

From Livelihoods to Citizenship: The Redistributive Land Reform in Zimbabwe

By

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Declaration Form

I, Mutanda Gideon Walter the undersigned candidate, declare that the content of this thesis is my original work and has not been previously submitted to any other University for an award of a degree either in part or in its entirety. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography & Environmental Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Signature of Candidate..... 

Date19 October 2020

Abstract

The launch, process and outcomes of the fast track land reform programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe have been highly contentious nationally and internationally. There are arguments that FTLRP was a large-scale program and the first of its kind in Southern Africa, hence it could not escape controversies. However, researchers should move away from the evaluation of the divisive process of ‘fast track’ to the evaluation of its livelihood outcomes. However,, evaluation of the ‘agri-livelihood’ outcomes of FTRLRP brought more controversies than before, making contemporary researchers to argue for the need to look for more indicators on which the policy can be measured. Controversies also emanate from the narrow view of the developmental and poverty reduction role of FTRLRP in economic terms. There is an argument that the new notion of development now embeds the citizenship concept and poverty should be defined as a multidimensional term referring also to lack of feelings and practices of citizenship (like belonging, identity and participation in local development).

The broad objective of this study was to understand how FTLRP as a development policy had shaped perceptions and practices of citizenship among beneficiary communities. The study was conducted in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms of Chiredzi district, Masvingo province in Zimbabwe. It used a qualitative ethnographic design to understand how FTLRP had shaped perceptions and practices of citizenship by A1 settlers. A total of 40 households and some few key informants were interviewed on their experiences of ‘fast track’, its impact on livelihoods, feelings and practices of citizenship. Results show that resettled households felt that ‘fast track’ had led to substantial land gains, ‘liberation’ of land resources and many people ‘caged’ in communal areas. Households also condoned farm invasions and showed trust of the informal institutional framework as it led to an inclusive land allocation. Such institutions were more concerned with having more people on land to evade evictions thereby ignoring political and ethno-regional traits of potential beneficiaries during land allocation. While informal institutions were ‘celebrated’ for advancing the notion of political and ethno-regional inclusivity, they were gender insensitive and led to ‘gendered belonging’. Results also showed that land beneficiaries had tenure insecurity though they evaded it by offering overwhelming support to the ruling party. Settlers felt the support being offered to the ruling party was a peaceful ‘practice of citizenship’ to uphold and defend their land gains and rights against reversal of FTLRP by ‘proxies’ of colonialists.

Land beneficiaries also expressed satisfaction with their incomes, agricultural land, livestock and farm implement ownership despite lack of some social services, unmet rights, food and water insecurity. These challenges faced post resettlement did not affect their sense of general well-being, an indication that land was more than an asset and an ingredient for livelihood outcomes. This led to the third research objective which sought to understand how land access through FTLRP had shaped feelings and practices of citizenship among beneficiary communities. Feelings of improved well-being in the face of some challenges in A1 farms show that well-being is not only a product of satisfaction of livelihood outcomes. Access to land brought a sense of belonging among the landless who joined the community of landowners. It also made them belong to the ‘community of commercial farmers’ which was all ‘white’ before FTLRP. Access of many rights remained a principle despite a constitutional provision stating that land reform enables households to re-assert their rights. Partisan politics during fast track, delays in regularising land ownership and limited budgetary ‘fought’ the very rights land reform was supposed to promote. However, actualization of the settlers’ rights to land, work and ‘property’ was enough to inculcate feelings of belonging. These economic rights overshadowed other rights that had not been made real. Settlers’ long history of landlessness and land ‘hunger’ made them to regard some economic rights as ‘more equal’ than other rights. Households felt the government had done its part by formalizing land invasions. It was now their role to actualize their other rights, improve their national belonging and sense of well-being by participating in local economic development.

Intrinsic feelings of improved social identity and belonging did not only shape citizens with a developmental mindset but also environmentally responsible. Though households had been resettled near conservancies and in former game ranches, they had adopted environmentally friendly methods to safeguard their assets, lives and crops against stray wild animals. There was an improvement in knowledge of environmentally friendly methods to reduce human-wildlife conflicts, dispelling allegations that settlers engaged in unsustainable behaviors.

Dedication

This Thesis is dedicated to my wife Museki Liona, my lovely daughter and son, Valence and Lance respectively.

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Acronyms

AALS	Affirmative Action Loan Scheme
ASD	Agenda for Sustainable Development
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre
ICESCR	International Convention on Economic, Social and Civil Rights
DLIC/LIC	District Land Identification Committee
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GEAR	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
LHA	Lancaster House Agreement
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
N.D	Not Dated
RDP	Rural Development Policy
SLAG	Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Global figures show that two-thirds of the world's poor are found in rural areas (Borras, Kay, and Lodhi, n.d). Access to productive resources especially land by the poor is believed to solve rural poverty since a significant portion of the income of the rural poor come from agriculture. The persistence of underdevelopment, food insecurity and rural poverty (tri-problem) in Africa can be attributed to the persistence of land policies which have their origins in exclusionary colonial regimes. In Southern Africa, landlessness due to land dispossession that occurred during colonial occupation has been acknowledged as one of several ultimate causes of poverty (Chimhowu, 2006). Vengeyi (2014) suggested that colonial land dispossession was not primarily for the purposes of productive exports (although industrial-scale agriculture did form an important component of colonial economics) but was a form of political control: to deliberately create poverty among the African population by depriving them access to their primary resource. For many in the anti-colonial movements in the early nineteenth century, liberation from colonial rule was the first step to enable access to land for the dispossessed majority (Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart, 2012; Zimbabwe Constitution, 2013). The political struggle for liberation emphasized that land and other resources should be redistributed equitably but because of the political and legal challenges, this has not been achieved (Gumede, 2014). As a result, many post-colonial regimes have not made sufficient interventions to reverse the tri-problem facing Africa (Vengeyi, 2013) despite having attained political independence. James (2007) reported that political independence in Africa (particularly Southern Africa) is an 'unfinished business' that has not fully addressed national questions and 'multidimensional poverty'. These were to be fully answered with a fairer redistribution of land since political independence had partly addressed these. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and World Bank (WB) (2009) reported that national questions and 'multidimensional poverty' eradication can only be answered and achieved respectively by implementing rural development policies like redistributive land reforms that 'asset' the poor.

However, these redistributive land reforms have generated a lot of debate with respect to the process, impact on poverty reduction and the overall developmental agenda. In Zimbabwe, the FTLRP, which began in 2000 and received high profile international media attention for the eviction of white farmers, was seen as the beginning of both disaster and a new dawn, depending on which side of the debate one stood (Cliffe et al., 2011). Both the

process of FTLRP and its overall impact have been contentious, with some commentators castigating the way it was implemented and its outcome while others have denigrated the implementation process but justified its launch and outcomes (Cliffe et al., 2011). The IRDB and WB (2009) reported that access to land through FTLRP led to improvement in rural agriculture, livelihoods (which I will refer to as ‘agri-livelihoods’) and reduced poverty levels. However, Chimhowu (2006) and the WB’s (2011) research findings on FTLRP led to their conclusion that the programme made the majority of the resettled households poorer and food insecure.

For many scholars and development practitioners, land redistribution is implemented with the expectation to see a ‘commercially’ viable agriculture, improvement in livelihoods and reduced income poverty. This is one reason the African land reforms and in particular the Zimbabwean FTLRP has become contentious locally and internationally. The debate has largely focused on the narrow developmental impact of land reform on economy and livelihoods (Dande and Mujere, 2015). It is believed that the developmental scope and objectives of 21st century redistributive land reforms like FTLRP broadened beyond agriculture production and livelihoods outcomes. Chimhowu (2006) stressed that redistributive land reforms should be conceived of as part of a broader strategy of sustainable rural development and a ‘multidimensional poverty’ eradication tool, rather than narrowly measure them in economic and livelihood terms. Magosvongwe and Makwavarara (2015) described it as misleading, myopic and retrogressive to evaluate the success of FTLRP only in economic and livelihood terms. However, there are other ways in which success might be evaluated. Gutto (2014) urged for a new conceptualisation of land reforms in African and modern epistemology where land access might mean something different. Some beneficiaries may have different expectations of the land reform process, connected to socio-cultural values/intrinsic feelings of citizenship (social identity, power, rights, dignity and belonging). According to Fanon (1963: 9) ‘for a colonial people, the most important essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all dignity’. Land access benefits may go beyond the economic thinking. For Moyo (2010), 21st century land reforms are broad development tools that also answer national/citizenship questions that political independence and 20th century land reforms failed to address. What might be these pertinent national/citizenship questions and issues? Chipkin (2003) reported that rural development policies are not simply about meeting the livelihoods and economic needs of citizens but reproduction of intrinsic feelings of citizenship and the making of ‘real’ citizens, residents who practice citizenship.

While many scholars believe that African poverty was caused by colonial land dispossession and can be eradicated by redistributive land reforms, there is a problem of under-conceptualising the term poverty. Contradictions in the story of African land reforms might be stemming from the under-conceptualisation of poverty as referring only to poor 'agri-livelihoods' and low incomes. The United Nations (U.N) (n.d) mentioned that poverty exists in many forms and dimensions and its eradication was a requirement for sustainable development. This is a departure from the narrow measurement of poverty through Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that focused merely on people's incomes. It, therefore, means that there are more indicators of poverty beyond income of the people. According to Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) (2005), poverty is not simply about having very low income; but multidimensional deprivation which might include basic needs, and intrinsic feelings of citizenship. A study by Wafer (2012) of the post-apartheid South Africa also revealed that while previously the extension of basic services and resources has had a poverty reduction and livelihood importance, it has also been a very important form of extending full citizenship and people's rights. Deprivation and lack of access to these constitute poverty, hence there is need to broaden the view of poverty when measuring the impact of development policies like land reform. If the IRDB and WB (2009) links rural development policies with 'poverty' eradication, it means policies like land reform are meant to fight against multidimensional deprivation in basic needs, socio-cultural values that define citizenship.

Polarised debates on the story of the Zimbabwean FTLRP are also attributed to the problem of leaving 'outsiders' (non-Zimbabwean scholars) to report and write about it while the voice of the 'insider' (land beneficiaries) is little heard. Magosvongwe and Makwavarara (2015) likened the land reform story to food granaries that should not be entrusted into the custody of neighbours, otherwise the story is 'poisoned'. They further argued that it was not surprising to find contradictions on land reforms as Africans had relegated to 'outsiders' the task to construct and produce knowledge about African experiences, despite knowing how contentious and fundamental land redistribution was. Besides using narrow economic tools, these 'outsiders' examined outcomes of land reforms with preconceived ideas of the black African as inferior, disorganized and unproductive (Chitando and Mashiri, 2015). According to Cliffe et al., (2011) 'outsiders' first undervalued the potential of Phase 1 land reform and might be repeating that with the FTLRP. The few who celebrated Zimbabwe's Phase 1 of land reform attributed its success

to substantial donor support and effective blueprints designed by technocrats from pre-independence Rhodesian institutions (Dekker and Kinsley, 2011). This black African inferiority view might have been extended to the process and evaluation of the success of FTLRP. Magosvongwe and Makwavarara (2015) urged ‘insiders’ who produced the ‘manuscript’ and ‘acted’ in the fast track ‘soapie’ to give perceptions of their experiences of the program and its outcomes.

While many studies unpacked the contradictions in the process and outcomes of ‘fast track’, very few have done so from the perspective of the land beneficiaries, beyond economic terms and from a multidimensional view of poverty and development. Achievement of ‘agri-livelihood’ outcomes was not an end in itself but ‘fast track’ sought to influence feelings and ‘practices’ of citizenship. The Zimbabwe Human Development Report (2003) further reported that access to land can achieve intrinsic values that define citizenship even in the absence of economic growth. This study was driven by the need to revise and reconsider the commonly held belief that ‘agri-livelihood’ outcomes were the only ‘ends’ of FTLRP. The program was also a means to influence people’s social identity, belonging and performances of citizenship.

1.2 Problem Statement

Land reforms (process and outcomes) remains the most contested issues in most post-colonial and post-apartheid African societies (Gumede, 2014) like Zimbabwe where the FTLRP has divided opinions. Opinions have been divided largely into two extremes where some scholars have hailed FTLRP whilst others have been critical of the process and its outcomes (Kufakurinani and Bamu, 2015). Marongwe, (2011) reported that ‘fast track’ has had varied outcomes even across different localities thereby further dividing opinions. According to IRDB & WB (2009) and Mbereko (2010), there is evidence of livelihood improvement among land beneficiaries compared to their communal counterparts after Zimbabwe’s FTLRP. However, Chimhowu (2006) and the WB’s (2011) livelihood analysis of resettled households led to their conclusion that the programme had made the majority of resettled households poorer and more vulnerable than they were before as they became food insecure and experienced a fall in household incomes. This shows that there is contradictory evidence on the economic and livelihood impact of Zimbabwe’s FTLRP.

These conflicting results make one unsure of the impact of 'fast track'. For Cliffe et al. (2011), contested outcomes call for the geographical widening of empirical knowledge to understudied environmentally marginal areas. However, this research believes contradictions stem from quantitative economic and livelihood analysis of the impact of 'fast track' by 'outsiders'. These 'outsiders' also take for granted the fact that 21st century land reforms shifted away from the economic focus and narrow definition of poverty to multiple motivations for land access and land reform by land beneficiaries and governments respectively (Magosvongwe and Makwavarara, 2015; Zamchiya, 2011). Provision of land through FTLRP might have been driven by the need to address beyond economic outcomes (Chirere, 2015; Vengeseyi, 2012), livelihoods and income poverty. While Scoones et al. (2011) calls for a shift from examining the FTLRP process to its 'agri-livelihood' outcomes, Chipenda (2018) urges contemporary researchers to contribute on how the programme influenced new outcomes of citizenship renewal and reconfiguration. Lund (2011) further argued that there are many studies on the socio-economic impact of FTLRP; but there is little research on how the programme influenced intrinsic feelings of citizenship as well as produce socially active and responsible citizens. This research study adopted an ethnographic study to examine perspectives of beneficiaries on how the FTRLRP has influenced beyond economic outcomes to include their intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship. This is the intervention and research gap the researcher seeks to cover in an effort to contribute towards showing the broader impact and meaning of FTLRP.

1.3 Research Question

How do land reform programmes in post-colonial societies shape perceptions and practices of citizenship among beneficiaries?

1.4 Research Aim

To understand the perceptions and practices of citizenship among beneficiaries of the Zimbabwean Fast Track Land Reform Programme

1.4.1 Specific Research Objectives

- (a) To understand the personal experiences and perceptions of beneficiaries' of FTLRP from 2000 to present.
- (b) To examine livelihood changes among beneficiary communities in Maware and PeterWenhamo A1 resettlement projects.

(c) To critically examine attitudes of social and community belonging among FTLRP beneficiaries in these two settlements.

1.5 Thesis Structure

Chapter 1

The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. The introductory chapter provided a background to the topic under investigation where the tri-problem facing Africa was traced. It also identifies land redistribution as one of the postcolonial intervention strategies and source of contradictions for many African land reforms. The chapter then identifies reasons this research study was carried and highlighting the problem to be addressed. It notes some research questions to be answered if the problems of contradictions in the outcomes of land reform are to be addressed. The chapter ends by giving the thesis structure.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 traces the historical development of the redistributive land reform in African countries from the second decolonisation phase through structural adjustment era to the post structural adjustment period. African land reforms are traced noting how each phase changed in focus and objectives which, therefore, influence their evaluation. First section of the chapter discusses how land reforms were used as a second decolonisation tool. The second section called 'the structural adjustment phase' notes how African land reforms switched from the decolonisation agenda to issues of economic growth and development. This section highlights the contradictions that were associated with economic evaluation of the land reforms. Last section then shows the need to move away from narrow and contentious economic evaluations to include influence of land reform on sustainable citizenship. Citizenship is interpreted as intrinsic feelings influenced by land reform like one's identity, power, view of self and sense of belonging. It is also associated with the responsibilities and forms of engagement by the resettled households while environmentality is concerned with subjectivities (feelings) and actions of households towards the environment post resettlement.

Chapter 3

This chapter begins by tracing the historical development of land reform in Zimbabwe noting also the change in focus from the decolonisation agenda to the post structural adjustment period where issues of sustainable citizenship and human agency are important in development policies. Practices and processes of FTLRP are discussed highlighting the debate that surrounded the implementation phase. The chapter also examines how the 'agri-

livelihood' outcomes of FTLRP have been contentious leading to new feelings that there is need to look for other indicators to examine the programme.

Chapter 4

In this chapter, the main methodological approach used to answer the three research questions. A qualitative research method was designed to understand the perceptions of beneficiaries towards the land reform process, its socio-economic impact and influence on feelings of citizenship, civic responsibilities towards society and environment and practices of citizenship. Questions were on perceptions of the process of FTLRP, its agri-livelihood outcomes, influence on intrinsic indicators of citizenship, civic responsibilities and citizenship as a practice. Resettled households are also asked on how their environmental subjectivities had been influenced by land reform programme. (Environmental subjectivities refer to resettled people's environmental knowledge and actions that are influenced by intrinsic feelings of self and power).

Chapter 5

The fifth chapter of the research thesis presents and analyses data on the first research objective, that is, evaluation of the experiences and attitudes of beneficiaries on FTLRP practices. It examines the motive for fast tracking Phase 111 of land reform and the radical approach it took. Household perceptions on the institutional framework and how it influenced beneficiary selection and issues of inclusivity during fast track are sought. The last section focuses on beneficiary experience of land ownership and feelings of tenure security after fast track.

Chapter 6

Chapter 6 focuses on presenting and analyzing data collected on the second research objective that seeks to assess the influence of FTRLP on beneficiary livelihoods. Emphasis will be on the perceptions of resettled households towards their livelihood status post resettlement. An assessment is done on how fast track offered households opportunities for new livelihoods. The research examines changes in asset accumulation post fast track and how this influenced livelihood outcomes of resettled households.

Chapter 7

This chapter presents and discusses data from land beneficiaries on their intrinsic feelings after land access, sense of belonging based on access to rights, social responsibilities to enhance their well-being and actualize unmet rights.

Perceptions are sought on settlers' view on rights access, since rights access influence sense of belonging. In this chapter, an examination is done on how intrinsic values associated with citizenship inculcated through land access had influenced the environmentality mode (environmental beliefs and practices) of resettled households. Changes in intrinsic values of people are believed to create environmentally responsible citizens.

Chapter 8

Chapter 8 offers a summary of key findings, conclusion and contributions made by this study.

1.6 Conclusion to Chapter 1

This chapter begins by tracing how the tri-problems facing African countries are linked to colonial land policies. The failure by political independence (first decolonisation tool) to solve these tri-problems facing Africa led to the implementation of redistributive land reforms to finish the unfinished business left by political independence. Redistributive land reforms were then implemented with a developmental agenda to solve poverty, production and livelihood insecurity for the rural poor, which the first decolonization process failed to solve. However, African land reforms have been contentious on their overall impact on the welfare of the rural poor. Contradictions are believed to emanate from the fact that evaluations have been political, delegated to 'foreigners' and based on a narrow view of poverty and the developmental role of African land reforms. More importantly, many researches have mainly focused on the livelihood and economic development outcomes which have been contentious. A call is made to look at other outcomes that can be used to **understand** the success of land reforms. Literature from other scholars urge for new debates to focus on how land reforms influence the little explored sustainable citizenship. This is identified as the research gap for this study. Research questions that seek to **understand** the perceptions of the 'insiders' on the process of FTLRP, its impact on agri-livelihoods and sustainable citizenship are posed. The chapter ends with the structure of the whole thesis.

CHAPTER 2: LAND REFORM AT INTERNATIONAL SCALE

2.1 Chapter Introduction

The chapter traces the historical development of the redistributive land reform noting how it has evolved conceptually and in terms of its focus from the time it was launched in Africa. The development of the redistributive African land reforms has been put into three phases: second decolonization phase, structural adjustment phase and the post structural adjustment phase. Though many African land reforms went through these phases, they have no synchronized timelines but focus. The first phase known as the second decolonization phase examines how politics and the race factor influenced initial African land reforms as finishing the unfinished business of political independence. The objectives of land reforms in the second decolonisation phase were influenced by events and ideologies of the liberation wars which were still fresh in the minds of the ruling governments. Phase two is the 'structural adjustment phase' where the focus of land reforms shifted from politics and the race factor to issues of economic growth and development. This phase is characterized by contradictions in the economic outcomes of most redistributive land reforms. The last phase to be known as 'the post structural adjustment/21st century land reforms' assesses the new conceptualization and broad view of land beyond economic thinking to views of land reform as meant to achieve citizenship. A section is devoted to the definition, different strands of citizenship and how it will be examined in relation to land reform in this study.

2.2 Redistributive Land Reform: The Second African Decolonisation Tool

Redistributive land reforms at international scale were initially launched and sponsored by USA as a political tool to control the spread of socialist ideas and dominance propagated by USSR and China. Funding of African land reforms was not meant to achieve economic goals but to 'score' political goals. In the post-World War II period, many post-independence governments implemented redistributive land reforms as a decolonization agenda. Dabale, Jagero and Chiringa, (2014) reported that land reforms have been popular as part of decolonization struggles in Africa and the Arab world. The period after independence witnessed the redistributive decolonization process spread like a 'prairie fire' from Arab and North African countries into Southern Africa (Borras, Kay and Lodhi, n.d). The spread to Africa and in particular Southern Africa has also been linked to the failures of the first decolonization efforts of the political liberalization wars. The first decolonization achieved through protracted wars has been

described as a facade that promoted the continuation of colonization by other means as it produced partially independent and sovereign states (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). The transition from colonialism and apartheid to democracy did not manage to translate into a thoroughgoing process of decolonization (Gumede, 2014) since many African countries had racially skewed land distribution post-independence. The racially skewed land distribution was a product of ‘property clauses’ that were inserted in constitutions of post independent governments, that recognized and protected existing property but signaling colonial land theft now preserved by constitutional sanction (Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 2000 as cited in Hall, 2004). Redistributive land reform became the ‘last’ decolonization weapon to be pursued by these countries to address these historical imbalances.

A second phase of decolonization was implemented to end the continued colonization initiated through smuggling property clauses in constitution of newly independent countries. Land reform as decolonization tool has been used to challenge the colonial situation and change the order of the world (Fanon, 1965) where the minority controlled a larger part of a country’s land. Land reform was framed in the policy discourse of finishing the unfinished business of decolonization (Chimhowu, 2006). Some land reforms in some countries had to be violent so as to remove extended periods of ‘colonial’ dominance and grip on the levers of the economy and livelihoods. This is why Fanon (1965) said at times decolonization was violent since these settled states would be trying to remove total control of the ‘oppressor’ on key economic and livelihood assets. African land reforms as decolonization struggles were fundamental in altering being, and a new humanity (Fanon, 1963).

The fall of the last Ethiopian Emperor in 1974 saw the coup government implementing a new wave of redistributive land reform that benefited the masses. It was a political land reform carried out to weaken the previous regime and to ‘steal’ the hearts of peasants since the new government had taken power through unpopular method of a coup. The coup government saw the need to dilute rural support of the Emperors and downplay their coup through massive land redistribution (Paul & wa Gĩthĩnji, 2018). The new government implemented a redistributive land reform with a new trajectory where land was allocated to the poor masses. In Kenya, the post independent land reform was influenced by the fear of peasant-based revolutions against unjust and exploitative conditions by landlords on the Mau Mau peasants (Borras, Kay, and Lodhi, n.d). Most of the peasants in this country had no land but accessed it from landlords as tenants meaning they were ‘foreigners’ and ‘rootless’ in their own land (IRDB and

WB, 2009). The Kenyan government sensed the peasant-based unrest and had to initiate and reform the land tenure which led to land access by the landless peasant group. Land reform helped to score political goals on the part of the government as it prevented unrest while it also achieved decolonisation that had continued by way of extensive land ownership by the few landlords. Evaluation of these land reforms that had a 'politico-decolonisation agenda based on socio-economic indices has the potential to reveal negative impact of the programme whilst the programme met its objectives.

'Settled states'/countries like Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which had experienced long periods of apartheid and racial land alienation contributing to black African poverty, implemented 'Type-1 land reform' which was framed in the policy discourse as unfinished business of decolonization (Chimhowu, 2006). Soon after independence, South Africa pursued a pro-poor policy of Rural Development Policy (RDP) where land reform was one strategy to improve the lives of the rural and urban poor. From 1995-1999, in line with RDP, the government availed Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) to poor households for them to purchase land though it could not generate a livelihood (Hall, 2004). The main target was to have as many black Africans on land since they had their land rights 'stolen' during the colonial period. SLAG's main target was to deracialise land ownership though land reform policy documents also mentioned economic development as another objective. There was a general belief that such a type of land reform was driven by the need to deracialise the land question and give poor black Africans land though the land ended up in the hands of 'fat cats' (Cousins, 2002). However, some of these better-off black 'cats' and political elites claimed they also gained land because they were 'landless' due to past racial and colonial exclusions (Moyo, 2011). The politics of race in land ownership influenced the decolonisation agenda, hence there was need to restructure the 'raced' landholding (Chimhowu, 2006).

Werner and Kruger (2007) reported that Namibia's land reform beneficiaries spanned from the poor to high ranking government officials, though there was a clear dominance of public employees as beneficiaries despite government reports indicating that the poor were the target. African land reforms target the poor on paper while real beneficiaries are the cronies, elite and those at the citadel of power. Kenyan redistributive land reform was plagued with rampant land grabbing by the elite who had no passion for farming for they later rented out land (Cliffe et al., 2011). This shows that initial land reforms in Africa were mainly political as they sought to take back land from the proxies of

the colonisers. Land ended up in the hands of the politically connected who lacked farming expertise and few poor people, meaning the objective of repossessing land was political and in the context of decolonisation. Governments were less worried with economic returns but to ensure that black Africans own land, be they the poor or politicians. Paul & wa Gĩthĩnji (2018) reported that the post-coup redistributive land reform in Ethiopia did not deliver widespread improvements in the agrarian sector as the peasants were no better off than they were under the imperial regime, as food insecurity persisted in rural areas. However, the post-coup government felt that the redistributive land reform had achieved its target of giving land to the peasants.

During the decolonisation phase, redistributive land reforms were implemented and evaluated based on the number of beneficiaries who had accessed. This initial phase was concerned with ensuring that many black Africans own land to address racially skewed land redistribution. Reports on the post-independence South African land reform (1994-1998) has not been convincing in restoring land rights of people that had been dispossessed during apartheid. By December 1998, out of the 63 000 claims of restitution which had been lodged by indigenous blacks only 41 claims had been settled (Sihlongonyane, 2005). Restitution as one of the three 'legs' of South African land reform targeted to benefit previous black Africans that had lost their land rights due to apartheid. Initial post independent land reforms in the 'settled states' were characterised by the race factor in their policy document objectives, hence they deserved to be called decolonisation tools.

Provision of land to the rural poor with little post transfer support was another important feature of redistributive land reform in the decolonisation phase. Some land reforms during this period were influenced by the agricultural determinism narrative that advocated for the provision of mainly land since most of the poor were found in rural areas where their livelihoods are linked to land (Chimhowu, 2006). Many countries like South Africa offered households financial support to acquire land but there has not been sufficient provision of post transfer support to improve productivity and livelihoods. South Africa supported land acquisition through enactment of supportive acts of parliament and provision of a limited 'Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant' to purchase land. Namibia also implemented the redistributive land reform where small, individual livestock farm units were encouraged. A subsidized loan scheme known as Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) to enable previously disadvantaged Namibians to buy commercial farms was offered (Werner and Kruger, 2007). The South African's SLAG and the

Namibian Loan scheme were for the purchase of farms only, but the amount was partial as new farmers were supposed to pay the remaining smaller fee. This left farmers with little or no money to support one's post settlement activities and needs. Sihlongonyane (2005) described the lack of post transfer support to South African resettled households as dangerous since it created new communities of Bantustans, where people were dumped in settlements with no visible means of supporting themselves. Funding was enough only for 'right acquisition' since access to land was equated with restoration of lost rights. There was absence of adequate post-transfer support for claimants; hence restoration of land led to access of non-consumable rights and justice but did not lead to development (Hall, 2004). According to Hall (2004), lack of funds for post transfer support and development, promoted "reverse dumping" associated with apartheid where people were assigned to undeveloped land incapable of providing decent livelihoods. While Sihlongonyane and Hall noted absence of post transfer support, they might not have realised that these land reforms were implemented with a decolonisation agenda where the target was to have many black Africans owning land. Economic growth and development were secondary to addressing colonial and racial land injustices

In this section, it can be noted that early independence African land reforms were seen as second phases of decolonisation with the target to plug the gap left by the first decolonisation tools (liberation wars). Land reform policy documents of many post independent African countries had socio-economic objectives, but these were overtaken by politics and the race factor, signaling how emotive the first land reforms were. Addressing historical and racial imbalances in the distribution of land became the dominant objective and this even influenced the evaluation of programmes' outcomes. Unpacking the success of land reform during the second decolonisation phase was mainly based on the number of 'indigenous' households who had been resettled than economic achievements. The main target for initial land reforms was to ensure that the disadvantaged black peasants and victims of war get land, hence the programme can be described as being driven by the race factor and the need to rehabilitate colonial victims.

2.3 Land Reform in the Context of Structural Adjustment

Years into independence, objectives and focus of many African land reforms became less influenced by events and ideologies of the liberation struggle but the need to compete in the global market, stimulate economic development of the country. Land reform became less emotive and driven by politics, the decolonisation agenda and the race factor. This section examines how African land reforms that were implemented some years after independence shifted from being driven by the rehabilitative, welfarist and race factor to issues of economic development through the influence of Structural Adjustment Programmes. The section ends with an assessment of how land reforms had impacted on the economic development of many African countries and controversies that have been associated with an economic evaluation of land reforms in the ‘structural adjustment era’.

A few years after many African countries gained political independence, respective governments adjusted their land policies and adopted ‘Type-2 land reforms’ (Chimhowu, 2006) that were less welfarist in nature and less influenced by the race factor. These land reform programmes reduced their deracialisation tone while there was strong emphasis in agrarian restructuring for economic growth and development (Hall, 2004). Land reforms in these countries have been called ‘post-decolonisation reforms’ because of the absence of the race factor in the land issue (Chimhowu, 2006) as the target was to make land a bankable asset that was transferable and could be used on the financial market. While other Southern African countries like South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe embarked on ‘second decolonisation land reforms’, Malawi Congress Party used land issue as political rhetoric to win independence elections. The party later downplayed land reform with a decolonisation agenda and partly scrapped it off on the post-independence national land policy in favour of market and rights driven land reform (Kanyongolo, 2005). The neoliberal type of land reform emphasized on increasing the number of smallholder households with private land for commercial farming but this further entrenched reduction in land available to poor communities. They were ‘jettisoned’ out of the market by those with financial, political and occupational power (Kanyongolo, 2005). This created controversies as the ‘fat cats’ were the major beneficiaries and this replaced racial dual agrarian structure created by the colonial governments with a new dual ‘classed’ agrarian structure post-independence. The market driven land reform did not address the needs of the landless masses as only the elite had access to privatized land. Despite being market driven, the land policy had a deracialisation objective to a limited extent as it encouraged

the conversion of customary land into private land. Customary land tenure was a colonial invention that was meant to disenfranchise indigenous Malawians from having 'real' land ownership and using this 'real' ownership as collateral security to agricultural financiers. This neoliberal type of land reform emphasized on increasing smallholder households with private land for commercial farming. The dominant driving force for the conversion of customary land into private land was to create private enterprises that were able to stimulate agricultural development by increasing the amount of 'valuable' land in private hands (Kanyongolo, 2005).

South Africa continued with its three-pronged land reform but in 2000, it was aligned to the new neoliberal economic blueprint that changed focus from being welfarist to economic growth. The government announced a new policy direction that discarded SLAG to Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) where the redistribution programme aimed at establishing a class of black commercial farmers that could stimulate economic development (Hall, 2004). The government's subsequent shift from RPD (a welfarist policy) towards more explicitly neoliberal economic policy (GEAR) decoupled the welfarist/rights-based approach from the market-based/economic one, favouring the latter (Deborah, 2013). Hall (2004) described LRAD which shifted land reform in line with GEAR as SA's self-imposed structural adjustment where there was removal of direct intervention and state support to the 'emerging' black commercial farmers. While SLAG placed more emphasis on equity, LRAD wanted to promote efficiency of the SA's land reform by giving farmers who had educational and financial capital to venture into farming as a business. Increased agricultural productivity was regarded as necessary condition for steering economic growth and development of the country. Moyo (2011) also reported that Zimbabwe implemented land reform in three phases where the second phase (1986 until 1999) adopted neoliberal principles that were later influenced by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the 1990s. Government changed from pro-poor to pro-rich as it required not just landless farmers, but those with master farmer certificates and capital to venture into small scale commercial farming. Zamchiya (2011) reported that ESAP influenced the government to focus on pro-rich agrarian policies opposed to pro-poor redistributive land reform. This neoliberal policy called for a 'hands off' approach to funding public activities.

2.3.1 Contradictions on the Agri-Livelihood Impact of African Land Reform

During the structural adjustment phase, many post-colonial governments shifted the focus of land reform from deracialisation to economic growth and development as measured by agricultural productivity and livelihoods respectively. However, there are intra and inter-state contradictions on the success of these land reform programmes. Welfare and livelihood status of resettled households post resettlement has been an area of uncertainty across and within African countries as there are mixed results being posted. The livelihood and welfare impact of African land reforms has generated divergent views of success and failure, hence examination of these debates is crucial before venturing into the Zimbabwean debate on same aspect. Gumede (2014) reported that land reform (process and outcomes) remains the most contested issue in most post-colonial and post-apartheid African societies.

Achievement of livelihoods is measured on the poor's access to various forms of natural capital. Reports on access to these forms of natural capital have been positive and negative across Africa and even within the same country. Alemu's (2015) findings in Amhara and Southern regions, Ethiopia showed an improvement in access to both safe and unsafe water for Metema households. These findings were contradicted by Bahry (2010) who revealed that most people in Metema site collected unclean water from rivers and rarely from hand pumps as the majority were non-functional. While Metema resettlement area in Ethiopia had abundant unsafe water, many beneficiaries of land reform especially in the Namibian south had water problems. Problems of water supply were critical in Namibia because many beneficiaries obtained portions of farms that did not have surface water (Werner and Kruger, 2007).

Redistributive land reforms were carried out in Africa to give prime land to the rural poor as it was their key livelihood asset but there were sentiments of dissatisfaction and satisfaction on land size and quality among beneficiaries across Africa. Zekele and Mberengwa (2012) noted that land given to Dawuro settlers in Ethiopia was to ensure that they have a place called 'home' but it was too small though fertile for arable farming. Alemu (2015) also concurred that Metema & Decha settlers reported of an insignificant increase of land per household of slightly above two hectares. For some Ethiopians, land in communal areas was better in terms of fertility than in their 'new' homes. Households were highly dissatisfied by the arable and grazing land given, arguing that government had given more prominence to equity at the expense of efficiency. This affected quality of cattle breeds as they were mainly fed with forage from forest and some grazed on unploughed strips on their plots (Alemu, 2015). While they

concluded that arable land was small, Dawuro settlers are the only ones that indicated that they had accessed fertile land leading to improved production and livelihoods. Land reform in Namibia was carried out to promote livestock farming and resettled farmers under both Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme (FURS) and Group Projects were satisfied with farm sizes they had been given for livestock production but not for arable farming (Werner and Kruger, 2007). Their problem was on building herds that fully utilize the given farms and shortage of water for their herds, but livestock herd and quality greatly improved. Like the Ethiopian settlers in Dawuro, Metema and Decha, land beneficiaries in Namibia also complained on the size of arable land given to group projects for being too small.

The outcomes of land reform on access to and quality of physical capital post resettlement have also not been consistent between and within African countries. There are reports of spatial variations in the quality of physical assets available within the same country and between countries. Alemu (2015) reported that education facilities were better in Metema and worse in Decha as residents were more dissatisfied with many variables used to measure quality of education than Metema residents. Bahry's (2010) findings in Metema contradicted Alemu's results. The former reported that there were negative feelings on the quality of education since the primary schools available were not offering up to grade 8 and there was no secondary school in the region. Bahry (2010) and Alemu (2015) concurred that all Metema and Decha residents were dissatisfied with quality of health they were getting post resettlement as the majority of the health facilities were offering only primary care and were poorly staffed.

In another study carried out in Dawuro zone, majority of the resettled households reported of a great improvement in access to social and economic infrastructure such as schools, clinics, veterinary services post resettlement (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012). Metema residents voted for eight out of thirteen of these infrastructures as having improved significantly while Decha residents had experienced a significant deterioration of nine social infrastructure post resettlement (Alemu, 2015). In another study of livelihoods after resettlement in South Africa, all Dikgolo farm households in Limpopo province mentioned lack of social and farm infrastructure before and after resettlement (Lahiff et al., 2008). While there were internal variations in access to infrastructure in Ethiopia, Decha situation concurred with what was obtained in South Africa's Limpopo province where households complained of lack of this form of capital. Going by the UNDP and Oxfam (1996) definition of poverty as inability to access critical resources,

infrastructure and services, it can be concluded that Decha and Dikgolo farm households in Ethiopia and Limpopo regions respectively remained poor after resettlement.

Income changes after Land reform

Income is an important measure of the livelihood status of the rural poor. However, its measurement has been a source of controversy as the poor's perception of their financial status always differs with government and international institutions' income reports on land recipients. More importantly, redistributive land reforms have also produced conflicting results of a rise and fall in incomes post resettlement from place to place and over time. Alemu (2015) reported that after balancing the income and expenditure for the resettled households in Ethiopia, generally households' monetary worth had improved post resettlement. While there was general income improvement for Metema and Decha residents, these figures were above and below the World Bank's calculated annual average per capita rural incomes of Ethiopia respectively (Alemu, 2015). Using UNDP's (1996) definition of poverty as exclusion to access assets, it, therefore, means Metema residents had moved out of poverty while Decha residents were still in its 'shackles'. Though Decha residents were labelled as poor according to WB's average, the households themselves were satisfied with the increase in income and felt they were no longer poor post resettlement.

While Ethiopian settlers reported a rise in income level post resettlement, resettled Namibian livestock farmers reported a decline in their income status. A 2005 study on Namibian farm production found that gross margin for livestock sales was N\$ 6,799, far lower than the average national annual decent living income of N\$ 15,000 for a household of five people (Werner and Kruger, 2007). The average annual decent living income was more than double the annual income acquired by households after selling their livestock. Low gross margins were attributed to high interests being incurred in the repayment of loans borrowed from the government for land purchase. This wiped off profit acquired by farmers as they were left with little or no income after repayment of loans and in some cases, households had to sell their livestock to service their loans.

Sources of income also varied spatially because what was regarded as the most important source of income and financial capital in one region was least regarded in another. In some cases, livelihood options that governments thought would be the chief 'cash cows' ended up being overtaken by other livelihood platforms because of different

reasons. The main source of income for Ethiopian settlers was crop farming followed by animal production and less from off farm activities (Alemu, 2015). For Namibians, livestock production was the second most important livelihood platform after off-farm livelihoods and crop farming was in third position (Werner and Kruger, 2007). The paradox of the Namibian land reform is that beneficiaries had been given loans to buy land for livestock production with the belief that it was going to emerge the most important livelihood platform.

Well-being and Perception of Self after Resettlement

Measurement of livelihood status and well-being on singular indices is important but it is more important to find out from the land beneficiaries on their general perception of self and well-being after amalgamating all livelihood indicators. The majority of Decha and Metema residents in Ethiopia had a positive view of their general well-being and felt better off with their lifestyle, material assets and disposable income post resettlement. In Dawuro region of Ethiopia, households were satisfied with everything and perceived their region as the ‘Canaan’ of their time since they were now food secure, accumulating assets through farm productivity (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012).

