The AfricAn JournAl of informATion And communicATion (AJIC) issue 29, 2022 Published by the LINK Centre University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) Johannesburg, South Africa https://www.wits.ac.za/linkcentre ISSN 2077-7213 (online version) ISSN 2077-7205 (print version) RESEARCH ARTICLES Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Wesley Moonsamy & Shawren Singh Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Riaan Bezuidenhout, Wynand Nel & Jacques M. Maritz International Copyright Flexibilities for Prevention, Treatment and Containment of COVID-19 Sean Flynn, Erica Nkrumah & Luca Schirru Value Creation and Socioeconomic Inclusion in South African Maker Communities Chris Armstrong & Erika Kraemer-Mbula Exploration of Public-Speaking Anxiety among Novice Instructors at a Ghanaian University Wincharles Coker Challenges for Foundation Phase Teachers in Interacting with Parents during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of Mangaung Primary Schools, South Africa Annemie Grobler AJIC Issue 29, 2022 i The AfricAn JournAl of informATion And communicATion (AJic) issue 29, 2022 Published by the LINK Centre, School of Literature, Language and Media (SLLM), Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa https://ajic.wits.ac.za The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) is a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, open access academic journal focused on the myriad dimensions of electronic and digital ecosystems that facilitate information, communication, innovation and transformation in African economies and in the broader Global South. Accredited by the South African Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), AJIC publishes online, free to the user, under a Creative Commons licence, and does not impose article processing charges. AJIC is indexed in Scientific Electronic Library Online (SciELO) SA, the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Sabinet African Journals and Wits University WIReDSpace, and is hosted on the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf ) Khulisa Journals platform. ediToriAl Advisory BoArd Lucienne Abrahams, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Tania Ajam, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Ufuoma Akpojivi, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Olufunmilayo Arewa, Temple University, Philadelphia Bassem Awad, Western University, London, ON, Canada Luca Belli, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Law School, Rio de Janeiro Erik de Vries, HAN University of Applied Sciences, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Barry Dwolatzky, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Nagy K. Hanna, independent innovation and digital transformation advisor, Washington, DC Geci Karuri-Sebina, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Erika Kraemer-Mbula, University of Johannesburg Tawana Kupe, University of Pretoria Manoj Maharaj, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban Gillian Marcelle, Resilience Capital Ventures, Washington, DC Uche M. Mbanaso, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria Isayvani Naicker, Technopolis Group, Amsterdam Caroline B. Ncube, University of Cape Town Nixon Muganda Ochara, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Chidi Oguamanam, University of Ottawa Marisella Ouma, independent intellectual property advisor, Nairobi Kanshukan Rajaratnam, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Carlo M. Rossotto, International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC Ewan Sutherland, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Hossana Twinomurinzi, University of Johannesburg Aaron van Klyton, Kean University, Union, NJ, USA ediTors Managing Editor: Tawana Kupe, Vice-Chancellor, University of Pretoria, tawana.kupe@up.ac.za Corresponding Editor: Lucienne Abrahams, Director, LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand, PO Box 601, Wits 2050, Johannesburg, South Africa, luciennesa@gmail.com Publishing Editor: Chris Armstrong, Research Associate, LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, chris.armstrong@wits.ac.za The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) ii Peer-reviewing AJIC acknowledges with gratitude the following peer reviewers of submissions published in this issue: Najma Agherdien, Ufuoma Akpojivi, Bassem Awad, Mark Burke, Reuben Dlamini, Bertram Haskins, Anika Meyer, Carolina Odman, Marisella Ouma, Kiru Pillay, Bobby Tait, and Aaron van Klyton. ProducTion Sub-editing: LINK Centre Proofreading: Linda Van de Vijver Desktop-publishing: LINK Centre dedicATion This Issue 29 of AJIC is dedicated to 100 years of knowledge production at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) as the university celebrates its centenary (1922-2022); to the continuous production of knowledge on the African continent, generating value for its countries and communities; and to all the authors, editors and peer reviewers who have contributed to this journal since its establishment. See https://wits100.wits.ac.za This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 AJIC is published by the LINK Centre, School of Literature, Language and Media (SLLM), Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), PO Box 601, Wits 2050, Johannesburg, South Africa. The LINK Centre is based at the Wits Tshimologong Digital Innovation Precinct, 41 Juta St., Braamfontein, Johannesburg, https://www.tshimologong.joburg ISSN 2077-7213 (online version) ISSN 2077-7205 (print version) Past issues of AJIC, and its precursor The Southern African Journal of Information and Communication (SAJIC), are available at https://ajic.wits.ac.za/issue/archive and https://www.wits.ac.za/linkcentre/sajic AJIC Issue 29, 2022 iii conTenTs RESEARCH ARTICLES Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Wesley Moonsamy & Shawren Singh Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Riaan Bezuidenhout, Wynand Nel & Jacques M. Maritz International Copyright Flexibilities for Prevention, Treatment and Containment of COVID-19 Sean Flynn, Erica Nkrumah & Luca Schirru Value Creation and Socioeconomic Inclusion in South African Maker Communities Chris Armstrong & Erika Kraemer-Mbula Exploration of Public-Speaking Anxiety among Novice Instructors at a Ghanaian University Wincharles Coker Challenges for Foundation Phase Teachers in Interacting with Parents during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of Mangaung Primary Schools, South Africa Annemie Grobler AJIC Issue 29, 2022 RESEARCH ARTICLES AJIC Issue 29, 2022 1 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Wesley Moonsamy Lecturer, Department of Information Systems, School of Computing, University of South Africa (UNISA) Science Campus, Johannesburg https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4285-236X Shawren Singh Associate Professor and Chair of Department of Information Systems, School of Computing, University of South Africa (UNISA) Science Campus, Johannesburg https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5038-0724 Abstract Electronic health (eHealth) is one of the focus areas of the South African Department of Health (DoH), with the ultimate goal being the development of an electronic health record (EHR) for every citizen. A commonly used subset of eHealth data, vaccination records, is still not yet fully digitised in South Africa. This study aimed to determine the perceptions of key stakeholders (doctors, nurses, parents, and school administrators) about a digital system for vaccination records for minors in South Africa’s Gauteng Province. Using a prototype online, cloud-based vaccine records management system created during the research, called e-Vaccination, quantitative and qualitative interaction-related data from 118 participants were collected using a five-point Likert-scale questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on Lund’s (2001) USE user perception framework, which considers usefulness, satisfaction, ease of use, and ease of learning. This study found that the participants supported the use of the digital vaccine records management system, with an emphasis on five identified factors: user friendliness, graphical design, practicality, user experience, and usability. Accordingly, this article recommends that policymakers and system designers carefully consider these factors in the design and development of South Africa’s digital vaccination records management system. Keywords vaccination records, eHealth, digitisation, health information systems, user perception, USE framework, Gauteng, South Africa Acknowledgement This article draws on elements of the first-listed author’s MSc dissertation (Moonsamy, 2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.23962/ajic.i29.13756 Recommended citation The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 2 Moonsamy and Singh Moonsamy, W., & Singh, S. (2022). Digital vaccination records: Exploring stakeholder perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), 29, 1-26. https://doi.org/10.23962/ajic.i29.13756 This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 1. Introduction The recent fire at one of South Africa’s largest academic hospitals, Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital (Motara, Moeng, Mohamed, & Punwasi, 2021), as well as the riots in the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces—in which organ- isations, including pharmacies and healthcare facilities, were looted and vandalised (South African Government, 2021b)—highlight the need to secure vital medical information such as patient records. Information that is exclusively stored on local servers, on hard drives, and in paper-based files is at risk of total loss during such events and other disasters. An increasingly critical subset of patient information, vaccination records, has shown a hastened conversion to a digital form as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (GAVI, 2020). There are several “patient-facing” health information systems in South Africa, including MomConnect and B-wise (DoH, 2020b; Health Enabled, 2021). A new addition to these disparate systems is the Electronic Vaccination Data System (EVDS), which was created as a self-registration portal that allows South Africans to register to receive their vaccination against COVID-19 (South African Government, 2021a). The hybrid EVDS, with a digital back-end but a physical vaccination card handed to a patient once the vaccination has been administered, allows the government to track and monitor the COVID-19 vaccination rollout. This hybrid approach, how- ever, does not give the patient easy access to a digital version of their vaccination record as it requires the proof of vaccination code, which can easily be misplaced. Decades since the first physical vaccination cards were handed to patients, South Africans must continue to store their physical vaccination cards safely, even with expensive technology having been created to register the patient. Such systems lack patient-centeredness, which is the key to eHealth (Nyatuka & De la Harpe, 2022). Immunisations are one of the greatest success stories of modern medicine (WHO, AJIC Issue 29, 2022 3 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa 2019). The study considered the grassroots level of vaccines and focused on the digi- tisation of vaccination records for some of the most vulnerable in our society: minors (from new-born to 12 years of age). The research therefore focused on South Africa’s expanded programme on immunisation (EPI) schedule (DoH, 2018). (The research did not focus on the COVID-19 vaccinations because adult vaccination records stor- age is at the infancy stage in South Africa.) This study commenced by determining the main challenges associated with the pa- per-based vaccination card in Gauteng. This was followed by an assessment of how vaccination records are stored by government and non-government entities globally. The eHealth aims of the DoH were then investigated. Based on information collect- ed, a prototype online digital vaccine records management system, named e-Vaccina- tion, was developed and tested with key stakeholders to determine their perceptions of the system. This was achieved by a questionnaire comprising of three sections. Section A was used to collect demographic information, section B collected percep- tions of vaccinations in Gauteng, South Africa, and Section C collected user per- ception (usefulness, satisfaction, ease of use, and ease of learning) information based on the USE tool (Lund, 2001. In addition to these four categories, one more user perception category (design and visual aids) was added due to the graphical nature of e-Vaccination’s user interface. The questionnaire was guided by the study’s core research question: What are the perceptions of the key stakeholders about replacing the paper-based vaccination card with a digital vaccination record system? 