DEMOCRACY
 13 - 1 5 JULY 1994
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 HISTORY WORKSHOP
 THE ANTI-AMIN RESISTANCE IN RETROSPECT:
 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE UGANDAN EXILE ORGANISATIONS TOWARDS
 DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN UGANDA, 1972-1979
 Balam Nyeko
 National University of Lesotho
The Anti-Amin Resistance in Retrospect: The Contribution of
 The Ugandan Exile Organisations Towards Democratic Change in
 Uganda. 1972-1979.
 By Balam Nyeko,
 National University of Lesotho.
 Abstract - The contemporary debate on democracy and change in
 Africa appears to have largely concentrated on the current and
 future role of political parties and the relative merits and
 demerits of multi-party politics vis-a-vis single party rule
 during the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of Uganda, little
 attention has been paid to the historical background to the
 present. In particular, a major lacuna has been the role played
 by organisations based outside the country for most of the 1970s
 in the struggle to remove the regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979) from
 power in Uganda. This paper seeks to make a contribution towards
 filling this gap by critically considering the part played by
 such organisations in the anti-Amin resistance which culminated
 in the formation of the Uganda National Liberation Front in March
 1979 and the establishment of the first post-Amin government a
 month later. While recognizing the proliferation of similar
 bodies in exile particularly in the period 1976-79, this paper
 concentrates on two Zambia-based groups, the Uganda Liberation
 Group (Z) and the Uganda National Movement.
THE ANTI-AMIN RESISTANCE IN RETROSPECT: THE CONTRIBUTION OF
 THE UGANDAN EXILE ORGANISATIONS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN
 UGANDA, 1972-1919.
 Balam Nyeko,
 National University of Lesotho.
 Introduction
 The starting point of this preliminary study of the anti-Amin
 resistance is the removal of the regime from power in April 1979.
 With the benefit of hindsight, several scholars have debated the
 question whether the action amounted to the 'liberation' of the
 peoples of Uganda and signalled the beginning of a return to
 democratic rule or whether it was merely the prelude to yet
 another phase in the struggle for the achievement of true
 "people's power" or popular'democracy1. Among the most frequently
 repeated questions in the aftermath of the Amin regime's fall was
 the extent to which the 'returnees' or exiles had contributed to
 the 'liberation' of the country and whether the local civilian
 population inside the country had been largely passive observers
 through the years. Given the brutality and viciousness of the
 regime, an impression had been created that no popular resistance
 was possible internally. On arrival in Kampala, the exiles and
 :M. Mamdani, 'Uganda Now', Ufahamu, 15, 3(1986/87),33-53; B.
 Nyeko, 'The Background to the Political Instability in Post-Amin
 Uganda1, ibid.,11-32;A. Omara-Otunnu, 'The Struggle for Democracy
 in Uganda1/ Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 3 (1992) ,443-463.
the Tanzanian military officers who had backed them in the anti-
 Amin war compounded the situation by camping at the country's
 most expensive and exclusive hotels in strikingly luxurious
 circumstances that contrasted sharply with the poor state in
 which the vast majority of the Ugandan populace lived. The
 social tension that this gave rise to within a very short period
 was self-evident23.
 For the scholar of Uganda's contemporary history, the above
 picture surely draws attention to important questions relating
 to such issues as the nature of 'popular resistance', the links
 between internal and external movements, the role of the
 extraneous factor (i.e foreign elements such as the participation
 of the Tanzanian troops and the role of Libya), the nature of the
 political alignments amongst Ugandans both at home and in exile,
 and the ever-present question of national leadership4. This paper
 examines the part played by the short-lived exile organisation
 based in Zambia which came to be known as the Uganda Liberation
 Group (Z) in the period 1977-79 and not only participated in the
 controversial Moshi Unity Conference of March 1979 but was
 represented in all the four post-Amin governments in Uganda from
 April 1979 to December 1980. An attempt will be made to relate
 2An indication of this tension comes from S.Lwanga-
 Lunyiigo's unpublished papers where he observes that some
 '"liberators" felt they were entitled to the fruits of ...
 "liberation"'. Cited in Phares Mutibwa, Uganda Since
 Independence,London: Hurst, 1992, p. 153.
 3.
 'some of these issues have been tackled by C.