Lahiff et al.’s (2008) study of the resettled Monyamane Communal Property Association (CPA) in SA revealed that government reported that there was a decline in the agricultural yields contributing to modest changes in welfare and livelihoods of land beneficiaries. While government was not satisfied with modest changes in income and livelihood benefits, the majority of land beneficiaries felt their wellbeing had improved post resettlement. The government and resettled households compared changes in income, livelihoods and production using different ‘templates’. While government compared changes in these based on nationally set thresholds, resettled households made a longitudinal study of their income and production levels and noted a positive change. What also made them feel better was the presence of positive social networks/ capital and solidarity they had with current neighbours, which was now better than their neighbours in the villages (Lahiff et al., 2008). This stresses the idea that some residents had moved to Monyamane CPA not to be more productive, but ran away from poor social networks and conflicts in the previous villages. Self-resettled Mahlahlalani farmers in Limpopo harvested maize output below the national average annual amount of 760 kg required by a household. In government reports, these farmers were described as having both ‘food poverty’ and ‘total consumption poverty’ as they lacked food for subsistence and extra crops for sale to buy other non-food items respectively. The same households felt their lives had improved as a result of joining the group

and accessing the land (Laiff et al., 2008) showing that wellbeing was not premised on productivity and food security only, but having somewhere they called 'home'. The collective sense of having somewhere they called 'home', common experience of reclaiming land and hostilities suffered strengthened current social relations of the group as compared to previous relations in homelands.

Six years after South Africa got independence, Adams and Howell (2001) studied about 400 resettled households who had received family-based arable holdings on the extent to which the welfare and poverty-reducing objectives of the programme were met. Positive changes in agriculture, higher and more equally distributed incomes were reported by the land beneficiaries. Beneficiaries reported an increase in arable land, incomes having trebled and crop and livestock production having greatly improved post resettlement. Despite positive sentiments on their sense of self and welfare after resettlement, Adams and Howell (2001) stated the overall livelihood impact of the programme was limited because redistribution was done at a small scale. If the programme had been done on large scale, it could have affected positively the livelihoods of the many people in the country.

Some land reforms had failed to provide human 'necessities' and capitals and this confirmed the view that acquisition and distribution of land are the easiest parts of land reform while recreating sustainable livelihoods on the land is another more difficult thing (Werner and Kruger, 2007). Many resettled households were generally satisfied with their financial status after resettlement though many government bodies and international institutions like WB felt the figures were below average for the country. For most households, including those that had not realised immediate benefits from long term projects like cattle farming, land reform had offered them 'Canaan' of their time. Satisfaction also came not because of livelihood improvement but having a place they called 'home' especially the landless.

Agricultural Outcomes: Another Story of Contradictions

Agricultural outcome is one important measure of the success of any redistributive land reform; likewise, it has not been spared with controversies within and between African countries. Successful land reforms broaden and/or offer better agricultural incomes to the land beneficiaries. However, there are mixed reports on the ability of African land reforms to broaden agricultural activities of many households. For Metema and Decha households in Ethiopia, crop

production remained the main livelihood option before and after resettlement (Alemu, 2015). Small farm size of two hectares made it difficult to venture into animal and cash crop farming because priority was given to cereal food production. Instead, resettlement had not improved their agricultural opportunities as they remained subsistence crop farmers like before except that some crops grown had changed. Alemu (2015) reported that cereal production in Decha and Metema region had increased after resettlement compared to pre-resettlement period but it was below the district production average. Similar results were found in Dawuro region where beneficiaries had harvested more maize per hectare post resettlement because their soils were more fertile than places of origin (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012). Decha, Metema and Dawuro settlers were satisfied with the agricultural increase in output despite government representatives feeling otherwise. In addition, the output could meet the annual food requirements for the majority of the households though they had no surplus to sell to get extra income for other non-food items. Using the UNDP and Oxfam's (1996) definition of 'food poverty' and 'total consumption poverty', many households in Metema, Decha and Dawuro had no 'food poverty' but 'total consumption poverty' as they were able to meet the nutritional needs of their families but unable to meet non-food expenditures respectively. Lack of food poverty means that resettlement had created households that were self-sufficient in terms of their annual food requirements.

The story was slightly different for Dawuro households in Ethiopia who remained crop farmers, but they had broadened their agriculture by growing both subsistence and cash crops. Dawuro residents had ventured also into cash crops, fruit crops and market gardening (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012). For Metema and Decha residents there was agricultural 'stagnation' while Dawuro residents ventured into agricultural extensification. Food crops helped to fight food poverty while cash crops fought total consumption poverty as the income from sales were used to buy non-food items. A study of Dikgolo farmers in Limpopo province by Lahiff et al. (2008) also revealed that livestock was now their main livelihood platform though with long term benefits, while crop farming was second, reversing the previous order of importance. Namibia had embarked on redistributive land reform that was purely for livestock production, but this livelihood option ended up being 'overtaken' by off-farm options in terms of income contribution. While households in Decha, Metema and Dawuro in Ethiopia became economically productive and food secure after resettlement, this was the opposite in Namibia where resettlement was done. A Namibian government survey in 2000 concluded that none of the nine resettlement projects were economically viable as some

remained welfare schemes dependent on food rations (Adams and Howell, 2001). Resettled households in Namibia experienced both food poverty and total consumption poverty as they were unable to meet annual nutritional needs and set of non-food expenditures for their families respectively. The Ethiopian and Namibian cases confirmed and contradicted Moyo's (2010) argument that previous food insecurity and rural poverty are mainly a result of restricted land access. All the countries carried out land reform but total poverty and 'food insecurity' in the former country was reduced while it continued in the later.

Dikolo case study of Limpopo province, SA, produced interesting figures on the productive capacity of farmers against national targets. Lahiff et al. (2008) noted most Dikolo farmers (27 out of 39) harvested an average of 255 kg of maize per household which was less than the annual average amount of 500 kg per household. Though maize production had dropped for the Dikgolo farmers in Limpopo province, crop production was not their main livelihood option but was second to cattle farming. Cattle farming as the main livelihood option had not brought any short-term benefits because initial profits had been ploughed into the project and used to meet expenses (Lahiff et al., 2008). Cattle farming is a long-term investment with short-term expenses and long-term profits. The same scholars reported that agricultural production yield for a group project, Monyamane CPA, was also disappointing mainly due to natural and human factors. Technically, these households experienced 'food and total consumption poverty'. Huge expenses which were being incurred in cattle projects and a fall in crop output did not 'dampen' their spirits and negate their sense of self and well-being. More than two thirds of the farmers at Dikgolo farm and many in Monyamane reported that their lives had improved since they joined the project (Lahiff et al., 2008). It means when farmers compared their present well-being, crop output and livestock quantity with the pre-resettlement period, the majority realized an improvement though crop production and income levels were below national annual average per household. From the perspective of Dikgolo and Monyamane households, their 'food and income poverty' had been reduced despite being below national thresholds.

Hall (2004) reported that some individual communities who benefited from South African land reform had witnessed clear success stories in terms of agricultural productivity, though little had been achieved nationally. It is reported that the few successful land claimants rarely stay on their farms traversing between their homelands and newly acquired farms. This concept of split families affected agriculture as there was little attention given to farms.

Majority of the scholars on the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in South Africa describe it as having failed to improve the fortunes of farmers. Jacobs, Lahiff and Hall (2003) also reported that national data collected on agricultural productivity demonstrated that very limited progress had been made in agricultural productivity because of little post transfer support. Lahiff (n.d) noted that there was a drop in agricultural production for resettled households in Eastern and Western Cape if the output was compared to previous farm owners.

Section 2.3 looked at African land reforms that were implemented during the structural adjustment phase and how they changed focus from being welfarist and racially toned to issues of economic development. During this phase, many countries shifted from emotive land reforms that were driven by the need to deracialise land distribution to those that targeted to make land beneficiaries more productive and contribute to the economy. Bias in land allocation was given to commercially-minded households with experience, capital and expertise. Even the objectives of land reform were mainly influenced by the need to improve livelihoods and agricultural productivity. However, this period witnessed a lot of contradictions in the outcomes of African land reforms within and between African countries. Most research findings revealed that crop production and human welfare had increased to the satisfaction of many resettled households though researchers and development institutions reported modest changes when compared against national averages. For many governments and development institutions, implementation of market driven redistributive land reforms during the structural adjustment phase were done with a target to see commercially viable agriculture while to the resettled households, land meant much more. This is an indicator that measurement of the impact of the land reform based on economic and livelihood outcomes is problematic. Therefore, there is need to look for other land reform outcomes in post structural adjustment/21st century era.

2.4 Land Reform in the Post Structural Adjustment Era

This section focuses on the changing nature and shifting emphasis of 21st development policies (post structural adjustment policies) such as land reform programmes. Most of development policies broadened their focus and view of development beyond an economic perspective to a broader one including the citizenship concept. The section defines citizenship and shows how modern research work on the impact of the programme should shift the emphasis from the contentious economic outcomes to components and practices of citizenship.

The structural adjustment period witnessed stories of successes and failures in the socio-economic outcomes of the African land reforms between and within countries. Mixed results on the livelihood, productivity and poverty level across the African continent and within African states might mean there is need to look at other indicators to measure the impact of the 21st century land reforms. Gutto (2014) argued that land (reform) is under-conceptualised in the prevailing mainstream capitalism and structural adjustment era as a mere commodity in market economic thinking while it means much more. The late 1990s saw ‘the rise of citizenship as an emerging area of debate in development studies’ (Jones and Gaventa, 2002:1). Land reforms in the post structural adjustment era seeks to move from a single view of citizenship envisaged by land reforms in the 2nd decolonisation phase. Land reforms in the latter phase focused much more on creating one type of citizenship, that is, national identity through democratization, dismantling racial separation and domination and eroding racially accumulated privilege (Mamdani, 1996). Post structural adjustment land reforms broadened their view of citizenship beyond nationhood and national identity as citizenship can be expressed in multiple and different ways. This research is driven by the need to understand how 21st century land reforms influenced other components and practices of citizenship beyond national identity. Botero and Sulonen (2010) argues that citizenship has three classical strands, with the first strand being the liberal thought where citizenship is synonymous to national identity, which is a legally backed status which entitles one to rights granted by a state to an individual. One’s citizenship is measured as one’s rights and duties. The second strand, the communitarian thought, views citizenship as one’s social identity produced in relation to others, hence an individual is a socially embedded person (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Citizenship in the communitarian thought is defined through socio-cultural values and virtues such as respect for/by others, recognition, sense of identity, power and belonging (intrinsic feelings of citizenship) (Imam and Kamminga, 2012; Moyo and Yeros, 2005). de la Paz (n.d) further stressed that citizenship is both a legal status and identity, with the state having an objective dimension to grant rights and duties and subjective dimension of cultivating feelings of loyalty, belonging and respect. However, components of citizenship accorded by the society, especially the nation-state promote passive citizens who view citizenship as given (Botero and Sulonen, 2010), formal (Appandurai, 2006) and invited (Miraftab and Wills, 2005)

Imam and Kamminga’s merged liberal and communitarian view of citizenship resonates very well with the African view of citizenship where land is seen as a source of informal rights, that is, African right to life/subsistence and

belong and socio-cultural values (unities, identity and destinies) (Magosvongwe and Makwavarara, 2015). For African citizens, land access brings intrinsic feelings of citizenship that cannot be evaluated using econometric tools but from the perspective of land beneficiaries. Land reform is meant to restore identity and rights (Hall, 2004) while rights access is believed to increase an individual's sense of belonging at all levels (Earle, 2009). Most researches on land reforms give reports of modest livelihood changes with production below national averages but land beneficiaries feel better off post resettlement. To the land beneficiaries, positive feelings might be a reflection of achievement of intrinsic feelings of citizenship, less to do with livelihood changes and productivity. This is supported by Lund (2011), who reported that some few things fundamental in social life are what we have (assets) and who we are. Asset ownership mainly in form of land is believed to be one important aspect that defines who we are (social identity). Notions of identity, respect and belonging which are the heart of personhood cannot be discussed without placing them into the context of land ownership and control (Mangena, 2014).

Werner and Kruger (2007) reported that for many Namibians and African land beneficiaries, land resettlement also signified restoration of power which had been lost during the colonial period. These scholars further noted that while the general perception was that Namibia's land reform programme was about economic growth and development, for the resettled communities it was meant to achieve power as one socio-cultural values of citizenship. Morales and Harris, (2014) revealed that land is fundamental in any exercise of power and communication of the existence of power for the occupants. It means people who were disenfranchised from land had nowhere to exercise their power, hence were disempowered. Land redistribution to the disenfranchised communities communicates a shift in the power dynamics and there is need to examine subjectivities of power generated by access to land. Imam and Kamminga (2012) merged the liberal, communitarian and African view of citizenship as a concept defined formally and informally through virtues like respect, power, rights, dignity and identity derived due to membership to different levels of a society. These are components of citizenship that define one's membership and are also influenced by access to resources like land.

The third strand of citizenship is known as the civic republican thought. Citizenship is an obligation for individuals to participate in community affairs since rights are not given and invited but created and invented through group actions and struggles (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). This strand argues for transformation of oneself from subjects and

mere atomized consumers of services and rights into claimants who act as 'citizens' (Isin, 2011; Chipkin, 2009). A true 'citizen' improvises, innovates, invents and creates new spaces of citizenship and own opportunities in the face of state failure to grant rights and dignity as components of citizenship (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). The new thinking is that formal citizenship is not a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship (Appandurai, 1996) but the latter is achievable through 'rolling up of sleeves', participation in development activities and acting like 'citizens' (Chipkin, 2009). Citizenship is practiced (Botero, 2010) self-initiated and invented participation (Groenewald, 2012) for the formerly marginalised residents. Turner (1997) views this strand of citizenship as emphasising on residents participation, self-reliance and autonomy in the face of state failure to actualise rights and get societal recognition. Implicit in this argument is that residents should move from 'citizen in right' to 'citizen in practice' (Chipkin, 2009).

While initial African land reforms were welfarist in nature, succeeding reforms had to adopt policies that resonated well with the third strand of citizenship. These reforms valued the liberal, communitarian and African view of citizenship but felt these could be substantiated by creating citizens who are active in own welfare, self-reliant and semi-autonomous. SA's shift from the welfarist land policy (SLAG) to a neoliberal land policy (LARD) was meant to create an 'emerging' middle class black farmer who is self-sufficient, independent of the state, commercially viable and able to forge her own way in the world (Deborah, 2013). While critics and some economists interpreted lack of post transfer support by the South African and Malawian government as lack of political will, from a citizenship perspective, it might be that the governments were trying to 'remake' self-sufficient black commercial farmers. This was a shift from the welfarist-oriented vision of citizenship where the state had the responsibility to promote inclusive citizenship, to one they were supposed to be responsible for their needs (Deborah, 2013). Namibia's Vision 2030 had one of the objectives of land reform as the promotion of self-sufficient households who are also able to create own employment and income (Werner and Kruger, 2007). This was the South African and Namibian new notion of citizenship where individuals had the civic duty to reduce their societal burden, create own opportunities and attain success through self-reliant struggles (Deborah, 2013).

Modern debates now argue for the need to examine citizenship beyond mere 'counting' of rights restored through land reform to examining invented practices of citizenship to actualise unfulfilled socio-cultural values and rights.

Deborah (2013) noted that redistributive land reforms restore land and other rights which had been denied during the colonial period. Actualization of these rights is regarded as a necessary responsibility that require citizen agency (Matthew, 2015) since land rights might not translate into access to other rights. Miraftab (2012) argued that the state's role in providing rights has been reconfigured as many of its responsibilities have been shifted to its citizens. Fanon (1965) further said, 'liberation' of rights and social services does not come as a gift from anybody; it is seized by the masses with their own hands. The new concept of citizenship views it as a practice where resettled citizens participate to actualise needs for present and future generations through responsible behavior. Citizens participate socially, economically and environmentally sustainable actions to meet their need and those for future generations. The link between land redistribution and citizenship in the 21st century is a move away from economic attitudes towards broader sustainability. The 27 Rio principles and 15 SDG targets cut across economic, social and environmental issues revealing a new idea that development programmes should be economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. The SDGs are described as integrated, indivisible, and universally applicable. It, therefore, means evaluation of development policies like land reform should go beyond economic development to include changes in the environmentality discourse and environmental subjectivities of resettled citizens. According to Agrawal (2006), 'environmentality' denotes a framework of understanding how and when technologies of self and power are involved in the creation of new subjects concerned about the environment. Self, social identity and power are believed to be some of the socio-cultural values of citizenship that can be cultivated within citizens due to land access. There is need to understand how 21st century land reforms influenced these intrinsic values and subsequently shaped citizens' mode of environmental subjectivities and practices. Forsyth and Walker (2014) argued that state policies (like land reform) are 'technologies' of government that advance the environmentality discourse by shaping environmental knowledge, subjectivities and practices.

Forsyth and Walker (2014) note that, besides confrontational approaches, the government can use state policies to shape environmental subjectivities and practices. As beneficiaries move into these new geographic spaces (farms), there are changes to feelings of power, self and respect which also affect their environmental subjectivities and practices. Land redistribution has been used as a tool to ensure individuals and communities align their environmental thinking and practices with state needs and ends (Forsyth and Walker, 2014). Morales and Harris (2014) reported that in-shore fishermen in Scotland fisheries developed positive subjectivities of themselves when in

fishing boats but once in meeting rooms with conservationists, they felt ashamed of their activities. Away from their 'home ground', the fishermen thought of themselves as unknowledgeable, irresponsible and greedy exploiters of natural resources (Morales and Harris, 2014). Their environmental subjectivity, therefore, changed in relation to the geographic space occupied. This stresses the importance of providing geographic spaces (land) through land reform since it can help to change perceptions of communities towards the environment. Agrawal (2006) urged the adoption of the environmentality discourse in researches of state development policies to understand how modern policies achieve state and environmental targets without force.

Section 2.4 discussed the need to broaden the developmental view of redistributive land reforms beyond traditional economic and livelihood indicators since development now embeds the citizenship concept. The merged liberal and communitarian thought define citizenship as intrinsic , socio-cultural values such as power, respect, dignity, identity, right and belonging while the third strand (civic republican) understand it as something 'measurable' in terms of acts to actualize rights and socio-cultural values associated with citizenship (practices of citizenship). Land access is believed to influence intrinsic values of citizenship and subsequently environmental subjectivities and practices of resettled households. Further, research studies of land reform in the post structural adjustment period examine its impact on intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship to meet own and environmental issues. Therefore, research work on the outcomes of 21st century land reforms should refocus on how the programme had an impact on components (socio-cultural values) and practices of citizenship

2.5 Conclusion to Chapter 2

The chapter revealed that some African countries implemented land reform programmes in phases while some reframed existing ones in line with national visions and international ideologies. Early independence land reforms for many African countries were highly emotive as they were driven by the race factor and the decolonisation agenda. The target was to ensure that the disadvantaged black peasants get land thereby change the land distribution of the country. Equity issues were the central core for most redistributive land reforms that were implemented during the second decolonisation phase. Most research work on the success of the land reform were based on the number of disadvantaged blacks who had been allocated land. As time progressed, African governments shifted focus from land reform as a decolonisation tool but a means to achieve economic development and compete in the global market. The structural adjustment period came with neoliberal policies that encouraged African governments

to refocus their economic and land reform policies from equity to efficiency issues. Governments then targeted commercially 'minded' farmers that were going to help improve the economy and subsequently change own livelihoods. Even understanding of the outcomes of land reform shifted from counting the number of resettled households to changes in livelihoods and agricultural productivity. However, this period witnessed a lot of contradictions in the outcomes of African land reforms. While there were reports of modest changes in productivity and welfare, land beneficiaries felt their well-being had greatly improved. In many African land reforms, land beneficiaries reported positive feelings of well-being post resettlement despite these modest changes in production and livelihoods. The 'template' used to measure land reform outcomes varied between development practitioners and the land beneficiaries. To the land beneficiaries, positive feelings might be a reflection of the achievement of intrinsic feelings of citizenship less to do with livelihood and productivity outcomes. Land meant much more than agricultural and livelihood outcomes, hence there is need to look for other indicators to evaluate 21st century land reforms. Research work on land reform in the structural adjustment period should focus on the programme's influence on sustainable citizenship. Sustainable citizenship is about responsible citizens who are not only economically responsible but socially and environmentally responsible. Changes in the focus of African land reforms might also have influenced redistributive land reforms in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 3: ZIMBABWE'S REDISTRIBUTIVE LAND REFORMS

3.1 Chapter Introduction

The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one is the chapter introduction. The second section examines the transition of the Zimbabwean land reforms and how they fit within the three phases of land reform (second decolonisation, structural adjustment and post-structural adjustment phase) followed by many African land reforms. Within that 'journey', there is also an examination of how the three phases of land reform changed in focus from the decolonisation agenda to economic growth and then sustainable citizenship. The section also highlights the controversies that surrounded the Zimbabwean land policies from the pre-colonial period into the three phases of land reform. The third section shows how the land reform debate intensified with the launch of the FTLRP. Many theories that try to explain why fast track was radical are discussed leading to a more intense debate on the process of fast track. Section four interrogates the contradictions that were also associated with evaluative work on the 'agri-livelihood' outcomes of the programme. Section 5 then discusses the various but contentious findings on agriculture productivity across the country post resettlement. Lastly, section six gives a conclusion to the chapter highlighting the main issues covered in the chapter.

3.2 Zimbabwe's Changing Land Policy and Focus up to FTLRP

This section examines the historical development of Zimbabwe's land policy and reform process from the colonial period up to the FTLRP. It tries to show how each land policy influenced succeeding land policies. Zimbabwe carried out three phases of land reform that changed in emphasis, objectives and focus over time. In line with international trends, these three phases of land reform can also be fit into the (1) second decolonisation phase, (2) structural adjustment phase and (3) post-structural phase.

Pre-Colonial Land Policy of Zimbabwe

Controversy in the Zimbabwe's land policy did not start with the FTLRP but during the colonial period. Landlessness and pressure in tribal trust lands was a creation of the colonial governments and is fingered as one of the several ultimate causes of 'poverty' and insecure livelihoods (Chimhowu, 2006). Vengeyi, (2011) reported that

Zimbabwe's pre-independence land policy was controversial and characterised by discriminatory land laws that deprived Africans of their traditional land, hence it resulted in two wars of liberation (1896-1897 and 1966-1979). According to Thomas (2003), land discriminatory laws did not only alienate Africans of their key asset and source of livelihood but stripped all that land symbolises. The reasons for the liberation struggles in African countries have been a subject of debate as reported by various scholars. For Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart (2012), regaining the land was central to the two liberation wars in Zimbabwe. Fanon (1963) described African wars of liberation as meant to ensure access to rights, assets and other symbols of land as these were not free gifts but at a certain point, arms in hand were indispensable. The colonial masters surrendered to the first decolonisation efforts that were accompanied by the use of violence through the liberation struggle and had to call the colonized to the negotiating table. African nationalists in many Southern African countries were made to sign agreements and constitutions upholding some negotiated neocolonial compromises that safeguarded colonialists' properties and preserved the white colonial resources theft (Hall, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). The battlefield changed from land to 'paper' and the brain was used as the 'weapon' of 'Africa's destruction. Thus, political decolonisation was just a façade as the inserted clauses advocating for market driven land reforms fingered the continuation of 'colonisation' as the new states had limited powers to acquire and equitably redistribute land (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

Zimbabwe's Land Reform in the Second Decolonisation Phase

According to the Zimbabwe Institute (n.d), post-independent Zimbabwe government carried out two phases of market driven redistributive land reform. Moyo (2011) reported that the first phase which lasted through 1985 made substantial land transfer, albeit below the official targets of 162,000 families on 9 million hectares. The Comptroller and Auditor-General's (1993) report revealed that though the first phase had many cross-cutting objectives, it ended up concentrating on achieving immediate social and political objectives of decolonisation (Chitsike, 2003). The initial target beneficiaries for the first phase were the landless black peasants, poorest sections of the population and those people adversely affected by war. The government's intention was to target the poor and deracialise land distribution in the country. Auditor-General's report shows that the decolonisation agenda overshadowed other economic objectives of the initial land reform.

Land Reform in the Structural Adjustment Phase

The second Phase of Zimbabwe's market driven land reform started in 1986 until 1999, through the era of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Moyo, 2011). The land policy of the government changed from being welfarist and racially toned to agricultural productivity (Marongwe, 2011), from being pro-peasants to pro-commercial farmers, from the decolonisation agenda to the development of the economy. The government recognised the role of commercial farming in the development of the economy, hence more land was to be redistributed to small- and large-scale farmers rather than focus mainly on the landless, war affected and the rural poor (Chitsike, 2003). Farmers with college certificates, capital and master farmer training were the main target group during this second phase which can be called the structural adjustment phase of land reform.

Contradictions in terms of the outcomes of redistributive land reforms did not start with fast track but with these two market driven land reforms. Some scholars evaluated them based on the number of beneficiaries who had accessed land, amount of land transferred while others assessed it on the achievement of 'agri-livelihood' outcomes. WB researchers labeled it a success as settler households increased their crop and livestock, productivity, overall incomes and livelihood outcomes were higher than in communal areas (Hanlon et al., 2012; Cliffe et al., 2011). For Chitsike (2003), the standard of living (as measured on incomes, access to water, sanitation, housing and schools) of most settlers on Model A and Model C schemes had significantly improved. The success noted on Phase 1 and 11 of the redistributive land reform programme was attributed to involvement of Rhodesian agricultural technocrats and strong post settlement support (Dekker and Kinsley, 2011). Jacobs et al. (2003) argued that land reform resulted in sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor, if provision of land is supported by a wide-ranging programme post settlement support.

While some researchers (Hanlon et al., 2012; Cliffe et al., 2011; Dekker and Kinsley, 2011) reported the success of Phase 1 and 11 of the land reform programme, some other scholars reported negative stories about it. Moyo (2005) reported that Phase 1 and 11 resettled farmers had the highest prevalence of poverty showing that land reform had worsened their welfare. The scholar further revealed that the Zimbabwean land reform process was limited in agricultural production and livelihood improvement because of the market driven nature of land transfer and limited scale of land access by beneficiaries. Chitsike (2003) reported that the standard of living of settlers specifically in

scheme B and D had not improved. Other contributory factors to limited agricultural production, income and limited land transfers included austerity measures on resettlement advocated by ESAP post 1992. Phase 1 and 11 of land reform achieved less because they remained committed to the market principle in accordance with the LHC provisions, and ESAP terms respectively (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). Zamchiya (2011) reported that ESAP influenced the government to focus on pro-rich agrarian policies opposed to pro-poor redistributive land reform.

FTLRP in the Post-Structural Adjustment Phase

The third phase of land reform known as FTLRP that began in 2000 had its objectives modified to reflect the changing philosophy and role of the government in land reform and resettlement. According to Gonese and Mukora (2003), policy outlines for Zimbabwe's land reforms changed from the welfarist/rehabilitative focus (1980-1986) to issues of economic productivity (1987-1997) and then the creation of self-reliant land beneficiaries from late 1990s onwards. Government moved from highly centralised and state-funded land reforms (Phase 1 and 11) to FTLRP which decentralised infrastructure and service provision to interest groups and local people to promote community driven productivity and local economic development (Gonese and Mukora, 2003). While phase 1 and 11 emphasised on provision of infrastructure and services first before resettlement of people, FTLRP de-emphasised on the state provision of infrastructure prior to beneficiary emplacement (Gonese and Mukora, 2003) placing larger responsibility on the community to implement own initiatives to solve own problems (Jacobs and Chavhunduka, 2003). Mamimine (2003:366) further argued that 'Global, African and Zimbabwean dialogue about land reform and land administration is currently focused on the need for substantial devolution. The development of more self-reliant communities allows central government to focus on more macro-policy issues, while 'assisting' or 'complementing' local initiatives'. While FTLRP de-emphasised on the provision of infrastructure and services before beneficiary emplacement, Sibanda (2003) argued that providing beneficiaries with mainly land and little or no support undermined productivity and achievement of secure livelihoods of beneficiaries. Many argued that, it undermined productivity and better livelihoods in the short-term but led to long-term sustainability of land reform through the creation self-reliant communities. Though many scholars agreed that there was a shift in policy associated with FTLRP, there are contradictions on what necessitated this shift in policy from a centralised and state funded land reform to a decentralised and radical one.

Section 3.2 discussed how the controversial pre-colonial land policy culminating into the Lancaster House Agreement might have contributed to controversies and failures of Phase 1 and 11 to achieve set targets. Phase 1 of land reform in Zimbabwe had multiple objectives but political objectives of decolonisation, equity and deracialisation ended up eclipsing other objectives. Target beneficiaries were the poor and those disadvantaged by the war, hence it was welfare oriented and rehabilitative in nature. The need to spur economic development made the government to launch the second phase of land reform where target beneficiaries were young, pro-commercial graduates and some farmers with capital and expertise. This phase generated varied stories of success and failure though they were not serious like the succeeding phase. Budgetary constraints and the number of landless people forced government to launch FTLRP where the state's role was mainly land allocation while interest groups and local people were supposed to create own opportunities and solve own problems.

3.3 FTLRP: The Launch, Process and the Contradictions

Section 3.3 covers the controversies that have been associated with the launch and process of the FTLRP. The fast track debate started with the programme's radical launch and spilled into the administration of the process, the inclusivity of the programme, varied views on tenure security, and the state of inherited infrastructure and level of investment by 'new' farmers.

Launch of the FTLRP

FTLRP was launched as the third phase of redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe but this programme has been the most controversial starting with its toponymy and reasons for its radical approach. Moyo and Yeros (2005) argued that the launch of FTLRP coincided with the period when the ruling party was being challenged from outside (by dissatisfied workers, opposition supporters) due to the falling economy and from within by war veterans. The ruling party resorted to the emotive land issue to regain the confidence of the masses and spruce up its waning support (Zamchiya, 2011). Worker protests targeted neoliberal policies implemented through ESAP that had privatised the city and increasingly exclude urban citizens (Miraftab and Wills, 2005) from enjoying basic rights as prices had risen.

In rural areas, liberation war veterans and the landless became increasingly restless, arguing they had gained nothing from the war and previous land reforms and the issue of land came back into prominence, although it was not a priority for the Zimbabwean government (Hanlon et al., 2012). IBRD and WB (2009) and Herring (2003) stated that history has shown that unresolved land issues and land reforms that appear dead are not dead in the minds of the poor. These easily spiral into crisis and conflict as citizens take over the responsibility to resolve the land issues. Authorities argue that the call for the donor conference by Zimbabwean government to support renewed land reform efforts in late 1990s and early 2000 was initiated by sporadic cases of land invasion around the country between 1998 and 2000. Government deemed the pre-2000 invasions illegal as they looked at them from a legal sense while the landless viewed it as means to make government account for its failure to uphold one of the liberation war promises. These promises 'glued' together the poor and 'watered' the movement to keep it alive. The insurgent and violent form taken by the landless is justified by Fanon (1963) who reported that land dispossession and African oppression was maintained by violence from above, so it is only possible to liquidate it with violence from below. It is also believed that the restlessness of war veterans and 'hunger' for land which had engulfed the landless citizens radicalized the FTLRP and made planning by government to be difficult. At this stage, claiming the land was far more important than any technical consideration as to how the land would be distributed, used and provision of post transfer support, hence the designation 'fast-track' (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011).

Another school of thought argues that the shift to agrarian radicalism (Moyo, 2011) was a reaction to the lack of support of the Phase II at the 1998 donor conference despite the donor community having contributed to the collapse of the economy through SAPs. Donors did not support the conference citing lack of a transparent land policy and the programme not being pro-poor (Zimbabwe Institute, n.d). Scholars like Cliffe et al. (2011) argue that farm occupations were not cases of 'insurgent citizenship' but they were sanctioned by the ruling party as a means of mobilising rural support and punishing its political foes. This is supported by Chitsike (2003) who argued that invasions had the backing of the government that used war veterans of the Second 'Chimurenga' (war of liberation) as 'foot soldiers' to begin the occupations. The question to ask is, 'who drove who to initiate the fast track land reform?' Some scholars argue that the collapsing economy, dissatisfaction by urbanites, landlessness by the rural folk and war veterans forced government to resort to the land issue to calm its citizens. For some, it is the ruling

government that mobilised its citizens to invade farms in retaliation of the failure by western donors to fund Phase 11 of land reform.

Controversies on the FTLRP extended even to the toponymy of the program because the names (fast track, accelerated land reform and Third Chimurenga) differed with other preceding two phases. What was being fast tracked? For the government, 'fast track' was process oriented. The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) (2001) defined fast track in the literal sense of an accelerated phase of the agrarian reform meant to speed up the pace of and activities supporting land acquisition, resettlement and allocation. Zimbabwean government's concept of 'fast track' was linked to quick provision of land and quickening the process that accompanied land acquisition. This involved amendment of the Zimbabwe constitution so that land acquisition was done without delays caused by constitutional challenges. The fast track also meant that through the amendment of the constitution, government was not going to waste time negotiating for the preferred farms but automatically put the farms into a government gazette without any challenges. For some scholars, the name 'fast track' had implications on the achievement of 'agri-livelihood' outcomes and poverty reduction. Matsa (2011) penned an article titled, 'Fast Tracked to Prosperity or into Poverty?' The scholar asked whether poverty had been reduced and livelihoods of resettled households improved post settlement or have been made worse. However, his research findings pointed to an improvement in human welfare, livelihood assets and outcomes. The fast track had, therefore, 'fast tracked' resettled households to enjoy better quality of life which could not have been achieved if it had not been launched. For scholars like Chimhowu (2006) and development institutions like WB (2011), it is believed the programme had fast tracked them into poverty traps and made rural poor to be poorer. They reported that the majority of resettled households were made to be poorer and more vulnerable than they were before as they became food insecure and experienced fall in household income.

Beneficiary Selection and Inclusivity of Fast Track

Zimbabwe domesticated many international protocols on women's rights that advocated for equality and full access to productive resources. Was recognition of the women's rights followed by actualization of these rights during the FTLRP? The gender sensitivity of FTLRP is one subject that has set scholars on two extremes of the spectrum. Based on sample results in Masvingo province, Scoones et al. (2011) reported that there was another recurrent myth that FTLRP was gender sensitive in land allocation as only 12% of sampled households with land permits were

women while government reported that 18% of women had benefited in Manicaland (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). Women's land woes were not solved by the three phases of land reform. They did not equally benefit compared to men despite fast track being hoped to be the panacea to gendered land ownership (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). Chingarande (2010) also reported that fast track had not benefited men and women the same way as a total of 30 percent of women in A1 and A2 had benefited directly from it.

Women continue to live on the land and carry on agricultural activities with their husband's permission or approval (Sithole, 2002). They receive land at the 'mercy' of their husbands and 'nature'. FTLRP had offered some people (in this case men) 'control access' to land while others (women) had 'maintenance of access' through those (men and patriarchal village heads) who had control over the land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In their 'Theory of Access', Ribot and Peluso (2003) defined access control as powers to direct, regulate, mediate and exclude access of others while maintenance of access requires spending resources or shedding some powers to continue enjoying a resource. Women had to 'dance according to the men's tune and/or stay married to their men to get access to land. Control access gave men more power than women to dictate production process and activities on the acquired plots. This defeated the equity objective of the FTLRP as it reinforced gender differences. Patriarchal society and institutions during FTLRP made women 'ride on men' to 'maintain access' to land. Ribot and Peluso (2003) called this 'access through social identity' where access to resources was mediated through social constructs like gender. Since men had 'control access' while women had 'maintenance access', this led to highly unequal society and 'fluid multi-layered social hierarchies' (Peluso and Ribot, 2020). Cliffe et al. (2011) noted that the policy documents presented at the 1998 donors' conference had reserved a quota of 20 percent for women, but this quota was not included in the Land Acquisition Act of 2000.

How the reserved 20 percent quota for land allocation made a 'miraculous jump' to the war veterans sector is still shrouded in mystery as they were not more disadvantaged than women. Unfortunately, very few war veteran members were women not because women did not participate in 'liberation struggles' (that include FTLRP). FTLRP's gender insensitivity was worsened by families that registered one of the multiple farms in names of young male children while some women refused to have land registered in their own names to prevent members of her natal family repossessing it in case of death (Chingarande, 2010). The problem of women having inferior

'maintenance access' to land while men had superior 'control access' to land was a creation of women themselves though ingrained on their minds by the patriarchal society they lived in. Patriarchal tendencies which most women have accepted have hindered them from accessing land in their own right, with some preferring to let their husbands apply and get permits in their names (Sithole, 2002). Matondi & Dekker (2011) exonerated institutions involved in 'unfair' land allocation that it was not deliberate but blamed the land policy which did not state threshold for women land allocation.

Moyo (2011) sang from a different hymn book, revealing that by 2007, 12 to 18% of women now owned land in their own right compared to the 4% former white women farmers and the 5% of black women who controlled the land in old resettlement and communal areas. A pre and post FTRLRP comparison made the scholar to conclude that fast track was gender responsive. The scholar concluded that the programme had registered a positive change but a comparison with the number of rural women makes the change to be insignificant. Considering the demographic number of women in the country, this was a drop in the ocean.

There is a debate among scholars on the 'ownership' of FTLRP, as some scholars label it a government programme while others call it a programme for the ruling party. This debate raises questions on the political inclusivity of the FTLRP because there are allegations of interference by the ruling party. According to Moyo (2011), access to A2 land was based on previous and current connections that straddled mainly from politics and less on professional and religious connections. He further said only 16% of the 50,000 A2 applicants had been offered land and the excluded households felt they lacked connections mainly to the ruling party officials and 'institutions' like chiefs and war veterans. According to Zamchiya (2011), most reports on FTLRP underplayed political patronage on A1 schemes, but it stretched from A1 to A2 as land was allocated to the politically 'correct' to force loyalty to those deemed to be belonging in the 'wrong political basket'. According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), 'access via negotiation of other social relations' like friendship, trust and all forms of patronage, connections were important for the landless to access land. Masiwa and Chipungu (2004) noted that local traditional and ruling party leadership were responsible for the initial selection of beneficiaries at ward level before the list was submitted to the District Lands Identification Committee (DLIC) for verification. Correct 'political belonging' became the 'visa' to access land and some households had to fake 'political belonging' to those in charge of land allocation.

The DLIC was 'exclusive' and partisan as majority of the officers were members of the ruling party or government officials seconded by the ruling party. Some farm workers and opposition supporters had to circumvent the local ward leadership and DLIC route by participating in land occupations (Chambati, 2011). It is undeniable that if ruling party functionaries were placed in the DLIC, it was meant to weed out 'undesirable elements' before their names were approved by the DLIC. If farm workers had to hide their 'farm worker' status during land application, what more of opposition supporters. Opposition supporters did not, therefore, distance themselves out of will but had realised that the process of land allocation was influenced by partisan politics.