2. Challenges with paper-based vaccination cards Paper-based records are prone to damage or total destruction by disasters such as fires and flooding. In addition to this, South Africa experienced civil unrest during 2021, in which some healthcare facilities were looted and vandalised. In certain cases, patient records were stolen or damaged. These events fall under the vulnerability challenge. Another challenge, accessibility, has also been noted. In some instances, the vaccination card, which has been the primary storage mechanism for over three decades, has to be presented to a healthcare worker for medical purposes or to school administrators for admission to a school. If the card is not available, the vaccination records cannot be accessed easily. Another challenge related to the use of paper-based vaccination records is the reliability of the data. Handwritten paper-based records are prone to human error and have the added disadvantage of being illegible. This can also cause downstream digital records captured from this medium to be incorrect. Processes that load vaccination records as daily, weekly, or monthly batches cannot provide real-time information. These scenarios result in information that is not al- ways reliable. These three main challenges are further explained in Table 1. Table 1: Challenges with paper-based vaccination cards The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 4 Moonsamy and Singh Challenge Category Details Vulnerability Fires Fire hazards pose a threat to physical documents such as vaccination cards. Fire hazards include fires at dwellings as well as healthcare facilities. During such events, paper-based documents, as well as physical hardware containing patient records such as vaccination records, can be damaged. Floods Flooding, especially in informal settlements, poses a threat to homes and with it, paper-based records such as vaccina- tion cards. Civil unrest During civil unrest such as the recent riots in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, healthcare facilities can be looted and dam- aged. Paper-based documents, as well as physical hardware containing patient records such as vaccination records, can be damaged or stolen. Accessibility Medical care In cases where patients need medical care requiring previous vaccination records, doctors have to rely on the presence of the physical vaccination card or the parental recall of the child’s vaccination history. Admission at schools In some cases, a child cannot be admitted into a school if the vaccination records are not produced. If the vaccination card is not available, this can cause delays in admission. Reliability General statistics Vaccination statistics that are compiled by hand are prone to errors. Real-time vaccination statistics cannot be measured if physical records have to be manually captured at various levels. Reporting of herd immunity The concept of herd immunity is receiving much attention due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Herd immunity, however, has always been valid in terms of vaccine-prevent- able diseases affecting minors. Without accurate and up-to- date data, policymakers will not be fully equipped to make critical decisions regarding vaccination campaigns and other programmes. Source: Authors 3. Management of vaccination records AJIC Issue 29, 2022 5 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa An investigation of 16 countries (developed, developing, and countries in transition) was carried out to determine how they managed their vaccination records. The find- ings were categorised as follows: • Fully digitised – A child’s entire vaccination record can be accessed with or without the presence of the vaccination card. The card merely serves as proof for the parent or guardian. • Paper-based – The primary storage mechanism is a paper-based vaccination card or other paper-based documents. • Hybrid approach – A digital system that stores the vaccination records does exist, but it is not updated in real-time and, healthcare practitioners, as well as parents, cannot access these records. The primary storage mechanism remains the vaccination card. The investigation revealed that 44% of the investigated countries had a fully digitised storage mechanism whilst 37% were paper-based and 19% used a hybrid approach. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1: Vaccination record storage mechanisms across 16 investigated countries Source: Authors In addition to determining how other countries managed their vaccination records, The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 6 Moonsamy and Singh non-government-related initiatives, such as mobile applications (apps) that can be downloaded from the Apple iStore or Google Play store, were also investigated. The capabilities of the mobile applications that were assessed are listed in Table 2. Table 2: Main features of investigated mobile applications Mobile app name Register child Add vaccination records View vaccination records Share vaccination records Vacci- nation reminders Schedule- based vaccination records Pass- code protec- tion Vaccine Reminder        Vaccines Log – Vaccination Reminder & Tracker        Child Immunisation Tracker – Baby Immunisation        My Kids Vac- cine Tracking        My Immunizations        Source: Authors The five investigated mobile applications listed in Table 2 had features that were common. These features were the registration of a child, adding a vaccination record, and viewing a vaccination record. These features do represent the core functionality of a vaccination records management system. Similar datasets were noted amongst these mobile applications. It should be noted that none of them shared data with any government entity. The applications were meant to be used as stand-alone systems to assist parents and guardians with keeping track of their children’s vaccines. This led to the understanding that there were no freely available mechanisms for par- ents to store and retrieve official (verified) vaccination records that share data with government entities in South Africa. An investigation of South Africa’s DoH’s aims for eHealth was then conducted. 4. Department of Health’s aims for eHealth AJIC Issue 29, 2022 7 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa The 2019–2023 National Digital Health Strategy prioritises EHRs, digital pro- cesses, linkage of patient data across various systems, mHealth (mobile health), and knowledge in a digital form (DoH, 2020a). Some of these priorities relate to the previous National eHealth Strategy 2012–2016, which indicates that the measure of success of a country’s eHealth maturity is made up of five stages (DoH, 2012). These stages are summarised in Table 3. Table 3: Five stages of eHealth maturity Stage Description Stage 1 District health indicators are collected using paper-based systems Stage 2 The optimisation of the paper-based systems. This is achieved by the simplification of information and reducing the amount of duplication Stage 3 Converting the paper-based district health information systems into electronic storage and reporting Stage 4 Introducing working ICT systems as the source of data in the Health Information System Stage 5 Integrated and fully comprehensive National Health Information System Source: Adapted from DoH (2012) The DoH’s eHealth maturity model is a framework that guides the development of electronic health records using the flows and sources of health information (DoH, 2020a). Overall, South Africa is at Stage 3 of eHealth maturity. Some provinces, however, are at Stage 4 in certain areas and other provinces are at Stages 1, 2, or 3. The DoH has outlined the following steps for South Africa to reach Stages 4 and 5 of eHealth maturity: • patient-based health information systems need to be implemented at the point where health care is delivered; • these systems need to be linked to a national health record system; • all information should be captured into the electronic system at the point of patient care; • every South African should have a unique identifier on the Health Informa- tion System; • births and deaths need to be effectively registered; and • all facilities must be able to access information from other facilities (DoH, 2012). These steps essentially describe a system that stores the digital records centrally, and The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 8 Moonsamy and Singh which can be accessed and updated from any healthcare facility. This would remove the need to recapture information from the individual healthcare facilities to the district, provincial, and national levels. Equipped with the aims of the DoH, to- gether with generally used datasets and key functions of vaccination record systems, a prototype centrally based digital vaccination records management system called e-Vaccination was developed. 5. e-Vaccination prototype e-Vaccination was created with four different profiles, one for each of the four key stakeholder types (doctors, nurses, parents, and school administrators). This allowed each stakeholder to engage with e-Vaccination from their particular perspective. With reference to the eHealth aims of the DoH, e-Vaccination was designed as a centralised system that allowed the stakeholders to access it via their internet-en- abled devices. This centralised architecture is illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2: Architecture of e-Vaccination prototype As illustrated in Figure 2, the key stakeholders could use their internet-enabled AJIC Issue 29, 2022 9 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa device (smartphone, tablet, laptop) to access e-Vaccination via their web browser. e-Vaccination was hosted on a remote server (the cloud) and was accessible via a URL (www.e-vaccination.co.za). The features that were built into e-Vaccination took into consideration those features that were included in the investigated mobile applications. Since prototypes are nor- mally built with limited purposes (Houde & Hill, 1997), only selected features were included in the design of e-Vaccination. The included features were viewing, request- ing, and adding vaccination records. Vaccination statistics, in the form of reports at national, provincial, and district levels, were also included. The features linked to the different stakeholder views are described in Table 4. Table 4: Features included in e-Vaccination, per stakeholder type Feature Doctor Nurse Parent School administrator View a child’s vacci- nation records     Request a child’s vaccination record     Add a vaccination record     View national reports     View provincial reports     View local govern- ment (district level) reports     e-Vaccination had six features built into it, as listed in Table 4. The viewing of reports was common amongst all the stakeholder types. The rest of the features were selec- tively added to the relevant stakeholder type. Based on the features and profiles built into e-Vaccination, 18 process flows (some process flows were common amongst the stakeholder types) were designed. These are illustrated in Figures 3 to 6. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 10 Moonsamy and Singh Figure 3: Process flows for parents Figure 3 is an illustration of the process flows that were built into e-Vaccination for the parent stakeholder type. Once a parent logged into e-Vaccination, they could select from a list of five processes. To avoid complexity due to e-Vaccination being a prototype and not a live system, some of the processes that were identified early on in the design were not built. These are the “register a child”, “e-mail records” and “download records” processes. Figure 4: Process flows for nurses The overall process flows for the nurse stakeholder type are illustrated in Figure 4. Nurses could select from four main processes. These processes are to view a child’s vaccination record and to view national, provincial, and local government (district level) vaccination reports. The “verify a vaccination record” process was not built into the prototype. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 11 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Figure 5: Process flows for doctors The process flows illustrated in Figure 5 are for the doctor stakeholder type. The process flows for doctors are the same as the process flows for nurses. The “verify a vaccination record” process was not built into the prototype. Figure 6: Process flows for school administrators The process flows for the school administrator stakeholder type are illustrated in Figure 6. School administrators could select from four possible processes. Apart from viewing the national, provincial, and local government vaccination reports as the other stakeholder types could, school administrators could also request a child’s vac- cination record. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 12 Moonsamy and Singh e-Vaccination was designed to be more graphical, allowing the user to type as little as possible with most of the options provided by large icons and dropdown lists. Figure 7 shows the actual user interface of e-Vaccination. Figure 7: e-Vaccination’s user interface 6. Assessment of e-Vaccination prototype To assess the effectiveness of e-Vaccination, a questionnaire was designed to collect feedback from the relevant stakeholders. e-Vaccination was initially piloted by 10 us- ers, who provided their feedback regarding the system. e-Vaccination was thereafter refined and prepared for distribution to the potential participants. A quantitative research analysis was conducted on the data collected from the ques- tionnaire, which was based on the stakeholder’s engagement with e-Vaccination. A questionnaire with three sections was designed to collect demographic information (Section A), perceptions about vaccinations in Gauteng (Section B), and user per- ception (usefulness, satisfaction, ease of use and ease of learning, design and visual aids) information (Section C). (See Appendix 1 for the questionnaire.) The participants who completed the questionnaire were anonymous. They were se- lected by word-of-mouth as well as via contact information that was available in the public domain. A link to e-Vaccination and the questionnaire was distributed to the prospective participants via e-mail, phone call, SMS, or visit. The prospective partic- ipants were asked to use e-Vaccination and to select the user profile based on their stakeholder type. Once they had used e-Vaccination, the participants answered the questionnaire and submitted their responses. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 13 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Following the data collection process, the data were statistically tested for reliability using a Cronbach’s alpha test. The Cronbach’s alpha scores were verified against the rating table by Gliem and Gliem (2003). To confirm that the data collected were not a randomised occurrence, a chi-square goodness of fit test followed as a subsequent step. The ANOVA test was used to determine if there were significant differences between different experimental conditions (Rutherford, 2000). This statistical meth- od was used to analyse Likert-type scales in a similar study by Holtz and Krein (2011). Once it was proven that the data were reliable, not random and that stake- holder groups did not have a significant difference between them in their responses, a principle component analysis (PCA) test was conducted. A PCA is a data reduction method (UCLA IDRE, 2020) that can be used to investigate a relationship between dependent variables (Syms, 2019). The PCA was used to determine whether the responses to the questionnaire were related to the overall research question as well as to uncover any underlying factors that influenced the responses. The data analysis steps are summarised in Figure 8. Figure 8: Data analysis steps 7. Results There were 118 respondents to the questionnaire (doctors: 16; nurses: 16; parents: 74; school administrators: 12). Of the 118 respondents, 95% had access to a smartphone and at least 96% had access to the internet and email. The paper-based vaccination card was the primary storage mechanism according to 91% of the respondents, while 5% felt that a digital system was the primary mechanism. Approximately 4% were uncertain. Most of the respondents, 94%, had at least one experience with a lost vac- cination card. The results of the Cronbach’s alpha test showed that the data collected were reliable. The chi-square test showed that the data collected were not a random occurrence and were due to an underlying factor. There was no significant difference in the data collected between the four stakeholder groups according to the results of the ANOVA test. The weighted scores for the questionnaire per user perception category and stakeholder type are depicted in Figure 9. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 14 Moonsamy and Singh Figure 9: Weighted scores per user perception category and stakeholder type The weighted scores as illustrated in Figure 9 show that the overall perceptions about the digitisation of vaccination records scored an 83%. The usefulness of e-Vaccina- tion had the highest weighted score, 87%. The PCA test was conducted on all 33 questions of section C of the questionnaire for all 118 participants (the full dataset). This test was used to determine the underlying factors relating to the five categories of the questionnaire as well as the perceptions of the stakeholders about the digital vaccination record. Eigenvalues were calculated and thereafter used to determine the main factors for each of the 33 questions. The factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 should be retained (UCLA IDRE, 2020). These factors are the significant factors that make up the principal components of the dataset. The factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are displayed in Table 5. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 15 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Table 5: Factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 Factor Eigenvalue 1 16.93 2 2.05 3 1.78 4 1.38 5 1.22 6 1.05 Factor 1, with an eigenvalue of 16.93, generated the steepest gradient on a scree plot (see Appendix 2). This main factor was identified as the one concerning the overall research question on the digitisation of the vaccination record. The remaining factors were renamed Factors 1 to 5. The contributions of the factors towards each of the user perception categories are detailed in Table 6 below. Table 6: Percentage contributions of five factors to user perception categories User perception categories F1 (%) F2 (%) F3 (%) F4 (%) F5 (%) Usefulness 18.608 17.457 60.125 3.225 0.584 Ease of use 23.421 0.000 9.301 3.367 63.911 Ease of learn- ing 21.340 0.229 17.994 52.903 7.533 Satisfaction 21.586 8.105 4.648 39.850 25.810 Design and visual aids 15.045 74.208 7.931 0.654 2.162 For each user perception category, the factor that the category contributed most to- wards was determined. The factors were then labelled based on the underlying reason for why they contributed towards that category. The relationship between the factors and the categories, based on the highest contributions, is illustrated in Figure 10. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 16 Moonsamy and Singh Figure 10: Main factor contributions of each user perception category None of the user perception categories made its highest contribution to factor 1. The “ease of use” category which revealed the “user friendliness” factor during the PCA, however, made the highest contribution towards this factor. The contributions, labels, and descriptions are listed in Table 7. Table 7: Five underlying factors uncovered by PCA test Factor Contribu- tion (%) Label Description Factor 1 23.421 User friend- liness The system has to be appealing to the stakeholders and should not intimidate those who are new to such platforms. Factor 2 74.208 Graphical design The use of graphics adds to the intuitiveness of the system and guides the user on accessing the features they want to access with minimal effort. Factor 3 60.125 Practicality The system must provide the users’ anticipated features. Factor 4 52.903 User experi- ence The user experience must be engaging; users must not feel the need to use help files to access the features they want to use. Factor 5 63.911 Usability The features of the system must match the users’ expec- tations. The features must also work in the way that the user anticipates. The result of the statistical analysis demonstrated that e-Vaccination is user-friendly, practical, usable, provides a good user experience, and has a graphical design that aids in the use of the system. The results of each statistical test are summarised in Table 8. