured in Mbiti’s dictum above.  



40 
 

To understand what Menkiti (2004) means by extended self, one can distinguish it from its 

counterpart notion, minimal self. The minimal self is sometimes understood as a biological self, 

that is, that which has subjecthood and agenthood without the inclusion of all the unessential 

features such as thinking or reflection (Heersmink, 2020, 2; Gallagher 2000, 15). Subject-hood 

refers to a sense of awareness of one’s own experience and claiming ownership of it whereas 

agent-hood means awareness of oneself as the source of the action (James, Burkhardt, Bowers & 

Skrupskelis, 1890; Heermink, 2020). Suppose a person decides to move his leg, such a person 

would regard himself as the source of the action and at the same time having felt the leg move. 

The latter is subject-hood, and the former is agent-hood. Lack of agent-hood would mean being 

made to move the leg just like a person who has his legs moved by a physiotherapist. Most of the 

time people’s experiences involve both subject-hood and agent-hood but there are times when the 

two come apart just as in the example above. Nonetheless, these two concepts, subject-hood and 

agent-hood make up the minimal self (Heersmink, 2020). 

On the other hand, the notion of the extended self goes beyond the minimal self. The underlying 

claim is about how things that are external to the individual could become part of the self. For 

example, suppose there is an individual who is playing a dangerous sport and accidentally trips 

and breaks his arm. The injured person hurts his arm so bad that the doctors recommend 

amputating the arm and replacing it with a synthetic one. However, due to advancements in 

technology, the synthetic arm can do the basic operations or functions that the normal biological 

arm would do. One would imagine that at some time, the boundary or line between what counts as 

biological and what counts as synthetic blurs or completely disappears such that the individual 

sees the synthetic arm as a biological one. If someone were to harm the synthetic arm, the harm 

done to the arm would be felt as harm done to the self. In this case, an object that is external to the 



41 
 

individual becomes to be identified as part of the self, that is, the self is now extended to include 

what was initially the “other” (Heersmink, 2020).