However, Moyo (2011) blamed the opposition party members for distancing themselves from the 'fast track', siding with white farmers while many people who were not necessarily ruling party loyalists were involved in the land invasion and allocation process. Fast track's attention was on the 'real enemy', white supremacy and land concentration while opposition supporters were 'insignificant enemies'. Scholars like Scoones et al. (2011) labelled it the third recurrent myth about 'fast track' that political party brokering and 'access via the negotiation of other social relations' (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) determined land allocation. He argued that beneficiary selection for A2 beneficiaries was based on an evaluation of a criterion-based business plan application to the Land Committees at various levels. For the scholar, some few land beneficiaries, mainly civil servants, took advantage of their positions to grab own land outside set criteria, but these could not be described as elite or political cronies. Elite capture had been reported but it was not the whole and dominant story of Zimbabwe's FTLRP as the ordinary people had benefited from A1 scheme and few civil servants in A2 scheme without invoking party politics (Scoones et al., 2011). Majority of these came from diverse origins and had not been driven by ruling party politics to acquire land but by the need for land despite the program being politically partisan. Cliffe et al. (2011) and Moyo and Yeros (2005) also reported that any statement that beneficiaries of FTLRP are confined solely to 'cronies' in the immediate power circles is indeed a 'myth', as smallholder households directly from communal areas now predominate in number and overall area. Scoones et al. (2017) argued that war veterans could not be described as cronies but 'ordinary poor' as war veteran 'label' had been eroded since majority were rural, unemployed, not in business and gained nothing from Zimbabwe's independence. The FTLRP was, therefore, described as having achieved a major

agrarian restructuring and benefited the ordinary poor. Participation in land occupations and negotiation with local leadership structures was key to A1 allocation (Moyo, 2011) and many of these participants were the poor.

While Scoones et al. (2017) and Moyo & Yeros (2005) argued that FTLRP benefited the poor, others believe it deviated from policy documents that described it as a ‘national programme’ and the real targets as the poor for A1 and commercially ‘minded’ for A2 scheme. It is alleged that the A2 scheme ended up benefiting the ‘fat cats’ and some urbanites who had capital, properties to mortgage and were educated to write business plans (Hanlon et al., 2012). Despite having some rural farmers who were commercially ‘minded’, majority lacked many of these to access A2 farms. The rich had to use ‘access to capital and knowledge’ as mechanism for resource access control to get land rights (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) in the commercial tagged A2 scheme though at the expense of the landless poor peasants. Access to knowledge gave them an edge over poor peasants in terms of drafting business proposal, one pre-condition to benefit in the A2 scheme. The supposed ‘real’, rural and poor beneficiaries were ‘side swiped’ and entrenched as second-class citizens by the rich urbanites in terms of A2 land access. Differential access to knowledge of drafting business proposal, properties to use as collateral security and capital to be considered for the commercial A2 schemes further widened the ‘citizenship gap’ that existed before FTRLRP and during the colonial period. In addition, the subdivision of land tenure into A1 and A2 schemes further condemned the poor (who were the majority in A1 schemes) into second class citizens while A2 were the opposite. A1 scheme was a replica of the less ‘secure’ communal type of land ownership with poor terms of land ownership while A2 was more ‘secure’ with better conditions of land ownership. The more things changed, the more they remained the same. Zimbabwe’s tenure remain strongly dualist (A1 and A2 schemes) with the former consisting of ‘family plots’ that are ‘unbankable’, while A2 schemes held as 99-year leases are marketable and transferable through a land market (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2010). Fast track’s land tenure system failed the ‘test’ of being a socially sustainable programme that could eliminate the ‘citizenship gap’ while fulfilling its holistic equity objective. It was carried away by the race factor and ended up being about white versus black in terms of land ownership while failing to apply intra-race fairness among the new land beneficiaries (Matondi, 2012). Other factors outside policy documents like politics dominated the selection process making the A2 selection process highly controversial. A study by Marongwe (2011) of peri-urban districts of Harare like Goromonzi district revealed that selection of beneficiaries for A2 farms that emphasized on the potential to use the land productively was ignored by the ruling party captured institutions. Most

beneficiaries were drawn from the governing or the local elite. While the rich use 'access to capital' as mechanism to acquire resources, the political elite utilise both access to authority and capital to get access to resources and capital (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The political elite in Zimbabwe easily benefited because they had a tri-advantage of access to authority that opened further opportunities to access of capital, information and technology needed to benefit under the A2 scheme. A survey in Chipinge District on land allocation process both in A1 and A2 confirmed results from Goromonzi district. According to Zamchiya (2011), in A1 and A2, land allocation was politically partisan because the compromised LICs shifted the redistribution from being pro-poor to pro-elite.

In some provinces, the application process for A2 farms became ethno-regionally structured and notable hotspots by 2004 were Mashonaland West and Matabeleland where some people were excluded on ethnic grounds (Moyo, 2011). Local leaders and war veteran groups alleged that majority of the 'foreigners' (from Mashonaland and Midlands) occupied peri-urban farms and conservancies at the expense of the local people. Despite the lack of 'appetite for farming land', these local institutions felt that land was supposed to be given to local people or left idle if locals were not interested. Allocation to A1 and A2 farms in some provinces was now based on the prefix identity number which appears on identity cards showing one's province of birth (Moyo, 2011) making the vetting and land allocation process to vary nationally (Masiiwa & Chipungu, 2004). Considerations of ethno-regionality in land allocation were reported in A1 village schemes of Gutu district in Masvingo province where the 'ethnic card' was used to produce subjective distinctions of 'strangers' and 'locals' (Cliffe et al., 2011). Anyone who could not trace their ancestry in the district was a 'stranger' and was not supposed to get land from the district. The concept of 'us' and 'them', 'insiders' and 'strangers' in land allocation resonates with Peluso and Ribot's (2020) idea that resource access is at times mediated by social traits like one's identity' ethnicity and place of birth. Although some scholars argue that the race factor in land redistribution ended with the first phase of Zimbabwean land reform, some argue that its 'ugly head' was seen during FTLRP. Some scholars ask if the FTLRP was able to deracialise land distribution or it was just a case of a 'tossed coin' that had landed on a different side. FTLRP has been associated with stories of exclusion and inclusion of some races and social classes during the process of land allocation. While FTLRP was implemented as a means to reduce racial inequalities in land distribution, there are assertions that it was overdone as it produced a new form of land inequality dominated by the black race (Zamchiya, 2011). Moyo (2011) also argued that FTRLRP's racial fairness was questioned because a limited number of white and coloured citizens

benefited because the state failed to recognize their 'indigeneity'. According to Chipenda (2018), Mugabe led government deployed the concept of Zimbabwe as a 'sacred space' for 'insiders' (black people), while 'outsiders' were supposed to be driven out to Europe, their God given place. It led to many white farmers being driven off their land and failure to allocate some to landless white people. It was, therefore, prudent for the government to have uniformly applied the A2 vetting 'template' to white farmers since they had farming experience and machines unlike to totally remove them from the farms. During FTRLP white settlers who had been part of the Zimbabwean citizenry at independence became labelled as 'aliens', 'others' and number one enemies of the state (Chipenda, 2018). This notion associated with FTRLP led to very few white farmers being left on the farms while the majorities were removed from their farms. Even some white farmers who were cooperative had no one to give them an 'ear' as most farms were acquired through invasion disadvantaging many white farmers.

Controversies in the inclusivity and beneficiary selection during fast track mirrored not only 'dysfunctional' formal institutions but also different regimes of land access during FTLRP. Masiwa & Chipungu (2004) reported that from ward up to national level, there was LIC for land identification and allocation. However, these LICs were dominated by 'securocrats', ruling party officials, a few ruling party seconded government 'technocrats' but 'wearing civil servant jackets' (Marongwe, 2011; Zamchiya, 2011). The inclusion of government technocrats in the DLC was cosmetic as they had no power to veto decisions made by the party functionaries. Some of these 'technocrats' made partisan than technical recommendations. The role of technocrats in implementing policy was overshadowed by partisan politics as it directed policy instead of policy directing politics because of mistrust between real policy implementers and politics advocates. This might have been the source of controversy as securocrats and ruling party officials' focus was to score partisan 'political goals'. Besides the LIC being the legal land allocation institution, in many areas the power had been usurped by parallel structures, several centres of authority and sometimes self-appointed LICs (Cliffe et al., 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In Chipinge, Masvingo and Gutu districts, war veterans, traditional leaders, committee of seven and base commanders operated outside DLC as they led the 'pegging' of farms (Zamchiya, 2011; Marongwe, 2011). In some cases, formal pegging by DLICs was done later to rubber stamp the work of these parallel structures. The existence of LICs was just a statutory fulfillment as they were rendered useless by mushrooming non-legal institutions that by-passed LICs at various levels. These cases reveal that the structures and the processes of FTLRP were not uniform throughout the country (Masiwa &

Chipungu, 2004) as the means of accessing land were context-specific and shaped by politics (Matondi & Dekker, 2011).

Land Tenure Security, Investments and State of Inherited Infrastructure

The FTLRP led to changes in feelings of tenure security which is believed to be one of the most important aspects of any agrarian restructuring. Security of tenure for beneficiaries has raised many questions as some scholars believe it is generated intrinsically, while for some it is extrinsic. According to Matondi & Dekker (2011), tenure is not merely related to administrative and legal aspects only but it is what people perceive it to be. Another source of contradiction has been the source of tenure insecurity. Tenure insecurity is believed to have been a characteristic for all redistributive land reforms in Zimbabwe. During Phase 1 of land reform, farm workers and some segregated landless members had to illegally occupy mostly abandoned farms. Government later regularised some occupied farms generating tenure security. For those farms which were not regularised, feelings of insecurity were generated especially before the year 2000 (Chambati, 2011). Insecure tenure emanated from the fear of physical displacement by government. When FTLRP shifted policy on land allocation from productive farmers to the poor and landless, this brought a sense of tenure security to former farm workers since the pool of households without title to land had increased. The paradox was that while the pre-2000 farm occupants felt secure due to the launch of fast track, new occupants who got untitled land post-2000 felt insecure.

During FTLRP, some Nyabamba households in Chimanimani whose plots were regularised still felt insecure because of lack of title to land and they continued with 'split farming' in their former communal areas (Chingarande, 2010). It, therefore, means formal regularisation of their allocated land was not enough to instill sense of security among them. Security of tenure for these households was externally generated by being in possession of offer letters and permits. National findings on tenure security indicated that 21% of A1 and A2 households doubted their tenure security because they felt their permits were too vague on conditions of land occupation (Moyo, 2011). Some of them had to evade insecurity of tenure caused by vague land documents and fear of evictions through 'split farming and homes'. The situation was worse among many A2 beneficiaries who felt that their leases were not bankable making their land to be 'dead capital'. However, Moyo argued that though tenure insecurity was existent, it had been overestimated especially among A1 households. The most insecure group was a paltry 16% of all A1 and A2

households in Zimbabwe allocated land in peri-urban areas. Their insecurity was derived from fear of evictions for town development and political heavyweights who would opt for land near cosmopolitan towns after being blocked to get land in 'foreign' provinces. All other resettlement schemes far away from urban areas had less threats of evictions, hence the number of insecure households was lesser.

A study on tenure security in Masvingo province produced results at variance with those obtained in Nyabamba and national level in terms of the source of tenure security. Scoones et al. (2011) reported that households in Masvingo had not been distracted by lack of permits and leases as they went on investing on their farms through conservation works and accumulating many assets. Lack of title to land was a side-show that failed to 'take off their eyes' on farming activities, investment on farms and amassing assets. In Mazowe district, nearly 80% of resettled families felt secure with their land ownership despite some having permits being labelled as 'vague' by other resettled families in other parts of the country (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Feelings of tenure security led them to sale or reallocate to adult children or close relatives anything they could not move to their newly found 'homes'. From the above discussion it is indisputable that tenure security post-2000 has remained a debatable issue that has polarised opinion (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Furthermore, polarisation stemmed from the fact that tenure (in)security varies with context, individuals and is not merely a legal but is a combination of extra legal and social perceptions of it by the people.

While some scholars argued that 'new' farmers invested on farms and other properties, some reported lack of investment and improvement on their farms except turning them into forests and 'sora farms' ('sora' - shona term meaning grass though now derogatorily used). The presence of the so-called bushy and 'sora' farms around the country attracted different interpretations as some scholars casted a shadow of doubt on resettled farmers' ability to productively use the land. Scholars and critics of FTLRP alleged that productive farms that were run on business models had been turned into bushes (Hanlon et al., 2012) and 'sora' farms (instead of soya bean farms). Resettled households were portrayed as undeserving people not worth to be given charge of farms. For Scoones et al. (2011), the story of arable land being turned into bushes was exaggerated as studies in Masvingo Province revealed that most occupied farms were ranches and large bush grazing land. The bushes were even there before the FTLRP. Chingarande (2010) further added that Nyabamba resettled people left part of their allocated land uncleared for

purposes of easy access to firewood and other forest products. In some cases, survey officials from government imposed an official plan based on land use planning regulations and the affected people had to clear fields anew (Scoones et al., 2011) leaving old plots to turn into bushes. This was then interpreted as being irresponsible and lack of a productive ‘mind’ by resettled families.

Scoones et al. (2011) indicated that besides the recurrent myth that ‘new’ farmers are not productive; critics peddled another myth that there was no new investment on inherited farms. Their decade long study of Masvingo province revealed resettled households who were producing, investing and accumulating despite lack of proper documents. Notable investments were in land clearance, purchase of farming and household assets, building own settlements, community social amenities and investment in conservation works. These were worthwhile investments given that majority of the farmers had started from scratch despite the economic meltdown, lack of post transfer support and international ‘isolation’ of the country. Another study of Nyabamba resettlement scheme revealed serious conservation works (like making contour ridges, stone contours, intercropping and crop rotation) by the land beneficiaries dispelling the myth of non-existent investment (Chingarande, 2010). The type of investment visible in resettlement areas varied from place to place and community to community. What was lacking were extensive, technical and capital-intensive community projects that needed an external hand because they were beyond the capacity of communities. This showed that FTRLP produced self-sufficient and responsible households, who advanced the new notion of sustainable citizenship. While resettled households in Masvingo and Nyabamba scheme in Chimanimani district invested in various conservation works, Matondi and Dekker (2011) noted that households and tobacco farmers in Mazowe were less willing to invest in conservation of natural resources and tree planting despite use of wood to cure tobacco. Tenure insecurity was cited as cause of non-investment in conservation works as beneficiaries were not sure on their stay on plots given.

The state of inherited farm infrastructure on previously owned white commercial farms has been another contested terrain among scholars as there are allegations of neglect and misuse while other scholars reported cases of good use for the same infrastructure. The former MDC policy coordinator general in 2011 described resettled households as squatters who made occupied farms to be largely defunct and farm buildings derelict (Hanlon et al., 2012). Chipenda’s (2018) survey results on Dunstan farm in Goromonzi district, reported lack of productive use of a

tobacco barn and other farm infrastructure. Buildings and on-farm infrastructures left by the former farm owners were said to be underutilised and/or lying idle while some were decaying under the watchful ‘eyes’ of resettled households. For Scoones et al. (2011) and Moyo (2011), this was another recurrent myth peddled against Zimbabwe’s FTLRP as inherited on-farm infrastructures provided additional assets to the resettled households individually or collectively. Most of these infrastructures in A1 schemes were shared and used by beneficiaries as social amenities and public service facilities. Its obvious changes in the agrarian structure also meant changes in the use of the inherited infrastructure. Though in some cases the infrastructure was not used for its real purpose, the idea of being defunct and derelict was a creation of the critics of the FTLRP. Moyo (2011) further indicated that one third of the A2 plots occupied had some of these infrastructures, with the rest of the farms being under-developed or ‘plain’ land. It was, therefore, unfair to negatively ‘brush’ all resettled farmers as having misused infrastructure while in some farms, former white farmers had not also invested into it. Matondi & Dekker (2011) acknowledged that there were contestations around the use and control of property especially among A1 households. However, these contestations cannot be used to dismiss the fact that some on-farm improvements left by white farmers were being used fruitfully. Resettled households are portrayed as responsible citizens who put new investments, utilised and converted existing farm infrastructure into social services while scholars viewed them as the opposite.

3.4 Livelihood Changes after Zimbabwe’s FTLRP

This section evaluates literature on livelihood and welfare changes that were brought by the implementation of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe since the program had a transformative agenda. These are examined in the context of changes in livelihood assets, outcomes, new livelihood opportunities and general well-being for rural people post resettlement. Scholars like Hanlon et al. (2012) condemned researchers who were quick to conclude that FTLRP was a failure saying agrarian reform is a slow process that takes a generation for new farmers to be fully productive and enhance livelihoods. Research results based on 2010/2011 survey (decade after FTRLRP) revealed high production output that had managed to translate into better livelihoods for the majority of resettled households. It shows that production was tightly linked to welfare and well-being of households as it meant more food, more income for various non-food items. Sporadic cases of households that remained in poverty were there but it was not the dominant story, as it was there before fast track where some few white farmers were unsuccessful.

In another study, Hanlon et al. (2012) noted that even the less ambitious A1 farmers who had smaller land holdings averaging five or six hectares, had greatly improved their standard of living after resettlement. Standard of living improved because majority of the beneficiaries had been poor, landless and unemployed before resettlement (Nyawo, 2014) meaning these tri-problems were addressed. The FTLRP offered them with resources in the form of land where they could grow food crops and also create self-employment. They were able to get surplus produce which was sold to solve other critical household needs, a situation which was difficult before resettlement because of landlessness. It, therefore, means the FTLRP 'fast forwarded' resettled households from poverty to prosperity. Many of them were able to produce significant quantities of maize, tobacco and other crops for sale and building up capital in the form of livestock, farm buildings and equipment and hiring labour for their agricultural operations (Nyawo, 2014). Better agricultural produce made households to acquire extra income to buy household items and other assets that propped up their livelihoods for the better. The FTLRP made them to go above 'food and total consumption poverty' level. If we are to use these two indices, one can conclude that FTLRP raised beneficiaries from 'rags' to riches.

Njaya (2015) also reported that provision of A1 land in Goromonzi District (Baines and Ingwenya farms) had a positive impact as it enabled some beneficiaries to acquire certain assets they did not have or they lacked potential to buy if they had remained in communal areas. Majority of A1 farmers had revealed that they had virtually no assets when they were allocated land in 2000/2001 and that their livelihoods in A1 schemes were now comparatively better than they were in the communal areas (Njaya, 2015). Access to land had translated into asset accumulation and subsequently a gain in welfare and income for the majority of the households. Land access unlocked opportunities to own equipment and other assets that were a 'nightmare' for them to acquire in the pre-resettlement period. If one is to use UNDP's (1996) definition of poverty as lack of access to resources, it, therefore, means Goromonzi A1 farmers who had acquired certain assets post resettlement had moved out of the poverty band. They managed to acquire resources and assets that were fundamental for any rural household mainly involved in farming as a livelihood. The scholar observed an improvement in housing quality as over 83% of households had moved from the traditional house characteristic of the rural areas to the modern solar-electrified house with fenced gardens that showed a change in lifestyle of farmers (Njaya, 2015). Despite all these personal and household improvements, Baines and Ingwenya farms had transport and communication problems limiting the link between the two

communities to the urban centres. Communities used self-made roads and relied on private vehicles of fellow beneficiaries.

Some studies on the socio-economic impact of 'fast track' revealed paradoxes on livelihood outcomes and agricultural output which are believed to be directly linked. Fast track was an opportunity to improve material wealth and livelihood status while for others it was a lost opportunity for the investments in agriculture did not pay dividends. Farmers studied indicated that though agricultural production had declined, FTLRP had improved their livelihoods post resettlement as they had acquired non-motorised equipment, farm implements, and livestock (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). Livelihoods had improved when compared to pre-resettlement but not above nationally expected standards while agriculture fell. What then led to an improvement in livelihoods if agriculture production was not the cause? It, therefore, means livelihoods are not all about agriculture but there are other off-farm livelihoods options that contributed to enhanced livelihood outcomes.

Some studies casted a shadow of doubt on the ability of FTRLRP to transform livelihoods of resettled households. Matsa's (2011) study on well-being of resettled families in Shurugwi District revealed that many of them conceded that their villages of origin were much better than their 'new homes' though they were hopeful for a better future. Their quality of life and well-being was measured based on service delivery, water quality, fuel and social services availability to the resettled people at Beacon Kop farm in Shurugwi District. Resettled households viewed their well-being as having declined post resettlement and the 'fast track' might have 'fast forwarded' them into poverty.

Land is believed to be an important livelihood asset which unlocks new opportunities and can act as a 'springboard' for the rural poor to launch new off-farm livelihood options. However, these off-farm livelihood options vary from place to place and in some, they were non-existent. A study by Chambati (2011) indicated that the land redistribution after 2000 had also opened self-employment and livelihood opportunities in natural resource exploitation to land beneficiaries and their communal counterparts who were once excluded. Fast track had liberalised 'colonised' land and other resources attached to it for the benefit of resettled households. Young people from the Seke and Rusike communal areas indicated that though they did not benefit from fast track, the only benefit from the nearby farms was sand and firewood they illegally poached for sale in Harare and Chitungwiza (Chipenda,

2018). In Goromonzi and Kwekwe districts, 30.7 and 21% of land beneficiaries respectively, were self-employed in gold panning, while 27% of the resettled households in Chipinge panned for diamonds (Chambati, 2011). Fast track farms in Mazowe and Mangwe district also offered resettled households with new livelihood opportunities like gold panning that provided alternative income sources compared to the communal areas where they used to live (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). In Kwekwe district, resettled households equated the fast track phase with previous wars of liberation as it had ‘unlocked’ and ‘liberated’ mineral resources which had been hidden under the monopolistic white farms (Moyo, 2011). There was proliferation of small-scale gold mining and panning as new livelihood platforms on the fast track farms. New livelihood options generated varied with areas as some resettled households engaged in low value activities like firewood, fish and thatching grass sale which had become none existent in communal areas due to degradation. Gardening is one new livelihood platform that was added to the ‘basket’ of livelihoods options for Nyabamba households. Wet climatic conditions in places like Nyabamba resettlement also promoted diversification into fruit and sugarcane gardening which was difficult in their ‘old’ homes and these became ‘cash cows’ for the households (Chingarande, 2010). Nyabamba households also ventured into forest-based livelihoods, tapping forest produce for subsistence and sale from their uncleared plots, Nyabamba and Nyahode forests. FTLRP transformed not only livelihoods of resettled households but other communal people that lived nearer to fast track farms.

3.5 Agricultural Production after Fast Track

Section 3.5 looks at the actual facts in agricultural productivity and the contestations in the facts being presented by researchers on FTLRP’s agricultural impact. The impact of the fast track phase on agricultural production has been another highly contested ‘terrain’ characterised by varied findings and varied reasons for the varied outcomes. Some scholars reported cases of agricultural decline soon after the fast track but justified it as normal of any large-scale agrarian restructuring like fast track. Marongwe (2004) indicated that previous researches have shown that upon resettlement, agricultural production and the livelihoods of settlers decline for the first couple of years but picking-up in the later years. From this argument, assessments of FTLRP that took place soon after its launch are fallacious as they produced results on a resettled people who were still adjusting to resettlement. Hanlon et al. (2012) reported that a decade after FTLRP, Zimbabwe’s agricultural production largely returned to the 1990s level as small-scale

black farmers produced almost as much tobacco as the white farmers once did. Data collected in the 2010/2011 season showed that some crops such as tea, sugar, cotton and groundnuts had outpaced the 1990 production levels while some like tobacco, maize, soya and small grains were about to 'hit' 1990 average (Hanlon et al., 2012). High literacy of resettled households, dollarization of economy and contract farming were cited as having contributed to high yields in tobacco, cotton, and soya. A decade after the launch of FTLRP the new farmers had caught up the white farmers' 1990 production level and this was expected to continue in an upward trend. Hanlon et al. believed that the first generation of households was important for land acquisition while it required another generation to reach full production as was the case with both the white farmers and the first land reform.

Moyo (2011) disputed the popularised notion of a failed land reform in Zimbabwe arguing that the programme was redistributive, hence it triggered significant progressive changes in the agrarian structure though accompanied by temporary decline. Given the magnitude of the FTRLRP, it was bound to cause some 'shocks' to the economy and agricultural sector but evidence on ground was showing that productivity of small farmers was growing slowly and output increasing. Maize, wheat, soyabeans, tobacco were -13.9%, -5.3%, -9.3% and -10.3% of the 1990 average in the 2006/2007 cropping season (Moyo, 2011). Given the smaller negative percentages below the 1990 level for main crops, one can state with confidence that these farmers were doing exceptionally well and almost there. According to Dekker and Kinsey (2011), these small negative margins experienced by resettled households from old resettlement areas and fast track farms were caused by the extraordinary economic meltdown that began in the late 1990s and accelerated dramatically after 2000. Other crops like edible dry beans, small grains, groundnuts, cotton, sugar, tea, citrus and vegetables increased to a figure above the 1990 average by the 2006/2007 cropping year. Majority (eight) of the crops surpassed the 1990 average and four crops had hit nearly 90% by 2011 though only coffee had fallen by 96% below the average (Moyo, 2011). Dekker and Kinsey's (2011) research findings revealed that in non-drought years, resettled households from old resettlement areas and fast track farms produced maize in excess of subsistence needs and most farmers produced cash crops such as cotton and more recently tobacco. For Moyo (2011), during wet years small farmers largely produced 65% of maize and cereals (barely 15% below the average 1990 level) for domestic requirements. The 15% below average for maize was a result of lack of post transfer state support making farmers use personal savings and remittances to finance their farm operations. White farmers had reached the 1990 average which was now a standard of measure because they were receiving support from the government and financial sector.

Crop production trends for Beacon households in Shurugwi were traced from 2000 to 2009 and negative trend was noted. Only 38.8% of the villagised farmers had managed to harvest cereal produce that could feed their families in only four years (2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009) in a decade (Matsa, 2011). It also means the majority of the households had never harvested cereal produce that could sustain them for the decade they had been resettled at Beacon Kop farm. Results from Beacon Kop also revealed that 61% of villagised farmers reported that food production and availability was better in their communal areas of origin than at Beacon Kop farm (Matsa, 2011). Resettled farmers experienced hunger and starvation throughout the decade. This was a gloomy picture showing that fast track had failed to improve the productivity of newly resettled farmers. Reasons for low maize output for the villagised farmers at the onset of FTLRP were attributed to a hectic process of settling and land partitioning. France & Bonarjee (2013) also indicated that tobacco production and growers declined sharply from 1990's average (of 198,600 tonnes per annum and 3,725 growers respectively) to 50% of the 1990 average levels by 2009-2010.

From an agrarian and lifestyle analysis of fast track farmers, Musemwa and Mushunje (2011) concluded that agricultural production since redistribution has been experiencing a decline in output over the past four years, though there were some few exceptions. In both resettlement schemes and communal areas, maize production had declined from 1.7 and 1.3 million tons in the mid-1990s to almost 1 million and approximately 0.8 million tons respectively in 2004 (Musemwa and Mushunje, 2011). The report shows FTRLRP as having affected agricultural production in a negative way, but one wonders why there was also a decline in communal areas of Zimbabwe during the same period. The reports noted that other crops (tobacco, maize, soya beans) declined heavily except cotton which had a less decline. If all crops in both communal and fast track farms experienced a decline, it, therefore, means the decline was not due to fast track or farmers themselves but other factors. Only plantation crops remained constant in terms of production showing that they were spared from fast track to honour bilateral trade agreements made with host countries. According to Sachikonye (2005a) in Musemwa and Mushunje (2011), the only crops that experienced increases but very insignificantly between 2000 and 2004 were paprika, citrus, vegetables and floricultural crops. So, crops that were negatively affected were the main food crops (maize and wheat) and cash crops (tobacco and soyabeans) and these were the 'heart' of an agrarian country like Zimbabwe.

Another national study on the impact of fast track post 2000 reported that the area under cultivation for previously commercial crops like maize, wheat, soyabeans and tobacco had shrunk by more than half (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). It is believed hectareage declined during fast track due to influx of farmers who lacked knowledge of the production of these cash crops and many grew traditional crops they were used to. The decline in hectareage and output did not affect all crops as some like barley, tea, potatoes and beans remained static and unaffected by the FTLRP. Commercial cattle production was also at the receiving end of FTLRP. Beef cattle herd also declined to one fifth the size it was before the onset of FTLRP while milk production dropped from 170 million litres to the current 108 million litres (Matondi and Dekker, 2011). The decline is attributed to cattle theft and slaughter by some resettled farmers who occupied dairy and beef production farms. Also, some farmers who inherited these commercial livestock farms lacked cattle farming expertise leading to cattle attrition due to diseases. The scholars also noted that poultry and pig production experienced a 25% and 70% decline by the year 2003. Decline in production affected crop and animal farming except plantation and floricultural crops as reported by Muchemwa and Mushunje.

Nyawo (2014) reported that FTLRP led to a decline in agricultural production in recent years due to varied and complex reasons that include decline in Zimbabwe's entire economy, western hostility after FTLRP and high recurrence of droughts. The scholar admitted that agricultural production fell but attributed it to an intricate mix of external factors not related to small scale farmers. During the early years (2000-2001) of FTLRP and before, Zimbabwe was the world's sixth largest producer of tobacco but thereafter up to 2009 it produced less than a third (43% drop), the lowest amount in 50 years (Nyawo, 2014). Other export crops that suffered severely with the inception and launch of FTRLRP included tea and coffee. This then contradicted results by Dekker and Kinsey (2011) as well as Hanlon et al. (2012) who noted constancy and an increase in plantation crops respectively. In terms of cereal production, Zimbabwe was once dubbed the 'breadbasket' of southern Africa but post-resettlement, it struggled to feed its own population and is importing maize to meet food requirements (Nyawo, 2014, Musenje and Mushunje, 2011). Two decades after 2000, critics of fast track are labeling Zimbabwe the 'empty basket' of Southern Africa. There was also a drop in total farm output as majority of primary beneficiaries were given land based on associational brokering, despite lack of agricultural experience and expertise (Nyawo, 2014).

3.6 Conclusion to Chapter 3

FTLRP has been a controversial programme from its launch to the implementation process. Some scholars described it as problematic to have evaluative work that still focused on the process of FTLRP six years after the programme had been implemented. A decade after the programme had been launched; there were still some scholars that focused their research studies entirely on the divisive process of FTLRP. There was a call for a shift to researches that focus more on the post transfer agri-livelihoods outcomes of FTLRP since there is belief that it's an underexplored area. Scoones et al. (2011) also urged other scholars to move beyond the divisive debate on the process of the FTLRP and refocus the debate on the impact of FTLRP on income levels and state of agri-livelihoods. In Southern Africa, FTLRP is believed to be a large scale programme that had been carried out, hence it required more time and also comprehensive studies on its effect on economic development. While many scholars later shifted their attention to the economic development and livelihood outcomes of FTLRP, their findings reveal that the 'raging' debate is still on and has intensified. There are mixed reports of positive and negative changes in 'agri-livelihoods' among resettled households. These economic debates also mean there is need to move away from economic measurement of the outcomes of FTLRP into other outcomes. Chipenda (2018) urged for contemporary studies to reframe their focus on the outcomes beyond economic indicators to citizenship. It is, therefore, imperative to further refocus the evaluation of the FTLRP beyond economic outcomes to indicators of citizenship such as people's rights, dignity, belonging and participation in economic, social and environmental sustainability. Chitsike (2003:11) further argued that Zimbabwe signed the Habitat 11 Conference's Global Plan of Action of 1996 that recognizes land access as important to the country's sustainable development agenda. This highlights the importance of land reform to economic, social and environmental sustainability. Emphasis should be on how 21st century land reforms like fast track had influenced social sustainability and created environmentally responsible citizens. This is a new focus away from the divisive economic outcomes to social and environmental sustainability.

CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

4.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter has seven parts, with the first section being the chapter introduction. The second section gives detailed information about ethnography as the research design used in this study. It focuses on the definition, ontological and epistemological politics of conducting an ethnographic study. Section 4.3 then examines the sampling methods used to select sites of study, land beneficiaries and key informants. It also looks at the sampling procedure of each method and the reason each was chosen for a specific group. Section 4.4 focuses on the first research objective, evaluating the FTLRP process. This section identifies the data collection method(s) used, source of data, data collection procedure, type of data collected, why it was chosen and how collected data was analysed. Part 4.5 dwells on the livelihood changes after FTLRP as the second research objective. It also identifies the data collection method(s), collection procedure, type of questions asked and how collected data was presented and analysed. Section 4.6 focuses on data collection and analysis of communities' socio-cultural values and practices that define a true 'citizen'. The last part is the chapter conclusion where main issues covered in the chapter are highlighted.

4.2 Ethnographic Philosophies Guiding the Study

The research adopted a qualitative ethnographic research approach. Creswell (2014) defined it as a sociological and anthropological research design of inquiry where a researcher studies a group's perception, behavioral pattern, language and actions in 'situ' over a prolonged period of time. Ethnography allowed me to be a **participant observer**, thereby collect participants' views on the FTLRP's process, 'agri-livelihoods' impact, perception and practices of citizenship. Data were collected using in-depth interviews to allow settlers to freely express their feelings on FTLRP and socio-cultural values of citizenship. Land beneficiaries were allowed to speak freely without being interrupted to ensure their inner feelings on a certain aspect were exposed. As they expressed themselves, the researcher recorded actions that accompanied these expressions and changes in tonal voice. Some of these were important in 'measuring' the exercise of civil and political rights which were important components of citizenship. As local functions and interviews progressed, certain behaviours that indicated positive or negative changes to their socio-cultural values (rights, power, belonging and identity) were noted. In cases where households expressed

contrary ideas on the same item or question, ethnography allowed for the presentation of such ideas, their context and subsequently interpretation. An explanation was given for the spatial and temporal change in perception on the same question of the interview schedule. An ethnography was an effective research design as it allowed the collection of perception and actions of settlers who were the 'actors' during FTLRP and also beneficiaries of the programme. As individuals who had lived experience of the programme, it made them experts to speak on their feelings about the programme's influence on livelihoods and citizenship. Member checking was done later to see if views and behaviours initially expressed by settlers had changed with time. I took advantage of being related to many land beneficiaries to carry out observations anytime when in the communities. I attended many community gatherings (social, political and development meetings) that were held when I was in the farms. At times I accompanied them on their long journey to the gardens and water sources for their animals. This enabled me to observe how land access had affected livelihoods, socio-cultural values and practices that defined citizenship. **As participant observer, I participated in different farm activities which allowed me to observe** and note certain behaviours that communicated the extent in the exercise of civil, socio-economic, political and environmental rights. I also recorded actions by resettled communities to participate in activities that created opportunities, actualise rights and enhance their socio-cultural values in cases where the state had failed to fulfil or protect them. Interviewing of land beneficiaries happened formally using an interview schedule and at times same questions were asked informally to some participants during community gatherings. Field notes were then updated to input new and complementary views given and the context in which they were given. This helped to explain how the social setting influenced expression of rights and socio-cultural behaviours.

This ethnographic **research study took five continuous months (May 2018 to September 2018) to collect perceptions**, behaviours and practices of households that communicated changes in livelihoods and components of citizenship. The first month was used to build trust with local leadership for the resettled communities through interaction and attendance of community activities. After this trust building exercise, I had to spend most of the next four months with the communities conducting a comprehensive data collection. I periodically visited the study sites outside the scheduled data collection period to attend social functions and/or get more information on issues that would have emerged as the data was analysed. Ethnography is flexible and not 'cast on a stone' thereby allowing continuous data collection even during the report compilation process. Periodic visits ensured continuous

observation, member checking and reexamination of certain views and behaviours to get a better understanding of the same. Detailed observations and interviews were done with 40 households selected from Peter Wenhamo and Maware A1 schemes.

An ethnographic research study has limitations like researcher bias which can lead to subjective conclusions. I made detailed field notes of my own pre-conceived and subjective ideas on the process of fast track, agri-livelihood outcomes and its influence on components and practices citizenship. This helped me to accurately interpret the views and actions of resettled communities based on what I heard and saw without being influenced by my own ideas. Another limitation is that it is difficult to generalise the findings of the ethnographic research as it is a field study from a particular setting, hence can only be generalised to that setting (Burns, 1994). I overcame this limitation through carrying out multi-site studies in two resettlement projects (Maware and Peter Wenhamo) all in Chiredzi district. Use of an ethnographic approach in this research study also makes it difficult to replicate the study in future to obtain similar results. However, I prepared comprehensive research methodology and procedures in the sampling of participants and data collection process through the use of interviews, observation and secondary documents. Another problem associated with ethnographic research study is that in the initial stages of the research, participants can give responses favorable to the researcher due to lack of trust. Acceptance and permission was first sought from the village chairpersons of resettled people, I explained the purpose of the research study so as to build trust before households were interviewed. After being accepted by community leaders, it became easy to interact with rank and file people in the resettled communities after they had been notified. In some cases, I had to seek permission from a family 'elder' or representative when dealing with female headed households or where the family head was not present at the time of the interview. I also visited resettled communities after the period scheduled for data collection to conduct 'member checking' where follow-up interviews were done.

Lack of internal validity of research findings was also enhanced through the use of the triangulation method where data was collected from many sources and compared to deduce meaning on a certain theme. I collected data on the perception of FTLRP as a process, changes in livelihoods, intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship by resettled communities. Triangulation involved collecting data from household heads through in-depth interviews, secondary data and participant observation. Questions used during interviews were designed guided by the research objectives.

Data from the different sources and data collection tools were compared on a similar item and an explanation for divergent views between household heads themselves or with key informants was given.

4.3 Sampling Methods and Procedure

The research study was undertaken in two resettlement schemes of Maware and Peter Wenhamo in Chiredzi district. The research sites were purposefully selected. I used names of the two former commercial farmers (Maware and Peter Wenhamo), though pronounced in vernacular language as the names of the two resettlement communities. Maware and Peter Wenhamo resettlement schemes were chosen because they had absorbed majority of households in my district of origin (Zaka) because it had no commercial farms for land redistribution. It was also easy to get accepted by the local leadership and people to carry out the research as participant observer. My communal area is nearer to the farms and many times I visit beneficiary relatives for social functions.

A total of forty (40) household heads were chosen using stratified random sampling from all the two resettlement schemes, while twenty (20) households were randomly selected from each of the two schemes. I got names of resettled household heads and their phone numbers from the respective village heads. Cards with names of all resettled households in each farm were prepared and put in two different boxes. Twenty cards were randomly picked from each of the two boxes labeled with the farm name until forty household heads were selected. Stratified random sampling of household heads from each resettled community ensured that every household had an equal chance of being selected since there was randomness in the selection of households. As a qualitative ethnographic study, random selection was ignored in favour of purposive sampling of households. The latter was used to replace chosen households who had refused to participate in the study and member checking to identify changes in behavior and perception of some households. Since data was collected everywhere, the researcher met participants and some who expressed views and behavior that answered research questions were purposively chosen. Ethnography allowed change of research methods whenever it helped to get the required data. I added the person to the sample list, provided him/her with PIS and consent forms and if consented, I would carry out interviews. I also purposively selected key informants like the local leadership, District Lands Officer, political figures and relevant public workers. Purposeful selection allowed me to get expert knowledge from key figures in the villages and public officials that dealt with resettled beneficiaries on a daily and regular basis.

4.4 Objective (a): To understand the personal experiences and perceptions of beneficiaries' of FTLRP from 2000 to present.

This section discusses data collection tools that were used to collect relevant data to understand 'insider's' perceptions of the process of fast track and then later compare their views with findings from other studies. It also examines all sources of data, type of data that was collected to achieve this research objective, the procedures to get that data and subsequently data analysis.