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 17 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Table 8: Summary of data analysis Statistic Usefulness Ease of use Ease of learning Satisfaction Design and visual aids Data Reliability Cron- bach's alpha 0.91 0.92 0.9 0.9 0.67 Chi-square test Chi- square value † 151.41 165.47 154.97 128.36 169.20 df 4 4 4 4 4 Critical chi-square value ‡ 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 Approx- imate p value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 Alpha value 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Outcome of calcula- tion 151.41† > 9.49‡ 165.47† > 9.49‡ 154.97† > 9.49‡ 128.36† > 9.49‡ 169.20† > 9.49‡ Result H0- usefulness chi-square Rejected H0- easy to use chi-square Rejected H0- easy to learn chi-square Rejected H0- satisfaction chi-square Rejected H0- design and visual aids chi-square Rejected ANOVA test Alpha value § 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 df between groups 3 3 3 3 3 df within groups 114 114 114 114 114 F value 1.48 0.54 0.55 1.54 1.45 p value ¦ 0.23 0.66 0.65 0.21 0.23 f crit 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68 Outcome of calcula- tion 0.23¦ > 0.05§ 0.66¦ > 0.05§ 0.65¦ > 0.05§ 0.21¦ > 0.05§ 0.23¦ > 0.05 § Result H0- usefulness ANOVA Accepted H0- easy to use ANOVA Accepted H0- easy to learn ANOVA Accepted H0- satisfaction ANOVA Accepted H0- design and visual aids ANOVA Accepted Principle component analysis The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 18 Moonsamy and Singh Statistic Usefulness Ease of use Ease of learning Satisfaction Design and visual aids Contri- bution to Factor 1 (User friendli- ness) 18.6 23.4 21.3 21.6 15.1 Contri- bution to Factor 2 (Graphical design) 17.5 0.0 0.2 8.1 74.2 Contri- bution to Factor 3 (Practical- ity) 60.1 9.3 18.0 4.7 7.9 Contri- bution to Factor 4 (User ex- perience) 3.2 3.4 52.9 39.9 0.7 Contri- bution to Factor 5 (Usability) 0.6 63.9 7.5 25.8 2.2 Overall Result H0- usefulness Accepted H0- easy to use Accepted H0- easy to learn Accepted H0- satisfaction Accepted H0- design and visual aids Accepted The data analysis alone cannot tell us the full story as it is important to consider the current context. Whilst conducting this research, the COVID-19 pandemic reached South Africa, necessitating the implementation of the EVDS. Though the EVDS was not examined in detail, it can be noted that some of the features, such as creating and viewing vaccination records, are common in both systems. 8. Response to new challenges The current COVID-19 pandemic has introduced a new paradigm, namely vacci- nation records for adults. Whilst the EVDS has been created primarily as a vaccina- tion registration tool for COVID-19 vaccinations, it also serves a secondary purpose, which is to store the vaccination records of the patients (adults). It is not unreason- able to assume that we will possibly move to adult immunisation schedules on a seasonal basis. The vaccination card, SMS notifications and QR codes provided to AJIC Issue 29, 2022 19 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa the patients after their vaccination still represent one-way information flow from the healthcare facility to the patient. Whilst the EVDS seems to satisfy some of the eHealth aims mentioned earlier, such as the centralisation of data (which facilitates the sharing of data between healthcare facilities), the patient is not yet fully able to access his or her vaccination records through an available portal independently. It must be noted that the sharing of medical information, even with the patient, must take into account the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) (RSA, 2013). The COVID-19 pandemic has also raised another consideration. This is vaccination coverage, which can contribute towards herd immunity reporting. If the information is appropriately utilised, herd immunity reporting can be done at a national level. Further research needs to be conducted regarding the reporting of herd immunity for other vaccine-preventable diseases based on the EPI schedule and at a more granular level, such as district level or lower. Though the EVDS does indeed represent a leap towards an EHR for South Africa, it has now contributed to a patchwork of systems created to address an immediate need. It contributes towards an EHR for every citizen, but we should be wary of it becoming the foundation for EHRs. Information Systems principles tell us that a solid foundation must first be laid. This includes getting the interconnectedness between the various systems done (whilst considering aspects such as POPIA) and then getting the related (medical) records appropriately positioned. In the past, other developing countries such as Tanzania have made massive investments in Health Information Systems, but issues relating to the adoption of integration resulted in resources being wasted (Smith et al., 2008). Considering that South Africa has a history of failed e-Government projects (Singh & Travica, 2018), the coupling of the current eHealth foundations and the EVDS needs to be analysed for current and future-readiness. In its haste, the DoH may have failed to adequately assess a key fac- tor, which is the usability of the EVDS. The downstream applications of the EVDS as well as an assessment of whether it fully meets the DoH’s eHealth aims are other areas that need further research. 9. Conclusions The results of the study show that the key stakeholders supported the development of a digital system for the safe and secure storage of vaccination records for minors in Gauteng. The successful design of such a system is influenced by several factors. These factors (user friendliness, graphical design, practicality, user experience, and usability) were identified during this research and should drive the design and devel- opment of a digital vaccination records management system. The DoH’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the strides that South Africa is taking towards an EHR for all citizens. Vaccination records for mi- nors (based on the EPI schedule), however, have still not made the same advances. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 20 Moonsamy and Singh The reason could be that the move towards stages 4 and 5 of the eHealth model might require a more gradual approach as historic information needs to be consid- ered. Facets of prototypes such as e-Vaccination, working eHealth systems like the EVDS, and existing healthcare infrastructure should converge when considering the factors uncovered during this study as well as future research. If the usability of the system satisfies the key stakeholders, the chances of the system being used and the overall vision of the DoH being met will increase. To avoid wasteful expenditure, eHealth designers and policymakers should carefully consider the usability of applications that are being proposed for all key stakeholders. References Department of Health (DoH). (2012). eHealth Strategy South Africa. https:// www.health-e.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/South-Africa-eHealth- Strategy-2012-2017.pdf DoH. (2018). Road to Health Book. https://sidebyside.co.za/resources/road-to- health-book DoH. (2020a). National Digital Health Strategy for South Africa 2019-2024. http:// www.health.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/national-digital-strategy- for-south-africa-2019-2024-b.pdf DoH. (2020b). What is MomConnect? http://www.health.gov.za/index.php/mom- connect#momconnect Gliem, J. A., & Gliem, R. R. (2003). Calculating, interpreting, and reporting Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for Likert-type scales. In 2003 Midwest Research to Practice Conference in Adult, Continuing, and Community Education (pp. 82–88). Columbus, OH. https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/ handle/1805/344/Gliem+&+Gliem.pdf?sequence=1 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI). (2020). Could COVID-19 accelerate the digitisation of vaccine records? https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/ could-covid-19-accelerate-digitisation-vaccine-records Health Enabled. (2021). South Africa digital health dashboard. http://healthenabled. org/wordpress/south-africa-digital-health-dashboard Holtz, B., & Krein, S. (2011). Understanding nurse perceptions of a newly implemented electronic medical record system. Journal of Technology in Human Services, 29(4), 247–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/15228835.2011.639931 Houde, S., & Hill, C. (1997). What do prototypes prototype? In Martin G. Helander, Thomas K. Landauer & P.V. Prabhu (Eds.), Handbook of human-computer interaction (pp. 367–381). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-044481862-1.50082-0 Lund, A. M. (2001). Measuring usability with the USE questionnaire. Usability Interface, 8(2), 3–6. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 21 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Moonsamy, W. (2021). An investigation into digital vaccination records for minors in Gauteng, South Africa. MSc dissertation, University of South Africa (UNISA). Motara, F., Moeng, S., Mohamed, A., & Punwasi, J. (2021). Medical disaster related to CMJAH fire. Wits Journal of Clinical Medicine, 3(2), 139–140. https://doi.org/10.18772/26180197.2021.v3n2a8 Nyatuka, D. R., & De la Harpe, R. (2021). Design considerations for patient‐ centered eHealth interventions in an underserved context: A case of health and wellbeing services within Nairobi’s informal settlements in Kenya. The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 88(3). https://doi.org/10.1002/isd2.12164 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (2013). Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) 4 of 2013. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_ document/201409/3706726-11act4of2013protectionofpersonalinforcorrect. pdf Rutherford, A. (2000). Introducing ANOVA and ANCOVA: A GLM approach (Introducing statistical methods). SAGE. https://0-ebookcentral-proquest-com. oasis.unisa.ac.za/lib/unisa1-ebooks/reader.action?docID=254651 Singh, S., & Travica, B. (2018). E-Government systems in South Africa: An infoculture perspective. The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 84(4), e12030. https://doi.org/10.1002/isd2.120300 Smith, M. L., Madon, S., Anifalaje, A., Lazarro-Malecela, M., & Michael, E. (2008). Integrated health information systems in Tanzania: Experience and challenges. The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries, 33(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1681-4835.2008.tb00227.x South African Government. (2021a). Electronic Vaccination Data System (EVDS) self registration portal. https://www.gov.za/covid-19/vaccine/evds South African Government. (2021b, July 13). Health on the impact of violent protests on health services. https://www.gov.za/speeches/health-impact- violent-protests-health-services-13-jul-2021-0000 Syms, C. (2019). Principal components analysis. In B. Fath (Ed.), Encyclopedia of ecology (pp. 566–573). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-409548-9.11152-2 UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education (UCLA IDRE). (2020). Principal components analysis: SPSS annotated output. https://stats.idre.ucla. edu/spss/output/principal_components/ World Health Organisation (WHO). (2019). Immunization. https://www.who.int/ news-room/facts-in-pictures/detail/immunization The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 22 Moonsamy and Singh Appendix 1: Questionnaire SECTION A: Respondent information (Demographics) 1. Regarding this questionnaire, please select your primary role: Medical Doctor Parent Nurse School Administration Staff For the following questions, please tick the appropriate box Yes No 2. Do you work in Gauteng, South Africa? 3. Do you have access to a smartphone? 4. Do you have access to the Internet? 