

**FROM CONFRONTATION TO CO-OPERATION,
ASEAN'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1967 TO 1981.**

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**A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts,
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ABSTRACT:

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organisation that emerged from a situation of inter-regional and ethnic discord, into a largely unified body. In effect, the organisation underwent a transformation from confrontation to co-operation. This dissertation charts the historical regional situation, covering the period from ASEAN's formation in 1967 up to 1981. The dissertation further analyses the rationale for the evolution of this collaborative association, providing the basis for the key argument of the hypothesis, which states that threats to regional security and stability during this period served as the primary catalyst for greater co-operation between member states. This thesis therefore opposes the generally held view that economic imperatives were the principal drivers of increased regional co-operation in the South East Asian region.


Keywords:

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PRC
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ZOPFAN

DECLARATION:

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.



Garreth Edward Elston.

30th day of November, 1998.

DEDICATION:

To my parents, for all their support and the lesson that hard work always pays off in the end;

Tanya-Lisa for her encouragement and devotion throughout my research; and

To the furtherance of the study of Southeast Asia, a field of study often sadly neglected and misunderstood in South Africa.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

South East Asia and the states that constitute the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are found in one of the most unstable regions in the world. Currently the area is seemingly at peace, but with the conditions present for a fall once more into Inter and Intra-regional conflict. It is a region brimming with economic promise, and also burdened with doubt concerning the region's long term stability. As an area, South East Asia has always been one of the most volatile sectors in the world. Throughout history South East Asian states, kingdoms and peoples, have experienced wars, conquests and ethnic conflict on a seemingly ceaselessly repetitive basis. The region is situated between the great powers of the East and the West, and the nations that make up South East Asia have been constantly been embroiled in a struggle for stataal survival, against the largest and most powerful civilisations and states through history.

The past of South East Asia is amongst the most complicated and convoluted of known history, and to this day the study and analysis of South East Asia is not an easy task. Scholars can not avoid being caught up in the myriad of peoples, cultures, regions, political ideologies, claims, and counterclaims. Each factor adds its own and extra dimension to the problem of formulating and proving hypotheses concerned with the region.

The essence of this thesis lies in the investigation and proof that despite ASEAN's stated goal of being an economic grouping, it primaril concerned itself with security issues, becoming a de facto military alliance during the period of the hypothesis. In concert with this

statement, the thesis shall investigate the security threats that drove the ASEAN nations into co-operation, contending that primary among these were the threats from the Peoples Republic of China and its support of local insurgent movements, and not the threat from Vietnam as is widely accepted. Thus this thesis contests the widely held notion that ASEAN was primarily an economic organisation viewing Vietnam as its primary threat, but rather being more security focused in nature despite its founding precepts.

ASEAN and its dilemmas are far from constituting simple issues, and fall into the realm of multifaceted complexity. In general little attention has been paid to the analysis and understanding of the issues and dilemmas present in the ASEAN states. This thesis aims to further understanding of the region and its politics, through a systematic and detailed investigation pursuing the test and proof of the hypothesis of this thesis. Through investigation and application on the path of proving the hypothesis, the thesis shall aim to improve the knowledge and understanding of ASEAN. Achieving this through a study of ASEAN from 1967 to 1981, a base can be formed for further analysis of ASEAN, and importantly a basis formed for study into the future direction of ASEAN.

A Brief Introduction to ASEAN:

The Association of South East Asian Nations was founded on 8 August 1967, by Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Brunei was admitted in 1984, Vietnam is the latest member being admitted in 1995, Cambodia and Myanmar have been accepted for entrance into ASEAN membership in 1998)¹. Although grouped geographically close together, the states range the gamut of political leadership and structure as well as differing ethnic and religious groupings. ASEAN's stated founding guidelines were promulgated in the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration) of 1967. The primary goals were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, also to promote regional stability and encourage collaboration on areas of common interest in areas ranging from economic to scientific fields, through mutual efforts on these various fronts.²

ASEAN was not the first attempt at a regional organisation in Southeast Asia, and was predated by two organisations. These organisations were: the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and the association of Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO). The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), an attempt at creating a South East Asia security regime, included both Western and South East Asian members. SEATO cannot be strictly seen a precursor to ASEAN, but merits mention as an attempt early attempt (albeit ultimately a failure) at establishing a security bloc in South East Asia.³

¹ Irvine, R. "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975." in: Broinkowski, A. (Ed.) *Understanding ASEAN*. London: Macmillan, 1982, Page 8.

² For the Bangkok Declaration in its entirety see Appendix A.

³ The formation of ASEAN and the historic regional groupings will be fully investigated in Chapter 3.

ASEAN in essence is a grouping of like-minded states that sought to foster a regional economic grouping to promote closer links between the states of Southeast Asia. It was envisaged that this new organisation through a united front could become an effective counter balance to Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese influence in the South East Asian region. What is significant about the states that formed ASEAN is that at some stage all of them had, (and to a limited degree still have) conflicting territorial claims and levels of ethnic conflict and rivalry. These conflicts have affected relations with each other, but through time and dialogue have been replaced by more portentous threats posed by other actors.⁴

The member states that established ASEAN, in conjunction with wanting to resist the powerful regional states saw a need to fill the strategic vacuum left by the British withdrawal in 1967⁵ and the gradual withdrawal of US forces from Southeast Asia from 1973 onwards.⁶ The British had maintained a significant military presence in Malaysia and Singapore, and it was British troops who were instrumental in defeating the communist forces during the Malayan insurgency (which was named the Malayan Emergency, which lasted from 1948 to 1960). British troops were also instrumental in curbing Indonesian incursions during the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation. The US withdrawal from Vietnam under the Nixon Doctrine, resulted in a general winding down of the American presence in the Southeast Asian region. This included large scale military downgrading in Thailand (which had been an important supply base and holding area for US air strikes into Vietnam, and advisors in Cambodia and Laos). The US maintained a strong presence at the important strategic naval (Subic Bay) and air (Clarke Air Force base) in the Philippines, until the withdrawal in 1992

⁴ These conflicts will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

⁵ Huxley, T. "The ASEAN States Defence Policies, 1975-81: Military Responses to Indochina?" Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper Number 88, October 1984, Page 20.

⁶ Ibid., Page 20.

from these bases following volcanic damage and Philippine public pressure to vacate the bases.

ASEAN's formation and prime stated policy was that of economic co-operation of an extremely low level through the late 60's and early 70's, hardly reaching the levels of co-operation assumed to be part of an economic association.⁷ Michael Leifer on this point states:

For example, by 1987 trade among the six member states, whose combined populations comprise some 300 million, had amounted to no more than 17 percent of their total trade. Preferential tariff arrangements had accounted for around 2 per cent of that Intra-ASEAN trade.⁸

TABLE 1: INTRA-ASEAN TRADE STATISTICS, 1973-1977.

As % of total trade

Year	ASEAN		INDONESIA		MALAYSIA		PHILIPPINES		SINGAPORE		THAILAND	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1973	17.62	13.88	11.76	8.70	24.38	14.48	2.06	2.10	23.98	24.15	19.79	2.74
1974	15.46	12.76	8.69	9.37	23.88	14.47	1.33	2.28	23.13	21.22	17.88	2.09
1975	17.08	12.48	10.31	8.70	24.22	15.19	2.66	4.80	26.45	20.24	17.16	2.72
1976	16.16	14.54	8.87	14.00	21.49	13.84	3.11	6.48	25.24	22.52	17.14	3.38
1977	15.83	15.25	10.64	14.27	18.91	14.60	3.96	6.37	23.52	23.77	19.99	4.28

SOURCE: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

⁷ ASEAN's diplomatic and economic relations during the early period of ASEAN's existence, were overshadowed by threats, both internal (insurgencies, civil unrest) and external (Vietnam, China, the UK and U.S. withdrawal from Asia) threats. These extraneous problems resulted in the ASEAN states, devoting their time to state survival issues, rather than the establishment of an effective ASEAN trading and political bloc.
⁸ Leifer, M. ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia. London: Routledge, 1989, Page vii. Also see Table 1.

In contrast to the low economic interaction, greater inter state political and security interaction occurred, increasing with the decrease of British and American involvement in the Indo-Chinese sphere.

With the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975, ASEAN continued to see a growth in inter-regional political contact. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea on 25 December 1978, after a series of Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese border raids and provocation's signalled the start of a new dimension in South East Asian power relations and ASEAN's regional role. The invasion appeared to spur the organisation into vigorous bouts of inter-governmental action. The Vietnamese threat to the ASEAN member state of Thailand appeared to assume primacy over the internal rivalry between ASEAN states. This was especially apparent, as neither Thailand nor a united ASEAN military force, was equal in man or materiel power to the combat seasoned Vietnamese army. It was doubtful that had Vietnam continued westwards that Thailand, or a combination of ASEAN military forces could halt an assault. Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore's prime minister at the time) remarked on the military balance: "For at least ten years there is no combination of military forces in ASEAN that could check the Vietnamese army in any open conflict."⁴

While it may appear that the Vietnamese invasion was the primary reason for the new era in ASEAN interaction, deeper study of ASEAN member state pr. lcy, reveals a diversion from the unity that is assumed and portrayed. Malaysia and Indonesia felt that Vietnam had legitimate security concerns over Kampuchea. Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia regarded China as the main threat to their security, due to China's vast military power and

⁴ Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN: The Five Countries," in: Broinowski, A. (Ed.) *op. cit.*, (1982), Page 237.

historical conflict with the East Asian region (having controlled most of the states as part of China in the past). Coupled to this was ongoing Chinese support of local insurgent movements.¹⁰ Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines through an analysis of Vietnam's military strength, concluded that Vietnam did not have the naval/military capability to threaten them, as they were islands (except for half of Malaysia on the Malayan Peninsula).¹¹ These states, in recognising Thailand's concern and as fellow ASEAN states, felt that they should support Thailand, despite their doubts of Vietnam's aggressiveness.

¹⁰ Huxley, T. ASEAN and Indochina: A study of Political Responses 1975-81, Canberra: Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, 1985, Page 42.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Page 17.

Thesis Chapter Overview:

Each chapter of the thesis shall aim to provide lucid insight and relevant facts to the discussion and proof of the hypothesis. Each chapter will present various parts of the argument of the thesis, leading to the collation of all factual and relevant information in the conclusion of the work. Presenting in its finality the proof of the hypothesis of this thesis. What follows is a chapter by chapter outline, to enable the reader to acquaint him or herself with the information that is to be presented in each of the chapters.

Chapter 2:

Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will lay the necessary theoretical foundation for the thesis. Through an in depth investigation and discussion of Alliance theory and Integration theory, their application to ASEAN's structures and events will be able to be better explained.

Chapter 3:

The formation of ASEAN will be discussed in this chapter. It will present more in depth information than the introduction relevant to the thesis. Highlighting especially the historical aspects of the region, regional conflicts, and the resolution of these conflicts leading to the potential for forming an association such as ASEAN. The chapter will also inquire into the reasons for the formation of ASEAN, looking specifically at the political realities of the region at the time of ASEAN's formation.

Chapter 4:

The historic regional, ethnic and security dilemmas, which faced (and in certain cases still threaten) each of the ASEAN states will be investigated in this chapter. Further analysis of ASEAN security perceptions and threats, individually and as a group will be undertaken. Included will be an exploration of the threat posed by the various insurgent movements to ASEAN, with an overview of the various movements, their ideologies, foreign support, and capabilities to threaten the states in which they operate. The threat posed by the Peoples Republic of China to the ASEAN states will also be investigated in this chapter. It will research the historical antagonistic relationship between China and the ASEAN states through illustrating the historical Chinese claims on the region, claims that have been persistently fuelled by Chinese nationalism. The military power of China will be investigated and used to illustrate the assertion that China is the only regional power possessing the military force projection capability, which can be used to threaten the security of the entire Southeast Asian region.

Chapter 5:

As the Kampuchean question is central to the hypothesis, this chapter will study Vietnam's conflict with Kampuchea. It will investigate the historic conflicts between the two nations of Kampuchea and Vietnam. As well as examine the border conflicts post 1975 and Vietnam's subsequent military campaign that conquered Kampuchea. This chapter will include an investigation of the ASEAN member states' reaction to the invasion of Kampuchea, demonstrating the divergence of views on the Kampuchea issue amongst ASEAN members, which is central to the hypothesis.

Chapter 6:

The conclusion of the thesis will collate the arguments and propositions presented in the main body, and demonstrate a clear argument for the proof of the thesis' hypothesis. The concluding chapter will include a brief investigation of ASEAN's role in the resolution of the Kampuchean issue and the effects thereof on ASEAN. The security perceptions of ASEAN following the Cambodian elections will be briefly investigated, and the security dilemmas that will now face ASEAN's will be shown. Finally it will comment on the future direction of ASEAN, giving examples of some significant developments that have occurred in ASEAN following the resolution of the Kampuchean issue.

Conclusion:

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the events leading to greater inter-ASEAN security co-operation, to argue the security co-operation was placed foremost in inter-ASEAN dealings, contrary to the assumption of Economics assuming the primary position. In considering the hypothesis, the debate over which was the primary security threat to ASEAN will be concentrated upon. The argument centres around whether the Vietnamese and their arguably expansionist campaigns into Kampuchea and Laos, or the threat posed by externally sponsored internal insurgency and the threat posed by the Peoples' Republic of China was the greatest.

The reasons for these forms of co-operation will be analysed, and comments made on the security and strategic aspects of this co-operation. Therefore it proposes to investigate through factual analysis which security dilemma was the primary cause of the increase in ASEAN's strategic co-operation, which matured from an era of confrontation between future members in a new era of co-operation on strategic issues (including armaments purchases and joint defence exercises). It will note the fact that Southeast Asia and ASEAN had the need to assume greater responsibility for their own security, following the United Kingdom and United States' respective withdrawal, downgrading of security assistance and military presence. In light of the fact that these withdrawals had upset the strategic balance in the region, and placed the burden

for the bulk of South East Asia's security primarily on the ASEAN states.¹² In conclusion, through lucid examples and empirical data, this thesis shall seek to prove the central hypothesis of this thesis in a clear and deliberate manner.