Data Collection Methods and Procedure

In-depth interviews were the main data collection method from land beneficiaries' perceptions of the fast track programme. After identifying the names of resettled households to be part of the sample, I first visited their respective village heads during early April to seek permission, show them approval letters from responsible ministry and my university. The visit was also meant to book village heads for key informant interviews, brief them on the purpose of the research study and number of resettled households to be interviewed from their villages. All selected village heads were given a month to notify their subordinates about my coming visit in the following four months and its purpose. Village heads took advantage of their monthly meetings and emerging social functions to notify their people of my four-month-long visit in their areas. At the beginning of May, I visited Maware and Peter Wenhamo village heads to notify them of my presence in their area. Using the list of sampled households in each farm, I first phoned each selected household head to notify him/her of my visit to his/her homestead. I gave each household head I visited a Participant Information Sheet (PIS), then two consent forms all printed in preferred language for signing. Those who consented had to keep the PIS and the other consent form while I remained with another consent form. For those who could not read and write, they had to be asked to look for a 'witness' who read the PIS and consent form on their behalf, ticking on appropriate options chosen by the participant. If the household head consented, I gave him or her, an ink pad to dip their right thumb and put their fingerprint on the signature section. Individuals who did not consent were replaced through the same process alluded to earlier. Some who consented to be part of the interview, but were still skeptical, were interviewed at last after others. Two household heads in two different schemes who initially consented avoided to meet the interviewer till the end of the research and they were replaced. Information collected from the neighbors revealed that they were suspicious of the fact that

I was studying with a foreign university. They professed fear of being recorded and then beamed or audios being sent to Washington DC based 'Studio 7' radio channel regarded as anti-government as it broadcasted from Voice of America.

I asked respondents to choose their preferred language for interviews since I had interview schedules in English and Shona. All the households in the two resettlement schemes chose Shona since it was the majority's mother language. This also made them freely and fully express themselves. A total of 40 in depth interviews and observations with resettled households were done, with each interview lasting approximately 60 to 80 minutes. I notified participants that the researcher will use pseudonyms instead of their actual names. The pseudonym, name of farm and context were written on the interview schedule before the start of each interview. Participants were then notified that pseudonyms will be used in the final report instead of actual names to protect their privacy and allow them to freely express themselves. I read through the first preliminary part of the interview schedule. In this part, I assured the beneficiaries that this study was purely academic, responses were to be kept confidential, anonymous and secured after the interviews. I also read through Part A of the interview schedule that had questions to evaluate beneficiary's perception of the process of fast track. It covered issues like reasons for fast tracking land access, institutional framework during FTLRP, beneficiary selection and inclusivity of fast track, tenure security and level of investments. Depending on what the respondent had consented to earlier on, I either audio recorded or wrote down notes on the responses given. Where respondents gave general, incomplete and unclear answers, I further asked for clarification.

I also requested offer letters and permits if they had any to help make an assessment of inclusivity of the programme and tenure security issues. I then photographed these documents to ensure the details are used during transcription and data analysis. Secondary documents allowed comparison of perceptions households had on the sensitivity and tenure security of the programme with the contents of the secondary documents. Observation and recording also complemented data to evaluate views held by resettled communities on the fast track as a program. I took pictures of 'new' investments made on farms and inherited farm infrastructure to examine current uses and state of infrastructure that had been left on the farms. Investments and infrastructure observed and pictured included the

farmhouses, farming structures and dams. Information on the current state and uses of on-farm infrastructure was collected to confirm or reject allegations that it was now derelict and dilapidated post fast track.

After collecting data from the resettled households, I went through the data supplied so as to pick some issues they had raised that were contradicting and some that needed clarification. These were added to the interview guide for key informants to clarify. Interview guides prepared slightly varied with the key informant. I visited the DDC's office as it is the first port of call in the district and 'chief executive office' for the district. Contact details (addresses and phone numbers) for the key informants collected earlier enabled booking them for interviews. Key informants like DDC, land officer, Chief, MP, local leadership, public workers, representatives of war veterans and political parties were interviewed. From key informants like DDC and lands officer, I asked questions mainly on issues like beneficiary selection, sensitivity of programme, state support given by government. Many of these key informants selected worked in government departments and some of them were members of the informal and formal land committees that dealt with land issues during the fast track phase. They therefore provided important expert knowledge and the government's position on certain issues like beneficiary's selection criterion, terms of offer letters, inclusivity of programme and reasons for fast tracking. Political players and war veterans were also important because they gave an independent position on the same issues.

Data Analysis Procedure

Qualitative data that was collected to understand resettled communities' perception of the fast track process and practices include mainly text, audio data and few pictures. The research objective was used as the broad theme and it was disaggregated into various interview questions which became the subthemes for chapter 5. At the end of each data collection day, I manually hand coded all captured written responses with predetermined codes and short phrases (Table 4.1) on the margin of the page. This was done with a different ink to easily identify the codes when compiling the final project. I played all audios that had been captured for the households in each area so as to pick main points raised and respondents who had raised those issues. The audios were replayed as I extracted more notes to beef up the initial compilation which would have been done. Replaying the audios also helped to identify quotes to use in the text of the project.

Table 4.1: Sub-Research Themes and Codes for Research Objective (a)

Theme No	Sub research theme	Research Code
1	Beneficiary selection and inclusivity	BSI
2	Tenure Security and farm investment	TS
3	Motive for fast tracking land reform	Fast track
4	Theme that needed key informant clarification	*Tenure security, Agritex* etc

Items that contradicted or needed further clarification (Theme No 4) from key informants were marked by stars in front and at the rear together with the responsible key informant to make the clarification. It was easier to identify issues that I was supposed to add in the key informant interview schedule and probe further. Data on the perceptions of resettled households was complemented with secondary documents that I had collected or photographed. I had to print the scanned documents and images of items that helped to understand the fast track as a process. The printed hard copies were then manually hand coded using codes in Table 4.1 and comparisons were then made with perceptions of land beneficiaries on the same aspect.

I went through notes for the twenty interviewees in one resettlement area like Maware reading through all the responses on a certain sub-research theme. For instance, I identified where I had written the code, ‘inclusivity’ in a different colour on field notes, read all notes for the twenty respondents on code ‘inclusivity’. I then identified a dominant, important and interesting idea that was recurrent in the responses given by resettled households. I took one respondent’s speech that summarised and touched on what was said by almost everybody and presented it as paraphrase or direct quotation. Photographed images that helped understand fast track as programme such as pictures showing state of infrastructure and terms of offer letter were also analysed so as to derive meaning on fast track. Each coded picture was juxtaposed and examined in relation to a certain key theme to enable comparison with perceptions of resettled households on the same aspect. I also coded written notes on responses by key informants using the same codes and then went through all key informants’ views on one particular research theme. Comments

from the key informants were then compared with responses given by resettled households. Where, there were contradictions, the researcher tried to unpack the contradiction. Views of land beneficiaries and key informants were also triangulated with scholarly work from the two literature review chapters to check whether it confirmed or contradicted findings by other scholars of the same item.

4.5 Objective (b): To examine livelihood changes among beneficiary communities in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 resettlement projects.

Section 4.5 examines the qualitative ‘agri-livelihoods’ changes that happened after fast track and how resettled communities viewed these changes. Changes are given qualitatively in form of their general perception of each livelihood component. The section also discusses methods that were used to collect data on changes in ‘agri-livelihoods’, how the data was presented and analysed.

Data Collection Methods and Procedure

In order to meet the second objective, I collected most of the data through in-depth interviews from land beneficiaries on their perception of their current livelihood status as compared to their previous locations. Questions that sought to answer the second sub-question on livelihood changes after fast track were contained in Part B of the interview schedule. Livelihood status was qualitatively measured in the context of changes in livelihood assets, outcomes and new livelihood options that emerged after fast track. Data collected on livelihood changes included forms and quality of assets accumulated, livelihood outcomes like their food security, income status and their view of well-being after resettlement. Resettled households were also asked to give their perceptions of their agricultural performance post-resettlement. Interviews were used to collect data on livelihood changes from the resettled households because these are the people who were actually feeling and seeing the changes in their lives. Also, they knew what they wanted and expected to change after fast track, hence it was crucial to give them a chance to air their views on well-being almost three decades after the launch of the program.

Data on livelihood changes was also collected through key informant interviews with officials from Agritex, Veterinary department, Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTCO) and local NGOs.

These worked and collected 'agri-livelihoods' data from resettled households on a regular basis. NGOs like CARE and World Vision also operated in the district provided support to government programmes. Some of the key informants included, officials from the health and education sector. Officials from these ministries kept records of the support given to the communities. Key informant interviews also allowed me to seek clarification on issues raised by land beneficiaries that required expert knowledge like the trends in income and productivity.

I also used observation and recording to collect data on visible components that helped to assess livelihood changes that had occurred after fast track. During transect walks and interviews with respondents, I took pictures of items that helped me to understand livelihood status of the resettled people though some of the pictures were not attached to the thesis. Observable data that was collected included housing quality of resettled families, state of their social services, water situation, infrastructure and assets acquired. These were important as they helped to compare perceptions of beneficiaries on their livelihood status with some observable assets and social services that were indicative of people's livelihood status.

Data Analysis Procedure

Information to understand livelihood changes among beneficiary communities in Maware and Peter Wenhamo resettlement farms was also collected mainly using interviews. The research objective again was the broad theme that constituted an independent chapter and it was disaggregated into various interview questions which became the subthemes of chapter 6. After the data collection session, I took written notes captured on perception of livelihood changes for each respondent. The notes were then manually hand coded with predetermined codes and short phrases (Table 4.2) using a different ink on the margin of the page. Since some views of resettled households on livelihood changes were captured as audios and these were replayed as I compiled notes on different subthemes depending on the question asked. Written notes were then manually coded using codes in Table 4.2. After going through all written responses and audios on a subtheme, one respondent's views were chosen to represent the other 20 households in the area.

Table 4.2: Sub-Research Themes and Codes for Research Objective (b)

Theme No	Sub research theme	Research Code
1	Natural Livelihood Asset.	Natural Ass
2	Physical Livelihood Asset.	Physical Ass
4	Livelihood Outcome (food security).	Food security
5	Livelihood Outcome (income level).	Income level
6	Livelihood Outcome (well-being).	Well-being
7	Changes in working days.	Working days
7	New Livelihood Options.	New options
8	Sub research theme that needed key informant clarification.	*Natural Ass, DA*, *Working days, Agritex* etc

Coding was then followed by data analysis which involved reading through notes for all the interviewees on each sub-theme like ‘new livelihood options’ and capturing the main idea on new livelihood options after fast track. The main idea was presented in form of direct quotation or a paraphrasing statement that ended with a pseudo name of the respondent and name of resettlement area. Captured opinions on livelihood issues by local key informants that worked for government, state enterprises and NGOs were also coded, juxtaposed and compared with views of resettled communities. I looked for key informant views that clarified views of resettled communities on a certain sub theme.

Where available, I identified scholarly work from literature review chapters that was in support or contrasted the views of Chiredzi resettlement land beneficiaries. Where there was a contradiction, I tried to examine why findings by previous scholars and respondent or key informant views were divergent.

4.6 Objective (c): To critically examine attitudes of community belonging and practices of citizenship among FTLRP beneficiaries in these two settlements.

This section looked at the collection of data on beneficiary communities’ intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship. It also discussed the type of data that was collected to check on how fast track had influenced the sense

and practices of citizenship. Data on how beneficiaries participated and were responsible for their social, economic and environmental issues were also presented and analysed.

Data Collection Methods and Procedure

This research study tried to understand the influence of fast track on the attitudes of beneficiary communities towards intrinsic values indicative of inclusive citizenship and their broad civic responsibilities at local and national scales. I collected this information mainly using interviews but complemented by observation of behaviours that pointed to issues relating to inclusive citizenship. Part C of the interview schedule had questions on beneficiaries' sense of identity, view of self, dignity, power dynamics and rights access after fast track. All these were important in understanding the social sustainability of the program and how these influenced their sense of belonging at local and national level. Data on actions which resettled households were taking to actualise their rights 'force' their sense of belonging, create own opportunities, reduce their social burdens and to show their environmental responsibility were also collected. I also collected data on how intrinsic indicators of citizenship like rights access, sense of self, identity and power had influenced environmental beliefs and actions post resettlement.

I also read through the questions on the interview schedule and responses were captured as written notes or audios. On unclear answers, I probed the respondent till he/she clarified all important but grey issues. Using a camera, I also took pictures of some activities that portrayed actions and behaviours to actualise their rights, showing lack or evidence of social and environmental responsibility. To have a better understanding of the state of rights of resettled citizens and actions showing social and environmental responsibility, key informants especially officials from government departments that have expert knowledge of these issues were interviewed. These officials were drawn from social welfare, education, health, public works, agriculture, local government and environment departments.

Data Analysis Procedure

Beneficiaries' intrinsic feelings of their citizenship after fast track were mainly collected through interviews and this produced a lot of text data and few images on the matter. I subdivided the broad research objective into disaggregated interview questions that subsequently became the subthemes of chapter 7. At the end of the data

collection session, I took written notes of responses from resettled households, key informants and few printed images to code them as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Sub-Research Themes and Codes for Research Objective (c)

Theme No	Sub research theme	Research Code
1	View of self/identity	Self /identity
2	Power dynamics	Power D
	View of Dignity	Dignity
3	Political rights.	Political R
4	Socio-Economic rights	Socio-Eco R
6	Civil Rights	Civil R
7	Environmental Beliefs	Environ B
8	Environmental Practices	Environ P
9	Theme that need key informant clarification	*Power D, DA*

I had to replay the audios for some respondents whilst taking down notes and coding them using predetermined codes (Table 4.3). Again, I read through notes with similar codes for the twenty respondents in each resettlement area in order to pick a view by a respondent that could represent the other nineteen respondents. On certain subthemes like ‘right to education, health and water’, images that helped to explain these rights were pasted just below the respondent’s views. A discussion followed the view and quotation of the representative respondent on a certain subtheme. The discussion identified the resettled households’ feelings on a certain item such as right to education. This was followed by an interpretation of their views and my comment on what the land beneficiary’s view implied on a certain sub-research theme. Views of respective key informants especially from government and NGOs that are working to promote rights access and inclusive citizenship were sought so as to clarify views initially given by participants. I then picked scholarly literature on the same sub-theme from Chapter 2 and 3 that contradicted or confirmed what was said by participants in Chiredzi resettlement areas. A comment was given on the link between scholarly literature and perceptions of Chiredzi settlers.

4.7 Conclusion to Chapter 4

The research study used ethnography as a qualitative research design to collect mainly perceptions of Chiredzi A1 households on the process, livelihood changes and influence of FTLRP on sustainable citizenship. While ethnography was the research design, it had some weakness (like researcher bias and lack of generalisability to other areas) that threatened the validity of research findings. Research validity was enhanced through writing some preconceived views I had about the programme's process and outcomes. I also used multi-sites for the research, that is, Maware and Peter Wenhamo resettlement schemes. Purposeful sampling was used to choose the two resettlement schemes in Chiredzi district since most people from my home district had been allocated land in this district. Key informants from government departments and NGOs were also purposefully sampled. These provided expert knowledge on issues relating to the process of fast track, 'agri-livelihood' changes and citizenship among resettled households. Land beneficiaries were chosen using stratified random sampling and the chosen two farms became the strata. This sampling method enabled every household to be chosen though the sampling method was not like a 'stone cast in a stone wall'. Some households not part of the initial sample of forty households who could provide important data were purposefully chosen. After the section on research design and sampling method, the chapter was subdivided into more sections guided by the three research objectives. In-depth interviews were the main data collection method to achieve all the three research objectives. Data from in-depth interviews were complemented by data from observation and recording some components of livelihood changes and rights access that were captured during transect walks and the process of interviewing participants. Qualitative data in the form of field notes, audios and images were manually hand-coded with a different ink using predetermined codes. All notes similarly coded were then compared and one dominant view that captured what was said by many participants was quoted and analysed in relation to the sub-research theme. The next chapter focuses on the first research objective, perceptions of land beneficiaries on the practice and process of fast track in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 5: THE PROCES OF FAST TRACK

5.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter is divided into three broad thematic sections. Section one examines perceptions of land beneficiaries on the motive for fast tracking and radicalising Phase 111 of land reform and its radical approach. The second section looks at households' perceptions of the land allocation institutional framework, how it influenced beneficiary selection and issues of inclusivity during the fast track programme. Section three focuses on beneficiary experience of land ownership and feelings of tenure security after fast track. The last section concludes by giving main issues that emerged from the land beneficiaries' experience of the fast track process. FTLRP is the third phase of land reform in Zimbabwe but it has been the most controversial programme, beginning with the events that led to its radical launch and implementation. Scholarly and policy-related work has been largely polarised on the programme's radical launch, the motive for fast tracking land redistribution; beneficiary selection and tenure security of the programme. There are fears that these mixed reports on the process of fast track might have influenced evaluations of the outcomes of the programme. Some early polarised reports on the process of FTLRP might have been influenced by emotions and personal subjectivities of scholars. In this chapter, I attempted to represent the experiences of the launch beneficiaries themselves since they were also active in the launch of the programme.

5.2 Fast Tracking Land Redistribution and Method of Land Access

The so-called 'fast-tracking' of land redistribution, that is, the demand to quickly push policy through parliament and constitutional amendments is said to have roots not only in the political context of the early 2000s in Zimbabwe, but are also the culmination of political and social pressures that pre-date independence up to Phase 1 and 11 of land reform. The expiry of the LHA agreement in early 1990s also saw the land acquisition act being amended to promote compulsory land acquisition though the programme was slowed by ESAP. To understand them requires that the reader understands the concept of the FTLRP and the ways in which these older political movements intersected with more contemporary socio-political pressures of rural poverty, population pressure and declining economic development. This section presents and discusses the perception of resettled households on why this phase

of land reform (FTLRP) ended up being fast tracked, radical in approach and launched in a manner different from other previous land reforms in Zimbabwe.

From Phase 11 of Land Reform to Fast Track

Zimbabwe carried out two successive phases of land reform (Phase 1 and 11) from 1980 to 1996 followed by third phase in 2000 which was named the FTLRP. The motive for fast tracking this late phase of land reform in the year 2000 has been debatable despite having phases that had started soon after independence. There was a feeling among resettled households in Chiredzi district that the initial phases were slow and were outpaced by the growing number of landless people. In fast tracking the programme, government wanted to avoid the long route of negotiating with former commercial farmers which was going to delay land redistribution given the increase in the number of landless people. Former landless but fast track land beneficiary Albert in Peter Wenhamo farm reported:

I know very few people who benefited from the early phases of land reform....The number of landless people had been rapidly increasing since independence, hence there was need to carry out a large-scale land reform programme. Towards 2000 the ruling party did not get time to plan for this massive land redistribution programme because they were caught unaware by the wave of farm invasions. So, the ruling party invoked the land issue time and again and mainly towards election to claim ownership of the programme. The government was hesitant to radically deal with the land issue because they were now comfortable in higher offices forgetting why we went to war. If we had not started these farm invasions, there would be no fast track for you to write about (Albert, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Views expressed by Albert that very few people benefited from initial land reforms shows dissatisfaction with the 'supply side' of the programme and satisfaction with FTLRP. This is indicative of the fact that communal areas where these resettled households came from were heavily congested forcing them to relocate to A1 schemes. Adoption of market driven land reforms in phase 1 and 11 could have slowed the reform process and this could not meet the demand for land. Views expressed by households confirmed Gonese and Mukora's (2003) findings that high population pressure and growth in the communal areas increased demand for agricultural land and other natural resources to improve their livelihoods. Another view raised by Albert is that the post 2000 land reform programme

was seen as a ruling party 'decoy' to appeal to the rural voters who were demographically higher than urban voters. Many households viewed the fast track as a ruling party programme totally different from the first two phases where government had authority. While government wanted to pursue planned reform process as evidenced by the 1998 land conference that suffered a 'still birth', the party adopted a radical and fast process that helped to spruce its waxing image. The party instead of government became the one in control of the land redistribution, fast tracked it. The change in focus, name of the programme and lack of planning for the programme shows that the party wanted a programme that rescued it from 'sinking'. Barraclough (1999) confirmed that competition for the votes of the rural poor and landless urbanites make some political parties to place land reform high on their political agenda and manifesto. The FTLRP ended up being controlled from the ruling party corridors which opted for unplanned programme for political expediency. This also support findings by Dekker & Kinsey (2011) that for the ruling party, claiming land became far more important than any technical consideration of land allocation and provision of post transfer support, hence the designation 'fast-track'.

For other households, FTLRP was a peasant instigated programme that government and the ruling party 'usurped' from landless peasants by initiating constitutional amendments. What then drove farm invasions when there were signs despite that government had initiated another land reform programme through the 1998 donor conference? Resettled households like Ashton blamed the government for the farm invasions that preceded fast track land reform programme. Though government was bound by the LHA and ESAP guidelines that recommended the use of market driven approaches to land reform, households felt government was reluctant to deal with land issue once and for all. The level of mistrust between government and its citizens grew over time and that then 'exploded' into farm invasions which forced the former to fast track land allocation. Citizens felt that government had reneged on its obligation to speed up land redistribution, hence invasions pre-2000 were sporadic until they became large scale after the year 2000. For the citizens, the fruits of the armed struggle had not been wholesomely felt as they kept hoping government was going to embark on large scale land redistribution. Their suffering continued even after independence because they felt land was the main motivator for launching second war of liberation. To the households, their connection to the post-independence government was getting weak with time. While political independence brought feelings of political belonging and connection to the government, slow pace of land reforms weakened the same feelings. By failing to deliver land, households also felt that those in power had failed to

actualise the liberation ideals, rendering the liberation war to be meaningless. This confirms Mangena's (2014) view that the landless black majority felt that FTLRP gave meaning to the armed struggle as it gave them the land they had fought for, though they got that land after enduring long suffering without land, a symbol of their identity. Sentiments by Ashton show that previous land reforms were government initiatives while the fast track phase was initiated from below. Gonese and Mukora (2003) confirmed that the masses being led by war veterans spearheaded the farm invasions forcing government to take over and legalise the process into FTLRP. Respondents indicated they waited upon government to discharge its constitutional mandate and fulfill one of the liberation war ideals, but they were not forthcoming. So, to the masses, it seemed like a betrayal by their leaders after independence. The large-scale farm invasions that happened in 2000 can be described as invented spaces of citizenship when the landless masses realised that the state seemed unwilling to act on land redistribution. Land beneficiaries felt that fast track was their own initiative as argued by Barraclough (1999) that large scale land reforms are always implemented after protests, invasions and demands by the peasants and rural landless. For the fast track, its launch by government was reactionary to land invasions that were started by landless and land hungry people. This finding is similar to findings by Hanlon et al. (2012) that farm invasions of 2000 were legalised to contain disgruntled urbanites and landless rural people although it was not a priority for the Zimbabwean government. For some households, FTLRP was the brainchild of the masses not the ruling party or government. The government was made to act, fast track the constitutional amendment, align laws and establish the institutional framework for land redistribution after realising that the landless people were determined to claim what was theirs. For phase 1 and 11, government came up with policies and relevant acts of parliament that mandated it to acquire land while the same came after land invasions justifying the view that fast track was peasant and landless instigated. The fact that the landless started farm invasions that triggered government to act supports the IBRD and World Bank (2009) as well as Herring's (2003) view that unresolved land issues and land reforms that appear dead are not dead in the minds of the poor. If citizens decide to act on their landlessness, it leads to violence and conflict. In rural areas, liberation war veterans and the landless became increasingly restless, arguing they had gained nothing from the war and previous land reform and the issue of land came back into prominence, although it was not a priority for the Zimbabwean government (Hanlon et al., 2012).

Why Third Chimurenga (3rd War of Liberation)?

Zimbabwe was involved in two protracted liberation wars to dislodge colonial rule and the last war ended with the attainment of independence in 1980. Two successive phases of land reform were carried out from 1980 to 1996 but these were not viewed as 'liberatory' in nature. FTLRP which was the third phase of land reform in Zimbabwe was viewed and named 'Third Chimurenga' (3rd war of liberation) meaning it was the successor of the second liberation war. Many resettled households concurred that FTLRP was liberatory in nature because it led to the liberation of land and other resources Phase 1 and 11 of land reform had failed to deliver. A female liberation war collaborator and farm invasion participant who gained access to land claimed:

First land reforms achieved 'nothing' in terms of land access. This time it was 'Hondo Yeminda' (serious war to liberate land) because only people had been freed by the first two 'Chimurengas.... We did not get this land on a silver platter but we had to fight against white commercial farmers and their backers. We had no arms this time but we had the people on our side. The first liberation war did not achieve much like the first land reforms. Mbuya Nehanda's (Spirit medium) spirit inspired the masses into action to make sure that this (Hondo yeminda) second 'land war' was a success like the second liberation struggle. I'm sure Mbuya Nehanda's spirit is resting in peace after winning this 'land war' (Esther, Peter Wenhamo farm).

By comparing initial land reforms and FTLRP, Esther felt positive with the outcome of the latter programme to address the supply side of the land question in Zimbabwe. For many households, they felt that the first two phases of land reform had achieved less in terms of ensuring total independence and belonging of the black majority because land had remained in the hands of the few white farmers. Land beneficiaries believed that not only people had been colonised but also their land resources and the two state-initiated land reforms (Phase 1 & 11) had failed to deliver. There was an association between people and their land resources. The landless had to initiate another land reform to ensure that total independence and belonging was achieved. It shows that humanity was highly attached to land resources, hence freedom and belonging of the people without freeing land resources led to partial independence. Mangena (2014) argued that a sense of belonging is cultivated within individuals when they get attached to a place or anything they think is important to them. Regular mention of spirit mediums like Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi by resettled households shows that fast track had a spiritual importance. While the land invasion was driven

by spirituality issues, the success of the fast track generated feelings within resettled households that they had finished the unfinished business left by the liberation wars. The name 'Third Chimurenga' was, therefore, meant as a source of inspiration by appealing to the founding values and persons that demanded the return of land to the black majority (Mangena, 2014). Only a radical land reform was able to close this gap as it delivered comprehensive freedom and feelings of belonging by providing households with a place/land they called 'home'. FTLRP was a 'liberation war' that led to the liberation of land resources. According to Fanon (1965) as well as Hanlon, Manjengwa and Smart (2012), regaining the land and other symbols (rights, dignity and belonging) embodied in land was central to the liberation wars. If regaining land was central to liberation wars and only a few people had been allocated land, it means the majority of the landless felt that they still did not belong to the country. Like the pre-independence liberation wars, FTLRP was a decolonisation tool to challenge neocolonialism (Fanon, 1965) and finish the unfinished business of decolonisation (Chimhowu, 2006).

For many other respondents, FTLRP was a 'war of liberation' in the literary sense of being characterised by acts of sabotage, attack and confrontation in order to get land. People viewed it as war but different from the conventional wars fought using guns. Farm owners through their farm workers destroyed huts of resettled farmers, poisoned water sources and dip tanks. They also destroyed part of their property like water engines and boreholes when they realised that they were about to lose their farms. Resettled households retaliated in a proportional way that matched the actions of the commercial farmers. From a legal point of view, white commercial farmers had title deeds, so they had a constitutional right to protect their property. As for farm employees, they protected their employer because land invasion signaled the end of their employment right. They did not see themselves living a 'dignified life' after the land had been taken away from the commercial farmer. While the farm owners defended their right to property, workers defended their right to work but to the landless they were asserting their right to agricultural land and dignified livelihoods. It was a 'battle to protect rights' which were being infringed by each of the three parties. It was a 'war of rights'. From a citizenship point of view, landless poor had to assert their right to land after realising that the government was slow in redistributing land to the poor. The state had failed in its mandate of promoting substantive citizenship, that is, fulfilling and upholding of an array of socio-economic rights (Earle, 2011).

Landless citizens had to transfer that responsibility onto their shoulders after realising that their economic right to own property and agricultural land had been given little attention since independence. Also, the land issue was one of the issues that was at the agenda of the liberation war, but political independence only brought an illusory independence. Government had no plans for a comprehensive land reform on its agenda while for the landless it was. This is supported by Herring (2003) who indicated that ‘dead land reforms are not dead; as the landless poor will call the state to account for promises made earlier. Citizens broadened the concept of liberation to include liberation of anything that matters in the lives of the rural masses. The citizens believed that they themselves had been liberated but their source of humanity and livelihoods had remained under ‘colonial’ subjugation in the name of protecting property rights. They had to employ performances of citizenship by using force and violence to speed up the rate of land redistribution after realising that government was being lenient with farm holders. Fanon (1965) argued that liberation does not come as a gift, but it is seized by the masses with their own hands and they fight for their interests in a thousand ways including use of violence. Citizens responded to violence meted on them by former farm owners during pre-independence land dispossession.

While there are feelings that fast track targeted to remove white commercials off their land, for the resettled households, it was a battle for inclusion into the commercial farming sector. Before the fast track, farming and agricultural land was dualised into white commercial farming and black smallholder production. However, resettled households, fought this dualised farming system by accessing land from the commercial farmers. Talk of commercial farming or land in Zimbabwe before fast track led many to think of the white farmers. Njaya and Mazuru (2014) argued that land occupations that intensified into post 2000 were a challenge to agricultural dualism and a strategy to promote belonging.

Condoning Invasions or Organised Policy?

Though fast track began as farm invasions, government later regularised it by making constitutional amendments and developing policy documents to guide land acquisition and allocation. However, it is not clear how Chiredzi resettled communities had acquired their plots and their perception towards the land allocation process. There was no uniformity in the way resettled households got land in Chiredzi resettlement schemes. Information gathered revealed that there were two groups of land beneficiaries based on how they acquired their land. ‘First generation’ of resettled households (invaders) had been allocated land during the farm invasions and they felt the process was not

exclusive. There was a general feeling among resettled households that farm invasions allowed everyone in need of land to get it. It shows that, land beneficiaries were skeptical of an organised policy as the vetting process could have disadvantaged other landless. One of the 'first generation' land beneficiaries reported:

I am among the first people to get land... Any participant in the process (farm invasion) was allocated land despite place of origin. Participants in farm invasion were allocated bigger plots to cater for their older children who were at school or work during the process. You just needed to negotiate with the team of farm invaders that had been selected to lead the process of land allocation. I even extended mine to that hill you see from here because that land had not been allocated to anyone (Ashton, Maware farm).

Views expressed by Ashton that farm participants got bigger plots during this spontaneous land reform shows appreciation and satisfaction with FTLRP for ensuring them easy access to land. For participants like Ashton they got land as a reward for participating in farm invasions. Some households that came outside the district who were initially skeptical of their chances to get land were allocated land without any hustles. However, because there was no formal institutional framework to preside over land allocation, 'foreigners' were able to get land like any other person. For these households, leaders of farm invasions did not make thorough vetting of the place of origin of the needy landless people unlike if that had been done by a formal institution. Landless people in districts like Zaka saw invasion as good because it allowed them to get land in 'foreign' districts. While Ribot and Peluso (2003) argued that one's birthplace (attribute of social identity) determine access to resources, this was not the case in Chiredzi district as residents of Zaka district benefited. If the programme had been conducted by the formal board, very few of these people would have been allocated land. Zaka district had no commercial farms to acquire, hence many landless people had to join Chiredzi residents in invading commercial farms in their district. While land allocation was done by informal institutions, this cultivated values of unity and togetherness as there was no discrimination in land allocation.

Land allocation 'institutions' did not keep records of the boundaries of individual plots allocated. They demarcated plots using hills, marks on huge trees and stream edges. The pegging of plots using unscientific methods allowed many households to extend their plots. This could not be done if land allocation and pegging had been done by

formal institutions guided by policy. The 'second generation' of land beneficiaries got land from the 'first generation' who had acquired multiple plots, oversized land or used their positions to allocate themselves abandoned plots. At the end of the farm invasions, individual village chairpersons continued to allocate land to needy people who were hesitant to join invasions or constrained by other commitments. To the village heads, households with adult children and those who did not benefit from the initial land allocation, they condoned invasions as it allowed them to reallocate, extend and acquire land without problems some years after launch of the programme. Organised policy would have put restrictions on the size of land per household and put a stop to future land allocations. One 'second generation' male land beneficiary Zadeus condoned invasions as it allowed his brothers and him gain access to land some years after launch of FTLRP.

My father participated in farm invasions and it was easy for him to get two plots. He had to subdivide the second plot to my two elder brothers... otherwise it was going to be difficult for them to get land here. I was disadvantaged by age, but my father negotiated with the village head for me to get land that had been abandoned by somebody but for a fee known between them. I got my plot in 2006 but upon payment...otherwise I would be landless whilst in these AI schemes. At least I got my land though smaller than that of my elder brothers (Zadeus, Peter Wenhamo farm).

By indicating that parents and village chairpersons provided land to those who were young at the launch of the programme, Zadeus felt comfortable with the continued informal mechanisms to gain access to land. Village chairpersons continued with land allocation after farm invasions upon receiving payment. While the village chairperson and Zadeus were both beneficiaries of FTLRP, their bundle of powers varied due to social positions. Payment given to village chairpersons confirms Ribot and Peluso's (2003) views that to gain and maintain resource access, subordinate actors often transfer benefits and resources (capital etc) to those who control it. This then cultivate relations between individuals with 'control of access' and those with 'maintenance of access' so as to ensure perpetual enjoyment of the resource gained. Village chairpersons had to mediate access to land to those who came later while the landless like Zadeus had to use money and loyalty to maintain access to that land. Social position determined mechanisms to access resources and 'bundle of powers' one had in a social relationship (Peluso and Ribot, 2020). This is despite the fact that access to agricultural land was a constitutional right for every Zimbabwean. For these households that came late, they viewed it as a right actualised and belonging enhanced since land was more important than money they owned. This confirms an argument raised by DFID (2002) that in many

societies where resettlement has been done, land is used as a tool of political patronage and corruption. Land allocations by village chairpersons continued despite calls to stop any new land allocations not sanctioned by government. Many of these were war veterans or individuals who became connected to the ruling party after leading invasions. However, actions by the village heads again confirmed findings by Elaydi (2013) that the politically connected and those with privileged access to authority can overlook laws and policies in resource access and use. The 'second generation' of land beneficiaries included beneficiaries who had been given plots based on kinship by the 'invaders' who had occupied oversized or two pieces of land. These did not participate in farm invasions but got land from parents and relatives who took advantage of the chaotic invasions to acquire many and large pieces of land.

A parent who had children outside the country or still in school had to acquire oversized or more plots in different villages for their children. Lack of an organised process and policy of land allocation was a blessing to men and women who were young, still in school and outside the country when the programme started. For the poor parents, fast track offered them an opportunity to acquire land they could bequeath to their children. Again, for the 'second generation' type of land beneficiaries, invasions and lack of formal institutions had allowed them to get land through their parents, years after fast track had been launched. The unplanned way fast track started had allowed 'first and second generation' land beneficiaries to unconditionally access land.

In this section, it can be noted that FTLRP was citizen and peasant instigated in response to population pressure in communal areas and the unwillingness by the government to take a radical approach as witnessed by the call for the donor conference in 1998. Invasions 'fast tracked' government to make constitutional amendments that legalised their actions. Citizens had to shoulder the responsibility to actualise their land rights though the ruling party later 'usurped' the programme to its own advantage. For the landless citizens, farm invasions and FTLRP were necessary to liberate land resources, hence it finished the unfinished business of decolonisation that political independence and initial land reforms had failed to achieve. Land beneficiaries felt that fast track began in a chaotic way, but it was to their advantage as the informal institutions that allocated land were never guided by policy hence many people and 'outsiders' got oversized or two plots. For the poor and landless, lack of organised policy and formal institutional framework allowed them to get an asset to bequeath their children who were young when programme started. This

shows that resettled households were skeptical of an organised programme that involved formal institutions which were alleged to be exclusive and partisan in land allocation.

5.2. Beneficiary Selection and Equal Inclusivity during Land redistribution

This section examines perception of resettled households on the inclusivity and regimes of land access during FTLRP. Land needs cuts across gender, political and regional ‘labels’, hence the research interviewed the ‘insiders’ to get their experience on whether FTLRP had mainstreamed these issues. The Zimbabwean constitution was enshrined with the right to equality and non-discrimination regardless of gender, race, tribe, political affiliation, origin, religion etc. However, literature has polarised opinions and research findings on the broader inclusivity of the FTLRP.

Institutional Framework during FTLRP

Though FTLRP was a government backed programme to promote rural development, there are ‘sticky’ issues on the institutional framework that was involved in land acquisition and allocation thereby promoting controversies on the selection and inclusivity of the programme. The programme’s institutional framework was supposed to ensure uniformity in the ‘template’ used to identify and allocate land. Many resettled households concurred that in Chiredzi district, land identification and allocation was mainly done by those who led farm occupations from the front and many of these claimed to be war veterans. One male member of the ‘land allocation committee’ narrated:

We were not given any ‘signal’ by the government to start ‘Hondo yeminda’ (war for the land)... Mbuya Nehanda was into it this time because the wave was irresistible. After farm occupation, we established a committee composed of the principal actors during farm invasions to allocate land. People were organised this time as they ‘engineered’ the farm invasions and land allocation without the help of the government. If government had started the programme, many of us will be in the communal areas. Zvinhu zvine hurumende mukati zvinononoka (Programmes implemented by government are very slow) (Sam, Maware farm).

By saying that no signal came from the government to start the farm invasions, Sam shows that FTRLRP was initiated from below. This suggests that FTLRP was a spontaneous land reform with little involvement of government sanctioned institutional framework. Majority of the respondents did not know of the existence of the DLIC during

the initial phases of FTLRP when land allocation was done. Farm occupants formed own land allocation committees that gave land to all participants in farm invasion. One can infer, therefore, that land resettlement in Chiredzi District was done by unofficial institutions. This confirmed Gonese and Mukora's (2003) findings that under fast track, many land allocations decisions were made by those who were active in farm invasions instead of the legal institutional framework. The fact that those part of invasions elected themselves to preside over land allocation shows the importance of politics of belonging in every struggle. Participation in farm invasions and selection of members to preside over land issues generated feelings of ownership of the programme by land beneficiaries.

Gender and Power Dynamics of Fast Track

The equality and non-discrimination constitutional clause calls for mainstreaming gender issues in land allocation if women are to be transformed into equal citizens. However, previous land reforms and the fast track have been accused of being gender insensitive. The main cause of insensitivity has been alleged to be the patriarchal mentalities and institutions mandated to allocate land. Women households acknowledged that very few women had land registered in their own right. However, women felt that having land registered in the name of the husband was no longer a major issue that 'upset' them. They acknowledged that many families respected the Legal Age of Majority Act (now section 15 of the General Law Amendment Act) and Customary Law Act which gave women the status of legal majors and permitted wives to inherit immovable property (Knowles, 1991). A widower after fast track claimed:

Many men now respect the country's (inheritance) laws and the deceased's property. The country's mother (First Lady) talked about this on radio on several occasions and I think men heard him. If they temper with any of my husband's property, I will sue them. Disposal of the property is now a 'ritual' activity where the wife and immediate family are given freedom by the deceased's relatives to use property. Also, A1 plots can only be repossessed by government because it is the one that had input in allocating land to my family...not relatives (Shupai, Maware farm).

Views by a widower Shupai shows that many women were at ease being treated as legal minors when their husbands were still alive, hoping to become traditional land registrants and legal majors after the death of the husband. As

legal minors, it means even their 'bundle of powers' to benefit from land were limited as they got inferior powers to 'maintain access' instead of superior powers to control access to land. Women's continued use of the land was dependent on the continuation of their relationship with parents or husbands (Sithole, 2002). Women automatically gained access and control of land after the death of the husband confirming Knowles (1991) that women's access to land in Africa continues to be derived from someone else rather than in their own right. However, this contradicted the 'chitengwa' (virilocal) marriage system in Malawi where the wife lost land rights upon the death of the husband (Mutangadura, 2004). Societal customs in fast track farms were changing in line with national and global practices where family members were supposed to respect the deceased's wife and immediate family. While the social position of married women gave them 'maintenance of access' to land, death of the husband automatically transferred 'control of access' to them. Old practices that disadvantaged women and transferred 'control of access' to the natal family members of the husband were fading away as generations change. While Gonesse and Mukora (2003) argued that most men did not want joint land allocation and registration, some resettled women in Chiredzi district believed that what was important was having family land. They did not see the need of having land registered in their names but in the name of the family. To them, the husband represented the family and they were part of the family, so it was their land too. Knowles (1991) reiterated that women internalised their own discrimination, were their own oppressors as they as they tended to see men as better than them. This also supports Chingarande's (2010) views that some women refused to have land registered in their own names but in names of their immediate family to prevent members of their natal family from repossessing it in case of death.

