Ptf/fcl
 DEMOCRACY
 1 3 - 1 5 JULY 1994
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 HISTORY WORKSHOP
 COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE ROLE OF SOCIETY IN THE CREATION AND
 DEMISE OF AUTOCRACY IN ZAMBIA, 1964 - 1991
 Bizeck Phiri
 History Department
 University of Zambia
COI.ONIAL LEGACY AND THE ROLE OF SOCIETY IN THE CREATION AND
 DEMISE OF AUTOCRACY TN ZAMRTA. 1964-1991.
 By
 Bizeck J. Phiri (Dr.)
 Introduction
 This paper explores the origins, growth and demise of
 autocracy in poet-independence Zambia from a historical
 perspective. It does BO from1 a macroscopic study of the
 nature of the political orientation of the nationalist party
 which secured a dominant electoral majority during the
 transition from colonial rule to independence?the United
 National Independence Party (UNIP), and its leadership from
 1964 to 1991. The paper also explores society's perception of
 nationalist leaders and how that perception contributed to the
 emergence of autocracy in post-independence Zambia. The one-
 party state system of government in Zambia, and indeed
 elBewhere, was perceived as form of dictatorship. Yet,
 scholars were merely content to comment on the shortcomings of
 this system of government. Its origins were generally
 explained away as part and parcel of the intransigence of
 political parties which assumed political power at
 independence. Little was said about the impact of the
 colonial past and, indeed, the role of society in influencing
 the political direction of post-Independent Zambia.
 Crawford Young alluded to "the autocratic and hegemonic
 impulses which were the more enduring legacy of the colonial
 state," in his seminal work dealing with, inter alia, the
 issue of the one-party rule.1 Yet, even in Young's work, the
 role of the masses towards assisting the "radical,
 mobilizational parties which secured a dominant electoral
 1
2
 position under terminal colonial rule," in becoming
 intransigent political monopolies waB not explored.2 This
 paper suggests, with specific reference to Zambia during the
 first and second republics, that politicians and the ordinary
 citizenry participated in bringing about autocracy in the
 country.
 Larry Diamond and Dennis Galvan saw Zambia as an
 authoritarian one-party state manifesting "somewhat greater
 political freedom."3 Yet, in the absence of legally
 constituted opposition parties, this freedom was largely a
 fallacy. As S.E. Finer noted, "without the freedom of
 association, it ie impossible to see how [people] can get
 together in order to put up the candidates who represent their
 opinions".4 In fact, lack of political freedom was the
 frequently cited example of the many evils of one-party state
 rule. As Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski pointed
 out:
 The truly distinguishing features is that the ruler
 ie not responsible to anyone elee for what he does;
 he is the autoa, who himself wields power; that is
 to say, he makes the decisions and reaps the fruits
 of them.6
 There are six basic features which distinguish an autocracy
 from a liberal democracy. By liberal democracy, we mean "a
 political system characterized by regular and free elections
 in which politicians organized into parties compete to form
 the government, the right of virtually all adult citizens to
 vote, and by guarantees of a range of familiar political and
 civil rights."8 An autocratic political system, however, is
 characterised by the following features: an official ideology;
 a single mass party led typically by one man; a system of
3
 terroristic police control; a technologically conditioned
 near-complete monopoly control of all meane of effective mass
 communication, Buch as the press, radio and television; a
 similarly technologically near-complete monopoly of control of
 all means of effective armed combat; and central control and
 direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic co-
 ordination of its formerly independent corporate entities.7
 These features characterised Zambia's seventeen year one-party
 state history.
 Zambia's official ideology, for instance, was Humanism.
 It was propounded and officially launched by President Kaunda
 in 1965. The declaration of one-party state in 1972 against
 protests from the African National Congress (ANC) was achieved
 amid fears of harassment by the much dreaded Special Branch.
 In the Zambian context, the Special Branch operated more or
 leBB like the well known secret policy in European
 dictatorships. According to former Lusaka Police Chief,
 Mwenda Muyunda:
 The special branch officers operated like people who
 were above the law. These officers though falling
 under the police had secret places where suspects
 were interrogated without our knowledge.8
 The "party and its government" in Zambia, aided by several
 units of the state, had total control of mass communication,
 it controlled and directed the economy through the
 bureaucratic coordination provided by the Industrial
 Development Corporation (INDECO) and the Zambia Industrial and
 Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)^two corporations set up following
 the 1965 and 1969 Economic Reforme. President Kaunda was
 initially the Chairman of this pyramid of ultimate political
 control of the economic activity.8
4
 UNIP wae formed in August 1959 ae an amalgam of the
 United Freedom Party (UFP) and the African National
 Independence Party (ANIP). Dixon Konkola wae its first
 president. However, within weeks of UNIP'e formation, Konkola
 was suspended and replaced by Paul Kallchini. Kalichini was
 also replaced by Mainza Chona who, together with others, had
 recently left the ANC. When Kenneth David Kaunda was released
 from prison, fresh elections were held on 3l6t January 1960,
 and Kaunda was elected national president. He remained the
 leader of UNIP until 1992 when he finally retired from active
 politics?of course following hiB electoral defeat in the 1991
 presidential and parliamentary elections.10
 Kaunda was generally considered the epitome of unity
 because of his strong anti-tribal politics.11 He was the
 only one in UNIP who did not have very strong tribal
 affiliations. He wae born of Nyaealand (Malawi) parentage
 among the Bemba of Chinsali in Northern Province. Ae such he
 was seen as a good compromise leader of the new party. It is
 plausible to suggest that other leaders may have initially
 thought they could use his neutral identity to their enda.
