COALITION POLITICS AND URBAN GOVERNANCE IN JOHANNESBURG’S HOUSING POLICY

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ABSTRACT
This research was conducted to assesses the nature of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality following the 2016 local government election, with a focus on the housing policy and housing provision. A key to understanding the nature of the coalition is to question the rationale behind its formation: was it done to bring more significant administrative and political cohesion or otherwise? The research project agrees with Kotzé (2019) that coalitions are notoriously and inherently tricky, often requiring a balancing act between the interests of parties. Different political ideologies and their impact on possible policy alignment or otherwise are significant contributing factors to the stability or instability of coalition governments.

Through a semi-structured interview with members of the Johannesburg Municipality coalition government council and senior political and administrative members of the council, this investigation aimed at answering questions about the nature of the coalition government, coalition government impact on governance, coalition government impact on housing policy and provision and if political, ideological differences might render the city ungovernable and ultimately result to the collapse of the coalition.

The researcher noted that the influence of the EFF ‘queen-maker’ status and ability to swing power within the council contributed to the many governance challenges faced by the coalition. A pertinent question remains: who owned the power behind the throne? Was it the EFF or was it former Mayor Herman Mashaba? The rationale behind the formation of this coalition government was essential to maximise power and take power from the ANC but more technically because no party had majority votes that were required to govern the city post the 2016 local government election. The research established that with that rationale in mind this coalition government however faced ideological difference, especially between the two larger political parties in the coalition.
DECLARATION

I, Bonolo Makgale, declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or part submitted it for obtaining any qualifications. It is presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management in the field of Public Policy at the University of Witwatersrand.

_______________________
Bonolo Makgale
Johannesburg
February 2020
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this research project to my baby Bokang-Morena Mzongwana, thank you for being my constant light and love. May you continue to dream bigger dreams and believe that you have the capacity to change the world around you. You are enough!
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To Mr. Moss Ntlha, Mrs Khumo Ntlha and Phemelo Ntlha I do not have adequate words to express my gratitude for all that you have done for me. May God bless you.

To Ausi Natasha, Khosi, Refilwe, Vuyokazi, Noloyiso, Nonhlanhla, Nokuthula, Ntsiki Elephant, Marlyn, , Babalwa and Nicole ke leboga go menagane. Indeed ‘it takes a village to raise a child’.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
<td>African Independent Congress</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ASGI-SA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South Africa</td>
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<td>COPE</td>
<td>Congress of the People</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>FV+</td>
<td>Freedom Front Plus</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth and Employment Redistribution</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>International Development Programme</td>
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<td>IRASA</td>
<td>Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa</td>
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<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Member of Mayoral Committee</td>
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<td>NNP</td>
<td>New National Party</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Patriot Alliance</td>
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<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Actors Dialogue</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Program</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction to the research problem

1.1 Introduction

The title of this research is “Coalition Politics and Urban Governance in Johannesburg’s Housing Policy. The research aims to investigate the nature of coalition politics in the Johannesburg Municipality’s housing policy. Coalition politics, in metropolitan governance, is a fairly new and under-researched phenomenon in South Africa. In addition to this, coalition politics in its nature is a complex concept. Law (2018) noted that whilst there are no perfect and ideal models for establishing and maintaining coalition, there are critical factors that political parties need to pay attention to both when establishing and maintaining coalition because of its complexity. Political parties coming together to form coalition politics need a careful consideration of South Africa’s political, cultural and economic context to ensure sustenance of coalition politics. This research will focus on the nature and implications of coalition politics whether at all different political ideologies contribute to policy formation delays and lack of governance in the Johannesburg Municipality housing policy. This study brings to light some service delivery and housing policy inefficiency in the multiparty governance coalition spearheaded by the DA in the Johannesburg municipality.

1.2 Background of the study

The 2016 local elections were a turning point for South African politics. This moment dramatically changed the political landscape of a country that had one party, the African National Congress (ANC) with complete electoral dominance and power (Law, 2018). The national ruling party lost the country’s capital city (Tshwane), the country’s economic hub (Johannesburg) and the Nelson Mandela Bay in Port Elizabeth, and only managed to maintain power in eThekwini. The Democratic Alliance (DA) managed to retain its electoral dominance over the City of Cape Town. Opposition parties in the three “hung” municipalities joined forces to unseat the ANC and proceeded to vote in the DA majors in the respective Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay constituencies. In the same vein, the coalition gained power in Ekurhuleni which was previously also a stronghold of the ANC.

The implication of this drastic change and shift of power in the political landscape was the formation of what is now referred to as coalition politics. Schereiber (2018) notes that these are not the first instances of coalition governments in the post-apartheid era. The City of Cape Town under the leadership of Helen Zille and Kwa-Zulu-Natal were governed by coalition politics for two decades during democracy. However, the current paradigm shift is markedly
distinct from the past two coalition scenarios in both size of its governance impact as well as geographical scale.

Law (2018) notes that global evidence of coalition politics shows that it is an incredibly complex and difficult political art form to manage. He suggests that the survival of coalition politics will require a range of expertise and skills to manage the undeniable and inevitable power dynamics as political rivals are forced to become allies (Law, 2018). The constant pressure for political parties to maintain their independence and autonomy in the eyes of their voters while being forced to collaborate with their competition requires an impeccable set of skills, clear terms of reference and regulatory mechanisms.

Housing policy is a key area to test this collaborative ability between political parties. This paper examines the tandem relationship between the Johannesburg Municipality coalition government and housing policy. Housing policy is a pervasive issue in the Johannesburg Municipality especially regarding the differing land ideologies between the EFF and the DA. As a result of this ideological opposition, which is investigated further in this study. Housing policy is often the central debate for this ‘marriage of convenience’ and is often used as a yardstick to measure service delivery and general efficiency of said coalition in addressing key societal concerns.

Section 26(1) of the South African constitution notes that everyone has the right to access adequate housing (Constitution, 1996). Section 26(2) furthers asserts that the State must take legislative responsibilities to ensure the progressive realisation of this right. The constitutive right to housing therefore puts the State under an obligation to ensure housing provision to every South African citizen. South Africa has a massive backlog that can be attributed to various factors including policy implementation challenges. Prinsloo (2011) noted that 3 million subsidised houses have been built in South Africa through various housing plans since the dawn of the new democratic government, however South Africa still faces a backlog of a further 2-3 million houses.

Lack of housing remains a pervasive issue in the Johannesburg Municipality. Statistics illustrate that close to half of the population in the Johannesburg Municipality do not have access to decent housing. An enormous housing backlog and the impact of urbanization could potentially account for this extraordinary shortage. According to the current Integrated Development Plan (IDP) (Integrated Development Plan, 2016, p.9) The Johannesburg Municipality has a population of approximately 4.94 million people. This population has increased by a significant 11.6% from 2011 to 2016 (IDP, 2016, p.9). The IDP also records that about 3027 migrants come to the city every month. A report to the Johannesburg
Municipality by Mazzuchetti & Skosana (2015, p.7) argues that urbanization is one of the reasons for rapid population growth in the city. Mazzuchetti & Skosana (2015, p.7) define urbanization as “the process of transition from a rural society to a more urban society”. Therefore, a prevailing increase of population in the Johannesburg Municipality as a result of urbanisation contributes to the high housing demands.

1.2.1 The Rationale of Coalition

Tradition has shown that the formation of coalition government can be seen primarily as an ‘act of political expediency’. This statement underscores the reality that given the choice, political parties would not consider forming coalition governments. Oyugi (2006) contests that parties form coalition governments because Parliament lacks a dominant party with majority votes. Back (2008) holds the same school of thought, surmising that in most democracies, a party will likely never win the entire majority legislature votes, which means that no party can have complete power in a country without support from other parties. In the South African context, ANC’s opportunity to win a majority of seats in the legislature could be attributed to the role the party played in fighting and unseating the apartheid government.

The most common rationale for a coalition formation is to win elections and unseat a ruling party, this applies in both cases of pre-election and post-election coalition. Elections are of crucial importance in the formation of coalitions, in fact there can never be a coalition outside the election framework. A critical look and analysis of coalition government formation required that careful attention be paid to election processes and agreements. Pre-election coalition is essentially when parties come together as a collective and outlines the strategic way forward in running for office as a collective instead of in singularity.

To this end, Kadima (2013) provides us with a distinction between coalitions and alliances which must be taken note of. In his argument he notes that alliances are a coming together of two political parties during the pre-election phase in order to maximise their votes and mutual interests. Therefore, one could argue that pre-election coalition could be viewed as alliances and not necessarily coalitions in light of this argument. Coalition agreement in this case will require political parties to agree that post-election they would form an executive coalition (Allam & Aylott, 2007 et Biegon J, 2008). It emerged in the data collection process of this project that a few parties in the Johannesburg Municipality had informal meetings prior to the 2016 local election because it was evident that most of them wanted to unseat the ANC.
Post-election coalitions on the other hand are what literature frequently refers to as classical coalition. This is formed after an electoral process which results in either the failure of a party to win a majority, or in the alternative scenario, when there is a dispute concerning election results. The former scenario was replicated in the Johannesburg Municipality and the latter was the case for Kenya and Zimbabwe. However, it is worth noting that Kenya and Zimbabwe had already formed a pre-election coalition and the post-election dispute simply re-affirmed the prior need for coalition. Coalitions according to Booysen (2013) and Kadime (2006) is the coming together of political parties jointly working together in government or legislative bodies influenced by election outcomes. Therefore, all parties involved in coalition are working together with an aim to achieve a shared and mutual goal through a collective strategy.

The decision to establish coalition governments is one that lies firmly on political parties, that is to say, that the electorate does not have a say in its formation. It is assumed that representative democracy finds expression in the formation of coalitions. Natalini (2010) points out that political parties on local government level are not obligated to consult with the electorate nor actively take note of what happens at the grass root level. This argument reinforces that political parties would form coalition without the input of the electorate. However, Lodge (2014) contends that evidence in India suggests that the electorate favours coalition and appreciates the inevitable ideological and policy trade-off that comes with diverse parties collaborating in governance. He further argues that in most countries stabilisation and not ideology are paramount.

Coalition formations as noted by Law (2018) provide an opportunity for medium to smaller political parties to take part in governance, in the same vein this provides an opportunity for these medium-to-small parties to create a public profile and use disproportionate influence to gain voting powers and participate in government as a queenmaker. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a typical example of a party that assumed a queenmaker status in the Johannesburg Municipality by strategically opting not to be part of the coalition officially, but rather employ its disproportionate influence to gain voting powers. Additionally, the formation of coalition in the Johannesburg Municipality enabled small parties like Congress of the People (COPE), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) to have a say in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality.

1.2.2 Urban Governance

The term governance has been used widely across many sectors in society from the public and private sector to civil society organisations. Andersen & Loftager (2014) noted that the
term governance still remains a contested, complex and not quite distinctively definable concept. The governance group of the World Bank Institute website says: “We define governance as the traditions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (1). The process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced. (2) The capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies. (3) the respect of citizens and the State for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (World Bank n.d). The World Bank Group definition seems to be centred around the state, its authority and legislative responsivities to govern and account to its citizens.

Scholte (2002, p. 281) defines governance as “a system of actors involved in the action of governing, where government is only ONE of the multiple players involved (together with business and civil society groups)”. Scholte (2002) further elaborates that it’s a process by which the focus is not only on government but also involves networks, arrangements, negotiations and conflicts between a set of various actors, the government itself included. This position enlarges the parameters for which governance as a concept can be applied. The act of governance therefore should not only be limited to government as it cuts across all sectors and is inclusive of non-state actors as well.

In recent years, governance and government were frequently used as synonyms. Ansell & Gash (2007) stated that political sciences broadened the meaning of governance beyond government players to include civil society and the private sector’s ability to use the inherent power that comes with governance in forming and enacting policy that directly impacts and affects human, institutional, economic and social development. Central to the act of governing is the development and formation of effective policies, which are essential for a response to social issues, management and distribution of public resources. These policies serve as a ‘guide to action’ for governance, setting out who gets what, where, when, and how in society (Howlett & Ramesh, 2016, p. 302). For the purpose of this study, the concept of governance will be discussed within the boundaries of public sector and public policy.

1.2.3 Formation of new governance: Case of Johannesburg Municipality

Martin & Vanberg (2004 p.2) clarify that “coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policy-making powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favoured by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners”. In the 2016 local government elections, with regards to the Johannesburg Municipality, the ANC won the majority of seats
in council, amassing a total of 121 seats. However, they did not achieve a majority. The Democratic Alliance formed a coalition government with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the United Democratic Movement (UDM), and Congress of the People (COPE), Freedom Front plus (FVP) and Al Jamaah, amassing a total of 115 members in council.

The unallied Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which have 30 members in council assists the DA coalition with additional voting numbers as separately, their coalition’s numbers are much less than the ANC’s. The dominance of the DA-led coalition is therefore strengthened by the voting numbers brought in by the EFF and should the EFF withdraw its voting members the coalition would collapse. The likelihood of collapse in coalitions is corroborated by Bāck (2008), who argues that coalitions are characterized by the feature that if any partner leaves for whatever reason, the coalition loses its winning status and as a consequence its control of the jurisdiction. Martin & Vanberg (2004) argue that once the coalition deal is concluded, party representatives in the coalition arrangement will always try to pursue policy positions that favour their political stance at the expense of the coalition deal.

Dunn (2012) agrees with the existence of contentions, arguing that various interest groups, individuals, bureaus, departments, and offices get involved in the process where cooperation, competition and conflict are commonplace.

1.3 Research Problem

Khan (2011) sums up the assertion that policy, governance, and coalition are inextricably intertwined when commenting that “governance concerns how the State and society relates. Therefore any questions about governance cannot be separated from broader questions about the economic role of the State in sustaining growth”. The constituencies of the coalition politics in the Johannesburg Municipality appear to differ in their expectations of firstly, the role government should play and secondly in their ability to access power in a manner that is effective in pressuring political power to act urgently. Against this backdrop, it seems inevitable that major tensions arose in a multiparty government as party politics delay service delivery. However, how these parties went about resolving tensions was pertinent to the future of the governing coalition. Muller & Strom (2000) argue that coalition politics is not straightforward but instead is rather convoluted. It forces parties to agree on policies with other political partners and yet strive to maintain their distinct political image. This is a particularly pressing issue in light of its role in the consolidation of our democracy. The democratic transition in South Africa was a monumental one internationally and the maturing of South Africa’s democracy has the potential to further influence democratic governance across the continent.
Coalition politics and governance is an increasingly appealing strategy across a considerable number of states in the modern world. Muller & Strom (2000) cited by Back (2008) argue that coalitions are a necessity and coalition formation is an important phenomenon that comes after elections. An interesting case in point is that of the coalition government headed by the Conservative Party, more specifically under the leadership of the current United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister, Theresa May. Following the resignation of the former Prime Minister David Cameron after the release of the results on Brexit (a referendum on whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union (EU), May won the leadership election on July 2016, which made her the second female Prime Minister in British history after Margaret Thatcher. Almost immediately after assuming office and following the initial process of withdrawing the UK from the EU, May announced a snap general election with the aim of strengthening her hand in the Brexit negotiations. The end result of this move was that of a hung parliament, where the number of Conservative seats dropped from 330 to 317, although the party had originally won their highest vote since 1983. In response to the unfruitful gamble that May took, a confidence and supply deal with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to support a minority government was agreed – giving rise to what is popularly referred to as the ‘Theresa May coalition government’ or ‘Theresa May/DUP deal’.

Against this backdrop, it was important to interrogate how the different political parties had different collaborative roles to play in the resolution of housing shortage in the city. The housing shortage in the Johannesburg Municipality remained a pervasive issue. The questions asked were: whether coalition politics had an impact in the Johannesburg housing policy? Ultimately, whether housing policy development was a protracted and winding process because of the different political ideologies and manifestos?

The literature review and theoretical framework in chapter two captures pertinent academic and political themes such as formation of coalition politics in the Johannesburg Municipality, regional coalition politics, collaborative governance and power sharing, in addition to South African Housing policy post 1994 among others. The researcher develops an argument of these various themes that are related to the research topic and objective. According to de Vaus (2001) like an architect is required to have full knowledge and purpose of the building before designing it, social researchers must equally be clear about their research questions before developing a research design. The genesis of every research question must answer this critical question ‘What issue am I trying to address?’

In light of that, this research project is an attempt to address the following 3 questions:
Research Questions

Research Question 1: What is the nature and character of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality, and how does coalition politics shape housing policy formulation in the Johannesburg Municipality?

Sub-questions 1. Is this coalition formed to maximise power or advance policy objective?

The purpose of this question is to interrogate the nature of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality. In addition to that, the question will explore the impact of coalition politics on housing policy formation in the Johannesburg Municipality.

Research Question 2: What are the implications of coalition government in housing policy formation processes?

Sub-question 1. Does multi-party governance have an impact on the provision of services, especially housing delivery?

This question will ascertain whether party politics have a role to play in the efficacy of housing service delivery in the Johannesburg municipality. This question will unpack the relative impact of multi-party leadership on municipal governance.

Research Question 3: Does Political party competition and different ideologies contribute to policy formation delays and non-governability?

Sub-question 1. Is it possible for different political ideologies to find healthy compromise in governance?

The purpose of this question would be to ascertain the impact that different political ideologies might have in the governance of the city of Johannesburg's policy formation and housing delivery.

Research Objectives

Coalition politics within the Johannesburg Municipality have undoubtedly had an impact on its resulting governance and policy administration. This study seeks to uncover the dynamics of these intertwining themes to unveil possible mitigation steps to ensure service delivery, mainly housing, can be effected in the face of a multi-party government. The research thus seeks to:

- To demonstrate that coalitions, particularly the DA-led coalition for purposes of this case study, was one formed with the intent to maximize power;
• To critically interrogate whether the coalition politics had a chilling effect on the coalition’s ability to govern the municipality, and;

• This study will further investigate the tension between the right versus left wing ideologies and the ultimate impact in housing service delivery in the Johannesburg Municipality.

1.3.1 Significance of the Study

The coalition has to manage the challenges that may be posed by ideological differences. The marriage of parties in the coalition government may, therefore, make housing policy development a protracted and winding process where outcomes are predetermined along party positions and mandate. Different political parties would have different roles to play according to the rules of conducive governmental relations espoused by the Housing Act, for the delivery of housing. A considerable academic debate on coalition politics questions the reasons behind coalition formation and whether political parties form them to retain power or advance policy objectives (Law, 2018, p. 6).