5. Do you have an e-mail address? SECTION B: Vaccination records in Gauteng, South Africa 1. In your experience with vaccinations, how is a child’s vaccination records primarily stored? Paper-based vaccination card No records are kept Electronic systems Not sure 2. Paper-based vaccination cards can be susceptible to loss or damage. Are you aware of a vaccination card that has been lost? Yes No 3. If your answer to the question above was “Yes”, please select the measures taken to recover the lost vaccination records. If your answer was “No”, please select “Not applicable”. Successfully obtained vaccination records from the vaccination clinic Performed a blood analysis on the child to determine the vaccines that were administered Other (if Other, please describe the measures taken below): Not applicable 4. In your opinion, who should be responsible for ensuring that a child’s vaccination records are safely stored? AJIC Issue 29, 2022 23 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Parents / Guardians Govern- ment Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below: Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree 5. Children living in Gauteng receive their vaccinations on time 6. Paper-based vaccination cards are a reliable way to store a child’s vaccination records SECTION C: A centralised electronic vaccination record system in Gauteng, South Africa, managed by the government Based on the prototype system (e-Vaccination application) that you have used, please indi- cate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Usefulness 1. The e-Vaccination application can help me to be more effective when handling vaccination records 2. The e-Vaccination application can help me to be more productive when using the vaccination functions 3. The e-Vaccination application is useful for managing vaccination records 4. The e-Vaccination application will save me time when storing vaccination records 5. The e-Vaccination application will save me time when accessing vaccination records 6. The e-Vaccination application meets my needs in terms of storing vaccination records The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 24 Moonsamy and Singh Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree 7. The e-Vaccination application meets my needs in terms of retrieving vaccination records 8. The e-Vaccination application saves my inputs as required 9. The e-Vaccination application displays vaccination records in a way that I can understand Ease of use 10. The e-Vaccination application is easy to use 11. The e-Vaccination application is not a complicated system to use 12. The e-Vaccination application is user friendly as it minimises the amount of input I need to enter 13. Any action on the e-Vaccination application is completed with the minimum number of possible steps 14. Using the e-Vaccination application is effortless 15. I can use the e-Vaccination application without written instructions 16. There are no inconsistencies within the e-Vaccination application 17. I can recover from mistakes easily when using the e-Vaccination application 18. I can use the e-Vaccination application successfully every time Ease of learning 19. I quickly understood how to use the e-Vaccination application 20. I easily remember how to use the e-Vaccination application AJIC Issue 29, 2022 25 Digital Vaccination Records: Exploring Stakeholder Perceptions in Gauteng, South Africa Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree 21. I quickly became skilful with the e-Vaccination application 22. I quickly learned how to navigate through the e-Vaccination application 23. I quickly learned what the colour coding of the visual aids (icons) meant Satisfaction 24. I am satisfied with the e-Vaccination application 25. I would recommend the e-Vaccination application to a friend 26. The e-Vaccination application works the way I want it to work 27. I am satisfied with the overall appearance of the e-Vaccination application 28. I am satisfied with how the navigation of the e-Vaccination application works Design and visual aids 29. The use of visual aids (icons) are helpful when using the e-Vaccination application 30. I would prefer written instructions on the e-Vaccination application instead of visual aids (icons) 31. The visual aids (icons) help me navigate the e-Vaccination application easily 32. The colour coding of the visual aids (icons) helps me to determine what the link means 33. The vaccination statistics provided are useful The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 26 Moonsamy and Singh Appendix 2: Scree plot of eigenvalues AJIC Issue 29, 2022 1 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Riaan Bezuidenhout Assistant Researcher, Department of Computer Science and Informatics, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5412-7512 Wynand Nel Lecturer, Department of Computer Science and Informatics, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5579-6411 Jacques M. Maritz Lecturer, Department of Engineering Sciences, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1556-8523 Abstract The term decentralised as a description of the architecture, operation, and gover- nance of permissionless blockchain systems has become ubiquitous. However, in these contexts, the term decentralised has no clear definition. Blockchain ecosystems are complex, and thus it is essential to address confusion among stakeholders about their nature and promote understanding of the intentions and consequences of their implementation. This article offers a theoretical definition of the term decentralised in the context of permissionless blockchain systems. It is proposed that five inextricable and interconnected aspects are required, at a minimum, to warrant a claim that a per- missionless blockchain system is decentralised. These aspects are disintermediation, a peer-to-peer network, a distributed blockchain data structure, algorithmic trust, and open-source principles. The relationship between the five aspects is discussed, and it is argued that decentralisation is not binary but exists on a spectrum. Any vari- ation in one or more aspects may impact the system’s decentralised nature as a whole. The researchers identify areas where further investigation in this field is required and propose instances where the knowledge garnered may be used. Keywords blockchain, permissionless, decentralised, disintermediation, distributed ledger, algorithmic trust, open source, peer-to-peer network DOI: https://doi.org/10.23962/ajic.i29.14247 The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 2 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz Recommended citation Bezuidenhout, R., Nel, W., & Maritz, J.M. (2022). Defining decentralisation in permissionless blockchain systems. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), 29, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.23962/ajic.i29.14247 This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 1. Introduction When the term decentralised is used to refer to a permissionless blockchain system, the term tends to lack precision with respect to its meaning and the aspects of the system it is being used to refer to (Walch, 2019, p. 40). Many terms are used to describe technologies built on so-called decentralised blockchains. The terms decen- tralised consensus systems, decentralised applications, decentralised digital curren- cies, cryptocurrencies, altcoins, meta coins, smart contracts, distributed applications, distributed autonomous organisations, and distributed autonomous companies are routinely used throughout the literature (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015). Some au- thors simply refer to blockchain or blockchain technology (Holotescu, 2018). It may be that within the computer science community, the term decentralised blockchain is generally understood. However, one would be hard-pressed to find a clear theoretical definition for it. The vagueness represents a potential problem for any stakeholder needing to engage with the technology on some level. This study provides a proposed clear theoretical definition of the term decentralised in the context of a permissionless blockchain system. In establishing and setting out the definition, this study seeks to make an important contribution to stakeholders engaging with blockchain by inserting critical, theoretically founded analysis into the subject’s discourse. What is a theoretical def inition, and why is it important? The conclusion Walch (2019) draws is that in law, the term decentralised already represents a legal standard that has implications for regulators and business, and its current lack of proper definition may result in misleading conclusions being drawn from it. This is exacerbated by the fact that regulators and managers have to deal with many different types of business models that are being established using blockchain systems (Stabile et al., 2020). Whether the underlying blockchain system is cen- tralised or decentralised is fundamental to the type of business model and, therefore, its regulatory environment. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 3 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Notwithstanding its vagueness, the term decentralised found its way into regulators’ language from early on, as this description by the US Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) shows: c. De-Centralized Virtual Currencies A final type of convertible virtual currency activity involves a de-central- ized convertible virtual currency (1) that has no central repository and no single administrator, and (2) that persons may obtain by their own comput- ing or manufacturing effort. (FinCEN, 2013, p. 5) And the practice is still ongoing, as is evident in this more recent US government statement: The vast majority of cryptocurrencies are decentralized, as they lack a cen- tral administrator to issue currency and maintain payment ledgers—in oth- er words, there is no central bank. (US Department of Justice, 2020, p. 3) In the first example above, the term decentralised is contained in the definition of the system (decentralised virtual currency), while the second example explains what a decentralised cryptocurrency lacks, not what it contains. A theoretical definition must go beyond a superficial description. In addition to specifying what is required in a decentralised blockchain system, this study also answers the how, when and why questions that apply to theories in general (Bacharach, 1989). Specifically, in the con- text of permissionless blockchain systems, this study answers the following questions: • What are the aspects (constituent stakeholders and components) of decentralisation in a decentralised blockchain system? • How do these aspects combine and interact to achieve decentralisation? • When (and to what end) do the stakeholders and components need to arrange themselves in a manner that delivers decentralisation? • Why is each aspect necessary? In other words, why can decentralisations not exist without the presence of each aspect? It is important to note that the end-product is not merely a list of constituent ele- ments and their individual roles, but is more importantly also an explanation of the interactions and causal relationships between these phenomena. Structure of the article This article starts with a description of blockchain systems, their components, and their purpose, before defining what a permissionless blockchain system is and the environment in which it operates. The terminology and environment make up the boundary assumptions within which the theoretical definition of decentralised will be positioned. Specifically, the definition of decentralised is bounded by the key con- straint of a permissionless blockchain system, as permissioned blockchain systems are specifically not decentralised (Vukolic, 2017). In the results, we propose a proper, the- oretically founded, technical definition of the term decentralised in the context of The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 4 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz permissionless blockchain systems. The article concludes with a discussion of the results and concluding remarks. 