Water International ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rwin20 Assessing the value of third parties in transboundary water governance: a constructivist institutionalism perspective on the Incomati River Basin Thobekile Zikhali-Nyoni To cite this article: Thobekile Zikhali-Nyoni (2025) Assessing the value of third parties in transboundary water governance: a constructivist institutionalism perspective on the Incomati River Basin, Water International, 50:1, 48-69, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015 © 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 28 Jan 2025. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 259 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rwin20 https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rwin20?src=pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015 https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rwin20&show=instructions&src=pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rwin20&show=instructions&src=pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015?src=pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015?src=pdf http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015&domain=pdf&date_stamp=28%20Jan%202025 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015&domain=pdf&date_stamp=28%20Jan%202025 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rwin20 RESEARCH ARTICLE Assessing the value of third parties in transboundary water governance: a constructivist institutionalism perspective on the Incomati River Basin Thobekile Zikhali-Nyoni Department of Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa ABSTRACT This paper examines the role of third parties in shaping transbound- ary water governance in the Incomati River Basin, focusing on the Southern African Development Community, the World Bank, China, and Brazil. The analysis explores how these actors shape power dynamics, foster cooperation, and balance regional interests with local needs. Using Constructivist Institutionalism, the paper reveals how prioritizing shared goals over individual interests fosters effec- tive cooperation. The findings underscore the dual nature of third- party involvement; balancing power while advancing their own agendas, and demonstrate how these actors’ help states navigate complex challenges, bridge gaps and facilitate cooperation in the river basin. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 10 April 2023 Accepted 6 January 2025 KEYWORDS Transboundary water governance; third parties; agency; power; institutions; constructivist institutionalism; Incomati River Basin; Southern Africa Introduction Transboundary water governance is increasingly complex due to the intersecting chal- lenges of climate change, population growth, power asymmetries, and global pandemics like COVID-19. The United Nations Human Development Report asserts that the ‘scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is rooted in power, poverty, and inequality, not in physical availability’ (UNDP, 2006, p. 2). This perspective is supported by substantial evidence indicating that the core issue is governance, rather than a mere water crisis (Mazzucato et al., 2022). Nevertheless, despite these formidable challenges, river basins like the Incomati1 shared by Mozambique, South Africa and Eswatini in Southern Africa (see Figure 1) have successfully fostered and maintained cooperative transboundary water relations (Zikhali, 2019). This raises the question posed by Weinthal et al. (2011): could water challenges indeed act as a catalyst for cooperation? This paper examines the factors contributing to such cooperation in the Incomati River Basin specifically focusing on the critical role of third parties. The Incomati River is of strategic importance to the three countries due to their growing developmental needs dependent on the Incomati watercourse (Zikhali, 2019). CONTACT Thobekile Zikhali-Nyoni thobekilezikhali@yahoo.com WATER INTERNATIONAL 2025, VOL. 50, NO. 1, 48–69 https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015 © 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent. http://www.tandfonline.com https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/02508060.2025.2451015&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2025-02-27 This creates interdependencies among the riparian states and third parties which often lead to cooperation as a panacea for conflict. The involvement of third parties often introduces additional layers of complexities, competing interests and power dynamics into the already intricate dynamics of transboundary water governance (Hayat et al., 2024). Transboundary water governance can be effective if we appreciate the coexistence of cooperation and conflict (Mirumachi, 2015) and consider power dynamics and actor interests in the process (Closas & Villholth, 2020). Failure to consider this and focusing on ticking the boxes for international principles such as equity, sustainable development and information sharing renders governance meaningless (Mirumachi & Hurlbert, 2022). To gain new theoretical insights into transboundary water interactions, this study employs Constructivist Institutionalism to examine the impact of third parties on governance in the Incomati River Basin. The key questions addressed are: How has the involvement of the Southern African Development Community, the World Bank, China and Brazil influenced transboundary water governance in the basin? What value do these third parties add? Do these third parties neutralize or reinforce power asymmetries among riparian states? The paper does not look at third parties as homogeneous but considers their hetero- geneity as a strength due to diverse needs and effects in the river basin. Within the Constructivist Institutionalism framework, the World Bank, the Southern African Development Community, China and Brazil emerge as pivotal players capable of mould- ing the identities and behaviour of Incomati riparian states, aligning them with Figure 1. Map of the Incomati River Basin. Source: Slinger et al. (2010, p. 4). WATER INTERNATIONAL 49 cooperative efforts and the progressive pursuit of development goals. Through capacity- building initiatives, norm entrepreneurship and diplomatic engagement, alongside navi- gating institutional evolution, these third-party actors cultivate shared understandings, trust and collaborative practices among stakeholders. The role of third parties in transboundary water governance Transboundary water governance is the regulation and management of shared water resources within a river basin focusing on interactions among multiple stakeholders to ensure equitable and sustainable use. These interactions are power laden by nature and this impacts agency at different levels (Hanasz, 2017; Jiménez et al., 2020; Mirumachi & Hurlbert, 2022). The multifaceted challenges faced during interactions may necessitate third-party involvement to address them effectively. The primary goal of third parties is to assist or persuade the states sharing a river basin on issues related to development or foreign policy (Van Genderen & Rood, 2011). The justification to involve either endo- genous or exogenous third parties in the governance process is their impartiality and credibility to create a conducive environment beyond historical grievances, power asym- metries or political tensions (Sneddon, 2007). Riparian states may openly decide to involve third parties in mediating disputes or to assist in infrastructure development projects. This openness to invite third parties, often referred to as the ‘apertura’, is a pivotal moment where riparian stakeholders acknowledge the need for third-party assistance to solve water-related challenges that they may not be able to resolve inde- pendently. The conditions leading to ‘apertura’ vary and may include climate change impacts (Dellapenna & Gupta, 2008); institutional changes (Allan & Mirumachi, 2010); the influence of international norms such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that encourage third-party involvement (Dellapenna & Gupta, 2008); and capacity gaps within the institutional and legal frameworks (Wolf et al., 