¹² The dilemmas facing the ASEAN members in dealing with their own security, become apparent when it is noted what a large contribution to external security was made by British and American troops. The large presence of U.S. air and naval forces in Thailand and the Philippines, provided these states with a very modern and credible deterrence to any attacker (especially when the cost of high technology air and naval craft are considered). British troops in Malaysia and Singapore, provided the same benefits, and their combat successes in the Malayan emergency and the Confrontation, demonstrated their effective and vital role in security. With their withdrawal the states of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and to a lesser degree the Philippines (due to continued large scale U.S. presence at Clarke Air Force Base and Subic Bay), had to now build up their own ground, air and naval forces to continue to have credible military capability.

CHAPTER 2

THE THEORETICAL DIMENSION OF ASEAN:

Introduction:

When addressing the hypothesis as concerns ASEAN, the theoretical framework of alliance theory is the most applicable to study of this regional organisation. As ASEAN has such a complex make up, other theoretical frameworks such as Integration theory and its divisions of Functionalist Integration theory and Neo-Functionalist Integration theory are included to form a comprehensive framework for theoretical analysis. Alliance theory primarily addresses the strategic and security relations between states, but as with all theories there are many divisions and academic debates on these divisions. Alliance theory is part of the broad form of co-operation between states, and included under this umbrella of theory are coalitions and alignments, which will be addressed to provide a relevant and adequate theoretical framework for analysis. Integration theory primary deals with economic integration, but also encompasses the field of political integration. Integration theory has in the main addressed the European sphere, and the majority of theoretical tests have been carried out on the model of the European Community.¹³

When investigating these theoretical frameworks with respect to ASEAN, there can be little doubt that each has an application to the study of ASEAN. The most pertinent argument for the primary use of alliance theory in testing the hypothesis is that while the other paradigms are applicable, they are mainly concerned with the economic interaction of states.

¹³ Now known as the European Union.

As the hypothesis deals with the security and strategic aspects of ASEAN, alliance theory with its security focus, will be the primary framework for the investigation of ASEAN security relations and dilemmas. Integration theory too must briefly be considered as its theoretical merit, albeit more suitable to the study of other arenas within ASEAN.

Alliance Theory:

Alliance theory has been addressed extensively by various scholars such as Granfelt, Beer, Osgood, Friedman, Modelski, Morgenthau, Holsti, Naidu and Liska amongst others. The reason for the extensive writings on alliance theory is the long history of alliances in the international arena. In defining the term "alliance", Friedman states:

Alliance refers to the relationship between two or more nation-states which includes:

- a. pairing or collaboration with one another for a limited duration regarding a mutually perceived problem;
- b. aggregation of their capabilities for participation in International affairs;
- c. pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel courses of action;
- d. probability that assistance will be rendered by members to one another.¹¹

Friedman goes on to list factors which distinguish alliance from other forms of co-operation, for example: integration, multi-national community building, economic partnership, and lists three more factors for the distinguishing of alliances:

- a. existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated;
- b. contemplation of military engagement and the risk of war;
- c. mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status quo or aggrandisement

¹¹ Friedman, J. Alliance in International Politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970, Page 4.

in regard to territory, population, strategic resources, and so forth.¹⁵

Alliances though do not assume a singular form, but rather take differing forms for varying circumstances and purposes. An alliance is generally defined as:

A formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force or consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force, in specified circumstances.¹⁶

Therefore alliances can be said to generally be an arrangement for co-operation between states, involving a treaty or other agreement.¹⁷

George Modelski makes the point that not all instances of international co-operation that are political, specific, and particularistic can be seen as alliances. Modelski on this point states: "Rather, we would argue, they are members of the broad class "alignments" within which "alliances" form only a subclass."¹⁸ Modelski in his discussion on alignments and alliances, goes on to show the difference between theorists on this issue. Liska differentiates

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Page 5.

¹⁶ Osgood, R. E. Alliances and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, Page 17.

¹⁷ While alliances in the main stem from official treaty agreements, there do exist alliances formed through mutual agreement, understanding or expectation, and these are termed 'tacit alliances'. Gomez-Manrique states that tacit alliances: ". . . tacit alliances, are no less significant for their being implicit manifestations of commitment. In fact these understandings and expectations are the substance of alignments of power and interest and alliances and other explicit commitments would be useless without them." In: Gomez-Manrique, C. The Politics and Economics of ASEAN Regional Integration (1967-1982). Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1983, Page 21.

¹⁸ Modelski, G. "The Study of Alliances: A Review." In: Friedman, J. *op.cit.*, (1970), Page 70.

alliances and alignments by stating that alliances are: "alignments that have found expression in a formal instrument such as a treaty."¹⁹ Osgood assumes a broader view and sees alliance as co-operation between two or more countries that are concerned with warding off a military threat from a third party. Modelski sums up the arguments and states:

This is the crux of the distinction between alliances and alignments. Alliances connote military collaboration concerned with a third power; "alignments" can be regarded as a blanket term referring to all types of international co-operation (that is also specific and particularistic). But the interesting implication of the distinction is this: conceptually, alliances hinge upon wars whereas alignments do not. War being so significant a part of international life, any distinction that turns upon it cannot avoid being vital.²⁰

No matter whether the form is of an alliance nature or alignment nature, there are reasons why states choose to co-operate with other states in the formation of alliances. States are generally unable to stand alone in the state system, and all states have differing flaws, capabilities, strengths, resources and so on. Therefore states seek out allies to strengthen their position in the state system, by engaging in alliances to accrue the benefits from co-operation with other states. Alliances thus rotate around the concept of interest and the seeking out of gain or advantage. Altruism is a feature devoid of in alliance formation. Alliances are sought or made to create, or increase a state's position of strength; maintain or regain a political, regional, global or stataal status quo; and to redistribute or magnify national resources.²¹

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Page 70.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Page 70.

²¹ Gomez-Manrique, C. *op.cit.*, (1983), Page 22.

Alliances entered into for state benefit, while being rapacious, usually occur between states that have a certain degree of commonality. This commonality can assume the form of similar political ideology, culture, language, global outlook or expedient political reality.²³

Alliances throughout history have been primarily geared towards war, either to the conduct or to the deterrence thereof. War by its nature has resulted in states having to modify, or sometimes forego their usual national policy. In times of crises, states are often compelled into seeking unity with other states to conduct a more efficient defence, offence, or deterrence during the conflict. Very rarely do alliances survive the ending of a threat, as each state is then once more able to pursue its own agenda.

In the past alliance research primarily focused on the larger powers, with little emphasis being focused on the smaller powers. As a result of the realities of the bi-polar Cold War, many states decided to avoid becoming embroiled in the Superpower polemic. Alliance theory evolved to keep pace with these developments in the international arena. The theory has come to terms with the post Second World War emergence of many small states, coupled to the rise of insurgencies and civil unrest in many states. Smaller powers that were not able to reconcile their state policy with one of the superpowers were left with little alternative for alliance formation but with like minded states. Coupled to this was the need of these small powers to avoid domination by larger powers, necessitating further the need for alliance formation among the weaker powers. It is within this category that the ASEAN states fall, while each of the states showed no hostility to the Superpowers, they made it clear that they

²³ An example of this would be the alliance between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, which was an alliance founded upon opposition to National Socialist Germany. The alliance would not have been established before the war, and the war's end saw the rapid disintegration of the alliance.

preferred relationships on their terms. In conjunction with the Superpower dimension, China too played (and continues to play) an important role in the formulation of ASEAN member states policies, both an individual and associational level.

Rothstein stated that mixed multilateral alliances were the best for small powers. Mixed multilateral alliances would be alliances between more than two parties, with a balance between large and small powers.²⁰ Rothstein though continued that such a balance between weak and strong was unlikely, and therefore chose to focus on inter-small power alliances. In connection with small power alliances Rothstein states:

It is true, though hardly surprising, that Small Power alliances tend to be more effective in local areas... However, Small Power alliances can also achieve some goals against Great Powers, and they can exert some influence on an international scale.²¹

More importantly for Small Powers concerned with Great Power meddling (as was, and is ASEAN):

If the Small Powers in an alliance can agree among themselves, if they can keep their own house, they can make it very difficult for the Great Powers to intervene in their region (at least without openly committing an injustice).²²

Countering Rothstein K. J. Holsti states that alliances have bolstered weak

²⁰ Rothstein, L. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, Page 172.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Page 172.

²² *Ibid.*, Page 173.

regimes and served domestic purposes rather than the defence against external threats.²² This observation has merit when viewed in the framework of the political reality of ASEAN states, and the reality that political freedom is not a characteristic of ASEAN states.²³ Coupled to this is the fact that the majority of ASEAN members faced and continue to face domestic threats (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines face internal stability threats). In opposition to Holsti's statement, it is clear from statements and realities within the ASEAN sphere, that Vietnam and China were viewed as great threats. With China being the dominant power in the region at present, but arguably also in South East Asia during the Cold War.

Alliance theory has in the main been used in the study and delineation of alliances in which the states, their threat perceptions and their intentions for the alliance were clearly mapped out. The situation in ASEAN as regards alliance or any conventional theory is rather more complex. ASEAN due to its complex political nature, caused by the varying political in its members, coupled with their historical interaction and antagonism, does not strictly fit into the previous patterns of theory. This is as most theoretical works concentrate on the European sphere, and have generally devoted little study to the particularities of the South East Asian region. Alliance theory in general though, does apply to ASEAN and in the course of the testing of the hypothesis will be applied to the ASEAN circumstance.

²² Holsti, K. J. "Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances." In Friedman, J. *Op.cit.* (1970), Page 94.

²³ In analysing the levels of democracy present in the ASEAN member states, the Philippines would appear to be the most democratic, followed by Malaysia and Thailand (which are largely yet though not fully democratic), then Singapore with its rigidly controlled political process, followed by the completely autocratic states of Indonesia and Brunei (Vietnam the latest ASEAN member, despite undertaking limited reforms is still an authoritarian Socialist state).

Integration Theory:

On the political side of integration theory, the forms of political integration that have relevance to ASEAN are Functionalist integration theory and Neo-Functionalist integration theory. Peter A. Toma and Robert F. Gorman state on Functionalist integration theory that:

This theory holds that when states co-operate to solve economic and social problems, they build up trust that may eventually extend or "spill over" into their political relations. This spillover effect, it is theorised, will eventually allow countries to resolve their political differences more easily.²⁸

With ASEAN's stated goal of increasing regional economic co-operation, Integration theory is applicable, but problematic from a theoretical view due to the Eurocentricity of most theory. Gomez-Manrique comments on this bias: "Such a Eurocentric bias has led to the questioning of many of the basic premises of integration theory, such as its applicability to other groupings in the world."²⁹

Functionalism becomes a problematic theoretical paradigm when looking at ASEAN, due to the fact that functionalism theorises that states evolve closer political relations through solving social and economic problems. In ASEAN's case, (despite its stated goal of being an economic organisation), closer economic and social ties, evolved after the political interaction on security issues (issues such as: insurgency, the British and American military pullout, the Chinese threat, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea).

²⁸ Toma, P. A. and Gorman, R. F. *International Relations: Understanding Global Issues*. Pacific Groves: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991, Page 253.

²⁹ Gomez-Manrique, C. *op.cit.*, (1983), Page 31.

Joseph M. Grieco comments on Neo-Functionalist and Functionalist Integration theory: "Most significantly they argued that international institutions can help states co-operate."³⁰ A. J. R. Groom and A. Heraclides define the difference between functionalism and neo-functionalism as: "There is no end-state in functionalism, such as occurs in neo-functionalism ... The end-goal of neo-functionalism is in fact a federation."³¹ Neo-Functionalist theory thus has the same problems as Functionalist theory, but has the added dimension the ASEAN has no stated intention on forming a federation.³²

While integration theory has its particular merits when investigating ASEAN (especially in the economic and political spheres), due to the nature of the hypothesis, Integration theory would not strictly be applicable. As the hypothesis is primarily concerned with the testing of security issues, Integration theory by its very nature would not be accurately able to aid in the review of the ASEAN situation. Integration theory though, will be used where applicable in the thesis to deal with the economic and political components of ASEAN. While these components will only form a small part of the thesis, their inclusion is vital. Integration theory while having its place, cannot detract from the primary investigation of the thesis, which is strategic, and security based, and to which Alliance theory is the most suited theoretical framework for analysis.

³⁰ Grieco, J. M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutions." In: Toma, P. and Gorman, R. F. *op.cit.*, (1991), Page 408.

³¹ Groom, A. J. R. and Heraclides, A. "Integration and Disintegration." In: Light, M. and Groom, A. J. R. *International Relations: A handbook of Current Theory*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1985, Page 178.

³² In comparison to the European Union's goal of economic and political integration, ASEAN can be viewed as not having entered the formative stages for the discussion of integration, especially when the unresolved territorial conflicts among ASEAN members are considered.

Alliance theory is furthermore particularly relevant because ASEAN was not a functioning economic body (or at least until the late 1980s) and was rather security based. Consequently, misguided efforts to understand ASEAN during its formation period of 1967 to 1981, utilising integration theory fails to adequately explain the dynamics, which drove the organisation. However as ASEAN operated as a form of de facto alliance, albeit within the constraints of international politics in Southeast Asia at that time, alliance theory is best suited for the analysis of this period within ASEAN's history.

CHAPTER 3

THE FORMATION OF ASEAN:

Introduction:

ASEAN is a regional organisation that emerged from a region permeated by inter-state and ethnic conflict. What is significant about ASEAN is that its establishment emerged from a period of strife between the future member states. The Southeast region experienced one its most highly confrontational era during the 1960s, having to face, experience and confront the multifaceted regional predicaments. These dilemmas included political instability as a result of internal power struggles and Superpower meddling, internal ethnic strife, conflicting regional territorial claims, and the need for economic development to address the needs of the state and population. All the states that were to form ASEAN (with the exception of Thailand) were states that had only achieved independence following the end of the Second World War, all were largely underdeveloped, many unaddressed territorial claims were yet to be resolved and each experiencing various levels of domestic turbulence and ethnic strife. The ASEAN states encompass a large geographical area, with Thailand being the only state exclusively situated on mainland Asia [See Map 1]. Malaysia has half its territory on the mainland (Malay Peninsula), with the rest of its territory (Sarawak and Sabah) offshore. Brunei is a small state surrounded by the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah. Singapore a tiny island city-state, situated at the foot of the Malay Peninsula. The Philippines is composed of a series of islands, as is Indonesia, but Indonesia is geographically by far the

largest ASEAN state. Although grouped geographically close together, the states range the gamut of ethnic and religious groupings.