This research study is significant in both academia and political public domain because it attempted to interrogate the nature of coalition politics in the Johannesburg Municipality and offer clarity on whether the nature of this phenomenon in the Johannesburg Municipality merely maximised on power dynamics for the different political partners or whether they were aligned in relation to housing policy. In the same vein, the study attempts to investigate the impact of coalition politics in the development of housing policy, which is quite significant. The housing policy agenda, maximisation of power and policy alignment are pertinent concepts and subjects worth giving attention to in relation to the new area of government in the South African political landscape and its sustainability and stability.

This study further offered new light to issues concerning democratic consolidation following democratic transitions in the developing world. New developments in the South African democracy, particularly coalition governments shed insight on how power sharing can be facilitated peacefully and whether it is effective. Twenty-six years into democracy, South Africa has shown minimal instability in relation to other countries on the continent. Although the liberating party continues to be in power, it has lost significant support from the electorate. Its longevity is called into question and the threat to its power draws questions concerning economic stability and future political engagement amongst contending parties. Local politics offers a prelude to challenges that could be faced on a national scale, allowing for strategies around dealing with power sharing during coalition governance.
1.4 Research Methodology

1.4.1 Case study

The study investigated an organisation, during which study an ethnographic design in the form of a case study was utilized. An ethnographic design, according to Mouton (2011, p.148) is "usually qualitative in nature which aims to provide an in-depth description of a group of people or community". Typical applications of the case study design, according to Mouton (2011, p.149) are when researchers are studying companies or organizations.

Descriptive codes were used, as it was more useful to describe matters relating to the coalition nature, the policy development processes and the housing situation. Data interpretation of the information was done through a data display to enable easy reading. Data was coded into categories that assisted in the identifications of patterns emerging from the data.

1.4.2 Sampling

The sampling employed for the study is purposive sampling. The aim was to ensure that the study provided an ‘in-depth understanding as is essentially the nature of qualitative research (Nastasi, 2001). Research participants were identified from the members of the council in the Johannesburg Municipality, namely regional leadership of the DA and its coalition partners, the EFF, ANC councillors and housing bureaucrats from the city.

The list included but was not be restricted to:

1. Senior Manager in the Johannesburg Municipality administration
2. 1 Senior Municipal Official
3. 7 Councilors from big political parties and smaller political in the Johannesburg municipality

1.4.3 Data Collection

The study used individual in-depth semi-structured interviews to assist in investigating the reality of coalition politics and phenomenon in the Johannesburg Municipality. Boyce & Neale (2006, p. 3) argued that “in-depth semi-structured interviews are useful when you want detailed information about a person’s thoughts and behaviours or want to explore new issues in depth”. The interviews were used to collect primary data that would not have been captured in documentary data sources and to test the veracity, reliability and credence of the data collected through interviews.
1.4.4 Anticipated Data processing, analysis and interpretation

Data was collected during the interviews. Detailed field notes were also made by hand as well as recordings. The notes were converted into intelligible write-ups that could be read and edited to reflect an accurate account. Theme identification, by recognizing word repetitions, keywords in interviews and documentary sources, was performed to pick up the consistency with which important constructs emerge. This mechanism was effective with the processing of data in ascertaining the nature and character of the city’s coalition government and on challenges relating to policy development.

1.4.5 Research Ethics

Before conducting the research, approval was obtained for the research from the relevant authorities within the Johannesburg Municipality. The institution with which the researcher is registered was stated clearly with all the participants involved. Before the participants took part in the study, the purpose and benefits of the research was explained. Consent from the participants to take part in the study was sought and every party was duly informed of their right to decline or withdraw participation.

1.5 Preliminary framework of the study

Chapter One: Background of the study

Chapter one introduces the research problem by reflecting on the 2016 local election, the ramifications of the ANC’s loss of power and formation of coalition politics. This chapter offers both academic literature and political public domain perspectives. The chapter briefly outlines research methodology techniques and the significance of this study.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

This chapter substantially focuses on existing literature on coalition politics, urban governance and housing provision in South Africa. The chapter explores debates in the public domain about the current political landscape in South Africa, this allowed the researcher to make an academic link and provided some analysis of any potential existing gaps in coalition debate and literature in the South African context.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

This chapter explored conceptual and theoretical framework that exist in academic literature to assist the research in answering the intended research question.

Chapter Four: Research methodology
This chapter provides in detail the research methodology technique chosen, the identified research philosophy and the sampling method employed. The chapter further outlines the data collection approach, data analysis, limitations encountered in the study and trustworthiness and credibility of the data.

Chapter Five: Research Findings, recommendations and conclusion
This chapter offers the key research findings and recommendations for both political and academic sector.
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

2.1 Housing Policy Post-Apartheid Era.

Introduction

Historically urban segregation in Johannesburg reserved the more attractive and well-developed parts of the city to those of Caucasian descent. To accommodate this Africans were relegated to poorly serviced townships. This was coordinated before the 1948 National elections when the apartheid government took a decision to place the black minority in the urban peripheries while accommodating white people in the fully serviced and low density suburbs (Tomilinso, 1999). The UN HABITAT report (2009) noted that urbanisation and its impact largely contributed to the severe housing problem in South African and further argued that urbanisation is interlinked to unemployment. Close to ninety percent of the world’s population live in informal settlements, countries like Nigeria and Kenya have a high percent of its citizens living in informal settlement to find economic opportunities close to big cities as a result of unequal levels of urban development in municipalities (Ogun-fiditimi, 2008).

South Africa saw the rise of urbanisation and a migrant labour system which resulted in a number of black migrant workers relocating to Johannesburg from their ‘homelands’, seeking work in mines, factories, industries and in white suburbs as domestic helpers. The National Housing Department currently known as the department of Human Settlement in 1997 reported that a number of South African families with no decent housing stood at 2.2 million and further made a prediction that this number would increase by 204 000 every year due to the enormous growth of informal urbanisation (Fuller centre for housing, 2014).

The government did not recognize the need to provide services to this group of individuals living in the city because they argued that ‘once their work life was over they were supposed to go home to the rural area’. This assumption reinforced the fact that the apartheid government did not believe that Africans belong in the city nor did they think that Africans should share common space with white people. Most importantly however was the assumption by government that Africans should not be privy to basic service delivery. Fundamentally, the government of the day did not perceive Africans capable of making meaningful contribution to the economy and were therefore not worth government investment.

Donaldos (2001) argued that the apartheid government’s spatial planning and segregation of racial groups led to a low-density urban sprawl which resulted in black South Africans travelling longer hours to work with no local access to recreation. On the matter of housing delivery in particular, the state did attempt to provide subsidies to low-income households to a minority
of Indian and Coloured people. Black South Africans however were left either without homes or with a rental status that gave them little to no security of tenure. We then cannot address the issue of housing provision in South Africa without considering it is a racial justice issue.

Since the dawn of the new democratic government, South Africa saw policy changes in various social issues including housing. South Africa had arguably groundbreaking policies which included the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994, the Growth and Employment Redistribution (GEAR) and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South Africa (ASGI-SA). Most notable was the introduction of the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP), a socio-economic policy framework specifically aimed at redressing the injustices of the apartheid government. Housing delivery was indeed one of the social achievements of this policy framework. South Africa’s new democratic government in its Bill of Rights provides that access to decent housing is a basic human right. Section 26 of the Constitution’s provision on access to housing states that:

- Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
- The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (The Constitution 1996, Section 26).

In his critique of this housing initiative, Harrison (et al., 2003) argues though that the RDP houses and its location on the peripheries of urban areas reinforced practices initiated by the apartheid government. The state’s attempt to provide housing to the poor should not have disregarded the social realities of the poor. The location of the RDP houses on the periphery of urban areas retains the limitation of access to socio-economic activities. A high percentage of beneficiaries of RDP houses channel the bulk of their resources to transport costs to and from employment and contributes to the plight of the working poor (Cross, 2006). Therefore, it could be argued that the housing policy solutions provided are not in fact effective or adequate, as they do not ameliorate the socio-economic welfare of the beneficiaries to the extent that brings progressive realisation to the right of the citizenry.

### 2.2 Housing battles in Johannesburg coalition

Governing a state can be a complex task considering that it involves multiple stakeholders and institutions that form the state. Intergovernmental relations are critical in navigating the complexity of governance between governmental institutions in their different forms and expression, Anderson (1960). These institutions would include national government, provincial government, local government and all government officials that form part of these
institutions. Intergovernmental relations by nature have multi-layered complexities and interdependency in political systems. If one were to consider the fact that political systems are made of diverse parties with diverse ideas of what governance and democracy should look like, ideally it must be realised that they are political parties with different political ideologies and political ambitions. Various governmental institutions do not work as separate entities but rely on other institutions, officials and office-bearers who occupy those institutions. The constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) states that intergovernmental relations are the interchange and interlink that exists and happens among the different spheres of government.

Housing provision in South Africa is a constitutional mandate and responsibility of the department of Human Settlements (DHS) according to Section 26 of the constitution and Section 3 of the Housing Act of 1997 Constitution, 1996; Housing Act, 1997). While this is a mandate and responsibility of the national government, the Department of Human Settlement works closely with provincial and local government. Gauteng government is therefore responsible for budgetary obligations for housing provision while municipalities are responsible for the actual provision of decent housing infrastructure as per the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Business Day reported in January 2019 that the Democratic Alliance was shocked to discover that the Gauteng department of human settlement reduced the ‘human settlement development grant funding from R249m to R68m’.

The Johannesburg Municipality has an enormous housing backlog and the housing crisis across the country is accelerating especially in urban areas due to the impact of urbanisation. The DA made claims that the budget cut is a political game and that the ANC is trying to sabotage the DA-led coalition in the city by restricting access to funding. The party further claimed that the budget cut was done without any consultation with the city and other stakeholders (Business day 2019). If the DA’s claims are anything to go by this is indicative of a failure of intergovernmental relations and its functions and puts into question the ANC and their failure to uphold a constitutive mandate of advancing pro-poor rights and providing decent housing to poor South Africans.

In May 2019 the Johannesburg Municipality became frustrated at the lack of housing service delivery expressed in the #AlexTotalShutdown movement where over a hundred members of the Alexandra Township community marched to the East Bank Hall in Alex, to air their grievances concerning service delivery to the South African Human Rights Commission (Kekana, 2019). Spokesperson for the movement Bobby Solomons stated that the march had been formed as a last resort to get the attention of the Johannesburg Municipality. During this march the residents highlighted the failure of the Alexandra Renewal Project which had an initial budget allocation of R1.6 billion, however according to residents the fund could not be
accounted for as no services had been delivered particularly in housing infrastructure (Kekana, 2019). In fact, in 2010, one thousand nine hundred and ten officials were arrested in 2010 over benefitting from the subsidies intended for housing and a further 20 housing projects between the contractors and government officials were found to be facilitated through dodgy contracts worth up to R2 billion (Manomano et al., 2016). It is the contention of Manomano et al., (2016) that if corruption is not addressed it will lead to losses for taxpayers and further worsen the housing situation.

Some residents alluded to the fact that poor housing material was leading to tuberculosis (Majiet, 2013). Yet others still lamented on poor location of housing, often are from employment and resulting in surge of unemployment, criminal activity and prostitution (Manomano et al., 2016). Despite these concerns the involvement of beneficiaries is usually limited and reserved for the final stages when their grievances are pointless to sanction (Mail and Guardian, 2014). This growing dissatisfaction with housing provision can sometimes also promote to housing challenges when beneficiaries rent or sell out their houses for economic reasons or simply because they are not happy with the provision (Manomano et al., 2016).

The then Johannesburg Municipality Major Herman Mashaba blamed the ANC for the Alexandra township crisis. He further accused the President of the Republic of South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa for lying to Alexandra residents when he promised to build a million houses to them. Mr. Mashaba called this a ‘criminal lie’ and questioned where the President would obtain the money to build these houses. The disintegration of intergovernmental institutions and the expression of dirty politics was surely at play here as expressed by Mr Mashaba.

Mayor Mashaba makes an interesting subject of institutional representation in this housing crisis. Another layer to the Alexandra shutdown is the former Mayor’s promise to the residents of Alexandra to rebuild illegal structures that were demolished by the red ants. The red ants abolished close to 80 shacks and asserted that they were acting on the instruction of the Johannesburg Municipality based on a court order issued in September 2016. Mayor Mashaba who is also a DA leader in the Johannesburg Municipality was aware of the DA’s position on land invasion.

The DA has maintained that land should not be occupied illegally and yet we can note the Mayor making promises to rebuild illegal structures that were demolished by the Red Ants. The ANC in Johannesburg accused Mayor Mashaba for ‘promoting illegality’ when he promised to rebuild Alexandra shacks and for choosing the EFF ideologies on unoccupied land over those of its own party. The EFF maintains that if land is unoccupied and
Johannesburg residents are homeless, they should occupy the land and the city should work on providing services required in the land. Johannesburg ANC spokesperson Jolidee Matongo told Time Lives in June 2019 (ref) that 'this seemingly virtuous act from the mayor is not only reflective of his glaring inability to lead the city but also the fact that he places political expediency and keeping intact the marriage of convenience between him and his alliance partners over lawfulness and the safety of Joburg residents'.

Mayor Mashaba was quoted by Times Live in June 2019 saying ‘It’s clear that this was not an act based on the order. The decision was based on something more sinister. Evil forces were behind this and we will get to the bottom of it’. Again it appears that the Mayor’s position on the matter insinuates that there is a political sabotage against the DA-led coalition. However, the Mayor’s promise goes against the DA’s principles, therefore one could wonder whether his priority was as a DA leader or as a coalition leader? This pertinent question will be answered in the data analysis chapter. It is important to note though that the crisis in Alexandra did not start with the DA-led government, this is a legacy that the DA inherited from the ANC administration but of course one could still ask questions around the timing of this shut down and if there are any potential political sabotage links considering that this was during the time the country was preparing for national elections. Sandile Mavundla was quoted by Mail and Guardian saying ‘The movement is about and for all the people who have an interest in the development of Alexandra. Members from all political parties joined the movement. The City of Joburg must stop hiding behind politics and assist us with service delivery’

2.3 Conceptual Framework

2.3.1 Collaborative governance and power sharing

The idea of shared power and collaboration in governance is one that is progressive because it speaks of different alliances and stakeholders putting at the centre a shared goal above their own interests. We have seen in countries like Kenya as an example, through the intervention of political elites, two political parties agreed to a power sharing government for the sake of peace and democratic stability. Cheeseman & Tendi (2010) however argue that these efforts are used as conflict resolution mechanisms and an act to bring stability which does not provide states with sustainable and effective reforms but it offers temporary solutions by postponing conflict as opposed to resolving it.

Ermerson, Nabatchi & Balogh offer a broader definition of collaborative governance that is not only focused on government and nongovernment stakeholders. In light of the work of Ansell & Gash (2008), it is noted that collaborative governance is a form of governance where one or more public government bodies and organs deliberately engage non-state actors in
decision making processes. It’s a collective effort by the state and non-state actors such as civil society, academics, private sector and the general citizen. Emerson, Nabatchi & Balong define collaborative governance as ‘processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engages people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished’. They argue that their definition captures ‘multipartner’ governance. ‘Multipartner’ governance essentially acknowledges partnerships within the states. Therefore, collaborative governance can be employed in multiparty governance. In the case of Johannesburg, coalition governance through multiple parties are collectively leading a policy making process and governing the city.

Ran & Qi (2017) present the conditions necessary for collaborative governance and identify six contingencies in this regard. The six contingencies are: (1) institutional environment; (2) the networks; (3) the cost benefit calculation of parties involved; (4) diffusion of power sources; (5) power-sharing experience of parties; and (6) what is accomplished through collaboration. According to these commentators, power sharing involves joint responsibility for decision-making and actions taken by the collective. They are less concerned with whether power is equally shared, rather focusing on creating the conditions that make coalitions effective.

Interestingly, Ran and Qi also point out that “collaboration requires careful empirical investigation before it is used to address issues brought forth by power imbalance” (Ran & Qi, 2019, p. 5). They argue that current literature does not address the practices necessary for effective power sharing to take place in the context of collaborative governance. However, power must be analysed when dealing with governance and should be done so through multiple perspectives to strategically manage and share that power. The efficacy of the coalition should not be assessed according to an agglomeration of events in a tenure, rather specific indices should be identified and addressed individually. Under consideration should be the satisfaction of stakeholders, the potential outcomes possible through the coalition, the potential to maximise output and how much was achieved as a result of working in collaboration.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

In governance, there are a range of theories that shape the expression of governance and the direction of public policy-making and analysis. The section attempts to explore two theories in relation to coalition governance and policy-making.
2.4.1 Political Systems Theory

Political theory assumes that popular perceptions, preferred narratives, and political agendas have an influence on policy results. It tends to neglect the crucial implications of power relations in the policy making process, especially when the space is occupied by multiple players, argues Dunns (2012). As indicated earlier in the study various parties seek to flex their muscle and dominate in many areas, including in policy development. The Johannesburg Municipality is a DA-led coalition government giving which can be used as an example of the above study. The nature of coalition creates a space for power dynamics and a complex power relationship. Power is a complex and multidimensional concept that has received enough attention in academia and the public domain from diverse perspectives. The theoretical and nominal representation of power is often different. In coalition and collaborative governance, as strikingly captured by Huxham (1991; Huxham et al 2000), power is presented as shared in an equal non-hierarchical manner.

Interrogating the relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance is key to the success or failure of the collaboration. The power to decide and the extent to which that power is distributed is critical. Qi & Ran (2017) argue that power sharing is a collective process of sharing responsibility for decision making and the pursuant actions to be taken. Power is in fact a process rather than an outcome. By virtue of power being a process one would imagine that it is not without challenges. Power should therefore be viewed from diverse perspectives at different phases and stages of governance in order to assist stakeholders to manage and share power. Political theory fails to acknowledge the implications of this phenomenon and does not provide a pragmatic and workable solution to respond to this reality. It however represents a less focused effort to wrestle with the question involving actors involved in policy process and more critically how these actors interact (Dunns, 2012)

2.4.2 Policy Approach Theory

Cloete & Wissink (2000) argue that the world of policy-making and analysis employ a multitude of theories and models in order to make sense of a rather chaotic, diverse, and seemingly complicated process. It is of great importance to however note that these theories and models are not a complete reflection of the reality of policy-making and analysis. Policy approach theory is informed by a cyclical, progressive, and interlinked process of policy development, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. The theory is perceived as oversimplified yet it profoundly assists in highlighting important aspects of policy-making, argues Dunns (2012). The phases flow from identifying and defining a problem that exists that should be resolved through policy prescription.
The following phase would be the consideration of alternative policy options to solicit as many views as possible. Phase three is the evaluation of the alternative options on their suitability for implementation, looking at the uniqueness of the implementation environment. After the selection of the most appropriate policy, the implementation follows along with evaluation while execution takes place. Feedback is given by those involved to unlock the challenges experienced. Lastly, a review is made to determine whether the policy may be retained, improved on or abandoned.