2003). Sneddon (2007) considers third parties to be neutral mediators capable of bridging differences and finding mutually beneficial solutions. The neutral platform created by third parties allows riparian states to build trust among each other. Trust building is crucial and actors should have trust building skills to be effective in negotiation. Keskinen et al. (2023) cite lack of trust as one of the major reasons hindering Eastern Nile states’ cooperation. According to Wolf et al. (2003), third parties may be valuable due to their technical expertise in governing shared waters that can be transferred to build the capacity of basin states and support the development of infrastructure. Through financial support, third parties are capable of closing the funding gap; promote the implementa- tion of development projects and cooperative initiatives (Sadoff & Grey, 2002; Wolf et al., 2003). Another valuable aspect about third parties is norm diffusion, whereby they promote the adoption of international norms and a shared identity among riparian states (Dinar & Dinar, 2009). The shared identity may elicit a culture of cooperation, which may lead to equitable and sustainable management of shared water resources. Despite the positive value that third parties bring in transboundary water governance, there are varying perceptions of their involvement in developing countries. While some see them as agents of colonialism (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017), others see them as an important component for democracy (Biswas, 2011; Sadoff et al., 2008). Third parties may produce ‘hegemonic ideologies’ (Furlong, 2006, p. 449) or a ‘crisis of values’ 50 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI (Shikhani, 2012, p. 7). For example, in Mozambique the influx of third parties has enabled individualism compared to collectivism and eroded the significant value of indigenous knowledge in Africa (Shikhani, 2012). The rise of third parties may shift the power dynamics and help iron out differences in a river basin (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017). Third parties may also add their interests to the already competing interests (Turton, 2000). The interests of third parties in trans- boundary water governance require closer examination. Unlike the colonial era, when third-party interests were openly displayed, today these interests are not easily imposed on host territories due to sovereign power of states and the protection by international laws. For instance, Britain’s strong agricultural interests in Egypt led to the 1902 Anglo- Ethiopian Agreement, which aimed to prevent Ethiopia from disrupting water flows to the Nile, essential for British cotton cultivation. Unless third parties’ foreign policy interests align with the vulnerabilities of those they intend to help, the dynamic may remain a complex power struggle. It is crucial to understand what drives third parties to intervene in river basins and what benefits they gain by influencing states to act in ways they otherwise might not have without external resources. China’s growing influence in transboundary water governance marks a departure from Western-backed projects, as its support often bypasses international water princi- ples. For instance, the Chamshir dam was constructed with Chinese financial assistance without following international social and environmental standards. Although China is not a signatory to key global conventions like the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes or the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, its transboundary water usage is still guided by customary international law. These principles have allowed China to engage in regional water governance and secure sufficient water resources for its large population (Wouters et al., 2024). The important role of third parties in facilitating cooperation despite political chal- lenges and conflicting interests is widely documented (Subramanian et al., 2012). The World Bank was a bridge in developing and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in the Lake Ohrid watershed, despite decades of no diplomatic contact between Macedonia and Albania riparian states (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017). Another example is the role played by the World Bank in facilitating cooperation between India and Pakistan in the 1960 Indus Water Treaty despite a history of hostile relations between the two countries. Similar to the Incomati River Basin, this hydro-diplomacy was and still is fraught with challenges such as power asymmetries and growing climate change impacts, which may necessitate the renegotiation of treaty terms. The relationship between India and Pakistan is a great example of how, through the help of third parties, states may cooperate amid other conflictual situations, such as the Indo-Pakistan wars in 19652 and 19713 and the 1999 conflict in Kargil.4 The success of the Indus Treaty is remarkable (Aslam, 2022); however, it has not been a panacea for conflicts such as the Kashmir dispute.5 This is normal as conflict management and not conflict resolution often takes precedence in transnational governance. Likewise, in the Incomati, cooperation against a background of colonialism, autocratic rule in Eswatini, the 1976–92 civil wars in Mozambique, the 1948–94 apartheid system in South Africa and the continued water access disparities within state boundaries could be best described as conflict management or constructed cooperation. The absence of water WATER INTERNATIONAL 51 wars in both rivers may be due to effective institutional designs (Hanasz, 2017) such as the Indus Basin Development Fund in the Indus River (Aslam, 2022). Theoretical framework Transboundary water interactions are better theorized through discursive notions of power, structure and agency in a changing world. According to Hay (1997) power is ‘the ability of actors to have an effect upon the context which defines the range of possibilities for others’ (p. 50, emphasis in the original). More powerful states tend to have decisive power over the activities of the river basin (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). This kind of definitive power over other parties is the basis of the Hydro-Hegemony Framework. The Framework highlights geographic, material, bargaining and ideational power as the four types of power in transboundary water governance (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). The limitation of the Hydro-Hegemony Framework according to Conker in Hussein and Grandi (2017) is its focus on outcomes instead of the complex nature of governance processes and third-party involvement. Hydro-hegemony often focuses on power and material interests but overlooks the extent to which third-party ideational factors can influence transboundary water governance (Furlong, 2008). By promoting ideational factors such as benefit sharing, sustainable development and equitable utilization of water resources, third parties may reshape the perceptions of stakeholders, thereby influencing the trajectory of water governance (Hay, 2006). Another useful framework to understand transboundary water interactions is the Rational Design Framework. This framework describes states as rational and welfare- maximizing entities who cooperate when it is more likely to benefit them (Klaphake & Scheumann, 2006; Sadoff & Grey, 2002). Rationalist frameworks may emphasize material incentives or cost–benefit calculations and overlook important factors such as socializa- tion and normative change (Hay, 2002). For rationalists, states are ‘risk averse’, and they will most likely cooperate in favourable circumstances even with low returns (Koremenos et al., 2001). Similarly, in the Perceived Risks and Perceived Opportunities Framework, Subramanian et al. (2012) argue that states will consider risks and opportunities before deciding to cooperate in a certain area. In the framework, countries will acquiesce to an opportunity that adds value to the country’s developmental needs. Theories like Constructivist Institutionalism, which go beyond material interests and power asymmetries, are essential for understanding