Despite, and it could be argued because of these realities, the then imminent member states of ASEAN, decided that establishing a co-operative forum would be the best means of addressing the various conundrums facing each nation and ultimately solving them to the mutual benefit of the states and the region. Facing the difficulties and obstacles to the formation of Association in a volatile and unstable locality, ASEAN was envisaged and founded to be of primarily an economic nature to thereby avoid the sensitive political issues that are raised by security alliances, also to limit Superpower interference and hostile regional reaction (especially by North Vietnam) who could raise the accusation of ASEAN being a Western aligned, anti-Communist security organisation which could cause further regional destabilisation. The problem that thus faced ASEAN was exactly how to establish an association that would foster closer member state ties, as well as contain and hopefully reduce regional tensions without assuming a structure that could cause distress to neighbouring non-members or other powers outside the immediate zone.

This chapter shall investigate the formation of ASEAN, illustrating its path to formation, internal structure and stated goals and aims. It will depict the circumstances from which ASEAN came into being, and briefly highlighting the regional factors, and conflictual relations of the states that formed ASEAN (these relations and dilemmas will be investigated in greater depth in Chapter 4).

MAP NUMBER 1

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES



The formation of ASEAN and its objectives, both envisaged and realised, will be shown to provide an appropriate base for the detailed investigation of ASEAN's responses and actions regarding the Kampuchean problem and the additional internal and external threats that faced ASEAN member states.

The Formation of ASEAN:

The Association of South East Asian Nations was established after a meeting of the Foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia in Thailand³³ in August 1967. After three days of deliberations they signed a declaration on 8 August 1967, known as the ASEAN Declaration or Bangkok Declaration, thus establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Brunei Darussalam was admitted as an ASEAN member in January 1984³⁴.

ASEAN was not the first regional organisation in Southeast Asia, and was predated by several attempts at regional co-operation entities in the Southeast Asian sphere, these were not very successful due to domestic and international factors affecting the newly independent states. When investigating previous substantive attempts at regional organisations before the establishment of ASEAN, there are two organisations that were significant. These were: the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO a confederation of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. ASA was formed in Bangkok on 31 July 1961 with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand as founders. ASA was established to promote economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative co-operation.³⁵ ASA had its initial proposal for formulation agreed to by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on a visit to the Philippines in 1959. The primary aims of ASA were social, cultural, economic, scientific and administrative. ASA was criticised for having a limited membership and for being viewed as a primarily pro-Western, anti-Communist group, who were more political than economic. ASA was greatly disrupted by the territorial conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines,

³³ At the Thai resort of Bangsaen.

³⁴ Teifer, M. *op.cit.*, (1989), Page 47.

over Northern Borneo, which was renamed Sabah, after being incorporated into the Malaysian federation in September 1963⁶.

During the period of conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia, the Philippines was developing a proposition for the establishment of a "Greater Malay Confederation" consisting of the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia. Indonesia's Foreign Minister named the proposed confederation "MAPHILINDO", composing the name from the first syllables of the three proposed member states names. MAPHILINDO was established in Manila, the Philippines during July and August 1963, after discussions held by the leaders of the three states. MAPHILINDO was impeded by being constituted as a Malay organisation, but was ultimately voided before becoming an official association by the internal conflicts of the three states. These conflicts were the continuing dispute between the Philippines and Malaya over Sabah, and the border confrontations between Malaysia and Indonesia, resulting in inter-governmental strife over the formation of Malaysia (opposed by the Philippines and Indonesia due to their territorial claims on parts of Malaya).⁷ ASA did however remain in existence, largely in name only and was eventually assimilated into ASEAN.

The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), while not being a precursor to ASEAN has a role in the discussion of the formation of ASEAN, as it was alleged that ASEAN was a successor to SEATO. SEATO was the organisational structure of the Manila Treaty of 8 September 1954, primarily formed and fuelled by the United States as a foil to Communist China, membership consisted of the USA, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, New

⁶ Ibid., Page 9.

⁷ Ibid., Page 9.

⁸ Gomez-Maqueo, C. op.cit., (1983), Page 4.

Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.³⁶ SEATO in the main failed to realise its foundation goals, and was disbanded in 1977. Initially many observers (generally the communist states of Asia namely the PRC and North Vietnam) stated that ASEAN was a substitute for SEATO, as had been claimed about ASA³⁷. This was an erroneous assumption made concerning ASA and ASEAN's stated intentions, both associations had no overtly stated goals of security co-operation, whereas SEATO did. Concerning this point Leifer states: "ASA was intended to be an embryonic alternative rather than a substitute for SEATO."³⁸ The reasons for SEATO's failure are complex, and not being the focus of this thesis will not be investigated, but SEATO is significant in the fact that it was one of the earliest attempts at a regional security organisation including future ASEAN members, albeit one that ended in failure.

Political developments within the Southeast Asian region opened the door of opportunity to establish a more inclusive regional organisation than either ASA or MAPHILINDO. The primary developments were the unsuccessful coup in Indonesia in 1965, which led to the ousting of President Sukharno and his replacement by President Suharto. The result of Sukharno's overthrow was the repudiation of his policy of confrontation (*konfrontasi*) with Indonesia's neighbouring states, with the dividend of better inter-state relations.

During the same year President Marcos was elected in the Philippines, and he brought with him to power a subdued and more pragmatic approach to regional relations. The result of these developments was a general lessening of tensions within the area. Indonesia and Malaysia entered into bi-lateral discussions to end the confrontation, and formally ended the

³⁶ Cook, C. *World Political Almanac*. New York: Facts On File, 1989. Page 371.
³⁷ Leifer, M. *op.cit.*, (1989) Page 28.

confrontation in August 1966. The Philippines softened their claims on Sabah, and correspondingly relations improved between the two states. While relations enjoyed the benefit of lessening tensions, the causes of the tensions were deep rooted, long standing conflicts. An investigation of regional disputes is necessary to illustrate the situation that the ASEAN states emerged from, and that continued to impede greater ASEAN co-operation and development, retarding the process of ASEAN becoming a truly effective regional organisation (these conflicts shall be analysed in Chapter 4).

The Aims and Achievements of ASEAN, From Establishment to the Fall of Saigon:

In establishing ASEAN the member states sought to create an organisation that would foster and maintain peaceful relations between members through nurturing mutual interests. Through mutually beneficial economic and political contact, it was hoped to move away from the previous disruptive conflicts, and enable the states to concentrate on internal development. Economic co-operation was viewed as the most feasible method to employ in bringing the states closer, with a common market touted as the end goal for ASEAN, and moves were made to establish a limited free trade area and a payments union. Using economics as the first stage in co-operative relations managed to side step the more sensitive areas of military and political co-operation. Alison Broinkowski states:

...economic co-operation not only paved the way for co-operation in other areas but was indeed an essential precondition for the achievement of objectives in these other area [sic].⁴¹

Broinkowski continues that:

...it is perhaps more likely that the key factor behind the emphasis on economic co-operation was that co-operation in this field, and even more so in the social and cultural fields, was relatively uncontroversial compared to co-operation in political or security matters.⁴²

⁴¹ Broinkowski, A. op.cit., (1982), Page 13.

⁴² Ibid. Page 14.

While political and security matters were still of a sensitive nature to the future member states, they did have converging political views and were all anti-Communist, aligned to the West and in favour free enterprise (but with state intervention when deemed necessary). In the formation of ASEAN though, the member states were careful not to mention any other reasons besides economic, cultural and social ones for forming ASEAN. While military co-operation was not advocated, it was not entirely dismissed either, Tun Razak stated that it was possible for ASEAN to have defence arrangements: "once we have become good friends with a common interest and destiny."⁴⁴ it was felt that mentioning a military dimension to ASEAN, coupled to putting a too overt line of anti-communism, political and security co-operation could lead to excessively antagonising the PRC and the Soviet Union who could escalate destabilisation of the region through their support of communist movements. ASEAN adopted the stance that it sought no interference in its sphere from any foreign power, stating that their path was to be non-alignment and anti-imperialism, and not pro-Western anti-communism. Therefore at this stage military and security issues were not conspicuously mentioned, although being considered and planned for on an individual state level rather than an associational one, with the states despite their statements of non-alignment arguably being indeed pro-western especially Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand who had very close ties with the United States.

After the declaration establishing ASEAN was signed it appeared that the association found itself in a state of limbo, with very little interaction occurring between the states. One year into the association all activities were suspended for eight months due to renewed clashes

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Page 17.

between the Philippines and Malaysia, over the Corregidor⁴⁴ affair and renewed claims on Sabah. ASEAN activities renewed in May 1969, and in November the Philippines and Malaysia normalised their relations.

Events were occurring in the region that would push ASEAN towards increasing competition. The primary causal factor was Vietnam and the events occurring there. The United States had come to the realisation that it would not be able to win the war in Vietnam, as the political costs of continuing the war were becoming too high. The US withdrawal from Vietnam commenced under President Nixon, known as the Nixon Doctrine, and it was completed under President Ford after Nixon's resignation. The doctrine was meant to ensure "peace with honour", but in effect was an attempt to extract the US from Vietnam as quickly as possible to avoid growing political problems with the US ground troops were the first to be withdrawn, with Air Force units remaining until January 1973⁴⁵ and Naval units present until the fall of Saigon.

In response to the British and American withdrawal from its Southeast Asian interests and allied to the fear that the PRC and the USSR would fill the void created by the Western withdrawal to further their own agendas at the region's cost, ASEAN decided to pursue a path of non-alignment and neutrality. What emerged from the desire for neutrality, though the states held differing opinions on what forms this should take, was the Zone of Peace, Freedom

⁴⁴ The incident came about as a result of Malaysian authorities becoming aware of a special Philippine unit composed of Muslims, being trained on Corregidor Island to infiltrate Sabah.

⁴⁵ US air power played a pivotal role in projecting US power and defending the South Vietnamese state, the US Air Force played a crucial role in halting the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and forcing the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table with the December 1972 Christmas Bombing (Operation Linebacker), allowing Nixon to complete his planned withdrawal.

and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration.⁴⁶ This declaration was made on November 27 1971,⁴⁷ after a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur. ZOPFAN was primarily directed at the foreign powers who sought to expand their influence in South East Asia (primarily the PRC, USSR and USA), to refrain from attempts at expansion and respect the neutrality of the states in South East Asia. The primary supporter of ZOPFAN was Malaysia (who had proposed it), but succinct reservations were expressed by the other ASEAN states. Indonesia felt that the regional states, instead of asking for undertakings by the great powers, should rather strengthen themselves, the Philippines and Thailand did not want ZOPFAN to impinge on their alliance with the United States, while Singapore was concerned about the actual feasibility of the plan, especially in view of the continued conflict in Vietnam.

Following ZOPFAN the next most important moment in ASEAN's history occurred at the ASEAN Summit Meeting in Bali in February 1976. The Bali Summit is viewed as the catalyst which moved ASEAN into its second phase, being the first real concrete attempt to move ASEAN out of the stalemate that had resulted due to the various conflicts between members, and onto the path that was envisaged in the ASEAN Declaration. The summit came about from a need to address the primary constraints that were holding ASEAN's development back, and to see if the Association could make concrete strides towards fulfilling its founding intentions. The most important issues that needed to be addressed were the continued territorial conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, liberalisation of trade, and the security situation especially as regarded Indo-China (predominantly Vietnam and China) and how ASEAN should address the security situation. Three major documents emerged from the Bali Summit: firstly the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, secondly the

⁴⁶ See Appendix B, for the text of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration.

⁴⁷ Antolik, B. *op.cit.*, (1990) Page 108.

Declaration of ASEAN Concord, and thirdly a Joint Press Communiqué that established a new level of substance in ASEAN statements.⁴⁸

The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation⁴⁹ was in essence a reaffirmation of the principles of the original Bangkok Declaration, the treaty sought to expand and increase ASEAN co-operation to ensure that the Association remained on track. Political co-operation regarding international and regional issues was enshrined as the basis of co-operative regionalism, as were national and regional resilience. In response to the territorial disputes that had hampered ASEAN, procedures were formulated for peaceful settlement of disputes consisting largely of mediatory measures with no real coercive procedures. The Treaty also espoused the ideal that ASEAN was always open to further regional members, especially to expand ZOPFAN, and it is generally regarded that most statements of this nature were aimed at Vietnam.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord established a plan of action for expanding ASEAN's political, economic, social and cultural co-operation formulated by the ASEAN member states' Economic Ministers⁵⁰. The development of Preferential Tariff rates between member states was the prime key postulated to establish effective interaction, other sectors to be addressed would be the empowerment of hitherto disadvantaged groups (women, children, rural populations, disadvantaged ethnic groups), also combined programmes to address drug trafficking and birth control. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers also signed an agreement to establish the ASEAN Secretariat, and further called for a review of ASEAN structures to ensure their relevance and effectiveness. The issue of security co-operation was addressed by what appears to be the standard ASEAN convention of engaging in security co-

⁴⁸ Broinkowski, A. *op.cit.*, (1982) Page 42.

operation but stating that security should be: "a continuation of co-operation on a non-ASEAN basis between member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests."⁴¹ Thereby stating that ASEAN security co-operation should exist and continue, but should still not be given the ASEAN moniker to avoid accusations of militarism.

The Joint Press Communiqué issued by the ASEAN Heads of Government was in essence an abstract of the entire Bali Summit, bringing together all the aspects that had been covered by the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, guidelines for consideration by the ASEAN Economic Ministers, and the Bali Summit was the first time that the five ASEAN heads of State had met.