 Gertzel,'Uganda after Amin: the continuing search for leadership
 and control',African Affairs,19,3X7(Oct.1980),461-489 and in her
 previous writings on Uganda.
the discussion to the issues identified above. On the basis of
 the available evidence, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
 operations of organisations such as the ULG(Z) and such similar
 bodies were best suited for the realisation of short-term answers
 to the social and political objectives of the membership, rather
 than for the achievement of long-term democratic change in the
 country. This surely helps explain why the Uganda National
 Liberation Front (UNLF), the umbrella organisation formed at
 Moshi in northern Tanzania in March 1979, was unable to transform
 itself into a political party or indeed to establish a stable
 administration once the Amin regime had collapsed5.
 Sources and Some Recent Interpretations
 The study of comparatively recent political history is, of
 course, replete, with several difficulties. One such difficulty
 relates to sources. Apart from contemporary newspaper reports
 from both inside Uganda and the outside world, the more
 established and regular overseas periodical publications such as
 Africa Confidential, Africa Diary: Weekly Diary of African
 Events, Africa Contemporary Record etc, and a few documents
 issued by the organisations themselves, one must rely on the
 personal testimony of some of the participants as well as one's
 own personal observation. Axiomatically, the information garnered
 from individual participants will be coloured by their desire,
 in nearly all the cases, to justify themselves while explaining
 'Phares Mutibwa's recent Uganda Since Independence offers a
 fascinating account of the activities of the 'liberators'. His
 interpretation of the Amin regime seems to rest on a theory that
 can best be described as reflecting Uganda's self-inflicted
 agony. See especially pp.85 and 120.
their own particular role in the events they describe. Another
 type of difficulty emanates from the fact that for all its
 universally acclaimed virtues in scholarship, objectivity in the
 study of a subject such as this one is particularly elusive6.
 That the literature on the Idi Amin regime and its fall from
 power is copious and continues to grow is commonplace and has
 been remarked upon by several scholars. Indeed, the spate of
 books and articles on it in the 197O's and early 1980's may be
 cited as a rather fine example of the construction of populist
 'instant history'. What is less well known, however, is the
 origins of the UNLF itself and its antecedents. It is easy enough
 to appreciate the inability of the UNLF to survive the heady
 politics of the first few months of post-Amin Uganda. Yet it
 would appear to be perfectly legitimate to set its activities
 within a historical context in order to begin to understand the
 present.
 There have, for example, been several interpretations of the
 Moshi Unity Conference which gave birth to the UNLF. One of the
 most detailed accounts of the background and formation of the
 organisation was Daniel Omara-Atubo's mimeograph7. A young
 Makerere graduate from northern Uganda, Omara-Atubo had spent his
 exile days in Kenya and Tanzania and had himself participated in
 the Moshi Conference as a delegate of the 'Moshi Group', one of
 the numerous organizations represented there. Interestingly, he
 is described in one of the Conference Documents as 'Conference
 sThis topic was briefly alluded to in Nyeko,'Background to
 political instability ...' Ufahamu, ibid.
 7D. Omara-Atubo, Why? The Uganda National Liberation Front,
 The Gospel of Liberation, (Moshi, Tanzania, 1979).
 5
Organizer, Moshi'5. His account is basically a factual narrative
 of the manoeuvring in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that
 preceded the actual summoning of the various exile groups to
 Moshi. It is also an interpretation of the proceedings of the
 conference itself. If Omara-Atubo's pamphlet generally steers
 clear of controversy over Moshi, it is quite obvious why
 Professor Gertzel's scholarly and hence understandably neutral
 discussion of the birth of the UNLF has relied upon it
 substantially6. Gertzel stresses the fragility of the new
 organization, pointing up especially the older social and
 political divisions within the Ugandan body politic which the
 UNLF does not appear to have overcome even as it declared itself
 united in the anti-Amin struggle. This account contrasts sharply
 with the pieces written by participants such as Dan Nabudere, a
 member of the Dar es Salaam organising committee - the 'Gang of
 Four' as they were described by their political opponents - who
 later became an official in the UNLF government. It is also a
 more balanced account compared with the interpretations offered
 by the major political contestants at the time such as Obote and
 Museveni7. While all three can be faulted for being clearly self-
 justifying, they nevertheless provide extremely useful glimpses
 into the story from 'within' . Nabudere vigorously defends his Dar
 es Salaam group against charges that they acted undemocraticaily
 ^Africa Contemporary Record, vol. X (1978-79),p.B445.
 6Gertzel,'Uganda after Amin', p.462-6$.