The fact that women felt comfortable having men as land registrants on behalf of the family shows that land in resettlement schemes could not be used as collateral security. If allocated land had a collateral value, women would have clamored for the joint registration of their land to easily borrow money from banks in case one spouse is deceased. Secondly, women felt that resettlement offered them more secure plots than in communal areas. In the communal areas, land is acquired through family inheritance which gives family members enough power over land of the deceased. Shupai's sentiments shows that FTLRP had undermined freehold tenure system in favour of state ownership that gave it 'control of access' while beneficiaries had to be loyal to maintain access. Though women acknowledged that very few had been offered land during fast track, they felt secure with the current status quo as members of extended family had no input in the acquisition of plots in resettlement schemes. Majority of the women

saw no evil in having men's names appear on the list of traditionally registered land beneficiaries. The community was highly patriarchal but fast track's gender insensitivity had been heavily entrenched by women themselves. Some women suggested to have names of their male children registered to ensure easy bequeathing of their land in future. This can be interpreted to mean that, beneficiary spouses had 'future insecurity'. They feared their children may be 'bullied' off their land by village chairpersons and not by members of the extended family. This time, the source of insecurity by women were not by members of the extended family but village chairpersons.

Though few women had land registered in their own right, majority of them became land registrants because of unfortunate situations like being a widow, single and in a polygamous marriage. A female land beneficiary who was in a polygamous marriage reported:

Because of the polygamous marriage, my husband could not be registered on two plots and thus how we ended up being land registrants. He feared that government machines (computers) were going to detect double land allocation leading to loss of both plots. This land is mine with my children....if anything happens to baba (husband), it will remain my family's property (Martha, Peter Wenhamo farm).

By saying that women in polygamous marriage were saved by men's fear that 'computers' could detect double allocation if they registered all plots in their names, Martha expresses lack of gender mainstreaming during FTLRP. This point to the continuation of women's land woes during FTLRP despite international protocols that advocated for equality in resource access. Only women in polygamous marriage, had 'control of access' to land while their husbands were alive and when dead. This was different to monogamous marriages where women acquired limited powers (maintenance of access), only to get 'control of access' when the husband dies. Other women who could get land directly and 'control of access' were those not tied to marriages by natural and artificial process like widows, single mothers and divorcees. However, very few were land beneficiaries as the violent beginnings of FTRLRP dissuaded them from partaking in it. While men and women agreed that FTLRP was gender insensitive, they differed on the causes of insensitivity. Views that emerged from men were that very few women benefited from the programme because of the way the fast track started. It started as violent invasions, hence most women could not

participate in land invasions as they were conflict ridden. A male participant in farm invasions and 'first generation' land beneficiaries noted:

For us to get this land, we had to fight, the 'war for land' required 'makono' (brave men). Our wives and other women were dissuaded from participating in the 'war' and this affected the number of women who benefited from land allocation. The few who were part of farm invasions got land in their own right. However, it was difficult for married women to participate in land invasions, relocate without the consent of the husband while the latter remained in the communal area. You were going to be the laughingstock of the village (Gift, Maware farm).

Sentiments by Gift that the environment surrounding FTLRP was not favourable for women to participate shows that the programme was initially confrontational. This affected the number of women who benefited from fast track, hence no deliberate policy to discriminate against them. While customary law and lack of gender mainstreaming in legal instruments were the main obstacles for women to own and control land during African land reforms (Mutangadura, 2004), conflicts associated with FTLRP were a disincentive for them to participate and own land. The fact that fast track started as violent farm invasion discouraged women to benefit because of the following reason. Land occupants were not sure of the security of tenure of the land they accessed through farm invasions. Households were to be split to ensure that they do not lose both the communal and resettlement land in case of eviction. While some men in Chiredzi resettlement farms agreed to Matondi & Dekker's (2011) findings that FTLRP was gender insensitive, they differed on the cause of insensitivity. For the former, the violent start of FTRLRP made some families to leave women in communal areas taking care of the family, communal land and many other family assets. Some other men indicated that the split household strategy that ended up disadvantaging women was caused by men who were trying to preserve their dignity as the head of the family. Culturally, married women could not leave their husbands in communal areas as they go to join the farm invasion even if they felt they needed land. It was seen as a misnomer, hence the participants in land invasions who largely happened to be males ended up having their names registered as land 'owners'.

Men who were initially skeptical of the programme further discouraged their wives to join the wave of invasions fearing to get negative social labels. It shows that married women who had the 'hunger' for land had to seek the

consent of their partners to join invasions and gain access to land. This was similar to Botswana and Lesotho where married and young unmarried women were seen as legal minors, incapable of contracting on their own, unable to acquire land unless with the written consent of their husbands or parents respectively (Mutangadura, 2004). This patriarchal mindset in the society affected women to gain and control resource access. Most men did not consent to have their wives participate in farm invasions for various reasons. Farm occupiers slept on open spaces, and men feared that their spouses would end up being abused by those who led the invasions. Fear of these conditions made many widows and unmarried women look for land when the 'war for land' was on the 'recession limb'. This affected the number of women individually registered as land beneficiaries. For Matondi & Dekker, FTLRP had no land policy which stated threshold for women land allocation. The violent beginning of fast track affected many households headed by single women and widows as they could not employ the 'split household' strategy to secure land in the two areas. The only safe option was to stay in the communal area until the fast track was now peaceful and formalised by the government.

Women in Local Leadership Roles

The post of village chairperson in resettlement schemes was important during fast track and the post-fast track period because it is this office that served as the link pin between resettled people government departments and NGOs. Since women constituted the majority of the rural poor and heavily involved in agriculture, their representation at local government level was important. Interviewed households acknowledged that 'countable' women had been 'appointed' to be village chairpersons because very few women were part of the 'land struggle'. One of the male principal actors in farm invasions and village chairperson claimed:

Few women were involved and able to stand the 'heat' associated with fast track. Two women who are village chairpersons here in Peter Wenhamo farm participated in both the 2nd war of liberation and 3rd Chimurenga and they self-anointed themselves as village chairpersons (Lisburn, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Sentiments by Lisburn that women could not withstand the heat associated with FTLRP express the tense atmosphere that characterised initial stages of the programme. The process of appointing village heads had no formal procedure but the only 'qualification' was one's distinct contribution during the farm invasions. Appointment

to be village chairperson was based on level of 'participation' during land invasion. Participation here meant being at the forefront and the 'face' of the farm invasions. Though a considerable number of women had participated, very few were part of the strategists and 'front persons'. Thus, though a number of women had participated, the level of participation was not considerable when it came to the occupation of the post of village chairperson. There were 'participant leaders' who happened to be persons with clout and were the 'face' of the 'Third Chimurenga'. Another group was of 'participant followers' who provided moral support to participant leaders and also provided the 'numbers' needed to evade evictions. The majority of the women were relegated to 'participant followers', hence were placed far away from the village chairperson 'throne' except for a few who had participated in the 2nd and 3rd wars of liberation. Their liberation war experience made them to be able to bulldoze their way to the post of village chairperson as they also self-appointed themselves. However, this ended with their deaths as in one area where the office was assumed by a male who described himself as one of the 'participant leaders' together with the late self-claimed liberation war heroine. There was no formula in the way the chairpersonship was assumed, hence this tended to disadvantage women in resettlement schemes. This confirms views raised by Jacobs and Chavhunduka (2003) that, while Zimbabwe's land reforms like fast track aimed to achieve social justice, the program had no complementary institutional reform to include women in local leadership roles in fast track farms. The woes for women in terms of land ownership and occupying key positions in the society continued during the fast track.

Other Forms of Discrimination during FTLRP

The 1980 independence brought with it political independence and freedoms to be enjoyed by every Zimbabwean citizen. Every Zimbabwean citizen was supposed to enjoy the privileges and benefits of citizenship including land without being prejudiced based on political affiliation. The process of land allocation was not partisan. Partisan politics were put aside because there was a feeling that all Zimbabweans had been disadvantaged by the colonial land dispossession in one way or the other. One male land beneficiary who came from a 'foreign' district reported:

Many of us in this farm came from outside Chiredzi district and no-one knew one's political affiliation. People were more worried with removing the 'enemy' from the land than denying land to fellow countrymen. I know we have different political views but to enjoy your stay in Rome, do what the Romans do'. Opposing the 'Romans' is like shooting oneself. Land occupation was done by everyone who wanted land... so there was no need to look for

someone's regional identity during land allocation. We shared land as Zimbabweans. That is why some informally call Chiredzi district A1 schemes as 'Zaka district 2'....many of us here came from that district (Fanasa, Maware farm).

The 'war for land' united people from different political parties as the success of the programme lied in the number of land occupiers. Land allocation was apolitical because the fast track started as farm invasions, hence 'leaders' of the process derived strength from the numbers to evade eviction. Differences in political affiliation did not matter in land allocation during this period. Sentiments by participants like Benjamin supported claims by Mangena (2014) that invasions that ushered in fast track, cultivated the cherished values of unity and togetherness, the same values that helped to liquidate colonial oppression. Fast track united the landless despite their political affiliation and region of origin as seen by 'inclusive' allocation of land. Land reform united the landless to finish the unfinished business left by the 1980 political independence. Allegations of partisan politics during land allocation were non-existent except that, one was supposed to subdue his/her political orientation and ideology. These sentiments differed with Masiiwa and Chipingu (2004), Moyo (2011) as well as Zamchiya's (2011) views that access to A1 and/or A2 land was based on connections that straddled mainly from politics, to professional and religious connections.

Though the process of land allocation was apolitical, one could only ensure perpetual land ownership through subduing one's divergent political ideology or play to the gallery of the so-called 'Romans' (farm invasion leaders and village chairpersons). Resettled households were supposed to display a certain type of political citizenship, in this case 'ruling party citizenship'. During land allocation, all land beneficiaries got 'control of access' to land which later changed to 'maintenance of access' to the opposition party loyalists. They had to maintain perpetual land access by subduing the divergent political views or display 'ruling party citizenship'. Benjamin's views confirmed Zamchiya's (2011) findings of forced political loyalty to maintain access by land beneficiaries deemed to belong to the 'wrong political basket'. Voting patterns in support of the ruling party in resettlement schemes were showing a positive trend than in communal areas. Land beneficiaries in the resettlement schemes of Chiredzi might have been 'metamorphosed' by the fast track programme because it had given them the opportunity to own land. Benjamin's view that, supporting the 'other' party was like shooting oneself in the foot was interpreted to mean two things. If one voted against the ruling party, it attracted negative consequences of being evicted. In addition, if one voted the

'other' party into government, all resettled households were going to be evicted by the new government. There were allegations that the 'other' party was backed by 'enemies' who wanted to reverse the land reform programme. Some of those who had subdued their divergent partisan political beliefs might have seen the need to move beyond 'faking ruling party citizenship' to 'acting the ruling party citizenship' in order to protect their plots.

Zimbabwe is an example of a unitary state though divided into ten provinces with tribal connotations. Fast track was a national programme launched by central government so as to benefit Zimbabweans despite region of origin. Did regional and 'district' citizenship influence land allocation in Chiredzi resettlement schemes? Participants interviewed indicated that what mattered most for one to be allocated land was: first the participation in the '*Hondo YeMinda*' (war for land) and the Zimbabwean identity.

There were no formal institutional structures that existed at the peak of the '*Hondo YeMinda*' (land war), hence no one demanded to know the district of origin of people who accessed land. FTLRP in Chiredzi district started as land invasion, hence self-appointed leaders had no template to use in the selection of land beneficiaries. Land occupation leaders were more concerned with getting land and having more people settled on land. Pre-2000 land invasions were characterised by evictions by the government, so leaders of the post-2000 land invasions had learnt a lesson. The only way to evade evictions was to occupy the farm in large numbers, hence they needed many people to be on the land. Those at the forefront of land occupations gave everyone who took part in the process of 'liberating' the land their share despite district of origin. Some leaders of farm invasions in Chiredzi farm had come from different districts and parts of the province making it difficult for ethno-regionally structured land allocation. This differed with findings in Masvingo province by Cliffe et al. (2011), Gonese and Mukora (2003) and another national study by Moyo (2011) where there were reports of exclusion and preferences in land allocation based on the ethnic card and district of origin. While attributes of social identity like age, gender and religion influenced land access, findings in Chiredzi district refuted claims by Ribot and Peluso (2003) that place of birth influence access to resources. Exclusion based on regionality might have happened in districts where there was a formal DLIC that gave land based on a certain template. However, resettled households viewed the DLIC with suspicion after taking over the administration of land in the district as they felt it might come up with new selection regulations that might affect

current beneficiaries in the provision of permits and those who might need land in future. The most worried members were ‘foreign’ settlers who had been allocated land in the district.

As can be seen in this section, FTLRP has not been without some accusations of inequality based on gender and political affiliation. However, these are not necessarily very prominent, but could begin to suggest the limits of inclusivity in the programme. Limits to inclusivity are not only limited to previous land reforms, but even within the fast track process itself, there are some specific gender, political and identity issues that emerged during land allocation though they were not the dominant features. Lack of a formal institutional framework during land allocation might have reduced cases of differentiated land allocation based on certain traits. Leaders of farm invasion relied on ‘numbers’ to evade farm evictions. This helped to bring some unity among land beneficiaries across the regional, ethnic and political divide during land allocation.

5.3 Land Documentation, Tenure Security

Scholars who provide the narrative of fast track as an economic failure cite lack of tenure security (titled land) as one of the reasons for poor productivity and unsustainable livelihoods. However, current arguments on tenure security believe that it is not only extrinsically derived from land documents, but it is also what landowners perceive it to be. Many household heads in Peter Wenhamo and Maware farm had no offer letters or permits of land they tilled. A ‘first generation’ land beneficiary with no land documents commented:

No one amongst the settlers has a ‘paper’ (land permit). We are regularly told that our names were forwarded to government and we will get the ‘papers’ after the formal pegging of our plots. However, we are not worried at all, we are used to this. We utilised land in the communal areas without these papers and our relatives are still using it without these papers. The fast track phase took two decades to happen. The same with land documents, they can take time.... but one day, we will get them. We are here to stay (Peter, Maware farm).

Resettled households indicated lack of land permits but expressed willingness to have them. Sentiments by Peter show the inadequacy of farm invasions as leaders of the occupation movement failed to give offer letters or permits to the resettled people. This backs the idea that FTLRP started as land invasion, but government had to legalise the

process later through gazetting farms that had been occupied by the 'land hungry' masses. There was no involvement of formal institutional framework in the allocation of land in Chiredzi though the movement leaders had later forwarded names of beneficiaries for formalisation. It might have been a strategy by the ruling government to have control of access so that beneficiaries maintain access by displaying ruling party citizenship fearing eviction. However, did lack of proper land documentation influence their tenure security? There were mixed feelings on their tenure security. The majority of the resettled households in the two resettlement farms revealed that they had tenure security despite lack of permits. For some land beneficiaries were not 'losing sleep' over lack of land documents since they had no similar documents in former communal areas.

The argument raised by Peter that their cultivated communal land was without land permits shows that settlers felt A1 schemes as an extension of communal lands. They claimed that proper registration papers were important but their 'lack' at the moment did not make them anxious and pessimistic about the sustainability of the land reform programme. Most settlers believed that fellow counterparts in communal areas did not have land registration documents, but life was going on. This differed with Nyabamba households in Chimanimani who felt insecure because of lack of land documents and adopted split farming to evade tenure insecurity (Chingarande, 2010). The majority of the households in the Chiredzi resettlement schemes once owned land in communal areas where land documents were non-existent, but felt that land was theirs, so A1 plots were theirs too despite lack of permits. This confirmed an earlier argument by Matondi & Dekker (2011) that tenure security is not merely related to legal aspects and permit ownership only but it is what people perceive it to be. While many had a sense of security despite lack of proper documentation, most of them were unaware of other benefits derived from a secure land title. There was no appreciation by resettled households that proper land documents made it easier for them to transfer land to their children and use it as collateral.

Another group of resettled households who initially felt insecure due to lack of land permits had to generate own sources of tenure security with time. These then derived solace and tenure security from the payment of annual land tax to council, voting for the ruling party and the number of land beneficiaries countrywide. One male land recipient who derived tenure security from his citizenship duties argued:

We produce for the country, we participate in national programmes, we pay our land tax like our communal counterparts.....GMB, COTCO and council have our names in their computers. We are also the constituency that provided the ruling party with the highest number of votes countrywide.... During elections, I vote not only for the President, MP and councilor but also for my land. Its better I vote for a party (ZANU PF) that I know (its land policy). I have a duty to defend the land reform through my vote. We are supporting our government in every way we can. Also check on the number of people who were resettled in the whole of Zimbabwe, is it possible to remove them on their land? Surely, there will be another revolution (Sam, Maware farm)

Like many other settlers, Sam had a positive sense of tenure security since they interpreted their actions as complementary to the state for formalising land occupations that led to FTRLP. Participation and engagement with the state and local authorities by households generate a sense of security within them as households felt they owed these institutions their support. Households felt they were contributing to the economy by paying tax to local authorities and funding other local state functions like ‘Heroes and Independence Day’ celebrations. Tenure security became a product of the fulfilment of their right to agricultural land and performance of one’s duties as a land beneficiary. Lack of proper land registration papers initially generated tenure insecurity but households got solace from fact that government recognized them through the performance of their duties. While from a liberal citizenship perspective, payment of tax, support of national programmes and the ruling party were obligations of beneficiaries, it can be interpreted as lack of control over their land resources. Performance of these formal and informal duties ensured households had tenure security though this made them to be passive citizens. According to the Theory of Access by Ribot and Peluso (2003), people can have control of resource access or maintenance of access. Sentiments by Sam and other land beneficiaries go beyond performance of citizen’s duties to mechanisms by resettled households to maintain their access to land resources. It shows the state, through its local government and leaders, had control of access as it could terminate access to those failing to pay tax or display ‘ruling party citizenship’. This promoted passive citizenship and subjecthood despite the fact that FTLRP was regarded as important in remaking and transforming formerly disadvantaged rural people from ‘subjecthood’ into ‘citizenship’.

The land issue is believed to have been a tool for political patronage for the ruling party from the pre-independence period up to fast track and the state media was roped in to propagate the fact that there were some internal ‘enemies’

that wanted to reverse the FTLRP. Participants like Agripa of Maware Farm indicated that his support and 'vote' for the ruling party was meant to not only to fulfil political rights but to protect his right to agricultural land. Issues of agricultural productivity played second fiddle to his vote when it comes to protecting the allocated plot. Voting especially in resettlement schemes was seen as more than an exercise of their political rights but also a means to protect the reversal of the fast track programme.

Sam's sentiments mean FTLRP was used for political patronage to the extent that voting was seen less as an expression of a right but partisan tool to protect land from alleged 'enemies' working to reverse the programme. The land issue had been influenced by partisan politics starting with the launch of the programme and it had been taken as far as the voting booth. It shows that, resettled households' land tenure security was dependent on the party that was in government. The fact that the vote was used to 'defend' their land means they lacked security with their land and there were fears of ejection for those who supported the opposition party. This confirms findings in Burkina Faso by Ouédraogo (u.d) that the ruling party adopted illegal ways of persuading people to support their cause threatening to confiscate land from land beneficiaries belonging to 'wrong political baskets'. Delay by the government to issue land permits and more importantly transferable documents might have been a strategy by the ruling party to ensure that land beneficiaries display 'ruling party citizenship'. Ouédraogo (u.d) further confirmed that land being the main asset for production and reproduction by the rural people is manipulated by politicians to ensure they remain in control of land beneficiaries.

So, as we can see, despite the successes of the process, the largely 'informal' nature of much of the invasions has meant that many beneficiaries remain anxious about their tenure rights. Intrinsically derived tenure security was not enough to generate comprehensive tenure rights which also required proper land documents and formal pegging of their land by government. Partial feelings of tenure security and programme reversal made households to display certain types of political citizenship and 'donate' their political rights in an effort to 'substantiate' their land rights and defend the programme. While lack of secure tenure rights did not affect productivity and asset accumulation, it violated property and political rights of resettled households enshrined in the national charter.

5.4 Conclusion to Chapter 5

The third phase of land reform post 2000 took a radical approach and the programme was regarded as the successor of the second war of liberation despite being preceded by two phases of land reform. Some resettled households felt that government had ‘fast tracked’ land redistribution driven by the rapid population growth in communal areas which had outpaced the rate of land allocation. For some, the programme had been accelerated by landless citizens who had to shoulder the responsibility of initiating a land reform through farm invasions. These land beneficiaries saw fast track as a citizen and peasant instigated land reform which forced government to harken and accelerate its policy formulation process and enactment of supportive legal statutes. Many land beneficiaries felt that fast track deserved a ‘liberation war’ tag as it had led to ‘liberation’ of more land resources unlike the preceding phases which had failed to cope with demand in land by the landless. Views from other land beneficiaries also show that fast track was a ‘battle of rights’ between the landless, farm workers and farm owners. The landless wanted to assert their right to agricultural land and property ownership while farmworkers fought in the corner of farm owners to protect their right to work. Farm owners resisted farm occupations as they argued that they had title deeds to the land, so they waged resistance to protect their property rights. Despite the fact that FTLRP had started in a disorderly manner and that the programme was not superintended by formal institutions, some settlers felt this was a necessary evil. Many land beneficiaries condoned invasions and disorganised land policy as it allowed inclusive land access despite one’s political affiliation and region of origin. The ‘self-anointed’ DLIC did not vet land beneficiaries but rewarded all participants in farm invasions which then cultivated cherished values of unity and togetherness which were part of Unhu/Ubuntu African philosophy. Lack of organised policy and formal land allocation institutions also allowed some households to acquire many and/or oversized plots for their children disadvantaged by age and geographical distance at the launch of the programme. This then allowed chronically poor households to get land assets they could bequeath to their children. Households trusted structures they created than those that the government prescribed emphasizing the importance of involving the locals in decision making and formulation of local development committees.

While lack of a formal institutional framework benefited those who belonged to a different political ‘basket’ and so called ‘foreigners’, women’s woes continued as few of them accessed land. The violent start of fast track dissuaded many households headed by single mothers and widows from partaking in farm invasions. These could not employ

'split farming' and 'split households' in order to protect the communal land in case of ejection in resettlement areas. The few women who had land registered in their own right were those who were at a 'marital disadvantage' (women in polygamy) due to artificial processes. However, many women who had no land in their own right were comfortable with the status quo. They argued that land in resettlement areas had not been acquired through inheritance, hence it was difficult for members of the extended family to repossess it when the husband dies. On the general tenure security of fast track, resettled households expressed mixed feelings. One group had tenure security that emanated from their communal experience where they 'owned' and tilled land without land documentation. To them, it was a continuation of what they had experienced in communal areas. It shows that proper land documentation to A1 resettled households was insignificant as they did not attach any economic value to land. Another group felt insecure with the land tenure but had devised ways to evade it like by honouring their tax payment obligations to council and giving overwhelming support to the ruling party. While lack of proper land documentation cultivated feelings of tenure insecurity among some resettled households, it also led to limited and conditional exercise of political rights in order to protect their land.

CHAPTER 6: LIVELIHOODS CHANGES AFTER FAST TRACK

6.1 Chapter Introduction

The academic rift that characterised the process of FTLRP made some scholars urge contemporary researches to move away from the divisive process of FTLRP and refocus on its economic development impact. However, economic evaluation has created a second academic rift that might be due to overreliance on evaluative work from ‘outsiders’ who use quantitative economic tools to measure FTLRP’s ‘agri-livelihoods’ outcomes. These quantitative economic tools measure ‘agri-livelihood’ changes indexing them on national and international thresholds set by these ‘outsiders’. However, this chapter seeks to evaluate livelihood changes from the insider’s (land beneficiaries’) perspective, own set standards and expected changes. The chapter is divided into 3 broad thematic sections based on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF). This framework divides livelihoods into many components though this research focused on: livelihood platforms, livelihood assets and livelihood outcomes. Besides being components of a livelihood, previous researches on FTLRP’s livelihood impact have shown that these have been contentious. The contentious nature of FTLRP made some scholars argue that the large-scale nature of the programme required more and comprehensive livelihood assessment of the programme conceptually and spatially. These issues forced this research to make a qualitative assessment of livelihood changes after FTRLRP in Chiredzi resettlement farms of Peter Wenhamo and Maware.

The first section examines how fast track had influenced livelihood platforms that households were engaged in. It is believed that ‘asserting’ the rural poor promotes livelihood intensification, extensification and also create new livelihood opportunities that were non-existent in their places of origin. The second section ‘taps’ on the views of households on changes in livelihood assets since land is believed to be the main asset for the rural poor that enables them to acquire other assets. Finally, section 6.3 presents the views of A1 households on changes in their livelihood outcomes after FTLRP. Asset accumulation is believed to be a precondition for changes in livelihood outcomes.

6.2 Changes in Livelihood Platforms

Provision of land to the rural poor is believed to enable them to access other resources attached to land that can help them to diversify their livelihood options. Land reform is not done only to promote agri-based livelihoods but also

natural resources exploitation and other opportunities that might arise in the area. This section presents and discusses views of resettled households on changes in the type and intensity of some of their farm and off-farm livelihood options post resettlement. Chiredzi resettlement schemes witnessed the ‘convergence’ of the landless that came from different districts of Masvingo Province. Their diverse spatial origins meant diverse livelihood options before and after households were resettled in Chiredzi district. A change in place due to land resettlement had the potential to affect livelihood options for the resettled households, hence it was worthwhile to assess livelihood intensification, extensification and diversification in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms.

Most rural communities are farming communities and land access through fast track was done for these people to continue with what they ‘know best’. Changes in the type and/or intensity of farming were inevitable after fast track. Many land beneficiaries were previously involved in dry land crop cultivation but mainly for subsistence farming. A former plantation worker and successful cotton grower with an irrigation plot claimed:

I have a dryland and irrigatable land where I grow cotton and green mealies respectively. I thank President Mugabe launching the land redistribution programme; I might be in that ‘land of hunger’ (communal areas). After getting land here, I left work in the sugar plantations to venture into full time cotton farming. Hatingazoregi kurima chibage nezvimwe zvatange tajaira... tisu varidzi veCOTCO. (We grow food crops like maize and others.... but we are cotton farmers, we are the ‘owners’ of COTCO). Before resettlement, my life was revolving around my plantation job and communal farming (Obert, Maware Farm).

After the launch of FTLRP, some estate workers who were full time casual workers decided to venture into full time cotton farming for the first time. The fact that some plantation workers had to forgo their estate work to become commercial cotton farmers shows that their new ‘occupation’ gave them incomes that surpassed their former work. Access to large pieces of land and their experience of working in plantations made some of the new land beneficiaries to diversify from subsistence to commercial cotton production. The number of cotton bales at a cotton marketing depot (Appendix 3) in Maware farm was enough evidence of diversification and extensification of cotton farming in the A1 schemes of Chiredzi district. Cotton production in the new resettlement schemes offered income that could equal or surpass blue collar jobs in plantations, hence some decide to forego them. FTLRP transformed and intensified not only cotton farming activities but also ‘intensified’ sense of self as they felt like they were the

'owners' of COTCO (the company that buys cotton). It shows that cotton farming had become an important livelihood option in the resettlement farms of Chiredzi since households felt that, the survival and existence of COTCO was owed to them. Accumulation of large pieces of land under fast track offered opportunities for intensification of cotton production as they gave undivided attention to their farming than they did before when some were plantation labourers. According to the Provincial Agritex officer, Chiredzi district was the major source of cotton in the province, an indicator that FTLRP enabled cotton intensification and extensification. However, some resettled households indicated that they only looked for seasonal work in plantations during drought years when crops fail. Many land beneficiaries continued with the production of food crops like maize, groundnuts, roundnuts and small grains as before but at smaller scale compared to cotton production. Results in Chiredzi resettlement schemes that crop production remained the main livelihood option were similar to Alemu's (2015) findings in Metema and Decha area of Ethiopia. The only difference was that residents for the former area ventured into commercial cotton production while residents in the latter remained subsistence cereal crop producers because of smaller pieces of land they had been allocated. The story in Chiredzi resettlement farms was slightly similar to Dawuro area in Ethiopia, where residents remained crop farmers but ventured into different cash crops and market gardening (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012).

Some few households in Maware farm had been offered a new opportunity to practice irrigation farming. This was for households who had been given plots nearer to the giant canal that linked Manjirenji dam and the South East Lowveld plantations. Households along the canal realised a great improvement in their farming operations as fast track offered them an opportunity for both dryland and irrigation farming for subsistence and commercial purposes. These households had divided their plots into two: dryland and irrigatable land. Irrigatable land was used to produce crops that were sold fresh in Chiredzi town channeling the money to cotton production and urgent household needs. Irrigation enabled treble or double farming which enhanced the household's food security post resettlement.

Off-Farm Livelihood Opportunities for Resettled Households

Access to land provides the platform where other off-farm livelihood options can be launched. Movement from communal areas to resettlement schemes is aimed at improving not only farm activities but also other off-farm platforms through exploitation of land resources. Land resettlement in Chiredzi district availed to farmers some

direct off-farm livelihood opportunities while others were indirectly created using proceeds from farming and other off-farm livelihood options. Interviews with participants revealed that there were intra and inter-variations in off-farm livelihood options in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms. For many beneficiaries, engaging in other off-farm activities was hindered by livestock herding which was perennial. A female cotton farmer with a large herd of cattle stated:

Here, we have no time for 'piece jobs' because livestock herding is all year round. If you let them loose during the off-cropping season, all your livestock will be wiped off by predators in a single month.... Cotton (production) also takes much of our time.... If you pursue these other small livelihood options, you will not grow cotton or have draught power in the next season...because lions from nearby conservancies stray into our plots. Government should do something on these reckless conservancy owners (Emma, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Land beneficiaries who were resettled on the northern and eastern part of Peter Wenhamo farm which bordered the highly 'porous' Save Valley conservancy had problems with engaging in other livelihood platforms because cattle herding was perennial. While cattle herding was perennial for some residents of Peter Wenhamo, many households in the same farm and Maware farm reported that cotton harvesting stretched into the other half of the dry season. One household said his wood 'curving job' had been totally overshadowed with cotton production activities. He only 'reactivated' it when there is crop failure due to droughts, or when there is a better monetary offer by someone. It shows that cotton production and livestock herding overshadowed other small off-farm livelihood options that relied heavily on the use of natural resources. Cotton production had become a major source of income for the resettled households, hence households had to spend much of their time preparing land and harvesting the crop. Naturally, the crop had a long growing season and was labour intensive as it required baling, transportation, uprooting, piling and later burning of dried crop residues. Farmers had to uproot and burn cotton stalks in compliance with a statutory regulation to have them removed by October annually. So, livestock herding and cotton production processes meant that some families had to divide labour even in the off-cropping season making it difficult to engage in off-farm activities. Emma's sentiments showed that FTLRP had offered challenges to households with other off-farm options, though their income contribution was insignificant. More time given to

cotton production and livestock herding might mean that off-farm livelihood options available were of low value, hence did not attract attention of households except in years of serious droughts.

Cotton farming was offering farmers better returns especially in good years despite the fact that the price per kilogram was poor. Farmers capitalised on growing cotton on large pieces of land. The production cost was also very low because households were being given free inputs under the presidential input scheme for the last four years, hence more hectareage was put under cotton production. So, engaging in off-farm activities was also constrained due to the fact that households into full-time cotton farming grew large pieces of land that took time to prepare, harvest and clear off residues. This did not allow many households an opportunity to venture into other off-farm options because of time constraints and the need to rest as they wait for the next cropping season.

Few households that lived on the southern part of Peter Wenhamo and Maware farms, close to sugarcane farms A2 farms (Mapanza area) and Mkwesine estate, looked for wage employment. The former were sugarcane out-growers who benefited from FTLRP under the commercial A2 scheme. When in urgent cash needs during the off-cropping season or drought years, some settlers looked for wage employment in sugar plantations. A land beneficiary and seasonal wage labourer who lived close to the A2 sugarcane out-growers claimed:

Pamwe pachu tinomboerwa neupenyu munguva yedrought, zvekusvika pakunotsvaga basa kunzimbe kana kuma 'plots' (A1 irrigation plots). Vanotibatirira zvakananyanya pabasa ratinoita uye muhoro wacho mudiki, asi hapana chokuita nokuti unenge uchida kuti mhuri iwane chokubata. Varungu vechitema ava, vanokuudza kuti siya basa racho kana risina kukufadza, kune vakawanda vanotorida (at times we get 'pressed' with monetary and food needs during drought years and we are forced to look for wage labour in nearby A1 irrigation plots and out-grower sugarcane (A2) farms. We are exploited but you can't do anything because you will be looking for something to put on the family's tables. When you complain, these 'white' black employers (A2 farmers) will tell you to leave if not satisfied with the conditions of work and remuneration, as there are many need of wage labour). Some close to the highway and Chiredzi town sell wood, mice, charcoal... and at times manure during the off-cropping season. However, as drought worsens it means predators become hungrier and our livestock become more vulnerable to attack hence they should be looked after. This affect time you devote to off-farm activities (Fanessa, Maware farm).

Sentiments by Fanessa reveal that they looked for wage labour during drought years and when in need of money for emergent issues. However, they got exploited by fellow land beneficiaries in both A1 and A2 schemes who take advantage of a drought and subsequently large pool of labour. Working conditions were dehumanizing and ill-treatment perpetuated by their counterparts affected their ego and self-esteem, it also reduced their social identity and dignity. While in communal areas, some of these A1 residents worked in demeaning blue collar jobs in towns and as farm labourers. These jobs reduced their self-esteem and social identity. Despite FTLRP being hoped to improve these intrinsic feelings of citizenship though this was not for some land beneficiaries like Ishmael who had to rely on wage labour to support their families in drought years. For some households, food insecurity became a perennial problem forcing them to look for wage labour in irrigation plots of fellow A1 farmers along the canal and A2 sugarcane out-growers. Food shortage and the need for money to cater for family issues made households to endure the poor working conditions that affected socio-cultural values that define communitarian and African citizenship. Increase in food insecure households during drought years even reduced their 'power' to negotiate for better remuneration for the work to be done. However, their 'power' was undermined despite being an important social cultural component of communitarian citizenship. It shows that FTRLRP had not only created a dual land tenure system but created new social division, 'classed' society and differentiated citizenship. While A1 could work for A2 farmers, this was not vice versa as the latter got larger pieces of land, easy access to capital and machinery that made them enjoy better welfare than A1 settlers.

Fanessa even revealed that they only looked for wage labour during bad seasons and when one has urgent problems that required money. It shows little interest by households to look for full-time employment in estates and out-grower farms as they wanted to give more attention on cotton production. FTLRP had created households with a new mentality that welfare mainly improved through entrepreneurship and self-employment. Lack of interest in full time wage employment in the estates meant that income from cotton farming in A1 farms had significantly changed their welfare compared to full-time workers in the estates. Opportunities for off-farm activities were dependent on one's geographical location within and between the farms. Some residents of Maware farm who lived close to Chiredzi Town, Chiredzi-Mutare and Chiredzi-Harare highway sold farm manure and forest produce like mice, wood and charcoal. Households that lived close to the town and highway relegated the sale of forest produce to the

post-harvesting period. This indicated that cotton production, and for some irrigation farming, had become the main livelihood options for the resettled households. Results from Maware confirmed findings by Chambati (2011) that land redistribution after 2000 opened self-employment and livelihood opportunities in natural resource exploitation to land beneficiaries. What only differed were the income contribution and type of natural resource exploitation opportunities. Chiredzi residents were engaged in low value forest produce activities while households in Chambati's study area engaged in gold and diamond panning. Fanessa of Maware A1 farm indicated that the sale of manure had become an important source of income to few households that lived nearer to Maware irrigation plots and Chiredzi town residents with backyard gardens. Double cropping on irrigation plots, high cost of fertilizer and vegetables in towns made manure to be a small business opportunity for settlers near these strategic points. A1 plots in Maware and Peter Wenhamo were naturally fertile as the farms were formerly cattle and game ranches, allowing natural fertilisation. Low rainfall also resulted in low levels of leaching, which then resulted in low usage of manure in farms post resettlement. While Mapfumo (2015) argued that land redistribution offers small-holder farmers with more and better livelihood options, this was a reality only to a few Maware settlers engaged in irrigation farming. Only a few sold low value forest produce and had access to wage labour due to their proximity to the Chiredzi town and sugarcane farms respectively.

In this section, it can be noted that FTRLP had allowed diversification from subsistence to commercial cotton and irrigation farming. For old and new cotton farmers, land access allowed intensification and diversification respectively. Cotton farming became the dominant livelihood option because of favorable dry climatic conditions and free inputs given under the presidential input scheme. Many production processes associated with cotton farming had affected households to fully venture into other off-farm livelihood platforms as it took most of their working time. Resettlement in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms also offered some households with opportunities in natural resources exploitation though these were low value activities mainly engaged by few households that lived close to highways and Chiredzi town.

6.3 Asset Accumulation

Land resettlement aims to improve the livelihoods and well-being of resettled households through asset accumulation. Nature and number of assets accumulated by households are good measures of the change in welfare and livelihoods over time. This section makes an assessment of the perceptions of A1 households on their current

and future prospects of asset ownership. Acquiring assets is a process that takes some years, hence this research was conducted two decades after the launch of FTLRP. A time frame was reasonable for a household to acquire various types of assets. Assets which were accumulated by settlers were classified into natural, physical and financial capital as guided by the SLF.

Ownership of Natural Capital

Rural households' livelihoods are mainly anchored on their access to natural capital. Land was considered in the broadest sense to include water, pasture and forests as land is the 'common denominator' for them all. Relocation to Chiredzi resettlement schemes was driven by the need to get land and other land resources. Fast track land reform had allocated them larger and more fertile land than they owned in communal areas. A proud land recipient, crop and cattle farmer reiterated:

I own a 'country' (large piece of land) both for crop and animal farming. In communal areas we were now keeping custody of our relatives' graves and growing crops on barren land (Samuel, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Land fragmentation and soil infertility in communal areas had reached unprecedented levels making crop production difficult. During transect walks in the area, I was shown by some household heads portions of virgin land in between plots they had turned into personal grazing lands and future sources of construction timber. Land allocation was done by informal institutions and lately by village chairpersons who used traditional methods of pegging making some households get oversized lands. Many households might have been given more than the state-recommended six hectares in A1 schemes. Some households who were allocated plots nearer to streams and grazing had to extend their arable land into these areas. There was also greater satisfaction with the fertility of land they had been given as some households ended up selling manure to irrigation plot owners and urban farmers in Chiredzi town. High fertility of the soil was enhanced by former cattle and game ranching activities which demanded little use of soil nutrients. While Chiredzi settlers acknowledged that FTLRP had given them large fertile land, Metema & Decha settlers in Ethiopia reported of an insignificant increase of slightly above two hectares of infertile land per household, worse than in their communal areas (Alemu, 2015). Metema and Decha households were highly

dissatisfied with quality and size of land arguing that government had given more prominence to equity issues at the expense of efficiency.