 Under Kaunda'e leadership, and because of itB policy of
 immediate self-government and elections based on universal
 suffrage, UNIP aoon emerged as the dominant African political
 party. As early as 1963 Kaunda was already seeking national
 unity through the Ideology of togetherness among Africans. On
 20 October 1963, for example, he asked Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula,
 leader of the African National Congress (ANC), to dissolve his
 party and accept "an honourable and respectable" position in
 public life.12 It is important to point out, however, that
5
 the ideology of togetherness among Africans first found
 expression in Sikota Wina's confidential letter to Harry
 Mwaanga Nkumbula in 1959. Writing to Nkumbula, Wina asked him
 to:
 ...summon together the UNIP and ANC and declare that
 you are moving higher in the African leadership
 hierarchy and that you are prepared to declare unity
 of all Africans under one banner, that of the ANC of
 Northern Rhodesia. And that because of your pre-
 occupation with Legco matters you will take the post
 of National Guardian, leaving the entire
 administration into the hands of a president elected
 by both organisations.13
 Kaunda was, therefore, asking Nkumbula what other UNIP leaders
 had previouely requested Nkumbula to do. Nonetheless, this
 request was repeated several times thereafter. It was
 generally believed in UNIP circles that ANC was too
 compromising and counter productive.
 The country became the independent Republic of Zambia on
 24 October 1964, after which the raleon d'etre for liberal
 democracy disappeared. Two issues immediately began to
 preoccupy the new UNIP government. First, UNIP was concerned
 about ways and means of maintaining it political dominance
 under a constitution which the departing colonial government
 had deliberately designed to guarantee liberal democracy.
 Since 1959 the country had operated a fragile multi-party
 political system which maintained competitive pluralistic
 institutions?a framework for power contest in the polity.
 Secondly, this drive for continued political supremacy
 was entwined with UNIP's search for national unity which, was
 seen as the prerequisite for nation building. Consequently,
 UNIP's quest to dominate the political scene was increasingly
 articulated as a process aimed at national unity. President
6
 Kaunda argued that although nationalism had successfully
 dislodged colonial rule, its future was uncertain because many
 Africans lacked any notion of national identity?"their
 loyalties were more restricted and fragmentary."*4
 Undoubtedly, since ite formation in 1959, UNIP remained
 essentially a coalition of various interest groups. It was
 never a truly coherently inspired political party. It was
 initially held together because of the strong desire by most
 of ite followere, who saw in UNIP the only hope of diemantling
 colonial rule. After independence, however, the various
 interests polarised. Thus, as Cherry Gertzel and others
 pointed out, "the most important level of political conflict,
 however, was not between UNIP and ANC, but within UNIP
 itself."i? A few months later, therefore, President Kaunda
 openly stated that he favoured a one-party state, but that he
 would let the people of Zambia decide.16 President Kaunda
 considered a multi-party political system a luxury the new
 state could not afford. He argued that multi-party politics
 unnecessarily divided people, thus impeded nation-building and
 national development. The ideology of togetherness wae once
 again being pursued by the Kaunda regime. Uttered in the
 1960s, these eentiments found many disciples and reflected the
 general thinking in most newly independent African countries.
 Analyzed from the perspective of the 1990s, however, the
 desire for one-party state rule by UNIP leaders suggests a
 deliberate strategy to dominate and sustain the UNIP
 leadership in power. More importantly, perhaps, one-party
 rule became the only surest way through which UNIP could
 remain in power. The "snowball and bandwagon" model had
7
 clearly failed. This was manifested by UNIP's failure to
 capture four seats in the Southern Province by-elections In
 1968.17
 RootB of AutocrsRV in Zambia
 It is an established fact that in modern political
 experience, dictators have been able to rule only if
 the masses of their people have a fanatical faith in
 the Leader Principle.18
 Few can deny that at independence the masses (and
 politicians as well) had "a fanatical faith in the Leader
 Principle". Long before independence, Nkumbula was considered
 the saviour by most Africans.10 It Is plausible to argue
 that Wina's letter to Nkumbula in December 1959 was inspired
 by similar feelings in order to "enhance [Nkumbula's] position
 in the Legco...."20 Some even referred to him as
 father.21 Thus the leader principle did not start with
 President Kaunda, even though the rootB of autocracy in Zambia
 can be attributed to the fanatical faith in the leadership of
 President Kaunda. This was, obviously, further aided by the
 fact that at independence in 1964 Zambia had not experienced a
 long tradition of liberal democracy. The nature of colonial
 rule made it easier for the new African leaders to become
 autocratic.
 Colonial rule in Zambia did not reflect the ideala of
 liberal democracy as they then existed in the United Kingdom.
 As J. S. Coleman pointed out, colonialism itself was
 essentially "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in which
 "politics, especially opposition politics, were barely
 tolerated".22 Coleman's views echoed thoae of Northern
 Rhodesia's (now Zambia) Chief Secretary who in 1935 pointed
8
 out that the Northern Rhodesian constitution did "not permit
 of an opposition or formation of absurd parties...."23
 Furthermore, "political parties are products of the western
 democracies" and "were hardly an accepted part of the new way
 of life of the various African societies when they gained
 political independence."24 This comment by a South African
 writer correctly mirrors the colonial view that Africans had
 no democratic past upon which to build.
 Yet, while pre-colonial political entities were diverse
 in nature, through them all the theme or Bpirit of a
 traditional type of liberalism pervaded in that rulers were
 expected to be answerable to the people and could be removed
 if they were not. As Kabunda Kayongo noted, "ancient people
 in Africa did not take kindly to any form of tyranny."26 No
 pre-European Zambian, ruler, therefore, was an autocrat in the
 fashion of Shaka or kings of Rwanda, Buganda or Dahomey. If
 some colonial chiefs acquired the attributes of autocracy, it
 was precisely because colonial officials allowed them and even
 gave them that kind of power. For seventy years, therefore,
 Zambia did not experience any form of government remotely
 resembling a democracy in its traditional or European form.