Policy-making and analysis in its very nature is diverse, chaotic and complex, thus begging the question whether coalition governance would assist in fostering a smooth policy process. Otherwise, it could create in fact perpetual delays that results in policy-making being a protracted and negotiated process where outcomes are rarely predefined along party politics and mandate. This in turn hinders efficient policy formation and coordination between coalition parties.

2.5 Coalition theories

2.5.1 The Office-seeking theory

If coalition formation involves a process which leads to power-sharing as well as the material benefits that accompany it, then by deduction coalition formation is a process which normally occurs because neither or none of the co-operating parties can manage to win an election and govern on its own voter's constituency. It is therefore a necessary evil – an evil in the sense that normally no party ever coalesces to such an agreement except in circumstances in which not doing so would deprive it of the chance to exercise power (Oyugi 2006, 54)

Himmelman (2001, p. 277) argues that coalition is ‘an organisation of organisations working together for a common purpose’ Political parties form coalitions for two primary reasons which are: the maximisation of power, and policy objectives. Law (2018) asserts that the two are not mutually exclusive, therefore the idea of a coalition government being formed to maximise power and equally for policy objective is almost inconceivable. Political parties’ main objective is to win governing power and serve their constituencies. Each political party is indebted to its voters to ensure that it honours the promises made during election campaign and has a constitutional obligation to deliver on the mandate. Beyond maximising power to serve constituencies, political parties form coalitions to unseat an incumbent ruling party. This action is usually motivated by various reasons which include corruption, questionable governance, absence of rule of law and lack of service delivery. This is called office-seeking theory, Indridason (2005, p. 440) provides a distinct explanation of coalition established for the maximisation of power. He asserts that in this case political parties primarily want to gain power, control the executive and political appointments, as well as on the power to pass and implement legislature. On the same vein, political parties and political leaders in addition to forming coalitions on the basis of maximising power they also form coalitions to influence
public policy for the interest of their own parties. Collectively forming coalition and winning a seat in Parliament will grant them some power to influence public policy-making (Newton & Van Deth, 2015).

Law (2016) makes a claim that many scholars and existing literature on this kind of coalition government states that such coalitions are prevalent across the globe unlike policy-based coalition.

Office-seeking theory emerged out of a theory by L von Neumann and O Morgensteren (1953). This theory was initially known as the ‘minimal winning hypothesis” which was developed in the area of economic games. Game theory is known to be a ‘theoretical framework for conceiving social situations among competing players. Furthermore, it is the science of strategy, or at least the optimal decision-making of independent and competing actors in a strategic setting” (Adam Hayes, 2019) this theory was later used by William Gamson (1961) in government formation. Its application in government formation brought an argument that coalition government should comprise smaller political parties that is parties with lower voter constituencies with just enough power to win the legislature’s vote of confidence. The rationale for smaller parties is that they can easily reach a consensus and eliminate conflict and minimise disagreements.

There are a few countries across the globe where the office-seeking coalition rational is prominent with a primary purpose to access power. Countries such as India, which has had one of the most successful coalition governments worldwide is an example of this. India makes a striking case of a successful coalition government formed with a primary goal to unseat a ruling party. Policy alignment was not a prerequisite for membership in India’s coalition government, the common goal was to access power. It is important to note that despite the fact that this government was formed by thirteen parties with no policy alignment and lacking similar political ideologies, it remains one of the most success coalition government cases across the globe (Law 2016 et el Sridharan 2008: 16).

Mauritius is another notable case example, this coalition government in particular is described as a ‘marriage of convenience' with a powerful history of coalition government established on office-seeking motive (Sithanen 2003: 8). There is also Lesotho and Kenya which I will write about extensively in this chapter.

However, these kinds of coalition can be more unstable because inevitably they experience policy ideology conflict, personality clashes and therefore have a shorter life span (Sithanen
2003: 3). Lesotho and Kenya make a perfect case study on this matter and will be discussed in detail below.

2.5.2 Policy-oriented theory

Policy-oriented theory assumes that political parties form coalitions primarily because of policy convergence and alignment and not necessarily to maximise power. Policy motives in coalition government formation require political parties to be ideologically aligned, however this is not a case for coalition motivated predominately by the acquisition of power (Kumar 2015, 34). Ideally, political parties consider their own party’s policy mandate and collectively agree on potential policy programs for the future government. This kind of coalition does not seek cabinet payoff as would be the case for office-seeking coalitions. Coalition government formations traditionally have coalition agreements and terms of operation, from the onset parties agree on policy positions and implementation of those policies. This formation is justified purely by shared policy goals. Law (2016) argues that this in turn creates coalition governments that are more stable founded on mutual understanding. Kumar (2015, p.38) & Law (2016) assert that empirical evidence shows that policy-orientated coalitions have less conflicts and therefore a longer lifespan.

Warwick (1994) argues that differences in political ideology contributes to the downfall of coalition governments because of constant policy compromises that the parties within the coalition have to make. The question often asked is whether these compromises cause voters and party constituencies to doubt the credibility of the party they voted for. More importantly do political leaders ever consider the impact of these compromises and in what ways are they actively exercising accountability and transparency to their voters? Parties need to consider the best ways possible to address parity concern and ensure that their voters are on assured on how best the coalition will serve government and voters at the same time.

Political parties forming coalition governments using the policy-orientated theory do not have to wrestle with these complexities. In this light, Meydani & Ofek (2016) in their analysis of Axelrod’s model of coalition government formation highlight that political parties form coalitions to maximise on what would be beneficial for them while equally minimizing costs by aligning with parties that are ideologically similar to them.

Literature on coalition governments maintain that office-seeking theory and policy-orientated theory are not mutually exclusive, to a certain extent I agree with this assertion because primary goals are not common. The one seeks to access power while the other is justified by
policy goals. I suspect that there is a crossroad somewhere considering that during elections party manifestos use policy and political ideology to win the electorate which could potentially lead to the maximisation of power. Accordingly, it may well be argued that there is a connecting point for the two theories in practice. Kadima (2006) in his work on coalitions in Africa, argues that for South Africa’s first coalition government and that of Mauritius, ideological alignment was not a determining factor in coalition formation though it resultantly led to ideological harmony between the main parties.

2.6 The Constraints of Coalition Politics

Strom (1990) strongly criticises both office-seeking theory and policy-based theory, he maintains that these two theories treat political parties as a uniform entity with no organisational complexities within its structures. He further argues that these theories disregard institutional models and the history and future of political parties. It must be underscored that while it might be imperative and essential for coalition governments to be formed, constraints that come with that formation should not be ignored. Considering the constraints such as institutional structures and perhaps pre-election commitments made by individual parties to the electorate could minimize coalition government instability.

Maserumule et al (2016) states that parties will always push for the fulfilment of their agendas, positing that Integrated Development Plans (IDP) of municipalities are structured such that they respond more to partisan politics than community needs. In order to neutralize the dominance of other parties in policy-making Martin and Vanberg (2004) argue that the coalition partners tend to scrutinize the actions of hostile ministers deployed by the main coalition partner. They further argue that the fact that there are attempts to exert influence and counter measures to strictly monitor deployed policy-makers depicts that in coalition governance there exists no complete trust between partners. The contentions should also be understood by accepting the argument by Bäck (2008) that suggests that political parties only seek power and prestige.

Depending on the terms of the coalition agreement, occasionally the delegation of the heading of departments may be handed to the partners that are not from the legislative majority party. When this situation occurs, a negative aspect of coalition governments could arise where the head of a department may not truly work in the interests of the party that has a legislative majority in the municipality (Martin and Vanberg, 2004). This could possibly be the case in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality where the administrators appointed by the ANC could sabotage the program of the new political masters that is the DA-led coalition. Maserumule et al.
al, (2016) argue that the ANC could have been politically displaced, however bureaucratically it is still intact because of the partisan manner in which the administration was appointed.

2.7 Contextualizing the Nature of Coalition Politics Within South Africa

Maserumule et.al, (2016) posit that the emergence of coalition politics is new for South Africa as a country, however it is not a unique phenomenon. Nearly two thirds of the countries, according to Maserumule et.al, (2016), that make up the European Union (EU), are governed through coalitions. Coalitions, argues Martin and Vanberg (2004) result in collective policymaking between political partners.

Bäck (2008) warns that forming coalitions is not an easy task and the lesser the number of partners, the better, especially considering how the coalition of the DA could make it difficult for the party to balance the policy interests of six other political formations, coming from different ideological backgrounds. The difficulty of being in a coalition is corroborated by Maserumule et.al, (2016) who after the 2016 local elections argued that South Africa is in an exciting and turbulent space as coalitions develop to open a way for hung municipalities. Through the Simple Model of Choice, Dunn (2012) clarifies the divergent policy views, arguing that policy choices can be preferred by the coalition partners between a new course of action, the status quo and at times there may be other alternatives that exist.

Bäck (2008) argues that the complexity of coalition politics could be lessened, when the coalition partners have previously had a similar relationship that has grown over time, with the parties having established cooperation routines, which is not entirely the case in the Johannesburg Municipality governance context. Coalition partners are constantly changing and this will most likely result to transaction costs increasing, as Bäck further argues (2008). Martin and Vanberg (2004, p.14) argue that coalitions simultaneously have many virtues and significant drawbacks. One of the positives asserted by the scholars is the mere anticipation of scrutiny by coalition partners, this creates a strong ex ante influence in the development of good policy content.

2.8 Global reflection of coalition government:

2.8.1 Lesotho Hung Parliament

Since its independence Lesotho has used a constituency based electoral system which means that only one political party has been able to gain majority seats in parliament. We have seen a similar case in the South African context with the ANC owning majority seat in Parliament.
and owning the government formation power since the country’s independence. The formation of coalition governments after elections could be an indication of disputed election results and post-election violence as it was in the case of Kenya, but traditionally it speaks of the absence of one dominant political party with majority of votes.

‘Nyane (2016) notes that the question of government formation has become an interesting one between constitutional, political, governance and democratic scholars across the globe. This, however, was never a point of debate in the case of Lesotho nor was it a constitutional controversy purely because of the constituency electoral system that seemed to have been working for the country for decades. Using the United Kingdom model, the king of Lesotho would lead the process of government formation by inviting a political party leader with the majority of votes decided by elections at the national assembly and form government.

In 2002 Lesotho introduced a new electoral system called mixed electoral system or mixed-member proportional system. Matlosa (2008) explained that the introduction of this electoral system was based on an assumption that it would change Lesotho’s political culture, which was always accompanied by conflict, to one that would be consensual. The mixed electoral system was to ensure that allocation of parliamentary seats to political parties was purely on the basis of the party’s performance during elections proportionally to the number of votes cast. The introduction of mixed electoral system transformed the politics of Lesotho from one of a leading political system to that of inclusive politics, it further brought about a new phenomenon of inconclusive elections when its outcomes resulted in hung parliament (‘Nyana 2016: 175). Inevitably this new process came with uncertainties in the formation of government in Lesotho.

However, it is worth noting that the same system was employed in 2007. Both the 2002 and 2007 election resulted with the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) winning majority seats in parliament and therefore there were no controversies. Lesotho experienced a shift in the formation of government in 2012, the third electoral process using mixed electoral system, when LCD did not have enough votes and its power was taken as a result of indecisive electoral outcomes (‘Nyane 2016, 175).

It was in 2012 that a new wave of government formation was introduced in Lesotho’s political framework. Political parties came together and formed a coalition government with the intention of enabling them to have enough numbers to form government. It was during this time that the conventional principle of government formation was put to test in Lesotho. For the first time since its independence, Section 87 of the Constitution, which is an expression of
the convention of the formation of government, was deemed useless (‘Nyane 2016, 176). Unlike Kenya coalition government in Lesotho was formed purely on the basis of a popular vote and not an agreement by political elite to ensure stability. The process of negotiation coalition is one that is deemed fair and the principle of shared power is practiced. This process does not grant any favours and power to any political party that might have had majority of numbers from the election outcome.

In 2015 the hung parliament phenomenon reoccurred in Lesotho and this is viewed as an outcome of the mixed-electoral system. There is also the prediction that this could be a reoccurring political culture in Lesotho. Coalition politics comes with its own challenges, as Lesotho’s Prime Minister Thabane highlighted in his Inaugural Speech in 2012. These include, among others: corruption, unemployment, personal security, and poverty and HIV/AIDS prevalence. It is only when the coalition is operating as a single powerful force could it address these challenges and prioritize policy formation and implementation. In their analysis of Lesotho’s coalition Kapa & Shale (2014) noted that the impact and results of coalition government in Lesotho might have been both positive and negative implication to the country’s governability and some of the negative implications of the coalition were those noted by Prime Minister Thabane.

Aerni-Flessner (2017) sharing his opinion on Lesotho’s coalition government noted that historically new coalitions would be unstable. In the case of Lesotho both coalition governments led by Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili of the Democratic Congress and Prime Minister Thomas Thabane of All-Basotho convention collapsed within two years of taking office. These collapses of coalition governments respectively resulted in political violence in Lesotho and security threats. However, Kapa (2008) asserts that Lesotho’s coalitions have given the country a positive outlook in consideration with its formal democracy. He further notes that a contemporary coalition government theory relevant to the Lesotho case would be the office-seeking based on Lesotho’s Mixed Member Proportional electoral system and political elites.

**2.8.2 Kenya Coalition government**

Grand coalitions have served other nations well. A coalition government is an open option when a country is in a crisis and right now, we are faced with a serious political crisis. The two sides come together and commit to sort out issues such as constitutional reforms and then organize an election, Oyaro (12 February)
Kenya held democratic elections in 2007 and President Mwai Kibaki who is the leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU) was declared the President of the country. Kenya experienced post-election violence, and this was not the first-time violence erupted after elections. In the 1990s Kenya went through political violence after its inaugural multi-party government but the 2007 violence was unprecedented. According to Khadiagala (2008), these elections were momentous because of a large voter turn-around which was indicative of Kenyan citizens yearning for a better future. Kenya post-election violence attracted international media and resulted in the Former Secretary-General of the United Nation Kofi Annan’s intervention. The violence in Kenya has been discussed in many academic and political discourses with speculations that it was purely an ethnic problem, an anti-kikuyu agenda. Although there might be some truth in this suspicion, Smedt (2009) provides an analysis that suggests that there might have been ‘underlying precipitating factors’ and that the elections brought them to the surface.

These are some of the factors that Smedt (2009, p. 582) suggest that they might have contributed to the post-election violence in Kenya:

- Grievance over resources, access to land in particular
- Deliberate weakening of government institutions
- The gradual loss of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force
- Economic and political exclusion

According to Musambayi (2006) the President’s ethnic group was the only privileged group that benefitted from the resources of the country. These assertions that allude to ethnic divergences contributing to the post-election violence are not farfetched. Kenya’s history is one of ‘divisive politics that revolves primarily around ethic allegiances’ as noted by Bieg (2008, p. 35) and the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights Referendum report (2006, p.25) (Hereinafter Referendum report). He further suggests that the post-election violence in Kenya should be seen as an expression of historical exclusion and a longing for future inclusion.

### 2.9.1 Kenya’s coalition formation post-election violence

With the leadership of the late Kofi Annan the mediation team negotiated a power-sharing solution. It was reported widely in global media that this difficult process took three and half weeks. Khadiagala (2008) notes that the mediation process was to ensure that they would not be any election re-runs or re-counts. The idea was to form a government of power-sharing between two equals. Kofi Annan strongly believed that forming a coalition government is the
only solution Kenya had for stability and to end violence. Eventually after three weeks of negotiation both leaders consented and agreed to a coalition. The Kenyan coalition government was a consociation theory in practice because fundamentally consensus was established by diverse political elites primarily to restore stability (Biegon, 2008). Both Kibaki and Odinga noted that they were taking a collective step forward to address Kenya’s challenges.
2.10 South African Post-Apartheid coalition government

Post the 1994 elections that saw the end of Apartheid and birthed the new democratic government in South Africa. It is was a radical time for South Africa but what was important at that moment was to maintain peace, pursue reconciliation and ensure that the country does not head towards civil war. Post-elections the ANC, National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) formed the first coalition government that is the first democratic government. The coalition arrangement was a constitutional arrangement which played out between 1994 and 1999. Former President Nelson Mandela led this government with the Former President Thabo Mbeki as his Deputy President and Former FW de Klerk as the second Deputy President.

Kadime (2003) argues that this was ‘a forced, cohabitation marriage’, the transitional constitution enforced this power-sharing mechanism for the purposes of political inclusivity and governmental continuity. Like Kenya a contemporary coalition theory employed here was consociation theory, this constitutional ‘forced marriage’ was to bring stability to a nation that experienced dividing racial lines for decades. Inevitably, this coalition did not work because of ideological battles and historical tensions.

In light of the above Booysen (2014) argues that the NP withdrew from this coalition because of leadership contest and ‘differences over strategic positioning. Kadime (2003) provided the same analysis and noted it as personality clashes between President Nelson Mandela and Deputy Preside FW de Klerk and because they were the minority party they couldn’t influence policy because the ANC had a majority representation and more significantly the NP history of racial injustice and violation of human rights did not work for the party. Furthermore, policy misalignment contributed vastly to their withdrawal because of neo-liberal policies that the ANC adopted at the time. The constitutional enforcement of this power-sharing government was unprecedented considering the fact that the ANC was the enemy of the state during apartheid and the NNP was the oppressor. It’s a curious case to interrogate how the drafters of the constitution reimagine what the new democratic South Africa will look like in light of the history of racial exclusion and segregation.

On a provincial level, South African so a play out of coalitions when the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) joined forces in 1999 in the Western Cape. In 2003 the ANC and NNP joined forced when the DP and NNP coalition experienced political turmoil in the same province. Things changed in the Western Cape when the DA became the second largest party in the country and won majority voted in the Western Cape. The DA has been governing the Western Cape since then to date. Another provincial coalition arrangement
which lasted a decade and it was essentially what Booysen (2014) and Kadima (2003) called a conflict resolution mechanism coalition was between the ANC and IFP in 1994.