 7D. W. Nabuciere,Imperialism ? and Revolution in Uganda,
 London: Onyx Press; Dar es Salaam: T.P.H, 1980, p. 331-46; Speech
 Delivered by A. Milton Obote at Kolqlo Airstrip, Kampala, on 7th
 June, 1980 (Typescript); Y. Museveni, Selected Articles on the
 Uganda Resistance War, Kampala: NRM Publications, 1985.
in literally hand-picking delegates to the Moshi Conference and
 excluding those groups - such as Obote's UPC - with whose
 political views they disagreed. He is particularly critical of
 the UPC and the ULGC2), both of whom he correctly labels as pro-
 Obote. He accuses them of disrupting the conference through
 raising numerous points of order8. Museveni, on the other hand,
 appears.to have adopted a staunchly 'militarist' approach by
 insisting that representation of the various organisations
 present at Moshi should be based on their military strength.
 However, his claims to a considerable military following within
 Uganda around this time appears to have been rather exaggerated
 and were certainly questioned by his political opponents. Obote's
 own views on the Moshi Conference, which he was to repeat several
 times during his second Presidency, were that the meeting had
 been manipulated to marginalize his own party9. This position was
 shared by the ULG(Z), which under the newly assumed - but
 unacknowledged - name of the 'Clean Uganda Movement' (CUM),
 issued a document in Lusaka soon after the Moshi Conference
 questioning several aspects of the proceedings and decisions of
 the meeting. Entitled New Uganda 1979-1980: Comments on the Moshi
 Conference, the Uganda National Liberation Front, the Office of
 the President in the New Uganda, and the Role of Comrade Obote,
 the document was extremely critical of the Dar es Salaam-based
 Conference.Organisers.
 The Origins of the ULG(Z)
 In its manifesto which was formally adopted at a meeting
 %abudere, Imperialism and Revolution ...,p.334.
 ^Speech at Kololo Airstrip.
 7
 ^
held in Lusaka on March 12, 1978, the ULG(Z) recognized that 'the
 task of liberating Uganda [required] the joint efforts of many
 forces within and outside Uganda'10. A striking aspect of the
 document was its emphasis on unity and the need to 'mobilize ...
 the workers, peasants, the youth, intellectuals and all popular
 democratic organizations of ... Ugandans'. Among its professed
 organisational principles were 'a democratic and unified
 discipline [system]', 'democratic consultations' and 'collective
 leadership, collective responsibility and individual
 accountability'11. Membership was open to any Ugandan 'of the
 apparent age of 15 years and above', which would have included
 children of the adult exiles themselves. The manifesto does not,
 however, specifically state that residence in Zambia was indeed
 a pre-requisite for membership although this was clearly implied
 in the organization's name. Finally, one of the provisions of the
 manifesto that was used by the leadership in October 1978 to
 declare its agreement to work with Obote was item 6 of Article
 Ten, entitled 'Powers of General Meetings'. These included the
 power 'to determine or approve other persons, groups or
 organisations with .which the ULG may conduct negotiations for the
 purpose of forging unity, a merger, cooperation .,.'12.
 Given the background of the majority of the Ugandan citizens
 who had arrived as exiles in Zambia from 1971 onwards, it was not
 surprising that the social composition of the ULG(Z) membership
 "The Uganda Liberation Group (in Zambia): The Manifesto,
 Lusaka, March 12, 1978 (Typescript) ?, p. 1.
 1!Ibid, p.2.
 I2Ibi<3, p.10.
reflected their- middle class status. Comprising'?.^almost
 exclusively professionals such as doctors, school teachers,
 lawyers, University lecturers and students, the group clearly
 belonged to the strata of educated Ugandan elites for whom it was
 relatively easy to start a new life outside their own country.
 Significantly, there were hardly any former politicians or army
 officers within their ranks; they all lacked any solid previous
 experience in government and the majority were probably
 apolitical. Moreover, their physical separation from Uganda
 obviously compounded their lack of touch With the masses. Thus
 the founding - and only - Chairman of the Group was the
 relatively elderly but rather bland and colourless Emmanuel A.