 Thus, the roots of autocracy in post-independence Zambia can
 be said to have origins in the nature of the colonial
 political syetem which anathematized opposition parties. In
 Zambia, therefore, autocracy should not, and can not, be
 explained as part of the African heritage.
 Consequently, at independence, neither UNIP nor the vast
 majority of politicians were sufficiently prepared to nurture
 liberal democracy which Britain had hurriedly put In place in
9
 1958.2e It was no Burpriee therefore, that within a year of
 Zambia's independence, President Kaunda, encouraged by
 "popular demand" was already advocating the creation of a one-
 party state. Furthermore, as he advocated the creation of a
 one-party state, the Leader Principle was also developing
 within UNIP for the reasons given above.
 Zamblans Mould nn Autocrat
 President Kaunda was not born an autocrat. Unlike many
 African leaders in the 1960s, who favoured what amounted In
 effect to one-man rule, he spent much of M B energies on the
 constant task of keeping some semblance of consensus among hie
 colleagues. However, policy differences, personality clashes
 and sheer personal ambition among the key political players of
 the day led to systematic changes in the body politic which
 entrenched power in the presidency aB the supreme institution.
 He was made an autocrat by the masses and fellow UNIP leaders
 who individually and severally placed him above reproach.
 This was aided by mounting tribal dissention in UNIP and the
 growing administrative chaos in the governrnent machinery. In
 response, therefore, President Kaunda took personal control of
 a vaBt range of government activity. He brought Foreign
 Affairs, the Civil Service, Defence and the running of the
 country's major commercial and industrial enterprises under
 hie wing.27 Already President Kaunda was being perceived as
 one who was beyond ridicule.
 A test case to this effect came before parliament in July
 1965, barely a year after Zambia's independence. Edward
 Mungoni Lieo, an ANC Member of Parliament for Namwala
10
 constituency, speaking in parliament on the Police Bill
 intimated that President Kaunda, at a rally in Chipata, had
 allegedly deplored the police for favouring the ANC. UN1P MPe
 were up in arms against Liso. They accused him of misusing
 hie parliamentary privileges and ridiculing the President.
 Sikota Wina, who was then Minister of Local Government
 and Housing and also UNIP Chief Whip in parliament, moved a
 motion to suspend Liso from the house for "false and
 unsubstantiated allegations concerning the conduct of His
 Excellency the President".aa Wina continued thus:
 It is ... going to be positive proof that not only
 are we on this side [UNIP] not going to brook any
 nonsense in the running of the this country, but
 that once and for all the idea must be drummed home,
 and I mean "drummed home', Mr. Speaker, that the
 name of His Excellency the President of this
 Republic must never be taken in vain.2"
 Wina was not alone in the pursuit of "justice". Ackspn
 Soko, who was then Resident Minister for the Eastern Province,
 making his contribution to the motion to suspend Liso, eaid:
 As far as I am concerned, I remember when I made as
 mistake and apologised to my father, he said I have
 to whip you and after that I will accept your
 apology. This ie the African way of life. We have
 to whip and then, probably the apology will be
 accepted later on.30
 Soko further wondered:
 whether this western democracy is the right system
 for this country. It is either we adopt African
 democracy whereby only the headman has a eay, or the
 chief has a say in that area, here we' allow
 everybody, anywhere in the ... I think it ie time
 that we took sterner measures ... This suspension
 which is proposed, to me ie too lenient.31
 Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, making his contribution to the motion
 concurred with Soko and said:
 When you make a mistake with your father, he whips
 you, if you make the mistake with your mother, she
 will whip you, or you may not have food. Thie is
11
 our philosophy, thie is our own foundation and we
 are going to continue because it is right.32
 Undoubtedly, the motion was meant to intimidate and place
 President Kaunda beyond reproach. Little did Kapwepwe and
 other UNIP leaders realize that they were creating a
 personality cult around President Kaunda whereby hie name
 became synonymous with "HiB Excellency the President".33
 Kapwepwe further praised President Kaunda as "... the man
 who listens to all complaints small and big from rich and
 poor, the real humanitarian, a man that we may not find again
 in our generation". And continued, "...The hon. member for
 Namwala (Mr. Liso) should be punished for his untrue statement
 in this House against His Excellency the President".34 Yet
 another UNIP Minister, Solomon Kalulu, argued that because
 Zambia's democracy was still at its Infancy, it wae
 "improper, [and] fatal at this stage to criticise the
 President because the President is a symbol of that undivided
 unity of this young nation".30
 Because parliament debated issues of this nature on
 partisan lines, the motion was passed by 46 (UNIP) to 17 (ANC)
 votee. Liso was subsequently suspended from parliament
 despite having apologized to the Speaker. In retrospect, the
 Liso case had serious implications for the future of liberal
 democracy in Zambia. The motion to suspend Liso was less an
 act of restoring the respectability of the Republican
 President, but a deliberately calculated move to weaken the
 opposition, both in and outside parliament. UNIP evidently
 began to show signs that as a party it was against criticism,
 particularly if that criticism was directed at the presidency.
12
 Inadvertently, the move contributed to the rise of UNIP'B
 autocratic rule.
 President Kaunda was thue created and defined by UNIP
 politicians who Bought to control him and perhape use him to
 their advantage. Unknowingly, the Kaunda image they created
 became equated to that of the nation, and therefore above
 them. It was too late when they realized that they had
 created a "Frankenstein Monster". This crystallised in 1968
 when President Kaunda briefly resigned as President of UNIP
 and the Republic on 5 February.3S The reeponee by UNIP
 politicians to this episode, in fact, turned President Kaunda
 into a demi-god. It hae been observed that Alexander Gray
 Zulu, tears in bis eyes urged President Kaunda to withhold hie
 final decision until the following day.37 Nephas Tembo's
 reaction was equally flattering of President Kaunda's
 leadership. Tembo pointed out that:
 My first thought following the shock of Ken's
 resignation waB the security of my family who were
 more than six hundred and forty kilometres away from
 thi6 confusion....30
 For both Zulu and Tembo, President Kaunda epitomised unity in
 Zambia, hence the fear that his resignation would lead to
 chaoB in the country?a theme which persisted until 1991 when
 President Kaunda lost to President Frederick T.J. Chiluba.