2. Background In the literature, some authors refer to blockchain as a data structure, an ordered list of blocks, where each block contains a list of transactions, and where blocks are cryptographically linked to provide a tamper-proof historical transaction record (Nofer et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017). The idea of a blockchain as a distributed ledger of transactions (therefore a data structure) is echoed by multiple researchers (Mulár, 2018; Rizun et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2017). Other authors describe a blockchain as a combination of technologies such as distributed ledgers, cryptography, and consen- sus mechanisms that allow untrusted parties to agree on the state of transaction data that is decentralised – therefore, a system (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015; Saad et al., 2019; Tasca & Tessone, 2019). To avoid ambiguity, in this study, the term blockchain explicitly means a distributed ledger that conforms to a cryptographically linked data structure that serves as a transaction record and makes up one component of a blockchain system. The data structure characteristics are specifically designed to enable parties to agree on the transaction record without having to trust one another. Furthermore, this study defines a blockchain system as a combination of stakeholders and technologies that produce, consume, or interact with required services, or are enabled by the use of a blockchain data structure. While permissionless blockchain systems may differ in their intended application and architecture, they all share essential objectives (Be- zuidenhout et al., 2020). Purpose of a blockchain system A blockchain’s purpose is to record transactions (which may include smart contract programs) that are immutable and cannot be repudiated, and that are secure, trans- parent and accessible (Tasca & Tessone, 2019; Xu et al., 2017). These terms (related to the nature of the blockchain data structure) are defined in the following way: • Immutable refers to the principle that a recorded transaction cannot be altered or, more accurately, can eventually not be altered (Tasca & Tessone, 2019). • Non-repudiation means that since a transaction cannot be altered, it can also not be undone or “taken back” (Xu et al., 2017). Immutability and non- repudiation are achieved by embedding cryptographic hash pointers into the blockchain to construct a tamper-proof log of transactions (Narayanan et al., 2016). • Security in permissionless blockchain systems pivots on a trifecta of techniques that protect the ownership of data, the integrity of the blockchain, and the system’s redundancy as a whole. First, data ownership security is established through public-key cryptography by allowing only the rightful owner of a private key to transact with their own data on the blockchain (Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016). Second, the blockchain itself consists of a sequential AJIC Issue 29, 2022 5 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems series of blocks, each linked by a cryptographic hash pointer to the previous block to produce a tamper-evident log of transactions. This ensures the integrity of the blockchain (Narayanan et al., 2016). Third, a centralised system controlled by a single authority carries the risk of single-point failure (Atzori, 2017). By doing away with a centralised or root authority and by distributing copies of the blockchain across many peers on a peer-to-peer network, a permissionless blockchain uses redundancy to mitigate this type of risk. • Transparency refers to the fact that all the blockchain transactions are open and, therefore, auditable by all the system’s participants. In the case of permissionless blockchain systems, this means anyone with an internet connection (Tasca & Tessone, 2019). • Accessibility is narrowly coupled with the idea of transparency, meaning all participants in a permissionless blockchain system have equal rights to transact on and manipulate the blockchain (Xu et al., 2017). For clarification, note that there is a juxtaposition between accessibility and security here. Accessibility implies the ability to inspect the blockchain, including all the transactions on it. This may include inspecting the data (for auditability purposes) of other participants. Accessibility also means that there is no restriction on participants to transact on the system, but transactions by participants are limited to their own data. Accessibility does not extend to the point where data ownership security is compromised. In a permissionless blockchain system (see section 2), the definition of decentralised becomes critical. This is because it must remain true to its purpose while being de- centralised and must therefore operate in the absence of a central trusted authority. Permissionless blockchain systems and their environment This study focuses on permissionless, i.e., public, blockchain systems. As a starting point, the emphasis is placed on the distinction between distributed and decen- tralised system architectures as described by Troncoso et al. (2017, p. 208). Note that these definitions are aimed at information systems in general and not blockchain systems specifically: Distributed system: A system with multiple components that have their behaviour co-ordinated via message passing. These components are usually spatially separated and communicate using a network, and may be man- aged by a single root of trust or authority. (Danezis & Halpin, 2017, p. 208) Decentralized system: A distributed system in which multiple authorities control different components, and no single authority is fully trusted by all others. (Danezis & Halpin, 2017, p. 208) These two definitions show clearly that while all decentralised systems are distribut- ed, not all distributed systems are decentralised. Permissionless blockchain systems do not restrict participation. Anyone can join or leave the system at will. They function The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 6 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz on a peer-to-peer basis, without a central authority and require a decentralised con- sensus mechanism for participants to reach an agreement on a single correct state of the blockchain (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015; Tasca & Tessone, 2019; Zheng et al., 2017). These are the only type of blockchain systems where the definition of decentralised may be applicable because permissionless blockchain systems are dis- tributed systems where different components are controlled by multiple authorities. In contrast, permissioned (private) blockchain systems are systems where only certain entities are allowed access to the blockchain. Although they are also distributed sys- tems, access is controlled by a central authority, and these types of blockchain systems are not decentralised (Deshpande et al, 2017). The definition of decentralised has no meaning in the context of permissioned blockchain systems. Layers in a blockchain system Three layers of entities or components in permissionless blockchain systems make up the blockchain environment. These are the external layer, the primary layer, and the secondary layer, as depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1: Layers in a blockchain system First is the layer that constitutes its mechanical operation. It consists of the block- chain, peer-to-peer network, and the consensus mechanism (Narayanan et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2017). This will be referred to as the primary layer. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 7 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems on a peer-to-peer basis, without a central authority and require a decentralised con- sensus mechanism for participants to reach an agreement on a single correct state of the blockchain (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015; Tasca & Tessone, 2019; Zheng et al., 2017). These are the only type of blockchain systems where the definition of decentralised may be applicable because permissionless blockchain systems are dis- tributed systems where different components are controlled by multiple authorities. In contrast, permissioned (private) blockchain systems are systems where only certain entities are allowed access to the blockchain. Although they are also distributed sys- tems, access is controlled by a central authority, and these types of blockchain systems are not decentralised (Deshpande et al, 2017). The definition of decentralised has no meaning in the context of permissioned blockchain systems. Layers in a blockchain system Three layers of entities or components in permissionless blockchain systems make up the blockchain environment. These are the external layer, the primary layer, and the secondary layer, as depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1: Layers in a blockchain system First is the layer that constitutes its mechanical operation. It consists of the block- chain, peer-to-peer network, and the consensus mechanism (Narayanan et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2017). This will be referred to as the primary layer. A second layer of more sophisticated applications can be built on top of the basic blockchain implementation through smart contracts. The meaning of the term smart contract is extremely broad. However, it allows for a range of automated, dynamic applications to operate independently, using the primary layer’s services (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015). These applications will be referred to as the secondary layer. It is important to note that the interaction with the secondary layer applications occurs by initiating a transaction (containing the smart contract code to be executed) on the primary layer. For example, Ethereum (Buterin, 2013) allows users to pre-program transactions by submitting software code inside a transaction that executes auto- matically under certain conditions. These transactions do not require any additional action by the users who created them. Blockchain systems do not suddenly spring into being and then exist in isolation; they are embedded within society at large. They are created and maintained by some entity or entities to fulfil a useful function to a community of consumers or users. These entities include: • Developers that develop and maintain software related to both the primary and secondary layers of many blockchain systems (Bitcoin.org, n.d.; Cardanofoundation.org, 2020; Ethereum.org, n.d.). These may be not-for- profit communities or business entities that operate for profit (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015). • Users who transact with the blockchain system, either directly with the primary layer or indirectly with the secondary layer. These may be individuals, organisations, or systems (including IoT devices). Users may also transact through intermediaries such as brokers or exchanges, which, in turn, can be viewed as users, organisations, or systems. • Regulatory authorities that may scrutinise blockchain systems from time to time (Tasca & Tessone, 2019). The entities above are examples of external stakeholders that make up an external layer, comprising all the parties that interact with or provide support to the block- chain system’s primary or secondary layers. The secondary layer is embedded in the primary layer and cannot exist without it. Furthermore, the external layer does not interact directly with the secondary layer but does so through the primary layer. Similarly, the primary layer does not exist without the requirement for, consumption of, and development by the external layer. Within the context provided in the preceding discussions—focusing on the distinction be- tween the terms blockchain and blockchain system, the purpose of a blockchain system, and the definition of a permissionless blockchain system and its constituent layers (envi- ronment)—it is possible to define the term decentralised. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 8 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz 3. Methodology This study investigated literature in the blockchain domain to classify the aspects that authors associated with the decentralised nature of blockchain systems. The purpose was neither to be exhaustive nor comparative, and to extract the meaning of the term decentralised as used by authors in information science in the context of the permissionless blockchain environment. Works that dealt with the theory of blockchain systems in general in the preceding five years (since 2016) were selected. Only peer-reviewed material was included, specifically journal articles and confer- ence papers. The primary search was conducted through the internet search services of Academia, ResearchGate, Semantic Scholar, and SSRN. A secondary search was done by looking for appropriate material referenced in articles and papers that passed this selection process. Each item identified in the literature was studied to determine which aspects the au- thor(s) ascribed to the term decentralised in the context of a permissionless blockchain system. In some of the material set aside for further analysis, the authors’ treatment of the term decentralised was too vague to warrant including it in the study. Eventu- ally, of the 89 articles and papers identified for detailed scrutiny, 46 (see Appendix) were included in the results. At this point, we concluded that it was unlikely that additional interpretations of the term decentralised were forthcoming by including more material, and that the disqualified material up to that point did not include any information that was not present in the final 46 articles and papers. 4. Analysis from the review of existing literature Throughout the 46 items investigated, it was found that the term decentralised could be associated with five aspects that apply to permissionless blockchain systems. These aspects, identified from the literature, were disintermediation, a distributed blockchain, peer-to-peer network, algorithmic trust, and open-source principles. They represent philosophical ideas (disintermediation and open-source principles), physical components (peer-to-peer network), and software implementations (dis- tributed blockchain and algorithmic trust) which form the basis of the theoretical definition of decentralised in a permissionless blockchain system. Table 1 lists the five aspects of decentralisation against the author numbers in the Appendix. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 9 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Table 1: Aspects of decentralisation identified from the literature Aspect of decentralisation Author number in Appendix Count Disintermediation 1, 2, 3, 4, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 32 Distributed blockchain 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 35 Peer-to-peer network 4, 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 33, 36, 39, 41, 43, 44 17 Algorithmic trust 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46 33 Open-source principles 5, 12, 20, 28, 41 5 The study did not assign any weight to the number of times an aspect presented in the literature (“Count” column in Table 1). This was done for two reasons. First, the literature reviewed did not aim to define the term decentralisation but assumed that decentralisation was a valid descriptor of a blockchain system because one or more of the specific aspects were present. Second, as will be shown in the results (section 5), no aspect is more important than the other; all are required in a decentralised block- chain system. Each of these aspects is now discussed in detail to provide the context of how they were represented in the reviewed literature. Disintermediation Disintermediation is a philosophical idea that was central to Nakamoto’s introduc- tion of Bitcoin. He posited a system of electronic payments where individuals could transact without the mediation of a central institution (Nakamoto, 2008). The idea of disintermediation, which refers to the absence of a central authority in a blockchain system, whether the transactions are meant to be of a monetary nature or not, is an assertion that comes across often in the literature. Some authors refer to a blockchain system being decentralised because of the lack of central authority within the peer- to-peer network directly, while others refer more indirectly to the absence of a central The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 10 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz point of trust or authority. Hackius and Petersen (2017, p. 5) called it “without rely- ing on a central authority or centralised infrastructure establishing trust”, while Lin and Liao (2017, p. 653) state that “blockchain doesn’t have to rely on a centralized node”. This philosophical flavour can border on political ideology, as noted by Atzori (2017, p. 46): “the advocates of decentralization tend to have in common the same dissociative attitude towards centralized institutions and the State in particular”. In this study, the researchers opted for the term “disintermediation” used by Holotescu (2018, p. 276) to describe the spectrum of phrases ranging from “not having to rely on a central node” to “dissociative attitude towards centralized institutions” as the term summarises all of the above ideas into a single word. Disintermediation means that any party that aims to participate in the blockchain system’s primary layer (for instance, join the peer-to-peer network, submit a trans- action, or attempt to extend the blockchain) can do so without the permission of any other party. Furthermore, any party that participates in the primary layer of the blockchain system may send data to, or receive data from, any other party. This can be done by contacting that party directly or through an intermediary, and if it does so through an intermediary (another node or series of nodes on the network), the party can expect that the data will be transmitted without any interference or changes whatsoever. This includes any undue delay in transmission. We argue that, as part of a theoretical definition, disintermediation can be interpreted as a software policy, loose standing from the motivations, political or otherwise, of any party that engages with the blockchain system. Distributed blockchain The most common reference regarding the nature of the blockchain data structure among authors reviewed includes the notion of a ledger, transaction ledger, or transac- tion record, distributed or shared among the nodes of the peer-to-peer network. For example: “At the heart of these systems is a shared ledger that reliably records a se- quence of transactions” (Chen & Micali, 2017, p. 1); “Every different user constitutes a network node and maintains a copy of the ledger” (Konstantinidis et al., 2018, p. 384); and “The information about every transaction ever completed in Blockchain is shared and available to all nodes” (Limata, 2019, p. 5). Other authors used the term distributed database, for instance: “A blockchain is a distributed ledger database” (Manski, 2017, p. 512), and “a distributed database of records” (Perwej et al., 2019, p. 82). All these terms refer to the cryptographically linked, tamper-proof blockchain data structure identified in section 2. In the context of decentralisation in permissionless blockchain systems, the blockchain has no central custodian and is duplicated on many peers (but it need not be duplicated on all) on the peer-to-peer network. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 11 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Peer-to-peer network A peer-to-peer network refers to the well-known network topology where no cen- tral node controls access to or data flow within a network (Schoder et al., 2005; Schollmeier, 2001). Logically it makes sense to argue that a peer-to-peer network is the only network topology that enables disintermediation because, if the network is hierarchical, the ability for stakeholders to interact with the network or transmit or receive data on the network will not meet the standard set for disintermediation (see above). In the literature reviewed, the purpose of the peer-to-peer network was named in relation to the storage of copies of the blockchain (Boudguiga et al., 2017; Labazova, 2019), the verification of transactions, the recording of transactions, and the verifi- cation of the validity of the blockchain (Atzori, 2017; Nawari & Ravindran, 2019). We add to these functions the provision of disintermediated communication (data exchange) between stakeholders and components. Algorithmic trust Disintermediation requires a transparent method whereby parties can agree that ad- ditions to the blockchain are valid. This mechanism is called a consensus algorithm (Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016; Zheng et al., 2017) and constitutes a distributed protocol (Blocki & Zhou, 2016; Cachin & Vukolic, 2017) to deliver community trust (Aste et al., 2017). Many terms exist to summarise how participants in a per- missionless blockchain system eventually agree on a single correct blockchain (trans- action history) and verify that the blockchain has not been tampered with. In the reviewed literature, these descriptions included mostly references to cryptography, proof-based consensus, and trust by computation. The consensus process in a per- missionless blockchain system aims to select the node that is allowed to add a block of transactions to the blockchain at random (Glaser, 2017). Essentially, the commu- nity of participants in a blockchain system accept a set of digital governance rules or “cryptolaw” (Rueda et al., 2020, p. 182), which will govern the system. For this study and in the context of permissionless blockchain systems, we define algorithmic trust as a set of rules that disintermediated stakeholders share to manage the blockchain’s extension and security. Logically these rules must be consistent (the same for all stakeholders), transparent (the details of how they work must be known to all stakeholders), and rigid (not changeable at the whim of any minority). However, algorithmic trust extends beyond the computational processes verifying and adding transactions or transaction blocks to the blockchain; the consistency, transparency, and rigidity requirements also apply to the communication protocols of the peer-to- peer network because these play a critical role in the disintermediation process. The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 12 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz Open-source principles The meaning of open-source development (Glaser & Bezzenberger, 2015), open- source system (Lin & Liao, 2017), and developers operating on open-source princi- ples (Tasca & Tessone, 2019) is more difficult to pin down into a single definition. Arguments will be presented in the discussion that the source code of the system must be open-source. This includes all modules that control communication, secu- rity, verification, and consensus. However, it goes beyond software. The entire de- cision-making structure of the developer community must be transparent. On the other hand, to demand that the decision-making structure must be open for partici- pation by every stakeholder that wishes to do so seems more idealistic than practical. 