



Research report for Masters by Dissertation

University of Witwatersrand

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Wits School of Governance

**ASSESSING WHETHER POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS
AFFECT STABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Name: Nosipho Mjekula

Student Number: 1570022

Student email address: 1570022@students.wits.ac.za

Supervisor: Dr Halfdan Lynge

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AG	Auditor-General
APP	Annual Performance Plan
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
DGs	Directors-General
DHS	Department of Human Settlements
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
DTA	Department of Traditional Affairs
DV	Dependent variables
EA	Executive Authority
HRM	Human Resource Management
HoD	Head of Department
HOPA	Head of Public Administration
IV	Independent variables
MECs	Member of the Executive Council
MTSF	Medium-Term Strategic Framework
NDP	National Development Plan
NPM	New Public Management
NT	National Treasury
OPSC	Office of the Public Service Commission
PAL	Political Administrative Leadership (Poli-Admin-Lead)
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PMDS	Performance Management and Development Systems
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
PSA	Public Service Act
PSR	Public Service Regulations
RARE	Responsible Accountable, Relevant and Ethical leadership
SMS	Senior Management Service
SDIPs	Service Delivery Improvement Plans (SDIPs)
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
SA	South Africa
TLGFA	Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act
USIP	United States Institution of Peace
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Glossary of key words and definitions

Administrative autonomy

Refers to public organizations' ability to determine their own preferences and to translate those preferences into authoritative actions.

Administrative independence

The ability of administrative individuals to make their decisions or influence other people.

Administrative state model

Reflects the observation that bureaucracy should dominate governments in policy processes

Adversarial Model

The bureaucrat will say "No to Minister".

Authoritarian regime

Refers to a government that concentrates its of power to a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people"

Bureaucratic co-primacy

Refers to a democracy dominated by administrators due to their knowledge, level of expertise, permanence, and institutionalisation.

Complementarity Model

The bureaucrat and politicians decide together in a reciprocal exchange process.

Controller

A level of control of public administrators by elected officials or vice versa.

Designated and undesignated

Designated means an official appointed to a specific post. While undesignated means not officially appointed to a specific office.

Formal-legal model

An interaction in which the bureaucratic policy-making role is reduced to saying, "yes Minister".

Functional-close model

Foresees public administration and political executives developing closer relationships.

Governance

Governance has been defined as the rules of the political system to solve conflicts between actors and adopt decisions (legality).

Impartiality

Equal treatment of all rivals or disputants; fairness

Permanent Secretary

A permanent secretary is the most senior civil servant of the department. In South Africa, they are called Directors-General or Heads of Department.

Political Independence

The freedom of a country, state, or other similar entity from an external government

Political interference

Interference is defined as a process that violates procedures, seeks to bias regulatory decision-making, or seeks regulatory decisions that violate the letter or spirit of laws and policies that regulation is designed to implement. Political interference can also be viewed as the impact of the political establishment on bureaucrats' personal and official decisions and the effects thereof. The activities of politicians should be prevented from encroaching on the administration "realm", which is led by appointed technicians or bureaucrats (Hauya, 2011, p. 2).

Political intervention

Action was taken by politicians to improve the institutions they lead.

Political overstepping and overpowering

A politician who oversteps the limits of a system or situation. While overpowering is making other people uncomfortable because they have a strong personality.

Regime-dominant model

A dominant-party system, or one-party dominant system, is a political occurrence in which a single political party continuously dominates election results over running opposition groups or parties

Village life model

both senior bureaucrats and political executives comparatively have similar values and goals

Abstract

The assessment of the political-administrative relationships between executive authorities (Ministers) and Directors-General (DGs) and whether there is a perceptible correlation with stability in three national government departments in South Africa, namely Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs, and the Office of the Public Service Commission was seized using a mixed methods approach (qualitative and basic elements of quantitative methods). Due to the editorial nature of this research piece, the academic knowledge gap, the lack of empirical evidence about the typology of these relationships in South Africa, and the deep interest of the researcher in the study, an analysis was necessary. This study focuses on the relationship between politicians who are Executive Authorities (EAs) and only administrators at the level of Directors-General (DGs) and who are regarded as the independent variable (IV). The EA and DG have an individual role to play in the policy formulation and implementation and enacting laws, and regulations (intervene variable). Another variable that intervenes and contributes to the relationship between politicians and administrators is the political landscape at a particular time which normally expresses certain relationships between the EAs and DGs. Ample evidence shows that poor relations between the elected and the appointed cause a high turnover rate at the administrative level and creates unstable institutions that are weak and characterised by corruption (SA Institute of Race Relations, August 2017). The high turnover refers to the number of DGs who leave the Public Service. However, most of the studies do not necessarily clarify whether the turnover rate within government was caused by the kind of relationships EAs and HoDs may experience, therefore remains unclear. Internal strife at the level of political and administrative executives is often heard through newspaper articles. This turned out to be a normality where tensions, poor working relationships and interactions, how major decisions are taken, individual and organisational instabilities, and political over administration power are mostly cited. The instability of relations between politicians and officials, created by high levels of public service politicisation, is the most solemn variable of instability and inconsistency in any democratic dispensation. The findings and recommendations of the study will shape improved relations, and help the government categorize the kind of relationships that exist through a developed model named Political Administrative Leadership (PAL) that the researcher established to map the relationship that is deemed functional even when tensions exist. The political executives, administrative heads, the Directors-General (DGs) or heads of department (HoDs), and public service practitioners will be able to sketch healthier relations that would shape and enhance the future of the political-administration dichotomy that existed and was questioned by some scholars e.g. Mafunisa, Maphunye, and others. The study will inform

policy and framework development that permits pragmatic analysis of the relationships at the political-administrative interface. The study uses a sample size of thirty-four participants selected using a purposive and snowball sampling technique in the three national departments. Fifteen of the participants were from the Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC), twelve from the Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA), and seven from the Department of Human Settlements (DHS). The study focuses on the unit analysis which is the relationship between a Minister and Director-General in each of the selected departments. The sample was selected using the offices and units that understand the political-administrative relationships and whether they caused or not necessarily instigated the stability or instability thereof. The study of two out of the three national departments showed stable relationships and stability between the EAs and DGs, however, the respondents were of the view that the poorer the relations the higher the instability in government departments, components, entities, and institutions.

Chapter 1: Introduction and overview of the dissertation

In the South African context, the relationships of executive leadership, senior management of government, and political office bearers have been critical for public administration, political and administrative leadership, and good governance since the beginning of the democratic dispensation in 1994. The public service is responsible for the administration or the execution of policies formulated by political office-bearers. Public administration refers to “an executive branch of government that deals with the responsibilities of implementing laws, regulations, and decisions of the government and management related to the provision of public services” (UNDP, 2015; Sebola, 2018, p. 4). Several laws and regulations were developed in South Africa to strengthen governance, the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the roles of political and administrative heads. This separation and its practical application have for a while been a bone of contention and a key source of tension at the political-administrative interface (Mogashoa, 2006 p.10).

The relationship at the apex of politics and administration has been and still is a key issue for deliberation amid public administration since the arrival of modern political systems. Ever since the works of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber, the relationship between politics and administration has been one of the themes of interest in public administration discourse. According to Svara (2001, p. 179), one of the important factors that have mounted the tensions between politicians and public servants is the increasing role of the administrators in the political process and the increasing involvement of politicians in the policy implementation process. An explicit division between the realm of politics and the domain of administration has long been a leading concept (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002, p. 1136). In his article, Mafunisa argued that “Since 1994, there have been some serious tensions between some political office bearers and their Directors-General. These tensions between political office bearers and Directors-General resulted in the latter leaving the departments concerned. The causes were due to serious tensions and confusion between political office bearers and senior public servants, alleged meddling, and interference of political office bearers in administrative matters. Mafunisa further cited an absence of understanding of institutional history by public functionaries and the non-existence of understanding of administrative or technical issues by the political office bearer. The political differences between the political office bearer and the senior public servant, and the strong participation in political issues by the senior public servant perpetrated the serious

tensions. It was also specified that seizing expert power by senior public servants through intentionally misleading political office bearers, maintaining a veil of secrecy, withholding information, and delaying decisions caused some of the tensions in the public administration (Mafunisa, 2003, p.95-96).

In later years, McTavish & Miller defined the political-administrative interface as “the intersection of leadership roles and the link between political and administrative terrains” (McTavish & Miller, 2009, p. 360). Hence, the prevailing theory categorised public administration, promoting a clear distinction between politics and public administration. This theory suggested that politics had nothing to do with public administration and, therefore, politicians should not interfere in matters of public administration” (Gerth & Mills, 2014, p. 221). To strengthen development, efficiency, effectiveness, and unbiased administration, the interface between politics and public administration should be disconnected. The underlying governance factors such as corruption, political interference, and lack of accountability, that are linked to blurry lines of interaction between politics and administration have in many instances been the root cause of the service delivery challenges in South Africa (Mamokhere, 2022, p.1).

According to Chapter 13 National Development Plan, inappropriate relationships and unhealthy interactions between politicians and administrators may cause instability within the state. Although it is not feasible to reach some of the developmental and capable state goals, unsuitable relations between political and administrative executives are contrary to the direction that South Africa envisages in the year 2030. These are some of the indicators in Chapter 13 of the NDP as “building a capable state that has a stable political-administrative interface”. According to Hartigh (2011), instability can be viewed as “constant variations in leadership which are often escorted by serious policy reviews and alterations in policy direction, contributing to instability in the public sector. The NDP also emphasises the public service in all spheres of government that must be disjointed from political pressure. If public administration has challenges in disconnecting from political pressures, it is bound to fail in fulfilling its democratic mandate to serve citizens equally and unbiased” (Hartigh, 2011, p. 366).

1.2 Background and significance

According to Steytler and de Visser (2009, p. 21), “[p]olitical instability has long been shown to create administrative instability”. This statement can be confirmed by many scholars as well as numerous countries in the world. This includes South African government institutions which in

certain cases experienced instability at political levels that caused administrative disorder and fragmentation. Countless times, political reshuffles and constant deployments could cause instability and in worst-case scenarios administrative interruptions in government. This means that heads of departments moved to different strategic positions than the ones they currently occupy. However, this process must be done in a meaningful way to avoid possible conflicts. Historically, political and administrative conflicts affected the relationships between Ministers and Directors-General (DGs). The apex of leadership has to be pinned to the top executive of the institution who should be able to create a conducive environment and interact with each other. Self (1972, pp. 150-151) sees this leadership as reinforcement of the expectation of a blending leadership. In the South African context, the relationships between political and administrative heads are not necessarily branded specifically at the leadership level. This means clearly stated frameworks that characterise executive leadership relationships need to be developed and communicated widely. Thus, this study attempted to guide possible policy development and implementation gaps in existing prescripts as well as contribute to academic knowledge gaps that continue to occur.

The country's Vision 2030, embraces that political interference in administration generates unevenness in performance and would create tensions and poor relations in the political-administrative edge, volatility in administrative leadership levels, and then the erosion of accountability and authority (Hartigh, 2011, p. 365). Political stability has been proven to be one of the variables that can shape the country's economic development and administrative performance (Milio, 2008, p. 920). The period the elected and the appointed are in office is a "key variable to understanding political-administrative relations" (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1981; Peters, 1987; Hood, 2000). Traditionally, politicians are usually in their positions for a short period (Peters, 1987 p. 270). A politically stable environment has five characteristics: the nonappearance of violence, the length of government, the survival of a legitimate constitutional administration, the absence of structural change, and a multifaceted social attribute (Dowding & Kimber, 1983, p. 240). According to the United States Institution of Peace (USIP), stable governance refers to an end state where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources. Government officials are held accountable through political and legal processes. The population can participate in governance through civil society organisations, independent media, and political parties. Stable governance is the mechanism through which the basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through

inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs non-violently (USIP, 2009, pp. 1-3).

Stability in administrative levels of government is equally vital. At an executive administrative level, there should be no frequent dismissals, firing, or transfer of the DGs from one department to another. In exploring and mapping the relationships that exist between executive authorities (politicians) and the heads of departments (administrators) in three national government departments in South Africa. It is important to argue that the empirical evidence shows that instability in both administrative and political levels has been caused by poor relations at the top. This would mean that there is a correlation between the types of relationships that exist amongst executive authorities and heads of departments locally and internationally. This was supported by Henri Fayol, a French business executive, who created and recognised fourteen administrative management principles of stability of tenure, in his book *Industrial and General Administration* (Fayol, 1916, p. 59). He emphasised that for an institution to operate effortlessly and free of conflict, personnel, particularly at the managerial level, must not frequently enter and exit the organisation. This requires organisations to develop strategies and systems that limit instability as much as possible. The strategies must be underpinned by faithful public servants who would be responsive to political priorities and meet the needs of the citizens by providing quality service delivery. The importance of collective interest is protected from private gain through legitimacy that is reinforced through stability and upkeep of public trust. Stable governance can be referred to as “the mechanism through which the basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs non-violently” (USIP, 2009, p. 1).

One study of public bureaucracy views relationships between political and bureaucratic executives as one of a principal and agent or master and servant. A political head exercises control over the head of a department as a subordinate (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 180). The principal-agent relationship stems from a situation in which one unit (the principal) influences another (the agent). In this context, the agent becomes the DG and is acting in the place of the principal, the Minister for precise or overall purposes. By so doing, the agent is required to carry out the principal's desires.

The theory of principal-agent utilises a hierarchical relationship and is of the view that the principal does not have the time and technical knowledge to do the task, therefore, delegates it to an agent.

This was further supported by Max Weber's bureaucratic theory and political power which describes how political power allows the strong to dominate, influence the weak, and the superior rank on the ladder possessing the greatest power (Weber, 1998, p. 15), Gerth & Mills (2014) argued that "the bottom layers of bureaucratic organisational structures are always subject to the supervision and control of higher layers" (Gerth & Mills, 2014, p. 236).

The effect of political allegiance on careers possibly balances out in most institutions. The elimination of individuals on political grounds was mostly disputed in Germany and it was highly controversial during the late 1960s. This was noticed in these countries where hypocritical political fidelity was by custom denied, though everyone knew it existed. Cassese et al (1999) indicated that republican Italy demonstrated the "ineffectiveness of irritating to stop perverse political influence by legal/bureaucratic means, which results only in immobilising public administration and intensifying reactionary tendencies towards corruption and colonisation by sectional and private interests. In such a case only, the political intervention has any hope of bringing reform" (Cassese, Page, & Wright 1999 pp. 55–64).

Cariño (2001, p. 1057), also derived types of authority models within the political-administrative realms and these are regime-dominant, bureaucratic co-primacy, authoritarian regime, and bureaucratic co-primacy. Similar to these authors, (Peters, 2001, p. 156) designed five models of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats which are analysed in detail in chapter 2. These are formal-legal, village life, functional, adversarial, and administrative state and will be mapped, applied, and discussed in detail as to how these apply in the South African context using three national departments, namely, Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs and Office of the Public Service Commission. The political-administrative predicament is the core of the government-wide system of governance. This problem was considered, on a larger scale in Peters' (2001) "Village Life" model and Hood's (2000) "Public Service Bargain". The study will involve in-depth analysis and elaborate on the types, models, frameworks, and theories that explicitly infer and map relationships that exist between political and administrative heads in these three national departments and whether the kind of relationship that exists contributes to administrative stability.

1.3 Purpose and objective of the study

This study aimed to:

- explore and map the relationships that exist between executive authorities (politicians) and the heads of departments (administrators) in three national government departments in South Africa.
- Investigate whether there is a correlation between the types of relationships that exist amongst executive authorities and heads of departments and administrative stability in South Africa.

1.4 Research questions

Overeem (2006, p. 41) retained the argument that “politics and administration are interconnected but distinct, however, the distinction is becoming progressively distorted due to parts of the puzzle cutting across at a certain point”. The distinction view suggests that an executive authority (EA) and head of department (HoD) have a dual role to make the relationship work between two adults given the mandate to lead organisations, contribute to effectiveness and efficiency in improving service delivery and solidifying development, thus the main two questions outlined below and addressed in the study:

- What are the most common types of relationships (models) between political and administrative heads in South Africa?
- How do these types affect administrative stability?

1.5 Research Problem

Challenges experienced by government institutions in dealing with the interface between politicians and administrators as well as strained relations between the executive and administrative echelons of government have led to poor service delivery as well as administrative instability in the past. The political-administrative interface and strained relations were examined as combined variables. There is a significant number of administrative heads who vacate public service or are deployed to a different department every time there is a new political head in an institution. It is important to build independence between the political and administrative heads. If the EA assigned administrative responsibilities, then that kind of independence would not exist as it would mean Ministerial involvement in administration and vice versa. According to Hansen & Ejersbo (2002), "the relationship between elected officials and unelected officials is the cornerstone for understanding the governance process in public administration" (Hansen & Ejersbo, 2002, p. 733). The relationship between these two parties is so vital that it cannot be ignored.

1.6 Scope of the study

This study maps the existing relationships and seeks to whether certain relationship types contribute to either administrative stability or instability in three South African national government departments. It is important to understand whether there is a correlation between these two variables namely type of relationship and stability in the three selected departments. The correlation will be tested using stability measure which is explicitly outlined under research the design whilst recommending possible solutions on how certain relationships can negatively or positively affect administrative stability at a political-administrative level. The provincial and local spheres of government and state-owned entities (SOEs) will not be covered due to the scope of this study. However, it must be noted that fragmented relations do occur frequently at levels of Member of Executive Council (MECs) and provincial HoDs municipal managers and mayors as well as boards and chief executive officers in SOEs. The correlation was tested using the stability measure (Y-variable) which is explicitly outlined under the research design whilst recommending possible solutions on how certain relationships can negatively or positively affect administrative stability at a political-administrative level. Only three departments were studied excluding all other national departments in South Africa, however, inferences are made based on the secondary data on the political-administrative that exists. Data triangulation was

conducted using the primary data collected from the selected departments with secondary data to support evidence. The provincial and local spheres of government as well as state-owned enterprises were not considered in this study and therefore, a knowledge gap transpires for future studies in South Africa to compare the depth of the research problem in other spheres of government. Nonetheless, fragmentation in relations does occur frequently at levels of MECs and provincial HoDs, municipal managers and mayors, as well as between boards and chief executive offices in SOEs and, has been evident in various daily news on different media platforms (News24, TimesLive, Daily Maverick) and in the recent spats at executive levels reported in the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of the State Capture. A study conducted in the Mngquma municipality in the Eastern Cape also revealed that the politics-administrative interface setback caused an exodus of municipal mayors and managers due to a lack of proper political interface and undue interference of either political or administrative officials is threatening stability. These political-administrative impediments could be triggered by a variety of inappropriate interpersonal dynamics and poor relations, e.g., abuse of power, political-administrative infighting, and interference (Ndudula, 2013, p.7). An improvement in political-administrative relations would require both actors (EA and DG) to move away from unnecessary disagreements, tension, and spells. Instead, they must lean towards inclusivity and there must be a strong presence of trust between the two parties to improve governance, leadership, and performance of each institution.

1.7 Structure of the study

The dissertation is structured in six successive chapters and outlined as follows: **Chapter 1** presents the introduction, background, and overview of the study which provides detailed background and significance to the study of political-administration relationships. This study is not a comparative; however, references are made to other parts of the continent and worldwide. Therefore, it is important to triangulate the political and administrative relationship connection between SA and other countries. **Chapter 2** is the theory and literature review which contextualise and synthesise the relationships between the Ministers in three selected departments in which five Peters interaction models, perceptions, and variables are presented and simplified. The formal legal, adversarial, administrative state, village life, and functional relationships are tested and linked to Carino's regime types which are regime dominant, bureaucratic co-primacy, authoritarian, and a combination of the authoritarian and bureaucratic co-primacy models. Svava's complementarity model within the political-administration realm is also discussed. These models are mapped, pragmatized, and discussed in detail as they apply in the South African context using three national departments, namely, Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs, and Office of the Public Service Commission. An inference is made between existing relations and whether stability is affected by any of the relationships and formal arrangements within the political administration sphere. **Chapter 3** are research methods, data, and research methodology that were employed in conducting this study in the three departments. The methodological portion pronounces the study area, research design, data source and collection, target population, sample size, ethical consideration, techniques, and data analysis approaches detailing the descriptions and explanation (data analysis) of the political-administrative relationship at the OPSC, DTA, and DHS. Participants were categorised according to their gender, age, race, and academic rank to ensure a balance in diversity. In **Chapter 4** more focus is drawn to the political administration challenges that persist in the African continent and the world. The background provides detailed descriptions and explanations of the political-administrative relationship and provides the convergences and divergences in the political-administrative relationships. Data analysis is both inferential which is steered by synthesis of the theoretical frame, synthesis studies made in different countries and inductively directed by empirical data collected as primary data. **Chapter 5** is the presentation of results and findings which represent the case studies and comparison thereof from the three departments separately and the variables of the study are scrutinised, the inferences

pronounced denoting the SA relationship model/s. **Chapter 6** presents the recommendations and conclusion of the study.

Chapter 2: Theory and literature review

2.1 Introduction

Ever since the beginning of South Africa's democratic dispensation, various pieces of legislation were enacted to strengthen the functioning of institutions supporting constitutional democracy. The Public Service consists of national, provincial, and local spheres of government with three tiers namely executive, judiciary, and legislature. Thus, the interdependency and interrelatedness that existed necessitated the strengthening of the relationships between executive leadership, senior management of government, and political office bearers in all spheres of government, a critical phenomenon for public administration and good governance since the beginning of the democratic dispensation in 1994.

Although several pieces of legislation were developed by the public service guiding Ministers and DGs and provide executive powers such as the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) no 29 of 1999, Public Service Act (PSA) no 103 of 1994, Public Service Regulation (PSR) as amended, 2016, Exchequer Act, 1975, Treasury instructions and Financial Regulations, 2005, issued under Exchequer Act, a gap exists in managing their relationships and lines are becoming more and more blurry. Some of the legislative regulations and laws governing departments are detailed in Chapter 2. The constitutional handbook for executive members in South Africa, which was developed for political office bearers, prescribes the roles of the political heads referred to as Ministers in the national sphere and members of the executive council (MECs) in the provincial sphere of government to supervise administrations. Their function is to serve in the respective party structures occupying leadership roles while also fulfilling the role of being political heads of departments as per the powers and functions assigned to them by the state President. Following the executive members' code of ethics, members of the cabinet, amongst other things, must not abuse their positions or any information assigned to them to either enrich themselves, inappropriately benefit any other person, or involve themselves in any conflicts between their official responsibilities and their private

interests. Denoting the political and administrative interface, political theorists like Wilson Woodrow and Max Weber developed theories that politics and administration are inherently different and the approach to public administration should be a field of business and must be removed from meddling with politics (Weber, 2009, p. 1137). The question persists on whether Weber's theory that advocates the complete separation between politics and administration should be followed or not and to what extent public administration should be intertwined with politics in modern public administration. Lynn's (2001) primary postulation under the orthodox public administration model is that the "government's task of policy implementation necessitates specialized expertise and technical know-how devoid of any partisan considerations" (Lynn, 2001; Ingraham and Ban, 1986; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981). Thus, as "an instrument or machinery for executing the goals of democracy, the administration needs to be insulated from political influence, and its members protected from the competitive political environment" (Weber, 1968, p. 1049). Weber's rational model postulates that the modern bureaucracy's composition and essential elements such as political neutrality, hierarchical structures, formalised system of procedures, and specialised knowledge and functions are basic preconditions for government predictability and reliability (Rosenbloom, 1983, pp. 78-82). To serve any government of the day, political neutrality is vital. This will allow administrative heads to serve the government with no qualms and lessen potential conflict between policy formulation and implementation. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) postulated that all choices in governance affect power relationships. For example, the choice of a provisional Minister, the location of a municipal centre, the approval of a law, regulation, or framework, or the granting of a contract to a resident business can exacerbate tensions or address and resolve internal conflicts. To identify and understand the specific sources of conflict and motivations for violence to ensure that governance reform efforts do not reignite violent conflict. The provision that public servants must not be biased but impartial in serving government and follow lawful directives to the best of their ability irrespective of their political opinions. Weber and Wilson argued that the complete separation of technical expertise from political objectives is a necessary condition to promote efficiency, effectiveness, and economy (Sager, 2009, p. 1136).

The Ministers, Directors-General (DGs), and senior management levels in government are required by the Financial Disclosure Framework to divulge all financial interests before assuming such offices on an annual basis. The Constitution is also clear under section 96 that they may not undertake any other paid work as this is viewed as part of a conflict of interest. The President can assign a cabinet Minister to one or more portfolios and the functions of the Minister can be shifted to any Minister through a process of cabinet re-shuffle.

In an article, Maserumule (2007) attempted to narrate how the conflict between Ministers and DGs is being treated in South Africa and concluded that it is rather too journalistic, which means that these conflicts are mostly reported in media spaces. He further argued that reporting these conflicts is often fixated on sensationalism and not scholarly analysis at all, and examined the situation from a postulative perspective, which is a hypothesis-setting approach. According to the researcher, postulative was conceived from the word postulation which is defined as an assumption that the causes of conflicts between Ministers and Directors-General are true based on scholarly books, articles, and reports on the subject (Maserumule, 2007, p. 147). This was an article written 15 years ago, however, it would seem that the status quo to this effect remains unchanged. As a researcher, one hardly finds documented articles on the relationships at the executive level. One possible reason is that SA government like most governments, may be reluctant to divulge the nature of such relationship to researchers as this could compromise its public value and image. Nor are there existing frameworks in this regard. A need for rigorous analysis to understand the real causes of the conflicts between the DGs and the individuals they report to (Ministers). There is a need for the development of a governance process and framework that is designed to critically resolve the conflicts and it should be closely monitored whether it yields the intended positive results. The current deliberations and discourses about conflicts between DGs and Ministers are however dominated by the media. The media space does not shy away from this topic which should rather be more openly discussed within the right platforms within government to improve the status quo. As argued by Maserumule (2007), in his study of conflicts between Ministers and Directors-General, this leaves much to be desired as “they are given to sensationalism and are often too simplistic. It shows a lack of theoretical and empirical understanding of the political-administrative dynamics in the governance process in South Africa”. He further cited that the conflicts between DGs and their Ministers just after the democratic dispensation (1994 and 1995) were,

“mainly occasioned by their dissimilar political orientations, and methods to issues of public administration. Most of the Directors-General who had relationship struggles with their Ministers or premiers were the ruling party cadres and came from the same political struggle background. Work-related scandals could also be the protection of one’s territory, personality, and policy differences, the muddling of the lines between political and administrative arms of the state, policy emptiness and flaws in the policy initiatives, the strategic and operational

policy path of the department was central to the cause of conflicts between them and their Ministers during the period 1996–1998” (2007, p. 154)

The overarching responsibilities of Ministers are those of policy formulation and oversight role of the administration of departments. The DGs must manage the day-to-day functioning of a department, implement the policies, as well as support the Minister in these processes. This separation between policy formulation (political) and implementation (administrative) gives effect to the distinctiveness of their roles. Divergent policy formulation is a function of politicians, as Arnold (1998, p. 279) argued that the elected (politicians) cannot make all policy decisions themselves, they must delegate some of their decision-making authority to administrative officials. Politicians generally seek ways to monitor and control how bureaucrats exercise this authority (Arnold, 1998, p. 279). Several authors also explored the traditional political-administration dichotomy of absolute separation in modern public administration and appreciated that both politicians and administrators are stimulants, strike a balance, and play an overlapping role in the process of policy development leading to duality. The overlapping functions and responsibilities within political administration emphasises that they should work as a unified portion. An acknowledgment that administrators would assist and support the elected in policy formulation and can both oversee the implementation thereof cannot overstated. Maphunye argues in the study of "The South African senior public service: roles and the structure in post1994 departments" (Maphunye, 2001: 316 - 317), both elected political office-bearers and appointed public servants agree that there is an overlap between the "worlds" of the public servant and that of political office bearer. However, the dual level of authority must not overrule administrative supervision and management issues. This would be a recipe for confusion in the allocation of tasks if some responsibilities under the watch of a DG are managed at a political level.

Technically, politics prescribes the goals that the administration needs to attain over time. In South Africa, the DGs must ensure that the goals in the National Development Plan by 2030 are implemented. In August 2019, the President of the country directed the DGs in government departments to strengthen the implementation of the government's plans and refocus their energies on improving the status quo. This would mean that government planning must fully be aligned with the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) and the Provincial Growth and Development Plans (PGDP) being developed by the provinces as well.

To implement the goals envisaged in several country planning processes the Constitution and existing legislation play a pivotal role. Equally, in cases where the Minister and DG disagree on matters with financial inferences, section 64 of the PFMA outlines the process of decision-making. This section sets out that any instruction by an executive authority of a department to the accounting officer of the department having financial implications for the department must be in writing. If there is a likelihood that the implementation of what the Minister ordered will lead to unlawful expenditure, the accounting officer will be answerable for any unauthorised expenditure provided that the accounting officer informed the executive authority in writing of such possibilities of the unauthorised expenditure. Any decision of the executive authority to proceed with the implementation of the directive, and the reasons for the decision, must be in writing, and the accounting officer must promptly file a copy of this document with the National Treasury and the Auditor-General, and if a provincial department is involved, also with the relevant provincial treasury (National Treasury, 2016). The Minister's view will prevail as long as the decision/directive is in writing. Therefore, legislation in South Africa provides a separation of functions for both political heads and administrative heads. Practically, whether this is applied or not is worth exploring. In light of the legislative direction of South Africa, section 1 of this chapter will outline the career incidents, contracts, and appointments of DGs, mandates, functions, roles, and responsibilities given to the three departments selected for this study. An exploration of the existing theoretical frameworks on political-administrative models will be addressed in section 2 of this chapter.