 Undoubtedly, these sentiments created a psychological
 feeling in President Kaunda that only he could lead the nation
 and provide security to families. It le therefore, plausible
 to argue that the Leader Principle within UNIP and the nation
 was boosted by the 5 February incident. It was a political
 gamble which paid dividends for President Kaunda who did not
 only emerge from the crleiB politically stronger, but whose
13
 image as a symbol of unity gained further weight. Later a
 Zambian scholar, Mwisenge S. Tembo wrote regarding President
 Kaunda'a brief resignation:
 It had very grave potential implications for the
 four million people of Zambia at the time. This was
 a young and fragile country barely four years old.
 It was surrounded by white Rhodesia, racist South
 Africa, and white colonial Portuguese Angola and
 Mozambique. These regimes would have been more than
 jubilant to see turmoil and bloodshed in independent
 black Zambia. That would have been ammunition for
 these regimes' racist colonial campaigns.3e
 The theme that without President Kaunda Zambia would be
 plunged into chaos and bloodshed continued to Bustain the
 Leader Principle as well as crystallize the ideology of
 togetherness. While President Kaunda carefully pursued the
 ideology of togetherness, he also tactfully continued to
 aeeume those tenants of an autocrat. His life having been
 already equated to that of the nation.
 As Samuel N. Chipungu noted, "leaders became "saviours',
 'godsent' and "liberators'"40 Leaders, especially the
 President, could not be questioned or, indeed, expected to be
 wrong. Consequently, Zambians "surrendered their right to
 make decisions and believed that what was right for the
 leaders was equally correct for them".41 A personality cult
 had developed and was being unknowingly nurtured by Zamblane
 themselves. President Kaunda wae slowly, but surely being
 seen as infallible. Slogans were coined which made him appear
 demi-god. For example, the slogan Kumulu ni Leea, Panehi ni
 Kaunda (In Heaven it is God, On earth it is Kaunda) portrayed
 that message.
 Autocracy in Zambia was further strengthened in January
 1969 following the first general election of December 1968.
14
 UNIP won an overwhelming majority over ANC in parliamentary
 seats. On 22 January the Speaker of the National Assembly
 Robinson Nabulyato, refused to recognize the ANC as an
 official opposition in the assembly because it was too small a
 minority to constitute an official opposition. He argued that
 ANC could "form neither a quorum to execute the business of
 the House nor a government".42
 The decision not to accord the ANC recognition as the
 official opposition had serious implications for the role of
 the opposition in both parliament and the nation. The
 decision ultimately destroyed the democratic process, since
 without an officially recognized opposition party Zambia
 became a de facto one party state.
 Nabulyato'e decision, however, should be understood
 within the context of the 1960s when ruling political parties
 in Africa were becoming Increasingly intransigent. His
 decision was equally influenced by pronouncements by
 politicians in the ruling party against those in opposition
 parties.43 President Kaunda had on 23 December 1968 warned
 that:
 I can not see how I can continue to pay a police
 officer or civil servant who works for Nkumbula....
 How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? They
 must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those
 who want to form a civil service of the opposition
 must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry
 Nkumbula.44
 President Kaunda further ordered Justin Chimba, then Minister
 of Trade, Industry and Mines, to "ensure that none of the
 eight opposition MPs elected in Barotee Province was granted a
 new licence or had hi6 old licence renewed.40 Unashamedly,
 "Kaunda promised...to implement the economic reforms in order
15
 to show that "it pays to belong to UNIP'"?? He was
 obviously behaving like a dictator.
 Meanwhile President Kaunda was careful not to appear to
 be spearheading the crusade for declaring Zambia a one-party
 state. Yet, within months Zambia witnessed maBsive round-ups
 of political opponents. And as UNIP prepared for a one-party
 Btate, cleavages within UNIP continued to grow. In August
 1969 President Kaunda issued a party presidential decree which
 dissolved the Central Committee and abolished the post of
 party president and vice-president. In their place he created
 a temporary National Committee to deal with routine party
 affairs.47 He began to call himself Secretary-General of
 the Party. From the point of view of Zambia's constitutional
 Bet-up, President Kaunda had emerged as a virtual dictator.
 He then appointed two conunieBionB, one to redraft the
 UNIP constitution (which he blamed for the lack of stability
 and efficiency), and another to work on the question of
 discipline in the party. The president also reorganized and
 changed the relationship between the party and the government.
 Henceforth, the party was supreme over the government.
 Simon Kapwepwe tendered his resignation as Vice-President
 of the party and government the same day saying:
 Some of my colleagues and fellow leaders have never
 recognized me as a properly elected Vice-PreBident
 and have engaged in mud-Blinging in the presB, at
 public meetings and in dark corners ... The people
 from the northern part of Zambia?the Bemba-speaking
 people?have suffered physically .... They have
 suffered demotions and suspensions because of my
 being Vice-President. I cannot sacrifice any longer
 these people.48
 However, on August 27, 1969 Kapwepwe withdrew his resignation
 from the government and said he would stay on until his term
16
 expired in August 1970. Meanwhile factionalism continued to
 dominate UNIP politlce.
 In August 1971 Kapwepwe resigned from the government as
 Minister of Provincial and Local Government and Culture, and
 became leader of newly formed United Progreeeive Party (UPP).