2.11 Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay Coalition government

Following the 2016 local government elections, 20 hung parliaments were birthed across the country. The ANC, which had enjoyed political dominance in most of the major municipalities since the first circle of local government elections, lost Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay metros. The DA formed coalition with other smaller parties to form local government in these two metros with the EFF taking up Queen-maker status. These metros and their coalition governments respectively are worth looking into with its apparently fractured nature of coalition politics. A central feature of these collaborative activities is characterised by complications with regards to lines of engagement across parties, among other aspects. An example of this involves the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) multifaceted relationship with the Democratic Alliance (DA). The former of the two parties had previously filed a motion of no confidence against City of Tshwane Executive former Mayor, Solly Msimanga. Msimanga later resigned from the City with an intention to run for Gauteng Premier during the May 2019 national election. The EFF wanted to take ownership of Tshwane regardless of the reported financial challenges. The DA however did not support the EFF’s intentions of taking over Tshwane metro and this resulted in the collapse of the EFF and DA collaboration. The EFF decided to withdraw its support of DA on the basis that the DA had no intention of supporting them in taking ownership of Tshwane. EFF leader, Julius Malema was quoted by City press (July 2019) saying ‘We cannot keep voting for people who do not vote for us. Power sharing is about give and take’. The Tshwane metro coalition has faced numerous challenges and to date there are questions about whether this coalition will be successful or not.

The seemingly fraying interactions in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro are worth paying attention to as well. The metro experienced political dispute over the dismissing of the deputy mayor Mongameli Bobani, a member of the United Democratic Movement, which has jeopardised the future of all other metros governed by the DA-led coalition. The former executive mayor of the metro, Athol Trollip in light of this, made the assertion that in the absence of the UDM vote in the coalition, they have 59 votes instead of 61. This is a gamble that he views as one that is permissible in curbing the UDM’s problematic sway.

The Nelson Mandela Bay coalition dynamics simply serves to show the disturbing trend in coalition disintegration among political elites. The political scene was also riddled with scandals where the mayor, Mongameli Bobani, was removed from office when the DA and the
ANC came to the unanimous decision that his mayoralship had proved a disaster for the city. Bobani had earlier been instated following a previous year of party discord which saw the collapse of the DA-led coalition by late 2018. Then mayor, DA’s Athol Trollip, was removed in favour of the United Democratic Movement’s Bobani. These transitions were all desperate attempts by the political parties to bring some semblance of representative and impartial coalition governance with dismal results, particularly on service delivery. These political dispute in the metro resulted in the resignation of Athol Trollip from the Democratic Alliance (Pieterse, 2019).

However, this in turn has also led to a decision on the part of the EFF to absent itself from all council meetings in the three metros governed by the coalitions. In response to this action, the DA in the form of leader Nqaba Bhanga, called this decision on the part of the EFF as short-sighted and that it would only serve to return power to the ANC. He added here that the EFF is defying the mandate provided to the opposition by millions of voters. The UDM has in turn, instituted legal actions against the DA in Port Elizabeth seeking to have Bobani reinstated as deputy mayor and his dismissal set aside. (Pieterse, 2019).

It therefore stands to reason that when parliamentary democracy is at play, and achieving the successful administration and regulation of a country by different political formations is the goal, coalition politics is a contentious space. What appears interesting in both of these cases is the position that the EFF occupies in the manner in which their involvement or lack thereof has very real implications for the future of the areas governed by this newly formed coalition. This is especially in the face of attempting to change the status quo that has been set in place by the ANC’s long-standing capture.

### 2.12 Johannesburg Municipality Coalition

In August 2016 South Africans went to the polls for local government elections. These were the fifth local government elections since the dawn of the new democratic government. South Africa holds local government elections after every five years to appoint councillors who will govern municipalities for five years. According to the Constitution of South Africa as stated in the Act 108 of 1996, local elections are to be held within the 90-day period of the end of municipal councils Hanaba & Malunzi (2019,) note that in South Africa communities in municipal areas make up the electorate and vote for political parties and individual to form local government and municipal council. *The party representatives and individuals voted for, by law become a municipal council and represent communities and derive the power to exist*
from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred as the 1996 Constitution).

According to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) ‘a total of 15 290 820 registered voters voted and 55 720 MEC 7 votes were cast out of 26 333 353 registered voters’. In its post-election report the IEC noted that the 2016 local government election voter turnout was higher than that of the previous local government elections with a 57.94%.

Elections observation is a phenomenon that occurs mostly in election processes across the globe and South Africa is no exception. 64 organisations of which 3 of them were international originations were credited with observer status for these elections. This is for the purpose of harnessing transparency, credibility and to improve electoral processes (Pieterse, 2019). It was reported by both local and international observers that the 2016 local government elections were transparent, credible and democratic.

In all the fifth local government election the ANC enjoyed the hegemony of electoral power except in the City of Cape Town which they lost to the Democratic Alliance after the 2006 municipal election. Subsequently the ANC was unseated again by the DA and lost the Western Cape Province during the 2009 national and provincial government. The 2016 August local government election result came with an unprecedented wave, no party had 51% majority of votes to govern the Johannesburg Municipality. According to IEC (2016) the ANC maintained sixty percent voter support since the first local government election held in 1995 and for the first time the ANC experienced an eight percent decline of electoral support at the 2016 local government elections. Booysen (2018) noted that prior to the 2016 local government elections some projections suggested that the ANC support was less than 56 percent.

There was multiple factors offered in the public domain that explains this drastic decline, Malala (2016 et Mokgosi, Shai & Ogunnubi 2017) argued that corruption, controversies surrounding former President Jacob Zuma, questionable governance, lack of service delivery, high rate of unemployment especially among young people may have contributed to the ANC’s loss of electoral dominance. President Jacob Zuma has been by far the most cited reason for the ANC’s loss of power on local government level in these metros. Booyesen (2018 et al TNS-Kantor) noted that on a national level South Africans had remarkable dissatisfaction with President Jacob Zuma and that his approval rating was at 18 percent of metropolitan South Africans.
Post-election the ANC went onto a coalition with the African Independence Coalition (AIC), Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa (IRASA), Patriot Alliance (PA) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality. However the EFF took an unprecedented move, one that the South African political landscape had not seen before. The EFF voted for the DA and declined joining the coalition for both Johannesburg and Tswane metropolitan municipality which granted them the queenmaker status. Congress of the People (COPE), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) are among smaller parties that formed the Johannesburg Municipality coalition.

Building on coalition government theoretical framework noted in the paper, the EFF did not choose to support the DA based on any policy alignment not any intentions of maximising power collectively. Mokgosi, Shai & (2017) in their analysis of the coalition formation in the Johannesburg Municipality point out that contemporary theories of coalition did not find expression in this coalition formation. The EFF President Julius Malema in his press statement speaking about the EFF queenmaker status said ‘The DA is the better devil. We couldn’t be neutral, we had to take sides. This is history. We were caught between two devils.”

On policy level and service delivery the coalition presented an opportunity for collective input from multi parties that form the governing body of the Johannesburg Municipality. It’s important to note the power that the EFF hold in these arrangements. The decision to support or oppose the DA on an issue-to-issue basis presents a rather complex challenge for the DA (Essop 2016, Feltham, 2016). The DA does not have powers to make decision and adopt and pass resolutions in the municipality without the support of the EFF. Essentially this arrangement renders the DA incapable of making decisions of policy issues because it does not have control over the municipality. Is the municipality therefore DA-led? Or it is DA-led by definition and the EFF is actually leading the municipality?

2.13 DA and EFF Policy Difference

Once more, it is important to note that in coalition governments, partners are forced to bargain over a common policy position, which then means that in a coalition arrangement, partners have to compromise (Martin and Vanberg, 2004). The compromise at times may be costly as a party may be forced to forgo a preferred policy option that may have brought positive results, just to accommodate the demands of its coalition partner.

The inevitable compromise therefore results in a situation where parties cannot implement all the ideals and plans it had promised its voters and the community. Another downside of coalition governance is that heads of departments from various coalition partners could be
inclined to use their partisan discretion in developing policies, and in the process, undermine the agreement by tilting policy towards a party direction. Meydani & Ofek (2016, p. 615) state that the polarization, fragmentation and ideological diversity of party systems have causal effects on a coalition’s stability. In the case of the EFF and DA the ideological distance and fragmentation could potentially lead to the instability and collapse of the coalition. Though the EFF has pledged alliances with the DA, the party remains quite critical of the DA. ENCA (30 November 2017) reported that the EFF accused the executive mayor of the Johannesburg Municipality, Mr Herman Mashaba of poor performance and anti-black rhetoric, more importantly of not prioritizing the needs of the poor. Fundamentally the EFF is pro-land occupation by landless people for production and residential purposes.

The EFF proposes, based on its pillars of economic freedom, the expropriation of the country’s land without compensation for equal redistribution among the citizenry. The EFF’s founding manifesto asserts that there is a need to build state and government capacity, which will lead to the abolishment of tenders. While the EFF advocates for the capacitation of the state to deliver services, including houses, the DA intends to utilize the private sector in addressing the housing challenges, which sector is by its nature profit driven. The EFF’s stance, that is antithetical to the DA’s position, believes in the state providing solutions for the people without the involvement of the private sector.

The DA’s vision is grounded on the defence, promotion and extension of the following principles:

‘The right of all people to private ownership and to participate freely in the market economy must be maintained. The EFF holds a different view, as it foresees that immense growth would be accelerated and realized by the nationalization of mines, banks, and other strategic sectors of the economy without compensation in order to regulate competition between market players. The EFF further believes that the vestiges of apartheid and colonial economic patterns, ownership and control remain intact despite the attainment of political freedom. The vision of the DA, for South Africa is of one nation with one future built on freedom, fairness and opportunity for all. On the other hand, the EFF believes that twenty years after the attainment of formal political freedom, the black people of South Africa still live in absolute mass poverty, are landless, youth have no productive future, all demographics are generally mistreated and looked down upon in a sea of wealth’.

The DA believes in equal opportunities for all, while the EFF maintains that there cannot be equal opportunities when the African majority is still lagging behind in terms of wealth. The EFF founding manifesto (2013) asserts that there cannot be equal opportunities when negating the glaring
disparities = between black and white South Africans. The policy development arena at times faces feasibility constraints, argues Martin & Vanberg (2004). Members of the different parties may abuse the notion to propose policies that are congenial to their party ideals and not in line with the agreed upon compromise Martin & Vanberg (2004). In the negation of compromise positions, coalitions are undermined and the dominance of one party over the other prevails.

Martin and Vanberg (2004) also point out that another problem associated with coalition governance occurs when parties accept that each party will have dominance in the policy areas within the jurisdiction of the departments it controls. This could result in a governance structure where the needs of society are negated in pursuit of political ends.

2.14 African National Congress’ Loss of Power

In South Africa, Maserumule et.al (2016) argues that coalition politics were borne as a result of community concerns, shown through protests against the ANC-led local authorities. Maserumule et.al., (2016) adds that the concerns were depicted by local citizens through engagement with extra-judicial measures, and not feeling satisfied with these measures, the fate of the ANC in local elections was sealed, resulting in hung municipalities. This is corroborated by van Onselen (2016) who argues that the ANC vote in local government elections had significantly declined in the 2016 elections to less than 50% in Johannesburg. Bäck (2008) offers another reason why the ANC lost control of the Johannesburg Municipality, arguing that political parties with a high level of factionalism are less likely to be in government. The ANC’s internal party ructions have been widely reported and this could offer another reason why the party is no longer in government in the Johannesburg Municipality, leading to it being replaced by a coalition formation.

Van Onselen (2016) concludes that it cannot be confirmed that the DA has won new voters from the ANC’s traditional voters, who were alienated by their party. However the decline of the latter has given the former an opportunity to form coalitions and introduce the country to a form of new governance.

2.14.1 ANC’S Current Position on DA-Led Coalition

The African National Congress in the Johannesburg Municipality claimed that the former Executive Mayor Herman Mashaba’s administration failed to deliver the many promises they made to their residents. The ANC lost the city governance to a DA-led coalition after the 2016 local government election. The former ANC executive mayor of the Johannesburg Municipality Mr. Paks Tau noted that Mayor Herman Mashaba led the city into a financial disaster. He
further noted that the residents of Johannesburg Municipality were complaining about service delivery. As a result the DA performance scores in relation to the ANC has only increased by 20% since the party took over governing power of the city. “The DA-led coalition has reduced a progressive African city into an institution that has failed to meet its new investor targets in the past 12 months. The ongoing financial crisis of the city has also seen government of the day borrow up to R4-billion for operations in the first month of the current financial year” (Tau, August 2017). The ANC filed court papers to place a motion of no confidence against Mayor Herman Mashaba. The opposition party claimed that only a few of DA members in the city expressed their dissatisfaction with the Mayor (Nicholson, 2017).

2.15 Land Rezoning

Land zoning decisions are largely very technical in nature. The process is bureaucratic and essentially informed by national, provincial and local government guidelines and policy. The decisions are taken at higher level politically and are centred on the Spatial Development Framework (SDF). So far, these decisions have not been contested, therefore in concrete terms one could argue that there aren’t any existing tensions pragmatically. The reservation at this stage of the research is highlighting preoccupations of existing tensions around land rezoning and it’s suspected that there may be findings that don’t exist in practice and cannot be proven. Mapping decision making moments on rezoning and paying particular attention to the political moments of that mapping might provide some indication on practical existing tensions. This form of data could potentially be accessed during the data collection phase.

2.16 Conclusion

The new terrain of coalition politics in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality brings both opportunities and challenges in the city. It gives the people of Johannesburg a platform to have a new administration at the helm. The administration promises to do business in a manner that would satisfy the needs of the citizens. Also, the new administration has managed to obtain an opportunity to resolve the challenges which the different communities were facing regarding the provision of basic services and housing, while the ousted administration gets to experience being in the opposition. The challenges the coalition government could face may come from many angles.

They could come from the coalition partners’ ideological differences in policy adoption and implementation; the challenges from the opposition benches that would wish for the collapse of the coalition; the personnel employed by the previous administration to serve partisan interests could also present a challenge owing to loyalty to former governors. It is likely that
the personnel could stifle the progress in the implementation of policy programmes of the new administration and make the city ungovernable and dysfunctional. In order for the coalition to function well, and for policies to be developed and implemented successfully, a balancing act between interests should be attempted, maturity to prevail in inter-governmental relations and sacrifices made for the benefit of the citizens.
CHAPTER 3: Research methodology and design

3.1 Introduction

Chapter one of this study provides the research problem which the research aims to address and the significance of the research. The 2016 South African local elections was a turning point in the South African political framework. The ANC’s loss of governing power in a few key municipalities resulted in the emergence of coalition politics. The research seeks to interrogate coalition politics and urban governance in the Johannesburg Municipality’s housing policy. To effectively address this problem, three questions were developed. These questions are the focus of this study. This chapter articulates research methods and research designs undertaken to answer the research questions and provides the data collection methods relied on to bring realisation to the themes of policy, governance and coalitions as intertwined political conceptions. I acknowledge some of the existing perspectives that exist in social science research in relationship to case study approach. Flyvbjerg (2006) refers to these diverse perspectives as misunderstandings. He points out that it is noted that theoretical knowledge is better than practical knowledge and that one cannot generalise from one single case study. However, he also states that sometimes the point of a case study is not to prove anything but rather a hope to learn something. Therefore, case study was an advantageous approach to this discourse because the Johannesburg Municipality, as a single study on coalition politics, could potentially provide valuable governance and collaboration learnings.

3.2 Research Methods

The study used qualitative research methodology. This method was used to explore, through direct contact with research participants, their perceptions and understanding of the nature of coalition politics in the Johannesburg Municipality. Qualitative research methods as argued by Garner, Kawulich & Wager (2012) is concerned with understanding the process and contexts that shape various behavioral patterns. Qualitative research methodology is able to create stories through the lenses of those who are part of the story. Those who are part of the story own it and determine ways in which the story is shared. Qualitative research employs a wide range of data collection techniques such as focus groups, interviews, and observations etc., as distinct tools used in various contexts to gather stories as experienced by research participants.

Makgale (2017, p. 1) notes that qualitative research provides a space for people to bring meaning to their own experiences and encounters. She further argues that it allows the researcher to probe deeper which would in turn provide a lot more reflections from participants.
The attractive trait of qualitative research is that it offers meaning and great understanding on how humanity, in its own creativity, analyses the world and social realities (Creswell, 2005 p.4). The use of a qualitative data collection approach will enable deep engagements with research participants. Data analysis was done through qualitative or thematic analysis, as noted by Holland & Kawulich (2012 p 231) “thematic analysis is a general approach to analysing qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns”. The thematic technique would help analyse the textual data gathered during interviews and documentary sources.

Coding was also used to make sense of the collected data and give meaning to it. Coding is a process that permits data to be “segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation. It is the search for pattern in data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place. Coding thus assisted in organizing and grouping similarly coded data into categories that share some characteristics.

Janesick (2000) argues that qualitative research design uses particular sets of procedures that enable an open-ended and rigorous process that does justice to the complexity of a social study. He further notes that qualitative design ‘is very much like choreography’ (2000, p. 79). Dance is quite creative and equally complex, a good choreographer is one who is able to produce a beautiful creation of art and captures the complexity of a dance by using rigorous and tried procedures flexibly without limiting the process to one approach of choreography.

It is important to note, as argued by Kawulich & Ogletree (2012, p.1) that issues of ethical concerns unfortunately cannot be predicted. However ethics is an issue that must be considered at every phase of the research. The study would not be conducted in a clandestine manner to ensure that the rights of individuals are preserved. The study searched for the truth and this was not done at the expense of other persons and society. The study was conducted in an objective manner that ensured that collected data would not be falsified or fabricated.

Blom & Chaplin (1988) cited by Janesick (2000, p. 81) described improvisational dance components as:

“Certainly and easily we can say that spontaneity is one of its constituent parts. At the same time it is not without direction. It is at once intentional and reactive…An organic plan emerges to take us forward in time, yet it only becomes articulated as we move. Because improvisation is a phenomenological process, we cannot examine any product per se. But it does exist and is perceivable. What we can do is examine the route it takes and our consciousness of it, a route which is on the way to creating itself while being itself. (Blom & Chaplin 1988, p. 7).”
This choreography analogy best captures what qualitative research design is, which is that it is complex and starts with fixed movements that include planned interviews, observations and focus groups etc. Like a dancer would ask ‘what do I want to communicate with this dance’ a qualitative researcher should ask ‘what do I want to know in this study?’ throughout the research process. Janesick (2000, p. 85) provides a few qualitative research characteristics that each social researcher should consider:

- Qualitative design is holistic. It looks at the larger picture and is not constructed to prove something or to control people.
- Qualitative design looks at relationships within systems and culture.
- Qualitative design is focused on understanding social settings, not necessarily making predictions about those settings.