 Oteng, a former High Court judge who was now working for the
 Zambian government; the Secretary was S.K. Kabogorwa, a lecturer
 in Adult Education at the University of Zambia who had previously
 worked as an administrator in the Uganda Public Service. Other
 key members of the group who were subsequently to become Cabinet
 Ministers in the Binaisa government of 1979-80 - and who were in
 the group labelled by Colin Legum as the UPC/pro-Obote faction
 of the National Consultative Council (NCC) of the Uganda
 National Liberation Front (UNLF) 1 3- include A.K. Tiberondwa, an
 education lecturer at the University of Zambia and J.K. Luwuliza-
 Kirunda, a medical doctor working at the University Teaching
 Hospital in Lusaka and subsequently (from 1981) Secretary General
 of Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC).
 In terms of its origins, this group may be traced to early
 13C. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and
 Documents, vol. XII (1979-1980), p. B348-B349.
1977 when a number of Ugandan students met informally in Lusaka
 to discuss issues related to their welfare in Zambia in
 particular and to the possible co-operation' with other Ugandan
 students' exile organizations in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam more
 generally. As was the case with the other such similar groups
 outside Uganda, ttie students' organisation in Zambia, though
 clearly aligned politically with UPC sympathisers such as A.K.
 Tiberondwa and others, was extremely cautious about engaging in
 overt political activity that might place their relatives back
 in Uganda at risk. This is quite evident from the tone of the
 exchange of letters - in the form of open circulars dated April
 1977 - between themselves and the Uganda Students Association of
 Dar es Salaam University (USAD). While the conflict between the
 two,student groups seemed to centre on the internal and external
 ramifications of the USAD president's controversial action in
 despatching a telegram to Gadaffi condemning him and Amin, the
 principal message from the USAD was that the rather more militant
 approach to resistance apparently advocated by the Zambia-based
 group was both 'adventurist and undemocratic'14. In reality,
 however, the divergence of opinion appears to have been closely
 intertwined with the perceived position of the Zambia-based
 student group which was known to be pro-Obote and that of the Dar
 students, which appears to have been greatly influenced by the
 }*Ms in author's possession: Uganda Students at the
 University of Zambia - a bunch of muddleheaded reactionaries, 26
 April 1977 by A. Magara; The Disgraced Byamugisha's Sheep - The
 Uganda Students at UNZA, 30 April 1977 by A.B. Kayonga; and
 Chairman, USAD, to The President of Uganda, 23 March 1977. The
 USAD documents vigorously defend Rugumayo and Nabudere gainst
 charges by a 'Patriot' based in Lusaka accusing both gentlemen
 as 'sellouts', 'traitors' and 'Amin's bootlickers' for having
 worked under him.
 .10
Nabudere-led group of academics working at the University. For
 most of its first year of ^ existence, however, the ULG(Z) - like
 its counterparts elsewhere in East Africa and Europe - was
 largely pre-occupied with the social welfare of its members and
 the, countering of the Amin propaganda by disseminating as much
 information as possible about the reality on the ground inside
 Uganda. Other concerns included the organisation of relief for
 newly arrived exiles, the holding of discussions on Uganda and
 the search for educational scholarships for Ugandan refugees15.
 An accurate record of the exact numbers is unavailable, but an
 estimate of the total membership within Lusaka cannot have been
 much more than a hundred and fifty at most. As the Tanzania-
 Uganda conflict broke out during October 1978, the group openly
 declared its support for the war and pledged.to work with Obote.
 Members were encouraged to make financial contributions for 'the
 war effort' and several officials of the group made extended
 visits to Dar es Salaam between January and April 197916. When
 the Moshi unity conference was announced for March 1979, the
 ULG(Z) was one of the first organisations to claim
 representation. Apart from the tension created by the group's
 arguments with the Dar organisers of the conference, the ULG(Z)
 faced its own internal difficulties in the aftermath of the
 ?'This entailed collaboration with similar groups overseas.
 For comparison, see Secretary's Report, 1977/78, in Umoja:
 Ugandan Voices, A Publication of the Uganda Group for Human
 Rights (UGHR) (London), no. l(Aug.-Nov. 1978), p.3-5. In Zambia,
 some of the social programmes of the ULG(Z) were co-ordinated by
 A.K. Tiberondwa, a member of the organisation's Executive
 Committee.
 ^Personal information from A.K. Tiberondwa, one of those
 who spent nearly three months in Dar 'co-ordinating the war
 effort1.
 11
meeting when some members queried the criteria for the choice of
 the group's representation. It appeared momentarily that these
 differences might lead to a split along 'tribal' lines17.