2.2 Career incidents, contracts, and appointments of DGs, mandates, functions, roles, and responsibilities of the selected departments

This section will outline in detail the legislative frameworks governing the public service specifically in the three selected departments, these are the Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC), the Departments of Traditional Affairs, and Human Settlements.

2.2.1 Career incidents of the Directors-General in the Public Service

Once the DG position becomes vacant in any government department, the vacancies are advertised in the public service vacancy circular issued by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) and on external advertisement platforms. In the absence of a DG in a department, the law stipulates that there must be an acting incumbent in the position for not more than six consecutive months. Whether the prescript on acting is implemented or not could

be another debate. They too should undergo a recruitment and selection screening and scrutiny which also include pending disciplinary matters declared by candidates as well as doing business with the state or any other business interests and memberships. In South Africa, a policy of open competition for the recruitment and selection of HoDs and the filling of vacancies thereof is being utilised. The selection panel of a particular DG/HoD usually consists of the EA, which means a Minister in the national government and a MEC in a provincial sphere of government. This arrangement has the potential of politicising these positions of which more neutral panel members could be an option. Chapter 2 of the SMS Handbook outlines the processes to be followed to recruit SMS members. The SMS members are government senior public servants at the levels of Director, Chief Director (CD), Deputy Director-General (DDG) as well as Director-General (DG). Matheson et al (2007) offered criticism that career public servants were historically often not responsive enough to changes in the priorities of their political leaders (Matheson et al, 2007 p. 15). Hood and Peters see the receptiveness to elected officials (politicians) as a broadly authentic way of being accountable to the citizens. The neutral competence of public servants is therefore supplemented by the somewhat contrasting value of responsive competence (Peters, 2004, p. 13). A hybrid approach to the selection process can be used, which consists of a panel selected from the recipients/clients of the department, societal fora/platforms, business units using the service of the department, academia, and politicians. According to the Public Service Act, section 12, sub-sections 1-4, administrative heads are appointed through a cabinet process and when there are disputes between the two parties, the President handles it as the super executive authority as these powers are not currently delegated and the Head of Public Administration has not been fully implemented in SA.

According to the law, the relevant EAs must approach the President as the powers and authority are vested in serving the President to recruit, hire, dismiss, and deal with any other career incidents of the DGs as an overarching EA unless this area is delegated as per the President's discretion.

2.2.2 Management of DG's appointments and performance

Since the appointments of DGs are based on a five-year contract, it has long been an individual threat to their employment security and stability in the Public Service as they may vacate the Public Service without having employment or businesses at their disposal and adding to the pool of unemployment in the country. Shane (2009) argued that in countries like the United

Kingdom (UK), DGs are officials who had successfully managed their businesses and had to pause during their tenure of being a DG and return to business on the expiry of their contracts (Shane, 2009, pp. 141-149). Tenure is defined as “where people with a long career behind them may have had more time to establish a rich network of contact” (Knoke, 1990, pp. 1041-1063). This would eliminate dependency on the government to provide them with lifetime employment even when performance cannot be vouched for. Contrary to the UK context, South Africa does not allow public servants while in employment to have businesses, as per the Public Service Regulations, amended in 2016. It is either employment or business. Furthermore, short-term employment contracts which in some cases are terminated and are shorter than five years have the potential of increasing instability in government. The two studies conducted by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) on *Political Musical Chairs: Turnover in the National Executive and Administration Since 2009* (Van Onselen, 2017, p. 46) and by the Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation on the tenure of DGs for the period 2006/2007 to 2017/2018 (Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, 2018, p. 20) both revealed that instability is common after each election when new EAs start in the respective portfolios. In *Political Musical Chairs* (van Onselen, 2018), it was established that the average amount of time a Minister and DG stay together in a department/ministry is seven months. While these two studies did not necessarily address the typology and characterising most common types of relationships that exist between EAs and DGs, the studies focused on duration, gender comparison, and survival rates which points to the stability or instability thereof.

Subsequently, in his presentation to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG), Prof. Richard Levin, a former DG of the Public Service Commission (OPSC), cited that the recruitment processes for the positions of DGs were not always employing the cream of the crop nor the organisational best-fit candidates as well as the inability of some EAs to manage the performance after employment. He further pointed to issues relating to the post-democratic transition (after 1994) where incumbents assumed that appointments for life were automatic and suggested a move beyond the democratic approach where DGs are appointed on merit and based on their performance rather than political or cadre deployments (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2012, p.1). This suggestion was also emphasised in chapter 13 of the National Development Plan that the country has to move towards meritorious and professional public service.

2.2.3 The employment contracts of the DGs

The DGs are employed on renewable contracts for not more than five years at a time. Before employment expiry, the employer must discuss with the DG whether he/she will be retained or not for at least four calendar months prior, as per section 12 of the Public Service Regulation, 2016 as amended. In consultation with the President, the Minister in the relevant portfolio can extend the term of office. If the employment contract is extended, it must also not exceed the stipulated period of five years.

2.2.4 Legislative mandate and establishment of the South African Public Service Commission

The OPSC was established in terms of the Public Service and Pensions Act, of 1912. In its inception, the OPSC was delegated the necessary powers to provide recommendations to various institutions and public service administrative matters. Just like any other Public Service Commission worldwide, these were ratings to Human Resource (HR) matters including appointments, promotions, and appointments. Over a while structural transformation had to be made, thus, today OPSC's focus shifted more to the requirements of a democratic and constitutional state. These structural changes were due to changes in the political landscape of the country, for example from apartheid (pre-1994) to democratic (post-1994) eras and towards building South Africa into a capable, ethical, and developmental state. Post-1994, the OPSC's role was leaning more on inspections, investigation, monitoring, and evaluation of the public service.

In May 1996, after the end of apartheid, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was adopted and was amended later in the same year. Section 196, sub-section 1-13, indicates the powers, roles, and responsibilities of the OPSC and stipulates that there is a single, independent, and impartial OPSC that must operate without fear, favour, or prejudice to ensure high standards of professional ethics as well as effective and efficient public administration. The OPSC mandate stems from sections 195 and 196 of the South African Constitution and therefore it must promote values enshrined in these sections. These nine democratic values and principles are to ensure that the public administration in all spheres of government has:

- (a) "A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.
- (b) Efficient, economic, and effective use of resources must be promoted.
- (c) Public administration must be development-oriented.
- (d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably, and without bias.

- (e) People's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making.
- (f) Public administration must be accountable.
- (g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible, and accurate information.
- (h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.
- (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation". (Chapter 10, section 195 of the RSA Constitution, 1997).

The Constitution also clearly states that the functioning of the OPSC must not be interfered with, rather state organs should protect their independence, dignity, and impartiality. On an annual basis, the OPSC accounts to the National Assembly for the national sphere of government and the respective legislature in each province. Section 196, sub-section 8 (a) stipulates that five appointed Commissioners are recommended by the committee of the National Assembly while 9 commissioners nominated by the Premiers in respective provinces are recommended by the committees in the provincial legislature which are represented by all parties. In total, there are 14 OPSC Commissioners. Their term of office is five years and is only renewed once after the first term lapses. One of the Commissioners is appointed as a Chairperson of the OPSC, another as Deputy Chairperson, and are both located in the national OPSC Offices. It must be noted that the Commissioners must not be the office bearers of any political party. This restriction is perhaps derived from strengthening the independence of the Commission.

In 1997, the Public Service Act was passed and enacted by the SA Parliament. The act conferred certain powers to the OPSC, to have a specific number of Commissioners appointed by the state President and approved by the National Assembly similarly as prescribed in the Constitution of the Republic. All candidates are invited through a public notice to apply. Section 14 of this act gives provision to the OPSC led by the DG, who is responsible for the administration of the office, subject to the control and directions of the commission.

Chapter 2 of the PSA, 1994 as amended in 2007, re-emphasises the role that must be played by the OPSC in the South African government administration in addition to the powers the OPSC is entrusted with in the constitution. The OPSC may make various recommendations or

give orders on matters concerning personnel practices and employment, grievances of public servants, as well as career incidents and conditions of service in the Public Service. The Commission is provided with powers to do inspections in government institutions has access to such official documents and may obtain such information from HoDs and other employees (Section 5(8) of the Public Service Act, 1994, as amended). The PS's constitutional power to issue directions as contemplated is also outlined in section 196(4)(d) of the Constitution, 1996. It is therefore important that all Ministers and DGs abide by the country's set laws and regulations that govern their roles and responsibilities and ensure that power between the two is appropriately separated to avoid political-administrative power interlacing. Confusion of the roles creates unnecessary tensions and conflicts and disturbs good governance, performance, and service delivery as these suffer the most. The PSC argued that "role confusion and misalignment between the expectations of EAs and strategic goals and objectives of departments undermines the execution of administrative duties and leads to tensions between EAs and HoDs, and further affects the performance of HoDs, the departments and ultimately service delivery" (PSC 2017). The role confusion is also "exacerbated by the Special Advisors to the Ministers, which at times run parallel with those of the HOD" (PSC 2017). The political sphere should not invade its power over the administrative territory.

2.2.5 Roles and responsibilities of the Public Service Commission in South Africa

As envisaged in the Public Service Commission Act and the Constitution of the country, the OPSC has to promote the nine constitutional values and principles that are prescribed by the law to ensure proper governance of the public administration. Therefore, the OPSC must be the custodians of good governance in the field of Public Administration. According to Svara (1985, pp. 221-232), administration refers to the specific decisions, regulations, and practices employed to achieve policy objectives and it is the domain of the bureaucracy. Their role is to investigate, research, monitor, and evaluate personnel practices, and measure the effectiveness and efficiency of public service performance whilst giving directions and recommendations aiming at improved procedural human resource-related matters in government. The OPSC provides recommendations and remedies to executive authorities, the national assembly, as well as relevant legislatures through various OPSC, reports. service.

2.2.6 Structure of the South African Public Service Commission

As per the country's constitution, the OPSC is headed by the Chairperson who has a Deputy Chairperson, nine provincially based (one in each province) Commissioners, and three located in the national office. The OPSC has a DG, like any other government department in South Africa. Unlike other DGs in South Africa who report to the relevant Ministers, the DG: OPSC reports directly to the Chairperson of the OPSC although HOD prescripts must be followed as other DGs in the South African Public Service. The OPSC is responsible for six functional areas which deal with labour relations, leadership, human resource reviews, public administration investigations, and professional ethics as well as governance monitoring. The generic area of the government system is corporate services. There are four deputies (DDGs) to the DG, three responsible for functional branches, and one for corporate services and reporting to the DG.

2.3.1 The legislative mandate of the Department of Traditional Affairs

To understand the unit of analysis (relationships of EAs and DGs) in each of the three departments, it is important to outline and appreciate the role and the mandates of the departments that they are leading. The Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA) derives its mandate from Chapter 12 sections 211- 212 of the South African Constitution requires recognition of the traditional leadership as an institution at a local level, status, and the role of traditional leadership according to customary law. The DTA plays an oversight role on issues related to traditional affairs and supports the development of stable and cohesive interfaith communities. The legislation informing the mandate of the department is that of the Traditional and Kho-San Leadership Act of 2019 and the Commission for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities Act, of 2002 (Act 19 of 2002). Its constitutional mandate is derived from Part A of Schedule 4 of the constitution, which states that indigenous law, customary law, and traditional leadership are functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislation. In 1993 the Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa (Contralesa) participated a great deal in the negotiations leading up to the 1993 Constitution and the 1994 South African elections and was then recognized in the democratic dispensation.

The national framework for traditional leaders originated from the 2003 White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance. The norms and standards in the national framework define the role of traditional leadership in South Africa. Post-apartheid, South Africa needed to acknowledge the role the traditional leadership of South Africa played in shaping and developing the society. Section 25 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 requires that the established commission examines and recommends cases where there is doubt as to whether a kingship, principal traditional leadership, or senior traditional leadership and headman-ship was established following customary law and customs. For instance, the National Khoisan Council aims to unite the Khoisan communities and create a platform through which they can raise issues affecting them as a group of communities. The most important issue is the statutory recognition and inclusion of the Khoisan people in formal government structures. Generally, traditional leaders should restore their people's dignity and improve development in their areas.

As a result, section 183 of the Constitution required the formation of Houses of Traditional Leaders in the various provinces to be an advisory body to the provincial legislature on matters

relating to traditional authorities, indigenous law, customary laws, and general traditions in society.

The Constitution and related legislative frameworks necessitated the establishment of the National House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) to uplift the representativity of traditional leadership and the development of communities. The role of traditional leaders is to promote nation-building; promote peace, stability, and cohesiveness, and to promote the culture and traditions of communities. Due to the legislative powers vested in traditional councils and the stronger voice they may have, partnerships are formed across the government to enhance the level of service delivery.

In essence, there are seven provincial houses of traditional leaders located in the Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, and North West. The two provinces, Gauteng and Western Cape do not have traditional leadership houses. The Gauteng province only has two senior traditional leaders which are less than the threshold of five senior traditional leaders per province required by the Traditional Leaders Act (Act No. 22 of 2009) and the Western Cape has no recognisable senior traditional leadership. Each traditional house must consist of a chairperson of a traditional council or a local house who must be a senior traditional leader, and if he or she is not a senior traditional leader the traditional council or the local house concerned must elect another member who is a senior traditional leader.

2.3.2 Structure of the Department of Traditional Affairs

The focus of this study is only on the relationships between the Minister and the DG in the Department of Traditional Affairs not the DG of the Department of Cooperative Governance. A lack of a well-cultivated relationship between the politicians and administrators appears to be a stumbling block to any government institution's initiatives for design and programme implementation. In all spheres of government, the misunderstanding and mistrust between the political and administrative heads and whether it is between local government councilors and the officials seem to fuel the growing conflicts in several local government authorities (LGAs) in Tanzania (Lyatonga, 2006, p. 30). Leticia (2008) quantifies the tensions existing in the LGAs that have resulted in the suspension and dismissal of some public servants in Mkuranga District, Arumeru District, and Dodoma Municipal Council as well as the dissolving Dar es Salaam City Council in 2002. The relationship of the actors is in the state of association or affiliation depending on the existing or emerging circumstances in the localities. In some cases,

the relationship may be tense to the extent of frustrating the politico-administrative system at the localities. Similarly, to other African countries like Zimbabwe, Tanzania, etc., these tensions have been a matching order even in the South African political-administrative at the local, national, and provincial spheres of governments as well as in state-owned enterprises. In the quest to improve long-standing challenges emanating from apartheid, the SA government enacted various laws, and departments like Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) were established. The department was formed in 2009 and was then named Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and later changed to COGTA. The department politically headed by the Minister of COGTA since 2019. Under the ministry, there are two departments administratively headed by the DG of Cooperative Governance and a DG of the Department of Traditional Affairs. The DG reports directly to the Minister. According to the budget vote number 15 and the strategic plan of the department, it has three programs which include (a) general administration of the department, (b) research, policy, and legislation (c) institutional support and coordination which are led by the deputy DGs. These branches deal with the restoration, stabilisation, and strengthening of traditional leadership, participation of traditional leadership and communities in municipal processes, regulatory environment, sustainable livelihoods in communities, and promote social cohesion and nation-building which are in line with the statutory prescripts (DTA strategic plan, 2020-2025).

2.4.1 Department of Human Settlements Legislative Mandate

The Department of Human Settlements (DHS) is constitutionally enshrined in the Republic of South African Constitution of 1996. It was earlier referred to as the Department of Housing pre- and post-1994. Section 26 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to access adequate housing and shelter as a basic right, "the Constitution". To realise this right, the department must establish and facilitate a sustainable process of housing development in collaboration with municipalities.

The DHS's legislative mandate is to establish and enable a justifiable process of housing advancements in partnership with provinces and municipalities. This mandate is derived from Section 3 of the Housing Act of 1997. Part of the work of the DHS is to set norms and standards for housing and human settlements, develop policies relating to their mandate, and ensure the availability of funding country-wide. In South Africa, a large portion of communities is dominated by informal settlements and people reside in structures that would not necessarily realise the basic right of having a decent shelter. Informal settlements were mostly created by the legacy of

the apartheid regime and urban migration. People had to migrate from under-developed rural areas for greener pastures to urbanised areas. They mostly resided in informal housing structures. Accelerated growth in informal settlements emerged and over the years this created a housing and human settlements backlog. Therefore, the department with relevant municipalities must upgrade and enable integrated human settlements.

In the year 1994 following the inauguration or swearing-in of the democratically elected President, Dr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, a National Housing Accord was signed off by the multi-party non-governmental members who were involved in pre-1994 housing negotiations. During the same year, a white paper on housing was promulgated and emanated from pre-1994 multi-party non-governmental negotiations. The negotiations had members from societal structures including development organisations, communities, businesses, political parties, and government. Upon the development of a South African National Housing Policy, the government considered the resolutions that originated from the negotiations that were held.

Succeeding the housing white paper and the policy, the Housing Act was passed, in 1997 and extended the provisions in the housing white paper and provided a legal foundation for the execution of the government's Housing Programme. The Housing Act aligned the National Housing Policy with the Constitution of South Africa and simplified the roles and responsibilities of the three tiers of government: national, provincial, and municipal or local. In addition, the Housing Act proclaims administrative procedures for the development of the National Housing Policy. Thus, indicating the general principles to be applied by all spheres of government by giving priority to the needs of the poor and consulting meaningfully with communities affected by housing development.

2.4.2 Functioning of the Department of Human Settlements

The mandate of the DHS is to help the construction of sustainable human settlements and the advancement of the quality of household life. The department's role is to regulate, finance, endorse, interconnect, and monitor the implementation of housing and sanitation programs. In its function in all spheres of government, the department establishes a national institutional and funding framework for housing development; negotiates the distribution of the budget for housing development as well as accordingly distributing such funds; prepares and maintains a multi-year housing development plan; evaluates the performance of the housing sector and ensure improved housing development. As indicated in the Housing Act, the DG of human

settlements is responsible for the administration and implementation of housing and human settlements mandates and policies. The DG in the DHS reports to the Minister responsible for that portfolio.

2.4.3 Roles and Responsibilities of the Minister: Human Settlements

Other than the Minister's publication of a code called the National Housing Code, the Housing Act listed in subsections 1 and 2 that a Minister may:

- (a) "establish a national institutional and funding framework for housing development;
- (b) negotiate for the national apportionment of the state budget for housing development;
- (c) prepare and maintain a multi-year national plan concerning housing development;
- (d) allocate funds for national housing programs to provincial governments, including funds for national housing programs administered by municipalities in terms of section 10;
- (e) allocate funds for national facilitative programs for housing development;
- (f) obtain funds for land acquisition, infrastructure development, housing provision, and end-user finance;
- (g) institute and finance national housing programs;
- (h) establish and finance national institutions for housing development, and supervise the execution of their mandate;
- (i) evaluate the performance of the housing sector against set goals and equitableness and effectiveness requirements; and
- (j) take any steps reasonably necessary to create an environment conducive to enabling provincial and local governments, the private sector, communities, and individuals to achieve their respective goals in respect of housing development; and promote the effective functioning of the housing market" (subsection 1 & 2, National Housing Code, 2009).

2.4.4 Roles and responsibility of the Director-General: Department of Human Settlements

Subsection 3 and 5 of the Act stipulates the administrative roles and responsibilities of the DG: Department of Human Settlements as follows:

Subsection 3 of the Housing Act:

- “require any provincial government or municipality to provide any information reasonably required for the data bank or information system and determine the form and manner, and time within, which such information is to be supplied;
- render to provincial governments and municipalities any assistance reasonably required for performing their duties contemplated in the paragraph.
- The DG must establish and maintain a national housing data bank (in this section referred to as the “data bank”) and, associated therewith, a national housing information system and oversee the department to:
 - record information for the development, implementation, and monitoring of national housing policy;
 - provide reliable information to plan for housing development;
 - effectively monitor any aspect of the housing development process;
 - provide macro-economic and other information to integrate national housing policy with macroeconomic and fiscal policy and the coordination of housing development with related activities;
 - serve and promote housing development and related matters; and
 - collect, compile, and analyse categorized data in respect of housing development, including, but not limited to, data categorized according to gender, race, age, and geographical location” (Housing Act 107, 1997).

Subsection 5 of the Housing Act:

- “link the data bank or the information system or both the data bank and information system to any other data bank, information system, or other systems within or outside the public administration;
- subject to other legislation prohibiting or regulating the disclosure of information, limit or refuse access by any person or category of persons to any information in the data bank or information system, or in any part of that bank or system” (Subsection 5, Housing Act 107, 1997).

Good governance practices can carry some contributions to reducing the challenges emanating from the relationships between Ministers and DGs by ensuring collective decisions and monitoring political and administrative executive actions. Fukuyama defines “governance as a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not”. He further cited two practices of quality governance which are the capacity of the state and bureaucratic autonomy (Fukuyama, 2013, 347-349).

The use of good governance and leadership has proven a crucial accomplishment of organisations. Therefore, understanding the roles and responsibilities of Ministers and DGs, the mandates, and the functioning of the departments they work for is important to avoid the intertwining of such functions which would assist in lessening the tensions that exist.

2.5 Background and Significance

According to Steytler and de Visser (2009, p. 21), “[p]olitical instability has long been shown to create administrative instability”. South African government institutions experienced instability at political levels that caused administrative disorder and fragmentation. This has been observed with changes at DG levels when there is a new minister. The review of the Public Service Laws Amendments Act 86 of 1998 at the time was expected to stimulate more stability in the public service. The review led to the removal of authority to appoint and dismiss Directors-General from the Ministers to the President. The premise of various media reports (e.g. BusinessTech, News24, Daily Maverik) showed that even though the President is the only responsible executive authority to hire and fire DGs, at times Ministers, and DGs find themselves in serious disagreements. Historically, political and administrative conflicts affected the relationships between Ministers and DGs. Further, countless times, political reshuffles and constant deployments could cause instability and in worst-case scenarios administrative interruptions in government. This means that frequent changes in the political stratum led to some of the heads of departments moving to different strategic positions than the ones they currently occupy which creates unstable institutions. However, this process must be done in a meaningful way to avoid possible conflicts. More often in South Africa, relationships between political and administrative heads are not necessarily characterised, or described and their features are blurred. This is explicitly discussed in the literature review. Thus, this study attempted to guide possible policy development and implementation gaps in existing prescripts as well as contribute to academic knowledge gaps that continue to occur.

The political-administrative dichotomy as elucidated in the NDP embraces that political interference in administration generates unevenness in performance and would create tensions and poor relations in the political-administrative interface, instability in administrative leadership levels, then the erosion of accountability and authority (Hartigh, 2011, p. 365). Political stability has been proven to be one of the variables that can shape the country’s economic development and administrative performance (Milio, 2008, p. 920). A politically stable environment has five characteristics: the absence of violence, the length of government, the survival of a legitimate constitutional administration, the absence of structural change, and a multifaceted social attribute (Dowding & Kimber, 1983, p. 240).

Stability in administrative levels of government is equally vital. This was supported by Henri Fayol, a French business executive, who created and recognised fourteen administrative management principles of stability of tenure, in his book *Industrial and General Administration* (Fayol, 1916, p. 59). He emphasised that for an institution to operate effortlessly and free of conflict, personnel, particularly at the managerial level, must not frequently enter and exit the organisation. This requires organisations to develop strategies and systems that limit instability as much as possible.

The study of public bureaucracy views the relationship between political and bureaucratic executives as one of a principal and agent or master and servant. A political head exercises control over the head of a department as a subordinate (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 180). The theory of principal-agent uses a hierarchical relationship and is of the view that the principal does not have the time and technical knowledge to do the task and, therefore delegates it to an agent.

This was further supported by Max Weber's bureaucratic theory and political power which describes how political power allows the strong to dominate, influence the weak, and the superior rank on the ladder possessing the greatest power (Weber, 1998, p. 15). According to Gert & Mills, "the lowest layers of administrative organisational structures are always subjected to the supervision and control of higher layers" (Gerth & Mills, 2014, p. 236). The findings will confirm or disconfirm this notion by theorists on whether hierarchy dictates how power relations are managed.

Cariño (2001, p. 1057) also derived types of authority models within the political-administrative realms and these are regime-dominant, bureaucratic co-primacy, authoritarian regime, and the fourth model is a combination of the authoritarian regime model and bureaucratic co-primacy. Similar to other authors, Peters (2001, p. 156) designed five models of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats which will be analysed in detail in this study. These are formal-legal, village life, functional, adversarial, and administrative states and will be mapped, applied, and discussed in detail on how these apply in the South African context using three national departments, namely, Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs, and Office of the Public Service Commission.

2.6 Literature Review

Although research on relationships between politicians and administration dates back over a decade, less research clearly describes the types of relationships between Ministers and DGs, specifically in the South African context. This study described five possible kinds of relationships linked to Ministers and DGs using the Peters Model. Maserumule (2002) cited conflicts that existed between Ministers and the DGs since the beginning of the democracy which may have led to a high turnover rate. He argued that tensions between Directors-General and Ministers were propagated. Firstly, it was postulated that during the first phase of transformation, from 1994 to 1995, “conflicts between DGs and Ministers were largely occasioned by their different and contrasting political orientations and approaches to issues of public administration”. Secondly, it was hypothesised that conflicts during the period 1996-1998 were caused largely by the “introduction of the new model for state administration, which gave DGs more latitude and extensive power in terms of the management of their departments, in a policy vacuum”. Thirdly, it was postulated that conflicts between Directors-General and their Minister were and are still caused mainly by the “contradictory nature of policies regarding the management of the public service” (Maserumule, 2002, p.162). However, the reasons for the conflicts remain academically unclear but rather postulative. There are also no visibly defined laws that stipulate how these relationships should be shaped to avoid such conflicts. Researchers undertook various studies concerning the political-administrative interface. The theoretical frameworks and models are discussed as follows.

2.7.1 Theoretical framework of political-administration relationship models

A significant theme in the political-administrative interface is tension and problems between Ministers and heads of departments. A fundamental feature of this is the balance between political control and professional autonomy. According to Svara (2001), “bureaucratic autonomy is feared by critics of the administrative state, who argue that administrators are self-controlling and advance agency interests rather than the public interest. In both situations, either the level of control or independence is extreme, and the key reciprocating value is not present: Politicians do not respect administrators, or administrators are not committed to accountability” (Svara, 2001, p. 179). While political heads should be able to control administrative heads, they must be able to strike a balance between the allocated roles and responsibilities without crossing any boundaries. It is anticipated that the appointed administrators should have substantial professional autonomy and serve the government diligently irrespective of political heads entering and leaving spheres of government or even in cases where political and administrative heads belong to the same or different political parties, administrative continuity, and competence will still be essential. Institutions require more managerial autonomy instead of more policy autonomy and managerial accountability should be strengthened without weakening political accountability (Laegreid, 2014, p. 230).

Below are four relationship models derived from Cariño’s pieces of literature comprising a *regime-dominant model*, *bureaucratic co-primacy*, *authoritarian regime model*, and a fourth, which is a *combination of the authoritarian regime model and bureaucratic co-primacy (hybrid type)*. Certain observations were identified through Cariño’s (2001) work which presented significant observations at a country level:

- 1) a government’s commitment to democracy to a large extent determines its mode of interaction and attitude toward bureaucracy;
- 2) regime changes even for a short while placing the bureaucracy in a vulnerable position; and
- 3) a well-institutionalised bureaucratic system is capable of getting out of the vulnerable position unless modified in an abrupt, dramatic, or disruptive way.

In the conversation that follows, some indicators are drawn between country models that would characterise the unstable and stable political systems and the kind of relationships. An attempt is made to suggest how certain regimes at a country level can affect types of relationships. The

relationships and the stability in each country model will be judiciously linked to Peters's five models which are also discussed in detail in the section following Carino's model. The following models would assist in plotting where South Africa would fit any of the model descriptions and if certain types of relationships are permissible in the specific model as outlined below:

2.7.1.1 Regime-dominant model

A regime is usually defined as “a set of formal or informal rules and norms determining how politics works in a specific country and government refers to a group of people and the country's central political institutions who control a country, which is usually divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches”. According to Cariño, a regime-dominant model entails high political control over administration. A regime-dominant model is where “political leadership completely controls the public service” (Cariño, 2001, p. 1057). The division and balance between political and administrative powers, the internal administrative divisions and structures, the degrees of devolution, and the forms of participation are subject to political decisions (Kickert, 2005, p. 178). In a regime-dominant state, Ministers in a lawfully chosen government have an authentic right “to control their government's organisation and reduce deflection from their policy direction”. (Peters et al, 2004, p. 20), administration implements what political authority decides. This regime resonates very well with Peters's formal-legal pattern of interaction where the administrative head agrees with the political head, “Yes Minister”. This regime is characterised by political organisations that have continually won elections and its future loss is unlikely overpowered in the predictable future. Many African countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ghana.) fit this description. Even though South Africa is characterised by a multi-party system, only the ruling party is dominant and directs the political system, and is firmly in control of state power. This results in power concentrated in a single party that enjoys the monopoly of power through the exclusion of other parties. Dominant regimes display characteristics that portray the tendency to rule until Jesus comes (long term). This was alluded (verbatim) to by one member within the current political. Dominant and long-term leaders exhibit a political landscape where there is widespread corruption and rivalry within the party leads to factions. Further to this, the weakness and ineffectiveness of the opposition become visible. The public institutions and leadership thereof are weak and unstable. These public institutions are characterised by erosion of administrative power, poor relations between the politics and administration, impairment of social and economic performance as well blurry interface between the party and the state. Once these elements and weak opposition surface in a dominant regime, the citizens lack choices then the fear of the unknown and uncertainties emerge. The


citizens may be left with little or no option but to elect the same dominant party over decades. Over time, the abuse of political power turns out to be the matching order of the day. Many writers may be preoccupied with the dominant regime and omit to raise critical questions and pinpoint the actual danger of this kind of regime. In these kinds of states, there is no assurance that power will be balanced, rather exclusively earmarked for the politicians. In their study on political-administrative relations, Schreurs et al, (2011) pointed out that in political dominance, politicians are very powerful and dictate everything to be done. This would imply that “administrative independence is low, because of the close watch of the political executive in the administration and the strict instructions they offer hence high political control”. The political dominance that results from “high political control and low administrative independence is the condition that has been attacked by reformers from the progressive era to the present because they were concerned for the loss of administrative competence and the potential for political corruption” (Svara, 2002, pp.176-183).