Preceding the Bali Summit, Vietnam and the Western retreat from the region can be seen as the primary catalyst that led to increased ASEAN co-operation, later the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh, and the subsequent Vietnamese and Kampuchean conflict would provide ASEAN with its greatest crisis and impetus to achieve meaningful co-operation (the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and its aftermath will be examined in Chapter 5).

⁴¹ See Appendix C, for the text concerning the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia.

⁴² For the text of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord see Appendix D.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Page 49.

Conclusion:

The formation, structure and form of ASEAN cannot be viewed as being simple in nature, but rather on the other hand as being intrinsically complex and vague. In performing a base analysis of whether ASEAN has met its founding goals as outline by the Bangkok Declaration, a simple answer of yes or no is not strictly possible. With ASEAN in the main falling extremely short of its economic co-operation targets, which were stated as being the prime reason for ASEAN's founding, it could be said that ASEAN economically has been a failure. The quandary is that despite this failure the Association has survived and expanded in membership and scope, reaching thirty years of existence. Therefore the question is posed that if economics was the pre-occupation of the founders and ASEAN consistently has failed to meet the criteria set out for itself, could other stratagems have been primary, but unstated goals? Whether the originators of ASEAN were truly committed to economic development and interaction as primary, or decided to use this as a smoke screen to safeguard increased political and security co-operation. This poses a question that necessitates an in depth explanation and the answer to this will be sought and demonstrated through the thesis as being the proof of the hypothesis.

The security situation in the ASEAN region both internal and external to the state, has in the main been one of tension and at times open conflict preceding and following independence for the majority of the member states. These conflicts are very important in analysing the developmental path of ASEAN, and necessary to provide a framework for the addressing of reasons to why ASEAN has performed the way it has and why it appears the it had deviated substantively from stated intent. The following chapter shall investigate the

regional and ethnic conflicts of the ASEAN member states, incorporating the threats posed by insurgent organisations and the Peoples' Republic of China to the member states of ASEAN.

CHAPTER 4

Regional and Ethnic Conflicts:

Introduction:

Southeast Asia is a region of numerous languages, religions, political perceptions and ethnic groups that can combine to form a rich plethora of humanity, but also the ingredients for widespread strife.

ASEAN member states occupy a significant geographical area, populated by many diverse ethnic groups, and include members of the world's major religions⁵². Thailand is the only state solely situated on mainland Asia, and is 17th most populous state on earth (513,115 square Km, population: 58,265,000). Malaysia has half its territory on mainland Asia (the Malay peninsula), with the rest of its territory (Borneo) offshore (329,749 square Km, population: 20,125,000). Brunei Darussalam is a tiny state (5,765 square Km, population: 288,000) surrounded by the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah, it has the smallest population of the ASEAN members. Singapore a minuscule island city-state, situated at the foot of the Malay Peninsula (618 square Km, population 2,853,000), by far the smallest ASEAN member, but also the wealthiest. The Philippines is composed of a series of 7,100 islands and is the world's 14th most populous state (300,000 square Km, population 69,257,000). Indonesia is

⁵² Indonesia (the world's largest Muslim population), Malaysia and Brunei are primarily Muslim; the Philippines Catholic with a Muslim minority; Thailand Buddhist; and Singapore with large communities of Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus.

geographically the 15th largest state on earth (1,904,569 square Km), with the world's fourth largest population (201,477,000) and by far the largest ASEAN state.³

Politically the ASEAN member states are all pro-Western, anti-Communist (especially during the Cold War) and economically capitalistic in bearing. Governmentally they differ from each other, and include most forms of known government. Brunei Darussalam is an autocratic monarchy headed by the Sultan of Brunei. Indonesia is still ruled by General Suharto, as it has been since the abortive coup in 1965. Singapore was ruled exclusively by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party, under a form of benign dictatorship, who later introduced a limited form of Parliamentary democracy. The Philippines (after President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed) and Malaysia are the most democratic of the members, but the Filipino political process is still beset by widespread violence. Thailand's attempts at full democracy have usually run foul of the military, and Thailand has witnessed a succession of military coups and governments. Thai politics have to pander to the military's conservative, anti-Communist norms as the military has shown itself to be willing to use force to remove any government that it views as a threat to its established status quo.

The primary threats to ASEAN's establishment and survival through its formative years, took the form of various territorial claims and ethnic hostility, often combined. Territorial conflicts will be examined at first, followed by the ethnic conflicts present among the member states, including the anti-government movements present in the states. To

³ All statistical information obtained from: Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, World Statistics Pocketbook 1995, New York: United Nations Publications, 1995, Pages 26 (Brunei Darussalam), 84 (Indonesia), 112 (Malaysia), 146 (Philippines), 166 (Singapore), and 181 (Thailand).

complete the threat analysis, the risk posed by the Peoples Republic of China to the ASFAN member states is to be investigated.

TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC DISPUTES IN THE ASEAN REGION:

Territorial Disputes:


See Map number 2, for the geographical location of the various territorial claims.

a) Indonesia and Malaysia:

The two predominantly Malay states' relations before and after their respective independence, were characterised by conflictual territorial claims and limited armed conflict. Indonesia under Sukarno, engaged in a nationalistically inspired low intensity border conflict with Malaysia over the territories of Sarawak and Sabah. The Indonesia armed forces engaged in penetration raids into the interior of Borneo, but were never very successful. At that time Britain still guaranteed Malaya's security and played the predominant in halting the insurgency, using its elite troops (including the Special Air Service) to prevent the Indonesians achieving much success. This clash was termed the "Konfrontasi" and occurred from 1963-1965.⁵¹ This conflict was mainly defused by the conservative coup by General Suharto, who overthrew Sukarno in 1965 and denounced his expansionist endeavours.⁵² Thus Indonesia entered into a rapprochement with Malaysia (not totally relinquishing its claims on Sarawak and Sabah, but giving

⁵¹ Antolik, M. *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*. New York: N. E. Sharpe, Inc., Page 18.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Page 20.

MAP NUMBER 2TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Source: Evans, G. and Rowley, K. Red Brotherhood at War. London: Verso, 1984, Page vii.

these very low priority). Indonesia and Malaysia after the resolution of the confrontation have remained on good terms, primarily viewing the PRC as the pre-eminent threat to the region, superseding potential dissension between them. Regionally Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Taiwan and the PRC claim the Spratly Islands, a tiny archipelago covered by the sea at high tide, but reputed to contain potentially vast oil fields. At present the PRC occupies the islands, but this has not diminished the claims of the other states on the islands.

b) The Philippines and Malaysia:

The primary Philippines and Malaysian conflict has centred over Sabah over which the Philippines made the first official claim in 1961 to the British government, and after the creation of Malaysia in 1963 resulted in intensive diplomatic clashes from 1963 to 1966, with the Philippines not recognising Malaysia with Sabah and suspending diplomatic relations⁵⁶. The Philippines claimed Sabah as part of the Philippines illegally incorporated into Borneo. Further claims are made on the Commodore Reef (Terumbu Laksamana) and Mariveles Reef (Terumbu Mantanani) against Malaysia, these reefs are also claimed by the Peoples' Republic of China and Taiwan.⁵⁷ The hard-line Philippine position on Sabah was softened in November 1965, when Ferdinand Marcos was elected president⁵⁸ and decided to tone down the Philippine claims in the interest of regional stability. Claims on Sabah were reactivated briefly in 1968-1969 posing the first threat to ASEAN's existence, but after mediation the Philippines and Malaysia resumed diplomatic links. The Philippines has not permanently and irrevocably

⁵⁶ Ibid., Page 126.

⁵⁷ Harmah, B. A. "Jurisdiction Issues and the Conflicting Claims in the Spratlys." *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Volume XVII, Number 2, Second Quarter, 1990, Page 137.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Page 70.

revoked its territorial claims on Sabah nor the Commodore or Mariveles reefs, but they are now of a low-key form.

c) Malaysia and Singapore:

Singapore and Malaysia experienced strained relations, due to Singapore's acrimonious departure from the Malaysian Federation in 1965.⁵⁹ Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak (formed the island of Borneo) were incorporated into Malaysia in 1963 (they were separate British colonies to Malaya). Singapore though being predominantly Chinese clashed with Malaysia over political and economic issues, and Singapore's Premier Lee Kuan Yew was a constant irritant to the Malaysian leadership, leading to the inauspicious split, with Singapore attaining independence. Singapore and Malaysia also have conflicting territorial claims on Batu Putih Island, a diminutive island off the coast of Malaysia.⁶⁰

d) Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam:

Brunei clashed with Malaysia over the establishment of the Malaysian Federation (notably sharing Brunei's oil revenues and the monarchical succession) and refused to join the Malaysian Federation⁶¹. Malaysian support of a Bruneian guerrilla movement, the Party Rakyat Brunei (PRB), resulted in Brunei laying a territorial claim on the guerrillas' sanctuary in Malaysia (known as Limbang). Brunei attained independence in 1984 after a period of being a protectorate of Britain, but was fearful of Malaysian attempt to forcefully incorporate it into the Federation. Indonesia's invasion of East Timor (with tacit Malaysian support for Indonesia), and Brunei's fears that Malaysia could do the same further fueled these fears.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Page 30.

⁶⁰ Samad, P. A. "Internal Variables of Regional Conflicts in ASEAN's International Relations." *The Indonesia Quarterly*, Volume XVII, Number 2, Second Quarter, 1990, Page 173.

⁶¹ Ibid., Page 84.

Brunei embarked on massive defence spending (the outlay covered by Brunei's substantial oil revenues) and received great diplomatic support from Singapore, making a Malaysian invasion too costly to be a feasible option. Brunei and Malaysia's relations have improved, but being a small extremely rich state, with large powerful neighbours is of great concern to Brunei.⁶²

e) Malaysia and Thailand:

Malaysia and Thailand had one prominent area of territorial contention, namely the Southern border region of Thailand. Due to the population of this region being primarily Malay in ethnic origin, there was support in Malaysia for secessionist movements in Southern Thailand who sought to join Malaysia, and several disagreements on the precise delineation of the border. These disputes have comprehensively been addressed and solved, in the main through discussions and mutual agreements by Thailand and Malaysia in bilateral negotiations and ASEAN structures.

⁶² Lelifer, M. ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia. London: Routledge, 1990, Page 66.

Ethnic Conflict:

a) Brunei Darussalam:

Brunei experienced the Azahari revolt in 1962, who opposed the creation of Malaysia and sought instead a larger Brunei. The group responsible for the revolt was primarily coastal Kedayans, and the extent of the revolt was limited to Kedayan territory.¹³

b) Indonesia:

Main Muslim support comes from the Sumatran groups called the Ambonese from South Molucca who were loyal to the Dutch colonists and opposed Indonesian independence sought by Javanese and Sumatran nationalists. After a failed attempt at secession in 1950, the Javanese and Batak sidelined them in military and civilian fields. Indonesia also experienced further anti-Jakarta riots in the 1950s from other outer islands, often led by military groups with ethnic ties to the islands. After the revolts were defeated, Javanese, who then held the reins of power, and an overt majority in the military, replaced commanders that were viewed as untrustworthy. David Horowitz lists the ethnic composition of the Indonesia armed forces after the 1965 coup as:

Although Javanese are only about half the population, by 1969 some 68 percent of the army leadership, 89 percent of the navy leadership, 81 percent of the air force leadership, and 76 percent of the students in the army general staff and command college were Javanese. Central Javanese, who comprise the core of Gen. Suharto's loyalists, were especially overrepresented in the military elite.¹⁴

¹³ Horowitz, D. L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, Page 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Page 516.

Other groups in conflict with Jakarta are continuing small-scale conflicts by groups in the outer islands seeking independence from Indonesia such as the Free Papua Movement on Irian Jaya (New Guinea)⁵⁴. Indonesia used force to incorporate the Portuguese colony of East Timor which it invaded at the end of 1975, and has continued to fight against remnants of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) and continuing civil disturbances.⁵⁵ Internal disruptions within Indonesia due to ethnic conflict are minimised by the large size of the ruling ethnic group (Javanese) vis-à-vis potential opponents, and the that ethnic opposition groups are geographically scattered. Generally these disturbances have occurred on the outer islands of the Indonesian archipelago and distant from the main power base of Indonesia.

c) Malaysia:

Malaysia after independence from Britain suffered widespread ethnic clashes, predominantly between the majority Malay and minority Chinese who had enjoyed a privileged position under the erstwhile British rulers, and who also owned the bulk of businesses in Malaysia. Communal riots which broke out in Penang in 1967, and in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969 were directed against the Chinese populace. During the riots great loss of life occurred among the Chinese population, as the bulk of the security forces being Malay, stood by or participated in the riots. Following the riots the government moved to redress the imbalances between the Chinese and Malay communities to forestall further civil disturbances. The result of these moves has been ethnic favouring of Malays over Chinese in economic, military and civil service by granting Malays preferential treatment. Borneo's

⁵⁴ Leifer, M. *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983, Page 129.

inhabitants have also come into conflict with mainland Malaysia over what they see as distant central government meddling in their affairs coupled with a neglect of their needs. Borneo has not seriously challenged the Malaysian State, but argued more for their rights within the state.

d) The Philippines:

The Philippines has been faced with several ethnic (primarily poorer Muslim groups) and politically (communist) inspired threats to the state. These opposition groups consist of the Muslim Moros and their guerrilla movement the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), who have long history of conflict in the Philippines having earlier fought the Americans when they controlled the Philippines; the Huks who are a similar Muslim separatist group, and these two main groups together with other Muslim separatist groups have been seeking independence for the southern Island of Mindanao from the primarily Christian northern island group of Luzon. The Filipino resistance groups received support primarily from the PRC, with lesser levels of support obtained from Muslim groups sympathetic to the separatists. In the main though the Philippine groups did not receive large amounts of support and relied on stealing or purchasing weapons (from the often corrupt Philippine Army).¹² The levels of largely PRC support though, were of enough concern for President the late President Marcos to state: "... the principal threat against South-East Asian countries is not outright aggression but the export of wars and subversion."¹³

The poorer South of the Philippines had been historically neglected by the Catholic north and as a result was economically underdeveloped in comparison with the Christian

¹² Leifer, M. *op.cit.*, (1990) Page 95.