 The UPP epitomised the tendency for intra-party competition in
 the guise of regional conflict which culminated in the
 secession from UNIP of some skilled politicians. The
 defections seriously impaired UNIP'e capability for mobilizing
 votes.40
 Although UPP was generally a Bemba-dominated party, it
 attracted those from UNIP who had always emphasized mass
 participation and popular control as opposed to those who
 emphasized the importance of unity and control from above ae a
 basis for party organization. The former was usually Bemba
 dominated while the latter was usually Lozi dominated. This
 was the ideological basis for the founding of UPP. The new
 party attracted small businesspeople, middle-level civil
 servants, local elected councillors and some party militants
 from UNIP whose services during the anti-colonial struggle had
 seemingly gone unrewarded after 1864. The UPP was strongest
 on the Copperbelt. It is in this respect that Gertzel,
 Szeftel and Baylies argue that UPP was "an expression and
 consequence of competition for limited resources."60
 Kapwepwe's resignation had a sobering effect on the UNIP
 leadership. A popular politician outside UNIP represented a
 real threat. President Kaunda was left with no choice but to
 go for the one-party state. What he now needed was a
 justification to make hie move. He did not wait very long.
17
 Because of the violence which followed, which was blamed on
 the new party, President Kaunda on 4 February 1972 proscribed
 UPP and detained Kapwepwe and one hundred and twenty-three
 leading UPP members.01
 Kapwepwe was now receiving the same treatment he had
 helped to administer on Liso a few years earlier for
 challenging President Kaunda's leadership. The women who
 demonstrated were often stripped off semi-naked as a gesture
 of extreme insult directed at Kapwepwe. Kapwepwe had
 difficult holding meetings for his party because the police
 often denied his party permits. The police were afraid of
 reprisals if they granted permits to UPP.02 Rumours were
 widespread that some UNIP members were actually followers of
 UPP. Yet, because of the oppressive card-checking campaign by
 uniformed UNIP party militants, few publicly supported UPP.
 The "It Pays To Belong To UNIP" mentality within UNIP
 prevailed. Those without UNIP cards were subjected to serious
 abuses of human rights. For instance, women without UNIP
 cards were barred from entering markets and shops. In some
 cases they were coerced into spending their housekeeping money
 on UNIP membership cards. Men without UNIP cards found
 themselves walking to and from work as empty buses drove
 away.oa
 The T-tmen of Znmhin carried a leading Btory about the
 harmful effects of the government's approach in dealing with
 members of the opposition. The editorials angered President
 Kaunda who, in January 1972 decided to replace the Editor-in-
 Chief, Danstan Kamana with Vernon Mwaanga, former Zambia's
 Permanent Representative to the United Nations.04 He told
18
 the new Editor-in-Chief that the government did not expect to
 be confronted with the same thorn in the flesh.
 On February 25 President Kaunda announced the cabinet's
 decision to establish a one-party state in Zambia through
 constitutional change.B6 A National Commission was eet up
 under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President, Mainza Chona, to
 recommend necessary changes to the constitution in preparation
 for the introduction of the one-party state system. The Chona
 Commission reported in October 1972. Public debate was
 minimal.
 The tenor of the Chona Report "suggested the "liberal'
 influence of Zambia's new administrators and entrepreneurs,
 rather than the populist influence of the party."60 The
 government, therefore, rejected most of the Commission's
 recommendations, which would have made Zambia's "one-party
 participatory democracy" have some semblance of democracy.
 The recommendation that the incumbent president be eligible to
 stand for a second five-year term, after which he or she would
 not be eligible to stand for office until yet another five-
 year period had elapsed, was rejected. The government also
 rejected the proposal for an electoral competition between
 three presidential candidates. Instead, the government White
 Paper67 provided for one presidential candidate who was to
 be elected by the party's general conference.
 In the end, the constitutional changes which ushered in
 the Second Republic reinforced party control over the
 presidency, while simultaneously providing for greater
 presidential control over the party. Contrary .to President
 Kaunda's suggestion in March 1972 that "one-party
19
 participatory democracy" would end the politics of patronage,
 i
 the reverse was true. On December 4, 1972 the UNIP National
 Council discussed the Chona Report and accepted the Government
 White Paper on it. On December B, by a vote of 78 to none,
 the National Assembly approved the second and third reading of
 the Constitutional Amendment Bill prohibiting all opposition
 parties. It established the ruling UNIP as the.country's sole
 legal party.08 President Kaunda signed the Bill on December
 13 at a ceremony to mark its enactment.08
 Under this Bill, no person was allowed to attempt to form
 a political party or organization other than UNIP. Further, no
 one was allowed to "belong to or assemble, associate, express
 opinion or do anything in sympathy with any such political
 party or organization."80 While President Kaunda had in
 September 1963 openly turned down a proposition that he become
 Life President of UNIP (and Ipeo facto of Zambia),81 the
 constitutional changes which ushered in the one-party state
 made him a de facto Life President. The current slogan was
 "ONE ZAMBIA ONE NATION; ONE NATION ONE LEADER, THAT LEADER
 KAUNDA WAMUYAYAYA."e2 President Kaunda never objected to
 the slogan. In fact he always began his political speeches by
 starting the slogan and letting hi6 audience carry it to its
 logical conclusion.
 Attempts 'by Nkumbula, Kapwepwe and Robert Chiluwe (a
 Lusaka businessman), in 1978 to challenge President Kaunda for
 the presidency were shattered when, by a show of hands, UNIP
 delegates at Mulungushi approved constitutional amendments.
 The most crucial amendment was the new requirement that a
 candidate for the post of president should have been a member
20
 of UNIP for at least five yeare, with no criminal record.
 Such an aspirant also needed twenty supporters from each
 province amonget the delegates at the party congress.