Weber, as quoted by Brennan (2020, p. 78) in his book, *Power and Social Stratification*, indicated that the ultimate goal of regime dominance is to influence the distribution of power among groups within the state. One of the characteristics of this model is the abuse of power that manifests itself in various forms, such as taking advantage of an individual/s, or institutions, or accessing information, which is not necessary to be known by the public and used for the benefit of individuals or personal gain. The inverse may be similar as Weber pointed out the danger that career public servants (administration) might also dominate politicians over their greater knowledge, technical know-how, and lengthier experience compared to regularly changing Ministers. Regime dominance possesses the characteristics of political dominance. According to the Svara (2002) complementarity model when there is political dominance in the case of high political control there is always low administrative independence. He then endorses the notion of politicians respecting administrative competence and that administrators should be committed, responsible, and receptive. The diagram illustrates the importance of Svara’s complementation values that set the level of administrative independence and power. In his teachings, it is pertinent that no one should dominate or overpower the interface. The patterns of interaction are also briefly discussed in section 2.9. The figure below shows Svara’s four combination levels of complementarity as follows:

- “Separate roles with the subordination of administrators to politicians and separate roles and norms.

- Autonomous administrators when administrators are involved in the policy role, whereas politicians are separated from the administrative role.
- Responsive administrators when administrators are subordinates to politicians and political norms dominate over administrative norms.
- Overlapping roles when reciprocal influence exists between elected officials and administrators and they share the roles” (Svara, 1999, p. 176) and is outlined in Figure 1 below.

2.7.1.1.1 Figure 1: Complementarity values



2.7.1.2 The bureaucratic co-primacy model

The bureaucratic co-primacy model refers to “a democracy dominated by bureaucracy due to its expertise, permanence, and institutionalisation” (Cariño, 2001, p. 1060). According to Laski (1921, p. 5), bureaucracy refers to “a system of government, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardises the liberties of ordinary citizens”. Such a regime is characterised by an appetite for repetitive administration tasks to the detriment of flexibility to rule, slow-paced decision-making as well as an inability to embark upon experiments. In the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, there is visibly reduced control of politicians over bureaucrats and towards “administration dominance”. This model can be aligned with two of Peters's interaction patterns which are the adversarial” model meaning that the bureaucrat will say “No Minister” and the second that would fit perfectly with this model is “administrative state” which is predominantly administrative dominance. Conflicts are bound to happen due to bargaining for power which may even lead to instability in the institutions they lead. Weber argued that “bureaucracy and the administrative body of appointed officials constitute the most efficient and rational way in which human activity can be organised. The systematic processes and organised hierarchies are necessary to maintain order, maximise efficiency, and eliminate favouritism” (Weber, 1998, pp. 287-292). Certain democratic fundamentals can still be pragmatic in authoritarian regimes in the same way as authoritarian tendencies can be identified even in the supposedly most democratic regimes. For this model, bureaucracy becomes supreme in decision-making processes, accuracy, permanency, discipline, and dependability. In the quest to oppose this view, administrative decision-making processes should not only be taken in boardrooms while leaving the rest of the citizens behind. The decisions must consider people’s needs and improve lives. Although only certain elements of this regime may apply in the South African context, administrators may not necessarily be provided autonomous space by political principals to dominate the bureaucracy given their technical expertise. In so doing, the Director-General may sometimes even sabotage or “resist implementation of policies or programs that impede their survival and contradict their individual preferences”, Ndletyana, 1999 as quoted by (Maserumule, 2007, pp. 147-164). The bureaucratic co-primacy captures the European tradition (e.g., Germany, the Nordic countries, etc.), with an extremely strong bureaucracy and only very few political appointments in each department (e.g., Minister and deputy Minister or Minister advisor/spokesperson). Bureaucratic co-primacy captures European tradition, Germany and the Nordic countries, etc. This mode

comprises an extremely strong administration and only one or two political appointments in each department (e.g., Minister and deputy Minister or Minister advisor/spokesperson). The European tradition, (Germany, the Nordic countries, etc.) with an extremely strong bureaucracy and only one or two political appointments in each department (e.g., Minister and deputy Minister or Minister advisor/spokesperson) can be considered a bureaucratic co-primacy model, which is the complete opposite of South Africa. The political pronouncement impersonates what the administration decides. This regime can be tied perfectly at a unit (individual) level with the “administrative state model” (Peters, 1987) discussed in the next section, where the administration has a strong leading role in government and is a perfect match with administrative dominance.

Although the Weberian model, strongly advocates for absolute separation of powers, Svava (2001) confidently believes that the bureaucrats and politicians decide together in a reciprocal exchange process. This is referred to as the “complementarity model” bureaucracy legitimates what the political elites decide. Although politicians have still a dominant position, the bureaucracy just legitimises political decisions, being not able to implement them. As seen in the above diagram, the pattern is called “laissez-faire” (Svava, 2001, p. 4). The “live and let live” attitude characterises the political administrative systems, in which bureaucracy is not able to autonomously organize itself and the highly fragmented and unstable executive cannot rely on a government majority, which makes it possible for effective political control of the bureaucracy.

Weber viewed the bureaucracy model as an epitome to which government institutions should aspire given the corrupt and unethical behaviours of leaders that had been seen worldwide. Weber argued that organisational leadership must be proficient in the tasks to be done and have impersonal relationships which must be characterised by order, consistency, reason, and reliability. He argued that organisational leadership should be tantamount to task proficiency and impersonal relationships.

2.7.1.3 An authoritarian regime

A third model that Cariño derived was the authoritarian regime model, which suggests that bureaucrats find very little room to maneuver. As a political regime, authoritarianism is an undemocratic regime that can be defined as “a form of government that dominates authority over the government without guaranteeing any political diversity or defense of civil freedoms and with little or no responsibility to the population” (Cariño, 2001, pp. 1053-1064). This form of regime does not possess democratic legitimacy nor convey characteristics of democracy. It represents autocratic rule which has been especially distinguished from totalitarian regimes (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956, p. 70). According to Linz (2000, p. 68), authoritarian regime typologies are racial and ethnic democracies, bureaucratic-military, authoritarian corporatism, incomplete totalitarian and pre-totalitarian regimes mobilising postcolonial, and post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes. These are characterised by the power concentrated within a single ruler or group and civil institutions are weak. This kind of political regime has a probability that a model that its leaders possess without any involvement of the people may overpower all human rights and is a complete contradiction to what a democratic regime signifies. Through opposing this regime as a researcher, it should be denounced that authoritarians lack consultative ability before decisions are taken and implemented which may create potential conflict. The authoritarian regime was experienced in some African countries and all over the world. To mention but a few countries such as Zimbabwe for many years during President Mugabe’s tenure, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, North Korea, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Some of the political leaders in an authoritarian regime are dictators and can sometimes be considered to rule for a very long term. At any level, be it a country or individual level, an authoritarian regime can be viewed as autocratic. Therefore, some autocrats rule for so long that they are feared even after their death and others remain in the institutional structure of authoritarian regimes (Ginsburg & Moustafa, 2008, p. 20-34). Rule by law: the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarians hold power and develop policies without considering people’s needs and interests and without the consent of the people that they rule. However, it must be acknowledged that leaders like Kagame in Rwanda and Meles in Ethiopia fall within the benevolent autocrats which are seen as “leaders in non-democratic polities who receive credit for high growth” (Easterly, 2011, p. 1). Power-sharing between the political and administrative heads can be complicated as dictators can be highly dominant and possess more power at the cost of administration. Indoctrination and winning support from certain individuals. However, there is barely any effort to provide for the interests of the vast majority. In this

regime, it may be almost impossible to separate politics and the proper functioning of administration due to dictators would prefer to preserve their interests. In an authoritarian policy trail, political leaders such as representatives from the policy and the state historically control policy-making. This supremacy in policy-making is guided by socio-technical and socio-language chronicles that legitimate the control of state institutions. The recruitment of new members of the elite is controlled by politicians and it can easily be predictable who will be the next cohort of leaders. While from a normative perspective, the recruitment process for administrators can be unjust and inequitable, this predictability of recruitment can ensure long-term stability as power is passed from one generation to another. For example, because a military regime will most likely involve military personnel in higher political positions, citizens who aim to hold political offices will need to enter the military and pursue a military career (Hernandez, 2021, p.175). In racial and ethnic democracies (e.g., apartheid South Africa), belonging to the ruling racial or ethnic group ensures access to political offices. The stakes of having the so-called *formal-legal* relationships of which patterns of the political-administrative interface are construed to only saying “yes Minister” and conforming to Ministerial demands.

2.7.1.4 An authoritarian and bureaucratic co-primacy combination

Lastly, an *authoritarian and bureaucratic co-primacy* hybrid model suggests that since bureaucrats assume less explicitly subordinate roles, they remain very close to authoritarian leadership. This model is more portrayed in military and civilian environments. This model is a combination of the second and third models described above. Several types of political systems have done so, including despotic monarchies, militarist regimes, and other authoritarian and totalitarian systems. An authoritarian or dictatorship occurs through a slow, steady, and above all legal process of suspending democratic procedures. The role of the bureaucracy becomes different when bureaucrats together with other societal groups look inside the barrel of a gun. With an aggrandizing strategy, the new authoritarian leadership cannot dispense of the bureaucracy; bureaucracy becomes an indispensable tool for advising on and formulating legislation as well as designing and implementing policies to strengthen the legitimacy of the new ruler (Weber, 2017 p. 256). The combination of these models can relate well with the village and functional close patterns of interaction. The term “village” does not denote the cooperative relationships in small communities, but the fact that politicians and administrators together form a padlocked communal interaction. Members of this community are the elites of the society; they share norms and values because they have common goals (Peters, 1995). The political-administrative relations can be characterised by power sharing in the formulation and implementation of policies. They work collaboratively to achieve government priorities and the goals of the institution they are serving. Mutual trust is one of the features of the relationship (Hood & Lodge, 2006): without mutual trust and respect there can be no fruitful cooperation. In the combined regime there is not necessarily a sharp separation of roles. Due to cooperative relations, trust, mutual respect, communication, and fewer intrusions, slight or no conflicts then stability at an individual organisational level may transpire.

2.7.2 A South African regime: A comparison with Cariño’s regime typologies

None of Cariño’s regime typologies illustrates South Africa in a perfect scenario. The models are Weberian ideal types, which means we are highly unlikely to find perfectly matching cases. A democratic regime exists in South Africa and obviously, any regime has its pros and cons. In a democratic regime, both political and administrative heads are elected in powerful portfolios and positions and require them to exercise power respectively. To ensure the proper functioning of each department, the power they possess would be evenly distributed to avoid single power.

The political sphere of government, in most democratic political arrangements, is supposed to animate policymaking and establish the agenda for public sector action. On the other side of this bargain are public administrators who are meant to provide continuity, expertise, and, loyalty in both the advice they provide to politicians and the service they provide when implementing public policies (Peters, 2001, p. 1). In the traditional conception of the relationships between political heads and administrators accept their seemingly inferior position in government in return for a secure career, interesting opportunities to shape policies, and protection against personal blame for policy failures (Schaefer, 1973, pp. 444-447). Both heads would have a particular role to play politically or administratively. (Svara 1999, p. 676) calls this a complementarity model. He argued that “complementarity recognises the interdependence and reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators”. They all have to acknowledge the importance of shared responsibility which is commonly regarded as having the possibility to address accountability gaps in situations of determined action. He further argued that the “elected officials and administrators maintain distinct roles based on their unique perspectives and values and the differences in their formal positions, but the functions they perform unavoidably overlap” (Svara, 1999, p. 676). Complementarity can also be an alternative precisely in a democratic regime to ensure that no single individual receives absolute power over the governing process. This may be beneficial to citizens as it will be difficult for politicians and administrators to pursue their interests. Democracy has never been about the individual absolute power and dictatorship, but about serving the interests of the people. In a democratic rule, the interpersonal and institutional relationships should characterise the capabilities of the elected to control their people’s government (Rose, 1976 p. 94). Various kinds of democracies exist and one can be pastoral where the state is dominated by politicians and no state, feuds, attacks, counter-attacks no inclusivity, and dominated by chaos. The citizens have the power to vote the politicians/rulers in or out of any government through the democratic election process, therefore, they should have the power to ensure their wishes are realised in the democratic country they envisaged. At a country level, the democratic dispensation is also not free of conflicts due to many disagreements that range from pursuing own interests, corrupt acts, abuse of power, contestation for political or administrative positions, etc. Although regimes employ different tactics for power, management of tensions and conflicts, decision-making processes, and stability within institutions, it must be noted that democratic regimes are better options for many countries worldwide compared to the regimes discussed above. This regime promotes human values, and assurance of human rights, contests inequalities that may exist, discourages any form of discrimination, and gives rights to freedom, transparency, etc. Many countries in the world opted for this regime and some feature in the top ten democratic indexes.

These are Norway, Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, and others. According to Ivaro (2019), South Africa remains a “flawed democracy” due to its weaknesses in governance, underdeveloped political culture, and low levels of political participation, and ranked 39 out of 165 states. ‘Flawed democracies have more substantial issues, such as low levels of political participation or problems in how the society and institutions are governed, though they still meet the basic requirements of free elections and respect for civil liberties’ (Ivaro, 2019, p. 38). The repercussion of this argument is that a flawed democracy has negative impacts on the relationships of political and administrative heads as well as affecting relations in general. According to Grenier, a true democracy has been a struggle over the years in countries like Mexico and there is widespread concern about “the lack of a true democracy” (Grenier, 2004, p. 137). Gault and Klinger (2004) characterise the situation in Mexico since the 1920s as a one-party system with, in addition, power strongly centralized in the executive branch. Philip (2003) differentiates three phases: pre-1994 as authoritarian; 1994 to 2000 as democratisation; and from 2000 on as a democratic phase. This successful democratisation has been strengthened by the reform of the public service in 2003. Before the reforms, the upper level of the bureaucracy comprised about 2 700 political appointees, with connections. The President chose his cabinet secretaries and they would choose their immediate subordinates, who would then select theirs. High-level bureaucrats belonged to groups of allies known as “camarillas”, bureaucratic politicians who moved from one short-term posting to another, building their career on political stances.

2.8 Relationships on authority and implication model

The models discussed above can generate any type of relationship that may be executed by a certain level of cooperation between public servants and their political masters as described by Peters (2001) in his five authority and implication model which are discussed below: South Africa may require a hybrid approach to these models as none of these may perfectly fit the descriptions.

2.8.1 Formal-legal relationship

The *formal-legal* relationship model reveals an interaction in which the bureaucratic policy-making role is reduced to saying, “yes Minister”. This model is similar to the agency theory that calls for a relationship between principals and agents in which one party (principal) determines the work and another party (agent) performs or makes decisions on behalf of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 90). In some relationships of “yes Minister”, the merits or demerits of the Ministerial demands may not necessarily be properly weighed before being agreed upon. This model necessitates political and administrative levels to have roles and responsibilities that are visibly stated, and the administrator is seen to be the dependable and mechanical implementer of policies premeditated and decided by politicians. Not enough space is created for bureaucrats to deliver functional responsibility while retaining political responsibility in the domain of elected political executives carried through by this model. Political decisions always win over administrative decisions and administrators are controlled by politicians. The formal-legal model is designed in such a manner that the politics and administration are distinctively separated. The role of the public servant is merely to follow the orders of the politician. This model is more aligned with the views of the earliest theorists Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber, which are far-fetched in inadequacy and insufficiency to be applied in today’s public administration as it requires more attention to intertwine administration with politics.

The political-administrative landscape in countries suits the formal-legal model in which the role of the public servant in policy-making is concentrated on saying “Yes, Minister” (Peters, 1987, p. 259). In this setting, political executives are solely responsible for policy formulation and public servants for the implementation of policy programmes (Brans & Hondeghem, 1999, p. 69). Therefore, this can be entrenched in civil service behaviours and role classifications. The public service is characterised by neutral servants of the state and displays a technocratic orientation and dismissal of partisan loyalty (Dierickx, 2004, p. 178). With the widespread informal politicisation and the bigger the size of politicians within the administration, the political agenda supersedes the administrative arena. The number of political executives is great, and the backgrounds and careers of public servants and politicians are distinct. Belgian Ministers are primarily generalists who do not see themselves as managers of their departments, but rather as representatives of their parties and electorates. Belgian public servants communicate with their political masters via Ministerial cabinets, which allows them only little use of their traditional base of power (expertise and experience). The significance of Belgium perspective is

that other public services can learn from it, depoliticised public administration and power relations minimised. According to Dierickx “Ministerial cabinets function as shadow administrations, which severely diminishes the policy role of the administration. The civil service culture kept public servants out of the political arena” (Dierickx, 2004, p. 180). Mutual mistrust between Ministers and their spoils on one side as well as those of the top public administrators has so far caused a breakdown in conceiving political-administrative relations beyond the formal legal model. This model can be associated with the authoritarian and regime dominant model discussed below as it is characterised by the strong political atmosphere and lines of communication may be only top-down approach and can be understood to be more vertically integrated.

2.8.2 The village life

The second model of the relationship between the bureaucrats and the political executives is the “*village life*” model. In this model, both senior bureaucrats and political executives comparatively have similar values and goals and ensure the well-functioning machinery of government and its executive branches. The village life model mirrors the pattern where politicians and bureaucrats form an elite with parallel standards. In their own right, they help to strengthen the stability of the government and governance processes. The decisive obligation for a specific department’s performance lies with both the political and head administrative heads, individually and collectively. Both political and administrative heads collectively should not be in battle over power within the government set-up but should rather unite the government and negotiate when there is a possibility of conflict to reach a common goal. This model (village life) distinguishes the politicians and public administrators as affiliates of the integrated state elite without severe core conflict and no one is expected to be a conqueror. Both are at the same level of understanding and good cooperation which may lead to long-term good relations and will maintain stability in any structure. This model is mostly applied in the developed British countries and some pockets in South Africa. Peters’ (1987) village models are built on collaboration, teamwork, and assurance between politicians and administrative heads of government.

Most developed European countries suggest that relationship realism within the central administration tends to follow Peters’ village models because of the cooperation needs among the Ministers and administrative executives. A good illustration of this kind of intersectional cooperation is contemporary strategic planning in government in which the politicians and

highest public administrators have their specific cooperative roles. On the one hand, senior public administrators function as gatekeepers regarding information and scrutiny in the upright and parallel strategic procedures of the administration fundamentals. They strive to collaborate in working as a team with their superiors (Ministers), however, their involvement is obligatory to reach actual results. Alternatively, the Ministers are the doorkeepers in approving or rejecting the proposals of the highest public administrators. Both the Ministers and the DGs need each other to a substantial extent so that there is a compulsory confidence hypothesis. This hypothesis will determine a point of estimation on the extent to which they can interact as they are both leaders in their respective spaces. Paradoxically, both partners “believe that they are in a leading position and sovereign partners in strategic procedures” (Tiili, 2007 & Puoskari, 2002). Tiili (2007) has established the analysis by presenting empirical results that indicate that the “management reforms aimed at introducing the strategic role of politicians have not been a success. This is not a surprise as politicians do not follow the logic of rational managerial models. Politicians are not eager to define goals and to set out priorities, nor are they motivated to consider issues that are not realised in the immediate future” (Tiili, 2007, p. 93).

2.8.3 Functional model

Another model is called the “*functional*” model which foresees public administration and political executives developing closer relationships. This usually happens when both parties serve in the same functional or sectorial areas such as legislative committees or even political branches. These kinds of relationship ties may collude in certain decision-making processes, this then may require leaders who would be able to properly manage such interactions. In the functional model often sometimes referred to as Functional close, “political and administrative careers are more or less integrated, outside interests will influence internal decision-making, and sectoral identities develop, implying that politicians and administrators in one ministry may unite in conflicts against other parts of the state administration.

The functional model can be comparable to the village life model, but the combination of actors is efficient, uniting the various actors in certain policy areas, regardless of their status. This functional group has little or no connections outside”. There is no dominant actor in this model, it is a win-win situation in any decision-making process. Because the same values, ideas, and vision are shared and there is less room for instability. Good conflict-resolution strategies have been shared on both sides. Interactions are based on the expertise of each actor either politically or administratively. The political-administrative formation in the Scandinavian

countries also tends to generate discrete functional communities within government, each with a robust relationship to supportive interest groups. While the village life conception conceptualizes government as a single entity, the "Functional Village Life" model considers government divided among many competing policy sectors. Within each sector, there may be a good deal of integration but across those policy areas, there may be more competition than cooperation. The competition is over budget and control of the policy area.

The idea is that government organisations tend to reflect societal interests and that organisations in the public sector, even if they are deemed to represent the interests of the public as a whole, also represent the interests of their immediate constituents. For example, in the United States (US), the structure of agencies and departments is very much influenced by the power of interest groups and reinforced by a committee structure in Congress so that the US may have many governments, but often seemingly no single government (Majone, 1997, p. 139). The relationship between the politically appointed Ministers in Hungary for instance can be classified as a "functional-close model" (Verheijen, 2001, p. 154). This model is also applicable in South Africa and its significance can be seen in the results of this study.

2.8.4 Adversarial model

The "adversarial model" is the fourth which is the opposite of the formal-legal model and contrary to village life and function. It can also be viewed as a less cooperative type of relationship between the two public executives. Interactions in this model can be viewed as hostile. Due to the hostility of the environment, there is a huge possibility of instability. The adverse model visualises an existence of a substantial conflict, but still unsettled between politicians and bureaucrats. This kind of relationship model assumes that political and administrative executives are competitors as they continue to struggle for political, and administrative power and control over functions and policy. In the adversarial model, the administrator's and politicians' dominance is a battled field in the policymaking process. The linkages can be made with the bureaucratic co-primacy model discussed below. The adversarial model is mostly characterised by senior public administrators' ability to take charge and say, "No Minister" when it is necessary to do so. This can also be portrayed by complete silence on the side of the administrative head while continuing to do what is best for the administrative bureaucracy to obtain the legislative mandate of government. Contextually, in SA the adversarial model would not work well given the power vested in Ministers.

2.8.5 Administrative State

In addition to formal legal, functional, adversarial, and village life, the “*administrative state*” model reflects the observation that bureaucracy should dominate governments in policy processes. Peters introduces it as a model of an administrative state, where “bureaucracy has dominated the pattern of relations with at least some acceptance by politicians” and undertakes a strong separation between politicians and administration. The administration becomes a strong part and is the victor due to the belief that Ministers are not experts and may struggle to understand policy complexities. In the administrative state model, the dissimilarities may be that the politicians have either excellently abandoned their powers to the administrative heads which could be due to the administrative expertise they possess. The more knowledgeable in technical content the administrative head is the more administrative dominance their interactions. More often than not, administrative dominance happens when the political executive lacks specialised education that would be backing structures such as Ministerial cabinets, committees, advisory fora, etc.

The upsurge of the administrative state model is rife in governments specifically when the administrative heads are political loyalists. This also happens if the administrative head is in a higher position than their Ministers within political ranks or branches. Another scenario is that the administrator drafts acts, bills, and regulations, makes policy proposals, and reviews and responds to parliamentary questions, this would also lead any government to an administrative state if the Minister is not properly acquainted with the subject matter. Hansen & Ejersbo (2002) argued Weber’s work that the “division of labour between politicians and bureaucrats would work best when there is a clear distinction between the two sets of actors.” (Hansen, & Ejersbo, 2002, p. 745) He viewed administrators as influential and technical expert advisors who remain subordinate to politicians. He saw “neutral competence” as a defining factor of an administrator. Conflicts are resolved by a virtual abdication of power by the politician in favour of bureaucracy (Peters, 1987, p. 267). The way tensions are resolved there may be no space for instability within this model. For example, Svara (1999) vouched for the complementarity model emphasises corporation, interdependency, collaboration, and reciprocal stimulus amongst elected and appointed officials (Svara, 1999, p. 676). The complementary model would improve the relationships between the Ministers and DGs due to its complementarity when both control and independence are high for both. None of the two dominates. Below Svara’s complimentary model is outlined in table 2.10.1 which depicts how these relationship types are analysed in a regime-dominant model that may be applied in South Africa.

2.9 Complementarity of politics and administration

In pursuit of complementarity between the two actors, Svava (2001) indicated that politicians and bureaucrats should play complementary roles in accomplishing public service and democratic goals became clear. He further postulated that the complementary relationship between politicians and administrators is not new since the relationship is recognised under all forms of administrative models. As speculated by Svava, it is “a deeply rooted model that continues to evolve” (Svava, 2001, p. 180). It is documented as a phenomenon embedded in the US administrative system. Therefore, the US comprises “a system of bureaucratized politics and politicized administration” (Aberbach and Rockman, 1997, p. 325). As Svava (2001) puts it, “Partisan politics are prohibited to public administrators, while elected officials are not allowed to interfere with the daily routines of management. However, when it comes to policy and administration issues, the interaction supports overlapping roles, reciprocal influence, and mutual admiration between elected and administrative officials” (Svava, 2001, p. 179-80).

Svava (1999) also postulated that,

the “complementarity model distinguishes the interdependence and mutual influence between elected officials and administrators. The politicians and administrators maintain distinct roles based on their unique perspectives and values and the differences in their formal positions, but the functions they perform inevitably connect complementarity entailing ongoing interaction, reciprocal influence, and mutual admiration between elected officials and administrators. Administrators help to shape policy, and they give it specific content and meaning in the process of implementation. Elected officials oversee implementation, probe specific complaints about poor performance, and attempt to correct problems with performance through fine-tuning” (Svava, 1999, p. 676).

However, the intermix between politics and administration must not be inflated as an alternative. There must be limits on the level of administration involved in the legislative activities as well as parameters in political sphere participation in bureaucracy matters. The interaction at both levels is common during the policy formulation and implementation.

Svara (1999) developed other typologies of the relationships between politicians and public managers which would connect in a form of close collusion with Peters's (2001) relationship patterns. Specifically, the “village and functional models” as these two models call for collaboration, cooperation, shared values, and goals as both need each other and cannot work in isolation. In his early studies, the author adopted a dichotomy-duality model. The governmental procedure is split into four functions: mission, policy, administration, and management. Mission refers to the “main underlying philosophy of the organisation, the values that guide its action, the strategic positioning, and the portfolio of functions and public services delivered”. The mission can be unambiguous or derived directly or indirectly from the effects of pronouncements that are not spelled out. Policy concerns all the decisions linked to the public service budget. Administration refers to the “management of administrative processes that are implemented to achieve the objectives of public policies, as well as the definition of the procedures and administrative regulations” (Svara, 1985, p. 229). Finally, the function of management is described in the residual form, and “it comprises all the activities undertaken to support the functions of policy and administration, including in particular those related to the management of human resources. Data collected by surveys involving managers and elected officials from local governments” (e.g. Svara 1985, 1999b) showed that elected officials and administrators seem to have a dichotomous-like relationship in activities related to mission and management. Whereas in the policy and administration-related activities, they seem to play overlapping roles. This pointed to Svara’s duality and complementarity prototypes (2001) that distinguish the interdependence and mutual influence between the elected and appointed officials. Both of them have to uphold diverse roles based on their exclusive perspectives and values and the differences in their prescribed positions, but the functions they perform necessarily overlap.

2.10 Linking political-administrative relationship models

Table 1 below shows possible linkages between the three theorists’ models which may work if combined at a country, organisational and individual level.