 The ULG(Z) in Historical Perspective
 In her study- of post-Amin. Uganda, Gertzel notes that by
 April 1979 the 'old divisions in local society' within Uganda had
 tragically not been destroyed by the Amin regime18. These
 divisions were certainly reflected in the exile politics
 conducted in Zambia. In August 1977, for instance, a clandestine
 unity meeting of various Ugandan exile groups from East Africa,
 Europe and the Americas was held in Lusaka. Although the Uganda
 National Movement (UNM) was formed at this meeting, it turned
 out to have been stillborn. More ominously, however, the UNM -
 whose leader was the Crown Prince of Ankole Kingdom, John
 Barigye, turned diplomat - comprised largely the anti-UPC
 elements, thus setting it in direct opposition to the ULG(Z)19.
 Yet a further significant and potentially extremely dangerous
 difference was that while the ULG(Z) membership comprised largely
 exiles hailing from northern and eastern Uganda, the UNM was
 evidently an organisation of Ugandans mainly from the southern
 and western regions of the country. This polarisation of the
 'This emerged at the group's first post-Moshi meeting in
 early April 1979, when it was claimed that Acholi members were
 left out and it appeared to some critics that loyalty to the
 group was judged by closeness to the UPC leadership. Personal
 communication.
 13Gertzel, 'Uganda after Amin', p. 477.
 i3Gertzel, 'Uganda after Amin', p. 464-5; Nyeko, 'Background
 to political instability', p. 24.
 12
exile population fitted neatly into the 'tribal' interpretation
 of the recent colonial and post-colonial history of Uganda which
 has attracted a considerable amount of comments from various
 scholars20.
 Students of the colonial history of Uganda have long
 recognized the way in which the country was often regarded as
 comprising these two major divisions. Whether one agrees with
 this classification or not, the socio-economic differences
 between the 'north' and the 'south' were clearly sharpened by
 colonialism itself over the years. An import ant.legacy was the
 unequal economic power-sharing in post-colonial Uganda. The
 creation of the ULG(Z), as with other exile bodies, was most
 indirectly a product of this legacy21.
 Resistance pre-1977: an illusion?
 ' As noted earlier, the image of the exiles and the Tanzanian
 troops who stormed into Kampala in April 1979 as the real
 'liberators' of Uganda has rightly been questioned. For within
 a short period, the country was disenchanted with the political
 malaise which the UNLF itself seemed to generate through the
 numerous internal squabbles and endless debates and arguments.
 Moreover, both the socio-economic and security situation in the
 country appeared no better than previously. Ugandans had been
 ^See, for example, Y. Tandon, 'Elements of continuity and
 change between Obote and Museveni: some lessons from Obote's rule
 for Museveni's government1, Ufahamu, vol. 15, no. 3(1986/87),
 p.79-97; M. Mamdani,'NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power' (Makerere
 University,1988).
 the way in which 'history' impacted on the activities
 of some of the political actors in post-Amin Uganda during 1979-
 80, see Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.153.
 13
'liberated' from the tyranny of the Amin regime, but they had
 clearly not yet escaped its legacy. Was 'liberation' then a mere
 catchword for opportunist Ugandan exiles? Or did their activities
 contribute anything significant to Uganda's efforts to resist the
 Amin regime? A related question is to what extent those who cite
 the lack of any re.al organised internal resistance prior to the
 Tanzania-Uganda war in explaining the relative longevity of the
 regime are justified in doing so. We must now turn to a brief
 overview of the internal situation from the coup in January 1971
 to around the middle of 1977.
 There now exist several useful scholarly as well as more
 journalistic studies of this period with particular reference to
 internal efforts at overthrowing the Amin regime. Olara-Otunnu22,
 for example, identifies at least four main forms in which
 resistance was presented. Apart from the Obote-led Dar es Salaam-
 based exiles' abortive invasion of September 1972, there were
 the more clandestine early guerilla activities of Yoweri
 Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). The regime's
 response in both instances was both swift and heavy-handed: the
 post-invasion arrests and massacre of civilians particularly from
 the Acholi and Lango ethnic groups in northern Uganda, regarded
 as Obote's mainstay of support, was widely reported. Similarly,
 the public execution of several alleged FRONASA guerillas in
 February 1973 - each in his home town of Gulu in the.north, Mbale
 in eastern Uganda and Kabale in the south-west - was intended to
 2i01ara-0tunnu, 'The Amin regime: some myths and realities,
 1971 to 1878', Umoja: Ugandan Voices, 1(Aug.-Nov. 1878), p.13-18.