the complex, nonlinear and unpre- dictable nature of social interactions, especially those involving third parties (Hay, 2011). Constructivist Institutionalism provides valuable insights into how third-party involve- ment has influenced the trajectory of transboundary water governance in the Incomati River Basin. It emphasizes the role of social norms, beliefs, and ideas in shaping actor behaviour and governance outcomes (Hay, 2002, 2006). Third parties can influence riparian states’ preferences towards cooperation and development goals by diffusing norms, constructing identities and institutionalizing cooperative norms (Hay, 2006). Constructivist Institutionalism suggests that third parties can be norm entrepreneurs who advocate for certain principles in transboundary water governance and influence states to cooperate based on shared norms, such as regional integration and equitable water sharing (Hay, 2006). These norms can be diffused as best practices in transbound- ary water governance through capacity building or diplomatic efforts. Third parties such 52 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI as the Southern African Development Community may shape the identities of riparian states by building a community around water governance and promoting shared values. Important for understanding governance trajectories in the Incomati is the ability of Constructivist Institutionalism to analyse the evolution of institutions (Zikhali-Nyoni, 2021). Through various processes such as mediation and consensus building, third parties may help the Incomati stakeholders overcome barriers to cooperation and sup- port the emergence of new institutional arrangements that are better able to address basin needs and priorities. Through socialization and learning processes, third parties may help facilitate cooperation through building trust, which may lead to homogeneous prefer- ences among actors (Hay, 2006). Constructivist Institutionalism addresses issues that other theories might overlook by considering social, normative and institutional factors, rather than focusing solely on material interests and power. While the role of third parties in facilitating cooperation is acknowledged by many, some theories underestimate the importance of ideational factors and institutional changes. Unlike the Hydro-Hegemonic Framework, which sees third parties as power brokers, Constructivist Institutionalism views them as norm entrepreneurs who can spread best practices across the river basin. By recognizing inherent inequalities among actors, Constructivist Institutionalism advo- cates for the participation of marginalized actors and the promotion of inclusivity and equity, unlike rationalist approaches that may prioritize efficiency over fairness (Hay, 2006, 2011). Methods This paper is based on 43 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2014 and 2019 with stakeholders involved in the Southern African Development Community trans- boundary water governance, particularly in the Incomati River Basin. These stakeholders were purposefully selected for their extensive experience in the field. Using snowball sampling, I interviewed both retired and current government employees, gaining insights into the lasting influence of individuals in transboundary water governance. I also used convenience sampling to gather data from key informants I met at the River and Environmental Management Cooperation (REMCO) conferences in South Africa (2014) and Eswatini (2016). Additionally, the paper draws on participatory observations from the 2016 Stakeholder Workshop in Maragra, Mozambique, led by the Regional Administration of Waters in the South (ARA Sul). During this workshop, held at the Illovo Sugar Estate, I observed the engagement and decision-making processes involving small-scale farmers, sugar industry representatives and third parties. These interactions provided valuable insights into the dynamics of stakeholder involvement in the basin. For Constructivist Institutionalism, understanding the process and outcomes of interactions requires a qualitative case study approach that emphasizes the active role of actors (Hay, 1995). In conversations with participants, I explored the normative aspects of third-party involvement, including their perceived roles and value within the river basin and states. The paper examined third-party dynamics through the perspec- tives of participants from all three states, recognizing that a single country’s view may be incomplete and could obscure critical normative and structural factors in governance. Data collection involved reviewing relevant reports, articles, and policy documents on transboundary water governance, both internationally and within the Incomati River WATER INTERNATIONAL 53 Basin. I took reflective notes immediately after completing interviews to ensure align- ment with research objectives and to document new insights. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically, revealing key themes about third-party involvement, such as their ability to help states navigate political challenges, their roles as norm entrepreneurs, identity shapers, managers of power dynamics, and capacity builders. The value of third parties: lessons from the Incomati River Basin Navigating complexity: the Southern African Development Community as a brokering force The Southern African Development Community is an intergovernmental organization consisting of sixteen states in Southern Africa. It was officially created in 1992, after operating as a ‘development coordinating conference’ opposed to apartheid South Africa since 1980. From being a Coordinating Conference to a Community, the regional organization has withstood a volatile political history, differing governance systems and inherent climate variability. Despite the apartheid government in South Africa and the 16-year-old civil war in Mozambique, the Southern African Development Community has never experienced a water war. The 1994 birth of democracy in South Africa coincided with the first multi-party elections in Mozambique, changing not only the political landscape of the two countries but also the Southern African Development Community’s geopolitical landscape: South Africa joined the community as a democratic country. The core mandate of the Southern African Development Community is to promote economic development, peace, security, regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa (SADC, 2020). Water is central to the socioeconomic development of Southern African Development Community countries (Msangi, 2014). Since all Southern African Development Community states with the exception of two island states depend on shared waters, efficient transboundary water governance is imperative. Southern African Development Community policies have helped the Incomati river basin stakeholders construct coop- erative transboundary relations through their guidance on aspects such as information sharing, sustainable development and equitable distribution of water resources (Zikhali- Nyoni, 2021). Notably, there is the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems (2000) informed by international principles such as the Helsinki Rules (1966) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). The Revised Protocol seeks to promote regional integration, poverty alleviation, sustainable development, and equitable distribution of water, among others (SADC Revised Protocol, 2000). Through their norm entrepreneur- ship such as the guidelines and mechanisms for better water management promoted in the Protocol, the Southern African Development Community may neutralize power differentials in the river basin (Dellapenna & Gupta, 2008), shape the behaviour of states and foster a shared identity, thereby encouraging cooperative outcomes (Hay, 2006). For instance, the Revised Protocol served as a framework for the Tripartite Interim Agreement of 2002 between South Africa, Mozambique and Eswatini. This agreement established principles of equitable and sustainable water use in the Incomati and Maputo river basins, ensuring that smaller states like Eswatini had a platform to negotiate fair 54 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI water sharing arrangements with larger states such as South Africa. By providing a common reference point, the Protocol influenced power dynamics and facilitated cooperation under the shared regional identity fostered by the Southern African Development Community. While the Southern African Development Community faces challenges in its role, to a greater extent, the participants as well as literature reviewed consider the Southern African Development Community as an effective institution. The Southern African Development Community’s ability ‘to alter its existing infrastructure to accommodate a new issue is something that needs to be replicated’ (Strategic Foresight Group, 2011, p. 33). This speaks to the importance of analysing institutional changes as prescribed by Constructivist Institutionalism (Hay, 2002). The Southern African Development Community expanded its mandate by creating the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems to manage water challenges that were threatening integration and security in the region (Strategic Foresight Group, 2011). In the updated Protocol, the Southern African Development Community was able to reshape regional governance to inclusivity after the demise of apartheid. It has also contributed to the evolution of interactions in the basin by promoting current global principles such as the SDGs. Speaking on the effectiveness of the Southern African Development Community’s norms and beliefs, participants 26, 20, 34 and 40 had the following to say: SADC rules help create and maintain order in the river basin. (Participant 26, Maputo, Mozambique, 6 December 2016) The SADC Revised Protocol is like the ‘Bible’ because it ‘guides us towards a vision of peace and security in the region’, (Participant 20, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 December 2016) SADC believes that they can fulfill their vision and so do the states. Such beliefs channel us to cooperation no matter what difficulties we face. (Participant 34, Piggs Peak, eSwatini, 15 February 2016, emphasis added) . . . SADC is an instrumental institution because it makes states accountable to their actions and attempts to iron out the legacy of the past based on the Revised Protocol principles. (Participant 40, Pretoria, South Africa, 30 March 2017) The Southern African Development Community’s role is shaped by the regional identity it promotes, which can at times clash with the national interests of its member states (Zikhali-Nyoni, 2021). Some participants argue that the Southern African Development Community is not always transparent with information affecting transboundary water governance in the region. In hindsight, a proceeding from the 2016 REMCO Conference reveals that information sharing is not only a challenge among states and neither is it about the Southern African Development Community not sharing information with relevant stakeholders. However, the issue is that the Southern African Development Community is not always informed about basin level developments to be able to make decisions that incorporate their needs. This calls for coordination of activities by actors across the river basin. Sharing information with the Southern African Development Community would add value to the work of the Southern African Development Community as they will be able to plan their interventions better (Participant 5, Mbabane, Eswatini, 17 February 2016). The reason why communication and coordina- tion may be difficult in the river basin is that: WATER INTERNATIONAL 55 All the three countries (South Africa, Mozambique and Eswatini) have their national strategies of dealing with problems. Unfortunately even if coordination is encouraged but in an African context, with different administrative levels and capacities it becomes next to impossible to always think the same. Therefore, each country will implement what works best for them. (Participant 28, Maputo, Mozambique, 12 December 2016) According to participant 40, we are still ‘reaping the sins of our former masters’. For the participant, South Africa is a young democracy that is still battling with the effects of apartheid which left an uneven distribution of wealth and opportunities in the country. Mozambique is recovering from several years of civil unrest and is trying to rebuild the infrastructure that was destroyed in the process. Eswatini is under autocratic rule, which may blind us to the internal politics that have a likelihood of empowering the royal elite while disempowering local citizens. Despite the complexity and incompatibility of state needs, the Southern African Development Community serves as a place for socialization and shared identity building which instils trust among riparians (Hay, 2006). The Southern African Development Community faces challenges when it comes to implementation and sustaining its good policies due to inadequate resources and high costs of river basin infrastructure (Zikhali-Nyoni, 2021). One of the participants notes that the problem is not really water scarcity in the river basin but the problem is lack of money for infrastructure development. This supports the assertion that we are faced with a governance problem and not necessarily a water problem (Mazzucato et al., 2022; UNDP, 2006). This leaves the Southern African Development Community with not many choices but to invite third parties, which unfortunately come with stringent conditions (Zikhali-Nyoni, 2021). Despite the stringent conditions associated with third- party involvement, the Incomati states have largely benefited from third-party learning initiatives that facilitate knowledge exchange, capacity building and best governance practices (Hay, 2006). Participants in the study commend the Southern African Development Community for its role in fostering successful projects and facilitating cooperation within the river basin. The principles promoted by the Southern African Development Community such as solidarity, participation, neighbourliness and regional integration resonate with ripar- ian states, motivating them to cooperate when their goals align. A notable example is the Maguga Dam construction project in Eswatini, celebrated for its participatory approach. This project, which prioritized the needs of the poor, involved various stakeholders, including the Southern African Development Community, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, while allowing state actors to retain their decision-making autonomy. Additionally, the governments entrusted decentralized agencies like the Komati Basin Water Authority with the design and implementation, leading to more effective outcomes. This multi-stakeholder governance process highlights the importance of agency in social interactions as emphasized by Constructivist Institutionalism (Hay, 2002). Bridging the gap: the World Bank as a catalyst for cooperation Zawahri (2009) identifies the World Bank as a leading donor and facilitator in transboundary water cooperation, with countries often preferring its involvement over that of foreign governments (Mukhtarov et al., 2021). This preference may be 56 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI linked to the substantial funds the Bank contributes to water governance, includ- ing nearly US$200 million for the Nile Basin Initiative (Zawahri, 2009) and US $800 million for implementing the Indus Water Treaty (Salman, 2003). The World Bank’s global water investment portfolio exceeds US$29 billion (World Bank, 2019a). Varady et al. (2023) explore the duality of the World Bank impact in transboundary water governance. The World Bank adopts a holistic approach to water management, focusing on sustainability, service delivery and resilience building (World Bank, 2019a). Viewing water as an economic good, it prioritizes water pricing, decentralization and stakeholder participation (World Bank, 2019b). By leveraging global knowledge and technical expertise, the Bank tailors solutions to fit local contexts. While the role of the World Bank is often portrayed as technocratic and neutral, with a focus on promoting sustainable development and good governance (Wouters et al., 2024), constructivist