2.10.1 Table 1 - Three theorist (Cariño, Peters, and Svava) models linked


Cariño's relationship model (country level)	Svava four combination typology (organisational level)	Peters's five authority and implication model (individual level)
Regime-dominant	Political supremacy where there is a high political controller and low administrative freedoms	<i>Formal-legal – Yes Minister</i>
The bureaucratic co-primacy model	administrative self-sufficiency in case of low political controller and high administrative independence	Adversarial” model – No Minister <i>administrative state” – Administration Dominance</i>
Authoritarian regime	No linkages to Svava typologies, however, there may be high political control and no administrative autonomy in this regime	<i>Formal-legal – Yes Minister</i>
<i>Authoritarian and bureaucratic co-primacy model</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “laissez-faire”, when both controller and freedom are low • complementarity, when both controllers and autonomy are high 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “<i>village life</i>” both have similar values and goal • “<i>functional</i>” model – collude in decision-making processes
<i>Notes: Plotting and linkages by the researcher</i>		

2.11 Political Administrative Leadership (PAL) Model

This study scrutinised the Political-Administrative-leadership (PAL), a thematic and archetypal model developed and named by the researcher to assess and plot any leadership relationship in South Africa. In the true sense of the word, a pal is defined in the Oxford dictionary as a friend. Therefore, the PAL model depicts that these leaders should be a companion to one another and should have the ability to lead. A shortened version of politics is (Poli), and for administrative (Admin) and leadership (Lead), the PAL model. The three selected departments were assessed using the themes shown in diagram 1 below and discussed in-depth in chapter 5.

2.11.1 Diagram 1: PAL Model

Political-administrative thematic approach



Source: Author (Mjekula, 2023)

Note: political-administrative leadership (PAL) model and thematic approach designed by the researcher

2.12 Factors affecting stability at political-administrative interface levels

Gorski (2003, p. 112) emphasised Weber's work on the importance of a modern bureaucracy that combines a high degree of administrative competence, meritocracy, impartiality, probity, and accountability to strengthen the development of the modern state (Gorski, 2003, p. 112). This modern bureaucracy was also supported by Chapter 13 of the National Development Plan, Vision 2030 which requires formalised recruitment processes that would attract talented individuals based on skills, experience, and merit. However, it must also be noted that despite European countries like Latvia which are at advanced stages in recruiting based on merit ideologies, the recruitment and career incidents were not completely free from political influence. Somewhat the political influence can be attributed to insufficient policy frameworks within a country that may lack clarity and open up to dangers of political overpower and politicisation of administration. The term "politicisation" was understood primarily as "the widespread practice of appointments to public service positions not according to formal civil service rules, but according to party-political or personal loyalty to his/her nominator" (Peters, Sootla, & Connaughton, 2006, p. 256). Nevertheless, discretion was permissible within the scope of the regulation (Randma, 1999, pp. 467-470). Many factors perpetuating instability in government were noted as well as hindrances to development as can be seen below.

2.12.1 Tensions between Ministers and Directors-General

As described by Cariño (2001). in the relationship models above, the aftermath of different regimes" applicability can be seen in practice both at the executive and administrative levels. Laegreid (2014) agreed that the tension is normally between political accountability and managerial accountability where there is ambiguity in much of the rhetoric around accountability in so far as some executive politicians have used the new politics/administration split to redefine policy weaknesses as managerial failures (Laegreid, 2014, p. 228). This enables politicians to offload accountability when things go wrong (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 9-18). The indistinctness in the process relating to the equilibrium point between political control and professional autonomy, and indistinctness in communication and interaction, led to more forceful use of symbols and more conflict (March & Olsen, 1983, p. 740). South Africa had legitimate reasons to change many top layers of the public in 1994 since many of them were predominantly white. To be noted though is that in South Africa, since the beginning of the 4th and 5th administrations (between the 2009 and 2019 electoral mandate), South Africa

experienced the worst political-administrative interface from as early as 2010. Some DGs were affected by constant changes made by executive authorities. This means that administrative machinery changes happen within a short space of time after a new Minister assumes duty which is usually poorly managed and always costly to the state. The department is likely to incur direct financial costs which are linked to recruitment, hiring, and training. The indirect administrative costs include loss of competence and decreased productivity, (Hayes et al, 2006; Shaw 2011). The challenges that are faced at a point of the political-administrative interface that negatively affects public administration can be avoided if the administrative and organisational processes are not changed when there is a political leadership reshuffle. A carefully studied and evaluated approach in reshuffles and shifting people around is important as constant changes can disrupt the government for a while. These may be reflective of impaired working relationships at a top echelon of government, which eventually cascade down to lower levels and may contribute to employee dissatisfaction and anxiety as well as a hindrance to productivity. The notion of changes in administration each time there is a change in a political landscape may affect the country's development negatively by creating unstable institutions. This further hinders the performance of an organisation. Some of these changes and political instability had a crippling effect on the South African economy, ranging from weak rand value, a poor economic performance which at a certain point reduced investor assurance and poor economic ratings like junk status. The currency's value is determined by South Africa's deteriorating economic conditions (Mail & Guardian 2023, p. 1).

There may be differences between people who concentrate on policy formulation (and on the political consequences of those policies) and those who are concerned with the actual delivery of services (and on the administrative outcomes of the policy implementation). Cabinets play a central role in the production of policy advice. Advisors in Ministerial cabinets analyse policy problems and evaluate solutions in such a way that technical expertise is combined with political feasibility. In contrast, civil servant members of Ministerial cabinets are outward-looking and engage in extensive contact with all other players in the policymaking process (Majersdorf & Dierickx, 1992, p. 40). Ministerial cabinets are centres of communication and coordination. The real conflicts between political and administrative heads are caused by the pull-and-push contesting for control over public policy, resources, and the actual policy content and therefore conflict is bound to surface. It is vital to maintain professional integrity between the political and administrative heads. Serving the public must be prioritised instead of focusing energies on tensions that may exist in these relationships. The frail and undistinguished political leadership within the government has been condemned and argued by former President Kgalema

Motlanthe to be one of the causes of tensions that worsen inefficient service delivery (City Press Online, 2015, p.1). The former President confirmed that a lack of “connection between political leadership and public administration was a source of strain between administrators and political heads”. It was further argued that in some cases the weak political leadership also led to strained relations between Ministers and Directors-General, resulting in the high turnover of senior administrative personnel, who take with them invaluable skills needed in public service. This “brain drain in rare skills and fundamental established memory further pressures the public service’s ability to deliver” (Sowetan Live 2013, p. 1). According to the former President, “weaker managerial capacity and non-existence of leadership, low staff morale, poor organisational design and tensions caused by weak political and administrative interface had led to the erosion of accountability and authority, poor performance, and lack of capacity. He claimed that a new culture and ethos of service delivery had to be instilled into public servants to infuse accountability in the public service. “Accountability in the public service is as important as the transformation of the human resource management principles that underpin work in the public service. It requires a mindset change and an understanding by citizens that they have a right to government services.” (Sowetan Live 2013, p. 1). Motlanthe went on to say that “it will be important that institutions such as parliament, provincial legislatures, and (municipal) councils that provide oversight, always interrogate whether public resources are allocated and used following policy priorities” (Sowetan Live 2013, p. 1).

2.12.2 Turnover rate of the national executive and heads of administration

A study on the turnover rate of national executives and administration since 2009 done by the South African Institute for Race Relations shows the unpredictability and liquidity at the political-administrative strata. Between 2009 and July 2016, there were “126 changes to the national executive, 62 changes to Ministerial positions, 63 changes to deputy Ministerial positions, and one change to the deputy presidency. Due to the many changes in the political sphere, the report further illustrates the average amount of time a Minister and DG stay together in the department/ministry to only seven months” (Van Onselen, 2017, pp. 4 -14). This is indicative of the highly liquid environment that the government finds itself in. The instability caused by the high turnover rate has escalated poor service delivery to citizens and cost the state its fiscal more than the country can bite. A similar study conducted in 2018 by the Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) on the tenure of DGs for the period 2006/7 to 2007/8 financial years cited the career incidences of DGs and the duration it takes for a particular DG in a position. However, it did not indicate the types of relationships between executives and heads of departments and whether a correlation between relationships and stability existed. Both studies contributed to the knowledge and are, therefore, commended. However, both studies were limited to duration, gender comparison, and survival rates across racial lines, and cited causes of departure which ranged from management and leadership issues; to internal politics; maladministration; or corruption.

2.12.3 Political interference in the administration

According to Frederickson et al. (2014, p. 70), “power separation remains a big challenge confronting public institutions, be it at the national or local government levels, where the political leaders have failed to adopt a healthy and positive attitude towards performance of public administration officers”. To strengthen development in public administration, heads of departments must be allowed to exercise autonomy and power, this should also apply at the political level. However, politics manifests too much in the jurisdiction of administrative public administration. At the onset, politicians may choose to either have proper or improper involvement in the administrative process. The improper involvement may happen when the Minister meddles with hiring, promotion, financial management, supply chain processes, etc. In some cases preferred individuals are hired, promoted and their companies nominated in

tenders without following due processes. In the end, such conduct may lead to a corrupt state which affects political-administrative stability and development.

2.13 Summary

The inclination and capability to take ownership by both political and administrative leaders are vital and they should constantly strive for what is best for the organisation and stand by good governance principles. Excellent communication, strong emotional intelligence, and the ability to build strong and performing organisation are critical skills for both leaders. Good leaders offer benefits for the organisations they lead and ensure that public finances, expenditures, and risks are managed. These leaders take sound decisions, pursuit excellent managerial leadership, and adhere to ethical leadership. It is a precursor for a more holistic leadership model requiring that leaders incorporate head, heart, and hands, into what she terms the “RARE Principles” of Responsible, Accountable, Relevant, and Ethical leadership. On the other hand, Ngambi describes a “toxic leadership” intermittently present on the African continent, where “legacies of empowerment and opportunity have often been squandered to kleptocracy, xenophobia and equally toxic followership.” (Ngambi, 2011, p. 15). Recent corruption scandals in the public sector where it has been said that “those with the right connections can get a sympathetic hearing from the powers that be,” Khoza, (2012), have raised important questions about the role of national leadership in shaping ethical conduct, a perception held in criticising contemporary short-term, transitional and ethically weak transactional leadership styles.” Kroukamp (2011, p. 29) argues that leadership should involve promoting public sector ethics. Both the Ministers and DGs are expected to deliver the type of leadership that should be based on sustainable public service delivery, or what one would call “operational leadership” as opposed to procedural leadership or “policy leadership” (Ramaite, 2002, pp. 17-19). A balance between political control and professional autonomy is also crucial in shaping the relationships, although the “autonomy concept in public administration research is multi-faceted, multi-dimensional and ambiguous” (Olsen, 2009; Verhoest, Guy Peters, Bouckaert, & Verschhuere, 2004). High political control over administration must be avoided in any regime as it would create high levels of tension between politicians and administrators. The administrative heads may feel overwhelmed by too much political executive interference and severity of the political executive in the administration and the strict orders which can lead to political-administrative tensions and unnecessary conflicts. The core aim of bureaucratic autonomy is for public servants to be able to translate their preferences into authoritative actions without external constraints (Maggetti, 2007; Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). Therefore, at a country level, whether regime-dominant or

authoritarian models are applied which both demand voluminous political control over administration, abuse of power and authority, administrative autonomy would seem impossible to apply. Administrative independence is much more appropriate in the bureaucratic dominant state where there is noticeably lessened control of politicians over administrators. In the bureaucratic dominance model, actors are more inclined to say, “No Minister”, or describe “the administrative state” model. A hybrid approach for South Africa which is a combination of village life and functional models grouped with democratic values at a country level may be an ideal approach for South Africa.

The other three Peters models which are formal legal, adversarial, and administrative state will not be perfect for a democratic state as these relationship models assume that administrative and political heads are in high rivalry for their roles and responsibilities and are in a constant struggle for power at both levels. Mantzaris argued that if relationships between political and administrative leaders were not strained, and if there were no inter-political rivalries, which in many cases fall in the political-administrative arena (when newly elected political leadership is obligated to work with opposition-backing management), then there would be no poor communication and accountability relationships in communities; if fraud and corruption were not rife, service delivery would improve, which would eliminate violent protests; and if there were no political or administrative/managerial interference, there would be no lack of skills capacity (Mantzaris, 2014, p. 18). To avoid the interpersonal challenges and conflicts within the political-administration arena actors must lead by example and practice capable as well as ethical leadership. They must be able to demonstrate a suitable and caring demeanor in and out of the organisation. Respect and motivation are the prerequisites for an ethically inclined leader that would relate to ethical values and align them to the organisation, beliefs, dignity, and rights of others. An ethical leader should be able to promote open communication, the ability to admit mistakes and accept accountability. Leadership positivity across the organisation becomes a norm thereby employees will be loyal, and motivated, and productivity may be increased. A capable leader is also able to influence and maintain good relations with the people they work with. Having good relations at the leadership level will also help eliminate constant changes, unnecessary rearrangements within government, weakened working relations, debilitated country development, interference with government performance and productivity, unstable institutions, etc. To nurture good relations at the individual level, it is worth studying the country-level demeanours and foundational analysis of existing regimes that may support a roadmap and advance arguments for Ministers and DGs. Thus, Chapter 3 below explains the research methodology used to gather data on relationships between the Ministers and DGs.

Chapter 3: Research methods and data collection

The study involves an in-depth analysis of the types, models, frameworks, and theories that explicitly infer and map relationships that exist between political and administrative heads and whether the kinds of relationships that exist contribute to administrative stability in the departments of Traditional Affairs, Human Settlements, and Office of the Public Service Commission. Combined variables on the political administrative interface and strained relations were examined. The focus is on theoretical frameworks and models that would characterise the nature of relationships between political and administrative executives in a South African context citing the work of Max Weber (1998), Cariño (2001), and Peters (2001) on the relationship prototypes. Svava's four combination levels of complementarity in the political and administrative interface are also alluded to. The study makes use of primary and secondary data collection methods. The research data that has been collected from these researchers was widely used in this study. The primary data was generated first-hand by the researcher with the aim in mind of understanding the relationships between one variable the relationship between a politician and an administrator. The advantages of both datasets were that the primary data provided legitimacy, preciseness, and current data, while the secondary data saved time and was much easier to collect compared to primary data. Although the secondary data was easier to collect and the literature exists, however, most studies did not necessarily capture in detail the types of relationships that exist between ministers and their DGs. This required a synthesis study and desktop review extracted from professional academic journals and literature, government publications and databases, case studies, and newspapers which was conducted to complete this study. The secondary data was used to source existing data that was generated by government institutions as part of a repository, independent national and international researchers, departmental and media reports published on websites, and academic pieces of literature on political-administrative relations. The secondary data was extracted from varied data files, government publications, websites, books, journal articles, and internal records. Although secondary data was used, it must be noted that in the South African context, the relationships between Ministers and heads of departments are not always available in academic studies but mostly in newspaper articles. This confirms its journalistic nature which was argued by Maserumula (2007, pp.257-259) in his study on conflicts between Ministers and Directors-General. Although it is argued to be journalistic, the South African Directors-General

information is also difficult to acquire as was argued by Merten that “finding information on South Africa’s top public service echelon is a little like looking for a needle in a haystack”. (Daily Maverick, 2022, p.1-4) termed “perpetual tensions, loss of institutional memory, (often) crashing uncertainty” details the administrative instability that continues to exist at the level of DGs in the South African national government. The reasons cited for such uncertainties range from suspensions, escaping scandals, threats, and intimidation, end of contracts, resignations, and retirements (Daily Maverick, 2022, p. 1).

3.1 Data collection methods

According to Zozus (2017), data collection is the process of gathering, measuring, and analysing accurate data from various relevant sources to find answers to research problems, answer questions, evaluate outcomes, and focus on trends and probabilities. As soon as the data was collected, managed, and broken down into two methods categorised as primary and secondary data. Data management is the process by which observations including measurements are defined, documented, collected, and subsequently processed, and is an essential part of almost every research endeavour (Zozus, 2017, pp. 1-8). The primary data was collected using detailed questionnaires from the participants’ responses. As per its name, the primary data is original pieces of data collected, first-hand by the researcher. However, the downside was the time spent on data collection from the three departments took very long, and the process was highly time-consuming. The data collection did not involve a face-to-face interaction as all the participants preferred to utilise the elaborative questionnaire that was distributed to them. The interviews were proposed, however, the participants favored questionnaires rather than interviews. Constant reminders to participants were sent multiple times through e-mails or WhatsApp links for those participants who chose those channels of communication for quicker responses and ease of reference. The questions were open-ended which provided the respondents space to construct their responses, yielded deeper, and probed the subject matter. All the questions were designed in a manner that responses are elaborative to acquire more knowledge and solve the research problem of the study. Closed questions were only part of the biographical data and were avoided purposefully for the content of the study as they tend to be restrictive, lack participants’ views, and do not provide detailed information. The participants contributed positively to the study and provided in-depth knowledge when they were responding to the questions as they were selected purposefully based on their understanding of the study. Immediately the data was collected from the sample of 34 participants, the data was organised, presented summarised, and managed using descriptive statistics. The gender, age,

race, and academic rank were used in each participant to diversify and balance this study. Out of the 34 participants across the three selected departments the gender is depicted in table 3.1.1 below:

3.1.1 Gender across three departments

The descriptive statistics assisted in collecting and organising the data sets from the participants which were used to infer and formally test the political-administrative relationships and stability in the public service. In the later chapters, data was interpreted and findings were generalised. Out of the total of thirty-four participants, there were nineteen males and fifteen females across the three departments in the study as indicated in table 3.1.1.1

3.1.1.1 - Table 2

Population	Males	Females
34	19	15

n = 34

m= 19

f = 15

The study design was mostly qualitative and used basic elements of quantitative research methods. It was useful for this study to use mixed methods that include both qualitative and quantitative elements as they combine elements of both techniques. Shaw and Frost argue that “portraying qualitative and quantitative research as being in opposition to one another is perhaps not very helpful or accurate” (Shaw and Frost, 2015, pp. 638-641). For a qualitative researcher, “concepts, and constructs are meaningful words that can be analysed in their own right to gain a greater depth of understanding of a given concept. In contrast, a quantitative researcher is likely to choose concepts or even to create words in such a manner that not more than a single meaning can be attached to the word being chosen” (Mouton & Marais, 1988,160). Generally, the validation of using both qualitative and quantitative methods is to deepen the study to critically analyse and understand the relationships of executive authorities and Directors-General within the governance and leadership context in the public service. Choosing mixed methods to collect the data was to triangulate and authenticate and get more credible results and improve the validity of the study result. The collection of data was conducted through a non-restrictive and elaborative questionnaire as well as documentary analysis. Several government and media reports were triangulated to augment this empirical study. The study also used a comprehensive qualitative data analysis technique which was descriptive and

the study made numerous inferences and findings based on the collected and collated data. The findings of the study were, inter alia about the interference between politicians and administrators in each other's affairs and vice versa, and adverse effects which at times were made by the cadre deployment and could harm service delivery. Cadre deployment is a policy that was developed by the African National Congress (ANC) to deploy active leaders to strategic positions of government. However, its implementation remains questionable. The highlights that "cadre deployment has long been a policy of the ANC-led alliance, which has governed South Africa since 1994, that safe party hands should be placed on all of what it calls "levers of power" in society" (Hoffman, 2010, pp.1). Chapter 6 of this study made recommendations which amongst others included clear roles and responsibilities between the two actors, mutually beneficial approaches to political-administrative leadership and governance in the public service as well as strengthening functional relationships.

The relationship between information that exists in theories and the data collected was verified and presented as per each respondent. This includes the reasons why the chosen theories exist and their applicability in South Africa using what respondents indicated in the responses. The researcher sought in-depth knowledge of the relationship archetypes between executive authorities and heads of departments and whether the relationship approaches contributed positively or negatively to administrative stability over the last five years. The qualitative methods will explore what types of relationships exist between EAs and DGs in the three departments and whether there is a correlation between relationship types and stability (quantitative). The quantitative methods investigate the number of changes made in the last five years at the level of EA and DG, frequency of relationship types, power handling, major decisions, conflict, and the existence of tension in a particular department.

3.1.2 Research design

A combination of descriptive design and correlational research design was used. The descriptive research outlined the characteristics, frequencies, trends, correlations, and categories of the political and administrative relationships. The descriptive research design that was used in the study aimed to obtain information to systematically describe the observational phenomenon without influencing it. According to Williams (2007), descriptive research is a research method that can determine the situation in a current phenomenon. The descriptive research was classified into different types using descriptive questionnaires to gather data about changeable themes, a descriptive status technique that seeks to answer real-life situations, descriptive analysis contributing to analysing the data, and descriptive classification of the relationship (Williams, 2007, p. 66), and descriptive comparison on whether one variable (relationships) affects the other variable (stability). The descriptive research design helped validate the existing conditions and widely determine the research object's predominant circumstances and underlying patterns. This type of research design is a non-invasive method; therefore, an in-depth analysis of each variable was conducted as well as the validation of existing conditions that exist within the studied population. This was shaped in response to how, what, when, and why questions relating to this study. Further to the descriptive research design, the study investigated the relationships between the studied variables without tempering them. They also tested whether the relationship exists between the type of relationships between the EAs and DGs affected the stability in a positive, negative, or neutral way. The study explores whether X (types of relationships) and Y (stability) are directly proportional, inversely proportional, or nonproportional to each other. It helped the researcher reflect on the correlation between the variables and whether the direction it followed was positive or negative while the neutral phenomenon will not be ruled out. The correlation between certain relationship types and stability in public service was tested. The study verified whether there is a positive, negative, or no correlation (neutral) between the two variables namely relations and stability. A positive correlation would mean a decrease in one variable may lead to a reduction in another. An increase in one variable leads to a decrease in the other. A practical example would be the higher the chances of a stable institution, the less the poor relations between political and administrative executives. The causation between relationship types and stability was also studied, which means that the change in one variable causes a change in another variable. The study tests the types of relationships that are independent variables and the rate at which they affect the degree of administrative stability in the public service, a dependent variable. These variables are expected to change as a result of experimental manipulation of the independent

variable or variables. The dependent and independent variables are generally defined in this study. The dependent variables are described as those that depend on other factors that are measured and independent variables are expected to influence the dependent variable (Liska, 1990, p. 292). The table below shows how a change in one variable may either show a difference or not in the other.

3.1.2.1 Table 3: Dimensions were tested on political-administration relationships and administrative stability

<i>Dimensions on political-administration</i>	<i>Measurement indicators</i>	<i>Type of relationship</i>	<i>Evidence</i>
Testing stability at the level of executive authorities and Directors-General			
Changes in Executive Authority	Number of changes made in the last five years	Type of changes indicated in Chapter 4 based on collected data (positive or negative change)	Certain types of relationships affected stability or not
Changes in Directors-General	Number of times the DG moved to a different position or exited Public Service	Type of changes indicated in Chapter 4 and based on collected data (positive or negative change)	Changes occurred or not
Typology of relationships between EAs and DGs			
EA and DG relationships	Frequency of relationship types in each department	Types of relationship that exists are explored in Chapter 4	Relationship type changes
Political-administrative themes			
Power handling	Frequency of administrative/political power	Types of administrative/political power	Positive/negative/neutral changes
Major decisions made at administrative or political levels	Frequency of decisions at administrative/political	Types of decision making	Positive/negative/neutral changes
Harmonised/Conflicts/environment	Frequency of conflict/harmony	Types of conflicts/harmony	Positive/negative/neutral changes
Existence of tension	Frequency of tension	Types of tension	Positive/negative/neutral changes

Case studies were also used as they are good for describing, comparing, evaluating, and understanding different aspects of a research problem.

The above thematic charting was used to ensure that the process of indexing was followed to refine the indicated categories and thematic matrices. The definition of these themes will be discussed in detail in the next chapter; however, analytical conclusions will be drawn across all themes. The main themes and their associated subtopics were plotted and carefully fine-tuned on a separate thematic table or chart. The number of charts was depicted by the number of main themes that the study presents. Thematic charting is “a process that refers to the summarising of the key points of each piece of data-retaining its context and the language in which it was expressed and replacing it in the thematic matrix” (Pereira and Bamel, 2022, p. 15). Each thematic table depicts responses from all participants and data was mostly presented in the form of graphs for each theme.

Through online Google forms, the questionnaires were created for ease of reference, data collection, and analysis as well as proper record keeping. Password access to the questionnaires and responses was also built-in to strengthen online cyber security. The online links to questionnaires for each department were created for participants to use on any device which proved a quicker and easier way to access the links, and faster responses and assisted the researcher in collecting data referral and secure storage. The primary data was collected, presented, and analysed using secured Google forms, excel, and word document platforms. All participants responded through these which made it quicker to analyse as the data was captured in a central repository.

3.1.3 Deductive research approach for the study:

1. Hypothesis based on existing theory on the relationship between the political and administrative heads:
 - The relationship between the political and administrative interface has led to different relationship dynamics and instability between political and administrative actors.
 - Political instability negatively affects administrative stability.
 - The increased roles of administrators in the political process escalated the tensions between politicians and senior public servants.
 - Poor relationships between EAs and DGs affect organisational stability in the public service.

- Political authority's interference in the recruitment and selection process of senior public administrators is built on managerial and practical expertise, the stronger the senior public servant's managerial position, the larger the guaranteed autonomy and added strategic power.

2. Data collection to test the hypothesis

- Data was collected on relationship typologies at a political-administrative level.
- Political administrative relationships and stability were tested on the three selected departments based on the following questions.
 - (a) Both political and administrative heads have distinct roles to play in government to improve government performance. How is power handled in the departments as each individual possesses either political or administrative power?
 - (b) Major decisions have to be made in public service, who would you say influences such decisions in the department?
 - (c) How would you describe the interactions between the EA/s and HoD/s in this department? Would you define the interactions with the EAs/HoDs as characterized by harmony or conflict? Please explain any chosen type.
 - (d) What do you think are the characteristics of a good working relationship between Ministers and HoDs? Kindly elaborate.
 - (e) Would you agree/disagree that the relationship between Ministers and heads of the department is sometimes characterized by tension and problems? Please explain.
 - (f) If disagreements and tension exist, why? How are disagreements managed?
 - (g) Literature shows that certain types of relationships exist, and these are five categories:
 - Formal-legal (Yes Minister/HoD) – agrees on every aspect one party is saying
 - Adversarial (No Minister/HoD) – disagrees with another party

Functional close relationship – a mutual understanding based on different structures they may serve

Village life - similar values and goals and ensure well-functioning machinery of government

The administrative state - HoDs are influential and technical expert advisors who remain subordinate to politicians

Which of the above types of relationships would be most applicable to the

(i) DG/s in this department: Relationship type

(ii) EA/s in the department: Relationship type

(h) In the past five years were there changes made at the EA/HoD level in your department? Specify for both the level of EA/s and DG/s:

3. Analysed and tested the data

- Most participants agreed that relationship dynamics cause instability in institutions due to how political and administrative power is handled and managed in departments. Most respondents cited that political power mishandling has led to unstable institutions since major decisions are mostly made by Ministers in the departments that they lead.
- The conflict between EAs and DGs exists whether they have good or poor relations. Therefore conflict, tension, and problems occur even in the most harmonious relationships.

Relationship types at the DG level

- 14 out of 34 (41%) participants viewed the relationships between the EAs and DGs (level of DG) as functional and close based on the different structures they may serve and the mutual understanding they have. These may be party branches, clusters, and sectors they belong to.
- Out of 34, 8 respondents selected the formal-legal model. Therefore 24% see DGs agreeing with the whole lot that the Minister says “yes Minister” relation type.
- The adversarial model had 2 respondents (participants 29 and 34) in DHS indicating that the DG disagrees with the Minister, records, and escalates to outside bodies when conflict arises. This depicts an overall 6% of the adversarial

model. In OPSC and DTA there were no records of DGs disagreeing with their respective Ministers.

- 9% selected administrative state at the DG level. It is assumed that the DGs across three departments are not as influential as they should be given their administrative role in government. If DGs are not influential administratively this may portray a political dominance over bureaucracy.
- None of the participants selected the village life across the three departments. This model is critical to strengthen relations between Ministers and DGs.
- 12% of the participants were either unaware of the existing relationship model or did not answer the question relating to the relationship type at the DG level.

3.2 Sampling methods

The basis of this study was conducted using forty-two questionnaires that were sent to possible participants of which 8 did not respond and 34 responded. The expected responses were not necessarily from Ministers and heads of the department due to their busy diaries and the fact that the study would have small data given the three departments that were selected. There is only one Minister and Director-General in each department. The questionnaires were distributed to participants based on a sample in the three departments who had expertise in the study, selected incumbents working closely with political executives, and career public administrators. All the names of the participants were suggested by the human resources coordinator or liaison who provided contact details and, in some cases, forwarded the link attaching all the research ethics necessities. The managers in DGs' offices were also involved in the process of suggesting relevant participants. The targeted individuals who retired exited public service, resigned, or were suspended could not be reached or did not respond to the questionnaire and were therefore excluded from the study although they may possess the required knowledge of the study. To increase the integrity of the findings and recommendations, a primary data triangulation with secondary evidence was captured, presented, verified, and supported by existing models and theories grounding the analysis on the most common types of relationships between political and administrative heads and the causal effect. Interviews were also planned; however, participants were willing to respond using questionnaires. For decades, face-to-face interviews have been the dominant technique in qualitative research, however in recent years due to country epidemics and international pandemics, face-to-face is mostly phased out and the use of virtual platforms is in the domain. Digital transformation of Higher Education institutions is a topical issue that several stakeholders of education must feel concerned about,

The ability to apply ICT in every sphere of life is on an incremental level; thus, universities must be up to the task of preparing potential professionals to be able to face challenges and provide solutions (Bond et al., 2018; Sandkuhl & Lehmann, 2017). Even with the rise of the virtual paradigm shift, the participants still preferred the written responses, and they were mostly detailed in doing so.