¹³ Kirk, D. "Kris to Kalashnikov." *SOE*, Volume 21, Number 9, September 1996, Page 45.

North in terms infrastructure and development. Widespread dissent to the conditions in the southern islands of the Philippines manifested itself in extensive armed resistance carried out by the Muslim groups and communist guerrillas, prompting a realisation by the central government that its policies regarding the south needed to be re-evaluated. Most of the strife centred in the southern parts of the Philippines with limited guerrilla and terrorist actions being carried out on Luzon and in Manila, but the opposition never effectively posed a great risk of session or wide spread unrest. This was due to Philippine state reaction implementing limited economic upliftment programmes to improve the social conditions and conducting sweeping security force actions to contain and reverse anti-government action.

e) Singapore:

Singapore is predominantly composed of citizens of Chinese descent, a reality that makes it markedly different in ethnic composition from its Malay neighbours of Malaysia and Indonesia. The population includes a large Malay community as well as a significant Indian populace. Being largely Chinese Singapore is well aware of the distrust of Malays against the Chinese, and has sought to reassure its neighbours that it has no exclusive Chinese agenda and guarantees the rights of its non-Chinese citizens. Having witnessed the destabilising and disastrous effects of ethnic conflict, Singapore has striven to accommodate the interest of all its ethnic groups so as not to disrupt its political and economic stability. While the Chinese are predominant in government and business, the other groups are not excluded and are actively encouraged to participate in all aspects of Singaporean life. The law protects language and customs equally, and despite having English as an official language, Chinese, Malay, and Hindi are recognised and used on notices, signs and publications.

¹⁰ Huxley, T. "Indochina and Insurgency in the ASEAN States, 1975-1981." Australian National University, Working Papers, Number 67, January 1983.

g) Thailand:

Muslim Malays are the largest indigenous minority in Thailand, and they constitute 85% of the population in Thailand's Southern provinces⁶⁰. The Malay minorities have engaged in attempts to secede from Thailand and join Malaysia, but Thailand has vigorously opposed this. Further conflict has occurred over Thai attempts to settle Thai Buddhists in Southern Thailand, as the Thai have sought to assimilate all non Thai into Thai society, and this has included the minority Indians, Chinese and the Thai Malay.

The Threat Posed by the Peoples Republic of China:

China's relations with ASEAN did not get off to an auspicious start with the Chinese stating that ASEAN was: "a military alliance set up by the reactionaries of the five countries at the behest of US imperialism... a military alliance directed specifically against China."²⁰ While the PRC's position has softened on ASEAN over time, and has ASEAN's towards China, the relationship while being seen as cordial and friendly has always had a guarded edge to it. The Chinese relationship with Southeast Asia has historically been one of an overlord (China) with vast tracts of conquered territory, as most of Southeast Asia was once conquered and ruled by the Chinese. With the Chinese never having fully relinquished claims over any territory that they once held, and the PRC maintaining this nationalist stance, the nations of Southeast Asia have always remained wary of Chinese intentions. The Chinese were never known for benign leadership, and the animosity that remains between the peoples who once fell under Chinese rule is still tangible. Anti-Chinese sentiment on a base level as indicated in the preceding section has featured heavily in Indonesian and Malaysian society. While the other ASEAN states have not experienced as high a level of anti-Chinese feeling, each of them possess substantial numbers of Chinese generally successfully engaged in economic activities in the individual states.

Chinese involvement in the Southeast Asian sphere has not been viewed by the majority of ASEAN nations as being of a constructive or benign nature. With the bulk of the PRC's activities in the region being seen to have been geared to undermining regional

²⁰ Khaw Guat Hoon. An Analysis of China's Attitudes Towards ASEAN, 1967-76. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Papers. Number 48, September, 1977, Page 1.

governments through support of guerrilla movements and achieving the PRC's territorial claims.

Over the past three decades Beijing has been viewed as a source of arms and training for the pro-PRC communist insurgencies in the region, especially to Thai, Malaysian, Indonesian and Filipino groups. Territorially the Peoples Republic has sought to achieve and consolidate its territorial claims in the South China Sea, claims shared by ASEAN member states. Clive Schofield comments on the Islands in contention:

The contested insular features are frequently little more than isolated rocks, low-tide elevations or reefs that have traditionally been regarded as little more than navigation hazards and not true islands at all. In the South China Sea in particular, many of these pseudo-islands, which include fully submerged sea mounts, have been subject to 'island building' activities, including the erection of above-surface structures; they have also been fortified and garrisoned in order to help bolster the occupier's claim.⁷¹

Chinese potential for conflict with the ASEAN states exists over the disputed Parcel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The PRC's 1992 Territorial Maritime Law and the exercising of the little used 'Continental Prolongation Principle' in International Law, are used to claim Chinese sovereignty over territories 800 nautical miles from mainland China. As a prelude to its force build-up in the South China Sea, the PRC developed the Parcel Islands⁷² as a naval base and staging point for any confrontation over the Spratly Islands⁷³. Beijing has

⁷¹ Schofield, C. "Island Disputes in East Asia Escalate." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Volume 8, Number 11, November 1996, Page 517.

⁷² Which China calls the Xisha islands. Source: *Ibid.*, Page 521.

⁷³ Named the Nansha Islands by China. Source: *Ibid.*, Page 521.

also made a grab for the Philippine claimed Mischief Reef, and appears to be moving its territorial claims excessively southward. China's reef grabs in the South China Sea have shown that it feels strong enough to simply take what it wants. China seems to be prepared to achieve its territorial and foreign affairs ambitions in the Southeast Asian region through the use or threat of brute force, not just by force of argument or negotiation.

The PRC's military expenditure has been rising steadily since 1988, with Beijing starting to address the large number of obsolescent systems and outmoded means of utilising their human resources. Overall numbers of troops were dropped sharply, with emphasis being placed on providing better equipped, trained and led military units. While on the materiel side, new systems are being sought to replace ageing aircraft, radar systems, naval units and armour. Despite signing the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the PRC is still testing nuclear weapons as has not yet indicated when it will completely cease testing. China's weaponry is particularly well suited for regional conflicts, providing the PLA with the capability to successfully engage any Asian adversary and inflict unacceptable damage.⁷⁴ China from ASEAN's formation till the present has been the most powerful military nation in the Southeast Asian sphere, possessing the largest conventional military force in the region and the largest nuclear arsenal.

Regarding Chinese regional military strategy in a regional context, the PRC's strategists favour a demonstrable capability to wage war across its borders as being part of sound national strategy. Their prime motivation for favouring this type of defence stems from lessons learned during the Korean War and applied to the Vietnam conflict with the United

⁷⁴ Shambaugh, D. "China's Challenge to Asian Security." *Survival*. Volume 36, Number 2, Summer, 1994, Page 56.

States. The Chinese believed that they deterred MacArthur from extending the Korean war in Manchuria by confronting US troops at the Yalu River and waging war on North Korean soil. China also believes that through the forward positioning of PLA regulars during 1965-68, it deterred the US from invading North Vietnam and possibly carrying the war into Chinese territory. This frontier defence policy was also utilised in the 1962 Sino-Indian and 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflicts as well as the long stand off between the PRC and the Soviet Union up to the fall of the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ Frontier defence is termed Active Defence or 'jiji fangyu in Chinese military writings'⁷⁶, and clearly demonstrates that the Chinese have little compulsion against waging war in states outside their own to keep the threat of fighting on their territory as remote as possible. The PRC has shown through the above examples that it still regards open conflict as almost a normal means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Especially its war against Vietnam⁷⁷, ostensibly to punish it for pro-Soviet diplomatic moves and anti-Chinese statements, clearly demonstrates the lack of qualms that the PRC has of engaging in conventional warfare. The PRC since its inception after defeating the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-Shek, have shown a willingness to follow their national interest regardless of prevailing world opinion or opposition to Chinese aims. The PRC can be viewed as the regional hegemon, by virtue of its sheer population size, immense though dated military power and national will to achieve objectives with less restraint than comparable states enjoying the same international stature. China has been viewed as a possible threat by and analysts state that: "despite a more peaceful regional environment, defence planners see potential conflicts with Japan, Taiwan, the ASEAN states, India and the US."⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Page 47.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Page 48.

⁷⁷ The PRC's attacks on Vietnam did not end after its withdrawal from Vietnamese soil in 1980, and continued on a smaller scale through the use of localised attacks and artillery bombardments up to the middle 1980s.

In dealing with the issue of Kampuchea (which will be investigated in-depth in the following chapter) it emerges that for two ASEAN members namely Indonesia and Malaysia, openly treated China as a greater threat to the region than Vietnam.⁷⁹ The ASEAN states also opposed the Chinese strategy of bleeding Vietnam white in Kampuchea, by providing massive amounts of military materiel and assistance to the Khmer Rouge to aid their conflict against the Vietnamese. ASEAN opposes the Chinese strategy and viewed this as being unfavourable as it could, if successful remove the Vietnamese buffer to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.⁸⁰ Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia desired to see the PRC expanding its influence in Southeast Asia and coming into competition with the security provided by US responsibilities in the region. Thailand on the other hand saw Chinese involvement in a more positive light, and viewed the Chinese as a useful bulwark and opponent of Vietnamese expansion, especially since it was the only ASEAN member state that directly bordered the area of conflict. The PRC for its part, aided Thailand by retaliating against the Vietnamese for any Vietnamese attacks on Khmer Rouge resistance bases in Thailand. This was not done out of an altruistic nature, but rather as a Chinese attempt to gain an ally inside ASEAN, being fully aware of Malaysia and Indonesia's position on relations with the PRC. According to Sheldon W. Simon:

Thailand possessed considerable leverage for keeping the ASEAN outliers on the Kampuchean issue in line. Unless Indonesia and Malaysia supported Thailand's insistence on a complete Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, they risked pushing Thailand closer to China, an outcome all ASEAN members wished to avoid.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Shambaugh, D. *op.cit.*, (1994) Page 49.

⁸⁰ Simon, S. W. "China and South-East Asia: Protector or Predator?" *Australian Outlook*, Volume 39, Number 2, August, 1985, Page 94.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Page 95.

⁸² *Ibid.*, Page 94.

One can see that China played the role in Southeast Asia (and still does) of furthering its own policy goals, through a dual approach. This dual approach was in using covert and overt military means to pursue claims and objectives. In the ASEAN region this took the form of materiel and advisory support for guerrilla groups in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The PRC also actively pursued its territorial claims in the South China Sea, resorting to displays and use of its military force to seize the islands it could, while maintaining its claims on islands occupied by other Southeast Asian states. China also sought to gain an ally in Thailand and cause a rift in ASEAN by supporting it both militarily and morally against the Vietnamese who were on Thailand's border, much to the chagrin of Indonesia and Malaysia but without concrete results in causing meaningful divisions within ASEAN.

China's historical antagonistic posturing in the region has made it not unfairly a nation to be wary of. The PRC's military power and force projection capability was the largest in the region, with Vietnam able to mount small-scale external campaigns but substantially trailing the PRC's force projection capability. Coupled to this was the fact that Vietnam did not claim any substantial part of disputed Southeast Asian territory in comparison to China. Vietnam, like much of the ASEAN members, had also been a historical target of Chinese imperialism, therefore having more in common with the ASEAN states than not when regarding Chinese nationalism. Therefore the PRC can be seen as a historical ethnic enemy of the majority of ASEAN members. That has consistently claimed vast areas of Southeast Asia as its own and possessed the military capacity and shown its willingness to use its resources on states that it was in disagreement with.

Conclusion:

As can be seen the ASEAN states do not have a rich history of co-operation with one another, but rather a tradition of conflicts surrounding territory, territorial claims, political ideology and ethnicity. It would appear that those issues of contention that previously existed among ASEAN members, coupled with existing and continuing disputes would put paid to the association, assuring it of a short existence span. What is of course significant is that this event has not occurred, and with the conflicts in the main perpetuating ASEAN appears to have increased in strength and scope.

ASEAN thus emerged from a history of internecine conflict between its members to form a regional organisation, albeit beset by various hurdles. In this first phase what is significant about ASEAN is not the very slow pace of co-operation or inter-associational trade, but the fact that the organisation was able to exist at all. As highlighted above conflict was the hallmark of the states' relations pre the founding of ASEAN. While the formation of ASEAN did not halt the conflicts or territorial claims, it provided a framework for dialogue on continuing territorial disputes and moderation of potential confrontations. The states have not though sacrificed national interests to a large degree, but it appears that the solution to pronounced conflict has been to down play and often ignore the problem to a large degree without completely reneging on the conflictual cause, for the sake of not splitting the Association.

As remarked upon the primary altercations continue, and while being given a lower emphasis by the states have not been completely abolished. Primary among these are the territorial claims that continue to provide a source of future conflict, and chief among these are

the Spratly Islands (and to a lesser degree the Paracel Islands) whose claimants include all the Southeast Asian powers and importantly the PRC, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. While the majority of ASEAN states have relegated their territorial claims to a low status, they have still not completely relinquished them, and with an aggressive Chinese position these areas continue to provide a source of conflict.

The internal ethnic conflicts within the ASEAN states have to date not been completely resolved, with conflict between dominant and minority groups still evident especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. Insurgency levels experienced a steady decline through the 1980s into the 1990s, with the levels of foreign support diminishing with the decline of the Soviet Union, and China's curtailment of support. This was coupled to increasingly effective anti-insurgency programmes in the ASEAN states, utilising greater inter-state co-operation, and effective development strategies to franchise previously ignored groups both politically and economically. Examples of this are that the Philippines appears to have largely managed to defuse the Huk and Muslim separatist movements, and the Thai who all but destroyed the CPT. Unfortunately the potential for insurgency has not been completely removed, and the re-emergence of heightened conflict is not inconceivable following major political or economic upheaval.