institutionalism reveals the underlying influence of neoliberal discourses that prioritize market based solutions. This influence renders the World Bank interventions value- laden, often resulting in water governance models that reinforce power asymmetries and marginalize local interests (Varady et al., 2023). By promoting norms like integrated water resource management and implementing capacity-building initiatives, the World Bank may shape stakeholder behaviour and drive change in the Incomati river basin (Hay, 2006). According to participant 17, the World Bank mainly focuses on institutional building and maintenance to foster cooperation: . . . More importantly, we provide mechanisms to try to help the countries move forward with cooperative joint actions as we have done in the Lesotho Water Highlands Water Project and with the Zambezi Water Commission (ZAMCOM).6 (Participant 17, Pretoria, South Africa, 23 February 2016) When participant 17 says that the World Bank ‘tries to help countries move forward’, we may deduce that their efforts largely manage instead of resolve conflict. This observation is supported by Warner et al. (2013), who argue that cooperative efforts in river basins often lead to conflict management and not resolution. This is similar to the Indus Water Treaty’s success that saw India, who was part of the non-aligned movement, totally opposed to western influence over their decisions, signing the treaty with Pakistan (Aslam, 2022). The most prevalent form of power in post-apartheid era is soft power. This is a diplomatic way of handling conflict compared to the violent methods that were used during apartheid and colonial era. These diplomatic conversations often take place in closed door meetings. Participant 17 narrates that, States are not going to ask you to help them if they think that you are going to take that information and put it up in the public domain. I have three clear examples where I was involved in and we have had to resolve issues between states who had failed to solve their problems for years. We came in, did a bit of analysis, facilitated a process behind the scenes and we were able to solve the problem. The solution benefits not just the countries involved but also the entire river basin. We built trust and that trust was based on the understanding that we are not going to disclose the information, we were not going to publish the paper, we were not going to put it in our website and wave our flag saying this was us. (Participant 17, emphasis added) WATER INTERNATIONAL 57 The quotation highlights the important role individuals play in negotiations. Although their exact words aren’t publicly disclosed, their influence is evident in the outcomes. Despite the controversial nature of these discussions, they showcase the effective broker- ing role of third parties in transboundary water governance (Biswas, 2011). Warner et al. (2013) suggest that this soft power approach reduces the risk of conflict. This scenario reflects what Delbourg and Strobl (2014) describe as ‘negative peace’, where public appearances suggest a lack of cooperation, but privately, stakeholders are content with the status quo. The World Bank requires all riparian states to cooperate prior to their involvement in the river basin (Klaphake & Scheumann, 2006; Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017). Similarly, participant 1 notes that: The World Bank will not invest in a conflicted river, so it needs minimum cooperation or acceptance between and amongst neighbouring states to a certain degree to engage in the building of infrastructure. Therefore, what they do is to get some projects with joint benefits to bring the states together. However, these projects are often controversial; displacing some people due to river works and brings controversy or conflicting interests with other social and environmental NGOs working there. (Participant 1, telephone interview, London, 23 January 2016) Participant 17 disagrees with the above, arguing that: It is not straightforward to say that we would not get involved if there is no consensus as this depends on the nature of the investment and the type of concerns on the table . . .. Again, we would not operate in direct defiance or formal objection from another country. For example, we work closely with all the countries of a river basin. This includes countries outside the investment we will be working in. This is so that we address their concerns and make sure what we are doing is in line with international and regional instruments of cooperation. It is important to note the brokering and financial role that the World Bank played in the construction of the Maguga dam in Eswatini. Before their assistance and financing the project, Mozambique was supposed to comply with the project propositions despite their ongoing contestation of unfair water distribution in the river basin (Van der Zaag & Carmo Vaz, 2002). Through the diplomatic efforts from the World Bank, Southern African Development Community, African Development Bank and other stakeholders, differences were managed and dam constructions in Eswatini (Maguga dam), South Africa (Driekoppies dam) and Mozambique (Corumana dam) began. While the other two dam projects were completed, the construction of the Corumana dam, which began in 1983, was disrupted by political interference from the Mozambican National Resistance Party (RENAMO) and the civil unrest instigated by RENAMO and Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The situation was further aggravated by RENAMO’s alignment with South Africa’s apartheid regime, which hindered regional integration. These regional instabilities likely deterred financial investments, contribut- ing to the dam’s incomplete status during that period. Participant 41 echoes, Some of the problems you really wonder where they come from. A war between RENAMO and FRELIMO can stop development that can benefit people. We are talking about people from the same country who are just preoccupied about grabbing power from each other while our people are suffering. These politicians do not suffer amid crisis because they have 58 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI money. However, our people fail to get access to water because of a disruption of the Corumana dam construction by a rebel movement RENAMO. Some of these problems are not external; donors have nothing to do with that; however, our people choose to focus on things that are not important. (Participant 41, Maputo, Mozambique, 23 May 2017) Relations in the region improved with the demise of apartheid, the independence of Mozambique and through the Inco-Maputo Agreement7 the completion of the Corumana dam is now a priority. The Joint Water Commission (JWC2), which is a bilateral agreement between South Africa and Mozambique on the Incomati waters, meets twice a year to discuss the development progress of the Corumana dam project (Participant 25, Maputo, Mozambique, 5 December 2016). According to Club of Mozambique (2018), the World Bank is committed to resume with the installation of floodgates in the Corumana dam and is funding the dam completion with a - USD25 million estimated budget. The completed dam will have a 1.24 billion cubic metres storage capacity and may contribute to regional food security (Club of Mozambique, 2018). Resettlement plans and building houses for about 132 families are also in the pipeline. Corumana dam is also expected to be a solution to salt water affecting the cities (Participant 22). The completion of the dam is part of World Bank’s water and sanitation projects in Mozambique, which have an approximate value of US$600 million, highlighting Mozambique’s heavy reliance on external funding for hydraulic projects. Shikhani (2012) notes that 51% of Mozambique’s national budget is financed by external sources. While the government defends its sovereignty, claiming to remain independent domestically (Shikhani, 2012), this high dependency may allow third parties to influence project direction to serve their own agendas. However, as one participant observed, third parties still require state approval, which gives the state leverage over their activities (Participant 