3.2.1 Purposive sampling technique

Purposive sampling is viewed as biased. However, it can provide reliable and robust data. The strength of the method lies in its intentional bias (Tongco, 2007, p. 149). The deliberate sampling for this study is selected based on the purpose of the sample in the three selected departments, which included current officials working closely with the three offices. These officials may have been chief of staff, private secretaries, administrators, spokespersons, and various units within each department fully understanding the study. The participants were deliberately selected as they may only possess the knowledge required for the study. Due to complexities in interacting with executives, a purposive sampling technique through a structured questionnaire was utilised in the study and it increased the pool of participants. As the sample built up, enough data was gathered from the offices of the executives, heads of departments, and any institution dealing with related studies. To gain access to the respondents, a more formalized approach in the form of a written invitation was utilised. To enhance credibility and increase the response rate, the purpose of the study was clearly outlined in formal Wits university-headed letters. The researcher applied for the research ethics certificate before the study was conducted as it involved human beings.

3.2.2 Snowballing sampling technique

Although purposive sampling was a dominant technique in this study, snowball sampling was also used through online questionnaires which are popular in qualitative research due to their referral nature. As the sample builds up, enough data was gathered from the relevant participants. Snowball sampling is a “non-random sampling because not every element in the population has an equal chance of being selected. Snowball sampling is used where potential participants are hard to locate. The method is well suited for several research purposes and is particularly applicable when the focus of the study is on a subtle issue, possibly concerning a relatively secretive matter, and thus requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people for the study and it is impossible to determine the sampling error or make inference about the

population on the samples obtained” (Nikolopoulou, 2022, p.1). However, in sequential sampling, the sample was taken at a given time interval, adjustment can be made by correcting the research and sampling method to centralize the analysis and make a satisfactory decision, hence sequential sampling techniques are preferred over snowball sampling. After contacting the befitting participants, some of them requested to recommend other participants who fit the criteria of the study and were willing to participate. This sampling method ended once the sample target was reached and at that point, the researcher could not take any more snowballed participants. All saved questionnaires were only used for this study. The South African context on the political-administrative interface was explored in this research using a desktop review.

3.2.3 Case study method

A case study for each department was developed to generate an in-depth and multi-pronged understanding of the relationships between EAs and DGs and whether it has affected stability in the three departments from 2015-2020 (five years). Several authors and researchers described the case study similarly, however, Yin’s (2003) interpretation of it is that “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident (Yin, 2003, p. 359).” Although the case study technique was established to assist in the field of clinical medicine, over the years, it also extended to various productions like social, educational, and business research. The case study technique is used to scrutinise the existing data about a specific subject. This method assisted the researcher in interpreting, describing, comparing, evaluating, and understanding different aspects of the research problem. The data sources from the questionnaires were easily interpreted at a glance which was reliable and relevant. This enabled the researcher to turn participants’ responses from shared sentiments into pieces of evidence and usable data. The case studies are based on the research questions below.


3.2.4 Table 4: Case study questions

Research questions	Case study
What are the common types of relationships (models) between political and administrative heads in South Africa?	Case studies on relationships between political and administrative heads of three South African national departments of Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs, and Office of the Public Service Commission
How do these types affect administrative stability	The case studies incorporated how the existing relationships affected administrative stability


3.3 1 Gender-responsiveness of the study at the OPSC, Traditional Affairs, and Human Settlements

Out of fifteen responses in the OPSC, 60% were males and 40% were females and there were no other categories and officials who preferred not to answer this area of demographic information for all three departments as depicted in the pie chart below. In the Department of Traditional Affairs, 58,3% were females and males were 41.7% out of the total of 12 who responded to the questionnaire. Males were recorded at 71.4% and females at 28.6% at the DHS. A total number of seven participants was documented in DHS. There were more males than females in the study for both OPSC and DHS.


3.3.1.1 Chart 1: OPSC by gender



3.3.1.2. Chart 2: DTA by gender



3.3.1.3 Chart 3: Human Settlements by gender




3.3.2 Participants by age

All 34 participants responded to this question and no one preferred not to answer. There 66.7% of the participants ranged between the ages of 45 and above for both the OPSC (10 out of 15) and DTA (8 out of 12), whilst persons in the same age range were 85.7% in the DHS. This means 6 out of 7 participants in the DHS were aged 45 and above. Ages 36-45 were 26.7%, 33.3%, and 14.3 from OPSC, DTA, and DHS respectively. A small percentage of 6.7% (1 participant) from ages 21-35 was only recorded in the OPSC. No officials participated in ages 21-35 both in the DTA and DHS. As can be seen from the data extracted from the study questionnaires, the officials who participated in this study were mostly ranging from the ages of 45 and above.


3.3.2.1 Chart 4: Participants by age in OPSC

2. What is your age?
15 responses



3.3.2.2 Chart 5: Participants by age in DTA


2. What is your age?
12 responses



3.3.2.3 Chart 6: Participants by age in DHS

2. What is your age?

7 responses




3.3.3 Participants by race

The majority of the participants responded to this question, only one did not respond in the DTA as eleven responses were received in this regard. There were many black Africans in this study, 83,3 from OPSC, 72,7% from DTA, and 85.7% from DHS. The participants from the Coloured race were 8.3% and 14.3% respectively from OPSC and DHS. There were 9.1% logged under the race category of Whites in the DTA while Indian/Asians/Asians were 8,3% and 18.2% in OPSC and DTA.

3.3.3.1 Chart 7: Participants by race in OPSC

3. Please specify your race


12 responses



3.3.2.2 Chart 8: Participants by race in DTA

3. Please specify your race


11 responses



3.3.2.3 Chart 9: Participants by race in DHS

3. Please specify your race

7 responses




3.3.4 Participant's level of education

The majority of the participants had acquired master's degrees, followed by bachelor's degrees, doctorates, honours degrees, and lower as depicted in the three departmental charts below. The OPSC (46.7%), DTA (33%), and DHS (42.9%) are at the master's level. In the OPSC and the DTA, there were higher percentages of participants who are at the Ph.D. level or higher, 20% for OPSC and 25% for DTA. Participants with bachelor's degrees were 33.3%, 25%, and 14.3% from OPSC, DTA, and DHS respectively. Honours degrees were recorded at 8.3% in DTA and 28.6% in the DHS when both categories of honours in the chart are combined. There were no high school categories in OPSC and DTA, however, 14.3% had some high school in the DHS. All 34 participants responded to this question.

3.3.4.1 Chart 10: Level of education at the OPSC

4. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?


15 responses



3.3.4.2 Chart 11: Level of education at the DTA

4. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?


12 responses



3.3.4.3 Chart 12: Level of education at the DHS

4. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

7 responses




3.3.5 Marital status of the participants

In this demographic area, some participants preferred to indicate their marital statuses as follows, OPSC 6.7% and 16.7% which constitutes 23.4% of the total number of participants in the three departments. Participants who were married were 40%, 50%, and 71.4% for OPSC, DTA, and DHS respectively. There were 40% and 25% at the OPSC and DTA who indicated that they were single at the time of collecting data which may have changed at the time of writing this study report. The DHS participants did not record any single-status participants. The divorced and widowed were at 13%, 8%, and 14% at the OPSC, DTA, and DHS respectively. Below there are charts that depict the marital status across the three departments.

3.3.5.1 Chart 13: Marital status at OPSC

5. Please indicate your marital status


15 responses



3.3.5.2 Chart 14: Marital status at DTA

5. Please indicate your marital status


12 responses



3.3.5.3 Chart 15: Marital status at DHS

5. Please indicate your marital status

7 responses



3.4 Ethical considerations

This study used the important principles relating to ethical considerations as outlined by Bell & Bryman (2007, p. 65) which stipulated that all participants must not be subjected to harm, and the respect for the dignity of research participants was prioritized. Full consent was obtained from the participants before conducting the study. During this study, the privacy of all participants was protected, and anonymity and confidentiality were ensured. The researcher that there is no conflict of interest to be declared. Transparency and honesty was adhered to and the misrepresentation of information was avoided at all cost throughout the study. Information received was reported ethically as per the Wits University requirements. An online research ethics application was submitted to the Wits Ethics Committee to decide whether a clearance certificate can be assumed. Once the decision was made and a clearance certificate was received by the researcher, then data collection through questionnaires commenced. As a Public Servant, a letter from the department was requested to warrant the researcher's protection. However, the departmental human resource unit deemed it unnecessary as the department which the researcher worked for was not studied. Approval letters to conduct the study were sourced from Wits University and the three departments that approved.

The first batch (three) of departments that were approached for this study declined. The first department cited that they were inundated with similar research requests and were able to accommodate a limited number of such requests considering the operational requirements of the department inundated with similar studies. The second department considered the topic sensitive and as a result, the information acquired from the study might have serious reputational damage and the study might negatively affect the political-administrative relationship between the Minister and the Director-General. The third department did not respond to the request. Due to ethical considerations, the first batch was not studied. A process of requesting university ethics in research then unfolded with a new set of departments which are the Public Service Commission, departments of Traditional Affairs, and Human Settlements. All university ethics considerations were met and endorsed and the three DGs approved the commencement of the study in the respective departments. The approval letters were submitted to the university and a clearance certificate was issued by the university.

This study followed the research ethics principles that no harm or distress will be caused to participants. The consent forms were prepared and submitted in advance to individuals who were responsible for coordinating the study in each department and participants were formally

invited. The consent forms allowed the participants to either reject or agree to participate in the study and withdraw when there was a need. Participants were invited accordingly and were also allowed to choose between virtual interviews due to COVID-19 considerations or respond to an online questionnaire.

The purpose and procedure of the study were shared and indicated that it explores and maps the relationships that exist between the executive authorities (EAs) and heads of departments (HoDs). The consent forms further indicated that the study aims to investigate whether there is a correlation between the types of relationships that exist (EAs and HoDs) and stability in South Africa. The duration of the interview/questionnaire, the number of questions relating to political-administrative relationships, and stability and demographics information were indicated in the participation information sheet. Permission to record and store the data thereof was also outlined in the request for participation. The participants were advised that they were selected based on their expertise in the subject matter and their participation was voluntary. Possible participants were also advised that they can e-mail consent forms, and participant information sheets should they prefer interviews or completing and submitting the online questionnaire would mean consent to participate.

The participation information sheet further advised that no personal cost to participants if they choose to participate in this project. There were also no direct benefits from participation, however, there were disadvantages or penalties if participants chose to participate or if decided to withdraw from the study at any particular point. The participants were also free not to respond to certain questions they were not comfortable to respond on. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained throughout the study as a result information sourced from participants and their identities remained anonymous and kept confidential to protect them. Personal data for each participant is unknown to the researcher as well since each online form did not specify the respondent. The information submitted online is held securely and not disclosed to anyone else. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with participants remained confidential and undisclosed. Confidentiality was maintained using the Wits University ethical clearance procedures. Potential participants were adequately informed of the intent of the study, aims, methods, potential risks, and unanticipated consequences.

3.6 Research Design

The qualitative and basic elements of quantitative research methods which focused on structured questionnaires individually responded to by each participant were used to gather the data. The relationship between information that exists in theoretical frameworks was used as secondary data while empirical evidence was collected and verified through the questionnaires. This included the reasons why the chosen theories exist and how these theories are applicable in a South African context using what respondents indicated in the elaborative responses. The researcher utilised an in-depth knowledge of the relationship archetypes between executive authorities and heads of department and whether these relationship approaches contributed positively or negatively to administrative stability over the last five years, from 2015 until 2020. From the data gathered, it is clear that poor relationships between the EAs and DGs contribute negatively to individual and institutional stability. To maintain stability, some institutions utilise transactional leadership which has been argued by theorists like Lussier & Achua (2004, p. 358) that, “transactional leadership seeks to maintain stability rather than promoting change within an organisation through regular economic and social exchanges that achieve specific goals for both the leaders and their followers.”

The combination of descriptive design and correlational research design was used in this study. Collected data were analysed, presented, and interpreted while establishing the correlation between certain relationship types and stability in public service and at regime levels. The study data verified whether there is a positive, negative, or no correlation between the two variables namely relations and stability. The study tested the types of relationships that are independent variables and the rate at which they affect the degree of administrative stability in the public service, a dependent variable. The dependent and independent variables were generally defined.

The data was manipulated through various data analysis apparatuses to find trends, connections, outliers, and distinctions that clarify the political-administrative domain. Patterns discovered within the data catalogue help convert the data into a user-friendly graphical format. The results extrapolated from the participants' responses were interpreted and recommendations were made.

3.7 Summary

An increasing amount of studies show that diversity in research is important. Gender balance and gender perspectives help to enhance the scientific quality and social relevance of research. The study incorporated gender, race, marital status, and academic ranks to reflect the rich diversity in the field of political-administration. Different views generated data on causes and strategies to be employed in dealing with challenges encountered by Ministers and DGs. The following chapter will focus on the background of relationships within the context of the African content and the world.

Chapter 4: Political-administrative relationships in the regional and international context

4.1 Introduction

The perspectives in which relationships between EAs and DGs across the world vary, classical models envisage a complete separation of the two as they are either politically or administratively inclined. This may mean that the role of a policy formulation is completely separated from the policy implementation which is assigned to both heads respectively. Ingraham and Ban (1986), pronounced it as “neutral competence”; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) call it “image I”, and in Mouritzen and Svava’s framework which was established in 2001, it is described as “separate roles”. In a turn of events as part of the new public administration reforms to fine-tune earlier theories, Svava (1999, p. 676) then regarded the political-administrative roles as complimentary which necessitates continuing interaction, reciprocal stimulus, and mutual admiration amongst elected officials and administrators. The image I, offer is a differentiation and distinction between professional public servants and party politicians. Image II admits to the role of policy-making for public servants. Image III, admits to bureaucrats having a political role while Image IV suggests a “pure hybrid” (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981, p.16). The complete separation may convey excessive political control which has been seen as the creator of tense relations between political executives and professional administrators.

Given this backdrop, the study mapped and characterised the relationships between the Ministers and DGs in South Africa using modern theories which would agree or disagree that the political-administrative sphere is negatively or positively affected by instability. The scope of the study mapped the existing relationships (x-variable) and whether certain relationship types contributed to either administrative stability or instability in three South African national government departments, that is Human Settlements, Traditional Affairs, and Office of the Public Service Commission. The three departments were chosen based on the political-administrative turnover rate that was experienced or even not necessarily happen in the last few years. It is important to understand whether there is a correlation between these two variables namely type of relationship and stability. The x-variable (relationships) were tested using the stability measure (y-variable) which is explicitly outlined under research design whilst recommending possible solutions on how certain relationships can negatively or positively affect administrative stability at a political-administrative level. All other national departments in South

Africa were not studied, however, the secondary data on the political-administrative interface exists, and therefore, a triangulation of primary data collected from the selected departments with the secondary data will support evidence. The provincial and local spheres of government will not be covered in this study and therefore, a knowledge gap transpires for future studies. Nonetheless, fragmentation in relations does occur frequently at levels of MECs and provincial HoDs, Ministers and chief executive officers of some state-owned entities (SOEs), as well as municipal managers and mayors, and, has been evident in the daily news on different media platforms. The relations under coalition governments in some provinces and municipalities have the potential to weaken political administration. A study conducted in Mnquma municipality in Eastern Cape also revealed that the political-administrative interface setback caused an “exodus of municipal mayors and managers due to a lack of proper political interface and undue interference of either political or administrative officials is threatening stability” (Ndudula, 2013, p. 7). These political-administrative impediments could be triggered by a variety of inappropriate interpersonal dynamics and poor relations e.g., abuse of power, political-administrative infighting, and interference. Further to Ndudula’s arguments, the report on the State of Local Government cited challenges that occurred in local government and municipalities such as “tensions amongst the political and administrative crossing points, the poor ability or lack thereof, of many local government councilors to deal with the difficulties of local government.

There is ample evidence on the turnover rate of HoDs, however, studies do not necessarily clearly state whether the turnover rate was caused by the kind of relationship between EAs and HoDs. Therefore, this study will interrogate the relationship types using the thematic areas described in Chapter 5.

What becomes important is to best prepare the two heads on handling either political or administrative tasks to strike a balance and complement each other. In the world of political-administration, as projected by the political school, the public administrators should collaborate to explore effective resolutions to technical challenges that may be encountered, in pursuit of their ultimate goal of a democratic society. The excessive overhead of political control creates a tense relationship between political officials and professional bureaucrats. The ramifications include distrust, lack of commitment, and lower job satisfaction on the part of professional bureaucrats (Ingraham & Ban, 1986, p. 152). Many reforms that were made in political-administrative models were unable to alleviate the excessive political influence on the work of the bureaucrats (Lynn, 2002; Frederickson, 1996; Ingraham & Ban, 1986). The basic hypothesis is that much of the administrative decision may have political and policy implications and

requires political leaders to work hand in hand to solve those challenges. Aberbach et al (1985), argued that the concerns of public administrators revolve around the “technical efficacy of policy” whilst politicians deal with the policy’s “responsiveness to the relevant constituencies” (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981, p. 6). In other words, “the competency of the careerists was placed at the disposal of the political executives to accomplish the political mandates” (Bendor and Moe, 1985, pp. 1094-111).

In this chapter, the focus will be on political-administrative challenges that are not necessarily unique to South Africa and encountered by various countries in the African continent. Thus, borrowing from the studies that were conducted in various countries in the African continent, given their similarities with a South African context. A case of Zimbabwe’s political administrative relations is discussed in-depth due to the level of resemblances with the South African situation.

4.3 Political administration relationships from an international and continental perspective

Over decades, the political-administrative relationships have always been a worldwide concern and remain a complex subject matter for public administration, researchers, politicians, public practitioners in general, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, policy think tanks, civil society organisation, and members of the public. The behaviour patterns between the EA and DGs are affected by individual ties (loyalties, friendships, alliances, cronies, etc) and the relations they may have at the macro and micro levels of government. Similarly, to the principal agent, the superior-subordinate kind of interaction can either build or break the relationship if it is poorly managed. The following international and continental perspective is drawn based on the comparative studies which were conducted in Zimbabwe and Norway.

4.3.1 A comparative narrative: A case of the African continent and the world

Azunu, (2013, p. 60-75) conducted a study on political-administrative relations in West African countries which exposed that the relationship between politicians and public administration officials has been categorised by consistent misperceptions and conflicts. The study suggested that permanent secretaries (as DGs are referred to in Ghana, Zimbabwe, and other countries in the African continent) were eradicated by black Ministers and were fired from their administrative positions even in cases where Ministers were not the appointing authorities. In the South African context, this is symptomatic of the case law of the former Home Affairs Minister and DG where the high court stipulated that the former Minister had no grounds to dismiss the DG without being a delegated authority. Referring to the 2017 case law (case number 65757/2017) of the former DG of the Department of Home Affairs, a founding affidavit alleged that the precautionary suspension the Minister put him on was illegal and illegitimate. The reasons that were cited, showed that the Minister acted outside of her authority. In earlier chapters, it was indicated that the President of the Republic of South Africa remains the responsible executive authority to dismiss DGs. The confrontation was reported as “tense, oversensitive and apprehensive among the existing permanent secretaries who were viewed as defensive of their jobs and pensions. The phenomenon triggered the Minister to employ a black permanent secretary in the ministry. The basis was categorically to circumvent interruption of government policies and programmes” (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p. 35). Mukonza (2011), cited that the recruitment and selection process of the permanent secretaries/DGs had its challenges namely, in most cases, the appointees did not have the requisite skills; they did not have the experience to quickly fit into the vision of the new government, (Mukonza, 2011, p. 580).

In other countries within the continent, similar to South Africa at the beginning of the democratic dispensation, the relationships were based on race and ideology and therefore the then EAs and DGs did not see eye to eye. This has been postulated by Maserumule in his study on conflicts between Ministers and Directors-General which was discussed in earlier chapters (Maserumule, 2007, p. 152-159).

Rogger (2014), did a study on “the causes and consequences of political interference in Nigeria”. The study aimed to investigate the causes and consequences of interactions between the agents, along two key margins: which public administrators a politician delegates the

delivery of public projects, as well as the incentives that politicians provide to those public administrators. The crux of his findings was that politicians were experiencing a great deal of political rivalry. Guided by a moral hazard model, he assessed the separate impacts of the delegation and incentive margins using an instrumental variables strategy. He finds that delegation to more productive bureaucrats is the key channel through which politicians improve the bureaucracy's output when faced with high levels of political competition. He discovered that "civic administrators have their hands occupied with political gravities while implementing public policy in a resource-constrained environment" (Rogger, 2014, pp. 15-35).

The study conducted by Lwegoshora (2013) showed that specifically in developing countries, "political-administration are intermixed so much turns public administrators into politicians and politicians into administrators thereby creating confusion and overstepping the zone where they need to execute their respective functions". Hence Lwegoshora argued the idea of mistrust between the elected and the appointed officials specifically in Tanzania although it also happens in most countries. The trust phenomenon was highly raised by the participants in this study and is discussed in Chapter 5. The overstepping of roles and functions remains a huge challenge in political- administration interface across countries and spheres of government.

For example, in Tanzania, the study conducted by Azunu assumes that a district executive director took to task the elected officials not to meddle with the tax collections as such onus lied on the appointed officials (Azunu, 2013, p. 65). In South Africa, human resources, financial management, and supply chain-related matters become a source of conflict among the elected and appointed officials. The study recorded public administration as the rarest resource that required leadership within the public service during earlier years of liberation in Zimbabwe. It was also found that Ministers had corrupt tendencies and abused power through the usage of state resources and influenced policy decisions for their benefit or personal gain. Key to political overstepping, overpowering administration was the administrative forte of a permanent secretary (DG in a South African context) who would be able to restrict such unfortunate activities. These inherent political-administrative battles and paradoxes between Ministers and permanent secretaries caused the late prime Minister and the then President Mugabe to facilitate a symposium in 1984, where he warned permanent secretaries and indicated that:

"I am fully aware that in some cases you may be working under a Minister irrevocably given to procedural irregularity. You must resist such propensity for error. Nor must you act as a Ministerial agent for preferential treatment based on regional, tribal, or nepotistic

considerations. Be not tainted with the sins of your Minister, but do allow his virtues also to become your own. I hope I am not giving you license to turn my Ministers into “yes Ministers”, as quoted by (Azunu, 2013, 60-75).

The “yes Minister”, or formal-legal patterns of interaction were fully discussed in this piece of work at the country level and unit of the study (EA and DG). This statement was made more than 30 years ago, however, it is still relevant in today's public administration. This is a governance and leadership issue that has to be attended to and taken seriously at the country, institutional, and individual echelons. The depth of the challenge requires an intervention by African leaders through African Union (AU) initiatives and be observed and hypothesised at an African government-wide regulation. If not attended to, phasing in the coalition government in some South African provinces will make political-administrative matters worse than they were when one party was governing.

According to Zhou & Zvoushe (2012), in Zimbabwe, this terrain has not been easy with “inter-party-political wrangles and squabbling as well as unending economic and social changes” (Zhou & Zvoushe, 2012, p. 219). According to Zinyama & Tinarwo’s study (2014), “Ministers from the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) did not have experience in government business and faced many challenges working with experienced and seasoned permanent secretaries appointed from the previous government. The initial unilateral appointment of permanent secretaries by the President without prior consultation with principals from other political parties as prescribed by the Global Political Agreement (GPA) did not inspire a spirit of trust and cooperation necessary for good working relations between Ministers and top public servants” (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014 p. 36). They further denoted that,

“permanent secretaries are apolitical and neutral administrative cadres would eliminate the struggle and unnecessary noise about their appointment. The mistrust and power struggles between some permanent secretaries and the Minister are wrong and missing the point in saying the permanent secretary cannot initiate anything. It’s not like that. The permanent secretary is an accounting officer and the establishment officer is an initiator. The avowal by the Minister shows the degree of consternation, vexation, and disenchantment about his working relationship with the permanent secretary. The relationship is supposed to be symbiotic. Furthermore, the duties and responsibilities seem to be perplexing and confused or there is overstepping and intrusion on each other’s terrain and jurisdiction. The Minister appears to be at pains to elucidate his duties and authority. One wonders why this could not

be addressed in the offices if the relationship between the Minister and permanent secretary is melodious and convivial” (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, pp35-40).

Zinyama & Tinarwo further explained that “the permanent secretary is an ex-combatant who sabotages the Minister’s plans, and the strained relations between the two actors were visible”. Another respondent in their study cited the “personality of the Minister is the problem. He bulldozes and does not listen to advice” (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p. 37). These are all challenges that are mostly closer to the heart of many countries worldwide inclusive of South Africa due to power relations.

The study also transcripts maladministration that frequently happened deceiving communiqué between the two parties. The political gravities constantly battle with administrative standards of designing and executing programmes as per objective criteria. For instance, in the UK, administrative borderlines are often drawn to ensure that political over-supremacy is minimised. When there are no reputable rules of engagement and agreements, the political-administrative space becomes a battlefield for turf wars.

Zinyama & Tinarwo’s (2014) study further revealed that the “permanent secretaries took advantage of the immaturity, ingenuousness, and inexperience of MDC Ministers in government business to obtain unrestricted supremacy in influencing the rhythm and implementation of government regulations and results” (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p. 37).

The study also cited two practical examples in the Zimbabwean Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Education, Arts, Sports, and Culture; where the permanent secretaries “reversed decisions regarding new school fees structure and implementation of the skills audit of public servants respectively”. In an interview, on 27 August 2009, the Minister of Education, Arts, Sports, and Culture referred to a perception of two centres of power in his ministry (himself and the permanent); however, he attributed this to the process of evolution that Zimbabwe was experiencing. Permanent secretaries or DGs have a responsibility to act objectively, honestly, impartially, and with integrity in any country including SA to strengthen the efficacy and productivity of government. In South Africa, this is drawn in the NDP, under the “capable, ethical and developmental state priority”. The study argued that the “conflicts, impertinence and the range of interpersonal challenges between the Ministers and permanent secretaries in the Government of National Unity (GNU) are palpable and unmistakable in the case of the Secretary of Information and Publicity when he overtly castigated the Prime Minister for signing

a bilateral agreement with the South Korean Government” (CISOMM, 2010, p.17). The permanent secretary argued that the Prime Minister had no jurisdiction and authority to preside over such matters.

This situation is not unique to Zimbabwe, it happens worldwide, a case in point is the Apleni vs President and the then Minister of Home Affairs where the DG argued that the “Minister had no jurisdiction to suspend him” and the case was won in the court of law. Undeniably, the secretary may have the point in line with the GPA framework, however, the matter could have been handled amicably between the permanent secretary and the President of the country. The study argued that it was against modus operandi and procedure for the secretary to openly criticize the Prime Minister. These are generic issues persisting worldwide that require mellowed daily engagements and openly mapping these relationships and challenges. Therefore, from the onset, in each institution, political and administrative leaders have the responsibility to openly characterize and map the authorised rules of engagement and by so doing, the patterns of interaction may improve.

The PAL model may come in handy for political and administrative leaders who would like to set foot on a good note. The model, as outlined in earlier chapters below, plots the types of relationships amongst Ministers and DGs, maps how power is handled, decisions political and administrative decisions are made, and how conflicts and tensions are resolved to harmonise the environment and stabilise institutions. Perhaps, before appointments can be made, a scrutiny of the right fit for the organisation as well as the flawless fit between the two critical players. Prior patterns of interaction can be used for both, to get the right match. For instance, it is not always possible to have a hybrid of the administrative state (influential DG) and the adversarial (No Minister) type at the same time, which could be a recipe for disaster. The mixture would be highly dominated by public administration and would not work as it is imbalanced.

According to the GPA framework in Zimbabwe, the Prime Minister heads government business meaning that the Prime Minister has executive authority over the secretary and the Ministers in the inclusive government. Then it is imperative to be aware that tensions between elected and appointed heads are not only curbed alone to officials from diverse political parties in the inclusive government. The conflicts can also be observed within party lines. The study reported that there was a fall-out between the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, and his secretary, George Charamba in 2005, which was a political-administrative theme. In this

case, it was reported that the permanent secretary bragged about his experience in government which reached over two decades against the Minister's less than five. As quoted by Zinyama & Tinarwo (2014), Moyo said Charamba had "no right to criticize him so publicly for allegedly impairing the line between public servants and politicians, (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p. 38). It is said that the Minister expressed anger in a letter to the Chief Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President and Cabinet demanding that disciplinary actions be taken against the permanent secretary. What was noticeable was that the permanent secretaries are not accountable to Ministers and Ministers have no sanction powers, i.e., to discipline errant, delinquent, and wayward permanent secretaries, similarly in the SA context. Delegation of authority has not yet been implemented from the President to the Ministers. Closely related to this case is the one between the then Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Made, and his permanent secretary, Pazvakavambwa, who was reported to have uproar as a result of disagreements on a deal that led to the procurement of sub-standard fertilizer from South Africa in 2006. Pazvakavambwa was expelled from the Ministry and his dismissal was announced by Chief Secretary to the Office of the President and Cabinet. However, Pazvakavambwa threatened to "spill the beans. He further argued that the danger was that even during good times within the political-administrative domain, there could be a lot of connivance, complicity, and collusion between the Ministers and permanent secretary to strike deals for self-aggrandizement at the expense of the taxpayers. Another classical example was between the permanent secretary and the Minister of Tourism and Hospitality. The permanent secretary told the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environment and Tourism that Zimbabwe had lied to win the bid to co-host the United Nations World Tourism Organisation General Assembly in August 2013. Zinyama & Tinarwo (2014), reported that the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority chief executive officer during the interview said,

"I see this lie by the permanent secretary as political. He thinks that lying can turn against the Minister. The Minister responded to the allegations of lying and mendacious by saying Zimbabwe's bid to co-host the General Assembly had been undertaken fairly and transparently. This explicitly shows the animosity, hostility, and tension between the elected and appointed government officials. The then-President also blasted the behavior displayed by the permanent secretary when he emphatically said: The team around the preparation of this event must desist from issuing statements of a policy nature that undermines the credibility and authenticity of this international event" (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p.p 33-38).