### 3.3 Research Philosophy

Mayer (2015) suggests that when undertaking any form of research it is imperative to locate your research in the philosophy of research. He further eludes that the genesis of the research process is found in the implementation of its philosophy. Research methods and questions are equally influenced by the research philosophy. Easterby-Smith et al (1997) identified three reasons why research philosophy is important in research methodology:

1. Research philosophy will assist the researcher to identify and develop research methods to be employed. It also offers a sense of clarity on the research strategy to be used, this includes what type of evidence should be gathered, how the evidence is analyzed and interpreted and most importantly how the evidence gathered answers the research question.

2. Research philosophy knowledge will enable the researcher to assess various methodologies and methods of research. This also assists the researcher to identify research limitations and prevents the usage of inappropriate and unnecessary work.

3. Research philosophy will assist the researcher to explore and adopt creative methods outside of their experience

For the purpose of this research, the research philosophy that is relevant to this study is that which is identified by Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2011): The philosophy of interpretivism. This is known to be the primary approach to qualitative research. This type of research philosophy promotes the need to ‘understand differences between humans in their role as social actors’ Saunder & Lewis (2012). Interpretivism explores an understanding of the world as others experience it and takes place in a natural setting where participants live (Garner, Kawulich & Wagner, 2012). Interpretivism is a commonly used theoretical framework for qualitative
research. Its view of the world is as constructed and experienced by people in their own ways of relating with each other and the world at large Maxwell (2006). Researchers within the interpretivist paradigm explore and investigate real world situations and observe them as they unfold naturally (Tuli, 2010)

The primary aim of this research is to explore the nature and character of coalition politics in urban governance in the Johannesburg Municipality Housing policy. The use of in-depth semi-structured interviews as a means of data collection will employ interpretivism philosophy as it will gather knowledge from the research participants on their perception of coalition governance in their social setting as public servants.

3.4. Research Design.

3.4.1 Case study

According to Baxter & Jack (2008), case studies present the research with tools to study convoluted phenomenon. It is an approach to research that provides an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon within a particular context using various data. Though there are various ways to define case study, Mabena (2011) maintains that a case study is a unit analysis within the parameters of time and space.

Both Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) have underpinned two philosophical approaches to case studies. They both view case studies through a constructivist paradigm, which suggests that everything is relative and therefore truth cannot be absolute. This approach maintains that ways in which one views life depends on their perspective and lenses used to view life. This paradigm according to Baxter & Jack (2008, p. 545) values what they call ‘the subjective human creation of meaning but doesn’t reject outright some notion of objectivity’. Case studies are significant in qualitative research because they create a space for participants to share their stories and realities and provides the researcher an opportunity to engage and understand the participants’ world. This study will focus on the Johannesburg Municipality as an organization, and an ethnographic design in the form of a case study will be utilized. An ethnographic design, according to Mouton (2011, p.148) is “usually qualitative in nature which aims to provide an in-depth description of a group of people or community”. Typical applications of the case study design, according to Mouton (2011, p.149) are when researchers are studying companies or organizations.

It is worth noting that the practice of case studies is not only limited to qualitative studies, case studies can be used in quantitative studies Gerring (2004).
Zainal (2007 p. 2) provides us with six important evidence that case studies should be able to prove:

i. It is the only viable method to elicit implicit and explicit data from the subjects.

ii. It is appropriate to the research question.

iii. It follows the set of procedures with proper application.

iv. The scientific conventions used in social sciences are strictly followed.

v. A ‘chain of evidence’, either quantitatively or qualitatively, are systematically recorded and archived particularly when interviews and direct observation by the researcher are the main sources of data.

vi. The case study is linked to a theoretical framework (Tellis, 1997).

3.4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Case Studies

Case study method, like any other research method has its own advantages and disadvantages. Yin (1984) noted three distinct advantages of a case study. He noted that the examination of data is conducted in its immediate context and this collection and examination of data is done right where the actual action is taking place. As noted above, case study can be employed for both qualitative and quantitative study. Lastly this method of research does not only assist in exploring real life data, but it also assists in describing complex real-life events and situation that can be captured through both qualitative (experiential) and quantitative (survey) research. Some of the disadvantages and criticisms associated with case study are that, case study has very little basis for scientific generalisation. This position comes with the fact that case study method uses a smaller number of subjects. Therefore, as Yin (1984, p.21) argues ‘how can you generalise from one single case?’ Tellis (1997) offers the same argument as Yin (1984) that the dependency on a single case exploration makes it difficult for the study to reach a generalised conclusion.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of case studies</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory</td>
<td>These case studies are a prelude to social research (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory</td>
<td>These are case studies used when conducting casual investigations (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>This type of case study needs a descriptive theory before the study begins. Normally used in special education study (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>This is when the researcher has an interest in the case (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>This is when the case will be used to understand what is obvious to the observer (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>When studying a group of cases. (Tellis, 1997:3).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The case study of choice for this research project is intrinsic case study, by its own definition it implies that the researcher has interest in the case and therefore this approach will offer a better understanding of the subject. Stake (1995) cited by Baxter (2008) noted that intrinsic case study in all its particularity and ordinariness is of interest. The researcher has an interest in urban governance in local government and public policy, furthermore to that the emergence of coalition politics in the South African political landscape is therefore a subject of interest both academically and politically.

4.4.3. Sampling

Sampling has two techniques which are probability or non-probability. Explained accurately by Botha & Laher (2012) probability sampling uses a random process which is inclusive where everyone in the target population can be afforded the opportunity to be included in the sample. Non-probability sampling on the other hand is non-random: people are part of a sample because they are willing and available to participate in the study. Non-probability sampling is deemed highly useful for qualitative research studies and was therefore applied. However, the primary reason for application of this technique is that the study has a specific geographical location with a specific topic and an entire population was not available to partake in the study. Non-probability sampling can be applied with a smaller sample Sauder & Lewis (2012).

Purposive sampling technique was applied in the study, it is viewed to be a useful type of non-probability sampling according to Botha & Laher (2012). Purposive sampling technique is considered useful because it uses particular criteria to identify relevant individuals and also allows the researcher to rely on their own experience of past research if there are any. Sauder & Lewis (2012) noted that it is considered as the best technique because it is used to select
small samples. The researcher identified councilors forming the Johannesburg Municipality governing coalition. The researcher further identified senior officials in the Johannesburg Municipality housing department. This target group is the best and reliable group to answer the research question.

4.5 Data Collection

Research questions for in-depth semi-structured interviews were prepared and used for all one-on-one interviews. The interview questions focused on the respondent role (political and administrative). This type of questioning was aimed at understanding respondent’s position and roles in their political parties or in the Johannesburg Municipality Housing Department. This further assisted the researcher in establishing the reliability and credibility of the respondent’s participation in the study. Secondly, the interview questions focused on the research subject matter. It consisted of questions on the coalition governance tenure, establishing the nature of the coalition (is it about policy alignment or about maximizing power), how relationships are managed in the coalition, power sharing mechanism, focus on housing provision which included apartheid spatial planning, post-apartheid housing policy and land rezoning and invasion. According to Johnson (2002) the researcher must start with what he calls protocol questions, these includes two or three introductory question, before moving on to what he calls transition questions, these will assist in clarifying the purpose of the interview to the participant. Finally addressing questions pertaining to the subject matter of the research. The researcher noted that all participants were honest and transparent and fully willing to share their experience and perception of coalition politics and housing policy in the Johannesburg Municipality. All-important topics related to the research subject matter were addressed during the interviews.

4.6 In-depth semi-structured interviews

It is widely known and accepted that much of the data collected in qualitative research is often generated from interviews. Interviews are a valuable source of data and helps the research to view the world through the lenses of participants (Niewenhuis & Smit, 2012). In-depth interviews as the name implies are aimed at exploring ‘deep’ information and understanding. Johnson (2002) noted that the word deep in a research context has several meanings. Research participants hold a deep understanding and knowledge of their context and everyday living. Therefore, the researcher should seek to achieve that level of deep understanding and knowledge through interactions with participants. Secondly deep understanding allows the research to achieve and communicate diverse views, perspectives and meanings of life.
This method of data collection enabled the researcher to use open-ended questions, which in turn opened a wider space for probing and hearing robust views from the participants. Johnson (2002) observed that as the interview progressed, it tended to take an unexpected turn based on the participant’s interest and knowledge. Such spontaneous digressions are usually quite productive; therefore the researcher should be flexible and allow the conversation to flow in the direction the participants is leading it to.

4.6.1 Details of the transcript

Between November 2018 and February 2019, a total of 9 respondents were interviewed. Number of minutes spent in all 9 interviews were 350 with the average times being 50 minutes. The longest interview was 1 hour 15 minutes and the shortest was 29 minutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interviews</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of the interviews</td>
<td>350 Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average duration</td>
<td>50 Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortest duration</td>
<td>29 Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longest duration</td>
<td>1 hour, 15 minutes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.6.2 Profile of respondents

Social researcher are bound to adhere to ethical guidelines which include confidentiality and anonymity of their research participants (Oliver, 2003). The researcher ensured that identities of research participants in this project were not compromised and therefore used phrases and categories that may not be clear to ensure anonymity. 9 research participants in total were interviewed. A total of 8 participants were males with only one female. The topic interrogated through this research is quite political, the lack of female representation suggests that the political space in South Africa may still be quite male dominant. These participants were from political parties that form part of the coalition governance in the Johannesburg Municipality.
Table 3: Profile of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From a large party in the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From one of the largest parties in the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior political figure in the council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From one of the largest parties in the council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 5</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From one of a large party in the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 6</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From a small party in the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 7</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From a small party in the coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 8</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Senior administrative official in the Johannesburg Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 9</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>From a smaller party in the coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7 Data Analysis

Data analysis has a huge impact on the outcome of any qualitative research study. This process involves multiple ways a researcher may use to make sense of the data collected (Holland & Kawulich, 2012). Berg (2001) offers a description of data analysis as a data reduction process, data display and conclusions and verification. It is important for the researcher to maintain the purpose and theoretical framework of the study throughout the data analysis process because the analysis follows from both the purpose and theoretical framework of the study (Holland & Kawilich 2012).

Bondas, Turenen & Vaismaradi (2013, p. 400) argue that thematic analysis ‘has been introduced as a qualitative descriptive method that provides core skills to researchers for conducting many other forms of qualitative analysis. In this respect, qualitative researchers should become more familiar with thematic analysis as an independent and a reliable qualitative approach to analyses. The researcher used thematic analysis approach to analyse data. This approach is perceived as the common approach used to analyse qualitative data. Holland & Kawilich (2012) noted that thematic analysis involves identifying themes and repetitive patterns in the data collected.

4.8 Trustworthiness and Credibility

Amp & Mays, Pope (1995) cited by Cope (2014) argue that qualitative research has been viewed as ‘soft’ science in history and has been widely criticized with arguments noting that unlike quantitative research it lacks scientific rigor, and does not use experiments and
objective methods, which suggests that it is subjective. However it is important to note that qualitative research is not inferior and there is a place for it in academia. Trustworthiness and credibility are important values in qualitative research. Researchers need to be mindful of their own subjectivity and biases, and how the seeming biases may influence research findings, (Nieuwenhuis & Smith, 2012). The researcher ensured that there was verification of understanding what was heard from the participants. This prevented any possibility of misrepresenting the words and experiences of participants. 9 interviews were conducted for this study which followed methods, techniques and approaches mentioned above. To ensure that the data was well captured, the researcher sent the raw data to three participants as a way of validating its credibility.

4.9 Research ethics

The researcher ensured that every participant signed a consent form after the research purpose was clearly explained in the research information sheet. It was explained to participants that their participation is voluntary and that they are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. The researcher assured participants that the findings of the study will be anonymously processed into a dissertation. The researcher does not have any professional and personal interest in the Johannesburg Municipality, therefore there is no conflict of interest.

4.10 Limitations

Participant’s bias: Primary participants in this study were politicians whose political parties form part of the coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality. The nature of politics and politicians is that they prioritise their party mandates and manifesto. This reality could potentially cloud judgements and can be quite subjective.

Participant’s accessibility and availability: The researcher encountered various challenges in accessing participants due to their undeniably busy schedule. In addition to that the researcher was unable to interview anyone from the ANC. numerous efforts to interview an ANC representative were made by the researcher which were unsuccessful. The process proved how inaccessible the ANC is to ordinary South African citizens.

4.11. Conclusion

This chapter explained research methodology, designs, techniques and approach employed in this study. The chapter focused in detail on the research philosophy and the key crucial factors that research philosophy offers a research project. This chapter explained
interpretivism as a philosophical approach used in the study. The chapter further covered the research design which explained qualitative research as a method of choice. Purposive sampling was highlighted as a technique used to identify research participants. To establish empirical evidence, in depth semi-structured interviews were used as a data collection tool. A total of 9 participants were interviewed through face to face conduct. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data collected through interviews.
CHAPTER 4: Presentation of data collection

4.1 Background of the Johannesburg Municipality Municipality

The Johannesburg Municipality forms part of the major municipalities in South Africa that manages local government in Johannesburg, Gauteng. The city of Johannesburg is highly divided based on class, and part of this is as a result of apartheid government spatial planning. The poor stay on the periphery of the Northern suburb where most of the rich members of the society stay. Another large amount of citizens of the Johannesburg Municipality live in the Southern suburbs. ‘Gauteng province is South Africa’s largest economy; Africa’s 7th largest economy and the 26th largest City Region in the world. We occupy a pride of place in the global economy where, increasingly, cities and city regions are becoming engines for growth and economic development. On the other hand, rising levels of inequality – income, assets and spatial inequalities – are a stubborn feature of our province. It is here in Gauteng where wealth and opulence exist side by side with urban poverty and hunger. We have to take bold action to fundamentally change this ugly and unacceptable reality (Makhura, 2019, July). This is the quandary and paradox of the province that the Johannesburg Municipality is located in geographically and this is a reality within the Johannesburg Municipality.

4.2 Introduction

This chapter outlines and presents the data accumulated during the data collection process. The data was accumulated through semi-structured interviews with 7 political party councilors and 2 officials in the Johannesburg Municipality. Interviews were conducted at various places across the Johannesburg Municipality that were mostly convenient for the councilors and city officials. Data revealed that there was a correlation between policy, governance and coalitions, to the extent that this nexus had a negative impact on housing service delivery in the Johannesburg municipality.

Research Question 1: What is the nature and character of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality, and how does coalition politics shape housing policy formulation in the Johannesburg Municipality?

Research Question 2: Does political party competition and different ideologies contribute to policy formation delays and ungovernability?

Research Question 3: What are the implications of coalition government in housing policy formation processes?
4.3. Data presentation process

The first research questions intend on exploring the nature of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality and the degree to which this new multiparty government impacts housing policy and housing provision in the City. Furthermore, the research question served to establish the nature of the coalition, is this coalition formed to maximize power or advance policy objective? The literature review on coalition governance as a global phenomenon provided insight on the nature of coalition, it assisted in understanding governance as a concept as well as power sharing, and provided some comparative analysis on countries that have been governed by coalitions. As noted above the data to answer the research questions was gathered through semi-structured interviews. The questionnaire asked various questions that ranged from the success of the coalition so far, relationships between political parties, intra-party conflict, and power sharing dynamics, political ideologies, housing policy and provision.

Research Question 1: What is the nature and character of coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality, and how does coalition politics shape housing policy formulation in the Johannesburg Municipality?

A. What do you think makes this coalition government different from the previous government?

4.4 Interview results with Councilors

The respondents mentioned that coalition governance under the current dispensation is not that different from the previous dispensation. When a respondent from one of the small parties was asked about what is his perspective on the coalition government in the Johannesburg Municipality was, these were his thoughts- ‘I do not think they (ANC and DA) are different from where we are seated, the DA and the ANC are not so different in terms of their policies. One will speak about transformation and the other will speak about diversity. They both focus on the semantics. They are different sides, but they are the same coin. The housing policy in the Government led by the DA is the same to that of the ANC’.

A respondent from a large and influential party in the coalition asserted that the DA and its coalition partners have experienced some difficulty in administrating the city. This difficulty in administration of the City was based on a suspicion that coalition politics has led to instances of sabotage as the deployed use their appointment to advance party interests. On the other hand, the DA respondents remarked that coalition politics under the DA has led to better...
service delivery. There are less funds lost to corruption and more money is directed to services. This observation was more general and didn’t relate to housing specifically.

Most respondents noted that the major difference between the current government and the previous one is the issue of corruption, an end to corruption was a common thread. This multiparty government prioritised ensuring that there is good governance in the Johannesburg Municipality and equally worked towards combating corruption. This is summed up by councillor from a larger party in the coalition who stated that- ‘Coalition government certainly presented the idea of shared power and losing power in favour of democracy. This will get to focus people’s minds to doing what they should be doing as a government, and the idea of sharing power, in turn, makes politics more fluid’. Coalition politics allowed parties to select officials on merit, not just political allegiance. Furthermore, they highlighted that the ANC-led government abused its power and had a reputation of corruption and financial irregularities in its management of the municipality. This resulted in service delivery being compromised and resulted to an increase in citizen unrest and service delivery protest.

Again, councillor from a larger party described the situation in the following way: “I was actually in the city council in the previous government between 2009 and 2013. I think the major difference between then and now is that the vast majority of money is directed towards service delivery and the business in government. Statistics have uncovered that 18 billion rand was skimmed out of finances over the last decade. So, 18 billion rand of corruption. What needs to be done with this government is make sure that corruption is not tolerated. It might be that later in this government we might find out that money has been stolen, as long as there are follow ups and action is taken against those. The problem with the previous government is that even though corruption was uncovered nobody paid the price for it”.

In the same vein, accountability as a principle of governance emerged quite significantly. The reality that the former Executive Major does not have the power to make decisions on his own was seen as the centrepiece of the coalition agreement. Furthermore, coalition politics has helped the parties in the coalition hold one another accountable. Coalition parties all govern together, therefore there is no opportunity for sabotage. While the majority of respondents noted that combating corruption and the principle of transparency and accountability where the centrepiece of this multi—party government and fundamentally underpins the difference between this current government and the previous one, one respondent asserted that there is no difference in how the DA-led coalition governs the Johannesburg Municipality and how the ANC governed the city. The respondent noted that the incumbent government is implementing
same policies from the previous government and therefore cannot claim any tangible differences and have failed the poor especially on a housing provision issue.