27, Maputo, Mozambique, 8 December 2016). Despite differing views on the extent of state influence, ‘de jure sovereignty accords states with certain rights and responsibilities’ because natural resources fall within state boundaries (Grant, 2015, p. 27). Supporting the government’s claim of independence, Participant 17 argues, ‘we do not have power to make decisions, these are sovereign states who exercising their sover- eignty . . . we serve at the pleasure and discretion of sovereign states’. He further emphasizes that the World Bank’s role is to advise states, as its shareholders, on good investments and poverty alleviation strategies. While Wolf et al. (2003) acknowledge that the conditions tied to World Bank investments may reinforce power dynamics in a river basin, they also recognize the Bank’s value as a mediator and knowledge broker in transboundary water governance. Forging forward: China and Brazil as strategic players amid challenges Diplomatic instruments employed by foreign governments can be valuable for promot- ing cooperation, preventing conflict, and managing water-related disputes, forming a key aspect of hydro-diplomacy. Hydro-diplomacy involves the engagement of states and non-state actors, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to build institutions, promote regio- nal development, channel investments, and manage conflicts in shared river basins (Mukhtarov et al., 2021). Small and middle power states can contribute ‘effectively to global public goods by leveraging their expertise and established networks’ (Van WATER INTERNATIONAL 59 Genderen & Rood, 2011, p. 2). Foreign governments’ interventions can facilitate coop- eration that drives economic development and regional stability (Participant 12). However, a potential challenge is the clash of interests between foreign governments and host countries or regions. As Participant 4 notes, foreign governments are often focused on peace-making while financial institutions like the World Bank prioritize profit-oriented investments. He elaborates that the advantage of foreign governments is that they lack overpowering economic interests, which allows them to be perceived as honest brokers, bringing knowledge and providing a safe space for diplomatic negotia- tions (Participant 4, Mbabane, eSwatini, 17 February 2016). Despite the positive con- tributions of foreign governments, there are concerns that their interests may overshadow local priorities and that their projects could prove unsustainable (Xu, 2020). Africa’s untapped hydropower potential has drawn the interest of global powers (Wouters et al., 2024). This section examines the role of China and Brazil in hydraulic projects in the Incomati river basin, focusing on the construction of the Moamba dam in Mozambique. Both countries are global leaders in large-scale infrastructure development (Wouters et al., 2024), bringing extensive expertise to the Moamba dam project. Before construction, Mozambique was required to inform South Africa and Eswatini in line with the principles of the Inco-Maputo Agreement (Participant 19, Maputo, Mozambique, 8 December 2016). The dam is intended to supply water to Matola, Ressano Garcia and Maputo as well as generating hydropower. The construction of the Moamba dam is timely for some participants, You cannot have a party while your neighbour is having a funeral we need to help each other . . . instead of fighting other riparian countries; in Mozambique, we need to build more dams to sustain us, and constructing the Moamba dam is a good step. (Participant 20) The original plan was for Brazil to finance the construction of the dam through a loan. However, the project was suspended after corruption allegations surfaced against ‘Andrade Gutierrez’, the company contracted for Moamba dam construction (Participant 25). Unfortunately a significant amount of money had already been invested in preliminary studies including the environmental impact assessments (Participant 25). Petersen-Perlman et al. (2017) argue that while environmental impact assessments are valuable, when development stalls and investments fail to materialize, the altered dynamics of the river basin can leave states worse off than before. This situation aligns with the theoretical assumptions of Constructivist Institutionalism, which suggests that actors often must make decisions under uncertain conditions (Hay, 2006). For example, Mozambique could not have foreseen Brazil’s suspension of the Moamba dam project during its early development phase. Fortunately, the construction of the Moamba dam resumed, but with a significant new development. China provided financial aid to the Brazilian company Andrade Gutierrez, becoming a partner in the project. Two major changes emerged: first, China’s involve- ment as a key partner; second, the project had to be refined to cater for the new water and project demands. Mozambique and Brazil have close diplomatic ties which began in 1975 when Mozambique attained independence from Portugal. As one of Brazil’s closest allies in Africa, Mozambique may see its relationship with Brazil further strengthened by this collaboration. According to Club of Mozambique (2018) the Brazilian funds to Mozambique came from its US$4.7 billion national budget for developmental assistance 60 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI in Africa. China, too, has a history of supporting Mozambique, notably providing aid during cyclone Idai in 2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). However, China’s involvement in the Moamba dam project is likely tied to its broader strategy of strengthening ties with Africa through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation established in 2000 and with Portuguese-speaking countries (including Mozambique) through the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation (Macao), established in 2003 (Bond, 2021). It is plausible to assume that China’s objective is to consolidate its influence in Mozambique, while Mozambique, in need of financial aid, remains open to working with any country that can meet its needs. In this case, the preference of both nations converge (Hay, 2006), allowing them to achieve their respec- tive goals. The relationship between donors and recipient countries is complex. As participant 24 observed, The relationship between donors and governments is complicated because on one end, you wish to be completely independent, but on the other hand, you do not have the money to survive on your own. Therefore, it is not a matter of good or bad it is simply a matter of survival . . . (Participant 24, Maputo, Mozambique, 7 December 2016) The relationship between Africa and China is described as ‘a partnership of equals’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). The role of China in the Southern African Development Community region has mixed views. China’s support is largely welcomed by states due to various factors, which include inter alia unconditional support, mutual benefits, loans which come with low or no interest rates, socioeconomic development, and the ability for African states to retain their independence (Bond, 2021). China’s massive investments and trading partnerships have been established across the Southern African Development Community. One of the ambitious investments include the Belt and Road Initiative. which has been joined by most Southern African Development Community states with the exception of Eswatini, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Democratic Republic of Congo (Bond, 2021). Of the three Incomati River Basin states, Eswatini is the one which is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative due to its longstanding relationship with Taiwan (Bond, 2021). Eswatini’s non-involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative is further seen by its absence during the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and 2019, where Mozambique and South Africa made contributions to the mechanism of cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s interest extend beyond simple developing the economies of host countries, but they aim to gain access to markets and natural resources