From the preceding President's statement, one can gather that hypothetically, the permanent secretary was not supposed to make remarks on policy formulation but rather policy implementation-related issues. In other words, this is the domain, realm, and terrain of the Minister. This is where many writers differ as political administration requires complementarity and collaboration as policy formulation must meet policy implementation otherwise policies will be attractive on paper and difficult to implement. Yes, the permanent secretary may have floundered about the purpose of national security, public interest, and the common good, however, it must be noted that an absolute separation of the dichotomy may not work effectively in today's public administration, governance, and leadership. The study reveals that the concept of neutrality of a permanent secretary is a myth and farce. The former Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai believes that it is possible to have politically apolitical top public servants. He once said:

"We do not believe that public servants should be appointed on a partisan basis; so there will be no civil servant from MDC or ZANU-PF. Any civil servant who participates in partisan politics will have no place in our public service and I urge the Minister of Public Service to ensure that the appropriate measures are put in place to that effect" (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p.-39).

The former Prime Minister realises a public service that is unbiased in its business, which may be problematic for many African countries. Presently the employment of permanent secretaries/DGs is even called "political appointments" in most countries including SA. The relationships between the Ministers and the senior public servants should be reciprocal and should strive to work as a team and collaborate to develop and strengthen public value. Autocracy as discussed in Chapter 2 has not been the best regime to facilitate collaboration and functional relationships. Thus, Zinyama & Tinarwo (2014) further argues that "the Minister should not be an isolated autocrat, giving orders without hearing or bearing in mind other people's arguments for alternative paths of action. To dishearten and depress honest official advice is both trivial and unhelpful. Furthermore, advisers who are viewed as mere "Yes-men" playing up to the Minister in the hope of advancement are just as perilous, and death-defying as are stubborn and obstreperous "No-men". It must be known that both types are bad" (Zinyama & Tinarwo, 2014, p. 39).

A comparison can also be made between the African continent and the world. For instance, when the United Kingdom (UK) executed administrative reforms, it was reported that a cluster of

Ministers established certain rebelliousness towards permanent secretaries and the contrary can also be true. For example, Sir Kenneth Stowe, a previous permanent secretary to three Prime Ministers of the UK said, “It will be lost if Ministers see officials as “gofers” and if officials see Ministers as only uncritical dogmatic” (Stowe, 1994, p. 175). Zinyama & Tinarwo’s (2014) research work noticed that the conflict strain between permanent secretaries and temporary Ministers in Zimbabwe was entrenched in the public service culture and different philosophical and fiscal paradigms. The Institute of Public Research in the UK stated that the working relationship between elected Ministers and appointed officials in the UK was for a longer period a cause to worry about and distrust the opposition Labour Party. Similarly, in Zimbabwe and SA, Ministers argued that since they are eventually accountable to parliament, they are leaders, while the permanent secretaries say they have the powers granted by the Constitution and acts of parliament to control all financial, human, and material resources of the ministry and to that extent, they are administrators and managers. In the SA context, the argument on what they should control is clearly stated in various pieces of laws (PFMA, PSA, Treasury regulations, SMS Handbook) that were discussed in earlier chapters.

Zinyama & Tinarwo (2014) study also contended that the “Ministers peddle expansively in the administration of the ministries, especially in the appointments of staff, use of vehicles, and above all, unnecessary claims for travel and subsistence allowances even in situations where there was no government business to be performed other than self-interest. However, these problems radiate from the demarcation of roles between the Ministers and permanent secretaries which is very absorbent, leaky, and fluid. In Zimbabwe, the demarcation is noticeable in circulars which are issued from time to time by the cabinet office, not procedures”. In other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, boundaries are officially written, demarcating the powers of both, but there are still problems in the relationships between the two. The Ministers’ guidelines are stated in the memorandum on the questions of procedures, for the permanent secretaries, they are stated in the duties and responsibilities of public administrators with Ministers. These demarcation problems can only be addressed through mutual, reciprocated respect between the elected and appointed officials. However, Ministers complain that “the quality of policy advice they get from permanent secretaries is extremely poor”.

4.4 Summary

Governance and leadership issues remain problematic in the African continent and require presidential intervention. In this chapter issues that relate to tensions between Ministers and

DGs, meddling between politics and administration, political interference, political overpower, and overstepping were not only isolated in South Africa but are governance and leadership issues facing the continent. As argued by Zinyama & Tinarwo Ministers have a lot to lose and thereby they need to provide strong policy leadership, build bridges, and avoid jumbled, fickle, and indecisive policies that would be difficult to implement and hinder quality service. Mistrust, disrespect, and failure to cooperate reflect poor leadership. These characteristics were elevated by many participants in this study which are outlined in detail in chapter 5 which depicts the results of the political administrative relationships and their effects on stability in the three selected departments.

Chapter 5: Research results, presentation, and findings

5.1 Introduction

The relationship between the designated and undesignated officials is the foundation for understanding the governance process in public administration (Hansen and Ejersbo, 2002, p. 733). The term designated simply means officially appointed and undesignated is the opposite. In 2002 Pollitt and Bekaert wrote that public administration cannot be accurately understood without making a referral to the vital relationships that exist between politics and administration (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2002, p.183). Thus, the relationship between politics and various scholarly studies, it is evident that the political meddling between the elected and appointed officials affects patterns of their interactions and teamwork negatively.

There is ample evidence of the turnover rate of HoDs in SA. However, studies do not necessarily clear whether the turnover rate was caused by the kind of relationship EAs and HoDs may have, therefore remains indistinct. Therefore, this study examined the political-administration-leadership (PAL), a thematic model developed and named by the researcher to test and map any leadership relationship. A shortened version of politics is (Poli), and for administration (Admin) and leadership (Lead), the PAL model. PAL was developed with an idea in mind from the themes derived from the questionnaire by the researcher. If described PAL also means a companionship that the two leaders can form and also translated as Political and Administrative leaders must both Lead. PAL is used throughout Chapter 5 to test the following themes in each of the three departments.

5.1.1 POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP (PAL) MODEL

As indicated in Chapter 2, the themes below were used to assess the existing relationships, how political administrative power is managed as well and who makes major decisions. The themes below are also testing whether these political-administrative decisions are resulting in harmonised or conflicts at the leadership levels. If the tension exists then is it managed? Can the identified relationships lead to stability or instability in institutions? The question is answered in sections 5.2 and 5.4 of this Chapter. Below are the responses to each of the PAL themes.

5.2 Office of the Public Service Commission analysis


The study addresses several themes based on the questions that were posed to the participants across the three departments and responses were provided under each theme. These themes are related to managing power, characterising the relationship typologies, characteristics of good relations between the two main actors, decision-making processes, and whether there is stability in the selected departments.

5.2.1 Handling of political/administrative power

The study questionnaires were based on the above thematical approaches and the responses to the questions varied per participant and department. Five demographic questions and ten study-related questions were posed to the participants. All fifteen officials agreed to participate in the study and responded to research question 1 (Q1). This question tested how political and administrative power is handled both at political and administrative levels as both heads have distinct roles to play in government to improve government performance. Both individuals possess either political or administrative power, hence a clear distinction has to be made between executive (Ministerial) power and administrative (DG) power, they are not the same. The distinction is usually made by affirming the executive function to be essentially political-power holders in character and controlling supervision over the technical administrative executive and taking necessary steps to see that the instructions are given and carried out and implemented by the technical expert, the administrative head. The essence of both politics and administration is power and can easily be abused or manipulated at both levels if unbalanced, mishandled, and ignored in practice.

Power should not be narrowly concentrated and possessed only by the politician or administrator. Out of the fifteen responses in the Office of the Public Service Commission (OPSC), 10 which translates to 67% (participants 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15) were of the view that both political and administrative power is handled well whilst 5 (33%) who are participants number 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 believed that power was mishandled as depicted in graph 1 below.

5.2.1.1 Chart 16: Management of power in the OPSC



The legislative pieces that were discussed in earlier chapters, for example, the PFMA, PSA, and PSR, are clear on what to be done and who is responsible for what. Therefore, ideally, the functions and responsibilities of each of the two parties are supposed to flow effortlessly. As recited by those participants who believed in the existence of abuse of power, they cited that political office bearers often meddle with the work of the accounting officer on administrative issues. They apprehended that ministers often abuse their powers. Elected politicians may refuse to share political power and opt for interparty rivalry and create short-term solutions that would perpetuate re-election rather than improve the quality of policymaking through interaction with relevant actors. This can also happen at inter-political levels and political-administrative points. Amundsen (2019), argued that "South Africa highlights abuse of political power as a contributor to corrupt practices. Corruption in its many forms has penetrated insidiously into SA government despite existing legislation" (Amundsen, 2019, p. 170). The participants who were of the view that there is the exploitation of power were basing it on the fact that the hierarchy of the politically inclined permits them to possess absolute power and always possess more power

than the one deprived of such power e.g. a Minister would be more powerful versus a DG. Even in institutions where power is managed well, such environments are bound to have pockets of political interference for ulterior motives in the operations which surface in operations through various internal platforms utilised by influential individuals.

The majority of participants (67%) perceive that there is a clear distinction between the two portfolios and separation of political and administrative powers due to the structure, functioning, and uniqueness of the OPSC which is led by the chairperson and EA and 14 commissioners at a political level. The DG reports to the Chairperson of the Commission who is an EA to the DG, and the EA who is the Chairperson reports to the Minister who is an EA. Therefore, the political power resides in the hands of all commissioners as political heads and they are supported by the office administratively. A chairperson is a political head and the EA while the Director-General is the head of administration and secretariat that supports the OPSC. The DG is responsible for operational matters of the department while the chairperson has an executive authority role to play. The Commission performs its mandate as per the Constitution which is an outward focus and the DG provides the necessary administrative support to lead a team of professionals/technical experts.

A well-oiled machinery of government requires balanced power from top bureaucrats and politicians. They all have a critical role to play to either provide a political or administrative role in the organisation and sound handling of power. This duality and mutuality necessitate non-interference and exclusion of administrators from resolving political controversies and carry certain elements that shape political-administrative model relations along with political neutrality, professionalism, sharing and division of function, and distinctive means (Svara, 2006, p. 121).

According to 67% of the respondents, in the OPSC power is not mishandled by the chairperson, commissioners, and Director-General. An example was made that the chairperson as the EA has a huge role in the recruitment, appointment, and renewal of the contract of the DG/s and will have a big influence on the DG and the direction of the organisation which the DG should follow suit without political power being abused. The respondents who indicated that power was handled well in the PSC based their views on the importance of dual roles played by both heads and cognisance of their responsibilities to promote the work of the OPSC, focus on providing strategic directions at all times and strengthen good working relationships. The respondents believed that even though each individual possesses either political or administrative power, there are instances where political heads interfere in the administrative heads' authority or

space, and this hamstrung government performance. In the case of the OPSC, the view was those good working relations were maintained even between the chairperson and the responsible Minister in the Public Service and Administration (MPSA).

5.2.2 Administrative/Political decision-making processes

Major decision-making processes were also tested on whether they were made at a political, or administrative level or in a balanced way (both). Twelve instead of fifteen participants responded to the question, with the majority of seven (59%) believing that the major decisions were made politically (participants 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11). While (1) 8% assumed they were administrative (participant 3), and (4) 33.3% were participants (2, 6, 7, and 12) and presumed decisions were a mix of politics and administration. The participants who presupposed that political decisions were made in the OPSC considered the political landscape in South Africa and its policies and felt that political heads have a greater influence in making major decisions because of the political authority they exercise. They noted that although the Commission has been given the political power to make a major decision they should remain impartial not only on paper but practically.

The participants who were pro-collective decision-making process indicated the necessity to collaborate as both heads each other. It is a prerequisite to progressive government. A lower percentage felt that the DG as an accounting authority makes major decisions.

5.2.3 Working relations in harmony, conflict, or both

At the core of public administration lies the need to implement the policies of the government of the day. According to Moe, it is the commencement of the challenges “making it difficult for the public to separate the political from the administrative system and making it possible for politicians to blame for unpopular decisions on the bureaucracy” (Moe, 1995, p. 116). While such mutual distrust and blame avoidance remain a problem, adversarial relations between politicians and bureaucracy have become more visible (Hood, 2007, p. 200). When the OPSC participants were asked about how interactions between the EA/s and HoD/s have been over the years in the department, 8 (participants 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 19, 11, and 13) out of the 15 responses indicated harmonious relations. There are differences in ideologies however, they do not affect the working conditions, and there are no unlawful instructions from the chairperson and the Minister. Even though a bigger percentage (53%) of them indicated that mostly harmonious, in

any relationship it is guaranteed that there are sporadic incidences of tensions and heated debates. From the pool of participants who agreed that there is harmonious interaction, participant 2 was of the view that “HoDs are sub-serving the master (EA), conflict is avoided by all possible just to secure a career and therefore may the harmony part come as a disguise”.

Five out of fifteen participants felt the relationship is not always harmonious and opted for both conflict and harmony. The view of one participant (number 12) which constitutes 7% is that the interactions between EAs and HoDs are a challenge due to different opinions. Their interactions are characterised by conflict because of competing short-term and long-term demands and not having a common purpose, therefore see it as conflict-based interaction. Only one participant was unsure of the kind of interaction (participant 15). The popular view was that interactions at this level are based on the understanding that politics should meet administration and therefore, the DG and EA have a very good and cordial interaction. The DG understands the importance of supporting the EA in terms of the PSA and PFMA functions and the Commission in terms of its constitutional mandate.

Participants 1, 4, 7, 8, and 14 indicated that interactions with politics and administration are often characterised by both harmony and conflict due to different opinions. A practical example was then made by participant 1 that “if comrades or allies are implicated or their interests are not fulfilled then conflict is bound to happen or vice-versa”. This varies from a perspective of personalities and department to department (institutional) as in some departments the relationship is harmonious whilst, in others, the relationship is full of conflict as can be seen in journalistic reports and news. To be specific in the OPSC there is a strong, collaborative working relationship between the two heads, cordial relationship, and supportive of each other. The bug of this harmonious relationship does not end with the two heads, it extends to other commissioners who seem to be in harmony, and when they have to account for oversight bodies the two defend and protect each other, claimed some of the respondents. As a result of the good working relationship and mostly harmonious environment between the DG, DDGs, the chairperson of the Commission as EA to the office and Commissioners the flow of work concerning approval of submissions for OPSC reports and other documents via the administration process to the final approval of the Commission’s Specialist Task Teams (CSTT).

5.2.4 Characteristics of a working relationship between Ministers and DGs

In terms of the characteristics of a good working relationship between Ministers and DGs, the OPSC participants stated that mutual respect is one of the important aspects of a healthy working relationship at any level. Mutual respect on a personal level and respect for one's roles and responsibilities. The two parties must respect the decision-making processes, and foster openness as per the 9 constitutional values and principles in Chapter 10 of the Constitution. Value 9 emphasises that relations with others should be respectful to affirm their humanity. The minute both the Minister and DG respect and honour the rule of law and adhere to fair labour relation practices in the Department/Office the healthier their bond between them. The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has been characterised by distrust mutual pressure and criticism in many countries in the global sphere including the African continent. In the case of the OPSC, mutual respect in the workplace helped the two heads to understand each other's roles in a department and value each other's responsibilities, abilities, functions, and qualities to promote the achievement of the department's mandate and goals. This can be achieved by each of them understanding the political direction and administrative actions required to accomplish the political direction and program of action of the government in line with the key priorities of the government. Being valued and treated respectfully helps to promote a positive work culture in which employees are fulfilled, loyal, engaged, and motivated to perform at their very best. In cases where respect is not offered to others, the environment becomes unprofessional and poses a threat to the health and success of the department. As a result of the threat that an unhealthy relationship may pose, the respondents indicated the importance of professionalism for both the EA and the DG and cited that although they need not be friends and will not always agree, they must be able to state their views and reach a consensus.

Another critical area to be observed at any level in molding good relations is "clearly understood roles". As soon as what is expected and the accomplishments thereof are clearly stated through performance agreements between the EA and the DG, and most importantly agreed upon, then their ongoing interactions should be more on the harmonious side and contribute positively to the overall success of the department. This then cascades down to the rest of the employees in the department with an extra motivational edge. Participants also argued that commitment to the vision of the government of the day and upholding the country's vision ensures the achievement of the goals. The political-administrative relationships require accountability and

transparency in terms of work and ethical decisions that should be made at each crossing point. Bröhmer looks at the roots of transparency and examines the question of whether a principle of transparency can be derived from the constitution. Consequently, he does not only consider administrative transparency but the transparency of all three powers: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary (Bröhmer, 2004, p.260). Transparency is central to trustworthiness between the two parties. Transparency in political administration relationships contributes positively to the integrity of public institutions which encourages public trust and public support. The value of transparency can be measured using a dipstick of how lawfulness and responsibility are promoted by politicians and bureaucrats which should create a shared assurance between the government and the citizens. A government with a deficit of transparency would be unable to find confidence in its people.

Political and administrative leaders require sound vision and the strength to pursue it, collaboration with subordinates and must possess qualities in transformational and ethical leadership, accountability, integrity and transparency, respect and dignity, cooperation, collaboration and consensus on major decisions, equity, self-confidence, empathy, assertiveness, and so forth. Many of these characteristics are also found in the list from other departments and therefore transversal. A good working relationship is always characterised by proactive management of inter-group conflicts and the creation of an environment of cooperation and a sense of responsibility, not the elimination of intergroup conflicts as is the case currently. The HoD and Minister must speak with one voice and understand the strategic objectives of the department in the same way. Together they should strive to enhance the performance of the department to realize the achievement of the set goals and targets, particularly understanding the specific role that each plays in Public Service.

Although collaboration, co-creating, respect for self, others, and office, and listening to each other were seen as good characteristics of a good working relationship, one participant emphasized the importance of having boundaries in these relationships in allowing each other to perform their roles as crossed zones can pose many challenges in political-administration. Undoubtedly, when those political-administrative margins are not demarcated, there will be blurry lines in terms of who directs organisational administration or vice versa.

Professionalism, a sense of responsibility, and accountability were also the traits that were cited to strengthen the performance of the department. It must be noted there was high frequency on the respect aspect as the respondents most mentioned its importance. Ministers and HoDs

should have a good working relationship because the ultimate beneficiary is the society whose needs must be addressed by leaders in good spirits. Once a common purpose has been defined, there should be no reason why the Ministers and HoDs cannot have a good working relationship because the ultimate beneficiary is the society whose needs must be addressed. Further, that is all parties must behave professionally and respect their office.

5.2.5 Existence of tension between political and administrative heads

It is essential to be attentive to the two groups' logic of action to get an overview and systematic understanding of the intricate interaction between politicians and administrators. It is argued that politicians are driven by the "inductive logic of action" while administrators are influenced by the "deductive logic of action" (Hansen & Ejersbo, 2002, p. 733-750). These two contraries produce a logic of conflict between the two actors. Participant 1 in the study indicated that several studies conducted by the OPSC also found that in general, the relationships are toxic due to abuse of power and referred to the state capture inquiry where EAs are the most implicated in the art of corruption, their pressure on HoDs resulted in the implementation of incorrect decisions which in the end formed malicious acts of maladministration of state funds. Eleven participants indicated below agreed that there is a level of tension (60%) that exist and these relationships can have problems and be characterised by tension because sometimes EAs would interfere in administration and by the relationship tensions are bound to arise (participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7,8, 9, 11, 12, 14).

There are government legislations and codes in place that should help to manage disagreements and tension if they are correctly implemented. The government prescripts like the Public Service Act (PSA) clearly outline the limits and give Ministers and DG certain powers. The Public Service Act gave all human resources powers to EAs and the Public Finance Management Act gave all finance powers to DGs. Then if you have an EA saying "I want to appoint so many people and the DG says it is not in the budget" you can have a conflict that spoils the relationship and affects the performance of the DG and the department. The Ministers who are provided with HR powers and DGs with finance powers become the source of tensions, especially when the EA does not want to delegate its powers and also wants finances for projects that are not part of the strategic plan objectives and the annual performance plan, specifically when the Minister wants to give unlawful instructions. The tension exists because of a lack of a common purpose and agreement on the implementation strategies. Usually, disagreements happen around operational matters and conflicts set by the responsibilities of the

EAs and DGs. Abuse of power and accountability that is not equally shared is the cause of tension. Sometimes disagreements are due to personality clashes that do not have anything to do with the functioning of the department. They have to realise the value of serving and being patriotic, and not fend for their stomachs. Other areas that were cited as a cause for tensions were fights related to the recruitment of people who do not meet requirements as well as service provider matters – even if such services are for free.

Where accountability is shared, the responsibility for the good governance of the department in question would be shared as well. It becomes even worse in those cases where the EA wants to be hands-on and be part of decisions even on operational matters. The government has a good structure of managing its work through strategic plans, annual performance plans, and performance agreements, however, EAs fiddle with financial administration and make decisions, alleged another participant. The EAs should focus on their responsibilities and monitor the implementation of national policy priorities implemented by HoDs. It is sometimes documented that some Ministers are not on good terms with the HoDs sometimes it harvests and illustrated by the turnover rate, irrational suspensions, and transfers of HODs to other departments which are done through mediation by an independent body like OPSC or Presidency by nominating a mediator or redeploying the DG to other departments. This may lead to the erosion of trust and reliance on each other and eventually a decline in departmental performance. The sense was that both political and administrative leaders do not practice what they preach. The participants were also solution-oriented and suggested the following to eliminate some of the tension between the two parties.

- ***To resolve the legal conflict and give HR and finance powers to DGs except for him/herself and give EAs oversight roles.***

Participant 12 indicated HR and finance powers should be given to DGs and quoted sections 44-45 of the PFMA of South Africa's financial powers reside with the DG of the department. His/her financial obligations would involve but not be limited to (i) exercising all reasonable care to prevent and detect unauthorised, irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure, and for this purpose implement effective, efficient, and transparent processes of financial and risk management. (ii) Taking effective and appropriate steps to collect all money due to the institution including, as necessary- (a) maintenance of proper accounts and records for all debtors, including amounts received in part payment; and (b) referral of a matter to the state attorney, where economical, to consider a legal demand and possible legal proceedings in a

court of law. (iii) Exercising the discretion to recover debts owing to the state in instalments. (iv) Writing off of debts owing to the state. This is also stated in the SA PFMA. (PFMA guidelines, 2014 p10-15).

- ***Tension should be managed through constructive dialogue and listening to each other more.***

The participants who agreed that tension exists agreed that in any tension resolution, a healthy dialogue is tremendously imperative to strengthen and expand cooperation between the two relationships. Communication is a critical factor in resolving any communication. A common ground between the parties must be reached for both sides to focus on a win-win solution while listening to one another for intrinsic needs and interests. A resolution dialogue has the purpose of resolving conflict.

- ***To train officials, so that they realise that they are in their positions to serve the government and not to enrich themselves.***

Self-enrichment has become the matching order of the day in various institutions and is a feature in the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture report which implicates many South Africans in high-level positions. The fact remains that a yearning for self-enrichment is the consciousness of private self-interest. This notion has proved that if individuals enrich only themselves, the rest of the citizens suffer. The country suffered a great deal when the leaders' ethical abilities were below par and questionable and this was evident in the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture report. The cases of corrupt and fraudulent activities in a leadership sphere signify unethical leadership at the apex of government. According to Budhram "Corruption in South Africa is endemic and statistical data show that the government is failing to combat this scourge effectively. Mcebisi Jonas, former Deputy Finance Minister, has observed that South Africa has experienced a 'silent coup' and become a 'shadow state' riddled with corruption, while others say that the country is on the verge of becoming a 'Mafia state' and a recipe for a failed state. This article assesses and reports on the performance of role players responsible for the investigation and prosecution of corruption, based on published data from annual reports and statistics for the three years, 2014/15 to 2016/17" (Budhram & Geldenhuys, 2018, p1).

- ***The creation of the Head of Public Service also should help as DG appointments and performance management would be under the Head of Public Service and small defined roles for EAs.***

The vision 2030, NDP gave rise to the creation of the HOPA in South Africa. The National Development Plan Diagnostic Overview report indicated that accountability mechanisms are frequently not implemented as managers seek to avoid taking responsibility, the result, in many cases, is the erosion of accountability and lines of authority, with an adverse impact on organisational performance. The current approach to appointments blurs the lines of accountability. The Public Service Act 1994, states that the responsibilities for both the appointment and career incidents of DGs rest with the President and according to the HoD PMDS, performance agreements should be signed by the President. This legislation has confused as to who can dismiss or suspend a DG, an example of this situation is the Apleni case law. Apleni had contested the President of the Republic of South Africa as the 1st

respondent and the Minister of Home Affairs as the 2nd respondent. Mr. Apleni as the applicant had challenged the Minister's authority to dismiss him from his job. The court ruled that the Minister does not have the power to dismiss the applicant, only the President can do so. The applicant won the case and was reinstated to his position. In reaction to the Apleni case, the DPSA sent out a clarification circular to state that the President is the relevant Executive Authority for DGs. This case law has been used a couple of times by other DGs who were shown the door after Mr. Apleni. Another major challenge in the public sector is the inability to retain DGs which leads to disruption in the functioning of the department. Leadership changes are often accompanied by major policy reviews and shifts in policy direction, contributing to instability in the public sector. This was revealed by the NDP Diagnostic Overview. The Head of Public Administration (HoPA) as a neutral official should be responsible for facilitating the resolution of tensions between the EA and the DG to ensure that they work together more effectively. The political-administrative interface is the source of tension between EAs and DGs as they contest each other's terrain which may lead to disputes. Being able to facilitate resolutions between EAs and DGs is the fundamental requisite for the effective and efficient management of organisations.

In South Africa, this creates challenges in terms of administrative reporting and accountability. In certain instances, political heads have been involved in labour matters for overstepping administrative power. Inappropriate political interference in administrative matters as well as strained relations between key political and administrative heads in the public service can affect the performance of a department. Probably political interference should be termed political intervention when a political crisis may originate within the administration rather than the negative connotation that comes with political interference.

The HoPA should be able to intervene by utilising corrective counseling in cases where there are strained relationships which will ensure efficient and effective performance in the public sector. All national DGs and CEOs of national government components will report to the HoPA which will ensure standardisation, fairness, and consistency in terms of performance reporting

- ***Professionalism should also be emphasized to manage conflict***

According to Gibson, Ivancevich, and Donnelly, factors causing conflict among co-workers “include among others the work interdependence when two or more organisational groups depend on one another to complete their tasks, differences in goals, limited resources, reward structures, the difference in perceptions, unfair treatment as well as leadership management aspect” (Gibson, 1994, p. 89) According to Marilyn Lindblad, professionalism in an organisation or at workplace refers to collections of an individual’s characters, skills, standard behaviour, attitude, and team spirits that, brings individuals and groups to work in harmony with each other hence better organisation performance (Marilyn, 2005, p 2). The participants contended that professionalism should also be emphasized to manage conflicts.

- ***Role clarification is crucial***

According to Participant 9, clarification of roles is a crucial point of departure. It is distinctively central to politicians and administrators as many can overlap and hypothetically cause conflict. Clarifying each other’s roles builds intra-team confidence, strengthens harmony, promotes openness, and builds lasting good relationships. Participant 15 even thought that Ministers and HoDs do not have a good working relationship as long as the ultimate beneficiary is the society whose needs must be addressed. Therefore, the presiding factors between the two individuals must be characterized by mutual respect and understanding, professionalism and accountability, cooperation and collaboration as well as integrity and transparency. Participant 12 wrote that “healthy tension between the Ministers and heads of departments should be promoted as long as it is in the best interest of the public service and society as a whole”. According to Arnold, 2017 leaders need to embrace “healthy tension” that provides a practical framework that allows them to tap into the power of healthy tension and thinking (Arnold, 2017, p. 1).

5.2.6 Causes of tension between politics and administration

The majority of the participants (67%) agreed that tension is bound to arise even in the healthiest relationships due to the nature of the relationships that exist. They also referred to the origins of the tension perpetrated by the following:

- Abuse of power is the cause of tension.
- Executive Authorities interfere in administration fiddle with financial administration and make decisions.
- The EA desires to be hands-on and be part of decisions even on operational matters. A strong DG would not and should not allow such interference as they take responsibility for operational decisions as Accounting Officers.
- The PSA which gives the Minister HR powers and PFMA which gives DG finance powers is the source of tensions, especially where the EA does not want to delegate its powers and also wants finances for projects that are not part of the strategic plan objectives and annual performance plans.
- An environment characterised by patronage, nepotism, and favouritism regarding recruitment and selection of preferred candidates with or without requirements
- Abuse of power over persons who may question their decisions a lot or who are a threat to their career or reputation.
- An unethical culture is the practice of the current ANC-led government. They do not practice what they preach.
- Erosion of trust and reliance on each other
- In cases where the Minister wants to give unlawful instructions
- Irrational suspensions, and transfers of HOD
- Uneven accountability between the politician and administrative head
- When employees forget about their social contract, i.e. their main responsibility to serve, and begin to be controlled by greed for tenders and other pervasive incentives
- Lack of a common purpose and agreement on the implementation strategies
- Disagreements are due to personality clashes
- Tensions emanate from greed, money, tenders, favours, nepotism
- The cause of these tensions is mainly caused by fights related to the recruitment of people who do not meet requirements as well as service provider matters – even if such services are for free (Participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7,8, 9, 11, 12, 14).