As has been demonstrated ASEAN had a rather inauspicious start, after formation and halting attempts at implementing its stated mandate, progress was rather slow and ineffectual. Mutual suspicions were still high and conflicts remained just below the surface. The global situation at this time was one of conflict and mutual distrust, with the two main camps of the Soviet Union and the United States about to be joined by a third, namely the PRC, following

its acrimonious split from socialist union with the Soviet Union and its historical claims in the region, to most of the region adding a further dimension to regional relations. To the reality of the major Cold War power blocs was added the catalyst of Vietnam's invasion of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea in 1978, and the existing realities coupled to this major new development were bound to cause a shift in the tangibility of ASEAN member relations, dialogue and action. It is this new dimension added by Vietnam's invasion of Democratic Kampuchea (vis-à-vis ASEAN) that shall be investigated next, to inquire into the reasons, role and consequences that transpired within ASEAN as a result of Vietnam's actions.

CHAPTER 5

VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA:

Introduction:

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea serves to illustrate this thesis's central contention, that is that regional security threats were catalysts for deepening co-operation between ASEAN, rather than economic imperatives. This chapter shall investigate the Vietnamese conflict with DK in depth, examining the events leading up to Vietnam's invasion of DK. Included in the examination will be the historical dimension of Vietnamese, Khmer relations. The events and interactions that formed the basis for the Vietnamese invasion will be researched. The military balance between the conflicting parties and the conduct of the war will be examined, culminating in an analysis of the outcome of the military contest between Vietnam and DK, and its effect on the region. The second component of the chapter shall detail the reaction and views of the ASEAN member states to the Vietnamese invasion, highlighting the divergence of member's views vis-à-vis the invasion.

Vietnam's Invasion of Democratic Kampuchea:

On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot⁸² defeated the Cambodian government of Lon Nol and occupied Phnom Penh the Cambodian capital. Pol Pot implemented his ideas of a new path for Democratic Kampuchea (DK), as he renamed Cambodia, putting him on a path to gross human rights violations and regional conflict with Vietnam. Pol Pot's murderous campaigns and grand plans for DK after his "Year Zero"⁸³ are of interest and relevance to the study of the region but this chapter's core investigation shall be Pol Pot's interaction and conflict with Vietnam.

Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam's disputes were the result of conflicting territorial claims and ethnic animosity pre-dating the French control of Indochina. Kampuchea's primary claim was for Kampuchea Krom⁸⁴, which entailed the entire Mekong Delta and areas around Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City. This territory which had been part of the Angkor Empire, was conquered and incorporated by the Vietnamese during their march to the south under the Vietnamese Imperial Tran and Le dynasties. The Khmer fear of Vietnamese conquest and domination caused a great deal of animosity between the Khmer and the Vietnamese, a fear that exists to the present day. Despite Khmer attempts, they never wrested control back from the Vietnamese, and under French control of Indochina (Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos) the borders were demarcated by the French (albeit not precisely). In concert with the disputes over the Mekong Delta, there were also disputes over certain islands

⁸² Whose original name was Saloth Sar.

⁸³ Pol Pot's design for Democratic Kampuchea was an entirely new start and organization of the state apparatus, the population and the countryside. Year Zero was the start of this 'new dawn' for Democratic Kampuchea, and commenced when the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh and assumed political control.

⁸⁴ Kiernan, B. How Pol Pot Came to Power. London: Verso, 1986, Page 363.

in the Gulf of Thailand, namely: Phu Quoc, Poulo Wai and Tho Chu⁶⁵. Following the French withdrawal from Indochina the two new states of South Vietnam and Cambodia, did not demarcate, nor agree on the precise location of the border.

During the 1960s the Cambodian government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk held talks with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). Sihanouk offered to relinquish Cambodia's territorial claims, if the National Liberation Front (NLF) unambiguously recognised the existing border. The NLF needing Cambodian border sanctuaries for its guerrilla campaign agreed, as did the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). In the middle of 1967 both Cambodia and North Vietnam made public statements agreeing to recognise the existing borders. As regards the status of the disputed islands, Cambodia failed to recognise the French demarcation line (the Brevie line)⁶⁶, which gave South Vietnam control of several islands in the Gulf, notably Tho Chu. The Cambodian claim was rejected by the South Vietnamese, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the NLF, and when Phnom Penh published a map leaving the marine boundary ambiguous, neither the NLF nor DRV commented.

The boundary disputes after these events assumed a back seat, as the Vietnamese civil war intensified, and Prince Sihanouk was deposed by a military coup in January 1970, with Lon Nol assuming power. Lon Nol was anti-Communist and under his leadership Cambodian troops attempted to eject the NLF and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) from their Cambodian sanctuaries. Lon Nol's forces were not very successful in their campaigns, and were fighting a losing two pronged battle, on one hand against hostile Cambodian elements

⁶⁵ Dulker, W. J. Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon, Athens: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 56, 1985, Page

(primarily the Khmer Rouge) and secondly the Vietnamese. Lon Nol's forces were not alone in clashing with Vietnamese elements on Cambodian soil, and there is evidence of frequent Khmer Rouge clashes with the NLF and PAVN. These clashes were primarily driven by the ethnic rivalry that existed between elements of the Khmer and Vietnamese populations. Lon Nol's clashes were conjunctively fuelled by his anti-Communist beliefs. The Khmer Rouge was on an elementary ideological level allied to the Vietnamese communists in their anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology. The Khmer Rouge was ethnically jingoistic, and Pol Pot had no great love for the Vietnamese as a whole, be they communist or not. The animosity of sections of the Khmer towards the Vietnamese appears to have become government policy even before the Khmer Rouge conquered Cambodia, with government officials constantly attacking the Vietnamese constantly in speech. An example of this is a 1973 statement by Kim Kai, a Communist Party of Kampuchea district chief in Kompong Chhnang who in a speech stated:

Kampuchea Krom must be liberated; it was once Khmer territory and we have lost it all. If we do not fight the Vietnamese, we will lose the rest of our country... Vietnam is the most acute enemy, the hereditary enemy. After Victory we aim to go and liberate Kampuchea Krom.¹¹⁰

The Khmer Rouge immediately after taking power appeared bent on regaining all the territory that was in dispute. Shortly after the PAVN took Saigon on April 30, 1975, Khmer Rouge forces attacked several Vietnamese border towns from Tay Ninh province, down to towns on the Gulf of Thailand. Khmer Rouge forces stationed on Poul Wai and the mainland

¹¹⁰.

¹¹¹ Ibid. Page 111.

also assaulted the Vietnamese Islands of Tho Chu and Phu Quoc. Vietnamese troops repulsed the Khmer offensive and force the Khmer Rouge troops back to Poulo Wai.⁸⁸ Pol Pot apologised for the attacks, stating that they were mistakes made by local commanders unaware of the exact border delineation. This excuse seems rather hollow when one considers the command structure of communist forces, and the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. Despite being a guerrilla army, large-scale military operations were never undertaken without orders from high up within the chain of command. With Pol Pot's leadership style, it is doubtful that any attack on that scale would occur without his knowledge, let alone without a direct order. With the situation deteriorating and armed contacts on the rise, diplomatic efforts were initiated to defuse the conflict, and the two sides agreed to a conference to discuss the border situation in 1976.

The 1976 conference delivered little in the way of solving the crisis, with the Kampuchean position being that their 1967 agreement should still be in force, allowing them to unilaterally request adjustments to the border perimeter. The Vietnamese for obvious reasons objected to the Kampuchean position, and proposed that rather either side could suggest adjustments. The diplomatic meetings ended with very little real progress, and at the adjournment of the talks Democratic Kampuchea published a claim to a 200 mile maritime economic zone⁸⁹, bringing it again into conflict with Vietnam's maritime area.

In January 1977, DK forces attacked civilian communities in six out of Vietnam's seven border provinces. The Kampuchean army used all their weapons including artillery in their attacks on the Vietnamese settlements. The DK attacks were aimed at continually asserting DK

⁸⁸ Kiernan, B. *op.cit.*, (1986) Page 362.

claims on Vietnamese territory claimed as Kampuchean. Vietnam responded to the Kampuchean attacks by reinforcing their border areas and increasing military patrols. The Kampuchean's continued their attacks, but in general the Vietnamese response was to prevent an escalation of the clashes. The Vietnamese government proposed diplomatic meeting on 7 June to solve the border issue, but on June 18 the DK government rejected this proposal. The DK rejection of Vietnam's diplomatic overtures led to Vietnam to increasingly contemplate military response to the continuing Kampuchean attacks. During the summer and fall of 1978, Kampuchean units advanced approximately 16 kilometres into Vietnam. The PAVN responded with retaliatory attacks on Kampuchean towns, and a steady build up of troops on the Kampuchean border.

It appears that Vietnam had decided that it could not allow the present situation to continue, and that all other attempts at a diplomatic and military solution had failed, leaving them with no option but a full scale invasion of DK Vietnam must have feared a Chinese retaliation, as Chinese-Vietnamese relations had become strained during the course of the Vietnam war, with Vietnam moving closer to the Soviet Union. China continually seeking partners for influence in the Southeast Asian region, increased political and material support to the Khmer Rouge. Chinese support included political support, usually assuming the form of condemnatory attacks on Vietnam in world bodies. Material support included tanks, armoured personnel carriers, other necessary military requirements, and the provision of development aid and Chinese advisors in Kampuchea. Hanoi viewed Chinese aid to Kampuchea as a threat to Vietnamese security interests, and as an attempt to dominate the states on Vietnam's southern flank. Vietnam while not being singularly able to confront China,

²⁰ Evans, G. and Rowley, K. *Red Brotherhood at War*. London: Verso, 1990, Page 107.

had the military and political backing of the Soviets to offset the Chinese superiority⁸⁰. Therefore while Vietnam would have feared a Chinese backlash following the invasion, it appears to have weighed the consequences of leaving Pol Pot in power as being too costly to Vietnam and Russian support able to parry the Chinese to an extent, decided to continue and risk Chinese aggression.

Vietnam to deflect condemnation for its invasion, set up Kampuchean groups hostile to the Pol Pot regime, but who would support Vietnam's course of action. Vietnam aided in setting up the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (KNUFNS), i.e. a Vietnamese occupied part of eastern Kampuchea. Heng Samrin⁸¹ was declared leader of KNUFNS. That Samrin was pro Vietnam was never in doubt, and it is very likely that KNUFNS was established entirely by the Vietnamese. KNUFNS membership was composed of those who had fled Cambodia's fall to Pol Pot, and also many that had fled Pol Pot's purges. KNUFNS had within its membership non- and anti-Communist elements, but the core was composed of revolutionary veterans who had become disillusioned with the revolutionary path of Pol Pot, and were amenable to co-operating with the Vietnamese.⁸²

Vietnam invaded DK on Christmas Day 1978, with twelve divisions (roughly 135 000 troops).⁸³ The Vietnamese invasion forces were commanded by the Vietnamese army chief of staff, General Van Tien Dung. That the Vietnamese military possessed a great superiority over the Kampuchians was obvious. Vietnam possessed a military machine honed by decades of

⁸⁰ Duiker, J. *op.cit.*, (1983) Page 112.

⁸¹ Alagappa, M. "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict." *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 46, Number 2, Winter 1993, Page 453.

⁸² Heng Samrin was a division commander in the Khmer Rouge, who had left Kampuchea in 1978 during the purges, and fled to Vietnam.

⁸³ Etcheson, C. *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, Page 193.

conflict, equipped with modern Soviet and captured American equipment. Vietnam's army possessed large amounts of sophisticated artillery, and their air force was one of the regions most powerful. The Kampuchean armed forces were still primarily guerrilla forces, more used to the indiscriminate killing of their own civilians than to conducting conventional military campaigns. The Kampuchean army numbered less than 200 000³¹, constituted primarily of members of the Khmer Rouge guerrilla forces and youths pressed into service. The Kampuchean army had been primarily concerned with implementing Pol Pot's pogroms, and small-scale guerrilla incursions into Vietnam. Pol Pot concentrated half of his forces in Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham Provinces, expecting a Vietnamese attack along Highway One, as this was the most direct route from Ho Chi Minh City to Phnom Penh.

The Vietnamese chose instead to attack the Kampuchean flanks in their opening campaign manoeuvre, and troops under General Hoang Cham attacked from Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku in the north towards Kratie and Stung Treng. In the centre and south General Le Duc Anh's troops attacked Kompong Cham in the centre and Takeo in the south. Approximately 100 000 Vietnamese troops supported by the vastly superior Vietnamese air force, and Khmer guerrillas hostile to the Pol Pot state invaded DK. General Hoang Cham's forces encountered light resistance and Kratie and Stung Treng fell on December 30 and January 3 respectively. General Anh who faced the bulk of the Kampuchean forces had a tougher passage than General Cham, but was able to use Vietnam's superior artillery and air assets to weaken the Kampuchean line in the Central Provinces³².

³¹ Duiker, W. J. *op.cit.*, (1985) Page 122.

³² *Ibid.*, Page 117.

³³ Evans, G. and Rowley, K. *op.cit.*, (1990) Page 109.

January 4 1979, saw most of Kampuchea east of the Mekong under Vietnamese control. The extent of the Vietnamese advance was a surprise to the Vietnamese who believed that they could defeat the Khmer Rouge forces, but had not anticipated the speed of the Kampuchean collapse. Vietnam's advance halted Khmer Rouge forays into Vietnam, and created the buffer zone that Vietnam sought to protect its provinces from Khmer Rouge cross border raids. Following the initial successes, Vietnam decided to press further into DK than the border zones. It is debated whether Vietnam's easy battlefield victories resulted in a prompt decision to invade DK entirely, or that the decision to invade completely was made by the Vietnamese government prior to the invasion. The Vietnamese continued their assault, but after their early border successes, they focused their offensive on capturing Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese captured Phnom Penh on January 7, and the following day the Vietnamese established a new government.

The new government installed by the Vietnamese was not unexpectedly the recently established KNUFNS, under its leader Heng Samrin. Samrin was declared president of an eight-man Peoples' Revolutionary Council, and the name of the country changed from Democratic Kampuchea to the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).