for Chinese enterprises (Xu, 2020). In the Incomati river basin, this interest is evident in investments like the Moamba dam construction, which aligns with China’s strategic goal of main- taining a strong presence in Southern Africa (Xu, 2020). The construction of the Moamba dam showcases how relationships are forged to construct cooperation in the river basin. Brazil benefits from financial injection from China as a co-partner in the river basin and the completed dam will help meet Mozambique’s developmental needs. While China’s non-interference norm may rein- force power dynamics, its emphasis on ‘win–win cooperation’ or mutually beneficial collaborations helps build trust and fosters cooperation. Brazil as a norm entrepreneur uses diplomatic channels to encourage cooperation. Together, Brazil and China help WATER INTERNATIONAL 61 address water scarcities and promote economic development through funding of infra- structure projects and empowering local stakeholders. Therefore, we get to witness the constructed relationship with homogeneous preferences but not necessarily comparable benefits and interests (Zikhali, 2019). Discussion Navigating power and interests in transboundary water governance The evidence from the Incomati River Basin reveals four primary interests of third parties: economic partnerships, diplomatic relations, environmental sustainability and knowledge sharing. A common critique is that third-party influence often prioritizes economic interests over local social and environmental needs (Wouters et al., 2024). While this critique has merit, it doesn’t negate the positive contributions these parties have made in the basin. This section explores how, despite the complex interplay of power and interests, cooperation within the basin has largely persisted, albeit with some negative consequences. The findings align with Hanasz (2017), who noted that third parties often emphasize procedural justice over distributional justice. Wouters et al. (2024) similarly question whether China’s focus on procedural aspects like technical cooperation and information sharing undermines the effectiveness of hydropower devel- opments. Projects like the Moamba dam highlight that while financial investments are prioritized to ensure completion, discussions around equitable resource distribution among stakeholders are often lacking. This is why, despite high levels of state coopera- tion, domestic issues such as poverty and inequality persist (Zikhali, 2019). There is a need to examine the socioeconomic impacts of such cooperation on livelihoods and poverty alleviation within riparian states. Third parties in transboundary water governance are driven by the desire to realize their own visions while influencing others to align with their objectives, highlighting the nuanced role of power. Power manifests differently across contexts and time (Zikhali, 2019) and is inherent in transboundary interactions, often shaping outcomes without being overtly recognized or wielded. It’s not just about possession but also about exerting control through will and expertise (Petersen-Perlman & Fischhendler, 2018). For instance, Brazil leverages its expertise in managing the Amazon River basin to assert leadership in transboundary water governance and bridge the north–south divide (Duran, 2016). However, Brazil’s influence is limited by its domestic constraints, a foreign policy that favours bilateral over multilateral engagements, and competition with global powers like China and institutions like the World Bank (Molle, 2017). Brazil and China’s trading relationship, particularly in virtual water through agricultural exports like soybeans, creates interdependencies that can shift power dynamics (Woertz, 2022). While Brazil’s role as a major soybean exporter contributes to China’s food security, this interdependence can create asymmetrical power relationships that could be exploited during conflicts (Woertz, 2022). The involvement of third parties in transboundary water governance has both positive and negative impacts (Hayat et al., 2024; Kramer & Pohl, 2016; Varady et al., 2023). For example, while the World Bank’s influence has facilitated large-scale infrastructure projects that enhance energy production and water availability, these initiatives often 62 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI prioritize economic development at the expense of equitable water distribution and environmental sustainability (Varady et al., 2023). Overemphasis on economic efficiency can marginalize local and environmental concerns, leading to adverse outcomes such as environmental degradation, social displacement, and the reinforcement of existing power asymmetries, which often favour upstream states and marginalize those downstream (Humphreys, 2007; Kramer & Pohl, 2016). China’s interests in the Incomati River Basin are seen as part of a broader geopolitical strategy, where both China and Brazil use their involvement to promote their norms and influence in Southern Africa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Brazil’s trade partnerships and the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa bloc are examples of this effort to secure economic and diplomatic gains. Their presence creates a complex web of power dynamics, where different cultures and governance traditions intersect, testing who controls resources and policies. While the effectiveness of these power plays in interna- tional relations remains uncertain, they have clearly impacted the governance of the Incomati River Basin. To balance power and mitigate negative impacts in host states, integrating global economic and water governance laws is crucial. Wouters et al. (2024) highlight the tension between international investment laws and transboundary water governance, noting how third parties, like China, may exploit these laws to prioritize their interests over local needs in riparian states. China’s use of bilateral investment treaties in hydro- power projects often includes provisions that protect its investments from regulatory changes, limiting the ability of riparian states to renegotiate terms that may harm their societies. This dynamic skews power in favour of China, allowing its economic interests to overshadow social and environmental concerns. Consequently, states may hesitate to enforce regulations that could negatively impact Chinese investments (Wouters et al., 2024). To counterbalance this, policies should equally emphasize sustainable water development and investment protection. Brazil and the World Bank approach interna- tional investment laws differently. Brazil’s investments are driven by diplomatic and economic goals focused on south–south cooperation and long-term relationships, with a greater emphasis on mutual benefits and sustainable development (Duran, 2016). While Brazil also uses bilateral investment treaties, its policy goals differ from China’s in prioritizing broader development outcomes (Alden & Vieira, 2005; De Sousa, 2017). The World Bank, on the other hand, emphasizes compliance with social and environ- mental standards, protecting its investments through project-specific agreements that balance investment protection with sustainability needs (World Bank, 2019b; Wouters et al., 2024). The involvement of various third parties in the Incomati River Basin can lead to geopolitical tensions, inconsistent policies and potentially undermine regional coopera- tion as countries may be pulled in different directions by competing powers. For example, China’s challenge to Western supremacy contrasts with the approaches of the Southern African Development Community and the World Bank, which largely adhere to Western principles. However, the Southern African Development Community plays a crucial role in mitigating these tensions and limiting the negative influence of external investors. By establishing legislative and policy frameworks, the Southern African Development Community has created a foundation for a unified stance in negotiations with third parties, enabling the Incomati states to counterbalance the influence of China, WATER INTERNATIONAL 63 Brazil, and the World Bank. The Southern African Development