 The amendment effectively disqualified the three
 independent contestants.33 Nkumbula had Just joined UNIP
 following the dissolution of ANC. Kapwepwe remained outBide
 UNIP since the dayB of his United Progressive Party which was
 banned in 1971. Chiluwe could not manage to raise the
 required number of supporters. Further more, Chiluwe was
 declared bankrupt after his bank accounts were frozen. By the
 law, therefore, he could not stand for the presidency or,
 indeed, any other public office. Within months Chiluwe was so
 pauperised that he could hardly afford bus fares. That is the
 price he paid for attempting to challenge President Kaunda.
 The High Court turned down Kapwepwe and Nkumbula's appeal
 against their disqualification on 16 November 1978, thereby
 leaving President Kaunda as the only presidential candidate.
 He was subsequently elected with an 80.5 per cent vote of the
 total votes cast in a 66.7 percent poll.6'* President Kaunda
 had effectively become autocratic and repulsive of any
 democratic processes in the party and the nation.
 President Kaunda's authority was further strengthened
 because he wae seem as the only one in Zambia capable of
 securing allegiance from all the 73 tribes in the country.
 Having launched the one-party state, President Kaunda found
 himself with the task of performing a balancing act between
 UNIP old guards and new members from former opposition
 parties. Nkumbula Joined UNIP following the signing of the
 Choma Declaration in June 1973.eo President Kaunda appeared
21
 secure, but silently worried about Kapwepwe's refusal to Join
 UNIP.
 While President Kaunda may have emerged as an autocrat,
 he was unquestionably helped by the behaviour of some cabinet
 ministers who more often than not showed extreme caution
 towards, decision making. Because of too much consultation,
 they inadvertently concentrated political power in President
 Kaunda's hands. Earlier in his rule President Kaunda was
 willing to delegate, but his ministers were reluctant to take
 initiative.68 No man can be a dictator alone. President
 Kaunda was surrounded by over zealous sycophants who went out
 of their way to show loyalty to the party and the President in
 particular.
 The notorious uniformed party militants were allowed by
 the UNIP leadership to mete out punishment to anyone accused
 of disrespect for the party leadership. These individuals
 terrorised people at bus stops, at markets, shops and even at
 places of work. They were above reproach. UNIP, particularly
 under the one-party state rule, gave them a silent
 encouragement. Examples of their activities are many. Aa
 late as 1990, the party militants were still very active.
 In January 1990 an Assistant Registrar in charge of
 Personnel at the University of Zambia became a victim of the
 party militants.e7 He was forcibly removed from his office
 at the University of Zambia and carried to a waiting van. He
 was then driven to the Civic Centre. His fate followed a
 report that he had relieved a University employee of her
 duties for constantly leaving her office to attend to party
 matters. The employee involved WSB, at the time, Women's
22
 League Ward Chairperson, and Trustee of the University of
 Zambia Allied Workers Union. At the Civic Centre the
 Assistant Registrar was told that what sacked worker was doing
 while attending party meetings was more important than what he
 did at the University.es He was therefore ordered to
 reinstate her and told that "what you should know ie that the
 University exists because of the party and you are supposed to
 respect it".6e
 Similar incidents are plenty in Zambia,B political
 history, particularly during the one party-state era. Because
 party militants helped to Bustain the autocratic rule by
 President Kaunda, they were not disciplined for their actions
 against administrators who tried to enforce discipline at
 places of work. In fact, party militants were the law onto
 themselves. No one dared to challenge them, at least not
 openly.
 The Df-mi BR of Autocracy
 Throughout the period that UNIP was in power, more
 especially since 1968 when election of party leaders produced
 disaffection, the par*ty did away with elections. This
 reluctance to hold free and fair elections for party posts
 remained perhaps the single moet important evidence of lack of
 democracy in UNIP. Most UNIP leaders were uncomfortable with
 the idea of challenging President Kaunda for the presidency.
 He was perceived ae the only one in the country who was best
 suited to rule Zambia.70
 However, the transformation in the country's demography
 changed the way such opinions were perceived. Ae more and
23
 more ZambianB became permanently urbanised, and as the rural-
 urban linkB became weaker, people looked more to the state for
 Burvival. Initially the state was able to meet the needs of
 the urbanites through the policy of subsidising food and other
 societal requisites. However, as the long economic depression
 which began in the mid 1970s worsened in the 1980s, moat
 urbanitea became disillusioned with government performance.
 While it had been easy to satisfy the rural population, the
 urbanites were more difficult to buy off. The unemployed
 youthful urbanitee became a source of worry for the Kaunda
 government. Several schemes were developed but they all
 failed to successfully solve the problem. Because of
 frustration, the urbanites became easily involved in food
 riots which rocked the late 1980s. These culminated in the
 June 1990 food riot which precipitated the Luchembe coup
 attempt.71 It was this coup attempt which effectively broke
 President Kaunda's grip to power and led to the formation of a
 pressure group, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).
 Faced with these mounting challenges,-President Kaunda
 felt insecure, vulnerable and excessively sensitive to
 criticism. Times had changed. ZambianB had also changed
 their allegiance. They were more supportive of the ideas
 about the need to remove the one-party state system. MMD
 political rallies attracted thousands of people. Lees and
 lees people openly supported UNIP. Even the notorious
 uniformed party militants were no longer as forceful as was
 the case a few months earlier. Most had switched sides and
 were looking forward to change.
24
 More importantly perhaps, the collapse of autocracy in
 Zambia can be better understood when one takes into account
 the fact that some leading members of the UNIP Central
 Committee declined to stand for re-appointment during the 1991
 UNIP Mulungushi extraordinary conference. ThoBe who offered
 to etep down include Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga and Gray
 Zulu. Obviously, the retirement of these seasoned UNIP
 politicians from active politics extremely weakened Preeident
 Kaunda's hold to political power. His efforts to replace them
 with young inexperienced leaders failed to sustain him in the
 position of power.