Animal farming was second most important livelihood option for the A1 households in Chiredzi resettlement areas making pasture an important form of natural capital. Households in Maware and Peter Wenhamo were also satisfied with the pasture and grazing land for their domestic animals. Samuel of Peter Wenhamo farm, like many other households, felt that FTLRP had decongested human and animal population in the communal areas. Communal land had become barren for crop production and also pasture growth. Increase in human population in communal areas made households extend into grazing lands thereby affecting pasture and cattle quality. Another successful farmer with a variety of livestock claimed:

'Nzvimbo ino inoita zvipfuwo zvipenyu, varungu vakanga vazviona' (This place has abundant and nutritious pasture; white ranchers had fully noticed that). In times of serious shortage of grass, my communal relatives temporarily give us their cattle. FTLRP relieved me to look for animal feed during the dry season. However, water both for people and our livestock is a problem here. If you hear someone saying there is acute water shortage in their communal area, just take him/her to this place for just two weeks... We need ten hours to drive our animals to and from water sources. If we don't accompany them, they will not return home. We worsened the situation when we destroyed water pipes in the farm...we only receive good rains when there is a cyclone... (Joppa, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Joppa positively commented the FTLRP for relieving them of the burden to look for hay and stockpile cereal crop residues that were used as fodder in the dry season. In some serious dry seasons, communal households have to embark on the 'long march' to the resettlement schemes to look for hay for their animals. Some 'loaned' their cattle to resettled families during the dry season up to the start of the rain season because the farms had abundant pasture. However, cattle transhumance to Peter Wenhamo farm was limited because communal residents feared to lose their livestock to stray predators from the nearby Save valley conservancy. Secondly, water shortage was serious in Peter Wenhamo because there was no flowing river or canal that passed through the farm unlike in Maware farm. While Maware and Peter Wenhamo settlers were satisfied with both the pasture size and its nutritional value, this was not

the same with Metema and Decha settlers in Ethiopia. Resettled households in the latter areas were highly dissatisfied with size of grazing land and pasture quality which they supplemented with forage from forest and unploughed strips on their plots leading to poor quality of cattle breeds (Alemu, 2015).

Since crop and animal farming were the main livelihood platforms in that order, surface and rainwater were important natural capitals for the resettled communities. However, the water situation was dire in all the two resettlement farms of Maware (except for households along the canal and Chiredzi river) and Peter Wenhamo. Resettled households complained of serious shortages of both rain and surface water in their areas. It was almost two decades after the FTLRP, but many households could recall the few years they had received normal to above normal rainfall. While cyclones brought bad memories of property destruction and loss of lives in some parts of the country, for Maware and Peter Wenhamo residents, they brought memories of good harvest and rains. This indicated that they had received low rainfall during the larger part of their stay in resettlement areas. Transect walks I made around the two farms revealed that there were few boreholes sunk before and after fast track. This was against the government policy on provision of physical infrastructure in resettlement areas where one borehole was supposed to cater for a village of 25 families (Gonese and Mukora, 2003). The borehole situation was worse in Maware because the occupied farm was formerly a game ranch and there was less investment in boreholes. Research findings in Maware farm confirmed an argument by Gonese and Mukora (2003) that FTLRP had de-emphasised on the investment in physical infrastructure like boreholes before beneficiary emplacement making water to be a problem in the areas. However, on the part of former farm owner, lack of investment in water infrastructure might have been caused by very deep water tables that discouraged borehole drilling. Also, Chiredzi resettlement schemes were in Zimbabwe's climatic zone 5 which is described as semi-arid. Unreliable rainfall in the area negatively impacted on both surface and underground water availability.

While Joppa acknowledged the serious water shortage in Peter Wenhamo farm, he also blamed the 'militant' nature of fast track which led to the destruction of water pipes to force the commercial farmer out of the farm. Before resettlement, Peter Wenhamo farm had a water engine and 'arteries' of water pipes running through the farm. Some were destroyed, while a few that remained were later stolen and sold to small scale irrigation farmers in Maware farm. If they had kept the network of pipes intact, Peter Wenhamo farm could be the best fast track farm in Chiredzi

in terms of water accessibility. However, destruction of farm property during *'hondo yeminda'* was an 'invented practice of citizenship' to actualise their right to agricultural land and dignity though it had a boomerang effect on their right to water. It can be concluded that though the water problems being faced especially in Peter Wenhamo A1 farm had a natural influence, resettled households exacerbated the water crisis. The water crisis in Peter Wenhamo farm can be described as more artificial than natural. From a livelihood perspective, destruction of water infrastructure led to shortage of water which is one important livelihood capital that complement land access for improved well-being. However, from a citizenship perspective, it takes one right to achieve other citizenship rights. If households had not sacrificed their water right through destruction of farm owners' water infrastructure, there would be no fast track to write about nor actualisation of their rights to property, agricultural land and dignity. Earlier, some resettled households indicated that they could not do other off-farm livelihood options because they accompanied their cattle once in two days to distant perennial water sources. This tell a story of an acute shortage of surface and underground water in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms.

Maware farm was extensive making it difficult for all households to access water despite having a canal and Chiredzi river traversing through the farm. While some households lived close to these water sources, the water was unsafe for human consumption. Residents spent more hours driving livestock to the river and canal. Households took their livestock to water points once in two days and a day's trip to the water source took them half a day. Besides the water sources being scarce and at a distance to many households, they were also a danger to livestock. Chiredzi river had crocodiles, so cattle owners were supposed to direct livestock to shallow pools with no crocodiles. The V-shape of the canal also made it difficult for unaccompanied livestock to get water as some ended up being trapped. Except for a few households, majority of them faced water problems as they lived far away from the reliable main water sources identified. The water situation in Chiredzi resettlement farms was different to Metema area of Ethiopia where Alemu (2015) reported of an improvement in access to both safe and unsafe water for households.

Ownership of Physical Assets

Physical assets are an important store of value while some are used to exploit natural assets for the betterment of humanity's well-being. They also accumulated in good times as safety nets to draw upon in unfavourable seasons.

Generally, physical asset accumulation shows changes in the welfare of resettled households. Ownership of land is believed to be the 'springboard' for a rural household to acquire physical forms of assets like farming assets, household goods and investment assets. Fast track managed to offer land to A1 households so that they can exploit it to acquire more physical assets. Findings in Chiredzi district indicated physical assets acquired over time by a household were determined by their main livelihood options. Since cotton farming was the main livelihood option for most resettled households, farming assets were the first to be acquired. Majority of households had bought basic farming equipment that included a plough, sprayer, yokes, hoes, axes, wheelbarrows, bicycles and scotch carts. A household head who acquired many basic farming and household equipment post FTLRP reported:

Many of my age in the communal areas struggle to buy farming and transportation equipment I have. Almost every year, I buy one or two farming equipment and household property out of cotton farming. In the communal areas, I worked very hard but it was difficult to repair even my old plough, buy scotch cart and bicycle. Soon after resettlement, we started by acquiring main farm implements and my wife understood this. We had a few household goods, electrical gadgets and a bicycle. As we continue adding to our farming equipment, we are also buying some household goods so that my wife continues supporting me in the cotton farming business (Charles, Peter Wenhamo farm).

A few years after settlement, many households had managed to acquire basic farming assets that were important for farming to take place before they looked for equipment that made farm work easier. Majority of the households had bought these basic farming assets which many of their communal counterparts could not buy in such a short space of time. Some households were motivated to quickly acquire own basic farming assets as they found it difficult to borrow from their neighbours because of poor relations during the initial years of fast track. Bicycles and scotch carts in Chiredzi resettlement farms were also important to carry inputs and produce since residential plots of many families were a distance away from their arable farms. These were important to regularly transport farm implements to and from farms. Besides being used as farm transport, they also served as means of transport to fetch water, go for laundry and when accompanying livestock to water sources. These were regular activities that required a means of transport since surface water was a problem. They became important assets to resettled households both during the cropping and off season. Transect walks in the two resettlement schemes confirmed what was said by Obert that

bicycle ownership was high among resettled households. Presence of fewer graded roads in these A1 schemes made bicycles to be the most suitable mode of transport that allowed residents to navigate their way in the farms. Some had been bought while others had been given by COTCO to Cotton Group Chairperson (CGC) or for being the best cotton producers annually.

Though acquisition of basic farming equipment had an agricultural importance, these assets also had social connotations especially to rural households. The quantity and quality of farm implements was used to measure the social status of men, while household assets did the same to women. Buying farm equipment first by many households also mirrored the patriarchal nature of the society despite the fact that these were important assets since farming was their main livelihood option. One male participant revealed that her wife had consented to buying farm implements first and larger household goods later. It shows that household goods, except for a few basic ones used on a daily basis were a luxury to resettled households and were seen in feminine terms. The fact that the male participant first had to convince his wife to buy household goods later may mean household goods were seen in feminine terms and purchase of physical capital was influenced by the patriarchal dynamics of the society.

There were some few household goods (electrical gadgets) that were not 'feminine' but bought because they were a regular necessity to the family. Solar panels, lamps and invertors provided energy to the radio and mobile phones which were sources of information and communication. Electrical power sources and phones were also important because cotton payments and any other financial transactions were mainly done using the plastic money transfer platform, Ecocash. It was, therefore, a requirement for every household to have full 'charging kit' and mobile phone. While these were viewed in 'masculine' terms, they were also a basic requirement for each family. Land was believed to be an important asset which if exploited would make households acquire other important assets. Many households felt that large household goods like television, beds, sofas could be bought at a later stage. Besides being seen in feminine terms, they also showed the family's luxurious lifestyle. While farming equipment was regarded as an important form of physical asset, they were also viewed as men's assets meaning preference in their purchase might have been driven by the patriarchal mentality that was still in the society. Very few households had bought farm implements like harrows, planters, ULV sprayers and cultivators. For many households, these were regarded as important but not basic in farming activities as they could not stop any farm activities but made work easier.

Reasons cited for lack of these varied from having a ‘congested’ budget and the fact that some of the implements like cultivators and harrows required ‘old’ plots that were now free from tree stumps and roots.

Most of the basic farm equipment given above were animal drawn showing the importance of draught power. Cattle and donkeys were the domestic animals used as draught power and another form of physical capital. Households indicated that pasture for their domestic animals was abundant and nutritious. Did the pasture quality improve cattle herds in the area? Another successful cattle owner with a large cattle pen reported:

‘Kuno tine mombe kwete zvatinoona kuruzevha’ (Here we have cattle not comparable to our communal counterparts). When I get a lot of money from cotton sales, I buy livestock. ‘Zvipfuwo zvinobatsira padambudziko’ (livestock cushions in times of difficulties)you can do barter trade, convert them into cash or use them to grow cotton, then you get money. Some are building houses and buying water pumps using proceeds from cotton or cattle sale. Go to Matedzi and other business centres in the farm, you will see grinding mills and ‘shops’ owned by farmers (Chris, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Sentiments by land beneficiaries like Chris show that cattle ownership had improved for many resettled households. Increase in the quality and quantity of cattle is attributed to good pasture and large grazing space for the animals. Increase in the cattle numbers in all farms happened despite threats posed by stray predators from nearby Save valley conservancy and Chiredzi river as reported in section 5.2. However, this did not affect cattle herds significantly as the households herded their cattle throughout the year and also accompanied their livestock to water sources. Besides investment in farm assets, household property and livestock, some isolated cases of household invested proceeds from cotton sales in income generating projects (grinding mills, shops and irrigation equipment).

Very successful cotton farmers bought cattle as a form of investment because they could sell them in times of serious and urgent household needs during the off-cropping season. Majority favoured to invest in cattle because they naturally increased without much effort from the farmer. Investment in livestock required little technical expertise and was culturally driven since one’s worth in rural areas was mainly measured based on livestock ownership. Cattle were not only a source of draught power but also a store of wealth for many resettled households.

Buying cattle can be interpreted as self-mitigation against the fall in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar which could wipe off their earnings from cotton sales. While the elite bought forex, resettled households bought cattle which they later exchanged or sold to buy assets like scotch carts, grinding mills and diversify their livelihood options. So, cattle and small goats 'acted' as banks because they could 'withdraw' their 'money' anytime without any movement to conventional banks. Some few households had invested in properties like irrigation pumps and building shops as these were income generating projects they relied on in times of crop failure due to droughts. They were also sources of income to fund farming operations or a means to diversify their livelihoods. Water pumps were bought by households along Chiredzi river and the canal. Households that built shops in the area took advantage of the large population in the farms and their distance to the town of Chiredzi that made it expensive to buy goods from there. At Chikwirire and Matedzi business centre in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms respectively, some local people and farmers had built shops and opened 'spazas' (informal shops) with the intention to raise incomes to build larger shops. One victim of 'Operation Murambatsvina' (Restore Order) in 2005 indicated that FTLRP had offered him another opportunity to continue with his 'spaza' business which he had turned into a formal shop at Matedzi business centre in Peter Wenhamo. Purchase of physical assets like farming equipment, household items, cattle by many households, opening and installation of 'spazas'/shops and installation of grinding mills at local business centres were forms of investment by Chiredzi settlers. These investments confirmed an argument by Scoones et al. (2011) that it was a myth that there was no new investment and accumulation of assets in inherited farms. Their study in Masvingo province noted evidence of investment and accumulation by 'new' farmers despite lack of proper documents. Another research by Njaya (2015) also reported that provision of A1 land in Goromonzi District had enabled some beneficiaries to acquire certain assets they did not have or lacked potential to buy if they had remained in communal areas.

As we can see in this section, FTLRP offered many landless and 'land hungry' citizens, large fertile arable and grazing land they could bequeath to their children. However, poor surface and rainwater militated against full utilization of the land and access to more physical and financial assets. Also, households had accumulated many physical assets and while some few made notable investments despite the economic meltdown, poor cotton producer prices, lack of land documents and de-emphasis of FTLRP on comprehensive household support. Farmers became

self-reliant and they felt satisfied with what they had accumulated. Asset accumulation feeds into livelihoods outcomes

6.3 Livelihood Outcomes after FTRLP

The success and failure of development policies like FTRLP is mainly measured on the livelihood outcomes, that is, food security, income levels, changes in working days and general well-being of the resettled people. Asset accumulation feeds into livelihoods outcomes, hence the need to examine how asset accumulation had influenced livelihood outcomes of resettled households. Achievement of livelihood outcomes is mainly measured using standard national and international indices, but this has been at the expense of views of households that experience these outcomes. This section, therefore, evaluates changes in livelihood outcomes from the perspective of land beneficiaries in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms in Chiredzi district. The division of livelihood outcomes into four sub-sections (income changes, food security, number of working days and people's well-being) was guided by the SLF.

Changes in Household Incomes

Income change is one of the livelihood outcomes and indices used to measure the success of development policies like FTRLP. Research findings showed that, households viewed resettlement as having increased their monetary worth compared to their place of origin. One of the prominent cotton farmers but dissatisfied with the loss of value in Zimbabwe dollar reported:

In the communal areas, we worked hard but money was difficult to come by.... It's now different here...cotton farming is a lucrative business. 'Mari yemumhepo tinopuwavo zhinji patinotengesa zvirimwa asi haumbooni mashandiro ayo (income from cotton sale is significantly high but mobile/plastic money has less value).....at the same time, sale of our livestock is subject to restrictions. For the past two years, COTCO was giving us cash and you could do something meaningful. The problem came with 'Ecocash money' (plastic money) (James, Maware farm).

Resettled households were satisfied with their incomes after resettlement, but the volatile economic environment was a challenge as it had reduced value of their money. The same livelihood option they were engaged in communal

areas had improved their incomes post resettlement. Fast track had offered many households opportunities for cash crop (cotton) farming while a few had diversified into irrigation production. While government encouraged use of plastic money in financial transactions, some resettled households felt that the tax on electronic transactions was reducing disposable incomes after sale of their crops. The three-tier pricing structure that was in forex, plastic money and hard local currency had disadvantaged resettled households as they had no sources of cash in their communities. Prices in plastic money were higher than in hard local currency, hence this wiped away resettled households' incomes as they transacted and buy items. Nonetheless, resettled households felt that they had experienced a positive change in their incomes post resettlement.

The participant also indicated that livestock production had the potential to increase incomes but felt that there were certain regulations that impacted negatively on the sale of livestock. Chiredzi resettlement schemes were bounded by some game ranches and conservancies which increased chances of domestic animals being infected with stray buffaloes etc. It was difficult for outsiders to buy and move out cattle from the district as it had been labeled a 'red zone' by the Veterinary department. This, therefore, contributed to a reduced market and subsequently reduced incomes for the resettled families despite having large stocks of animals. Resettlement areas in Chiredzi district had also offered many small business opportunities to residents that had improved their monetary worth. These include casual work in sugar plantations, sale of manure, green mealies and forest produce by some residents to Chiredzi town and along surrounding highways. Many households reported a positive change in their incomes when compared to their fellow communal people. Feelings of a higher monetary worth by Peter Wenhamo and Maware residents confirmed findings by Alemu (2015) in Metema and Decha area of Ethiopia where households felt their incomes had improved post resettlement. There was general income improvement for settlers in Decha and Chiredzi residents, but the former's incomes were below the World Bank's calculated annual average for rural incomes while for the latter, higher incomes had been eroded by the inflation. Research results of resettled Namibian livestock farmers also indicated gross margin below average national living income (Werner and Kruger, 2007). For both Chiredzi and Namibian settlers, increased incomes had been affected by inflation and high interests incurred in the repayment of loans respectively.

Food Security Situation

The success of the FTLRP was also measured based on one of the ‘deliverables’, food security. Many households got surplus food during wet years, but their main challenge was recurrent droughts. This supported Joppa’s sentiments in section 6.2 that they only harvested enough food during cyclone years. However, few cyclones had affected Zimbabwe post 2000 and some of them covered small parts of the eastern province of Manicaland. It shows that resettled households had experienced food insecurity for the larger period of their stay in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms. Droughts made food availability to be a challenge despite households having been allocated large pieces of fertile land. Other factors that made households to be food insecure included poor storage facilities, crop damage by wild animals, sale and barter trade of surplus grain to cover other household needs. One woman reported her food security situation after fast track:

We regularly experience food shortages mainly because of droughts...but we have other challenges like crop and grain damage by wild animals, weevils, rats and ‘makoronyera anotorera mbeu dzedu’ (exploitative grain middlemen) (Nathando, Maware farm).

In some wet years, households harvest enough food that meet or surpass annual needs, but their crop are at times damaged by stray wild animals when ready for harvesting. When they successfully harvest their crops, their food remains at risk of weevils and rodents as storage granaries and facilities used are poor. Very few families afford grain fumigants. Rodents and weevils enter through the thatched roof, rotten poles and cracking walls of granaries. For the few who apply grain fumigants, they quickly ‘vapourise’ through structural weaknesses found on granaries and damaged sacks. During field work, I slept in a room where grain was stored in empty cotton and grain polythene packs that had been attacked by mice and weevils. An Agritex officer in Maware farm revealed that while hybrid maize varieties used by households were adaptable to the dry conditions in the district, the grain could easily be affected by weevils. Grain attack by weevils made households to be more food insecure.

Also, households remained food insecure in many years because they sold their grain to address some cash needs. It also shows that, the money they got from cotton sales was not enough to take them to the next season, so they ended up selling grain or making traditional beer to get money. This exposed them to exploitative middlemen who bought

their grain at cheaper prices. While resettled households felt that grain middlemen were exploiting them, Maware Agritex officer indicated that some households delivered damaged grain which attracted low prices. Households continued tagging their prices of grain on the grain quantity and not quality. In 'wet' years middlemen paid low prices taking advantage of many households with a grain surplus. As a means to get more income, households ended up selling many bags of grain to maximize their income. Also, many households fell in the middlemen's 'trap' despite offering very low prices because they paid grain upon delivery unlike GMB which took months to pay them. The term middlemen also referred to vendors who barter-traded grain with groceries, second-hand clothing, small farm equipment, household and some electrical goods. Every 27th of the month had been gazetted by council as an open day market day for Maware residents at a place called 'Filling Station'. The market became popularly known as 'Ku 27' (27 market) in the area. These petty traders took advantage of the distance between resettlement areas and market points (towns and viable townships) where they can get these goods. They exchanged grain with these goodies and later resale the grain to GMB or other grain millers at higher prices.

Families in the resettlement schemes also produced watermelons, pumpkins, okra and cucumbers in large quantities since these did well in dry conditions. This improved the nutritional value of food taken by resettled households, but this was seasonal. These crops were not easy to store for use up to the next season. In many cases, I noticed that they were stored on open spaces and under granaries exposing them to bad weather, rodents and pests. All these challenges had made households to be food insecure after fast track. This was in contrast to Decha, Dawuro, Metema residents of Ethiopia who harvested more grain output that could meet annual food requirements (Zeleeke and Mberengwa, 2012; Alemu, 2015). According to the UNDP and Oxfam's (1996) definition of 'food poverty', resettled households in Ethiopia had no 'food poverty' as they were able to meet the nutritional needs of their families. Lack of food poverty means that resettlement had created households that were self-sufficient in terms of annual food requirements. While Chiredzi and Dikolo resettlement projects in Zimbabwe and SA respectively remained food insecure and dependent on food aid, causes of food insecurity varied. In the latter project, resettlement has been done to promote cattle farming as the main activity in the dry Limpopo province. Cattle farming had not brought any short-term benefits because initial profits had been ploughed into the project (Lahiff et al., 2008) leaving households with little income to buy food. Also, households had been given small pieces of arable land so that they give more attention to animal farming which was to their main livelihood platform.

Changes in Working Days

Using the SLF, change in working days is one livelihood outcome that can be used to measure the success of rural development policies like FTLRP. Economic growth can only be achieved if citizens' time is used productively. Did access to land affect the productive working days of resettled families? An interview with one adult revealed that fast track had made all resettled households more occupied than before though the activities differed with season. Both households into dry land and irrigation farming had cotton farming as the main activity that took most of their time while the later added irrigation activities. The off-cropping season was characterised by division of labour as male adults cleared plots and drove livestock to water points. Women and in some days children, engaged in the sale of green mealies, firewood, charcoal and mice in Chiredzi town or along the highway. A farmer and seasonal commercial harvester of forest produce stated:

'Kuno kumakombo hakuna zororo' (people in resettlement areas have no time to rest). Cotton harvesting stretches up to early September...livestock should be attended to even in the dry season. At times I will chop wood, make charcoal and prepare mice for my wife to sell. We have no time to rest...but that brings food on the family's table. You will see what you worked for when the year lapses unlike in communal areas. They spend time looking for wage labour which is hard to get from other fellow villagers because many are struggling there (Richard, Maware farm).

Many households had limited time to rest after cotton harvesting but they felt it was a necessary 'evil' since they would be fending for their families. Cotton had a long growing and harvesting period which occupied land beneficiaries into the growing season. Also, fast track allowed households to increase cotton hectareage which subsequently increased their working days. Agricultural diversification and extensification by new and old cotton farmers respectively might have created more working days for the households as they capitalised on larger pieces of land they had been allocated. Though the period for cotton harvesting was known to be long, lack of money to hire labour for harvesting processes made households work into the dry season. Work was mainly done by the family members, hence it took them more time to harvest the crop and destroy crop residues.

Many households concurred that their 'working days' post-resettlement had been extended. But were these 'working days' productive? Despite the extension of their post resettlement 'working days', some of the activities that made them occupied were non-productive while some were productive. Activities that extended their 'working days' beyond the cropping season included plot clearance, irrigation farming, off-farm livelihood options, driving livestock to water points and harvesting of cotton. Households engaged in these activities had a 'fully' packed and productive annual calendar. Majority of these activities were productive as they brought incomes to land beneficiaries. Land clearance increased land for agricultural intensification and extensification, indirectly leading to more incomes for the households. In the dry season, many households failed to engage in meaningful off-farm livelihood options as they looked for water for their animals. The destruction of water infrastructure in Peter Wenhamo farm during 'FTLRP' had increased unproductive working days for residents as they lined up to get borehole water for their animals. In the same farm, livestock herding was perennial so as to protect their domestic animals from being preyed upon by predators from the nearby porous conservancy. While their counterparts in communal areas had let lose their livestock for other off-farm livelihood options, Peter Wenhamo residents had to endure tending livestock in the dry season. All these activities took time for resettled households they could use to do productive work like off-farm activities, mending farm assets and land preparation.

General Well-being of Resettled Households

General well-being is another important livelihood outcome that sums up views of resettled households on asset accumulation and livelihood outcomes achieved by an intervention policy. Many participants indicated positive feelings of well-being after FTLRP though they noted some issues that required attention. It indicated that FTLRP was associated with challenges, but they were not the dominant feature in their sense of well-being as they argued that a perfect place was only the biblical Garden of Eden. One participant noted many positive and a few negative developments that had affected his sense of well-being. However, he was still optimistic that these negatives will be sorted out further increasing their well-being.

Generally, I can say my well-being improved if I'm to compare it with my previous life. I have my land, my homestead, more livestock, more farm assets and higher incomes. Just having land for me is enough because I can utilise this to get all other things I want. Chinodiwa kuva nemusoro kuti uzvisumudzire (one should be organised

and plan how to further improve well-being). However, this place cannot be like (biblical) 'Eden', where everything was good. Improvement in schools, roads, health facilities and water sources will make us be far much better than our communal counterparts (Simeon, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Households felt that resettlement areas, like communal areas, had their share of problems affecting well-being but still they were better than their counterparts. It shows that they had a slightly higher sense of well-being post-resettlement compared to their colleagues in communal areas and were optimistic that it was going to further improve. Sentiments by settlers like Simon that AI farms were not like the biblical 'Eden' might be an expression showing that their well-being had not improved as expected but they were not apologetic about their situation. They saw the potential for it to improve than in communal areas. Besides accessing land and having accumulated some assets, FTLRP had improved their intrinsic feelings of worth, identity and national belonging as some of them had never owned land and had a place they called 'home'. Lack of important infrastructure did not negatively affect their sense of well-being as they knew that these were large investments that required time for them to be provided. Like Chiredzi settlers, a study in Decha, Metema and Dawuro, Ethiopia, revealed that households had positive feelings of well-being post resettlement despite each area having a fair share of challenges. The majority of resettled Ethiopians felt better off with their lifestyle, accumulated assets, food situation and disposable income post resettlement and perceived their regions as the 'Canaan' of their time (Zelege and Mberengwa, 2012; Alemu, 2015). Lahiff et al. (2008) also reported that resettled families of Monyamane CPA in SA felt their well-being had improved because of better social networks and solidarity they had with current neighbours than their communal neighbours. This was despite the fact that the resettled families in Ethiopia and South Africa had been given small land pieces, some infertile and not being productive respectively. While Chiredzi settlers felt an improvement in their well-being despite lack of major infrastructure in their area, this was not the same for resettled households in Shurugwi district. Resettled families in the district viewed their well-being as having declined post-resettlement and felt that fast track had 'fast tracked' them into poverty (Matsa, 2011). Their sense of well-being and quality of life post resettlement was measured based on service delivery, water quality and social services availability to the resettled people. What aroused feelings of well-being among resettled communities varied with people, conditions in the previous and new place and were also a product of intrinsic and extrinsic factors.

From this section, it can be noted that households felt better off post-resettlement due to positive change in incomes, increased productive working days and new assets they had acquired. Food insecurity, shortage of water and lack of important social services in their areas did not dampen their sense of well-being and hope for the best in future. It shows that besides positive changes in income, increase in assets and productive working days, there were some intangible benefits that were associated with land access that made many households have a positive sense of well-being post resettlement. So, research work on the outcomes of development policies like FTLRP should go beyond the livelihood outcomes as defined by the SLF to include changes in intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship.

6.4 Conclusion to Chapter 6

Resettlement in Chiredzi farms under fast track had encouraged new entrants into cotton farming while 'old' cotton farmers were given the opportunity to venture into extensification of cotton production. Large pieces of fertile land and the dry climate were the main factors that encouraged households to venture into cotton farming. However, cotton production became a hindrance to many households to venture into other off-farm livelihood activities as harvesting extended into the off-cropping season. Long harvesting period for cotton shows that cotton farming income was too poor to enable farmers to hire labour to help with harvesting and removal of residues, hence it took much of their time. While fast track had allowed households to diversify from subsistence to commercial cotton and green mealies production, it did not offer meaningful opportunities in off-farm livelihood activities. Very few households ventured into low value natural resources exploitation activities like the sale of wood, charcoal and mice to urbanites and highway motorists. Some looked for short-term wage employment in the nearby sugar farms. Households in Chiredzi resettlement schemes also accessed large fertile arable and grazing land though full utilisation of that land was affected by low rainfall and stray wild animals. Many reported of an increase in physical assets despite the poor economic environment and de-emphasis by government on pre and post transfer support. Incomes of the settlers had also improved compared to their places of origin though their value had been affected by the unstable macro-economic conditions for the past two decades. Land beneficiaries also indicated that they felt better off post-resettlement despite low incomes, lack of social services and being food insecure. One can conclude that access to land resources and accumulation of some few assets generated some intangible benefits to some households that made them feel better off after resettlement. Therefore, research work on the outcomes of land reform should go beyond livelihood outcomes to include intrinsic outcomes of land ownership and how the intrinsic outcomes promote environmentally and socially responsible citizens.

CHAPTER 7: EXPERIENCES AND PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP AFTER FTLRP

7.1 Chapter Introduction

The implementation of fast track as the third phase of land reform in 2000 witnessed a lot of changes in the role of the state, budgetary support, programme objectives and emphasis of the programme. Critics of fast track were quick to condemn the state for lack of political will and for making hurried decisions to implement such a large scale programme without adequate funding and beneficiary emplacement before infrastructure provision. The state might have been driven by a new conceptualisation of development that embeds the concept of citizenship in it. Current development programmes aim not only on promoting economic development but also transforming people from being 'subjects' to 'citizens'. Such development programmes transform beneficiaries' intrinsic feelings, values and 'practices of citizenship'. While intervention policies like FTLRP seek to change people's livelihoods and welfare, they also remake the actual citizen, their feelings, responsibilities and practices as citizens. The new notion of development emphasizes on remaking citizens who participate in local development issues as a means to inculcate intrinsic feelings of responsible citizenship, promoting self-reliant and 'functional communities' (citizen in right' to 'citizen in practice') (Chipkin, 2003).

To understand FTLRP's new developmental focus, the chapter is divided into four broad thematic sections. The first section examined how land access through FLTRP had inculcated new intrinsic values (of respect, self-identity, power, dignity and belonging) associated with being a citizen (intrinsic feelings of citizenship). Second section examines how fast track had advanced some rights that were lost in the colonial period since rights are linked to citizenship (citizen in right). It also believed that recognition and access to political, civil and socio-economic rights influence perception of belonging, which is one of the intrinsic values of citizenship. Section three looks at how resettled households are transforming themselves from being 'citizens in right' to 'citizens in practice' in the face of state failure to actualise their rights, provide basic needs and social services. The fourth section looks at how intrinsic values associated with citizenship, inculcated through land access had influenced the environmentality mode (environmental beliefs and practices) of resettled households. Change in intrinsic values of people is believed to create environmentally ir/responsible citizens.

7.2 The Nexus between Land Access and Socio-Cultural Values of Citizenship

This section examines the belief that land access alters humanity by inculcating intrinsic social values and feelings of whether one is a ‘community’ citizen or not. Development policies like FTLRP are believed to have the potential to restore these values that were lost due to colonial land dispossession and failures of political independence. The large-scale nature of FTLRP might have brought new feelings of citizenship. Citizenship starts as a feeling that ‘citizens’ generate internally on whether they are part of the community or not as shaped by an understanding of their experiences in an area. Farm invasions that characterised and preceded the pre- and post- 2000 land reform show that the rural poor and landless felt that they did not ‘belong’ to Zimbabwe. Deep thinking of their citizenship values and status made them to question the achievements made by political independence and previous land reforms. Some studies on the ‘agri-livelihoods’ impact of FTLRP show that many land beneficiaries had failed to meet 1990 production levels and some livelihood outcomes. These same beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with their well-being post resettlement, an indication that land access meant much more than ‘agri-livelihoods’. Land reform go beyond altering the ‘agri-livelihood’ outcomes of land beneficiaries but also influence and ‘cultivate’ intangible outcomes and feelings of what it is to be a ‘true’ citizen. Experiences of the process of FTLRP and its livelihood changes might have influenced intrinsic values of resettled citizens. Goldin (2013b) in Morales & Harris (2014) also argued that allocation of geographic spaces (land) and land ownership generate new emotional experiences and subjectivities about citizenship that were non-existent when the same people were landless. Motivated by this argument, this section, therefore, seeks to understand how land ownership through FTLRP transformed Chiredzi settlers’ socio-cultural values, subjectivities and practices that define citizenship.

Feelings of Self-Esteem and Identity after Fast Track

Both land access and landlessness generate certain feelings towards oneself as land is an important asset to the rural people. ‘Invented practices of citizenship’ in the form of farm invasions that preceded FTLRP were as a result of certain subjectivities of self that had developed over long time among the landless. Did sense of self-identity change after households were ‘allocated’ land? Many households interviewed expressed positive but varied ‘senses of self’ generated by land ownership. There was a feeling that increased land ownership by black people replaced a dual ‘raced’ citizenship that existed after the political independence and pre-FTRLRP. Fast track ushered in a new type of citizenship which was inclusive, non-racial, as more landless blacks acquired land for subsistence and commercial

farming. 'Raced' citizenship was further worsened by the concept of criminalising movement of 'others' in the former white commercial farms and ranches. A former communal landowner on the edge of Peter Wenhamo farm reported:

Before I got land in my own name, I was like a foreigner in my own country. Setting foot in the white man's ranch was criminalised as trespassing unless you were a farm worker. That did not happen to our white farmers if they drove through our communal areas. Fast track made me be an independent man.... Independent from my parents and relatives where I used to rent out parcels of land. No one can dare me now. I now have a rural homestead like any other family man.....important village meetings are attended by registered 'landowners'. I can now attend and contribute as a proud landowner and successful cotton farmer (Phillip, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Before the fast track, the constitutional clause that said Zimbabwe was a unitary state was just a principle and not a 'practice'. On the ground, resettled households felt that white commercial farms were enclaves of 'independent, superior states' in the country where some sort of a 'visa' was needed for one to pass through, worse still to utilise their environmental resources. They were 'independent' rural areas within the broader rural areas of Zimbabwe. However, fast track restored the oneness and transformed the 'unitary state' principle in the national constitution into practice. It also eliminated 'racing' of farmers into white commercial farmers and black subsistence farmers. Some new black farmers who were allocated land in Maware A1 scheme ventured into small scale commercial irrigation and cotton farming, a 'territory' which was 'all white'. There are some arguments that prosecution for trespassing was done in the spirit of protecting commercial farmers' property and wildlife in ranches. However, former neighbors to the ranches reported situations when 'trespassers' were prosecuted for walking through the farm. This was regardless of the fact that most former white commercial farms had divided communities that co-existed before colonial occupation. Before fast track, resettled households felt like foreigners in their own country, since they had certain places and environmental resources they were barred from accessing and using. This generated a sense of being second-class citizens and differentiated belonging in their own country.

Many adults who were landless before fast track felt that land access through fast track had helped them to improve one social standing and independence in the community. While it is a known fact that one's social status is

dependent on many things, someone's possessions are also a factor. In rural communities, land ownership is one asset that makes one be 'counted' and listened to in the community. Many young adults and couples who benefited from fast track land reform felt that the programme had broadened their meaning of the word 'independence'. Fast track deserved the tag 'Third Chimurenga' as it had 'liberated' them from the mercy of relatives and villagers who leased them farming land. Rented land is always given with conditions which in turn limits social independence and esteem of some young adults. Fast track freed them beyond colonial subjugation that was extended in the name of white commercial farmers to social 'subjugation' initiated by their relatives. Many young adults were made to depend on their relatives for land despite reaching marriageable age and could not fulfill the aspirations of their families because they relied on borrowed and limited land. As children reach adulthood, they want own space where they can 'dominate' and control. The launch of fast track broadened independence from political independence to social independence. There were feelings of an improvement in identity and social standing as land ownership made them 'sit' and contribute their views during village meetings. In most cases, village heads invite land registrants to represent a household. Many young couples who had no land in communal areas ended up being represented by the parent, a situation which reduced self-esteem at family and community level. By being landowners after fast track, some landless adults saw it as an opportunity to be recognised in the community. One's identity was not only derived from being productive but from land 'ownership' like any other family and adult person in the community. They were now being recognised through their agricultural and social contributions and this improved the identity of former landless adults. Majority of these were 'crowned' best cotton farmers for the cropping season and many hosted field celebrations. Some ended up being elected to lead other cotton farmers as cotton group chairpersons. The awards, the recognition and contribution given to young farmers like Milton made them 'visible' socially and economically.

Dignified Life or Not?

Dignity is the state and feeling of worthiness by a human being in a community. Land access, symbols associated with land and changes in agri-livelihoods after FTLRP might have influenced the sense of dignity of resettled households in Chiredzi district. The constitution of Zimbabwe also recognizes dignity not only as a feeling but as one of the civil rights that should be enjoyed by Zimbabwean citizens. Was this civil right fulfilled post resettlement? Resettled households in both A1 farms felt that before fast track, wild and domestic (cattle) animals

that were kept in former ranches of Maware and Peter Wenhamo were more important than them. While people in communal areas had exceeded the carrying capacity of their area, this was not the same with animals that were kept in these former ranches. These animals grazed freely on extensive ranches while people were congested in communal areas. Households felt that they were no better than the former rancher's wild animals because they were congested in communal areas. Sam, like many other households, indicated that in communal areas they ended up farming and building houses in areas (riverbanks and hills) that were habitable to wild animals. However, fast track decongested communal areas and offered them larger plots in the resettlement schemes which helped to improve their dignity as people. A Malawian by descent who obtained land in Maware farm claimed.

Just imagine that this large farm was for wild animals...a few kilometres from here there is another one (Save Valley Conservancy). They were happy to see wild animals graze freely while we were packed like animals in 'cages' (communal areas)...building and farming in hills and rivers. So, what was important, people or wild animals? These former farm owners didn't see us like them. Thanks to President Mugabe for restoring our human dignity. To be human means to have your own place called home...your own land....kana usina izvi uri rovha (if not, you are destitute). Many urbanites walk 'tall' coming out of rented houses....it is better if you have your own rural home....some don't have. The biblical 'Legion' was better because the cemetery became his 'home'. Thanks to Gushungo (President Mugabe's totem) for restoring my humanity, my family's humanity by giving us our own place (Sam, Maware farm).

Land access through FTLRP managed to improve human dignity of people in communal areas and resettled schemes through decongestion of former areas and access to extensive land in the later. Land sizes improved for both communities, generating feelings of increased self-esteem despite the fact that they had no clear land ownership rights and permits. The fact that they had land they claimed to be theirs made them satisfied with their dignity post resettlement. Land was more than an economic asset but an important tool that generated intrinsic feelings of one's worth. Perceptions of improved dignity after fast track confirmed earlier subjectivities about self-identity where resettled households revealed that they now felt they belonged to the country. Earlier sentiments were premised on the fact that 'racing' for land had been eliminated while in the current, they felt they had been accorded their biblical status where 'man' was supposed to be above other species. When the settlers took land from the rural people during

the colonial time, they took not only land, but other symbols associated with land like one's humanity. Household heads like Sam, whose parents were of Malawian descent, never had the opportunity to have owned a rural or urban home. The only 'home' they knew were workers' compounds (like Hippo Valley Estate) they occupied before fast track. Lack of a place called 'home' had tormented him and his family to the extent that they felt like destitute though living in workers' compounds.

For householders like Sam, humanity was defined by having your own place (land) where one could put a home. Sam believed that if God had built the Garden of Eden as the home of humanity's 'first family' and the biblical Legion had the cemetery as his home, descendants of the 'first family' deserved to have their own homes. Fast track restored humanity, respect and dignity of many parents when they got a place (land) where they were attached to. Sentiments expressed by resettled households revealed that citizens may be independent and enjoy all other rights but if the right to land is not met it means their humanity would be incomplete.