5. Results Armed with the five aspects of decentralisation, namely disintermediation, a distrib- uted blockchain, a peer-to-peer network, algorithmic trust, and open-source prin- ciples identified from the literature (see section 4), it is now possible to construct a theoretical definition of the term decentralised or decentralisation, in the context of permissionless blockchain systems. Decentralisation def ined The aspects of decentralisation are inextricable, and decentralisation cannot exist if any one aspect is lacking. However, a theoretical definition must explain not only which aspects are required, but also when and why each aspect is required and how it contributes to decentralisation. Figure 2 shows the interrelationships between the aspects of decentralisation and how these aspects support the purpose of a decen- tralised blockchain system. The primary driver of the decentralisation process is the aspect of disintermediation at the top centre of Figure 2. The requirement that the blockchain system must be permissionless (by definition) is the reason why disintermediation is needed. Any party must be allowed to participate in the blockchain system without the permission of any other party. In practice, it means that the blockchain must, in the first instance, be available to anyone or any system that may want to use it for any purpose it may see fit – because no permission is needed. Secondly, disintermediation also means that any party can send valid data to any number of the nodes on the peer-to-peer network with the expectation that it will be propagated across the whole network and be accepted as part of the blockchain. Valid data refers to a transaction, a new addi- tion to the blockchain, or any other data that may form part of the system’s operation. The processing of any valid data by any source must be indistinguishable from any other valid data from any other source. In other words, disintermediation gives rise to a software policy of data and source equivalence. Disintermediation supports the permissionless blockchain system’s purpose of transparency and access. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 13 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems Figure 2: Interrelationships between the aspects of decentralisation and how they support the purpose of a decentralised blockchain system Supports Peer-to-peer network Distributed blockchain data structure Algorithmic trust Open-source principles Requires Enables Necessitates Secures Requires transparency Provides transparency Disintermediation Transparency Accessibility Accessibility Immutability Non-repudiation Security Immutability Non-repudiation Accessibility Security Transparency Aspect of decentralisation Supports Supports Supports Purpose Supports Disintermediation creates the requirement for a peer-to-peer network—the second aspect of decentralisation in Figure 2. A peer-to-peer network requires no central au- thority to grant or deny access to any would-be participant. Peers on the network do not screen data in any way except for checking its validity according to the consensus rules of the system. It allows for the unencumbered flow of data between all the stakeholders in the system. The peer-to-peer network supports the permissionless blockchain system’s purpose of accessibility. A peer-to-peer network enables a distributed blockchain environment—the third aspect of decentralisation in Figure 2. The distributed blockchain ensures that the transaction data has no single custodian. A distributed blockchain contributes to- wards the blockchain system’s purpose of security by providing redundancy of the blockchain and operational nodes. Since the blockchain is also a tamper-proof log of transactions, it also supports the purposes of immutability and non-repudiation. The requirement for algorithmic trust is a consequence of disintermediation (the fourth aspect of decentralisation in Figure 2) and the peer-to-peer network. Since The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 14 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz no central authority exists in a permissionless blockchain system to serve as an au- thoritative source of truth concerning which information is to be trusted or not, it requires a mechanism for algorithmic trust. Algorithmic trust is the implementation of the software policy of data and source equivalence, the security protocols, and the communication protocols of the system (section 4). It provides both the mechanism for constructing valid data to be transmitted on the peer-to-peer network and the mechanism whereby all participants can verify the validity of data received. Algo- rithmic trust ensures accessibility through data and source equivalence, immutability through accessibility, and non-repudiation and security through data validation of transactions, new transaction blocks, and the blockchain. In practice, algorithmic trust is the result of software programs that are executed by participants in the blockchain system. The programs may construct and broadcast new transactions to the peer-to-peer network, they may verify transactions and at- tempt to construct new blocks of transactions to add to the blockchain, they may broadcast new transaction blocks or new versions of the blockchain to the peer-to- peer network, or they may validate newly received transaction blocks or blockchain versions. In section 4, we argued that three requirements must apply to the rules that these software programs follow. The rules must be consistent (the same for all stake- holders), transparent (the details of how they work must be known to all stakehold- ers), and rigid (not changeable at the whim of any minority). These requirements necessitate that all stakeholders have access to the details of how algorithms are implemented in the code, and the permissionless blockchain system must therefore operate on open-source principles – the fifth aspect of decentralisation in Figure 2. Open-source principles ensure the transparency that is required by disintermediated parties to function in an environment of algorithmic trust. It is the pivotal aspect that allows permissionless blockchain systems to fulfil their purpose of transparency. Section 6 will explain, however, that this is the most precarious aspect of the decen- tralisation of a permissionless blockchain system. Our definition of decentralisation in a permissionless blockchain system can be sum- marised as follows: When a distributed blockchain data structure is implemented between dis- intermediated parties, it provides the basis for a decentralised blockchain sys- tem. This creates the logical requirement for a peer-to-peer network topology that serves to transmit data between parties and store the blockchain in a distributed manner. Since no central authority exists in this system to serve as an authoritative source of truth concerning which information is to be trusted or not, it requires a mechanism for algorithmic trust. This algorithmic trust mechanism must be auditable by any stakeholder in the system and must, therefore, operate on open-source principles. These f ive aspects are a mini- mum requirement to define a decentralised, permissionless blockchain system. AJIC Issue 29, 2022 15 Defining Decentralisation in Permissionless Blockchain Systems 5. Discussion As the results have shown, the aspects of decentralisation are inextricable and thus cannot be viewed in isolation. If all five aspects of decentralisation are present, one may ask if it is enough to define the blockchain system as decentralised. The answer is no. One must consider the presence of the five aspects and their individual nature, which may be much more nuanced. For example, many consensus algorithms have been proposed for blockchain systems that operate between disintermediated parties. Two of the most prevalent are proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, which are both probabilistic. They aim to give all participants a random chance of adding a new block of transactions to the blockchain. However, this random chance does not mean equally probable for all participants; in fact, there may be significant discrepancies that give some parties a larger chance of proposing a block than others (Nguyen & Kim, 2018). In the case of Bitcoin (using proof-of-work), it is generally accepted that when 51% of the computing power in the network is centralised, then the consensus mechanism loses its decentralised nature (Eyal & Sirer, 2014). Eyal and Sirer (2014) have, how- ever, shown that even at concentrations as low as 25%, consensus can be manipulated to some extent in favour of some stakeholders. It shows that decentralisation is not a binary aspect (it exists on a spectrum (Walch, 2019)), and for any stakeholder to eval- uate the decentralisation of algorithmic trust, the software needs to be open-source (so that its exact mechanics can be interrogated, as Eyal and Sirer (2014) have done). Similarly, Di Bella et al. (2013, p. 21) have shown that evidence exists to indicate that a small core (concentrated group) of developers take the most important decisions about the “architecture and evolution” of open-source software projects. This type of centralised behaviour has many examples within the developer communities of Bit- coin and other blockchain systems. Gervais et al. (2014) and Walch (2019) warn that, despite the presence of open-source principles, the algorithmic trust mechanisms of both Bitcoin and Ethereum have been altered through the decisions taken by a small group of developers and miners. On the other hand, practical considerations regarding the maintenance of complex software systems preclude consultation with every stakeholder. 6. Conclusion The introduction to this article identified the confusing nature of the term decen- tralised in blockchain literature and made the case for a proper definition of the term. A review of a large body of recent blockchain literature has identified five aspects (disintermediation, distributed blockchain, peer-to-peer network, algorithmic trust, and open-source principles) that are required for a permissionless blockchain system to be defined as decentralised. Table 1 shows that while many authors have some of these aspects in mind, very few refer to all of them in unison when claiming decen- tralisation. The confusion seems to arise from this incomplete description that is of- The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC) 16 Bezuidenhout, Nel and Maritz ten used by authors. Perhaps the term is so ubiquitous that not much thought is given as to the details of its meaning. This study addresses the shortcoming by providing authors with a set of five aspects to consider when they refer to a permissionless blockchain system as decentralised, and therefore it contributes to the understanding of blockchain technology. The study goes further by describing the interrelationships between these aspects, acknowledging that the aspects are not of an entirely fixed nature and must be evaluated against the real-world practicalities that are faced by all complex systems. This article represents an opening statement, a foundation on which arguments that seek to answer many unanswered questions about the implications of decentralisa- tion and its building blocks may be built. Especially in the fields of blockchain gov- ernance and regulation, there remains much work to be done in the interpretation of these aspects and how they affect the legal standing of permissionless blockchain systems. It is also important to the ongoing search for better blockchain technology, such as data structures, cross-chain functionality, and consensus algorithms. Consid- eration should be given to the implications of these technological advances for the decentralised nature of the blockchain system. We stopped short of investigating or making claims about the nature of decentralisa- tion in the secondary layer of blockchain systems. This is an important shortcoming that must be addressed in future research efforts. 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