A respondent from a larger party asserted that - “As much as housing is a competency of national and provincial government, the fact that they have given the responsibility to the local government and only provide funding is lamentable. Already it’s proven the current policy on housing is not that effective, during the ANC's tenure they used to build 3000 units per annum and now in the Johannesburg Municipality we have a backlog which is close to a million. And in the 2016/2017 financial year, the DA led coalition only managed to build 2800 units and in 2017/2018 they only managed to build 1081 units, so they’ve dropped from the normal 3000 units per annum. If that is the case if it takes a year to build 3000 units it means it will take a 100 years to be able to build 300 000 units since on paper, when the ANC was in charge, they are 300 000 people on the housing list.”

4.5 Interview results with Johannesburg Municipality Officials

The governance of metropolitan municipality includes administrative bodies and political bodies. The researcher interviewed both these institutional representations with an intention to get a more holistic picture of the nature of coalition government and housing provision in the Johannesburg Municipality. The respondents were asked slightly different questions from those that were posed to the political representative because their role in the governance of the city is different. However, the question about a comparative analysis of the two administrations was the same.

Respondents revealed that is it too early to speak of successes considering that the coalition government has only been in operation for two years and a few months. However, it was noted that the City managed to generate a path-breaking human settlements strategy for the City, one that national government is encouraging others to emulate. The strategy is critical because it speaks among other things about diversification in the delivery model, and in the sources and instruments of funding – intended at fast-tracking delivery, improving quality and diversifying the product.

Research Question 2: Does Political party competition and different ideologies contribute to policy formulation delays and ungovernability?
Conflict and compromise
It was noted that former Mayor Mashaba seemed prepared to put party allegiance aside, and act in the best interests of the city. It was firmly and collectively asserted by respondents that the former Executive Mayor and the EFF can reach separate consensus over issues where the EFF and the DA party structure cannot: ‘The coalition has not proposed any program. That’s why in the media you hear him being called the mayor of the EFF, it’s because the EFF is the only organization that brings in concrete programs on how to improve the lives of our people. The mayor as the leader of the government has no choice but to implement what has been reserved by council, and though his implementation is seen by the DA and their numbers as someone who is putting forth the implementation of the EFF’s programs, that is not the case, he is prioritizing the city over the coalition’. Despite the ideological differences between the DA and EFF, the former Mayor of the City seemed to have mastered the art and ability to look beyond the party’s position on certain matters and prioritises the coalition agenda. Some respondents remarked that he is the coalition major and not the DA major. In fact it was noted by most respondents that former Executive Mayor Herman Mashaba in most cases prioritised the coalition government agenda far beyond the DA’s party agenda. One respondent captured this aptly by stating that -’Politically the DA does not really agree with him, if it was up to them, they could’ve removed him as mayor because everything which he allows to happen in the Johannesburg Municipality, all programs which he leads in implementation in the city are not found in the manifesto of the DA’.

The former Executive Mayor was consistently perceived as one who ensured that conflict in the coalition is managed with integrity and mutual respect. A member of a large political party on the coalition emphasised that there would always be differences in the DA-led government. However, the DA-led coalition needs to be clear about the red lines on what they can or cannot compromise on. What can the DA compromise on? What are those red lines? Once the DA has answered these questions, the party needs to ensure that those red lines are not compromised, even if it means bringing the coalition down. The respondent further noted that the challenge about being in a coalition is that in some instances the party is forced to go contrary to its core principles, if those core principles are compromised the party might as well become the opposition. One respondent from a small party noted that the party was open to negotiate and compromise where it is needed but mentioned a preparedness to withdraw from government in the event that coalition’s policies work against its voters’ interests.

The biggest contention in the Johannesburg coalition is ideological issues and land in particular especially between the EFF and the DA. A long standing contestation between the DA and the EFF is over ideology, particularly in debates over the WITS Land and land grabs,
the conflicting positions of land grabs were highlighted as a factor that complicates the work of municipal government. As far as implications are concerned, it was noted by most respondents that each party’s individual policies/ideologies are prone to cause disagreements in the city.

As one Respondent phrased it: ‘The whole free market system which does allow for social security, the free market system aligned with democracy has been the most successful system in the increase of wealth when you compare it to the alternative. That is our (DA) ideology, I said to my constituency that our party needs to be loud about this, because we represent the most successful ideologies in the world in human history. The EFF stars are Zimbabwe and Venezuela where people are living in poverty at the moment and Cuba. So what do they have to offer people? ANC is in the middle, they don’t know whether they are a socialist or a free market, they have an emotional attachment towards socialism because it helped them achieved liberation but it doesn’t really work. So when there is ideological clash, it’s between the EFF and the DA mainly about land rights’.

A councillor from another small party conceded that, where necessary, coalition politics could on occasion cause the party to surrender its position in favour of the collective. ‘From a coalition perspective it is difficult to manage different ideologies because you sit with multiple parties. My party is apolitical, it is just that we have biblical principle. You sit with the ACDP, COPE, IFP and the Freedom Front Plus around the table. The AIC and the EFF vote but they are not sitting with us around the table, yet they have voting powers. Now you sit with all these parties and they each have their own ideologies and objectives and it is a very difficult animal to manage, what you have to manage is the relationship as a collective’.

However, it was expressed by a majority of respondents that the coalition agreement allows members of the coalition to express disagreement where core principles would be violated. The coalition established a dispute resolution mechanism used in cases of conflict and disputes. One Respondent stated that: ‘This mechanism is good for the people, allowing parties to put aside differences and work together’. However the respondents contradicted themselves with hesitation to affirm the idea of ‘agreement’ with other parties. A few respondents drew a somewhat artificial distinction between agreement and the alignment of principle and policy.

A respondent from smaller parties explains the situation as follows: ‘The agreement says either we take items off the agenda or we discuss them to reach a compromise. In the event that there are disagreements, to avoid voting against the items, it is then sent to the dispute
resolution committee, so the coalition has a place for disagreements’. Although it was not mentioned expressly but going through all these stages and fighting to reach consensus would inevitably delay service delivery, yet it is an important democratic mechanism.

Since there is a general position on the implication of ideological differences in the coalition, one respondent asserted that coalition management had nothing to do with ideology. For this respondent, the real focus is on money and resources and this is in contrast with a few other respondents who maintained that different party ideology does play a role in governance. This DA respondent made reference to the tension in Nelson Mandela Bay noting that the genesis of the tension with the UDM was about contracts and access to resources and not so much about different ideologies and power.

One respondent summed it up by declaring: ‘I think in Johannesburg a lot of interaction has been taken by Herman Mashaba himself engaging the political parties themselves, well to be a little bit cynical I don’t think it’s about ideology at all. It’s about money and resources’.

Budget allocation and approval proved to have been a key tension in the coalition government for a few parties represented. The preoccupation with the tension within the coalition is mostly located in budget priority, budget allocation and subsequently service delivery. Consequently, the process leading to budget approval takes a slower pace and has a huge impact on service delivery. On the housing matter in particular, A Councillor from a third small party expressed deep frustration with the coalition government and how it fails to prioritize hostel development. As the Councillor stated: ‘We are fighting with the DA over hostel development and there is no budget for that because that’s where most of our votes come from, we want to see hostels being developed and DA and other parties have their own views when it comes to hostel development. But because it is our constituency, we must speak on behalf of them. That is where we fight most in the coalition because when it comes to service delivery and where the bulk of the budget should be channelled’.

4.5.1 Coalition analysis: Power vs Policy

The issue of policy and power received the most diverse responses. Out of the 9 respondents, six maintained that parties in coalition are more concerned about power and not policy. The coalition government formation in the Johannesburg Municipality was about taking power from the ANC and maximising power of the coalition. Parties are more concerned about maximising power than they are about policy. When asked about the tension between policy and power the following remarks emerged:
“With regards to the Johannesburg Municipality, it’s clear because we agreed on taking power away from the ANC because they did not listen to the people, and whether you are in power or not we should have a common goal. We agreed to surrender some of our policies for the purposes of unseating the ANC”

‘If we are in a coalition, we have agreed that we must surrender who we are for the purposes of this. In multi-party politics, you have different parties with different ideologies but they are gathering on a common goal. That is how the Johannesburg Municipality coalition politics was formed. The Johannesburg Municipality coalition government was formed by different political parties in order to topple the ANC and look at the common goal’.

‘If you look at the Cape Town coalition of Helen Zille in 2006 she had 14 parties in that coalition, and that’s how the DA took power in Cape Town for the first time for 5 years. In navigating this it was quiet an unstable coalition until Patricia De Lille came with enough numbers, and it was the DA and ID that was running Cape Town. So what you do is that there has to be meetings of senior leaders of the coalition. It’s probably easier to run a coalition on a municipal level than a provincial level. Because the issue about municipality is that it’s about service delivery and providing basic needs, it’s less about policies and financial growth. It’s easier to focus on service delivery at a municipal level. That’s why our coalitions have been successful because there is an agreement to provide services and basic needs’.

Furthermore, compromise over policy and power is a common thread. It was explained to the researcher that the mandate of local government is to provide services to Johannesburg residents. These services include electricity, water and housing to name a few, because it is a constitutional right of the citizens. Now political parties in the coalition prioritizes service delivery over their own principles and policies. The EFF in particular emphasised that the party is guided by principle and not power when it comes to the negotiating table. Stated that negotiation process is premised on some form of comprise. This implies that parties can’t put forward unreasonable motions.
Two respondents noted that coalition politics in Johannesburg is about both securing power and enforcing policy:

“In the Johannesburg Municipality, it is a bit of both power and policy. We wanted to take power from the ANC. But we have shared policies, the DA is pro-poor, same with the EFF, the IFP and the ACDP. It is all because of the history of this country”

‘This coalition is about power; we were tired of the ANC and wanted to provide basic needs to our constituencies. But I think it is also about policy alignment and principle because if it wasn’t, we would have struggled to work together’

One Respondent noted that the coalition government is not about power but principle: ‘It’s not a matter of power, it’s a matter of principle. As you all know that we are the largest political party in the country. Okay, let me give a background of the Johannesburg Municipality in terms of who is the majority. The DA is not the majority and nor is the EFF. The majority is the ANC. The ANC in their 54th national conference they adopted that they need to expropriate land without compensation although it is the EFF who have been advocating for that from day one. So if you put a motion in council for the expropriation of land without compensation, it’s a matter of who will agree with you on a matter of principle, it’s not a matter of power’

4.5 EFF-Queen Maker Status

The role of the EFF in the coalition is a theme in and of itself. Nearly every respondent remarked on their role in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality, probably because the ‘queen-maker’ question was asked several times, this entails that they have had considerable influence in the direction of party policies. In one way or another, most Respondents and members of the Johannesburg City Council and coalition accused the EFF of playing politics, being disruptive or abusing their power. The EFF’s exercise of power was almost universally identified as hampering the effectiveness of coalition governance. However the Respondents had contradicting views, it was noted that the young party definitely had a place and a significant role in South Africa’s public domain and political landscape. In fact most respondents remarked that the EFF’s absence from the DA-led coalition limits effective engagement. Furthermore, it was told to the researcher that the EFF’s involvement in coalition politics is good for democracy. A few respondents remarked that the coalition would have been improved if the EFF elected to join it. When asked about the EFF’s queen-maker role in the governance of the City, these are the remarked that emerged:
‘The EFF is an effective opposition party in the Johannesburg Municipality. Because we have proposed programs and they are being implemented’.

‘They play their parts good; I would’ve done the same. But I think if the EFF were part of the coalition they would have had more influence’.

‘The good thing about them is that they have forced the Mayor and the MMC for finance, to put in more budget for informal settlement. Which is something I applaud’.

‘The EFF’s Queen-maker role is not exaggerated in the Johannesburg Municipality but it’s different in Nelson Mandela Bay. Because we (DA) do not have enough seats, we do not have enough votes without the EFF. Because in Johannesburg the ANC had more sits than the DA but with the coalition parties, the DA had more seats’.

The EFF received some criticism from members of the coalition government. Some respondents’ criticism did not only cover their role in the Johannesburg Municipality coalition government but included the role the play in the national assembly. These are some of the quotes from the data collected:

‘Sometimes I feel like they abuse their power, because the truth is even though we have different policies and ideologies there are times where you should allow other organizations to make their own input and take their own decisions based on their own policies that could assist the municipalities going forward. You will find that if they don’t agree with whatever you are saying, they will not vote with you and obviously you will lose because they’ve got the deciding vote. Sometimes they abuse their voting powers’

‘The EFF knows and understand governing processes, whether they discuss what they want beforehand, I do not know, because they are not formally part of the coalition. I would have preferred if they were part of it then we can engage because we can all learn from them because they have a significant role that they are playing. But if I could be critical, it is the way they do things that troubles me, they have wrong timing’.

‘The EFF’s absence from the coalition causes inefficiencies and when the EFF gets involved there is chaos, the party is disruptive’.

‘There are issues of them being involved in corruption, which is sad. My concern is the rumours about a R500 million contract in Tshwane, and some it is going to the EFF.’
So, the question is, is the EFF just as corrupt as the ANC. Have we given them more strength by giving them access to the government? The one bad thing about the EFF for me is that they don’t respect the rule of law and they have been behind most of these land invasions. It might seem romantic and wonderful with them but the reality is that at the end of the day you need to come up with a proper plan for infrastructure and you can build proper houses but it’s not easy and it will take long and it’s not a way to grab short term votes. People who are in survival mode will probably vote for the EFF and the reality is that 5 years down the line people will be living with no electricity and poor infrastructure. So, it would be a quick solution rather than a long term one’.

4.5.1 The EFF’s position on their Queen-maker status

Every respondent had something to say about the EFF, and the researcher thought it was Imperative to hear the EFF’s perspective about their role and queen-maker status in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality.

An EFF Respondent stated: ‘I can tell you why the EFF chose the way that they played, the Johannesburg Municipality’s budget is bigger than any municipality in this country, as a matter of fact it is bigger than many provincial budgets in this country. If utilized correctly and efficiently it could make a huge difference in the lives of Johannesburg residents. The ANC has been looting the coffers of Johannesburg. Then we asked ourselves ‘who is the better devil’? Is it the one who has been milking the coffers of the city or the one who is so obsessed with power? And the decision was to vote against the corruption first. One of our cardinal pillars is anti-corruption and that is why we didn’t vote with the ANC, it was strategic. You can see now that corruption in Johannesburg has reduced dramatically’.

The Respondent argued that coalition politics could force the party to contradict its policies. In these such cases, “We have to stick to those [core principles], even if it means bringing the coalition down.” Another respondent dismissed the characterisation of the EFF as queen-maker. This reasoning is unconvincing because the EFF is clearly a queen-maker in South African coalition politics. ‘We are not “queen-makers”, like I said its matter of principle. It’s about who agrees with us at the end of the day, it’s about advocating for our peoples manifesto.’

It was also noted that through coalition politics, the EFF has been able to pass a number of motions relating to spatial planning & expropriation of property where owners could not be
identified. The Respondent also mentioned that these efforts have been frustrated by political sabotage and the legacy of the previous administration. The researcher probed further on the political sabotage position, conflicts and agreement. One respondent seemed hesitant to the idea of agreement with other parties and drew a somewhat artificial distinction between agreement and the alignment of principle/policy.

The researcher further asked another EFF respondent about what is particularly significant about the EFF’s queen maker role, these are some quotes from respondents:

‘First and foremost, we have advocated in the Johannesburg Municipality that the housing waiting list must be made public. And our policy as you know we’ve got the seven non-negotiable Cardinal Pillars, the first one which is land expropriation without compensation. As I’ve alluded earlier that we’ve successfully passed the motion in the Johannesburg Municipality council to expropriate the so called ‘Wits land’ for the purpose of accommodating the people of Greater Alexandra for residential purposes’.

‘We have put down a motion with the proposal that the inner city should not only be for people that have jobs, it must be for the people of Johannesburg. That in its own is a way of trying to do away with the apartheid spatial structure. There’s part of that motion which expanded to say some of these so called buildings are abandoned or hijacked buildings where owners cannot be found, and according to the law people are allowed to expropriate these buildings. Our motion even went further to say that once we have expropriated let’s take a particular percentage and give the housing co-operatives in the city, so these co-operatives can be able to maintain these buildings and that people can be able to stay in these buildings and afford the rent charges’.

**Research Question 3:** What are the implications of coalition government in housing policy formation processes?

**4.5.2 Housing provision**

Housing provision is a national and provincial government agenda, but the implementation of this agenda is given to local government with funding coming from national and provincial government. The DA respondent argued that the national government has made numerous attempts to sabotage the DA’s efforts in housing provision at the municipal level. A few respondents observed that the city is not receiving enough funds from the provincial
government. The tension at the political level particularly between the ANC and the DA has potentially triggered a reduction of funding.

However, the EFF seems to think it is policy issues, lack of political will and shared inheritance of incompetent administration and not entirely a sabotage attempt from national and provincial government. However, there is a recognition of partly some sabotage because the majority of the administrators are inherited from the ANC.

A few respondents stated that the parties’ contest for political influence is having a negative effect on service delivery, particularly where housing is concerned. They see coalition politics leading to fractures over the delivery of housing. The EFF’s position is that the DA’s focus is on having people wait their turn and being assigned housing with running water & electricity.

This implies that the provision of services, regardless of the quality of housing, wasn’t a concern of the EFF which the EFF contested: ‘The issue of Johannesburg Citizens without housing, who then go on to occupy unoccupied land for primary shelter, should not be confused with the EFF’s position of housing quality”.

A senior official in Johannesburg City Council noted that since entering office, the department of Human Settlement in the Johannesburg Municipality managed to implement some of the department’s human settlement initiatives, these includes establishing an electronic waiting list, issuing title deeds, improving security of tenure, and facilitating the upgrade of informal settlements, stating: ‘End of term, the intention is to radically increase the number of housing opportunities provided, number of integrated human settlement projects like Riversideview increased, and the title deeds backlog radically reduced’.