Change in the Power Dynamics

Alienation of blacks from their land during the colonial period led to changes in the power dynamics of the country as land symbolised and communicated existence of 'power'. Resettled communities felt that political power ushered in by 2nd 'Chimurenga' was not enough, hence should be complemented by land access as it was a symbol of absolute power. The 1980 independence had managed to force the colonial government to relinquish 'political power' while absolute power remained in the hands of white farmers and industrialists. At the Lancaster House Conference, Zimbabwean nationalists were persuaded to accept compromised constitutions that had been inserted with clauses protecting white owned properties like land and industries. The colonial masters knew that land was a symbol of power and communicated its existence. Land beneficiaries like Amon believed that fast track had consolidated economic power and political power gained through protracted pre-independence wars. A village chairperson and self-proclaimed war collaborator revealed:

In 1980, there were wild celebrations that (Ian) Smith (Zimbabwe's pre-independence prime minister) had lost power.....we didn't know that power lies in our land resources.... It took us two decades to realise this truth. You

think fast track was called 'Third Chimurenga' for nothing? We were punished (put on sanctions) by Britain, America (USA) and friends (European countries) for awakening other sister states that power lies in our land. That is our crime to Britain and America...? Takarova chidhoma, mai vacho vakagumbuka... (We took land from the proxies of colonialists and the later (Britain and USA) were not amused.... (Amon, Maware farm).

Households like Amon felt that, it was now that Zimbabweans were supposed to hold more wild celebrations as fast track had transferred absolute power to many of its citizens. Fast track is believed to have served as the last blow to wrestle absolute power from proxies of the former colonial master. For many resettled households like Amon, total sovereignty was only achieved when the 'last blow' was thrown in the 'face' of the colonial master, Britain. All other land reforms that preceded fast track only managed to 'rescue' few hectares of land towards the landless because those who wielded absolute power resisted. Insertion of constitutional clauses that delayed the amendment of the national charter by a decade and ESAP recommendations for a market-based land reform sought to protect properties for the few farmers. They knew that amendment of the constitution will remove clauses that hindered comprehensive land redistribution while public funding was going to target development policies like land reform. All these strategies are viewed as strategies by the former colonial master to foil attempts to gain absolute power from the proxies of the colonialists. This confirmed Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2012) argument that the first decolonisation was a facade that led to mere 'flag' independence of utterly impotent and powerless quasi-states lacking the substance of sovereignty'. Two decades after the 1980 independence, Zimbabwe lacked the substance of sovereignty and symbol of absolute power.

Views by Amon from Maware A1 farm were supported by one war collaborator cum village chairperson who claimed that Zimbabwe had been put on sanctions by Britain, its allies and the European Union (EU) for taking land which symbolised absolute power for a nation. Other European countries supported Britain, the former colonial master after realising that the 'wave' could spread to their former colonies. EU states wanted to send a clear message to their former colonies on the negative consequences of comprehensive land reforms. It was a strategy to ensure that their absolute power and their continued influence on their former colonies is not challenged. Loss of control over land by their proxies in the name of commercial farmers meant loss of influence by western countries over African resources. These findings confirmed Vengeseyi's (2012) view that some Europeans did not dispossess Africans of their land in order to utilise it but for speculative purposes and to create 'poverty' among the Africans. If

poverty is defined from a multi-dimensional perspective, it means ‘poverty’ of identity and absolute power as land symbolised these. Once people become poor, it translates to powerlessness as they become subservient to the rich and those with the ‘keys’ to power. However, resettled people like Susan, felt that fast track reform had tackled ‘poverty’ of absolute power by giving more land to landless citizens since land communicated existence of power.

From this section, it can be noted that fast track had managed to instill positive feelings of citizenship and national belonging among many resettled households. While many beneficiaries indicated that some livelihood outcomes had not improved as expected, they felt that their sense of self, view of humanity and identity had improved just because they had accessed land. The programme also replaced dual citizenship that existed in rural areas with an inclusive one as black farmers ventured into the commercial farming sector which was ‘all white’.

7.2 Formal Rights’ Influence on Sense of Belonging

Section 7.2 examines how FTLRP influenced access of rights by resettled communities and subsequently their sense of belonging at local and national scale. According to Section 72 subsection 7 of the Zimbabwe Constitution (2013), land reform is necessary policy to enable landless Zimbabwean citizens to re-assert their rights and regain ownership of their land. It, therefore, means that land dispossession that happened during the colonial period took away people’s package of rights. Rights access does not only affect access to some basic needs but also affect sense of community belonging as some citizens may feel like second class citizens and ‘unequal animals’. Fast track was one way of building a unitary and integrated community where everyone had a sense of belonging because they will be able to assert their rights like any other member. Belonging is one of the intrinsic values of citizenship that can be influenced by recognition and access to rights. This section, therefore, looks at the perception of resettled households on their access to constitutionally recognised political, civil and socio-economic rights and how rights access influenced their sense of belonging.

Perception of Political rights

The Zimbabwean constitution has many political rights that citizens are supposed to enjoy and the state has the responsibility to respect, promote and fulfill these rights. Some of the political rights include the right to vote, to be voted, occupy political post and participate in political party activities. Most participants evaded questions about

their political rights. The few respondents who answered the question indicated that everyone was free to enjoy all the political rights but cited a few conditions attached to these rights. Another elderly man, seemingly an ardent ruling party loyalist in Maware farm reported:

I'm free to join and participate in a political party of my choice. But as a land beneficiary, I should know the party that fought in my corner for me to get this land. This does not need one to be lectured, it's known (Gift, Maware farm).

Discussion of political rights was a sensitive area and a 'taboo' among resettled members as many of them ducked the question especially these rights. It was also evident that political rights were enjoyed disproportionately by resettled households in the two resettlement farms. Though land allocation was apolitical, secure and perpetual land ownership had political conditions to be met by land beneficiaries. While the participant's response and questions seemed to be vague, they were a reminder to beneficiaries that FTRLRP was a party programme. Otherwise, it was clear that the ruling party supporters viewed FTRLRP as a partisan programme. Political party activities were selectively enjoyed in Chiredzi North Constituency which housed Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms. The opposition Provincial Chairperson confirmed that this was the only constituency where the major opposition party did not field a parliamentary candidate and one third of wards in the 2018 elections. The irony of it all was that, the ruling party was represented in all wards and constituencies in the country. Representatives in many wards feared victimisation and ejection during and after elections since a councilor or MP was supposed to be resident in the area. In section 5.3, one land beneficiary indicated that elections offered him an opportunity to vote for office bearers and his land. It shows that Chiredzi North constituency was a political hotspot where the land issue had been politicised thereby affecting the enjoyment of political rights. Casting of ballots and participation in political party activities was no longer seen as an exercise of one's political rights but means to defend the land issue.

Some A1 land beneficiaries in the wards attended social, developmental and farmer group meetings clad in hats, scarf, t-shirts and veils bearing the ruling party and candidates' messages. None was seen wearing regalia for the opposition parties despite the fact that 24 political parties had successfully registered to contest 2018 presidential elections. It shows that the right to participate, campaign for other parties was promoted but on a partisan basis. The

ideals of the liberation struggle for the 'one man, one vote', among other reasons, was not just about casting the ballot but the right to belong and participate in political party activities without any external influence. So, there was more to the 'one man, one vote' mantra but the ruling party had politicised the land issue leading to differentiated enjoyment of political rights. 'Forced belonging' to the ruling party also undermined the social identity of those who had divergent political ideologies as they were forced to remain 'low' to avoid eviction. Social identity improves when one can fully participate and contribute to an organisation one feels is important to him/her. This contradicted Gonese and Mukora's (2003) views that Zimbabwean land reforms had a political agenda of achieving individual... self-determination. Some households felt that land access automatically meant beneficiaries had lost the freedom to belong to a political party of their choice.

State of Civil Rights for Resettled Households

Chapter 4, Part 2 of the Zimbabwean constitution is the basis of all civil rights that include the right to privacy and right to information, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression and from arbitrary eviction. These are important to people who have been discriminated and denied freedoms dating back to the colonial period. There are debates of politicisation of fast track during launch and its aftermaths. Politics have a bearing on access to civil rights

Once someone has been given land and built his/her homestead; the right to privacy becomes important. Intrusion into someone's private life and property has the potential to affect one's dignity, a right in Zimbabwe's national charter. Many cotton farmers in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farm were being sponsored by COTCO under the auspices of the free Presidential Input Scheme. COTCO officials and cotton group chairpersons (CGC) had an obligation to inspect cotton farms to check for compliance with conditions for cotton production but some households felt it was intrusion into their private land. A cotton farmer but also a victim of debt collectors in Peter Wenhamo felt actions by debt collectors undermined their social identity and dignity:

These cotton group chairpersons now wield too much powers...they just enter our cotton farms....come to our homes checking on harvested cotton. It's now too much. I don't think they now have time to attend to their plots. Ukuwo zvikonzi zvinouya zvichiita zvazvinoda. Ummmh zvikonzi zvavanotumira hazvina rukudzo nedzimba or

matanga edu. Hakusi kungorerutsa musha weumwe chete asi kutorerutsa nemurudzi wemusha wacho ikoko (some of the debt collectors engaged by cotton companies don't respect our houses, animal pens and the household head at all) (Albert, Peter Wenhamo farm).

For many households, COTCO officials were disrespecting them through unannounced visits they made to their cotton farms. However, one land beneficiary cum CGC indicated they had an oversight role to ensure that the production of cotton was done in accordance with cotton production regulations. During the planting and marketing season, the CGC made spot checks on planted hectareage against inputs supplied and to reduce cases of side marketing respectively. At the end of the season, they checked for compliance with cotton regulations that encouraged farmers to uproot cotton stalks and burn them. To the farmers, they felt that cotton officials were invading their privacy by visiting their plots and homesteads without their consent thereby undermining their social identity. While cotton farmers felt it was an infringement of their right to privacy, some of the visits benefited farmers. Forcing compliance with the October deadline to uproot and destroy cotton stumps prevented the breeding of dangerous pests by breaking their cycle. However, there was poor communication between cotton farmers and officials on the purpose of these visits and farmers benefited in the long term.

While some resettled households felt CGC intruded into their private land, some residents complained that some cotton companies violated their right to privacy as they attach and collect goods for failure to repay loans or side marketing of cotton. Invasion of privacy came about through debt collection to farmers who would have failed to repay loans or diverted their outputs to 'poacher' cotton companies. In cases where cotton farmers failed to repay loans or side marketed their output, private cotton companies like Cargill, Taraffin and FSI engaged debt collectors to attach property equivalent to arrears. This was a challenge mainly before the launch of the free presidential input scheme when farmers entered into contract farming with private cotton companies. On many occasions, debt collectors entered into livestock pens and houses as they attach property and livestock. Households felt it was a violation of their right to privacy and also undermined their social identity. Attachment of property does reduce one's social standing and respect in the community as it portrays someone as deceitful and irresponsible. In African terms, you do not only respect an individual without all his belongings as people are identified by their own assets.

So, when debt collectors enter private properties to attach items, they are also ‘attaching’ their social identity as material things are a source of that identity.

All ‘men’ should ‘belong’ and be part of a social, economic or political grouping. Belonging to certain groups in a society is an important social capital that can be achieved if freedom of assembly, association and expression are respected and protected. However, freedom of assembly and association was being respected as long as residents discussed developmental, social and ruling party politics. A land beneficiary reported:

We can freely meet to discuss all other issues affecting our community except opposition politics...we just hear they meet under the cover of darkness. We mainly get agricultural information from our farmer group associations...and in some cases from Agritex and Veterinary officers. We have an advantage of seasoned farmers we met here, some of them are ‘Agritex officials’ themselves. For current affairs, radio stations are accessible here but ‘chirungu choga choga’ (broadcast in English)...the fearless listen to Studio 7 (Richard, Maware farm).

Freedom of association, assembly and expression was not limited as long as participants met to discuss issues outside opposition politics. While ruling party members had total freedom of assembly and expression to discuss their party programmes, this was not the same for opposition party supporters. This shows the extent to which fast track had been politicised and how politics had affected the right to assemble and associate for some households. Freedom of expression was also limited to certain issues. The right to express themselves could only be practiced if their ideas and thoughts were not showing the ‘dark side’ of the ruling party and fast track land reform. There was, therefore, ‘guided’ freedom of association, assembly and expression on the part of all resettled households. During the interview process, actions of some resettled households showed lack of freedom to assemble and associate. A notable case was that of a land beneficiary who always disappeared early in the morning and came back late in the evening to avoid being interviewed. It showed more in terms of the gaps that existed in the enjoyment of freedom of association and expression. Politicisation of fast track had led some households that believed in opposition party ideologies to lose some of their freedoms though many households felt that economic rights were ‘more equal’ than these civil rights. Many households felt satisfied with this status quo as they believed that they ‘owed’ the ruling party for ‘assetting’ them.

Feelings of belonging are also enhanced through access to relevant and up to date information about on current, national affairs and ways to improve their welfare. The state or any other institution of government have an obligation to ensure the right to information is actualised. The term ‘institution’ refers to any organisation that contains information that affects the social, economic and political life of citizens. Agriculture was the main livelihood option for Maware and Peter Wenhamo settlers, hence households were supposed to have up to date information in order to improve productivity. The main sources of agricultural information for the resettled households were farmer group meetings, Veterinary and Agritex officers. However, they felt that Veterinary and Agritex officers were rarely ‘visible’ and only emerged when there were free inputs to distribute and emergent disease outbreaks.

Resettled households knew that these agricultural officers were there but felt they were not doing enough to share relevant information. One of the Agritex officers concurred with resettled farmers that they rarely visited these communities because of two reasons. Work regulations for Agritex officers allowed them to visit farmers upon request by the latter or if they have been given instruction by the higher office. Secondly, they visited farming communities doing routine checks so as to write monthly agricultural reports. Little interaction with these institutions of government made households form farmer group associations which enabled sharing of vital agricultural information with experienced and successful farmers. Feelings of ‘detachment’ from state institutions availed an opportunity to enhance belonging ‘with’ experienced farmers. Land beneficiaries had to ‘quench’ their own ‘thirsty’ for agricultural information through self-made farmer associations and annual field day celebrations. These became ‘invented spaces of citizenship’ resettled households devised to actualise their citizen right to agricultural information.

While farmers are ‘economic men’, they are also political and social beings that require information about current national affairs. Being ill-informed on current and national issues makes one out of touch and sync with others on events happening in the country. Belonging is also evident when members of a society have up to date information on national issues. However, settlers in the two farms felt that their right to information on national issues was partly met. The two farms were accessible to only two out of five state radio stations. There was little investment in

communication infrastructure pre-FTLRP as most farms were ranches, hence sparsely populated. Further challenge emanated from the fact that the two accessible state radio stations broadcasted in English, of which the majority of resettled households were well conversant with Shona language. Broadcasting programmes in English weakened national belonging for adults since they were left out on national issues.

The only community radio station that broadcasted from the provincial capital of Masvingo town had a radius of less than 20km. This disadvantaged Maware and Peter Wenhamo communities that were more than 170 km from the provincial town. They had also ‘access’ to an independent radio station (Studio 7) but it had been labeled a ‘regime change station and its listeners described as ‘agents of regime change’. Those who wanted independent news from this station were forced to listen to the channel while ‘indoors’, but this created differentiated belonging among resettled households and Zimbabweans in general. Those who listened to state radio stations were seen as ‘regime sympathizers’ while those who got independent news from Studio 7 were labelled as ‘agents of regime change’. Such labels affected some resettled households, hence they ended up listening to Studio 7 while ‘indoors’ to avoid attributions that showed differentiated belonging. This confirms an argument by Floya (2013) that belonging is also a product of labels attached to some members of the society though some might not properly describe the person. Many resettled households who listened to the independent radio station were exercising their right to varied and independent information though this right ended up being politicised on partisan lines. Tajfel (1969) in Macleod (2019) argued that stereotyping and grouping individuals into in-groups (us) and out-groups (them) undermines the latter’s social identity and subsequently their sense of belonging.

The State of Socio-Economic Rights after FTLRP

One of the objectives of post independent government in embarking in rural development policies like redistributive land reform was to promote economic and social development. Socio-economic development can only be achieved if the socio-economic rights of the rural people have been met. The constitution of Zimbabwe states that compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement of people was done to give an opportunity for the landless to re-assert their rights. These include socio-economic right to work, property, agricultural land, education, food, water and health.

Zimbabwe's national charter lists the right to work as an important economic right for a nation's citizenry. Majority of the rural people have a double tragedy of being landless and unemployed. Land reforms that preceded fast track listed employment creation as one important objective to be achieved through land access. Due to many constraints, very few landless people benefited from these previous land reforms, thereby limiting employment creation opportunities. The same objective was carried forward to FTLRP. Creation of employment through land access helps to fulfil the right to work for those who would have failed to find formal employment. For Gebha, FTLRP had offered them with better work opportunities through cotton production and sale of fresh produce from their irrigation plots. A dryland and irrigation farmer who believed in the inheritability and spirituality of land claimed:

My annual income from the sale of cotton and irrigation produce makes me almost equivalent to other paid civil servants. I even lend some of them green mealies and they pay when they get their salaries....and you say I'm not working? What I don't have is the payslip.... FTLRP gave me land I use at will. If I'm tired or I die, my children will utilise it....we can't sell this land, its ancestral heritage? Did our ancestors sell it to us? Did President Mugabe sell it to us? Selling it will anger our ancestors, even President Mugabe's soul will not rest (Gebha, Maware farm).

Majority of the land beneficiaries acknowledged that fast track land reform had afforded them the right to work. The new place offered them new opportunities like medium scale cotton production, irrigation farming and new livelihood activities that relied on natural resource exploitation. Land beneficiaries like Gebha felt that incomes they got from some of these livelihood opportunities made them feel that they were now at par with some lowly paid civil servants. For the formerly landless and unemployed households, work opportunities created by FTLRP through cotton and irrigation farming improved sense of belonging among resettled households. When they compared themselves with formally employed people and other civil servants, many of the resettled households no longer viewed themselves as second class citizens, an improvement in their social identity. Societies have hierarchies among members and usually those who perceive themselves to be at the bottom of the 'ladder' yearn for rising to the top. Income is one tool used to produce these societal hierarchies. Therefore, positive change in income that was brought through cotton production might have moved some land beneficiaries up the 'ladder'. Land access had not only eliminated 'racial belonging' and dual citizenship, but also low social identity and class belonging as many resettled households reported an improvement in incomes post-fast track.

Section 21(2) of the Zimbabwe Constitution (2013:40) also state that every Zimbabwean ‘person has the right to acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, lease or dispose of all forms of property’ and own agricultural land. It is one thing for the state to provide land and another thing to respect property rights. The property rights could be divided into two sets, that is, right to acquire, hold and use property and the second set is the right to transfer, lease or dispose property). There were feelings among many residents that land allocation by informal structures during FTLRP had offered them the first set of rights ‘within’ the property right (the rights to hold, occupy and use land). In section 5.1.3, resettled households condoned invasions and informal institutions that made them acquire oversised land and this helped them to fulfil these first set of rights ‘within’ the property right.

Maware and Peter Wenhamo residents expressed sentiments that showed satisfaction with fulfilment of the first set of rights ‘within’ the property right. The right to occupy, hold and use land by black farmers brought more satisfaction to households as they felt that they were now equal to the remaining white commercial farmers. It improved sense of belonging for the land beneficiaries as they also became owners of prime land in areas that were predominantly controlled by white famers. The second set of rights ‘within the property right (the right to transfer, lease and dispose property/land) had been denied due to lack of permits and titles to land but the settlers were not livid about it. The same informal structures that had helped them to occupy and acquire land could not give them documents to actualise their second set of property rights. Households felt comfortable with a scenario where land could only be traditionally and informally ‘transferred’ to members of the immediate family in case of death or when some children get married. They defended the informal transfer as good because it helped to reduce the commercialisation of an ancestral heritage. They argued that their ancestors had bequeathed them with that heritage, hence they had an obligation to bequeath it to the next generation. Commercial transactions involving land transfer would attract bad omens and provoke the spiritual world. Sentiments by land beneficiaries like James shows that many resettled households valued traditional transfers of land at the expense of commercial transfers. In market terms, their land was like ‘dead’ capital and was not transferrable while in traditional terms, it was inherited ‘capital from the dead’ (ancestors) which could be bequeathed. FTLRP was, therefore, an extension of communal land ownership where land inheritance was the only form of transfer that could be done.

Zimbabwe's liberation wars were fought premised on the need to regain land dispossessed from indigenous people. Post independent land reforms were implemented to fulfil one of these liberation war ideals. The constitution has a clause that states that citizens have a right to regain not just land but agricultural land (land suitable for agricultural practices). In section 6.2, Chris of Maware farm indicates that FTLRP had offered them extensive fertile land for arable and animal farming. Esther from Peter Wenhamo farm concurred that fast track had actualised their right to agricultural land except that the place was dry. Like other settlers, she felt that their right to agricultural land was only met after fast track, indicating that land and pasture they owned before resettlement was now small and/or infertile. A female land beneficiary contended with the quality and size of her land stated:

This is not just land but farming land.....it cannot be compared with what I had in communal areas.....rainfall is the only problem here. As a farmer, you only need to 'understand' (agricultural activities suitable for) this place. Our problem is that we want to grow crops we used to grow in communal areas...but this is a dry area. In good years, we harvest grain that can take us for two or more years but it does not last long... Food is, therefore, a problem in this area during most of the years. In some times of the year, we get vegetables, grasshopper, mice, mushroom and even game meat from the forest (Esther, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Sentiments shared by Esther show that there were some people who condemned the place because of the arid climate. To her, the place was dry but it had good agricultural land, hence the need for people to practice agricultural activities that suited the area if they were to realise the place's agricultural potential. Households were satisfied that their right to agricultural land had been met. However, they felt that productivity and livelihood improvement were an interplay between land and other livelihood capitals. Land beneficiaries were supposed to get knowledge of farming activities suitable and tap into the potential of their land by acquiring suitable assets. In the previous chapter, it was noted that some households nearer to water sources had started irrigation farming, while some with dryland grew cotton and kept livestock. These appreciated that FTLRP had actualised their right to agricultural land and had gone a step further to engage in activities that suited the dry climate.

The satisfaction came from the understanding that FTLRP transcended beyond providing land as a natural asset but also fulfilled their right to agricultural land that had been 'failed' by political independence. Thomas (2003) noted

that through the Land Appointment Act of 1930, black Zimbabweans were confined to reserves which did not qualify to be termed agricultural land. The fast track of 2000 reversed the colonial legacy that had denied many rural people their constitutional right to agriculturally productive land. For land beneficiaries, FTLRP was a 'liberation war' as it had added in their 'basket' of political rights, the right to own agriculturally productive land. Though there were reports of unproductivity in fast track farms, this did not stem from the size or quality of land but low rainfall and lack of post settlement support. It, therefore, means, until action is taken to deal with these problems, the right to land that is suitable for agricultural production will seem to have been partly addressed and fulfilled.

Access to sufficient food and water are other important social rights to be enjoyed by Zimbabwean citizens. The right to food was measured based on the perceptions of resettled households on their food sufficiency and accessibility. Households in Chiredzi resettlement areas acknowledged that during some 'wet' years, they harvest enough food to cover a period of at least two years. But in many years, households experienced food shortages because of reasons cited in section 6.3, making them to be food insecure. The right to sufficient food also means food with sufficient nutrients. The rainy season provided households with nutritious but seasonal natural vegetables, edible rodents and insects from the forest. They also harvested food crops like pumpkins, watermelons, gourds and cucumbers that provide vitamins. During droughts and winter, the nutritional value of food consumed by households decreased as these food sources were dependent on rainfall received. It also depreciated from wet season to dry season and from wet years to drought years. To maintain, the nutritional value of their food, some residents illegally harvested game meat and fish in the nearby game ranch and Chiredzi river. Accessibility of food during drought years was a challenge as their food was 'weaponised' against perceived 'enemies' while some middlemen exchanged cattle with a few bags of maize. A victim of food insecurity due to political patronage reported:

Government and CARE distribute food in times of famine but the problem are politicians...the political party you support will determine whether you get it or not. 'Dai kuchine ma 'back pay' tisinganetseki' (If cotton companies were still offering 'back pay' we would not face food problems). Ecocash (plastic money) we get from COTCO does not buy maize.... they want forex. Almost every year, we lose cattle to some middlemen selling grain (Milton, Maware farm).

Though government departments were mandated with distributing food to the hungry people in Chiredzi resettlement farms, it ended up in the hands of local councilors and village heads. Also, it was mandatory for NGOs that distributed food to work with local leaders and councilors, majority of whom were more political than civil in mind. Food distribution became an opportunity to punish perceived political and social foes. It also means irrigation plots in Maware farm were producing insignificant food for local residents to buy. During very serious droughts, A1 households engaged exploitative middlemen in livestock-grain barter trade. They were given few bags of maize per beast forcing them to sell more cattle to get more bags of grain. This shows that food accessibility during the times of famine was a challenge to most households in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farm. Incomes from cotton sales and other off-farm livelihood platforms were seasonal and insignificant forcing them to sell their cattle to buy food. The situation was different from the late 1990s up to early 2000 when cotton farmers were given an off season 'back pay' (second payment) as a 'thank you' token for transacting with a cotton company. It was a small percentage from the company's profits, but it enabled households to meet food needs during the off-season and times of famine. According to FAO (2008) in Zeleke and Mberengwa (2012:126), the right to food normally exists when all people, at all times have physical and economic access to enough safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs. What was obtainable in Chiredzi resettlement schemes shows that food sufficiency and accessibility was a challenge thereby greatly affecting households' right to food. Households had poor economic access to food as their incomes from their main livelihood options were seasonal. Fast track had greatly failed to improve food access as a livelihood outcome and right.

Resettlement usually involves the movement of the whole family from the source to the receiving area. This affects education of children of moving families. However, education is one constitutional right for any Zimbabwean citizen despite circumstances one found her/himself into. The Zimbabwean statute advocates for the availability and accessibility of free and state-funded education. This right is mainly anchored on the availability of physical and human infrastructure. Resettled households like Charles of Peter Wenhamo farm were dissatisfied with the availability and accessibility of primary and secondary schools in both farms. There were feelings that hopes for a better future for their children had been shattered by schools availability, poor infrastructure, lack of teachers and resources. A parent dissatisfied with access and availability of education stated:

Education here is poor in everything...there is shortage of everything. Our children are really 'dying'. Handicharoti vana vedu vachizoshandawo mabasa epamusoro-soro kana emuhofisi'. Tanga taita rombo rakanaka kuti donje, zvipfuyo uye ma 'plots' zvanga zvichitipa mari yekubhadhara fees yevana gore rose. Dambudziko ndere zvikoro. (Dreams of my children occupying white collar jobs vanished soon after resettlement here. We are getting a lot of money out of cotton, livestock and irrigation farming that can pay annual school fees, but payment is wastage. There are no 'schools' here) (Charles, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Sentiments by Charles shows that, the few schools found in A1 schemes of Chredzi district did not meet the standard of an educational institution when they compare with schools in their former communal areas. The few schools in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms were inaccessible, poorly built and resourced. Fig 7.1(a) and (b) shows farm structures that had been converted into classrooms and teachers' accommodation respectively.



(a)



(b)

Fig 7.1(a) & (b): Chikwirire Primary Classrooms and Teachers' Accommodation.

Households in all farms reported that children travelled long distances to schools. Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms had five primary 'schools' against a standard of at least five schools per farm. Three of them were 'schools' in name but none of the structures deserved to be called classrooms as they had been built using poles and dagga. The foundation of primary education had been compromised due to limited Early Childhood Development Centres (ECD) at most primary schools in the two farms. Many children started primary level (grade 1) at an advanced age having skipped ECD despite its importance in preparing children for junior primary school. ECD level was also skipped to evade long travelling distance and threats posed to these minors by stray predators. All these factors made the right to make basic education accessible a pipedream for many infants. This contradicted government policy that one primary school classroom was supposed to be shared by 20 families and children were supposed to travel a maximum of 5 km (Gonese and Mukora, 2003).

Only Maware farm had a satellite secondary school but it started offering ZIMSEC examinations in 2017, 17 years after fast track. It, therefore, means many children failed to proceed to secondary which affected literacy levels. Charles, like any other resident, felt that the quality of education offered in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms

reduced opportunities for their children to be employed in white collar jobs. While residents were satisfied that their incomes 'matched' those of some low-grade civil servants, they wanted their children to occupy better offices in the formal employment sector. Communal areas offered better educational facilities and services when compared with resettlement areas. These feelings of dissatisfaction with educational services created feelings differentiated belonging between residents of A1 farms and their communal counterparts. Lack of secondary schools meant that many children ended their education at primary level which further worsened differentiated belonging and literacy gaps. Lack of many secondary schools means many children in A1 farms had already been 'condemned' to informal employment while those in communal areas had chances to secure opportunities in both formal and informal sectors. This compromised feelings of belonging at national level as society had been divided spatially due to lack of enough secondary schools in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms.

The Right to Health Post Resettlement

Engagement in different livelihood platforms can only be done when a person is in a state of good physical and mental health. All human beings get sick in the course of life and need to consult health personnel on their condition. Cotton farmers were exposed to chemicals, requiring regular medical help from the health facilities. Chiredzi district farms were infested with mosquito and snakes because of high temperatures and land acquisition of former cattle and game ranches. ICESCR (1997) states that the right to health should be enjoyed by every citizen. Zimbabwean constitution's national objectives further acknowledge that accessible and adequate basic health care service is a right. Was adoption and recognition of this health right in the national charter followed by access of the same right? Views by resettled households showed dissatisfaction with their right to health. Right to health was measured based on accessibility and affordability of health facilities. It was one right which was inaccessible and unaffordable as there was no single health facility in both Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms. One resident who showed dissatisfaction with the quality of health care in Maware A1 scheme claimed:

I still have an unanswered question? Where did Maware and Peter Wenhamo farm owners and their respective labourers seek medical help when they get sick? You can't plan to be sick, it can be an emergency. In this place many people get sick and recover because of grace (of God). This place requires one to have 'alert' 'strong' ancestors who can fight for you because you can get sick and die before being attended by medical personnel.

Dambudziko nderekuti Maware, Peterwenhamo, Makondo uye Geri hakuna chipatara (no one of the four A1 schemes in Chiredzi district has a clinic). Our cattle are better than us because they have a dip tank. We hear that when they (top government officials) get sick; they go outside the country for medication... (Peter, Maware farm).

Land beneficiaries in both farms concurred that there was no single basic health facility in their places of residence. Resettled communities felt that government had reneged on its obligation to ensure basic health facilities where available. This is despite the fact that the government's policy was that 300 to 500 families were supposed to share a single clinic (Gonese and Mukora, 2003). While sentiments by Peter showed dissatisfaction with access to their health right, they also point to feelings of differentiated belonging between settlers and their top government leaders. Settlers complained that their top government officials sought medical attention outside the country to avoid poorly resourced local health institutions. Residents of Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms had to seek medication outside their farms because there were no basic healthcare facilities. Lack of basic health infrastructure contradicted Musemwa and Mushunje's (2011) argument that FTLRP had promotion of investment in infrastructure as one of the objectives. This objective remained a pipedream for the settlers in Chiredzi A1 schemes. Some patients that collected free drugs non-communicable diseases had to skip their routine drug collection because of the distance where drugs were collected. Women were also exposed to maternal health problems as many pregnant women could not get reproductive health services and information. Lack of basic reproductive health services and information violated women's full rights and their right to dignity.

As can be seen in this section, land reform had enabled many resettled households to re-assert mainly economic rights at the expense of a bunch of other rights. Politicisation of land ownership, lack of social services and infrastructure affected the ability of households to exercise many of their civil and social rights. This also led to 'forced and differentiated belonging' among resettled households. However, this did not 'dampen' their sense of community and national belonging as households felt that economic rights were 'more equal' than other rights. While they recognised that some other rights had not been met, they felt government had started with more important rights of providing land and work which would lead to other rights being actualised. This was against a view held by Ahmad, Rahim, Pawanteh, Ahmad, Zainal & Ahmat (2012) that a positive sense of belonging is enhanced when rights are upheld. Access to some civil and socio-economic rights remained a pipedream but

resettled households had positive view of their social identity and belonging due to actualisation of their right to land. The dominant belief was that, once the right to agricultural land and work have been met, it means Zimbabwe belonged to everyone as land offered a platform where all other rights could be exercised. While politicisation of FLTRP influenced access to many rights, this provided a platform for Chiredzi settlers to move from ‘citizen in right’ to ‘citizen in practice’. This leads to the next section on citizenship as a practice by resettled household in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms.

7.3 Practices of Citizenship by Land Beneficiaries

Lack of budgetary support to infrastructure and services provision affected many resettled communities of Chiredzi district to access many of their rights. Politicisation of FLTRP also affected access to some rights, showing the need for Chiredzi settlers to move from ‘citizen in right’ to ‘citizen in practice’. The constitution of Zimbabwe also states that citizens must assert their rights through land ownership. To assert means to defend, uphold and stand up for their rights. Such a constitutional clause seems to suggest that land ownership gives ‘asseted’ citizens the power to uphold their other rights in case the government reneged on its obligation. This is supported by ICESCR (1976) which states that citizens have right to freely pursue their socio-economic development. This section examines practices that showed self-reliance, entrepreneurship and independence by resettled households in the face of community challenges, failure by the state to actualise their rights and to fund social services and infrastructure provision. Constrained by the number of landless and lack of financial resources to support the FTLRP, government de-emphasised provision of social services and infrastructure before beneficiary emplacement. Emphasis on beneficiary resettlement prior to services and infrastructure provision means access to basic needs and some rights linked to social services was affected. This called for settlers to move from ‘citizen in right’ to ‘citizen in practice’ by shouldering the responsibility for local economic development and actualisation of rights. The new notion of development argues that development can only be sustainable if there is human agency, citizenry is active and when there is local participation.

Practices of Citizenship to Actualise Political Rights

Access to political rights was differentiated and the ‘victims’ were those resettled households that believed in multi-party democracy. One of the few resettled households who felt enjoyment of political rights exclusively revealed

that they ensured their ‘voice was heard in the voting booth’. Some indicated that, they wore ruling party regalia and cards, attended their meetings and became ‘chameleonic’ in the voting booth. An opposition loyalist and land beneficiary from Maware farm claimed:

I do whatever it takes to save myself, my family and plot. These are dear to me. ‘Asi kana ndasvika mubhokisi, handiiti ‘mistake’...ndinoita zvinoda mwoyo wangu’ (if I get into the voting booth, I will express what is in my heart). No one can take away what is in my heart. What is more important is to cast a vote, all other political rights are not important. I will not feign illiteracy at all when in the polling station, never! (Amon, Maware farm).

These sentiments show that resettled households in Chiredzi A1 farms lived in communities that had ‘poisoned politics’ but political silence had proved to be golden. They only ‘voiced’ on their political rights in the polling booth to avoid eviction while at the same actualising their right to vote. While these actions helped to actualise the right to vote, households had challenges to campaign and participate in political party activities. For them, the right to vote was ‘more equal’ than other political rights. By subduing the right to campaign and participate in political parties of choice through wearing regalia and attending rallies for the ruling party, households thought of it as a defense mechanism while it was a suppression of their other political rights. To them, the right to vote was the most important right since it was protected by the principle of secrecy of the vote. The provincial chairperson of the main opposition party indicated they had many party supporters in the district, but they had told them to only show their ‘true political colours’ when behind the polling booth. For many resettled households, this had worked but allowed them to enjoy one of their political rights, the right to vote.

Beneficiary Actions to Assert the Right to Education

The Constitution of Zimbabwe, in particular the Education Act (25:04), clearly states that every Zimbabwean child has the right to education and primary education is compulsory for every child of school going age. Resettled households acknowledged both facts that basic education was a right, and that the state had failed to fund construction of schools and resource schools. Maware and Peter Wenhamo residents had to shoulder the responsibility of providing basic education to their children. Households in farms like Maware had to convert the barn and residential infrastructure for the former white farmer into Chikwirire primary and secondary school. The

large ban, farm and workers' houses were converted into classrooms, teachers' houses and dormitory for students from distant places respectively. Chikwirire member of the school development committee (SDC) stated:

We realised that lack of schools here can 'kill' generations if we allow one of us to be greedy and occupy the farmhouse. We agreed as a community at the onset of farm invasions that once the 'war' is over, the farmhouse and other structures owned by the former farmer should be converted into a school. We are constructing a 'modern' primary and secondary school at Chikwirire but our children have somewhere they can learn from. We are providing labour...paying an annual building fund. We are doing our part, the community is united to build the school. Government did its part by giving us land and teachers. On the western part of Maware farm, they had to build classrooms with poles, dagga and thatching grass because they could not just watch their children seated at home. Using local builders, they are also building a better primary school. The people are united. Each village was given a target on the number of farm bricks to produce (Susan, Maware farm).

While the resettled households had improvised by turning farm structures into a school, they went further to produce farm bricks, ferry sand and actual building of the school blocks. During my visit to Chikwirire schools, I saw members of the community who were providing labour and supplying locally available building material for the construction of classroom blocks at the two schools. Communities in resettlement schemes of Chiredzi acknowledged that basic education was a right for their children but believed that communities had duty to complement the government. Households in Peter Wenhamo contributed financial resources through their village heads towards the construction of school blocks to ensure that there is reduced overcrowding in schools. Since Maware farm was formerly an extensive cattle ranch, other parts of the farm had no farm structures to be converted into schools. Communities in the western side of the farm had to build Sebhanani primary school using rudimentary material under the guidance of their village chairpersons.

Households in that part of the farm came together soon after the fast track to build temporary school structures while they made farm bricks for the new primary school. Each village head kept records of households that would have paid the building levy and contributed labour in building the modern school at Sebhanani primary school. Households that did not meet their financial and labour commitments to build the school were called for trial at the

village's traditional court. However, most village heads used threats of eviction from the plots undermining other land beneficiaries' constitutional freedom from arbitrary eviction. However, such threats worked to ensure all households contributed to the building of schools in the two farms. Some households paid their building levy in kind by providing grain, small livestock that could be sold or converted to food for builders or ECD children. Provision of food overtly helped to meet one of the basic needs and right to food for primary school children and also ensured regular school attendance thereby access their education right. Teacher turnover was high further affecting access to quality education in these two farms. School authorities in partnership with school development communities had to employ some locals as ECD 'teachers'. This was meant to address high staff turnover but mainly for the infant departments at primary schools. All these actions by resettled households to ensure that the right to education is met confirms a view by Ahmad et al. (2012) that rights always come with responsibilities for societies.

Performances of Citizenship to Realise the Right to Food and Water

Chiredzi resettlement schemes experienced serious droughts and food insecurity due to its arid climate. While government and other NGOs provided food to hungry masses, at times the food was distributed on a partisan basis, was inadequate and/or given only to vulnerable members of the community. It, therefore, means many were left to fend for themselves and actualise their right to food. Resettled households close to Mkwasi and Triangle sugar estates illegally harvested sugarcane to supplement their food requirements and reduce overreliance on little maize donated. One resettled household in Peter Wenhamo reported:

'Tingashaya hedu sadza kwete chekuisa mudumbu...idzo nzimbe dziripo' (We can only face 'sadza' shortage not food shortage, we are in the vicinity of sugar plantations). Those who were fortunate to get land nearer to the canal and perennial Chiredzi river can afford irrigation equipment demarcated a portion of their dryland into irrigation plots. They are food insecure and also provide wage labour to other households in exchange for money or food (Emma, Peter Wenhamo farm).