After capturing Phnom Penh the Vietnamese continued to further advance into Kampuchea towards the Western rice producing areas. The Vietnamese forces advanced along Routes 5 and 6 around the Tonle Sap Lake, rapidly reaching Sisophon. The Vietnamese success resulted in the remnants of the Khmer Rouge army dispersing to the mountains of Southwest Kampuchea and along the Thai border. The military state in Kampuchea stabilised from May 1979, as the monsoon rains transpired. With the monsoon curbing further military

activity, the situation that arose was Vietnamese control of the main populated areas, the eastern border region and the western and central rice-growing sections of Kampuchea. This left the Khmer Rouge with the largely sparsely populated areas of the Southwest, and the Thai border, with the only meaningful town under their control being Pailin. Khmer Rouge military strength had been decimated by the Vietnamese, and that by mid 1979 only 35 000 combatants remained⁶. The Khmer Rouge leadership was largely intact though, based on the Thai border [See map number 3].

⁶ *Ibid.* Page 111.

MAP NUMBER 3

KAMPUCHEA FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE INVASION



Source: Evans, G. and Rowley, K. *op. cit.*, (1984) Page viii.

ASEAN's Response to the Vietnamese Invasion of Democratic Kampuchea:

The situation now arose where Vietnam had invaded a neighbouring state, conquered its territory and replaced its government with one installed by itself. That the Pol Pot regime was a murderous and barbarous entity, unacceptable in a civilised world is beyond debate. What the system of states was confronted with was a state that had invaded and conquered its neighbour, a situation completely unacceptable in terms of international law and one that could set a dangerous precedent. While Vietnam's action was concerning for most states, especially the ASEAN states where those in whose geographical sphere the strategic balance had just drastically tilted. The ASEAN states now undoubtedly knew of Vietnam's military prowess following the PAVN's rapid conquest of South Vietnam, now faced an entirely new dilemma. Vietnam was now not separated from ASEAN member Thailand by Democratic Kampuchea, but had troops on the Thai border. In concert with the Vietnamese troops, the remaining Khmer Rouge forces were also concentrated on the Thai border, plus Thailand had to deal with multitude of refugees the war creates. This was the situation that faced the ASEAN member states, requiring their attention, study and response.

The ASEAN member states were faced with the dilemma of an aggressive Vietnam that was now on the border of one of their members. ASEAN though could not be said to have an entirely common response to the Vietnamese invasion, and in actual fact there were differing views on the genuine threat that Vietnam posed. Thailand of all the ASEAN states was the member state who was in the closest proximity to Vietnam before the invasion of Kampuchea, and following the invasion was faced with Vietnamese troops on the border. Thailand felt that it had a reason to fear further Vietnamese expansion. Another fear in

Thailand was that Vietnam would now be in a position to more easily support the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), easily being able to supply materiel and basing support inside Kampuchea. Thailand thus justly feared Vietnam's new close proximity to itself. This fear did not stem from Vietnam actually invading Thailand⁹⁷ itself, but of Vietnam being able to easily supply and base CPT guerrillas. Added to this was Thailand's fear of destabilisation of its eastern provinces by an influx of refugees, and the presence of large groups of Khmer Rouge guerrillas on Thailand's border. Thailand had clashed with the Khmer Rouge before Vietnam's invasion⁹⁸, and was hardly a friend of the Khmer Rouge. In January 1977, Thai and Khmer soldiers clashed at the village of Ban Noi Parai, in the biggest engagement on the Thai border.⁹⁹ In 1977 the Thai Prime Minister accused the Kampucheans of roughly 400 border incursions, and actually threatened the Kampucheans with war. Ethnic rivalries also existed between the Thai and Khmer, and Pol Pot often referred to the Thai as: "contemptible people from the west"¹⁰⁰.

Thailand found itself having exchanged one factor of instability for another. The new factor included the old Khmer Rouge element, and added the Vietnamese dimension. Thailand when analysing the situation, would have concluded that the Vietnamese despite having invaded and conquered Democratic Kampuchea, were not about to invade Thailand too, but had committed an act in contravention of international law. The reasons for this have been stated above, and the chief fears of the Thai were that domestic problems that would be

⁹⁷ The Royal Thai armed forces while not being as powerful as the Vietnamese, were a well trained and equipped fighting force. Thailand was receiving a great deal of military aid and advice from the United States. Thai troops had combat experience in Vietnam as they had sent troops there to aid to American effort. Therefore while Vietnam could in probability have attacked Thailand, I believe that the military, diplomatic and economic cost would have compelled the Vietnamese to consider an invasion of Thailand unviable.

⁹⁸ Border clashes were usually caused by Kampuchean forces crossing into Thailand in "hot pursuit" of Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) forces, bringing them into contact with Thailand's border police and army.

caused by the numbers of refugees that sought Thai assistance and the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge destabilisation of the border, coupled to Vietnamese aid to the CPT. The solution for Thailand was to replace both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese with a new government, one that would take a more neutral stance than that of its predecessor. Bringing stability to the region, and importantly within Kampuchea, encouraging internal stability and development. These factors would reverse the then situation of a shattered economy and state, with its accompanying refugee and dissatisfied groups.

Singapore allied itself strongly with the Thai position as regards its condemnation of Vietnam's action. Singapore's primary reason for condemnation was that one state had invaded another, and been permitted to complete and consolidate its conquest with no by intervention the world community. Singapore viewed Vietnam's act as that of a strong state attacking and routing a weaker state. Singapore had very good reasons to vehemently oppose any attack of a stronger state on a weaker one. The most salient reason was that Singapore was a tiny island city-state that as stated earlier had left the Malaysian Federation under acrimonious circumstances. Singapore's fear lay in that, if Vietnam could conquer Democratic Kampuchea with no effectual repercussions, what was to stop Malaysia reincorporating it through force back into the federation? Therefore Singapore took the strongest anti-Vietnamese stand of any ASEAN state. Primarily opposing Vietnam's actions on the principle of the Vietnamese attacking a weaker state, rather than support for the ousted Democratic Kampuchean state: "It is Singapore which takes the hardest line against Vietnam. With survival resting on the vulnerabilities of geography, population and economic growth."¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Evans, G. and Rowley, K. *op.cit.*, (1990) Page 102.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Page 103.

Malaysia and Indonesia, took a differing approach towards Vietnam's invasion, viewing Vietnam as a potential ally against Chinese expansion in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia had traditionally viewed China as a threat to themselves, and viewed China's support and involvement within DK with concern. The two states viewed a Democratic Kampuchea allied to China with alarm, as this would place (as they viewed it) hostile Chinese elements within too close a proximity to themselves. Indonesia and Malaysia believed that a moderate attitude towards Vietnam would be more productive, than Thailand's hard-line attitude. Malaysia did not deem Vietnam to pose a significant military threat to itself, but was wary as much of Malaysia is continental and if Vietnam did invade Thailand Malaysia would then definitely be threatened. Indonesia's geographical nature made it more secure than Malaysia. Both countries though still held the view that China was the only state in the region that posed a serious threat to their security. Indonesia was concerned about ASEAN solidarity, and feared a split in ASEAN if it did not support Thailand¹⁰². Indonesia, realising that Vietnam's position could (and in the eyes of the Thai did) threaten Thai security, heeded the Thai position and supported it.

The Philippine policy on Vietnam's invasion fundamentally assumed the same form as that of Malaysia and Indonesia. The Philippines as with Indonesia was separated from the proximity of the conflict by its geographical position and composition¹⁰³. The Philippines as with Indonesia believed that it should not allow its view on Vietnam to cause a division within ASEAN. The Philippines viewed ASEAN as an alternative to a complete reliance on the USA, and therefore it believed that its diplomatic actions should ensure cohesion within

¹⁰¹ Clementson, J. "No More Dominoes: ASEAN and Regional Security." *RUSI Journal*, Volume 129, Number 4, December 1984, Page 34.

¹⁰² Alagappa, M. *op.cit.*, (1993) Page 452.

ASEAN. In concert with this the Filipinos could not be seen as being too muted in their criticism of Vietnam, considering their ties to the USA¹⁰¹, and the large number of anti-Communists in the armed forces.

¹⁰¹ As with Indonesia the Philippines is a collection of islands, even further maritime separation from Thailand, Kampuchea, and Vietnam, than Indonesia is.

¹⁰² The Philippines had the American naval base at Subic Bay and Clarke Air force base, plus received large amounts of American foreign aid, which was vital to the Philippine economy.

CONCLUSION:

It is apparent that while there initially existed a divergence of ASEAN member views' on the Vietnamese invasion, the members felt that greater ASEAN unity was more important than their individual views on the invasion. While three out of the (then) five ASEAN members felt that Vietnam's action did not directly threaten them, nor did they feel that Vietnam's future intentions were hostile. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines decided to support Thailand and Singapore's more hard-line position, rather than cause a rift on the first major dilemma to confront ASEAN.

The majority of ASEAN member states decided to lay aside their individual opinions on Vietnam's invasion, and support the member states that felt most aggrieved by Vietnam's action. In analysing this decision it appears that ASEAN solidarity was the primary catalyst for mutual support, and the subjugation of individual opinion for the betterment of associational co-operation and unanimity. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines had nothing to lose by supporting Thailand and Singapore, as Vietnam was of little economic or political value or interest to them. On the other hand ASEAN co-operation held the promise of economic advancement through increasing intra-ASEAN trade. Denouncing Vietnam would also prevent alienation from the United States that was supporting them through economic development and military assistance, especially as the USA vehemently denounced Vietnam's actions.

ASEAN's collective response to Vietnam's aggression was not moulded by a unified vilification of Vietnam, but rather a pragmatic response to Vietnam's actions shaped by

ASEAN member states' desire to maintain ASEAN fellowship. Despite Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines not viewing Vietnam (and its actions) as a threat, they had nothing to lose by supporting Thailand and Singapore. They could still maintain their view of China as the primary threat, while maintaining ASEAN's solidarity and not alienating the United States. Therefore, while it appeared that due to their support of Thailand and Singapore's censure of Vietnam, they viewed Vietnam as a threat, closer study reveals that this was not the case. Outside aggression was a threat to them, but not they believed from Vietnam, rather regarding China as the primary regional peril. Homogeneity could deter further aggression by making the sum more powerful than its parts, acting as a foil to states bent on regional hegemony, deterring Vietnam from further aggression, and hopefully containing China's expansionist tendencies.

The present political cohesion of ASEAN is thus a measure of the joint determination to freeze these differences in order to assume a solid regional stance for collective security against outside influences. The mortal fear of external aggression continually gives renewed life to ASEAN.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Clementson, J. *op.cit.*, (1984) Page 34.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION:

As this thesis has progressed use has been made of various historical incidents, occurrences and agreements in an attempt to prove the hypothesis. Each chapter's conclusion has demonstrated the salient aspects of its content as relates to the thesis. What the final chapter shall present is a strengthening of the arguments postulated earlier, providing further information to present a lucid argument for the proof of the hypothesis.

This thesis has charted ASEAN's progress from its early beginnings and evolution from MAPHILINDO, ASA and SEATO into the association that it developed into. Not only did ASEAN succeed where the other attempts at regional organisations have failed, but the association has managed to survive and achieve 30 years of existence with future of the organisation seeming secure. During this period ASEAN has faced dilemmas both economic and security in nature, ranging from external and internal threats that have included ethnic, territorial and open conventional warfare. ASEAN's official primary goal was that of encouraging and facilitating economic co-operation and not security. What is clear though, is that ASEAN had to deal with complex and disruptive security issues, with these issues at various times assuming primary focus within the ASEAN membership. This final chapter will individually and conclusively present the two divisions which are of primary importance in testing the hypothesis, namely: the threat perception of Vietnam versus that of the Peoples' Republic of China towards ASEAN; and ASEAN as a de facto security organisation.

Vietnam and the PRC:

Many scholars have regarded Vietnam as being viewed by ASEAN as the primary threat to regional security, as a result of its invasion of Kampuchea¹⁰⁶. As has been seen in the body of the thesis, Vietnam was not viewed with hostility by many ASEAN states and enjoyed a certain degree of sympathy for its actions in Kampuchea. ASEAN states such as Thailand who bordered Kampuchea were directly affected by the invasion and found they had little scope for action but to denounce and resist Vietnamese moves for fear that the Vietnamese would advance further West. It is though highly doubtful that Vietnam would have invaded Thailand, and despite limited border clashes, Vietnam never proceeded or gave intent to proceed further than Kampuchea. Singapore was the most vehement ASEAN state in its opposition to Vietnam; this can primarily be ascribed to its acrimonious split from Malaysia¹⁰⁷. Singapore could therefore not abet nor ignore Vietnam's actions, for fear of legitimising conquest of smaller states by larger states. The desire and need to maintain ASEAN solidarity manifested itself in a unified position being postulated by ASEAN members through much of the Kampuchean crisis.

The Kampuchean conflict was resolved through diplomatic initiatives that included the United Nations and ASEAN. The diplomatic initiatives led to the United Nation's interim UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which oversaw the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea after the Paris Peace Accord of October 1991. The Paris Accord facilitated, and later through UNTAC, observed the demobilisation of the Kampuchean Guerrilla armies (though the Khmer Rouge reneged on its agreement and returned to fighting

¹⁰⁶ As noted by Clementson, in *ibid*, Page 21.

¹⁰⁷ Razmah, B. A. *op.cit.*, (1990) Page 30.

the Cambodian government). UNTAC also supervised and monitored the national elections, which despite the Khmer Rouge's opposition proceeded smoothly.

With the resolution of the Kampuchean conflict ASEAN rapidly expanded its ties with Vietnam in both the economic and political spheres. Vietnam had now shed much its status as an aggressor state with those ASEAN members who fervently opposed it before its withdrawal from Cambodia. Opening the way for discussions concerning its expanding relationship in the ASEAN sphere (and eventual membership in 1995). Vietnam has not renounced its staid Socialist ideology, but it has introduced market and bureaucratic reforms, though firmly remaining intrinsically the same Communist state that defeated the USA, South Vietnam and Kampuchea. The continued adherence of Vietnam to its socialist ideology appears to be a serious ideological anomaly within ASEAN. The maintenance of the political socialist tenets is indeed an aberration from the dominant anti-Communist political structures in the other ASEAN states. More importantly this factor demonstrates that the founding ASEAN nations do not oppose all socialist states equally (for example the PRC vis-à-vis Vietnam), opposing the communist PRC more than the communist Vietnamese. Which can primarily be ascribed to the Chinese ethnicity of the PRC and its nationalist threat to the region, being viewed as a greater threat than any ideological differences ASEAN may have had with Vietnam. Vietnam has sought ASEAN backing against China, and has received sympathy in this regard from the other ASEAN states in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, but ASEAN has not adopted a homogenous anti-PRC stance, although the majority of ASEAN members support this.