A senior administrative official in Johannesburg City Council noted that the department has managed to generate a path-breaking human settlements strategy for the City, one that national government is encouraging others to emulate. He said: ‘The strategy is critical because it speaks among other things about diversification in the delivery model, and in the sources and instruments of funding – intended at fast-tracking delivery, improving quality and diversifying the product. It speaks to an enhanced role for the private sector and civil society’. This strategy was mentioned by two DA respondents when asked about practical and creative ways in which the City is providing housing:

‘One of the things that we’ve been doing is to identify abandoned buildings, probably hijacked, and we are trying to revitalize those, and possibly give them to Joshco.
Joshco is a rental body for the Johannesburg Municipality. Their core mandate is to rent out houses or flats on behalf of the Johannesburg Municipality with reasonable rentals. So it’s a question of what do we do with the limited resources.

‘Truth be told, we are running out of land to create houses and the city won’t be able to give you houses all the time, sometimes we are going to give you service land where you will have to build your own house, sometimes we’ll give you a flat, sometimes we’ll meet you halfway and say you don’t have to pay a bond of R5000 but pay rent of R5000’.

‘In Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba has been trying to think out of the box, this has been one of the biggest challenges because it is the biggest municipality in the country. We need to think more out of the box especially on matters such as sites and service. The City needs to provide people with sites or land where people can build their own houses and provide them with the services for that site. The problem is that we don’t have enough money in the government, and the DA would be more concerned about the quality of houses as opposed to the ANC. That’s why the whole land grab thing is a short-term idea and has a negative impact on the economy because it affects the middle class, because people won’t come into the country to invest. It will create something like Zimbabwe where the government will collapse due to investors pulling out’.

However, two smaller parties in the coalition and one large party asserted that the coalition hasn’t brought its own innovations to the table. It’s largely just implementing the old projects of the ANC administration. Previous administration policies weren’t changed. A Respondent from a small party stated, ‘I discovered certain things and it is clear, if our party were to take over power tomorrow we will also change the policy’. A senior political member of the coalition acknowledged that housing policy was not changed when the DA-led coalition government took over. He explained: ‘No we have not changed any policy. Remember you have a span of 5 years and housing is a national agenda so you have to look at that, you can change the methodology to fit into your context but the national policy will remain the same because you are obviously guided by the Constitution’.

The researcher asked this senior political member of the coalition if there are any housing related successes he would want to highlight. He noted that despite challenges, the multi-party government has been able to reduce the backlog of 300 000 to 200 000 houses. These are some of his reflections: “In my tenure as the senior member of the coalition obviously the
cry from people is the building of houses and allocation of houses. The second thing was title deeds, because they want ownership and part of the things that I decided to do when I came in is to make sure that the cry of people is heard. You might not be able to provide even a quarter because the Johannesburg Municipality currently has R300 000 backlog and it could be more now as we go along, but we have to make sure that people are housed and one of the things I said to the officials is that I do not care how you get there as long as it is done'.

4.5.3 Land invasion

Most respondents were of the view that the issue of ‘land grabs’ is an obstacle to consensus. The DA & EFF’s contrasting views on land grabs have led to the loss of life during land invasions according to the respondents. ‘Herman Mashaba, the mayor sent people out to remove people who had invaded the land. Some of them got killed the red ants and the EFF got involved’. Some respondents even mentioned that those who are invading the land are not the poor as the public thinks it is. One Respondent went so far as to state that: ‘it’s about people taking advantage of poor people. The people that are taking over the land drive big cars, they are government officials, teachers and policemen’.

This is a contentious issue in the coalition, especially between the DA and the EFF. The DA argues that it doesn’t mean that the party does not care about black people or poor people. Furthermore, the DA argues that the fundamental difference lies in the fact that the DA does not want to see black people living in shacks without electricity or running water. A DA respondent clarified this by saying: ‘So maybe the DA is more ambitious than the EFF. The EFF is quite happy for people to live in shacks where rain is coming through, no water, no electricity and no proper roots. Herman Mashaba has been talking about expropriating buildings and turning that into accommodation and I think that’s really good for the country’.

The same senior political member of the coalition doesn’t think this is a DA issues, it is an issue of a few political parties: ‘It is not really the DA’s contention but a problem for me as well as senior member of the coalition. It would be a problem for any political party, it will be a problem for you as a citizen in the city. I mean if people were to invade land while your mother was on a waiting list for so many years, you would not take it lightly. Nobody takes land invasion easy, it’s frustrating. We became scared to say where our next project would be. Most of the land that the housing department has planned to use for housing provision is occupied and we have to go to court for eviction orders. This impacts negatively of how we speedily provide housing to the citizens of Johannesburg’.
Respondents from a small party echoed the same sentiment as that of a senior political member of the coalition: ‘We don’t support land invasions because our belief is that land must be distributed equally because you have people that are patiently waiting for government to give them land. We don’t support land invasion at all.’

A respondent from one of the larger parties in the coalition made a claim that the land grab issue started with the ANC, he asserts that this practice started when the city was governed by the ANC: ‘They owned a very large piece of land and had about 40 families living there many of them that were living there for about 30 to 40 years did not have title deeds to their land. If we as a party that respect the rule of law allow a group of people just to come and take land away from people who have been waiting for years, it would not be just’.

Furthermore, this respondent mentioned that the EFF doesn’t respect the rule of law, and the EFF maintains that if there is unoccupied land and there is a need for shelter, the land should be occupied by those in need: ‘You can’t tell me when I see unoccupied land for so many years, while I’m staying in squalors, in a shack, that when I occupy that land for the purposes of accommodation, it’s an invasion’. A respondent from a larger party explained that after the 2016 elections there were about 180 informal settlements in the Johannesburg Municipality. That number has increased to 200 and a respondent from a larger party asserts that they ensure that these informal settlements have received basic services even if it is not a permanent solution.

4.6 Land Rezoning

Most respondents mentioned that every zoning decision must be taken at its own merits and demerits. It appeared that the City does not have a general principle that prohibits rezoning of land intended for economic activity or either for housing/residential (which is the primary contention of this study). A senior administrative official noted that: ‘Questions to ask would be the most optimal use of land like location, types and quality of services existing, priorities set out in the spatial development framework of the city, etc.’. A senior political member of the coalition noted that instead, a large portion of land should be allocated to housing considering the housing backlog.

4.7 Conclusion

In conclusion it can be noted that the ideologies in the different parties to the coalition believe either solutions should be granted in the interim vs the long-term, and that the rezoning of land should be based on occupation vis-à-vis a structured feasibility plan for rezoning.
CHAPTER 5: Analysis and summary of findings

5.1 Introduction

This Chapter will outline and discuss the research findings. The research results that emerged out of the research process will critically provide an analysis of the data that was gathered through interviewing 7 Councillors and 2 appointed senior officials from the Johannesburg Municipality. Various themes were identified and outlined in the previous chapter, the researcher therefore grouped similar themes into six thematic areas that will be discussed in this chapter. The analysis here will be based here on the primary evidence, that is, the findings obtained first-hand from the sources interviewed. That is to say that this finding is based on the data collected through interviews as well as the secondary literature survey on coalition governance.

The agreement is practically unanimous that housing policy is porous and a more structured plan, or regime to implement that plan, is required. The 2016 municipal elections were a game changer. After 21 years of uninterrupted ANC hegemony, Johannesburg’s political landscape changed with the DA’s installation as administrative government of the city. For the EFF, despite failing to secure a single metro, the election results presented a fantastic opportunity. With just 11.09 percent to the votes, the EFF emerged from the election as ‘queen maker’ allowing it to select the ultimate victory in Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Pretoria.

After weeks of intense negotiations, a series of DA-led collations propped up in each of the three metros. Once considered impossible, coalition politics quickly became a serious consideration in Johannesburg’s political arena, raising a host of questions around policymaking, the EFF’s influence, and the delivery of service in the city. Here, through a series of interviews with key coalition players, this chapter aims to answer the research question by focusing on six major themes identified in the interviews. Namely the themes of: Compromise, which details the coming together of power and policy in coalitions; Power, Policy Convergence, Principle and the EFF, which chronicles the coalition politics as a tug of war between parties; Conflict Ideology, which arose as an inevitable consequence of differing party ideologies, and; The Outcome of Housing Policy, which examines the extent to which conflict ideology disrupted the provision of service delivery in the Johannesburg Municipality.

5.1.1 Theme one: Compromise – reaching a middle ground between power and policy

Kotzé (2019) argues that coalitions are notoriously and inherently difficult, often requiring a balancing act between the interests of parties. They force hostile parties to come together and
form a collective policy for which each, during the election period, will be individually responsible. In this game, each player must make moves that advance their policy and maximise their power while also ensuring that their voters remain faithful, and their coalition partners remain satisfied.

The willingness of parties to relax their position and acquiesce to coalition demands was a repeated concern for all respondents. This response was especially noted when respondents were asked to measure their relative successes during that particular tenure as well as what they had hoped to achieve? This question was asked with the hopes of investigating research problem 2, namely, the implications of coalition governance in housing policy. In housing policy especially, party strategists would strike a compromise with the parties that may have even opposed the initial ideology, to implement policies that are somewhere ‘midway’ between the ideological positions of all coalition parties.

Of all the parties engaged in coalition discussions, one seemed the most unwilling to compromise with the other members of the council. The most obvious indicator of this was its outright refusal to enter into any coalition in all metros. Evidently it would not accept blanket cooperation, instead it would form ad hoc alliances where appropriate. ‘Who is the better devil’ being the mantra. It constantly made short-term, infrequent arrangements with the other parties only if it was beneficial to them. The researcher found that this party was very strategic in a way in which it positioned itself as a new, decision-steering and young party in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality.

For those within the coalition, the development of the housing policy was the result of agreement reached collectively by parties that are separately accountable come election time. Given that any particular initiative cannot simultaneously correspond to all the parties’ most preferred policy, the question of whose preferences are ultimately reflected in policy outcomes under coalition government becomes central. In this vein, there is a place for compromise but the coalition equally made room for non-negotiables. It was noted that the coalition allowed councillors to disagree against the multi management caucus if it is in contradiction of principles of their own parties.

However, these non-negotiables triggered most of the conflict in the coalition. Again the EFF was most unwilling to reach any compromises and stressed the importance of the party’s seven ‘Cardinal Pillars’ and how these guided its activities regarding expropriation of land and therefore would unapologetically disagree with the multi management caucus if it directly challenged these ‘Cardinal Pillars’. Smaller parties conceded that where necessary, coalition
politics could on occasion cause the party to surrender its position in favour of the collective’s. Most likely, this probably has more to do with these parties being a ‘small-fish’ i.e. requiring the definitive sway of larger parties in the partnership, than it does with any genuine desire to reach a compromise. However, the DA observed it’s a trade-off that is primarily underpinned by serving the residents of the city.

Perhaps the most surprising form of compromise was the contradictory alliance reached between Herman Mashaba, the centre-right former Mayor of the Johannesburg Municipality, and members of the EFF caucus. If political compromise was a screenplay, then the EFF would cast Mashaba as the protagonist. Similar reviews of Mashaba’s performance was that he was ‘prioritizing the city over the coalition.’ The former executive Major was praised as a skilled negotiator, capable of charming even the most hostile of his party’s opponents. He is skilled at negotiation, and ‘from time to time managed to persuade [the ANC and the EFF] to work together’. Though I must add this came from some who felt that the former Mayor overly prioritises the coalition over the DA, he was referred to as the Mayor of the City/Coalition and not a DA leader.

While there is some variance in their answers, all respondents are in agreement that coalition in Johannesburg has forced parties to make compromises over policy. What follows in theme two is an assessment of these compromises and how they interact with the dynamics of power and policy in the city. As noted in the literature survey, partners in a coalition government are forced to bargain over a common policy position, which then means that in a coalition arrangement, partners have to compromise (Martin and Vanberg, 2004). The compromise at times may be costly and demanding. Parties may be pushed to agree with policy options that are contradictory to their own principles and polices in order to accommodate the demands of the coalition.

5.1.2 Theme two: Power, Policy Convergence, Principle and the EFF – coalition politics and the tug of war

For this section of analysis, the following questions were especially relevant. Firstly, the Respondents were questioned on their experience operating within a coalition, and as a follow-up question, how their perceived relationship with the EFF developed and subsisted? These particular questions spoke to Research Problem 1 which investigated the nature of the Johannesburg municipality. The EFF argued that their participation in the governance of the Johannesburg Municipality was not a matter of power, but a matter of principle. This, no doubt,
echoes similar positions expressed by “Commander in Chief” Julius Malema. However, given the party’s considerable ‘queen-maker’ authority which they attained through strategically using their disproportionate influence of gaining voting powers (and how Malema exercised that authority to hand the city’s keys over to the neo-liberal DA, despite sever policy contradictions), one can argue that the EFF is clearly far more interested in power plays than they allege. As highlighted in the literature survey, the EFF stands strongly on its pillars of economic freedom, the expropriation of the country’s land without compensation for equal redistribution among the citizenry.

The EFF’s founding manifesto makes an assertion that the state should build its capacity which will ultimately result in the state not outsourcing services through tenders. On one hand the EFF advocates for the capacitiation of the state to deliver services, including houses, while on the other, with the EFF contends is unfairly profit-driven. Therefore, while it is clear that there are fundamentally different political ideologies between the DA and EFF, the EFF still chose the DA over the ANC through a strategic ‘queen-maker’ status because it is a power game changer so to say. A smaller party in the coalition affirms this by the view that the EFF’s decision to remain outside the coalition was clearly a move to guarantee power. By refusing a seat at the table, the EFF would not be bound by any agreement reached, allowing it to protest on the outside and prioritise its own agenda.

One of the smaller parties in the coalition argued that the EFF would frequently frustrate coalition activities and abuse their “queen-maker” status and power. The status affords the EFF voting powers and any party that challenged their position would not receive support from the party. In fact, a smaller party councillor went as far as calling the EFF destructive.

Therefore, by opting to stay out of the coalition, the EFF guaranteed itself power over the coalition. In particular, it escaped the mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms that limit the agency of parties within the coalition. Manifestly, this move is not a matter of principle, but of power - and all the respondents interviewed shared this assessment.

In contrast, the DA which as coalition leader, had the most “skin in the game”, seemed more willing to endure political drawbacks in favour of successful housing policy. A notable example of this was in the city’s hiring practices, which according to COPE have become less factionalised, allowing administrators to appoint candidates ‘fit for the position’. A senior political figure in the coalition however paints a less rosy picture. When asked if appointment

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procedures were stalled by power plays, he remarked that the DA had a candidate that was preferred by the ANC however the EFF voted against it. He emphasised the difficulty of a coalition government which is the fact that the solution for governance challenges do not lie with one party but in all the parties. Attempts to secure power, or even diminish an adversary occur both from within the coalition and from outside it.

Given South Africa’s relatively decentralised system of government, respondent’s observed inevitable tension between the leadership of the metros & state administrators at the national/provincial level. The City is DA led, while the province and country are ANC led. As a result, the ANC at both provincial and national level can determine the size of the housing budget to be allocated to the City’s Department of Human Settlement. The extent to which the DA-led coalition can fulfil its duties and housing provision commitments may be compounded by its lack of financial capacity.

The DA argues that the national ANC has kept a tight grip of funding to frustrate the coalition’s effectiveness. It was explained to the researcher that there is housing grant which comes from national government. This grant is given to the province which allocates to local government accordingly. Before the DA-led coalition government, Gauteng province used to increase the local government grant beyond what was given by national government. It was their interest to see to it that the city is governed in accordance however it is not in their interests to see Herman Mashaba succeeding.

Business day reported on the 17 January 2019 that the Gauteng department of human settlement significantly decreased its grant to the Johannesburg Municipality from R249m to R68m. This decrease in the grant is astonishing considering the fact that the housing crisis in the Johannesburg Municipality continues to grow and it is a contentious issue in the public domain. The DA argues the ANC is deliberately trying to destroy the public image of the DA-led coalition and to ensure that the coalition government appear to have failed in the provision of housing. Is the ANC choosing to play politics over caring for the poor? The DA asserts that the ANC continues to make excuses about resources and therefore reduces budgets, housing budgets in particular. As reflected in the literature survey in the 2016/17 Annual report of the Office of the Premier (2017, p.2), Premier David Makhura admitted to the stubborn challenges that beset the Gauteng administration, citing among others, a housing backlog, that has left 600 000 residents unhoused. The decision to reduce the human settlement budget is contradictory to this acknowledgement that the Johannesburg Municipality is facing a housing crisis. Funds are generally allocated which if not used within the fiscal period, are reclaimed.
Naturally, the views on the matter are conflicting. A councillor from a smaller party in the coalition on the other hand claims the differences between the national and metropolitan leadership has not had ‘budgetary implications. The DA’s position on this matter however would appear to reject this completely. The claim is that the ANC has ‘reduced’ the city’s budget, in an attempt to deprive the metro of the resources it needs to meet its targets.

It is also worth stressing that one of the smaller fish in the coalition pond were also not above playing politics. The respondent emphasised, ‘we wanted to take power from theANC.’ They noted that the current coalition in Johannesburg was formed by smaller parties with the common goal of taking power from the ANC.

5.1.3 Theme three: Conflicts in ideology

When asked what challenges councillors were especially experiencing during the administration, balancing party politics, as well as taking over from the previous administration, Respondents acknowledged that finding middle ground on political ideology was the defining crisis in the provision of housing service delivery. This line of questions directly correlated to Research Problem 3 wherein the predominant theme for investigation was whether political party competition and differing ideologies resulted in service delivery delays and ungovernability. Law (2018) argues that coalitions are strange entities. They force hostile parties to come together and form a collective policy for which each, during the election period, will be individually responsible. In this game, each player must make moves that advance their policy and maximise their power while also ensuring that their voters remain faithful and their coalition partners remain satisfied. In the coalition that led Johannesburg, it is impossible for all interests to be equally represented. Be it religious fundamentalism, free-market capitalism, or support for the expropriation of land without compensation, every party in the city was bound by some ideological principle. Thus, inevitably, there was a proactive preselection of interests. As theme three demonstrates, the interplay of these different, often irreconcilable interests, would have severe impact on housing policy.

The ACDP’s position was clear that right from 1994 the RDP program has failed to eliminate the city’s housing problem. These largely echoed the views calling for more radical response to the crisis. The EFF further noted that their vocabulary does not include phrases like ‘land-grabs’ & ‘land invasion’, instead land occupation represented a useful intervention to ensure that people in Alexandria (and elsewhere) have access to housing. Naturally, the EFF’s eager stance on land occupation proved a stubborn thorn in the DA’s side. The DA contests that the
EFF doesn’t respect the rule of law and have been behind most of these land invasions. The DA strongly noted that the EFF might need to think about a proper plan for infrastructure.