The few participants who thought that tension was non-existent in the OPSC indicated that stiffness in relations does transpire alternatively in other departments and agreed that it exists in the broader sphere of government. Even those who were not privy to any tension in the OPSC quoted that based on observations, tension exists in government. This group constituted 23%. They indicated that when the correct emotionally intelligent persons are appointed as Ministers

or heads of departments, they easily manage the conflict. This requires the right fit for purpose leaders with the correct and highest qualification/s, skills, experience, and know-how and again understanding of each other's specific roles. It must be acknowledged that it is usually practically difficult to apply this given the SA government's cadre deployment policy. Given this policy, such terms are mere rhetoric and unrealistic in a public service setting. The EA from the governing party of the day will formulate policy and for the HoD with his executive management team to implement such policy strongly according to the PFMA and other Treasury instructions (Participants 5, 10, 13, and 15).

5.2.7 Management of tension

Management of tension between politics and bureaucracy requires mediation by an independent body like OPSC or the Presidency to nominate a mediator or redeploy the DG to a different department where the DG would fit perfectly based on experience, skills, and qualifications. The executive authorities should focus on their responsibilities and monitor the implementation of national policy priorities by HoDs. The government has a good structure for managing its work through various government plans e.g. strategic plans over five years based on the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), Plans, Annual Performance Plans (APP), and performance agreements signed between EAs and DGs. This requires proper management of the existing government processes and constructive dialogue and listening to each other to avoid conflict-based relationships, "they have to realise the value of serving and being patriotic, and not fend for their stomachs as presumed a participant". There are legislation and codes in place to manage disagreements and tension, for example, the Public Service Act gave all human resources powers to EAs and the Public Finance Management Act gave all finance powers to DGs. Therefore, roles should be clear, restrictions applied and boundaries not crossed. Usually, disagreements happen around operational matters and conflicts set by the responsibilities of the EAs and DGs. In cases where it happens that an EA requests to appoint so many people and the DG says it is not in the budget, you can have a conflict that spoils the relationship and affects the performance of the DG and the department. The first thing to do is to resolve the legal conflict and give HR and finance powers to DGs except for him/herself and give EAs oversight roles. The creation of the Head of Public Service also should help as DG appointments and performance management would be under the Head of Public Service and small defined roles for EAs.

5.3 The types of relationships that exist in the OPSC

Based on Peters' relationship types, the participants from all three departments including the OPSC were asked to select from five types at the political level (EA) as well as the administrative level (DG), (a) formal-legal, yes Minister type of relationship (b) adversarial, No Minister relationship, (c) functional close relationship, mutual understanding, (d) village life – both have similar values (e) administrative state – the DG has inspiration in the department.

5.3.1 The relationship typology at the level of the administrative head

Most respondents indicated that they are basing their respondents on the previous DG of the OPSC as the new DG had two months at the time of collecting data and the period was too short to determine the relationship type. Some of the respondents felt that the EAs and the DGs normally have functional close relationships because DGs are rather powerful when it comes to administrative matters and exercise authority. On the other side, the administrative head feels obliged to agree with political heads because, amongst others, he/she wants his contract to be renewed. In a nutshell, the relationships become the kind of “you pet my back and I will pet yours”. Peters sees the functional-close relationship as conspiring in certain decision-making processes. This would require ethical leadership that can separate each other's functional areas and works collaboratively in terms of functional-close relationships and such interactions must be properly managed for the benefit of the organisation. If these relationships are handled well, the administrative and political leaders can track and probably practice the writings of Woodruff which date back to 1919 mentioning that politics and administration are not two antagonistic elements, each seeking to enlarge its sphere of action at the expense of the other. They are not even independent powers in the government, each working in a distinct field, performing its appropriate acts, and having for these purposes an authority of its own.


On the contrary, they are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the same way as two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the character to the substance. In a sense, politics and administration take part jointly in every act performed (Woodruff, 1919, p.37). The relationships can be characterised by trust, caring, interdependence, mutuality, and commitment. Out of the responses received, three types were identified from highest to lowest functional close relationship (42%) followed by the formal-legal relationship (33%), and lastly administrative state (25%). This is indicative that at the OPSC

concerning the DG, the relationship is functionally close. None of the participants selected adversarial and village life.

Unlike certain countries in European countries which can be clustered in the village life category in Peters' terminology, and due to penetration by external political forces see other countries closer to the "functional village life" model (Peters, Sootla, & Connaughton, 2006, p.151). The postulation is that most bureaucratic systems may be characterised as falling into either the "village" or "functional village" category. It appears that most of the Westminster systems would have begun in the village model, while most other systems would have been divided more functionally. For example, the United States may be particularly divided along functional lines, given the strength of sub-departmental. It must be noted though that the Thatcher- Great Britain, Reagan-United States, and Mulroney-Canada governments, among others, burned the village life, that had joined politicians and bureaucrats in their joint pursuit of governance (Peters & Pierre, 2008 p. 8). Graph 5.9.1.1 below shows the percentage of existing relationship types as per the participants' responses.

5.3.1.1 Chart 17: Relationship typology at DG level


The relationship type at the level of a DG is viewed to have a functional close relationship with the Chairperson of the PSC as the bulk (42%) of the participants lean more toward working types of the relationship and 33% view it as formal legal which would mean that the DG agrees with the Chairperson who is an EA in the PSC whilst 25% thinks that the DG is influential “Administrative state model”.



5.3.1.2 Graph 1: Administrative relationship types

7(a) DG/s in this department: Relationship type

15 responses




5.3.1.3 The relationship typology at the level of political head

As per the questionnaire, a similar question was posed for possible responses at the level of EA in the OPSC. Graph 5.9.1.1 below outlines the relationship at the level of EA and does not necessarily depict the relationship with the newly appointed chairperson. At both levels, the heads were new at the time of collecting data. The research results for this particular question were slightly different compared to the same question raised at the level of the DG. This depicts that the relationships were not the same for this question posed at different levels. Forty-six percent thought the relationship at this level was formal-legal interaction. This kind of relationship has similarities with a relationship between principal-agent which earlier theorists defined as the separation of ownership and control, one party (principal) regulates what to be done, and the agent performs or makes decisions on behalf of the principal. In 1984 Moe argued that the political principal exercises “constrained” power over the bureaucratic agent via a host of institutional mechanisms at their disposal (Moe 1984, p. 739-777). If administrative heads are always agreeing, “yes minister” all the time without any disputes can be problematic. The agent is expected to perform the following duties without fail and if not performed, relations may be affected negatively, turn sour and conflict may arise.


5.3.1.4 Chart 18: Relationship types in the OPSC: EA

At the EA level, the relationship tends to be formal-legal (46%) as the Chairperson of the PSC agrees with the DG while 23% interpret the relationship as functional close due to the understanding the Chairperson of the PSC may have with the DG. Sixteen participants thought that the Chairperson of the PSC disagreed with the DG while fifteen percent were of the view that the DG was influential.



5.3.1.5 Graph 2: Political relationship types in DTA

7(b)EA/s in the department: Relationship type
15 responses



5.4. Political-administrative stability in the Public Service Commission

The oversight role played by the OPSC in public service is vital. It contributes positively to the fact that no one should be above any law in a country including political and administrative leadership. There must be an efficient, transparent, and fair manner in which complaints and other HR matters in government are investigated. Therefore, the OPSC acts as the gatekeeper and oversees public service HR-related matters, and in reality, they must also walk the talk. In terms of what the respondents had to say about stability in the department is that at the level of the EA, it happened once when the term of the Chairperson and Commissioners ended, and then the new EA was appointed. At the DG level, it happened when the former DG of the OPSC was dismissed in 2020 due to misconduct-related labour issues. There is currently a new DG. In previous years DG contracts ended or they were transferred to other departments and it was never done constantly. From the responses, it is safe to say there is no instability in the OPSC.


5.5 Traditional Affairs analysis

The study analysis covered various thematical areas that relate to managing power, characterising the relationship typologies, characteristics of good relations between the two main actors, decision-making processes, and whether there is stability in the department of traditional affairs.

5.5.1 Management of power between the EA and DG

The graph below depicts that in the DTA, power is handled very well between the EA and the DG as 80% of the responses show political-administrative maturing in terms of handling power. Participants 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, and 27 Knowing when the time is right to use power is a skill that normally comes with time and experience either within the government or in a particular position. This is indicative in the DTA as both EA and DG are long-serving in their respective positions and as a result, only 20% have taken a view that mishandling of power exists. Those are participants number 19 and 20. Participants 22 and 26 indicated that the situation was unknown to them. Therefore the 80/20 percentage is based on those participants who were aware of the state of affairs. Power and influence can work together to strengthen one's leadership in an organisation as power is not necessarily bad when used positively.

5.5.1.1 Chart 19: Management of power



Some of the respondents indicated that over the years, stability was created in government before 1994 Directors-General and heads of departments were persons with many years of experience within the bureaucracy. In other words, officials started at low levels and got promoted over the years until they reached the point where they could be considered for the position of DG. In Canada, the prerequisite for a deputy Minister (DG) position is to grow within the ranks of the public service and be groomed to be an experienced DG. This was shared while on a Canadian study tour in 2015. Somewhere after 1994, this changed and DGs became political appointments. As a result, there was no longer a clear distinction between administrative and executive responsibilities. One participant claimed that it was found that individuals from political backgrounds became DGs in the sense that they wanted control over departments. For example, many delegations of an administrative nature were withdrawn. When a political head becomes involved in the day-to-day administration of a department, it raises the question of whether the DG is still in charge of the department. This has been a challenge in most departments for more than 20 years. There are many instances where the distinction between the political and administrative powers is blurred and there is no strong role clarification. Political power seems to dominate administrative power and the interference of politicians in administrative matters affects service delivery in many areas. Politicians should not interfere with the administration. In cases of intrusion with administration, the portions, orders, and the border lines between Ministers and Directors-General, MEC and HoDs, mayors and municipal managers as well as boards and chief executive officers (CEOs) in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) turned out to be increasingly blurred.

In the DTA, indeed, the roles are distinct, however, the administrative heads have the responsibility of ensuring the mandate of the department as reflected in the performance agreement of the Minister is achieved. The department is fortunate for not facing such interference currently, everyone knows their roles both administratively and politically, this was indicated by the participants who responded to the question of the distinctiveness of the roles. In the department, political heads can separate their duties from those of the administration in improving the government's performance. So, no power struggle was spotted over the years, power is suitably demarcated in each portfolio. The political heads play their political responsibilities whereas the administrative heads also play their administrative responsibilities.


The Minister is the executive authority whilst the Director-General is an accounting authority and each role is played appropriately. The flow in reporting lines has been managed well as the DG reports to the Minister while the National House of Traditional Leaders provides oversight.

The department also implements programs supported by the DG and both the Minister and the National House of Traditional Leaders report to parliament. There is a clear distinction and separation of roles in the Department of Traditional Affairs between the political and administrative roles played by the Minister and the accounting officer.

5.5 .2 Administrative/Political decision-making processes in DTA

A dominant feature of the decision-making process in any institution is striking a balance between political control and professional autonomy and discretion. According to Weaver & Rockman, elected political leaders should be able to control the subordinated public bureaucracy and its public servants (Weaver & Rockman, 1993, p. 2 &18). According to Simon, public servants should have significant professional freedom, because professional competence forms the backbone of any public organisation, both through factual and normative decision premises (Simon, 1957, p. 250-261). Simon's notion is not always practical given the political interferences that exist in the professional competence within the administration. While Political executives in modern public organisations where subordinate levels have significant autonomy face several challenges. Brunsson warns that political leaders who are not fully informed about, nor can they always influence what goes on in subordinate units, at the same time, get the blame if something goes wrong (Brunsson, 1989, p. 219). In the case of DTA, seventy-five percent of the respondents were of the view that decisions are made at the political level and some felt that it is correct to have decisions made at that level because policy formulation-related decisions are influenced by the political heads (Ministers and deputy Ministers), National House of Traditional Leaders, cabinet, and even parliament. These were participants 16-23 as well as participants 27. The political direction and decisions are taken through various legislative mechanisms. The political heads also play an important role in providing counsel or advice which serves to influence decisions about public service delivery. This is correct as political heads are the ones to guide policies, however, a question can be asked whether parliament should have a direct influence on policy-related matters while their task is to do oversight and pass legislation. Fewer (25%) respondents (participants 24 and 25) were of the view that the decisions were made at both administrative and political levels. This population indicated that the Minister does take into consideration advice from the collective e.g. when decisions are made administratively by the DG assisted by the top management of the department. In that way, all stakeholders are involved, and the DG influences administrative decisions.


5.5.2.1 Chart 20: Decision-making processes



5.5.3 Harmonious relations at the political-administrative interface in DTA

The relations between heads of departments and politicians are one of the utmost critical interpersonal and official relationships for any government. The strength of these relationships should ascend both from a top-down and a bottom-up approach to governance. The top-down approach, the political leadership influence, and the bottom-up, administrative leadership should be influential in carrying out administrative matters. Political demands are then carried out by the rest of the government using administrative leadership vehicles and persuade policy implementation philosophy.

5.5.3.1 Chart 21: Working relations at executive levels



Graph 5.5.3.1 above depicts that 66% currently see the harmony between the EA and the DG in the department as the current executive authority guides principles and policies and leaves it to the DG and officials to develop policy documents, legislation, and manuals. The 66% was instituted by participants 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26. The DG is involved in the implementation of policies and the political decisions thereof, taken by the Minister at the political level. The Minister gives political vision and the DG always ensures that the Minister's vision guides the departmental plans. The interactions between the EA and HoD are cordial and respect one another's terrain as a result the relationship seems harmonious. If the conflict exists, they can find ways to resolve and address any deficiencies and potential risks professionally that may face the department. Participants 16 and 27 which constitute seventeen percent see the existence of conflict in the department mentioning challenges that may be caused by political interference with the decisions of the department, and insufficient planning at the political level. Some EAs may lack proper planning skills and just give instructions, therefore it is imperative that the instructions should be in writing, suggested one participant. While another 17% (participants 19 and 23) indicated that both harmony and conflict exist as this varies and depends from situation to situation. The challenge is that "some officials in the ministry unfairly put pressure on the department to implement certain activities. This may be viewed as tampering with the work of the department and appear to have been supported by the political head concerned", noted participant 24. This is the part that creates conflict as these officials use the political principal's status and power to further those interests.

5.5.4 Characteristics of a working relationship between Ministers and HODs in DTA

The political principals should play their role as political executive heads of departments, provide sound advice on public service delivery, and influence the strategic direction and annual performance of the department under their portfolio to respond to the service delivery needs of the department as well as the efficient functioning of the department. In this regard, they are expected to hold DGs accountable and respect the administrative boundary of DGs. So, accountability, respect for each party's boundary, and service-oriented interaction are the key characteristics that define the relationship. Unfair expectations that temper the administrative standing and integrity which may result in the violation of public service prescripts are a key threat to the relationship. Trust, respect, effective communication, and mindfulness are integral parts of a pleasant-sounding relationship. There should be a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each. Unfortunately, in many instances, lines are blurred and it is especially a problem when executive authorities get involved in administrative matters such as the appointment of officials on certain levels or specific posts, alluded participants 17 and 20.

5.5.5 Existence of tension in the DTA

Many of the respondents in DTA agreed that even in the best working relationships, tension is bound to happen sometimes and may be due to pull and push caused by administrative-political challenges in general. Perhaps it may not be in the current situation, but, most definitely in previous instances, confirmed participant 17. Another challenge that was referred to as part of the cause for tension is that sometimes it has everything to do with politics as some of the DGs/HoDs are themselves politicians and even may hold powerful positions in the party they both belong to. Therefore, political power and political differences may be at play within the administration and they start to have no regard for each other. According to Van Weissenbruch et al, "political primacy" means: "legislative power has precedence over executive power, Ministers over public servants/ managers, and the public interest have priority over particular interests" (Van Weissenbruch et al, 1997, p. 452 - 458). One of the most common problems is that many executive authorities do not give instructions in writing as required by the Treasury regulations and other laws and can therefore not be held accountable for certain actions taken. An example that was quoted was that,

"if an executive authority, for instance, can instruct a department to incur certain expenditures and is not done in writing - if the DG or the department complies with such

a request it becomes an audit query. It is the DG and officials who must explain and there is nothing in writing to serve as evidence that the instruction came from above. Disciplinary action will be taken against the officials and not the executive authority. The solution is that all instructions should be in writing. Virtual meetings nowadays actually help in this regard because it is recorded and the recording can be downloaded and saved to protect those officials that are involved” alluded participant 17.

Another tension-related challenge that was mentioned was that when the Minister has a candidate to substitute the DG, therefore, the Minister may create situations for the HOD so they are unable to manage properly and may opt to leave the department, said participant 19. Participant 17 also indicated that although in the current situation, nothing of that nature was experienced, however, numerous media reports point to tensions in some of the departments although many respondents were of the view that there is no tension in the DTA. For instance, the media recently has had many conflicts in relationships. The tensions about the political-administrative relationships are mostly reported through media, this confirmed Maserumule’s view that political-administrative relationships are journalistic (Maserumule, 2007, pp. 147- 164). It is a cause for concern that nothing much brought a positive change in some of the relationships in the political-administrative domain. Recently in 2022, there were media reports on tensions between certain DGs that required the President to intervene and make necessary deployments or transfers. The process of transfer is envisaged to be facilitated administratively by the DG: Presidency as per the PSA and PSR. In an article titled “SA Government’s Directors-General: Perpetual tensions, loss of institutional memory, (often) crashing uncertainty” a list of DGs who were shown the door was listed (Daily Maverick, 2022, p. 1). The newspaper made mention of the various DGs who either left Public Service or moved to different departments due to a collapse in relationships and emerging cracks in the leadership fraternity etc. To mention the few most recent administrative changes were the South African Police Service (SAPS), departments of Employment and Labour, Human Settlements, Mineral Resources and Energy, and Treasury. The relationship squabbles at the helm of the political-administrative interface require decisive and strong leadership who should solve them as they happen to avoid idling public servants mostly at the expense of taxpayers. The depth of the squabbles varies according to each administration. Some tensions in the two offices may be created by the characters of the officials appointed in terms of the Ministerial Handbook to support the Offices of Ministers. They further exert unnecessary power on departments to implement decisions that may compromise the departments. In the end, the existing DG will have to vacate the position to make way for the new incumbent. This option can be associated

with a functional-close model where both have known each other from functional, sectoral areas or parties and may collude in decision-making processes. The political-administrative negative alliance can affect the performance value chain, weaken the government machinery's high echelons, and cascade down to the lowest employee in the department. As opposed to positive collusion (honesty, integrity, ethics, trustworthiness) which can be good attributes of such conspiracies and result in positive longitudinal impacts.

5.5.6 The types of relationships in the DTA

According to Peters' (1987) five ideal models of structural relationships between politics and administration, there are three sets of explanatory variables such as the nature of political administration, the institutional characteristics of the political executive, and the administration that are supposed to create an occurrence of a certain pattern of interaction between the two main actors. Each model is explained in chapter 2 and is characterised by five proportions such as (i) general interaction between the two partakers, (ii) the "winners" of the institutional politics game, (iii) the modes of decision-making, (iv) conflict resolution as well as the (iv) powers of various systems of interaction on the policies adopted by the government.

The chart and graph below depict that at both levels (EA and DG) the interactions are mostly functional-close with the Minister, there is a functional close relationship between the two players.


5.5.6.1 The types of relationships at DG level in DTA

Questions 7 (a) and (b) of the questionnaire probed the relationships that may exist at the political and administrative levels of interaction. As per the responses below, to understand the relationships at the political-administrative level (see graphs from 5.10.6.2 - 5.10.6.6). The most chosen type in the DTA from both viewpoints is the "functional" close. As can be seen in chart 10.10.6.6 the functional close model sits at 42%, formal-legal at 33%, and administrative state at 25%. Functional close is constituted by participants 18 – 22 as well as 24-25. Participants who opted for formal legal were 16 and 17. While 23 and 26 chose the administrative state.

5.5.6.2 Graph 3: Administrative relationship types

7(a) DG/s in this department: Relationship type


12 responses



5.5.6.3 Graph 4: Political relationship types in DTA

7(b)EA/s in the department: Relationship type


12 responses




5.5.6.4 Graphs on relationship types

Graph 5 and chart 22 below depict the relationship types in the department and the mutual understanding that the EA and the DG share. It also shows that the DG mostly agrees with what the Ministers are saying as a bigger chunk indicates a formal-legal perspective.

5.5.6.5 Graph 5: The types of relationship at EA level



5.5.6.6 Chart 22: Administrative typologies



5.6 Stability in DTA

A simple definition of stability would assume that nothing has changed over time or is unlikely to come to an end. Any country requires a stable government to prosper. When stability was tested in the DTA, the participants indicated that before 2015 there were a lot of changes at the Ministerial level (e.g. from 2011 until recently in 2021). Participant 17 said that the department

previously had 7 Ministers. However, it would seem like the instability at the political-executive level had settled down in the recent years, e.g. 2017 until to date. This was confirmed by participants 17-27 who indicated that currently there are not a lot of changes at both political-administrative executive leadership levels. At the DG level, changes only happened once when the former DG retired and the current DG was appointed thereafter, there were no changes. At the time the study was conducted, the current DG was almost at the end of his first term of office in the department, this would translate to stability in both leadership fraternities.


5.7 Department of Human Settlements analysis

As per the previous thematic analysis for the OPSC and DTA, the investigation of the Human Settlements for the same themes is outlined as follows.

5.7.1 Management of power in the Department of Human Settlements

When assessing how power is managed, it is important to point out that the administrative actors must be neutral. According to Christensen and Laegreid, professional neutrality of the bureaucracy is crucial, because whereas political executives come and go, professional public servants are expected to serve governments of any political stripe. A related aspect is how the relationship between a superior ministry and a subordinate agency should be organized and how it functions in practice. (Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P, 2021, p. 250). Although agencies should have more managerial autonomy but not more policy autonomy, managerial accountability should be strengthened without weakening political accountability argued Laegreid. The power dynamics between executive authorities and accounting officers has been a long-standing theme and varies from one politician to the other as well as accounting officers. The 1st elaborative question posed to the participants was “how is power handled in the department as each individual/s possesses either political or administrative power given the fact that both political and administrative heads have distinct roles to play in government to improve government performance”. Sixty-seven percent felt that the power was mistreated citing many reasons which are indicated below the chart, while 33% viewed power relations as well-managed. See the chart in 5.12.1 below.

5.7.1.1 Chart 23: Power management in DHS



The participants who were of the view that power dynamics exist (participants 28, 29, 32, and 34) in the departments and periodically not handled well quoted that yes, some politicians afford the accounting officer/s the latitude to lead the administrative affairs of the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) in accordance to the PMFA and other prevailing prescripts, whereas in some instances the political sphere overreach, especially amongst politicians who are still trying to grasp the mandate and functions of the department. There are also instances where politicians would refuse to sign documents and not direct the accounting officer to provide reasons or to brief them accordingly. This harms the administration and can lead to non-compliance and missing critical deliverables in the MTSF and other countries' planning documents of government. Further to this, the political executives do not always allow the accounting officer to do their work, there are times when interference in administration and decision-making are meddled with, during which administrative autonomy and discretion are also vital in decision-making processes. Administrative autonomy refers to public organisations' ability to determine their preferences and to translate those preferences into authoritative actions (Maggetti and Verhoest 2014, p. 239). The concept describes a relationship between an organisation and a set of actors outside the organisation, most importantly the elected officials and executive politicians. Participants 31 and 33 argued that "on paper, it is indeed clear what roles are supposed to be played by the administrative and political heads. However, conflict develops every time the political head tries to usurp the legislative powers of the administrative head. There is interference from the political side. Unfortunately, this is where


things are at the DHS. An EA can only delegate to the DG and only the DG may delegate to other performer levels. However, this is not always the case in the department”. It was further argued that the responsibilities of the Minister and the DG are derived from the financial and human resource delegations from DPSA and the National Treasury. The EA provides the DG with appropriate powers and authority to enable him/her to manage the department efficiently and effectively. The DG empowers employees in the department by employing appropriate delegations. The EA may in writing delegate to the DG any power conferred or duty imposed on the EA (s42A (4) of the PSA). “These delegations are currently on hold as the Minister has taken away some authority from the DG. This has led to a very unhappy situation in the department where the DG is circumvented and boundaries are crossed in terms of working directly with other performer levels. This has since created unnecessary tension as administrative departmental work must be finalized via the administrative head.

The lesser percentage, (33%) who thought that the power is handled well were participants 31 and 33. They were basing their founding argument on the notion that in government, there are clear delegations approved dealing with financial management and human resources [human capital] as per PFMA and Public Service Act. Having approved government regulations and frameworks assist in ensuring that accountability and responsibility are clear. Ministers represent political heads in government and are responsible for formulating and developing policy. On the other hand, Directors-General are administrative heads in government and therefore constitute accounting officers in government while also ensuring policy implementation.

5.8 Decision-making processes in DHS

The environments beneath which the political and public administrative executive functions have changed so much. In some institutions, a shift from government to governance can be seen in changing the role of the state in societal regulation. There are pockets of improvement in this setting, a web of other players both at an individual and at an organisational level is entering the democratic governance of public institutions, playing a key role in shaping decision-making processes and in co-creating and co-producing outcomes of public interest (Sancino et al, 2018 p.70-81). Thus, politics and administration in current times are increasingly situated in orchestra settings characterized by both vertical and horizontal multi-level arrangements and by various relationships with different actors (Budd & Sancino, 2016, p. 129-145). Today, these political-administrative actors are participants in diverse decision-making and information exchange arenas, from cabinets to “think tanks”, in a generalised core executive. (Dunleavy, 1990, p. 30-35). Therefore, the DG/HoD must implement the decision that was taken between the two actors, and character aspects must be ruled out. In a South African context, the decisions are delegated in terms of DPSA principles of delegation, 2019, as amended. However, some of the political principals behave as if they are playing the role of the head of administration. The shared roles and responsibilities between the Minister and the DG must be maintained at all times and ensure that there is a balance. The decisions must be taken at both the political and administrative levels, and the political leader has to provide political guidance in terms of the necessary political leadership. When participants were asked, who would influence decision-making processes in the department as major decisions have to be made in public service, 43% responded that the decisions are politically inclined and 57% pointed out that both heads are involved in making major decisions. Graph 5.13.1 below, shows that more than 50% of the decisions taken are mutually agreed upon between the EA and the DG. Under 40% of participants showed that the decisions were rather political.

5.8.1 Department of Human Settlements decision-making processes




5.9 Conflict-based relations in the DHS

According to Maphai, South Africa was not only triggered by indistinct lines between EAs and DGs, but it also appears that “conflicts were caused due to personality and policy differences”. (Maphai, 1996, p. 67) observes that the problems of conflicts between the Directors-General and their Ministers, which could be very detrimental to the performance of the state, were caused by the blurring of the lines between the political and administrative wings of the state. (Maphai, 1996, p. 22). The DHS empirical data shows that conflict at the top levels politically and administratively is in existence as the interaction patterns are sometimes viewed as particularly poor and characterised to a certain extent by conflicting views and political interference when decisions are made on projects and programmes of the department. It would seem that the engagement patterns are sometimes complimentary yet confrontational. In some instances, the EA and HOD do take time to understand each other’s style of management, e.g. how the EA wants to be briefed, detailed or high-level engagements. It boils down to Ashforth et al views that “establishing a more or less stable relationship may be viewed as a learning process, where actors adjust to each other over time”, (Ashforth and Saks 1996, p.149; Levitt and March 1988, p. 319-340). However, it must be noted that at times there is no use of emotional intelligence, but excessive use of power. Being politically and administrative savvy is significant to attaining and maintaining high-level leadership roles. In many countries, there is substantial personnel overlap between politics and administration, in the sense that politicians often have job experience from the administration, and that administrators engage in political

careers (see Peters 2001, p. 85 –133). The intersections in roles and responsibilities require stable relationships and will most definitely result in harmonious cordial and professional arrangements. In DHS 57% thought that there is conflict, 14% believe in most relationships there is both conflict and harmony while 29% that conflict is non-existent however, harmony may not be where it is supposed to be. Jacobsen argued that, through interaction, people learn to know each other, whom to trust, who to go to with a specific request, and so on. Over time, both structures and contracts stabilise and regulate the behaviour of the actors they apprehend to. Therefore, from a dynamic view, the relationships are anticipated to become clearer over a period for the actors tangled in the political-administrative dealings. In the beginning, politicians particularly the newly elected ones may experience the situation as chaotic, not knowing who to turn to or how to act, while administrators must find out whether there are new political expectations and how they are supposed to relate to new politicians. Over time, knowledge about how the system works increases and more stable relations may be established between the spheres. (Jacobsen, 2006, p. 308). This would require political-administrative leadership who can provide opportunities and time for the relations to improve. If not nurtured, the DG may be realised off his/her duties. The chart below depicts the responses received from participants 28-33. The mistrust between the political-administrative segments was hailed strongly as a measure of any conflict situation and participants suggested trust as a remedy to most leadership battles and for improving relations.