Community’s strategies to limit third-party influence and ensure positive outcomes include capacity building, developing regional institutions like the Water Sector Coordinating Unit, and adopting integrated water resources management (SADC, 2020). These efforts aim to balance economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and social equity in hydropower projects (SADC, 2011). Additionally, partnering with international organizations such as the Global Environment Facility and the African Development Bank provides alter- native financial and technical support (AfDB, 2018). The Southern African Development Community’s vision aligns with broader African policy frameworks, like the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which seeks to integrate markets and strengthen regional econo- mies and solidarity (SADC, 2020). Hanasz (2017) highlights the role of institutional design in fostering productive dialogues that transform historical grievances into trust and cooperation. In the Incomati River Basin, the institutional frameworks have shifted power dynamics from hostility to diplomacy. Beyond Southern African Development Community instruments, Mozambique, South Africa, and Eswatini have implemented systems like the Tripartite Permanent Technical Committee, integrated water resource management principles, and joint initiatives such as the Komati Basin Water Authority. These mechanisms promote equitable water sharing, sustainable development and conflict resolution while ensuring regional interests are prioritized in hydropower projects and third-party investments. The 2002 Incomaputo Agreement and collaborative data sharing further enhance trans- parency and informed decision-making. The establishment of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourse Commission in 2021, supported by the Southern African Development Community, underscores the success of cooperative water governance, driven by shared values and agency, even before the formal creation of a River Basin Organization. The paper highlights the dual role of third parties in transboundary water governance, recognizing both their contributions to infrastructure development and regional coop- eration, as well as the challenges they present to achieving comprehensive and inclusive water management. It underscores the urgent need for cooperative frameworks that address the complex interplay of power and interests. These frameworks should strive to balance economic development with the socioeconomic rights of all riparian stake- holders, ensuring equitable water governance and sustainable development. Conclusion The paper underscores the pivotal role of third parties in the Incomati River Basin, particularly in infrastructure development, fostering cooperation, capacity building and shaping norms. While some scepticism persists, viewing third party involvement as an extension of colonialism or a means for China and Brazil to build regional hegemony, the evidence shows that shared preferences, rather than interests, are key to successful cooperation. China and Brazil have contributed through diplomatic engagement and investment, driving economic development and enhancing regional water and energy security. The Southern African Development Community has proven instrumental in bridging divides, navigating historical and political complexities, and ensuring regional cooperation, while the World Bank’s support has been crucial in managing power dynamics, although 64 T. ZIKHALI-NYONI not eliminating conflict. The study highlights that when the benefits of coopera- tion outweigh the costs, states are more likely to comply, with third parties playing a significant role in this dynamic. However, while third parties can help manage power imbalances, they are not a cure-all, as power remains a constant force in transboundary water governance. Notes 1. The Incomati River Basin flows from South Africa (eastern part), through Eswatini’s northern part into the southern part of Mozambique and discharges into the Indian Ocean (Zikhali, 2019). South Africa occupies 61% of the approximate 46,800 km2 river basin, while Mozambique and Eswatini occupy 33% and 6%, respectively. 2. The 1965 Indo-Pak war was between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir states. The war did not solve the problems despite the engagement of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Many analysts blame the politics of Cold War for this political stalemate https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war (accessed 24 October 2022). 3. The 1971 Indo-Pak war liberated Bangladesh and created friendly relations between India and Bangladesh. This was after Bangladesh received arms and training assistance from India. At the time the Cold War tensions were high, the USA backed Pakistan while India had locked arms with Russia. Victory for Bangladesh was beneficial for India as it ensured peace and connectivity in the north-east region. https://www.clearias.com/indo-pak-war -1971/ (accessed 24 October 2022). 4. The 1999 Kargil conflict was between India and Pakistan in Kashmir over territorial control. 5. Kashmir is a highly contested area where India and Pakistan have been fighting to control the area for more than 70 years. There have been third parties involved such as China and the United Nations while the USA was at some point keen to mediate the crisis. The region was divided between the two countries, giving birth to the ‘Indian-administered Kashmir’ and ‘Pakistan-administered Kashmir’. Later, the Indian-administered Kashmir was split into two territories. Despite peace talks and efforts the area remains contested. https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286 Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it, BBC (8 August 2019) (accessed 3 November 2022). 6. ZAMCOM is an intergovernmental river basin organization that governs the Zambezi river basin shared by Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, and Angola. 7. Tripartite Interim Agreement Between the Republic of Mozambique and The Republic of South Africa and The Kingdom of Eswatini for Co-Operation on the Protection and Sustainable Utilization of the Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourses. Acknowledgements This paper is based on the PhD dissertation: Power, Hydro-Hegemony and the Construction of Cooperative Transboundary Water Relations: The case of the Incomati International River Basin. University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). WATER INTERNATIONAL 65 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war https://www.clearias.com/indo-pak-war-1971/ https://www.clearias.com/indo-pak-war-1971/ https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286 Funding This publication was made possible by support from the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation in Africa Fellowship, with funds provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York. References AfDB. (2018). African development bank’s strategy for 2013–2022. African Development Bank Group. Alden, C., & Vieira, M. A. (2005). The new diplomacy of the south: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism. 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Journal of Southern African Studies, 47(4), 703–718. https:// doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2021.1932100 WATER INTERNATIONAL 69 https://doi.org/10.1163/157180609X432833 https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2006.054 https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2021.1932100 https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2021.1932100 Abstract Introduction The role of third parties in transboundary water governance Theoretical framework Methods The value of third parties: lessons from the Incomati River Basin Navigating complexity: the Southern African Development Community as a brokering force Bridging the gap: the World Bank as a catalyst for cooperation Forging forward: China and Brazil as strategic players amid challenges Discussion Navigating power and interests in transboundary water governance Conclusion Notes Acknowledgements Disclosure statement Funding References