 Furthermore, some of the more experienced politicians had
 already identified themselves with the MMD. People like H.
 Mulemba, the- former UNIP Secretary General and then Zambia's
 High Commissioner to Canada, had since 1988 become an MP and
 increasingly critical of UNIP policies. He was among the
 first MPs to move over to the MMD and was indeed a founder
 member of MMD. The MMD also gathered further support from
 most of those who had suffered humiliation during the one-
 party state era. Even the recently pardoned coup plotters
 like Edward Shamwana supported the MMD.
 President Kaunda's position was evidently weakened. -Just
 as the Zambians had created and defined autocratic President
 Kaunda, they unmade the autocrat by simply denying him the
 support he always enjoyed. Consequently, from an
 uncompromising refusal to change from one-party Btate to
 pluralism, President Kaunda began to soften. He announced
 that there would be a referendum to decide whether or not
 Zambia should return to plural politics. Yet, as pressure
25
 mounted, this wae abandoned. Instead a national election was
 called for October 1991. UNIP and the MMD (which had been
 transformed into a political party) were to participate. This
 followed the change in the constitution to allow opposition
 parties to legally operate in Zambia.
 With this newly found freedom, several other partieB
 emerged. The most important being the MMD and UNIP. During
 the October 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections MMD
 overwhelmingly defeated UNIP. F.T.J. Chiluba was elected
 president, and on 1st November 1991 he was sworn in as
 Zambia's second republican president.
 Chiluba's accession to the political throne in Zambia's
 political history marked the end of an era?the end of the
 long dawn?according to The KcnnomiRt.7^ xhe twenty years
 of autocracy has also taught Zambians one major lesson.
 Zambians will never again surrender their political rights to
 one individual. Thus the success or failure of liberal
 democracy to day would depend on whether or not Zambians
 internalized the problems of one-party rule. In another
 decade or so, some one will be able to chronical the
 experience of the Third Republic. This paper has,
 nonetheless, shown that the concentration of political power
 in President Kaunda's hands was only possible because the
 people made it possible. The Zambian society hero-worshipped
 the president so much that with time, they managed to make an
 autocrat out of an otherwise democrat. With the return to
 liberal democracy, it is hopped that Zambians will guard
 against creating another autocrat out of President Chiluba by
 avoiding hero-worehipping him as they did President Kaunda.
26
 NOTES
 1. Crawford Young, '"The African Colonial State and Its
 Political Legacy," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds),
 The Precarious Balance: Statf; and Socif-tv 1n Africa (Boulder
 and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 57.
 2. Young, "The African Colonial State," p. 57.
 3. Larry Diamond and Dennis Galvan, "Sub-Saharan Africa,"
 in Robert Wesson (ed), Democracy: A World Survfiv (New York:
 Praeger, 1987), p. 84.
 4. S.E. Finer, Comparative finvfirnment (Handsworth:
 Penguin Books, 1970), p. 441.
 5. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
 Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard
 University Press, 1956), pp. 3-4.
 6. Richard Sandbrook, "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A
 Socialist-Revisionist Perspective," Canadian Journal of
 African Studies. 22, 2 (1988), p. 241.
 7. For detailed discussion of these features, see:
 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and
 Autocraov. pp. 10-13.
 8. Zfimhia Daily Mall. Wednesday, 3 February, 1993.
 9. For details see, Anthony Martin, Minding Their Own
 RimineKfl: Znmh1n*B Struggle Against Weetern Control (London:
 Penguin Books, 1972), 215.
 10. Kapasa Makaea, 7.amhi?:Fi March to Political Freedom
 (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1985), pp. 115-116.
 11. Kapasa Makaea, 7nmh)a'a March tn Political Freedom.
 (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1985), p. 94.
 12. Keeslnge Contemporary Archlvsp.. 14, (1963-64), 19689.
 13. Party Archives, ANC 7/63, Sikota Wina to Harry
 Mwaanga Nkumbula, 10 December 1959. At the time of writing
 Wina was a member of UNIP and his letter was secretly written
 to Nkumbula. Undoubtedly, these sentiments were meant to deal
 with the political situation at the time, but they nonetheless
 form the background to the ideology of togetherness as
 advanced by Kaunda.
 14. Kenneth D. Kaunda and Colin M. Morris, A HnmqpiBt in
 Africa: Letters to Cnlin MnrrJB From Kenneth Davtd Knnnda
 (London: Longmans, 1966), p. 84.
27
 15. Cherry Gertzel, et al The Dvnnmlnft of the One-Party
 State in Zamhla (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
 1984), p. 7.
 16. KeesingB Contemporary Archives. 15 (1965-66), 21511.
 17. For a detailed discussion of this argument, see
 Thomas Rasmussen, "Political Competition and One-Party
 Dominance in Zambia", The Journal of Modern African Stndlna.
 7, 3 (1983), pp. 410-411.
 IB. Anonymous, The Northern NBWB, Tuesday, 27 January
 1953.
 19. Makasa, Zamhla'fi March to Political Freedom.
 20. Party Archives ANC 7/63, Wina to Nkumbula, 10
 December, 1959.
 21. PA ANC 17/63 M. Sipalo to H.M. Nkumbula, 11 November
 1957.
 22. J.S. Coleman, "Economic Growth and Political
 Reorientation", in Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz
 (eds), Economic Tranpltlon In Africa (Evanston: Northwestern
 University Press, 1964), 396.
 23. H.C. Donald C. Mackenzie-Kennedy, Northern Rhodesia
 Chief Secretary to Stewart Gore-Browne, 12 June 1935, cited In
 Robert I. Rotberg, Blank Heart: Gorfl-Browns and the Politico
 of Multiracial Zamhla (Berkeley: Los Angeles, 1977), 168.