When faced with serious food shortage, households nicodemously harvested sugarcane from nearby Tongaat Hullet plantations and out-growers' farms. For many households, sugarcane replace breakfast and lunch and would only take a normal supper. This helped to reduce the number of times they cooked the little mealie meal they had while

actualising their right to food. A1 households argued that foreign owned Tongaat Hullet was using water that came from their areas and former communal areas while they were not benefiting from it. Other households sold their livestock (mainly cattle) in cash or kind so that they buy or get food for their families. Participants like Susan argued that cattle were not only a form of asset but insurance for resettled households when faced with food shortages and other serious problems. A food insecure female household head with large herd of cattle reported:

'Vazhinji vanoshora hurumende chaizvo asi chinofanira kuzivikanwa ndechekuti zhara ndeya Mwari haisi yehurumende iyi... munhu wakangwara unoti makore akwanaya zvakanaka, wotenga mombe dzako...mombe ndidzo 'Joni' rangu, saka vana vangu havangafi ini ndine mombe (many people blame the government when there is a famine but it should be known that famine is natural; we should not blame the government. During wet years, people should use wisely their proceeds from crops to buy more cattle that will act as insurance during drought years. Cattle are 'my own Johannesburg' (my source of income), I can't look at my children dying in order to preserve my livestock). Youth with no cattle have no option, they go to 'Joni' (Johannesburg in S.A) so that they can support their food insecure relatives at home....(Susan, Maware farm).

While households with cattle resorted to sale, young adults with little or no cattle looked for work in South Africa in order to buy food items for their families. The couple of measures constituted practices of citizenship by households to ensure the right to food for their families was actualised. Households took it also as their responsibility to help the government to ensure their right to food is met since they believed that famine was natural. Maware resettled communities near the canal opened up irrigation plots they used to grow food crops for subsistence and commercial purposes. Initially they clashed with plantation owners and ZINWA (Zimbabwe National Water Authority) over what they termed illegal use of water which had been paid for by the former. A former resident of Zaka district and owner of an irrigation plot near the giant canal reported:

Water in the river and the canal flowing to the estates originates from Zaka, my district of origin and some of it from this farm; hence I have the right to freely use it. At first, Tongart Hullet denied us access to the water but we had to illegally harness it. Takati hatingambofi nenyota makumbo ari mumvura, kwete! Kana takambokwanisa kutora ivhu,

tozokonewa kutora mvura inoerera pamusoro paro, zvinoita? (We said we can't die of hunger and thirsty whilst our feet are in water, never! 'We told ourselves that if we were able to take back our land, what will stop us from taking water that flows on that land?') In fact, it's ours; estates should pay to us (Ishmael, Maware farm).

While there were clashes over illegal use of water to irrigate food crops and illegal harvesting of sugarcane, these actions forced ZINWA and sugar plantations to act to the advantage of these communities. ZINWA succumbed to pressure from resettled households and gave them favourable water permits so that they become responsible with the water they used. Tongaat Hullet which owns sugar plantations prepared some hectares of land towards the growing of maize which is given to its workers and drought prone areas of Chiredzi district and Masvingo province as part of its social responsibility. This was done to ensure that mainly resettled households cooperate with the plantation owners in terms of illegal harvesting of sugarcane. Resettled households had to force these two authorities to actualise their rights when they took it upon themselves to show their resentment of monopolising water resources that passed through their farm. Actions of resettled households might have been illegal but were meant to force their 'belonging' and feelings of ownership of resources they were excluded to use for a long time.

Provision of commercial water permits fulfilled settlers' right to food and water. Resettled households also indicated that access to this right was a 'problem' though Chiredzi river and the canal passed through Maware farm. Other households far away from these water sources faced serious water problems. Some land beneficiaries along the canal and Chiredzi river were siphoning water for small scale irrigation purposes. Resettled households felt that they 'owned' the water and were entitled to use it. They believed that restrictions in the use of water was a return to the pre-FTRLRP when they were not allowed access to environmental resources in the former ranches. Now it was ZINWA making them to pay for water that was rightfully theirs because it passed through their area. During the early years of FTLRP, some A1 households siphoned water to their irrigation plots and livestock water troughs despite having no water permits from ZINWA. Resettled households had to actualise their right to water after realising ZINWA was denying them this right. This, however, benefited households that lived near the canal. For some households in Peter Wenhamo, they had to use their voting power to get their boreholes repaired by the aspiring ZANU PF Member of Parliament (MP). A young land beneficiary who believed in the power of the voter stated:

We are tired of MPs who give promises... get elected and disappear. We now vote for someone's 'works' not promises. Were united by landlessness and we used that as a motivator for farm invasions. Now we are united by lack of basic infrastructure, where we can we pull our labour together to build schools and clinics. So, we are united by our common problems, so those who want our vote should do something 'tangible' here. We don't just vote for MPs because of their eloquence but their 'deeds'. That worked for us in 2013 and 2018....roads were graded....boreholes repaired. The MP promised to desilt Matedzi dam and reopen the community garden....I think he is doing it for 2023 (elections) (Jimalo, Peter Wenhamo farm).

A1 communities in Peter Wenhamo had more serious water problems because they had no perennial dams and rivers or canals like Maware residents. When it came to water and transport problems, households decided to forgo their politically influenced 'differentiated belonging' and fight for their cause. They used the political right to vote to influence one of the aspiring ZANU PF MPs to repair some boreholes and gravel roads. Households used one of their political rights to make real their water right. This time, households refused to have their right to vote being abused by MPs that gave them manifestos and then never came back. This confirmed an argument by Miraftab (2012) that citizens can use their civil and political rights to achieve social rights that help to improve their welfare. What started was the actualisation of the manifesto before their right to vote. This represented a paradigm shift in the status quo where politicians sold their manifestos but promised to implement them after they had been voted for.

Grassroot Actions to Actualise the Right to Health

Feelings of dissatisfaction by households towards their right to basic healthcare and reproductive health made them rely on indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and local resources. Some households believed that their local 'health personnel' offered service on some health problems. A female believer and user of health related IKS and herbs reported:

There are not only farmers here, we have capable 'nurses'. We rarely seek medical help for some health problems like headache, snake bites, fire burns, sores and tooth aches etc. We have renowned midwives who help pregnant women to deliver safely. Remember we have people (who came) from different areas....it helps us in getting herbs to

deal with various ailments. We have relatives who die at home, but lack of mortuaries does not make us bury our dead relatives like dogs. We spread wet sand on small portion of the traditional kitchen floor and put the linen wrapped corpse on it.... it's a refrigerator on its own. The sand should be constantly replaced. We can go for two or three days 'mourning' our 'relative', especially our elders while distant relatives are coming to pay their last respects (Samuel, Peter Wenhamo; Mary, Maware farm).

Having people from different parts of the province was an advantage as households shared information on medicinal herbs and local resources that dealt with some health problems. Some of the local people indicated that they visited hospitals for prolonged cases or some which required use of modern machines. They also relied on the services of midwives who offered reproductive health services to pregnant women. Though lack of health facilities exposed pregnant women to maternal health problems and lack of reproductive health information, this did not make many of them lose sleep. Local residents believed that local midwives were helping pregnant mothers to deliver safely. Some local women used traditional herbs and elephant dung as there was belief that they helped to widen the 'path' for the baby during birth. They got elephant dung from the nearby conservancy and some that strayed into their farms. Some women supplied elephant dung to their communal counterparts, an indication that they also believed it had reproductive health benefits.

When I was doing rounds collecting data in Peter Wenhamo farm, one female passenger requested to collect elephant dung that was by the roadside. Informal discussions with her revealed that burnt dung is put in water to produce a liquid substance that is drunk by women missing their menstrual periods or pregnant women to deliver safely. However, a nurse at Nyangambi clinic acknowledged that this was a practice in the many rural communities, but the dung's medicinal value had not been confirmed by scientific research. She also revealed that delivery complications were not linked to the narrow 'passage' only. Problems to do with loss of blood, mother becoming 'tired' during delivery, wrongly positioned child and transmission of HIV to the child cannot be sorted using elephant dung. She admitted that women believed on the medicinal prowess of elephant dung but that had not been confirmed by scientific research. The use of elephant dung and herbs had the potential to expose women to some reproductive problems and cervical cancer. However, for some women in Chiredzi resettlement farms, the use of elephant dung and traditional herbs for pregnancy related issues had been in use from time immemorial.

Health facilities were not only important to the living but also to the 'dead'. In African culture, both the living and the dead are supposed to be afforded a dignified life and end respectively. Mortuaries at health facilities ensured that the dead were given a dignified send-off. However, the 'nearby' Nyangambi clinic in the border district of Zaka had no mortuary despite some people dying at the clinic. Lack of mortuary at this clinic made the right to dignity of deceased persons be undermined. Despite lack of mortuary and funeral policies to provide proper burial services, many households in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms revealed that they still accorded the dead the right to a dignified send-off. To afford a dignified send-off for their dead, households wrapped the corpse in a linen which is placed on wet sand spread on floors. Moisturised sand cools the body and absorb any watery substances being released by the corpse. Absorption of fluids from the corpse by wet sand reduced flies on the corpse, hence 'slow tracking' decomposition. The cooling effect of wet sand also reduced cases of hurried burials thereby allowing distant relatives to gather and mourn their dead, especially their elders. It is a cultural belief that all people should be accorded the right to dignity up to the last day when one is buried.

As we can see in this section, politicisation of FTLRP and lack of funding for the programme affected access to most rights and basic needs. Lack of these social services served as a push factor for households to work together in ensuring provision of some critical social services. Some resettled communities also used their political right to vote to actualise other social rights by demanding politicians to deliver first before getting their vote. This replaced partisan politics with developmental politics and also united people to work towards local economic development. Households also developed entrepreneurship skills as they looked for alternative options to improve their right to education, health, water and food though it was difficult to do the same for some political and civil rights. Lack of access to many political and civil rights did not 'dampen' their spirits and affect their sense of belonging as they felt economic rights were more important than other rights.

7.4 Changes in Environmental Subjectivities up to Fast Track

The influence of the Rio Summit Principles and the SDGs broadened the view of 21st century development policies like land reform beyond socio-economic productivity to environmental sustainability. When the Zimbabwean government launched fast track, its emphasis shifted to creation of self-reliant and responsible citizens. Its objectives

also placed more emphasis on a land reform where there is sustainable utilisation of environmental resources, meaning, resettled households were supposed to be environmentally responsible. The state can launch development policies to undermine and reinforce certain environmental subjectivities. This section, therefore, assesses changes in environmental subjectivities and actions before and after fast track. Land ownership is believed to influence intrinsic feelings of power, identity and belonging which can subsequently impact on land beneficiaries' environmental beliefs and actions. The section examines how FTLRP had changed the environmental discourse, knowledge and action of land beneficiaries who were once denied access and use of land resources in former white owned ranches.

Environmental Thinking and Practices Pre-Fast track

For a long time stretching into independence, access to environmental resources in commercial ranches was criminalised. This might have generated certain environmental subjectivities and subsequently actions to register their concerns. Chiredzi settlers and others who lived in districts bordering these former ranches had a feeling that wildlife resources in them were for the ranchers 'only'. One participant who formerly stayed close to the ranch and a victim of human-wildlife conflicts narrated:

Black people had no portion on the environmental resources in this farm.... we were not allowed to even pass through this farm. We used to say, 'Nzou dzaPeter Wenhamo dzapaza' (Rancher Peter Weinham's elephants have strayed in our area, showing that they were his). I felt that total independence will only be there if we have total ownership of our resources. During the liberation struggle and farm invasions, we used to sing songs like, 'zvinhu zvose ndezvaMbuya Nehanda' (all things belong to spirit medium, Nehanda). We stayed close to the ranch but our 'reward' was crop damage and killing of our domestic animals. No benefit from these ranches, no meat, no timber, nothing. 'Kwaiva kufa kaviri' (to us, it was a double tragedy) but we made sure stray wild animals do not return to the ranch...harvested forestry resources against their will (Obert, Peter Wenhamo).

People who lived close to Chiredzi ranches viewed environmental resources in the ranches as 'belonging' to a few privileged ranchers and not a national heritage. Fast track removed racialisation of environmental resources as it led to recognition of their right to share the environmental heritage. A sense of ownership of environmental heritage was cultivated in resettled households and this positively impacted on their feelings of belonging. Another villager who

was interviewed indicated that he felt that Zimbabwe had not yet gained total independence because land, wildlife and other environmental resources were still in the hands of the few game ranchers. He mentioned that colonial settlers had not only subjugated '*Nehanda*'s' people but her land, wildlife and other environmental resources. So, the 1980 independence was cosmetic because there was continued ownership of land and environmental resources by the few game ranchers. Phase 1 and 11 of land reform acquired farms that were not rich in environmental resources. However, compulsory acquisition of farms that characterised fast track allowed the landless to harness some farms that had important environmental resources like wildlife in Chiredzi resettlement schemes. This improved their sense of humanity since it is defined by what one control and owns. Such songs invoked feelings that complete liberation would occur if all that belonged to Nehanda, the spirit medium had been captured by all Zimbabweans. Also, many totems for the Zimbabwean people are linked to animals showing a strong attachment between people and the animals. Full belonging could only exist when these environmental resources that defined their identity had been 'liberated'. So, liberation of man politically without making black Zimbabweans the owners of environmental resources were incomplete.

Environmental thinking that land and wildlife resources in former ranches were all for the 'white men' led to the poaching of environmental resources in these ranches. They did not report stray wild animals to their ranchers but poisoned (especially deadly animals) or slaughtered some for meat.

Communities that lived nearer to the ranches in Chiredzi district killed or illegally harvested wildlife. Sentiments from households that lived close to the ranches show that they illegally harvested these resources as a means to fight their exclusion from the use of these resources. Poaching can be interpreted as an 'insurgent form of citizenship' where the excluded blacks fought for the inclusion in the use and ownership of environmental resources. During a transect walk in Peter Wenhamo farm, I 'bumped' onto a sign post (Fig 7.2) that was on the boundary between the farm and Save Valley Conservancy that supported the idea that ranches and conservancies entrenched exclusive ownership, use and governance of environmental resources.



Fig 7.2: Trespassing Signpost near Peter Wenhamo A1 farm

Post Fast Track Changes in Environmental Thinking.

The exclusion of communities surrounding former ranches to benefit from land resources had forced them to engage in sabotage tendencies as ‘performances of citizenship’. However, did their environmental beliefs change after the fast track? Participants showed satisfaction with access to land and other resources (like forests) attached to it but argued that they cannot practice arable farming under trees for the sake of conservation. One crop farmer reported:

I cannot grow my crops under trees because I want to conserve forests. Move around all commercial crop farms owned by white farmers today, you will not see a single tree. Crop farming require to be done in an area free from trees. In some cases, we had to burn forests to reduce snakes and pests, otherwise we could have lost many lives, animals and our crops. Now, we don't want people who burn forests because it's a source of our food and for our livestock. However, I spare some trees on personal land I'm not utilising for crop farming. I have my personal forested grazing plot (Martha, Maware farm).

Resettled households argued that previous farm owners were into beef production and game ranching, hence they kept forests as they did not affect their farming systems. Instead, grass and forests were important natural capital for ranching since they were into animal farming. Fast track in Chiredzi district witnessed an agrarian restructuring from ranching into mostly crop farming where pasture and forests were no longer the main natural assets for resettled communities. Therefore, Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 settlers felt that the removal of vegetation during fast

track cannot be interpreted as lack of environmental concern for the forest resources. Certain households had spared mini-grazing areas on their plots that helped to conserve forests. Fig 7.3 shows one household that had such a mini-grazing land within the allocated plot.



Fig 7.3: Resettlement Homestead with a Mini-Forested Grazing Land.

Some households argued that there were many cases of veld fires during the early years of fast track because they want to eliminate excess pests, rodents and snakes since they had been resettled on ranches. Ranching respectively provided conditions for the reproduction of pests and poisonous species because there were no measures to eliminate them pre-fast track. Farmers like Peter Wenhamo had a snake park inside his game ranch and it is believed that he had to let them loose at the peak of land invasion. This exposed ‘new’ famers to poisonous snakes forcing them to use veldfires to eliminate some. This confirms findings by Bowora (2015) in Hwedza district, Zimbabwe, that fire is an important land clearing tool, a pest and disease control strategy to resource constrained farmers. Many resettled households expressed positive concern over the forests because they were an important natural capital for cattle farming. Forests now offered them with pasture for their animals and forest produce for both subsistence and commercial purposes. Realisation of the direct benefits from the forest made households change their view of environmental resources in their farms. Water for their livestock was a problem, hence households did not want to compound their livestock problems. Agritex officer in Maware farm also supported the view that cases of large veld fires that occurred during the early days of fast track should not be interpreted as lack of concern for the

environment but as ‘invented practices of citizenship’ against monopolistic use and ownership of environmental resources. Similarly, cases of ‘deforestation’ and veld fire during the initial days of fast track were meant to clear residential, arable plots and improve their environmental health respectively.

Practices to Deal with Problem Wild Animals (Herbivores)

Maware and Peter Wenhamo residents bore the brunt of crop and property destruction because they had occupied former ranches. They also shared boundaries with conservancies which had not been annexed during the FTLRP. Gebha of Maware farm reported that killing of stray herbivores is done by people who are ignorant of friendly methods of dealing with them. Interaction with these wild animals made households study the behavior of some of the herbivores. This understanding helped households to devise environmentally friendly methods to deter herbivores that destroyed their crops. Many households in Peter Wenhamo built ‘guard rooms’ on their arable plots. One environmentally responsible citizen with an entrepreneurial mindset stated:

I sleep in makeshift house on my arable plot while manning my crops, with a dog on the door. We built makeshift houses close to one another so that we alert each other when wild animals come... we will ‘beat’ some noise drums to drive them away (Gebha, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Households with plots next to each other had to build these ‘guard rooms’ close to each other so that they will team up in driving away dangerous herbivores like buffalos and elephants. At times they made shifts to guard each other’s plots in areas where elephants and buffalos did not visit regularly. Fig 7.3 shows two typical ‘guard rooms’ used by resettled households at night. Many times, they were alerted of nearby wild animals by barking dogs they took to their plots. Households ensured they had at least two dogs to help in manning arable plots and the homestead since many settlers had been given residential plots far away from their arable lands.



Fig 7.4: Arable Plot ‘Guard Rooms’ for Resettled Farmers

To further enhance the security of adults who guarded crops, fire was made outside ‘guardrooms’ to scare away some wild animals. Fig 7.3 shows heaps of ash outside ‘guardrooms’. Gebha indicated that when dangerous herbivores enter their plots and/or threaten to destroy their guardrooms, they throw burning logs to them. To repel small herbivores, farmers had to put shiny and repellent ribbons of radio and video cassettes around planted crop. As wind blow, these ribbons whistle and constantly move as if someone is moving them, thereby driving them away. Some resettled farmers had to beat drums, put dolls and caricatures clothed like human beings around green crops.

Practices to Deal with Problematic Carnivores

Like other stray herbivores, carnivores like lions and leopards were causing problems to resettled villagers in Peter Wenhamo farm because it shared a boundary with a conservancy. Cases of poisoning of these predators declined post fast track as villagers used friendly practices to protect their animals and the predators. Many settlers had developed knew and safer ways to deal with the predators. Another environmentally responsible resident stated:

Initially, we poisoned.....set traps on these carnivores because we felt these wildlife resources belonged to the white rancher. Lack of knowledge of dealing with these wild animals also made people think that killing was an answer to human-wildlife conflicts. We now have better knowledge to protect ourselves and our assets, maybe it’s because we ‘interact’ with them regularly. Each night, we leave burning logs near livestock pens to scare these

carnivores. Dogs also alert us on the presence of 'naughty' wild animals..... we then throw burning logs on them. This is working.... otherwise we would have no single cattle or goats (Enock, Peter Wenhamo farm).

Barking dogs helped to alert livestock owners of the existence of predators in the area. While herbivores like buffalos and elephants destroyed planted and harvested crops, carnivores targeted livestock. It was, therefore, necessary for each household to have at least two dogs to help in 'guarding' the arable plot and home. Prolonged barking of dogs usually signaled the presence of predators around the homestead. Neighbouring households also teamed up when predators come in large numbers. In Peter Wenhamo farm, households also made fire outside livestock pens to scare away wild animals. Fig 7.4 shows a large heap of ash nearer to the cattle pen. Households threw burning logs, charcoal and hot ash on 'stubborn' wild animals that were no longer scared of the fire outside pens.



Fig 7.5: Ash from Burning Logs outside a Cattle Pen

Besides the use of fire, households also made animal pens using thick mopane poles and further 'fenced' them with dry thorny tree branches (Appendix IV). During informal discussions with some resettled farmers, they indicated that they surrounded their livestock pens with branches of thorny trees to protect their domestic animals from predators. Owners of game ranches and government departments responsible for wildlife had failed to protect people, livestock and their properties from wild animal damage. Citizens had to invent individual and community

'practices of citizenship' that made them and their assets secure. Practices like building 'guardrooms', erecting caricatures, use of fire and thorny 'fences' and 'sniffing dogs' can be interpreted as non-violent performances of citizenship by the resettled households. What is interesting and important is that these 'invented performances of citizenship' were environmentally friendly and protected the predators. Farmers could put snares and poisoned baits around their homestead to kill the predator animals like before but opted for these environmentally friendly methods. This confirms an argument by Njaya and Mazuru (2014) who argued that despite the lack of enough environmental officers in A1 farms, locals are using traditional and local practices in preserving natural resources in their areas.

While the above practices could be interpreted from a citizenship perspective as invented practices to deal with human wildlife conflicts, they also contributed to environmental sustainability. Resettled families had to act responsibly to protect their livestock, but their actions showed they had concern for wildlife resources. Their actions might have been driven by the knowledge that these wild animals were retracing their habitats and 'corridors' they had occupied. They hoped that they will soon forget as older generations of wild animals disappear. Therefore, fast track did not only create environmental subjects but 'reservoirs' of knowledge on sustainable ways to deal with problem animals.

In this section, it can be noted that resettlement that happened in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms replaced cattle and game ranching with arable farming, hence removal of forests and use of veld fire to clear plots were unavoidable. However, households felt that removal of vegetation and use of fire to clear plots was not portraying their lack of concern for the environment. With time, they looked for friendly ways to live in harmony with their environmental resources like wildlife. Resettled households' actions contradicted a view held by Ahmad et al. (2012) that society become socially, environmentally virtuous, caring and responsible when their socio-economic rights are upheld by state policies. As for Chiredzi settlers, only a few economic, social and political rights were met but the right to agricultural land made them show concern for the environment and wildlife resources they found in their farms. Resettlements nearer to ranches and farms that had wild animals before made households look for friendly methods to co-exist with wildlife that strayed into their areas. There was an improvement among beneficiaries in their environmental knowledge and strategies to safeguard their lives, properties and livestock while at the same time protecting wild animals. The fact is that, they felt they belonged to the country through land

ownership which made them have feelings that environmental resources were a national heritage, hence the need to use sustainable practices to curb human-wildlife conflicts.

7.4 Conclusion to Chapter 7

Modest changes in incomes, food security and limited social services in Chiredzi A1 farms, had little influence on intrinsic values that make resettled communities feel like real citizens. Decongestion associated with fast track and access to large and prime land had improved their sense of self-identity and humanity. It shows that land reform provides the rural poor with an important asset that brings prospects for a better well-being. Land is, therefore, not only an asset for livelihood improvement but also a tool that defines what it is to be a true community and national citizen. Improvement in the intrinsic values of citizenship was mainly a product of land access despite the fact that many rights that also define citizenship had not been realised. Partisan politics during FTRLP and lack of transfer support affected access to political, civil and social rights. Fast track had enabled many resettled households to re-assert their right to land, work and 'property' though at the expense of some civil, political and social rights. While partisan politics during fast track promoted 'forced belonging' to the ruling party, lack of social services caused 'differentiated belonging'. However, since many households had been unemployed and landless while in communal areas, access to land made them feel that economic rights were more important than other rights. Addressing historical injustices and 'raced' land ownership associated with the pre-2000 land distribution seemed more important than access to other rights. Fast track had enabled black households to own land and belong to the community of landowners which was previously 'white'.

Failure by government to provide social services, infrastructure and actualise other rights made land beneficiaries to shoulder the burden for local economic development. At times, government intervened to support initiatives started by the local people. Fast track transformed resettled communities from 'citizen in right' to 'citizen in practice'. Communities provided labour and other local resources in the building of schools, clinics, bridges and other important infrastructure. In some cases, they used their political right to vote to influence politicians to start projects and set up infrastructure that actualised some of their social rights, thereby improving their well-being. Though they used civil methods to actualise some of their rights, in some cases they engaged in confrontational approaches like illegal harvesting of water and sugarcane from the canal and plantations till responsible authorities engaged in

actions to actualise their rights. Resettled communities were not only responsible in making sure that their rights are real but also practiced environmentally responsible behavior. Fire incidences during the initial years of fast track, were driven by the need to clear their residential and arable plots. Resettlement in Maware and Peter Wenhamo farms replaced ranching activities with arable farming, hence removal of forests and use of fire to clear plots was unavoidable. This did not indicate lack of concern for the environment as households later engaged in environmentally responsible behavior in line with sustainable citizenship. Environmentally responsible behavior was a culmination of their interaction with some wild animals which enabled them to understand their behaviour and subsequently sustainable methods to reduce human-wildlife conflicts.

CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary of findings that emerged from an evaluation of land beneficiaries' experiences of FTLRP, its 'agri-livelihood' outcomes and influence on feelings and practices of citizenship. Section two provides a conclusion on the meaning of these findings on Zimbabwe's fast track and its influence on citizenship.

8.2 Summary

The divisive nature of the FTLRP and controversies surrounding its economic development outcomes forced this research to look for other indicators that can be used to evaluate the success of fast track. Development now embeds the concept of citizenship, hence the need for more evaluative work that focus on this component of development. Therefore, this research examined how the FTLRP as a development policy had influenced socio-cultural values and practices of citizenship among Chiredzi land beneficiaries. It also aimed at investigating how land ownership, de-emphasis of FTLRP towards pre- and post-transfer support had influenced intrinsic feelings and practices of citizenship. To achieve this, the study employed an ethnographic study to get perceptions of resettled communities on their feelings and practices of citizenship as the other new dimension of development policies like FTLRP.

Findings on Beneficiaries' Experiences of FTRLRP

Many resettled households felt that fast track was a peasant instigated land reform driven by previous land reforms that could not match the number of landless people in communal areas. All state instigated land reforms started with legal reform, planning, involvement of government technocrats and infrastructure placement prior to resettlement but fast track was not accompanied with any of these before beneficiary placement. Fast track was the only land reform in Zimbabwe that had been initiated from below by actions of the landless and land hungry citizens. However, the ruling party went into overdrive to publicise the programme and legalise this spontaneous land reform. It shows that citizens can use non-legal channels to assert their rights which may force the government to take action to fulfill demands made. All other phases which were instituted by the government were implemented with the help of institutional frameworks made up of technocrats unlike fast track.

Households believed that naming fast track as the ‘Third War of Liberation’ was appropriate as it had liberated many landless citizens ‘caged’ in barren communal lands. Also, it is the only land reform that had made substantial gains in terms of land access, large beneficiary placement and liberated land resources. FTLRP was also a ‘battle of rights’ between farm owners, farm workers and the landless people. Farm owners resisted farm invasions to protect their right to property while being supported by farm workers that fought in the ‘corner’ of their employers to protect their right to work. For the landless, they wanted to assert their right to agricultural land that had been partly met through political independence and initial land reforms.

Many households condoned land invasion that preceded fast track as it allowed them to acquire pieces of land, large enough to bequeath to their children. Lack of formal institutional framework in land allocation allowed households from ‘foreign districts’, with divergent political views to evade exclusive allocation to land. However, invasions affected women beneficiaries as households had to employ ‘split families’ to safeguard both resettlement and communal land. Women ended up being left in communal areas which affected their land registration. This led men to have control of land access while women had to be loyal to their parents or husbands to maintain access to the land.

Households in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms had no land permits but had to generate tenure security through honoring their formal and informal duties as land beneficiaries though contributing to passive citizenship. Delay in the provision of permits give the state through its proxies (local authorities) ‘control of access’ while households have to ‘maintain access’ through performance of duties like payment of tax and display of ruling party identity.

Findings on Perception of Livelihood Changes Post Resettlement

Fast track in Chiredzi resettlement areas promoted many households who had never ventured into commercial production to venture into cotton and irrigation farming. Some settlers who were employed in blue collar jobs left their positions to engage in fulltime cotton farming. However, cotton farming as the main livelihood option had many production processes, long growing season thereby affecting many households to engage in other off-farm livelihood platforms. Few households who managed to squeeze time out of their tight farming schedules went into low value sale of forest produce and wage labour in nearby plantations.

Fast track also allowed households to access many forms of natural and physical capital, that is, farming equipment and cattle though full productivity was affected by lack of water. Large fertile land and accumulation of physical capital improved incomes of resettled communities if it is compared with their communal counterparts. However, their incomes were affected by the three-tier pricing structure and the inflationary environment that started post 2018 elections. Households also felt FTLRP had offered them productive working owing to cotton, irrigation farming and sale of forest produce. All these were non-existent in communal areas due to small land pieces and forest degradation. Despite notable challenges in access to social services and infrastructure, food insecurity and water shortages, households felt their general well-being had improved. This shows that land access meant much more than 'agri-livelihood' outcomes as it might have other psycho-social benefits associated with it.

Findings on Beneficiary's Intrinsic Feelings & Practices of Citizenship

Many resettled households developed positive feelings of their socio-cultural values that defined their communitarian citizenship despite being food insecure, having modest incomes, water and social services challenges. This reveals that land access only brought a sense of belonging, positive identity, and power as the formerly landless rural poor were integrated to the community of landowners at community and national levels. It also made them belong to the 'community of commercial farmers' which was all 'white' before FTLRP as some went into cotton and irrigation farming. Land ownership brought feelings of belonging important for creating virtuous and responsible communities.

The constitution of Zimbabwe states that land reform enables households to re-assert their rights and instill sense of belonging for the long disadvantaged rural poor. Accessing many political, civil and social rights remained a principle to many resettled households in Maware and Peter Wenhamo A1 farms. Except for a few economic rights, many rights were not accessible due to politicisation of fast track and limited budgetary support to actualise some of the rights. Lack of proper land documents also affected households to fully exercise many of their civil and political rights fearing eviction from farms, meaning delayed regularising of land ownership fought the very rights land reform wanted to promote. For the resettled households, actualisation of their rights to land, work and 'property' was enough to inculcate feelings of belonging. These economic rights overshadowed other rights that had not been made real. Settlers' long history of landlessness and land 'hunger' made them regard some economic rights as 'more equal' than other rights, generating feelings of belonging and dignified lives. To further improve their sense of

belonging, households had to shoulder the responsibilities to actualise some of their rights. They believed that government had done its part by formalising land invasions, thereby making them belong to the community of landowners. It was now their role to actualise their other rights, further improve their sense of well-being by participating in local economic development.

Intrinsic feeling of self, identity and belonging had not only shaped socially responsible citizens but also households that were environmentally responsible. Though households had been resettled in farms formerly used as game ranches, they had adopted environmentally friendly methods to safeguard their assets, lives and crops against stray wild animals. These methods also helped to protect wildlife resources that were found in their areas and strayed from the nearby conservancies. Adoption of friendly methods followed long periods of studying the behavior of these wild animals. So fast track improved environmental knowledge of resettled communities dispelling allegations that settlers engaged in unsustainable behaviors.

8.3 Conclusion

This study sought to understand how FTLRP and its livelihood outcomes had shaped socio-cultural values and practices that define citizenship among A1 settler communities in Chiredzi district. Based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that land ownership initiated by spontaneous land reforms had instilled positive values and practices of citizenship despite households experiencing notable challenges such as lack of ancillary support, low productivity, food insecurity and environmental burdens. Lewis (2005) defined development as a positive change or progress in Africa. It, therefore, means FTRLRP led to development since it inculcated a positive change in the sense of citizenship among beneficiaries (a new dimension of development). Though beneficiary communities experienced some negatives in livelihood outcomes, lack of land permits and partisan politics that later replaced developmental politics, but this did not affect beneficiary communities' sense of well-being and subsequently socio-cultural values (social identity and belonging) that define citizenship. This confirms a view by Hodgins (2018) that positive well-being is not only underpinned on sustainable livelihoods but also a positive sense of belonging. Land ownership, therefore, achieved much more than 'agri-livelihood' outcomes, as it restored colonially undermined socio-cultural values and benefits that define liberal, African and communitarian citizenship. Land reform brings some intrinsic benefits that cannot be measured using economic and livelihood indices. Therefore, evaluation of the impact of redistributive land reforms should now broaden and move beyond these traditional indicators to include

citizenship as a new component of development policies. Land invasions united the rural poor with divergent political ideologies and from different regional areas, though partisan politics was now threatening this value important for the social fabric and inclusive citizenship. While access to some political, civil and social rights was a challenge, resettled communities felt the right to agricultural land, work and first set of the property rights bundle were more important than some civil and social rights. For the rural poor, economic rights (such as the right to land, property and work) are 'more equal' to the other rights, hence create a sense of belonging. Actualisation of these few rights was enough to promote feelings of enhanced well-being and resultantly socio-cultural values that defined African and communitarian citizenship though other rights remained in principle.

Though FTLRP is castigated for beneficiary emplacement before ancillary support, it can also be concluded that it inculcated a sense of self-reliance and entrepreneurship among resettled communities as they worked to actualise unfilled rights. Performances/practices of active citizenship that started with the spontaneous land reform in 2000 continued as households shouldered the responsibility to actualise many unmet rights individually and collectively. Households teamed up to build social services lacking in their AI farms, an indication of the existence of virtuous and responsible communities that participate in local economic development. This advanced a new notion of development where citizens become self-sufficient and turn challenges into opportunities for local participation and human agency. Such community initiatives create not only feelings of belonging but promote a sense of ownership and responsible use of social services, in line with sustainable citizenship. It was from 'insurgent practices of citizenship' to gain access and control of land through farm invasion to peaceful 'practices of citizenship' to actualise other unmet rights that further enhance socio-cultural values that define African and communitarian citizenship.

It was also concluded that gaining access, control of land and enhancement of socio-cultural values lead beyond practices to enhance opportunities and rights but create environmental subjects who care for their environmental resources. Households in Chiredzi district were resettled in game ranches but engaged in sustainable actions to manage human-wildlife conflicts despite threats to their livelihoods posed by these wild animals. While lack of planning during FTLRP affected the mainstreaming of environmental issues in the program local people had to

adopt an entrepreneurial mindset and tap into the rich indigenous knowledge systems to sustainably resolve environmental ills and injustices they faced in the former game ranches.

These findings are consistent with an argument in The Zimbabwe Human Development Report (2003) which stated that access to land can achieve intrinsic values that define citizenship even in the absence of economic development. Dande and Mujere (2015) further argued that African land reforms and in particular the Zimbabwe's FTLRP have become contentious because the debate has largely focused on the narrow developmental (agri-livelihood) impact of land reform. Findings from this study were also in harmony with Chipkin's (2003) that rural development policies go beyond livelihoods and economic needs of citizens to reproduction of intrinsic values of citizenship and the making of active citizens. This study followed Gutto's (2014) line of argument for a re-conceptualisation of land reforms in African and modern epistemology. Some beneficiaries may have different expectations of the land reform process, where findings revealed that land access is connected to socio-cultural values that define citizenship. Findings from this study appear to support the argument for a reconceptualisation of African land reforms beyond economic development and sustainable livelihoods to include their impact on citizenship. However, the findings of my qualitative ethnographic study are limited to Chiredzi district A1 schemes. The sample size of 40 participants was small making it difficult to generalise findings from this study to other cases outside Chiredzi district.

Other researchers can also consider undertaking narrower but detailed studies on the impact of FTLRP on individual components of the liberal, African and communitarian citizenship (rights, social identity, belonging and power). This will allow analysing theories of social identity or belonging in the context of redistributive land reforms so as to understand how the latter influences individual socio-cultural values (such as social identity, humanity and belonging). Also, possible areas for further research can include an understanding on how 21st century land reforms enhance resettled communities with a holistic environmentally entrepreneurial mindset that turn challenges into platforms for active citizenship. FTLRP emphasised on beneficiary emplacement before social services and resolution of environmental burdens, hence settlers were supposed to be entrepreneurial and promote local economic development. Future research might also focus on whether post independent African land reforms transformed previously marginalised indigenes from colonially induced subjecthood to citizenship.

A number of recommendations, therefore, can be made. Since belonging is connected to a place one calls home, there is need for government to complement and improve fast track farms by providing social services and infrastructure. This will improve belonging and remove the negative label 'kumapurazi' (prazeros-) associated with underdevelopment. While locals are actively involved in local development, construction of certain social services and infrastructure requires technical expertise for them to meet certain standards. Access to these improve access to certain rights but also help to create belonging at national level. FTLRP was a spontaneous land reform, hence gender mainstreaming was a challenge. Since government has called for downsizing of farms, gender issues should be considered to reduce differentiated access, control of land and subsequently gendered belonging in resettlement areas. Appropriate policies that support farming activities of A1 households will improve not only food security but reduce multidimensional poverty (that is, poverty of income, social identity, dignity and belonging). As households produce more, they become food secure and also become 'visible' at community and national level as they contribute to the economy, thereby enhancing their social identity and belonging. While households resettled in and on margins of ranches/conservancies adopted sustainable actions to manage human-wildlife conflicts, they should also be involved in sustainable utilisation and management of wildlife if they are to continue being environmentally responsible. Government in conjunction with conservancy owners should also erect fences around wildlife zones to protect resettled communities from environmental injustices associated with living in and with wild animals.

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APPENDIX I: Interview Questions for Land Beneficiaries

My name is Mutanda Gideon W, a PhD student at the University of Witwatersrand Johannesburg. I'm carrying out a research study in Chiredzi District resettlement schemes. My research topic is titled, "From livelihoods to citizenship. The redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe". This research study is purely academic and research results will be published as a PhD thesis and journal articles. Names of respondents will only be published as pseudo names. You are kindly requested to answer the interview questions as honestly as possible.

Section A: Experiences of Fast Track Process.

Q1: Why was the FTLRP named 'Third Chimurenga' (3rd war of liberation) in Zimbabwe?

Q2: How did you get land during FTLRP?

Q3: How do you view the inclusivity of the FTLRP?

Q4: What is your comment on the tenure security post resettlement?

Section B: Livelihoods Changes Post-FTRLRP

Q5: How did FTLRP change your livelihood options?

Q6: What can you say about asset ownership before and after resettlement?

Q7: How do you view your family's food security for all the years you have been here?

Q8: What is your perception of your income status post resettlement?

Q9: How did FTLRP change your annual working days?

Q10: What is your view of your general well-being now?

Section C: Perceptions and Practices of Citizenship Post-FTRLRP

Q11: Can you comment on how FTLRP influenced your self-identity?

Q12: In what ways did land access influence your sense of belonging?

Q13: How did the FTLRP affect power dynamics in the country?

Q14: How did land access influence access to the different types of rights?

Q15: What are you doing to solve obstacles to full citizenship?

Q16: How did land access change your attitude towards environmental resources in former white commercial farms?

Q17: In what way are you involved in the protection of environmental resources?

APPENDIX II: Interview Questions for Key Informants

1 Why did fast track take a different approach from the previous land reforms?

2 How inclusive was the fast track?

3 What are the feelings of the resettled households towards their land ownership?

4 What were the livelihood highlights during FTLRP?

5 Do land beneficiaries feel they are full citizens after land access?

6 What is the state of rights for land beneficiaries?

7 In what ways are settlers involved in enhancing their full citizenship?

8 How did land access shape the environmental beliefs and actions of resettled households?

APPENDIX III: Items for Observation

- Quality of social services in resettlement area.
- Lifestyle of local resettled households.
- Freedoms of people in the villages.
- Assets owned by people in the area.
- Actions to protect environmental resources.

APPENDIX IV: Livestock Pens made using Mopane Poles and 'Live' Fenced