In their critique of EFF ideology, the respondents argued that the real agents of land reform lack a genuine interest in the matter. For the most part they contend that the beneficiaries ‘are government officials, teachers and police’, with no sincere claim for state funded accommodation. The DA alleged that the focus is on having people wait their turn, and being assigned housing with running water & electricity. Quality accommodation, allegedly, was not a concern for the EFF according to critics.

Some councillors from a large party in the coalition had a different take on this matter, and were less critical of the EFF. Under the current political climate it was argued that they were both natural allies – both had the common aim of displacing the ANC as hegemon in South African politics. This shared goal is arguably the strongest justification for forming an alliance. However, this more conciliatory approach must be contrasted with the previous positions expressed by the EFF. As far the EFF is concerned, they and the DA have overlapping agenda that should make an alliance go smoothly. But, when this optimism is juxtaposed with the EFF’s obvious hostility to the DA that seems very unlikely. It is clear that whatever strategic alignments exist between the two parties, the EFF in Gauteng (for deep ideological reasons) will not be moved by the DA’s attempts at courtship.

To complicate matters further, the IFP appears to also have serious disagreements with the DA on hostel development, most of the IFP voters come from hostels and therefore the development of hotels is important to the party. Should the two parties fail to reach an agreement, the IFP has warned that his party would exercise its right to ‘pull back from being part of this government because it is not assisting us in meeting the needs of our voters’.

5.1.4 Theme four: the outcome for housing policy

This final analysis theme centred around questions of housing policy stance, what discussions had informed this stance, and what preparations had been made to address the apartheid social planning methods that had lead to socio-economic isolation. This line of questioning was especially related to the First and core Research Problem 1 which looked at whether coalition politics have a hand in shaping housing policy formulation especially in the Johannesburg municipality. Housing provision in the city is a strong litmus test for the effectiveness of the DA-led coalition. The factors identified in themes one, two and three all facilitated or frustrated this process. What follows is an assessment of how interactions
between the different parties affected overall service delivery. The DA considered the DA’s time in office a success for service delivery, with less funds lost to corruption and more money directed to services. In laying out the party’s strategy, the DA remarked that their policy is multi-pronged, with interests ranging from replacing damaged housing, stopping evictions, and ‘revitalizing hijacked buildings. DA councillors argued that the DA’s housing priorities had changed since it entered into office. The DA’s focus is no longer oriented around the interests of wealthy, urban voters who would prioritise ‘cutting the grass’ over other initiatives.

Now that it enjoys more support from the black middle class, the party had to shift its attention to more basic needs. The DA has a challenge to please both the black middle class, wealthy urban voters who are mostly white and equally prioritise the needs of the poorer voter. Now crucially, despite a lack of assistance at the national level, the DA’s multi-party government has been able to reduce the city’s backlog of 300 000 to 200 000 houses.

A senior political leader in the governing municipal coalition seemed less enthusiastic about the coalition’s progress to date. ‘Too early to speak of successes,’ he remarked. He was however prepared to speak to the city’s increased collaboration with actors in the private sector and civil society, and how this would allow it to ‘diversify the housing product, the funding instruments and delivery model’. A senior administration manager in the City further alluded to this by highlighting the housing strategy which seeks to enhance the role of the private sector and civil society for housing delivery in the City.

**5.2 Conclusion**

If the conditions are right, a coalition can be a powerful guarantee of representational democracy in allowing multifaceted needs and ideologies to be pursue, which may appeal to different members of the constituencies. However, to be effective, there must be compromise from all sides and a willingness to concede power to the other partners. As the coalition in Johannesburg demonstrates, not only must the ideal proposal be jettisoned, watered down or shuffled along the list of priorities, but it is equally possible that all partners will force to accept (and publicly promote) some measures they believe misguided or even wrong. The EFF, which avoided this marriage, could escape these restrictions. The other parties however, have no choice but to see the coalition to its conclusion, and accept whatever gains, or defeats, they encounter in the process.
CHAPTER 6: Recommendations and conclusion

6.1 Recommendations

Introduction
Many people are able to relate to the age-old adage “home is where the heart is” but yet to many more this adage is nothing but a fabled reminder of promised dreams and crushed hopes. It is unconscionable to note the fact that for many, housing is still based on tribal lands and racist groupings, far disconnected from economic activity, where basic services become more of a luxury than a right (Malatsi, 2018). And this state of affairs is yet to be addressed adequately by government, 20-odd years into democracy.

Although some areas have access to low-cost housing from government, there are still persistent challenges being faced by the poor. This final chapter will thus attempt to examine these challenges and recommend solutions by conducting a review of the available literature as well as case studies. Findings have determined that the majority of housing challenges are as a result of the following: corruption and mismanagement; small housing structures; poor housing materials; poor location of housing projects; as well as lack of involvement of stakeholders and beneficiaries (Manomano et al., 2016). Additionally, urbanization, unemployment and the sale and resale of housing by beneficiaries have also had a subsidiary role to play according to Manomano et al., (2016).

What is clear in the final analysis concerning housing policy crisis is that it is inextricably linked to the strained dynamics of coalition politics. The Johannesburg Municipality entered the realm of coalition politics after the 2016 local elections and found themselves short of a majority party to take charge of governance, leading to the formation of a coalition for the Johannesburg Municipality, amongst others (Kotze, 2019). Three South African cities in particular, Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay have been governed by party coalitions for the past three years have been facing tough times (Pieterse, 2019).

In October 2019, the nation woke up to a shocking resignation announcement by then Mayor Herman Mashaba, not only from the Democratic Alliance but the Johannesburg Municipality as well. Subsequently a new Mayor was elected and the ANC had majority votes. The ANC won with 137 votes, followed by the DA with 101 votes and the EFF with 30 votes. An analysis of these votes shows that there is a possibility that one DA member voted against their own party in favour of the ANC. The ANC took back the Johannesburg Municipality (Kotze, 2019) which they lost post the 2016 local government elections. Proceeding this there was a
turbulent shift in the political alliances within the council, when some smaller parties abandoned the coalition and sided with the ANC, which holds majority membership within the council, resulting in the ANC’s Geoff Makhubo being elected as new mayor (Pieterse, 2019). There are concerns about Makhubo with corruption allegations that surround him and his company implicated in the state capture scandal (news 24, 2019-12-04). The Deputy President of the EFF said news 24 ‘So we are noting that the DA has participated in establishing or re-establishing a corrupt government here in the Johannesburg Municipality and we are going to continue as opposition and expose the corruption that the ANC has obviously engaged in. So that is our stance in terms of the recent outcomes’.

6.1.1 Rationale for Coalition Disintegration?

It has been seen in many cities all around the world that there are often consequences to opposition parties winning local government elections. This is due to the fact that national governments are often tempted to sabotage their opponents by stripping them of city powers or limiting their access to resources (Pieterse, 2019). The scramble for limited resources coupled with the pressure to economize them for the benefit of the people is a rational limitation to the provision of service delivery and a rightful cause of party tensions. Thankfully, however, for the Johannesburg Municipality, the Constitution has largely prevented such occurrence as it prescribes a system of cooperative government and ring-fences the powers and resources for cities, regardless of who is in at the helm and which party they represent.

Key to understanding what went wrong is to question the rationale behind formation of the coalition in the first place, is it done with the aim of bringing greater administrative and political cohesion or otherwise? When observing the coalition dynamics in the Johannesburg Municipality it is clear to see that the rationale for the coming together was in order to usurp power from the prevailing ANC (Kotze, 2019). It was essentially to make the point that other parties were just as capable of doing the meeting the needs of society as the ANC, and thus deserved an opportunity to demonstrate this.

According to Kotze (2019) a middle ground often has to be forged involving advancement of the party’s goals while creating an administrative and political climate of stability to govern with the people in mind. What ultimately led to the demise of the DA-led coalition was difference in ideologies and a concomitant failure and unwillingness to reconcile them. This is a problematic stance which undermines the core premise of coalition politics, or rather, the cardinal pillars which are: cooperation, compromise and managing diverse policy agendas (Kotze, 2019). It comes as no surprise then that cracks quickly began to show in this model.
6.1.2 Impact of Smaller Parties on Coalition Governance

Smaller parties are often referred to as the queen makers in coalitions due to their ability to swing power within councils, this is done by using their vote to either support or undermine the coalition government whenever it is deemed worthwhile to do so (Kotze, 2019). Such dynamics were evident in the Johannesburg Municipality where the EFF, a party well-known for its radical populism and the third largest political party in the country, made the decision that they would no longer vote in the two separate councils as they felt they had been negated the opportunity to have an executive political seat, in favour of power-sharing (Kotze, 2019). They were quoted as saying: The Democratic Alliance don’t want to vote for us but they want us to vote for them. We cannot keep on voting for people who can’t vote for us, power-sharing means give and take. From 2016, the DA still does not appreciate that we vote for them.” In this situation the actions of the EFF, that is a small party, rendered the councils hung and impeded its ability to make decisions. Overtime this will have a growing impact on citizens as service delivery and developmental projects grind to a standstill, alluding to the notion of developmental patrimonialism to be discussed further below.

What has proven to then to be devastating to governance in Johannesburg, as well as similar examples in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay is the inability to share power. The political coalitions in each city had very little common purpose other than a desire to usurp power from the ANC and side-line them from governance (Pieterse, 2019). This had the unintended consequence of inviting a culture of instability and tension which has laid a big threat to good governance especially where it concerns housing policy.

What must be noted however is the fact that coalition politics involve more than just inducing parties to compromise. It is must be borne in mind that the South African local government system was devised during a period where one-party dominance structures were the norm and thus taken for granted, this norm structure is inherently unable to provide for a system of power-sharing (Pieterse, 2019).

6.1.3 Inadequate power-sharing system in local governance

It was observed that the Johannesburg Municipality coalition has an executive mayor system, where-in the responsibility for decision-making vests almost entirely in the mayor and the mayoral committee. The remaining municipal councils are reduced to mere oversight roles which in practice have resulted in their side-lining by executives who are keen to centralise their power and create a phenomenon known as developmental patrimonialism. This is a form
of government in which the development of the State flows from one central power, in this case the Executive Mayor (Ilyin, 2015 p. 1).

Furthermore, in 2002 the Constitutional Court ruled that mayoral committees were not obliged to maintain proportional representation. This effectively meant that mayors were free to choose councillors which gave executives the leeway to further side-line political opposition candidates. For example, in the Johannesburg context, the ANC was marginalised despite occupying the majority seats within the council (Pieterse, 2019). This promotes factionalism which may have even been noticed in Johannesburg where it was reported that some DA councillors were unhappy with Mashaba’s engagement with the EFF, but nonetheless found themselves isolated, it is no wonder then that some of the DA members resultantly sided with the ANC in promoting Makhubo as mayor (Pieterse, 2019).

This over-centralization of power is further exacerbated by the blurry lines between political parties as well as state institutions. Party leadership has a disproportionate influence over urban governance and the resultant factionalism between city leaders can distract them from attending to more pressing matters. This was undeniably the case surrounding Mashaba and Msimanga’s resignations. After the 2016 elections, coalitions either purged their senior administrators loyal to ANC or made their work increasingly difficult in an effort to convince them to resign. (Pieterse, 2019). In this way Johannesburg lost a considerable number of skilled personnel which affected service delivery in the end.

These examples according to Kotze (2019) illustrate that in South Africa, it is party interest, rather than good governance of the people, that inevitably shapes coalition politics. More so it demonstrates that political leaders in South Africa generally lack the political maturity to look beyond these party interests and consider the best interests of the polity. To this date recent events have only gone to prove that coalitions are rather about acquisition at the expense of sharing and building together (Kotze, 2019).

6.1.4 Responses to Lack of Quality Coalition Governance

In resolving such a state of affairs where coalition governments are not effective in service delivery it is considered unnecessary and unrealistic to propose a new law to manage coalition politics. What can be agreed upon however is the fact that there are obvious aspects in South Africa’s governance systems that need to be modified accordingly to better provide for efficient service delivery through multi-party leadership (Pieterse, 2019)?
Firstly, the country must find ways to hold mayors accountable especially in providing avenues for the local municipal councils to play meaningful roles in the steering of cities. This can be done ensuring offices of the Public Protector and the Commission against corruption are mandated to investigate policy issues and give binding recommendations.

Secondly the country may need to devise a mechanism which will create stronger legal ties between political parties and municipal councils, the latter whom are often regarded as responsible for local service delivery. For example, the legal mechanism could stipulate that mayors may only be dismissed by the council and no by parties to ensure stability, of which the former process is known to cause coalition imbalances. Mostly it is important for binding legislation to be created which will curb the resale of beneficiated housing.

Thirdly it is a necessity that greater civil professionalism be introduced to the sector calling on party leaders to hold offices with dignity and a sense of purpose (Pieterse, 2019). Ultimately a successful coalition is that which will depend greatly on maturity and the parties’ ability to govern across party divisions. Unfortunately, in this regard South African politics appears to be sorely lacking.

On the socio-economic front, it would be government officials imperative to address the status of its residents. This could firstly be done by mandating quality checks for houses to manage resident’s dissatisfaction. Houses that are in line with the United Nations Habitat institutions could be made a prerequisite for a proposed project to avoid inadequate housing (Manomano et al., 2016). In addition to this the adequate housing must also be signed off by the beneficiary as part of the bottom-up approach principle (Manomano et al., 2016).
To further alleviate the socio-economic challenges faced by the people, parties can establish income generating projects within the housing settlement so as to afford residents the opportunity to learn vocational skills that can alleviate unemployment, crime and prostitution within communities according to Baumann (2003).

Given the nature of coalition politics in in the Johannesburg Municipality and their ability to shapeshift according to differing party dynamics, it might be useful to note in a future study, tools that can be used to provide uniformity in governance. This mechanism can come in the form of a policy framework developed conjointly by parties during a national dialogue of political parties. Emulating a similar measure instituted in Zimbabwe, it might be worthwhile for parties to predetermine voting rights, political powers, citizen’s expectations and other interests prior to engaging in a coalition, and so that each may party may get a sense of the accountability required to other members as well as to the greater polity at large. In Zimbabwe,
POLAD, the Political Actors Dialogue, is a conglomeration of the main political party ZANU-PF, along with other smaller parties, regrettably excluding the Main Opposition Party MDC (Movement for Democratic Change). This serves to show that coalition governments are also complicated across different jurisdictions. South Africa may be able to draw nonetheless from this institution in bringing political parties together in a joint forum to discuss these complicated issues and provide resolutions before maladministration can affect service delivery. As was reiterated in this final chapter, compromise will be the key to sound policy. It is hoped that a study detailing the success of multi-party dialogues will be investigated to show the relevant success of such a collaborative institution.

### 6.2 Conclusion

South Africa is expected to conduct another round of local government elections soon in 2021 at a time when political mistrust is only expected to increase, given past examples. Playing a zero-sum game within the councils and turning local governance into somewhat of a political theatre will only serve to further undermine political trust (Kotze, 2019). It is inevitable that this in turn will result in voter apathy and thus a decrease in voter turnout, threatening to place parties yet again at the mercy of small political parties in the next round of polling, when the larger parties fail to secure a majority. Coalition politics can only be described as a vicious cycle waiting to happen, while housing policy is the neglected afterthought that watches it all unfold.
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‘What is Governance?’ http://web.worldbank.org/

2016 local government election report


Appendix 1: Interview Questionnaires

2 Senior Municipal Officials
1. Could you walk me through a typical day in your role?
2. What have been the successes of your tenure so far?
3. What are you hoping to achieve by the end of your tenure?
4. How has working in a coalition differed from
   a. navigating the business world?
   b. Being the opposition?
5. How would you describe your relationship with the EFF and the ANC in the Johannesburg Municipality?
6. How do you intend to meet the needs of the poor in Johannesburg, particularly concerning housing?
7. The DA has been perceived as anti-poor- given their neglect of communities like Khayelitsha- please walk me through how you intend to include poorer communities in the decision-making processes?
8. What needs to be done to ensure long-term growth in the city that will benefit the city’s worst-off residents?
9. How do you intend to deal with apartheid spatial planning?

Johannesburg Municipality Councillors
1. Could you walk me through a typical day as a Councillor?
2. What do you think makes this coalition government different from the previous government?
3. What challenges are you facing in navigating shared power and taking over from the previous administration?
4. What issues are your party pushing for in the coalition and how do these compare to the DA’s priorities?
5. The EFF is not officially part of the coalition. How would you describe their role in this administration?
6. Please walk me through discussions concerning the plight of the poor in this city, particularly with regards to providing housing?
7. Could you explain your party’s housing policy or vision for housing in South Africa, particularly here in Johannesburg?
8. What should be done to address apartheid spatial planning and how it has excluded the poor from the benefits of urban development?
Appendix 2 : Wits School of Governance Research Director Letter

Note:

Elected councillors were approached as political party members and active members of the coalition government in Johannesburg municipality and not as City Representative to unpack the politics of the coalition and not the performance of official duties. Therefore, the researcher did not seek permission from the local government speaker to facilitate interviews.
25 October 2018

To whom it may concern

This serves to confirm that Ms. Bonolo Makgale student number 1543801 is registered for the Masters in Management at the Wits School of Governance. The title of her Research is: Coalition politics and urban governance in Johannesburg’s housing policy.

Ms. Bonolo Makgale is currently undertaking research on her topic. It is recommended that she be given assistance in terms of information for research purposes towards her Master’s Degree. The information will be used for research purposes only.

Please do not hesitate to contact me - if you have any queries.

Yours sincerely
Prof Pundy Pillay
Research Director

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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY

Research title:
Coalition Politics and Urban Governance in Johannesburg’s Housing

I, .......................................................... (participant name & surname), confirm that the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

- I have read and understood the study as explained in the information sheet.
- I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and prepared to participate in the study.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty.
- I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a dissertation.
- I agree to be interviewed and/or to complete a questionnaire.

..........................................................  ..........................................................  ..........................................................
Participant’s name and surname       Date       Signature
Appendix 4: Wits School of Governance Ethics Clearance Letter
05 March 2020

To whom it may concern

This serves to confirm that Ms. Bonolo Makgale student number 1543801 is registered for the Masters of Management in Public Policy at the Wits School of Governance. The title of her Research is: The case of housing in the City of Johannesburg post 2016

Ms. Bonolo Makgale successfully defended her proposal on 2 August 2018; she was given ethics clearance on the previous ethics system. The Defence panel members approve the ethics component of the research and the Research Director will issue a letter to enable her to proceed with obtaining data and completing her research.

Please do not hesitate to contact me - if you have any queries.

Yours sincerely

Prof Pundy Pillay
Research Director