 24. J.J.N. Cloete, Emergent Africa: Political and
 Administrative Trends (Pretoria: Africa Institute, 1966), 11.
 25. Kabunda Kayongo, "One-Party States in Pre-Colonial
 Africa," Multl-Partv News. No. 2 (22 September-4 October
 1990), 5.
 26. PRO DO 35/4636/333 Draft White Paper on the
 Constitutional Proposals for Northern Rhodesia, February 1958,
 p. 8, para. 19.
 27. Africa Confidential. September, 1969, p. 4.
 28. Official Verbatim Report of the Debates of the Second
 SeBsion (Resumed) of the First National Assembly, Hansard No.
 4, 13th July to 22nd September, 1965, p. 182.
 29. Hansard, No. 4, 22 July, 1965, p. 189.
 30. Hansard No. 4, 22 July 1965, p. 210.
 31. Hansard No. 4, 22 July, 1965, pp. 209-210.
 32. Hansard No. 4 22 July 1965, p. 199-200.
28
 33. Little wonder that President F.T.J Chiluba, Zambia's
 second republican president, declined to be refereed to as
 "Hie Excellency the Preeident". Instead he preferred to be
 simply refereed to as "Mr. Preeident".
 34. Hansard No. 4, 22 July 1965, p. 201.
 35. Hansard No. 4, 22 July 1965, p. 222.
 36. On the details of this Bee Sikota Wina, A Night
 Without. A President. (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1985).
 37. Wina, A Night Without A President. 45.
 38. Wina, A N?ght Without A President. 46.
 39. Mwizenge S. Tembo, "Zambia by Zambians',
 Jourpa] of African SturiieK. 22, 1 (1988), 151.
 Canadian
 40. S.N. Chipungu, "The Third Republic Needs Democratic
 Vigilance", The Weekly PoBt. 5-11 June 1992, 4.
 41. Chipungu, "The Third Republic", 4.
 42. Keeslngs Contemporary ArchiveB. 17 (1968-69), 23321.
 43. Under different circumstances, Nabulyato made a
 different ruling in which he accorded UNIP the status of the
 officially recognized party in parliament, despite ite decimal
 performance during the October 1991 general election. The
 Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) had made it very
 clear that they cherished an opposition, both in parliament
 and outside. The Speaker, Nabulyato therefore, made a ruling
 which reflected the atmosphere of the 1990s.
 44. KeftBlnas Contemporary Archives. 17 (1968-69), 23321.
 45. Keepings Contemporary Archives, 17 (1968-69), 23321.
 46. Fola Soremekan, "The Challenge of Nation Building:
 Neo-Humanism and Politice in Zambia, 1967-1969",
 AfXicfl, 9, 1 (1970), 24.
 1494.
 47. Africa Research Bulletin. (August 1-31, 1969), p.
 48. Africa Bulletin. (August 1-31, 1969), p.
 that the Bemba-speaking people1495. Kapwepwe's claims
 suffered physically because he wae Zambia's Vice president do
 not reflect African political realities. In fact the conflict
 within UNIP centred around the party leadership which
 reflected Bemba dominance. (See table VI). Because of the
 patronage system, Bemba-speaking people were more secure than
 is acknowledged.
 49. Cherry Gertzel, et al "Introduction: The Making of
 the One-Party State," in Cherry Gertzel, et al (ede), lh&
29
 Dynamics of the One-Party State In Zambia. (Manchester,
 Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 14.
 50. Gertzel, et. al "Introduction," p. 14.
 51. Africa Research Bui letin. (February 1-29, 1972), p.
 2377.
 52. Kaunda had warned already that he would dismiss any
 police officer who appeared to have been serving the interest
 of the opposition.
 53. Africa Confidential 1972.
 54. Africa Confidential. 1972.
 55. Africa Research Bulletin. (February 1-29, 1972), p.
 2377.
 56. Cherry Gertzel, et al, The Dynamics of the One-Partv
 State., p. 18.
 57. Summary of Recommendations Accepted bv Government..
 Government Paper No. 1 of 1972 (1972).
 58. Congress MP's walked out in protest and therefore did
 not participate in the voting.
 59. KeeBinp'B Contemporary Archives. 19 (1972), p. 25676.
 60. Keenlng'H Contemporary Archives. 19 (1973), p. 25676.
 61. Colin Legum (ed.), Zambia: Independence apd Beyond,
 the Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda. (London, Oxford University
 Press, 1966), pp. 154-155.
 62. Wamuyayaya means "for ever and ever" in Chinyanja.
 63. KssfilngR Contemporary Archives. 25 February 1979,
 29450.
 64. Caroln Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "Elections in the
 One-Party State", in Cherry Gertzel, et al (eds), The nvnaminw
 of the One Party State In Zambia (Manchester; Manchester
 University Press, 198-), 29.
 65. Africa Confidential. 14, 14 (1973), 8; London Times.
 17 July 1973.
 66. Africa Confidential. January 1973, 5.
 67. See: TlmeB of Zambia. Saturday 6 January 1990.
 68. Times of Zambia. Saturday 6 January 1990.
 69. TimeB of Zamhia. Saturday 6 January 1990.
30
 70. Such views continue to be held by some UNIP
 supporters long after President Kaunde's defeat in October
 1991. Former UNIP MP for Chipili maintained during an
 informal discussion that there was no one in hie view who was
 best suited to rule Zambia but Kaunda. (11 June 1992, at
 Marshlands, Lusaka).
 71. See: Beatwell Chisala, r.t r.<ichemhf> C O U P Attempt,
 (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications, 1991).
 72. The Economist, 7 July 1990, p. 15.