At no time during the Kampuchean crisis did Vietnam overtly threaten the security of ASEAN member states, as previously mentioned incursions did occur on Thai soil primarily in response to Thailand's material support for Khmer Rouge and other Kampuchean groups. Vietnam has continued to its maintains territorial claims in the South China Sea, especially on the Spratly and Parcel Islands which conflicts with other ASEAN member's claims. Therefore if Vietnam and ASEAN are viewed together it emerges that Vietnam did not pose as great a threat to ASEAN as is supposed. Rather ASEAN extended membership to Vietnam who remains a steadfastly Socialist state, Vietnam's threat to ASEAN was greatly exaggerated and the bulk of ASEAN members did not look unfavourably upon Vietnam following its actions in Kampuchea. Vietnam had also successfully opposed the Chinese invasion of its territory in 1979 and had proved itself willing to confront the Chinese on territorial, ideological and political disputes.¹⁰⁰ Vietnam's military strength, experience and historically antagonistic relationship with China made it an ideal ASEAN member to serve as an effective bulwark to any Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. Thus Vietnam can not be seen as having been the primary threat to ASEAN and the catalyst for increased co-operation, and identifying the principal threat leads conclusively to the Peoples' Republic of China.

The PRC despite its socialist ideology is steadfastly nationalistic in its outlook, maintaining territorial claims that have their basis in areas conquered by Chinese dynasties up to a thousand years ago¹⁰¹. Coupled to this is the Chinese predisposition to use any means at

¹⁰⁰ Vietnam has historically been one of the most successful states in resisting foreign interference on its soil, having defeated the Imperial Chinese in the 15th century. Later violently opposed the Imperial Japanese, then defeating the French, Americans, Communist Chinese and Khmer Rouge.

¹⁰¹ Barnett, A. D. *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977, Page 32. and: Hinton, H. C. *China's Turbulent Quest - An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949*, London: Indiana University Press, 1972, Page 64.

their disposal to achieve stated aims, be they military, political or economic in nature. The PRC from the period of ASEAN's formation has pursued the objective of increasing and expanding Chinese influence and control in the South East Asian Region. Concurrently it has undertaken a course of action to strengthen its position as regards territorial claims in the South China Sea. This has been done through direct military action and the use of International Law to further its claims on these disputed areas. During the formative years of ASEAN the PRC was the primary supplier of weapons to Guerrilla groups in ASEAN states, especially in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The PRC was the principal supplier of arms to the Khmer Rouge to maintain the tempo of anti-Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, in a continuing program to punish Vietnam (as mentioned previously Vietnam and the PRC still engaged in periodical border clashes following the 1979 invasion of Vietnam by the PRC). It is only recently that the PRC has largely cut back on its materiel support of guerrilla groups, with these reductions largely a by-product of the end of the Cold War and the success of counterinsurgency programmes in Southeast Asia.

It can be seen that PRC has not only overtly posed a security dilemma to the Southeast Asian region, but through its historical and continuing antagonistic actions has come to be viewed as a habitually flagrant threat to the region, a threat in both conventional and ethnic hostility security terms (especially by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia). It cannot be denied that Vietnam's actions placed it in the realm of being a threat to regional stability. Vietnam's actions though when viewed against China's long history of conquest, continually expanding claims, acceptance of the use of armed force (and with no repudiation of any of these factors in sight) can only lead to the conclusion that the PRC is the pre-eminent regional threat and the peril to which ASEAN has prepared itself to respond to since its inception. This

leads one to the acceptance of the hypothesis that China and their concurrent security threat (such as support for localised insurgencies) was the primary threat to ASEAN and not Vietnam.

ASEAN as a De Facto Security Alliance:

When regarding ASEAN as a de facto security alliance, it is significant that there was never an overt official statement to this effect nor was a mechanism touted as being that of an ASEAN security structure. What is significant is that ASEAN found it continually important to keep stating that they had no security aspirations. This could be construed as an attempt to deflect cognisance away from their existing security co-operation, or a sincere statement that ASEAN had no interest in security dealings. Security co-operation was therefore not implicitly officially sanctioned by any ASEAN declaration. What is significant is that when noting the level of intra-ASEAN military dealings it becomes apparent that security co-operation was a significant part of member interaction.

The ASEAN states engaged in numerous military exercises at regular intervals throughout the period of the thesis and beyond [See Table 2], with these taking the form of joint naval, air and land force exercises. These exercises were held frequently and regularly, with many becoming annual fixtures in the training regimens of the ASEAN member states' militaries.

Outside of the time period of this thesis but with a relevant bearing to the discussion of ASEAN security co-operation, was the establishment by ASEAN of the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF in 1992 at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore. The ARF was formed to allow ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners to come together to discuss security matters, but this forum was though only formalised in December 1995. The ARF while starting to formalise ASEAN security relations has not achieved a great deal of success and appears to be

hampered by an unclear mandate and decision making process. While the achievements of the ARF have not been significant to date, what emerges of importance from ARF is that ASEAN has finally entered into a formalised framework for security issues. Therefore moving away from its old position of simply engaging in security consultations and exercises, towards a stated and promulgated mechanism for these matters.

TABLE 2: ASEAN JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES, 1981-1982

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COUNTRIES INVOLVED</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
January - February 1981	Indonesia - Malaysia	Army
February - March 1981	Indonesia - Malaysia	Army
April-1981	Malaysia - Singapore	Air Defence
May-1981	Indonesia - Philippines	Naval
May-1981	Thailand - Malaysia	Naval
May-1981	Indonesia - Malaysia	Naval
December-1981	Thailand - Malaysia	Army
March-1982	Thailand - Singapore	Naval
March-1982	Thailand - Malaysia	Air

SOURCE: Gomez-Manrique, C. op.cit. (1983) Page 167.

In conclusion ASEAN as an organisation is a far more complex and faceted International actor than it appears to be at first glance. Not only does it operate in one of the world's most historically conflictual and at times diplomatically unstable regions, but it is constituted of member states with divergent ethnic compositions, religious affiliations, a myriad of languages and a history of conflict with each other. These factors make ASEAN remarkable for the fact that it exists at all, but what is extraordinary is that the organisation appears to be continually strengthening and expanding. As mentioned earlier in addition to the granting of membership to Vietnam in 1995, ASEAN announced at the Ministerial Meeting held in 1996 that Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar would all be granted membership at a yet

unspecified date in 1998. Therefore through this thesis it has been demonstrated that ASEAN, as a highly complex organisation cannot be accepted at a basal face value, but rather requires further in-depth research. Whereas Vietnam was supposedly the greatest threat to ASEAN, it has now been incorporated as a member of ASEAN. This constantly returns us to the question that if ASEAN feared a communist Vietnam so much, why did it allow Vietnam to join its membership so rapidly. Especially in light of the fact that Vietnam was intrinsically the same communist state it has been since the French withdrawal from Indochina.

Security issues have been allowed to come into the open from their covert position into the open of ASEAN (from a position of frequent understated security dealings and exercises) through sanctioned attempts at security arrangements such as ARF. ASEAN to a great degree has emerged from its previous intra-regional conflict as a much closer and unified organisation. That conflicts are not completely resolved is a fact, but in the main it can legitimately be stated that ASEAN has moved from "Confrontation to Co-operation".

Appendix A

The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration, 1967)

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of South East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and co-operation;

DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional co-operation in South East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace progress and prosperity in the region;

CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the region already bound by ties of history and culture;

CONSIDERING that the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Co-operation among the countries of South East Asia to be known as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

SECOND, that the aims of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote South East Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer co-operation among themselves.

THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established:

- (a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required;
- (b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members accredited Ambassadors of the

other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers;

(c) Ad Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects;

(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees as may hereafter be established.

FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.

FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and co-operation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.

DONE in Bangkok this Eighth Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.

For Indonesia:

(Signed) Adam Malik

Presidium Minister for

Political Affairs/Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Malaysia:

(Signed) Tun Abdul Razak

Deputy Prime Minister

Minister of Defence and

Minister of National Development

For the Philippines

(Signed) Narciso Ramos

Secretary of Foreign Affairs

For Thailand

(Signed) Thanat Khoman

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Appendix B

Kuala Lumpur Declaration (ZOPFAN Declaration, 1971)

We, the Foreign Ministers of
 INDONESIA,
 MALAYSIA,
 THE PHILIPPINES,
 SINGAPORE,
 And the Special Envoy of the National
 Executive Council of
 THAILAND:

FIRMLY BELIEVING in the merits of regional co-operation which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian Nations;

DESIROUS of bringing about a relaxation of International tension and of achieving lasting peace in Southeast Asia;

INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, abstention from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of states;

BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which among others, enunciates the principles by which States may co-exist peacefully;

RECOGNISING the right of every state, large and small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity;

DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

COGNISANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tensions;

REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples";

AGREEING that the neutralisation of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realisation, and

CONVINCED that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being;

DO HEREBY STATE:

1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers;
2. that Southeast Asian Countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November, 1971.

on behalf of the

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Adam Malik

Minister of Foreign Affairs

on behalf of

MALAYSIA

Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein

Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

on behalf of the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Carlos P. Romulo

Secretary of Foreign Affairs

on behalf of the

REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

S. Rajaratnam

Minister of Foreign Affairs

on behalf of the

KINGDOM OF THAILAND

Thanat Khoman

Special Envoy of the

National Executive Council

Appendix C

Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (1976)

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties:

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;

DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual co-operation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference on Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of South East Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder co-operation;

BELIEVING in the need for co-operation with all peace loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Co-operation as follows:

CHAPTER I

Purpose and Principles

Article 1

The purpose of this Treaty is to promote peace, everlasting amity and co-operation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Article 2

In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:

Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;

The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;

Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

Effective co-operation among themselves.

CHAPTER II**Amity****Article 3**

In pursuance to the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and co-operation which bind them together and shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

CHAPTER III**Co-operation****Article 4**

The High Contracting Parties shall promote active co-operation in the economic, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspirations of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest.

Article 5

Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit of their principles. In this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and essential co-operation with other States as well as international and regional organisations outside the region.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic co-operation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest co-operation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster co-operation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to co-ordinating their views, actions and policies.

Article 10

Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to co-operate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self confidence, self reliance, mutual respect, co-operation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER IV**Pacific Settlement of Disputes****Article 13**

The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them should arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

Article 14

To settle disputes through regional processes, The High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognisance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.

Article 15

In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognisance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.

Article 16

The foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.

Article 17

Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V**General Provisions****Article 18**

This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory state.

It shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.

Article 19

This treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 20

This treaty is drawn up in the languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.

DONE in Denpasar, Bali, on the twenty fourth day of February in the year One thousand nine hundred and seventy six.

For the Republic of Indonesia

(Signed) Suharto

President

For Malaysia

(Signed) Datuk Hussein Onn

Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines

(Signed) Ferdinand E. Marcos

President

For the Republic of Singapore
(Signed) Lee Kuan Yew
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand
(Signed) Kukrit Pramoj
Prime Minister

Appendix D

Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976)

A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of Singapore, and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,

REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;

ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states;

UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN co-operation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

ASEAN co-operation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in pursuit of political stability:

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify co-operation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standard of their peoples. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard

the pace of development of member states. They shall extend within their capacities, assistance for relief of member states in distress.

4. Member states shall take co-operative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilising as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementariness of their respective economies.
5. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on a peaceful process in the settlement of intra-regional differences.
6. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful co-operation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefits.
7. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all, and respecting all nations on the basis mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.

AND DO HEREBY ADOPT:

The Following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN co-operation.

A. Political

Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary;

8. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia;
9. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible;
10. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible;
11. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political co-operation;
12. Study on how to develop judicial co-operation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.

13. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of views, co-ordinating positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.

B. Economic

Co-operation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and Energy.

Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the acquisition of exports from member states, in respect to basic commodities, particularly food and energy.

- i. Member states shall also intensify co-operation in the production of basic commodities particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region.

Industrial Co-operation

Member states shall co-operate to establish large scale ASEAN industrial plant, particularly to meet regional requirement of essential commodities.

- i. Priority shall be given to projects which utilise the available materials in the member states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange, and create employment.

Co-operation in Trade

Member states shall co-operate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.

- i. Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate, through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states.
- ii. The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through co-operation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy through co-

operation in ASEAN industrial projects.

- iii. Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw materials and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.
- iv. Such efforts shall also lead to co-operation in the field of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports.

Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems

The principle of ASEAN co-operation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading systems, the reform of the international monetary system, and the transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral forums, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

- i. Member states shall give priority to the stabilisation and increase of export earnings of these commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including bufferstock schemes and other means.

Machinery for Economic Co-operation

Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:

Formulate recommendations for the consideration of Governments of member states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic co-operation;

- i. Review the co-ordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic co-operation;
- ii. Exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonising regional development;

and

Perform such other relevant functions as agreed to by the member Governments.

C. Social

Co-operation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well being of the low income groups and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration;

1. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts;
2. Intensification and expansion of existing co-operation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies;
3. Intensification of co-operation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.

Cultural Information

Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states;

1. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists, and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship;
2. Promotion of Southeast Asian Studies through closer collaboration among national institutes.

E. Security

Continuation of co-operation on a non ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.

F. Improvement of ASEAN Machinery

Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat;

3. Regular review of the ASEAN organisational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness;
4. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN.

DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy six.

For the Republic of Indonesia

(Signed) Suharto

President

For Malaysia

(Signed) Datuk Hussein Onn

Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines

(Signed) Ferdinand E. Marcos

President

For the Republic of Singapore

(Signed) Lee Kuan Yew

Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand

(Signed) Kukrit Pramoj

Prime Minister

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