 For comparison, see P.F.B. Nayenga, 'Myths and realities of Idi
 Amin Dada's Uganda: a review article1, African Studies Review,
 22, 2(Sept,1979), p. 127-38.
 14
demonstrate the regime's determination to stamp out resistance
 . ' ' ? ? "
 T
 "'
  : :
 ' B : - ' : " ? ? $ . ?" " . ' '?  :-?' ' ? - ? ? ? ? ? ? .
 and presumably score maximum deterrent effect. Yet by carrying
 put these executions in nearly all the regions of the country
 Amin had, by default, confirmed the increasingly widespread and
 'national' character of the covert but growing opposition to his
 government23. Thirdly, from as early as. July 1971 and throughout
 the regime's existence, several internal military plots and
 assassination attempts on Amin were widely reported. Given the
 increasingly 'militarist' character of the regime as the years
 passed, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that these plots
 and conflicts would surely have amounted to little more than a
 palace coup had they succeeded. . .
 Finally, several other instances of opposition usually cited
 include the strike action by the Kilembe Copper Mines workers in
 1973, and the students' challenge to the government through their
 National Union of Students (NUSU) organisation and the Makerere
 Students' Guild24. A major turning point in the resistance
 movement was the February 1977 murder of Archbishop Janani Luwum
 and two Cabinet Ministers by the regime'. This: also clearly
 marked the Church's entry point into open criticism of the Amin
 government's excesses25. By this stage, both internal and
 external resistance had become a great deal more intense and
 "it ought to be noted, though, that up to this point Amin
 still enjoyed considerable support in several parts of the
 country, not least because of his expulsion of the. Asians a few
 months back. See, among others, P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since
 Independence, p.98-100.
 "oiara-Otunnu, 'Myths and Realities'; a useful account is
 B. Langlands, 'Students and politics in Uganda', African Affairs,
 76, 302(Jan. 1977), p.3-20.
 25Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.112ff.
 ' ).:\'i'. . 1 5 . . ?
widespread. Internally, one of its most striking features was
 that it had come to cut across tribe, religion, region as well
 as political and ideological orientation. Externally, the mass
 exodus of refugees after February 1977 provided evidence to the
 outside world that support for the anti-Amin resistance had been
 long overdue. It also acted as a source of inspiration for the
 exiles to emerge in the open.
 As Olara-Otunnu correctly argues, the internal opposition
 to the Amin regime failed to overthrow it because it had been
 'sporadic and isolated' and had not been successfully 'translated
 into a grassroots resistance movement'26. Evidently, there was
 widespread popular discontent but this had not found the avenues
 through which it could be expressed concretely and effectively.
 While this point is commonsensical enough, it does help reiterate
 the argument that resistance was not an illusion, and that it had
 begun as soon as the January coup itself had been carried out27.
 The connections between these internal efforts and the activities
 of the fledgling exile organisations, however, are hard to
 establish at this stage.
 Conclusions
 It will be obvious that the present paper is by no means
 definitive; it is merely an early attempt to construct a research
 agenda for the historical understanding of Ugandan exile politics
 during the Amin years. The UNLF was an umbrella organisation
 comprising a variety of social groups with unclearly defined
 ^Olara-Otunnu,'Myths and Realities',p.15.
 '?See, for example, Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence,p.81.
 16
political ideologies. Its short-!ived existence may have been of
 rather little immediate political consequence for Uganda as it
 fizzled out almost within a year of its formation, but its
 historical significance cannot surely be underestimated. The
 ULG(Z), as a component part of the Front, would similarly seem
 to deserve study. If neither body could be remotely described as
 representing the 'popular will', at the very least their history
 would appear to help explain why the achievement of popular
 democracy in an ex-colony with a such a complex 'tribal' history
 was so complicated.
 As for the possibility of any comparisons that might be
 drawn from here for Southern Africa, it would certainly be rash
 to suggest any at this time, given the underdeveloped nature of
 the study. The working out of a new form of democracy is
 currently under way in Uganda. Clearly, the theme is beyond the
 scope of the present paper, but it may well-be the case that the
 exercise is a vindication of the argument that the country's
 failures in this area were the result of its past. Uganda appears
 to fit neatly into the History Workshop organisers' category of
 a 'poor country' with a history of 'weak state structures'. The
 UNLF and its component parts were the product of this history.
 17