5.9.1. Chart 24: Categorizing political-administrative relations in DHS



March and Olsen both argued that it is vital for new politicians to learn how to find their way in the administrative “jungle,” and administrators must figure out how to relate to new politicians and new coalitions. They must learn the rules, both formal and informal, regulating how they should interact (March and Olsen 1983, pp. 281-296). The higher levels of conflict for the DHS in the chart above may be indicative of what March and Olsen argued when it comes to new Ministers or management as indicated by some of the participants. In such situations, a greater level of trust might lower uncertainty (Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012, pp. 647-667) and distrust might enable both political and administrative heads to act under a high level of uncertainty. Doing so, potentially intensifies positive results, such as following public management decisions or granting power to political leaders. Trust, for example, is a key issue in administrative guidelines and management in modern states, leading to a greater affinity between flexible and timely actions of government and political accountability (Cooper, Knotts, & Brennan, 2008).

5.10 Characteristics of a good working relationship

There are various relationship traits that participants strongly believed would shape the political-administrative phenomenon. Judge et. al (2009) examined the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and a variety of leadership criteria and found that extraversion and conscientiousness are most strongly correlated with leader emergence, with extraversion and openness most strongly correlated with leader effectiveness. For lower-order personality traits, the authors find that sociability, dominance, and achievement are most strongly correlated with leadership. Below are other traits that were deemed necessary for both leaders (Judge et al, 2009, pp. 855 – 875).

5.10.1 Mutual trust and respect for each other’s roles and functions

The issue of trust surfaced again when the participants were asked what views they held in terms of the characteristics of a good working relationship between Ministers and HoDs. Participants 28, 29, 32, 33, and 34 cited mutual trust, respect, and respect for each other’s functions and allowing the HoD to handle administrative matters. Due to multiple descriptions of trust different authors like Lane et al sees, trust as an expectation (see Lane and Bachmann, 1998; Rousseau et. al, 1998), while for others, it can hardly be separated from shared norms or rules (see Putnam, 1995, p. 664). As discussed in the previous section on politics and administration all over the world have to learn the skill of mutual trust, this would mean that both parties are honest and sincere with each other and will not consciously do anything to impair

each other's image. If the level of trust is low in any relationship or organisation, people may put boundaries and would not want to involve themselves with such individuals or what they are willing to do or share. In contrast, when the trust level is high, people reward it by giving more, and this would lead to a good relationship between the two parties. Although leaders may not realise the break in trust easily, it is also evident that mutual respect is one of the features in enabling a good working relationship. Mutual respect is most needed worldwide and can be used to appropriately view and accurately handle the differences between different countries, parties, institutions, and individuals. Anyone who would be interested in developing relations, building consensus, and strengthening cooperation and relations would require a specific level of trust whether they have opposing views, and this would result in mutual benefit.

5.10.2 Emotional intelligence

Emotional intelligence was one of the characteristics that participants 28 and 34 felt was needed in leadership positions. Political savvy is important in both political and administrative leadership and is all about leveraging emotional intelligence to sensitive and emotional situations can be handled that at work. Emotional intelligence is defined as "the capacity to be aware of, control, and express one's emotions, and handle interpersonal relationships judiciously and empathetically" (Goleman, 2017, p 94-95). Leaders with more emotional intelligence exhibit better work environments and higher employee deliberations.

5.10.3 Good and open communication

According to Cherry, in communicating, one may "enquire, inform, dispute, negotiate, agree, dissent, quarrel, commune, insult, admire, and ritualise in endless ways." (Cherry, 1978, p. 4). All levels whether at the individual or organisational need to have good and open communication in times where there is harmony or conflict. Participants 28, 29, and 30 were confident that without effective communication between the leaders, the department would fail.

5.10.4 Professionalism

The United Nations defines professionalism as the value that entails a high standard of work and adherence to certain standards and principles about specific work to be done. Professionalism embodies skills, competence, efficiency, and effectiveness. The public sector is characterised by unprofessional and unethical conduct. (Adewole, 2007, 69-79). This basic

value is also enshrined in chapter 10 of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa as discussed in earlier chapters of the study. Therefore, the public sector is required to promote and maintain high standards of professional ethics. A lack of this value will lead to unnecessary tensions and conflicts. Therefore, participant 34 was of the view that if the leaders are professional in their interaction, the department will not be a battlefield for politics. If in the administrative and political sphere, professionalism is practiced and both have equal know-how on public policy-related issues then the relationship between the EA and DG becomes mutually exclusive and harmonised. Between the two, professional discretion should be practiced. Professional discretion is simply understood as the latitude of actions available to managers or executives to influence important organisational outcomes (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Carpenter and Golden, 1997; Sowa and Selden, 2003)

5.10.5 Clear delegation of authority and respect for the delegation

Dessler has defined it as "it is an authorised transportation from high management to executives" (Dessler, 2006, p.11). Lutgans & Hodgetts said that "it is a process of distributing tasks and authorities" (Lutgans & Hodgetts, 2004, p. 20). Participant 33 mentioned clear delegation of authority and respecting the delegation. Delegation can be helpful as things get done quicker if labour is divided and decision-making responsibility is given to an individual who reports to the particular manager. In SA, there is a delegation framework to be followed in which area of work can be delegated by a particular leader e.g. President to EA then to DG then to DDG, etc., until the lowest level in an institution. As a result, the lines of communication neither the Minister nor DG/HoD must seek information directly from the level that is not within the reporting lines. For instance, the Minister is not allowed to direct requests or delegate to DDGs or line function managers when there is a DG who leads administrative work within a department. It is important to preserve delegation within the right level of delegation e.g. the Minister cannot delegate to other levels other than the DG. Some participants cited the importance of communicating the delegations and government directives in writing with clear timelines. Clear verbal and written communication through the DG would lessen the level of conflicts that may exist and enhance understanding of each other's responsibilities while supporting each other.

5.10.6 A clear understanding of the role separation of Minister and DGs and exercising complementarity, cooperation, and collaboration

Although the roles of politicians and administrators have become complementary, cooperative, and collaborative in modern public administration, a clear separation must be maintained and will result in much healthier and more beneficial political-administrative relationships. Both actors should possess a managerial style that is participatory and cooperative. The role of the administrator should portray extensive technical competencies to support the Minister. Giauque et al. suggested that it is not a problem if a Minister and a service manager have a different political colour, provided that their vision is agreed upon. Confrontation of ideas must be intelligent. In reality, there is no clear separation between political and administrative areas; service managers are involved in strategic considerations, in that the Minister is dependent on the expertise of senior public servants. A relationship of trust is essential. In the end, the Minister takes the decision (political responsibility), and the service manager implements the decision, with no objections. Success factors in the political-administrative relationship are clarity, transparency, trust, honesty, loyalty, and collaboration (Giauque, 2009, p. 701). Participant 31 wrote when they were asked about good qualities of a working relationship between the EA and DG, "It is when there exists complementarity, cooperation and collaborative effort between the two", while participant 28 also thought that understanding each other's responsibilities and support can help in complementarity. A complementary relationship implies separate parts and distinctness but the emphasis is on how each contributes to the whole. Such a model is better grounded historically and offers a positive approach to examining the distinct contributions of political office-bearers and public servants to the democratic process (Svara, 1998, p. 57). The separation would be on administrative work of the department of which the DG must be allowed to excel and handle it administratively while DGs must also not meddle with politics. The challenge may surface sometimes when DGs are highly politically inclined and hold higher positions in their parties than those of their political principals (e.g. executive leadership, party branch chairpersons, treasurers, secretaries) or even when one belongs to a particular faction or share a village or functional close relationship with the predecessor/s then "the department becomes a battlefield of the internal party politics. Politics should not dictate how departments function and are led. Projects must not be put on hold or changed in the middle of a financial year because one

disagrees with the politics of the previous Minister”. It must be discouraged at all levels and the departments must never suffer due to party politics.

5.10.7 Understanding of good governance for the effective and efficient administration

Participant 33, felt that if there is an insufficient understanding of good governance, effective and efficient administration, or the lack thereof, challenges will arise between EAs and DGs. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, as cited by Agere in his book “Promoting good governance: Principles, practices and perspective”, defined good governance as the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage the nation’s affairs. This includes the complex array of mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens manage affairs including public life (Agere 2000, p. 2). At the country- level in most cases, the efficacy of a political party possessing power determines whether good governance in a country exists then at the level of institutions the political and administrative leadership given a lifetime opportunity to lead those organisations has a big role to strengthen good governance as per the country’s vision 2030. South Africa therefore, cannot deprive citizens of quality service delivery and make bad choices. The backlog of South Africa has a huge gap between rich and poor. Only good governance can shrink this gap and create wealth (Prinsloo, 2012, p. 14).

5.10.8 Ethical leadership, good departmental performance, and provision of quality service to the poor

Participant 33 cited the importance of ethical leadership in today’s leadership. Ethical humiliation in various countries has been a threat to democracy, governance, politics, administration, and a variety of areas. In recent years, ethical scandals and ethical behaviours have been of great concern to researchers, organisations, governments, and practitioners (Manz et al., 2008; Mehta, 2003; Brown and Treviño, 2006; Treviño et al., 2014; Al Halbusi and Tehseen, 2017). Ethical leadership is required by most institutions to take departmental performance to great heights a requires a couple of formal and informal values that an individual possesses. The values may range from integrity, trustworthiness, fairness, ethical professionalism, collaborative and complementary leadership. A briefing by DPSA to Parliamentary Monitoring Group has shown poor performance by most departments on service delivery improvement plans Service Delivery Improvement Plans

(SDIPs), the service charters which was viewed by the committee as a dismal failure and hampers the provision of service delivery to the citizen (PMG, 2015, p. 1)

5.10.9 Existence and management of the tension in DHS

Any unhealthy tension is bad for the performance and productivity of the organisation. Participants 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 argued that “Healthy and unhealthy tension do indeed exist.”. Problems may arise due to unhealthy tension, but the relations good or bad have to be managed at both levels. The seven participants agreed that tension exists as it is a natural part of life and should be addressed healthily. A classical theme in public administration research is the tension and challenges in the relationship between politics and administration. Further, the relationship between politics, knowledge, and expertise is also a widely addressed topic (Gora, Holst, & Warat, 2018, p. 51). All the participants in DHS agreed that tension exists like in any working relationship due to the nature of the environment they work under. However, it was also quoted that the legislation clearly states the administrative functioning, and therefore EAs should not meddle with administrative decisions.

Once one party crosses the line it becomes a problem not only for the offices but for the functioning of the department as a whole, noted some of the participants. The interference by any part (politics and administration) hampers service delivery, and staff morale and confuses the department’s direction as well as delays in decision-making processes. Political or administrative interference plays a big role. Interference should not be made a norm in any department as this may cascade down to the staff at the lower levels. This may lead to departmental factions where officials may also be categorized as belonging to either the political or administrative head side, "The DG’s people" and "The Minister’s people". The EAs/Ministers have South Africans to answer to while DGs and HODs are the real drivers of service delivery and should strive to work collaboratively. Tension must be avoided at all costs as some of the relationship challenges may to labour court matters due to clashes caused by decisions taken and administrative or political power. Power is an indefinable perception because it displays itself in so many ways. Everyone has many potential sources of power, most of which he or she is often unaware of. Some are independent of the conflict while others can be enhanced or diminished by the process of conflict (Bernard Mayer, 2000, p. 54). Below are some of the responses when participants were asked if there was tension what would be the possible reasons for such and how it could be managed.


- “There’s no closed list of factors that could lead to tension, suffice it to mention that it could arise from an assortment of things like poor communication, the HOD not meeting targets, damning audit findings, directives from the AG that are not implemented, the peddling of misinformation by persons who want a different HOD for business reasons, external influences from persons who want the removal of the EA to advance a subjective political cause, etc.”
- “It can be managed through talking to the chief of staff, Ministerial advisers, and any other party that can help the EA and HOD to find each other. The last resort is to seek the intervention of the Public Service Commission.
- The tension exists because one party wants to behave as if it has administrative powers to make decisions and undermine the other.
- Tension is managed through letters and escalations to outside bodies with authority to deal with them.
- I suppose issues of both personal and political maturity, communication, and personality are critical. One could also add the issue of mutual respect and understanding are also critical in resolving such disagreements and tensions.
- Tension can be managed through the guidelines of the Ministerial handbook and DG forum.
- Trying to be civil with each other, avoidance, playing ignorance, suspensions, trump charges, dismissal, court cases, requesting third party e.g. President intervention to resolve conflict.
- Some conflict exists due to a lack of trust between the two parties and one may feel undermined and usurping the powers.
- The solution to the poor relations is to report it to the Presidency, DPSA, and OPSC.

5.11 The types of relationships at DG level in DHS

A bigger chunk (57%) of participants plotted the relationship at the DG level as a functional close relationship (participants 28, 30, 31, and 32) which would mean that even when tension exists the DG has a mutual understanding of his role and would agree to disagree with the Minister in decision-making processes within the department. In the functional model this can be interpreted as both parties having the autonomy to be strong in their functional areas provided there may be trust and respect which are two vital values that were strongly emphasized by many participants across the three departments, which are vital in an environment where accountability gravities have augmented on both politicians and bureaucrats. Twenty-nine percent viewed the relationship at the DG level as adversarial (participant 29) which clearly

states the DG/s does disagree with the Ministers at times while fourteen percent thought of an administrative state (participant 33) which clarifies the influence that the DG/s had in the department. Even though the relationship scale was higher on functional with mutual understanding with the superior there were pockets of disagreements and dominant quadrant from the administrative level.


5.11.1 Chart 25: Relationship types at the DG level in DHS



5.11.2 Graph 6: Administrative relationships

9. If there were changes, how often did it happen for both EAs/HoDs levels? Explain


7 responses



5.11.3 The types of relationships at EA level in DHS

The empirical evidence shows that the EA is a dominant actor (administrative state) at the administrative level (participants 28 and 31), and disagrees, adversarial (participants 29 and 34) while having a mutual understanding (functional) with the DG (participants (Participants 30 and 32), then participant 33 selected formal-legal. It would seem that the participants had mixed views of reality when plotting the relationship at the EA level. This means that the functional close, adversarial, and administrative states were in three equal parts (29% each) as can be seen in the chart below. This simply means that the EA has a mutual understanding with the DG, however, the Minister is influential and disagrees with the DG at the same time. Therefore, the EA in Human Settlements is categorized as an adversarial, functional, and administrative state as opposed to only 13% that view the Minister as formal-legal (participant 33) which can be interpreted as the EA seldom agreeing with the DG.


5.11.4 Chart 26: Relationship Typology in DHS



5.11.5 Graph 7: Political relationship types in DHS

10. What were the reasons for such changes? Kindly elaborate.

7 responses



5.12 Stability in DHS

All participants (28-34) viewed the department as currently stable as there were not many changes made in the last 5 years except at the DG level in 2022. Cook describes “political instability as a condition of a country where a government has been toppled or controlled by factions following a coup, or where basic functional pre-requisites for social order control and maintenance are unstable and periodically disrupted” (Cook, 1990, p.7). In the past, several

changes were made at the political level in DHs while administratively it remained the same until a change of DG happened recently in 2022. Political instability can bring disorder into an organisation as administrative leadership, policies, plans, and a range of organisational processes like decision-making processes, and irregularities with corporate services (HR, supply chain, finance, IT, etc.). The new changes may sometimes clash with the initial departmental plans. The changes were made due to new administration, transfers, or reshuffles and administrate it included suspensions. For instance, Times Live newspaper reported the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa organised that the former DG in the department was shifted to a different department due to a collapse in the relationship between the Minister and DG. The reasons cited by the newspaper for the relationship failure were that the former DG did not accomplish the duties as an accounting officer of the department and defiance. According to the newspaper report, this resulted in a mediation process that involved the Presidency. Building administrative capacity at the DG level is vital. Politicians can come and go, but if there is stable administration and strengthened internal processes there could be fewer organisational, administrative, and leadership failures. To ensure stability at the DG level, the acting Minister for Public Service and Administration (MPSA) considered as part of the professionalising the public service to increase the term of office from five-to-ten-year contracts to improve the tenure of DGs.


5.13 Principal-agent relationship across institutions

As outlined by Murray (2009), these are five critical duties an agent (DG) should accomplish and are:

- **A duty of loyalty:** The agent must act according to the principal's wishes, put the principal's interest first, and not benefit from the relationship at the principal's expense.
- **A duty to obey instructions:** This includes a duty to clarify instructions when the agent doesn't fully understand them.
- **Duty to act with skill and care:** An agent is hired because of their specific professional expertise. More expertise means the agent is held to a higher standard.
- **Duty to notify the principal of important matters:** If any important information or situations come up in the course of the agent's service, the agent is expected to notify the principal.
- **Duty to account for time and resources spent:** The agent is expected to track their hours worked, money spent, and property used in the course of the agency relationship (Murray, 2009, p. 4).

As represented in diagram 2 in 5.13.1 below, the separation of the ownership or power of a principal and the "control" of an agent in principal-agent relationships generates the playground for potential conflict of interests between the main actors. The principal plays a critical role in delegating authority while the agent has to act and take administrative decisions which is why the principal must not cross the political administrative boundaries. The asymmetric information that they possess requires both of them to have a good relationship and avoid conflict of interest at any cost.

5. 13.1 Diagram 2: Principal-agent



Corporate Finance Institute: 2022

5.14 Summary

The political-administrative dynamics and relations forces that emerged over decades and persist to this day necessitate a governance and leadership paradigm shift. These were also postulated in media spaces as follows:

- There isn't a system of managing the careers of public servants across the three spheres of government with provision for cross-functional or multi-organisational exposure. A person recruited into one institution is there forever, thus incentivizing job-hopping.
- Recruitment norms are in the main left to individual institutions and there are too many lateral appointments that come from outside the government for the OPSC or the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) to have any real control.
- There isn't an annual intake into the public service. Recruitment is in the main driven by appointments to individual vacancies. Such an approach makes it very difficult to plan recruitment and manage the careers of public servants. Among other things, it impacts negatively selection processes, formal induction, institutionalizing probation, and formal universal training of all entrants.

It is vital to strengthen processes on how heads of institutions are appointed, how their career incidents are managed, the short duration of their contracts, and the politicization of their roles, discouraging capable candidates from entering the public service. In the international arena,

Peters and Pierre's book "Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective" tackles issues related to the convergence of political interference in the implementation of the New Public Management model, political responsiveness in a merit bureaucracy, and its ramifications, and the weaknesses and lacunae created by the "mixing" of political and administrative actions (Peters and Pierre, 2014 p.125).

The tenacious dynamics of institutions that continue to temper with leadership, and governance and create tensions should transition to more inclusive versus extractive slopes. This can be done through a coalition of people and a strong presence of trust, professionalism, and many more characteristics which were cited by most of the participants in this study. With these good traits properly implemented, political-administrative turmoil can be reduced, and the stability of the institutions. To achieve stability in terms of policies, processes, regulations, guidelines, etc. leadership must not frequently enter and exit public service.

Chapter 6: – Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

The empirical evidence shows that the relationship between executive political leadership and administrative leadership is so critical for the performance of government institutions that it cannot be disregarded by both the EAs and DGs as it contributes to good governance specifically in a democratic regime like South Africa. This answers the earlier question on Weber's work which advocated for complete separation between politics and administration. Modern public administration within a democratic dispensation requires complementarity of the two as discussed in Chapter 2 inclining to Svava's work. Recent research has questioned and significantly updated the relations of the public bureaucracy with the elected public representatives. Aberbach argued that "the earliest theory about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats was in many ways the simplest: politicians make policy; public servants and Ministers. Politicians make decisions, bureaucrats merely implement them". (Aberbach, 1981, p. 4). While the lines between them must not be blurry, administrators should distinguish the political authority of elected officials to govern the duties and are obligated to advance the obligation of the organisation they lead, through action taken in policy administration, implementation, and management. The role of political leadership is not to interchange between political leadership and management administrative functions in a department. This must not be done irrespective of whether the administrator can be perceived as weak. The role of the politician remains policy formulation and overseeing the functioning of the department. However, it is clear from the 2009 report (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009) that in practice, the line between policy and administration is not that clear. This implies that political interference can be instrumental in scuppering honest and efficient administration" (Mantzaris, 2014, p19). Their political-administrative interface and territories must be safeguarded by each of the players in the process, to ensure the right way of engagement, and this is solely dependent on each individual how they opt to interact. Patterns of interaction are a choice between the role players which requires inspirational or transformational leadership. These kinds of leaders are motivational, "they express an attractive conception of the future, offer followers the opportunity to see meaning in their work, and challenge them with high and professional standards. Through their motivational speeches and conversations and other public displays of optimism and enthusiasm, highlighting positive outcomes, and stimulating teamwork" transformational leaders encourage followers to become part of the overall organisational culture and environment (Kelly, 2003; Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, undated).

Theoretical frameworks and media reports confirmed that unhealthy political-administrative relationships led to instability within the government currently and in the past. The NDP envisages a government that is free from constant changes in leadership and constant alterations in policy reviews and direction, however, this has not necessarily changed to ensure a stable government. In the three departments that were studied, it is clear that there are somewhat instabilities even though such changes were not at the highest levels and were caused by a variety of issues e.g. constant reshuffles, transfers, and shorter terms than expected of either EAs or DGs.

This should be infused into the existing frameworks e.g. professionalisation of the public service as well as characterising them using a hybrid approach both at the country level and the unit level (EA and DG) of this research. The professionalisation of the public service will not work only on paper but requires strong leadership with all the qualities cited by different participants in the three departments. The new or existing frameworks will require robust implementation systems. The leaders and institutions need to accept and commit to changing unreceptive environments. The faults and flaws that exacerbate the leadership tension, poor relations, and institutional and individual instabilities must be openly debated.

Like any law, regulation, or framework that governs the public sector, the relationships will have to be strengthened in practice and require interest groups, appetite, and buy-in from both sides. Intermingling instead of nurturing the two impedes the division of responsibilities between elected officials and administrative staff and obviates the possibility of maintaining democratic control over the governmental process and would seem that in SA there is still a challenge for government officials to be dislocated from political gravity as cited by some theorists. The South African government can learn from countries like Croatia and Serbia where the political relationships were normalised through football” (Goldblatt, 2008, p. 542).

It must be clarified that the poor relationships and social glitches between Ministers and Directors-General exist not only in the African continent challenge, it exists worldwide, and what is pertinent is how it is managed.

The deliberate “Yes or No Minister” type should be avoided as argued in Chapter 2 in formal-legal and administrative state models. This is a lesson to be learned by all Ministers and

permanent secretaries/DGs/HoDs around the world and could opt for greater partnerships characterised by mutual respect and understanding of the work to be done by both players.

The PAL model will assist the departments in plotting the relationships between EAs and DGs even way before the conflicts begin. Relationship traits should be mapped and can even be open to public view to avoid the journalistic nature of reporting which may sometimes be obscure, skewed, and not a true reflection of what is happening between the leaders. Special gratitude to all the DGs who approved that their relationships with ministers can be studied, the coordinators who diligently facilitated the process of distributing data collection instruments as well as the participants who provided elaborative and quality responses to reinforce this area of work.

6.2 The hypothesis and concluding remarks

6.2.1. Hypothesis 1:

The relationship between the political and administrative interface has led to different relationship dynamics and instability in government

While verifying whether there is a positive, negative, or no correlation between the two variables namely relations and stability, the primary and secondary data show that the relationships between politicians and public managers have been viewed as based on bargaining, conflict, or as being complementary. According to Hood 2001, A public service bargain can be defined as an actual or imagined bargain between public servants and other actors in the political system concerning their rights and duties, and expressed in an agreement, in law, or according to a combination of one or the other” (Hood, 2001: 130). The empirical results show that due to insufficient separation of roles and functions or lack thereof, poor relations are created and lead to instability in government. This study confirms that the differences between Ministers and senior public servants over departmental autonomy or independence lead to muddling over who is accountable for which decisions, delaying cross-government initiatives. According to Ugyel, there is value in the complementarity and layering of politics, and administration is fully appreciated and embraced in ways that are likely to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of government and governance. Political and administrative leaders must recognise the value of utilising the interdependence and reciprocity of politics and administration in the public interest. Such recognition and the responses to it must be appropriately geared to the particular political and socio-economic contexts involved. This requires considerable political and administrative astuteness, including an ability to cope effectively with the fluidity of power relationships and the demands of strategic action in the ongoing processes of change and reform, (Ugyel, 2017, p.5)

6.2.2 Hypothesis 2:

The more the administrative strategic power and greater autonomy the more solidified the senior public servant to Minister management role

Backed by a theoretical framework, it is strongly believed that administrative autonomy is the outcome of delegated authority by political decision-makers, who are primarily concerned with ensuring political control over the permanent bureaucracy. Once certain functions are delegated administratively, the stronger management role becomes. The dominant theoretical paradigm

for the analysis of delegated authority is the principal-agent approach, which theorises the relationship of a political head that delegates a specific task to a bureaucratic agent (Pollack, 2007, p. 102).

6.2.3 Hypothesis 3:

In most situations, the political heads dominate and interfere in administrative matters

Based on the synthesis and the empirical data of this study on the political-administrative research work which is detailed in this report that leans more toward accessibility of political supremacy that resulted in administrative independence in a much lower end, I accept the hypothesis of political dominance and interference into administrative matters which potentially lead to corrupt activities.

6.2.4 Hypothesis 4:

Political instability negatively affects administrative stability

There is a clear negative trend as shown by empirical data that numerous times when there are persistent changes whether in a leadership domain or at policy formulation or implementation there is bound to be resistance, delays, and doubts which affects the functioning of any institution. This delays many organisational processes, for example, if there is a new EA or DG, the year may pass while the leader is still in an orientation stage trying to figure out how the particular institution works. This was also confirmed by the statement made by the acting MP/SA when recommending an increase in the tenure of DGs/HoDs and of the view that with the 5-year contracts less work is done. It even makes it worse if DGs/HoDs do not even make it to the end of the contract due to poor relations with EAs, constant deployments, and other career incidents of DGs. To test whether this hypothesis can be accepted or not, participants were asked to elaborate whether at EA and DG levels there has been stability or not and what was the cause of such instabilities, if any. As shown in earlier chapters political interference is viewed as one of the main causes of the instability in government. A sound political-administrative interface and stability require both agents to create effective patterns of interactions that may not only one party but both parties. To do this, a particular crop of desired leadership skills to make the necessary sacrifices, mutual understanding and respect of each other's roles, collaborate, and contribute positively in their spheres. The widespread inability to interact effectively between elected politicians and administrative officials creates unnecessary barriers to sound interface and stability. The political-administrative interface is inherently

disjointed and unstable; therefore, the government needs to pace up on clear policy development and its implementation. Political-administrative syndrome that caused instability in many institutions must strengthen the implementation of the current laws to encourage stability in the public service. For instance, the SA President of SA is currently the executive who has the authority to appoint and dismiss DGs, not the Ministers, and therefore dismissals by the Minister can be avoided at all costs. From time to time, the President may facilitate executing briefings and sessions with both political-administrative heads to avoid serious disagreements and poor relations at their levels and reinforce stability. The nature of relations between EAs and DGs is most of the time the main cause of conflicts and instability.

6.3 Recommendations

Even though the political-administrative sphere requires complementarity and collaboration instead of competition, for a healthier and more beneficial relationship, a separation of roles and functions is important to avoid negative influence and imbalances from both sides. The two leaders should work in partnership in policy formulation and policy implementation and appropriate separation of functions would be central to a competent public administration and curtail political intrusions. If improperly balanced, it highly and negatively influences employee performance, hinders professionalism, demoralises employees, creates unnecessary conflicts, and leads to a high turnover rate, specifically at the leadership level. As contended by Ntwenya, there should be a clear separation of duties between elected and appointed officials, and awareness creation and education should be provided to elected and appointed officials to help them understand their roles and responsibilities (Ntwenya, 2020, p. 5). The two critical players in each department must be able to sit in one room and discuss these pertinent issues that relate to the relationships. These should involve the “dos and don’ts” in the leadership space. If done properly, conflicts can be avoided or minimised where it has occurred.

A study conducted by Mkuku revealed the causes of conflicts were largely economic interest, political interest, and authority and not adhering to the existing work rules, regulations, and procedures. Others include conflict of intellectualism and lack of confidence. (Mkuku, 2016, p. 46). It is recommended that every individual abides by the same rules and no one should be above any law.

There should be no singular pattern of interaction among politicians and senior public administrators, as they should be part of an integrated whole, each one of them should back the other with technical (the appointed) and political (the elected) advice. When patterns of the interface between the two actors are poor then the organisation is bound to fail and performance is likely to follow a downward slope. Combined leadership becomes critical in the engagement process and they should have formalized arrangements. By establishing good habits, standard operation procedures, and guidelines and abiding by them, the political and administrative heads will not have to solve the same relationship challenges over again. The relationship paradigm shift may mean that relations between politicians and administrators may become more formalized over time. This may narrow the gap in poor relations and channel them into more formalized arena channels. Jacobsen also established that as time passes by,

early relations that were deemed “unsuitable” are being corrected, newcomers are disciplined, and the organisation reaches a new form of stability (Jacobsen, 2006, p. 309).

Constant interaction and feedback mechanisms are important to strengthen good relations between the two offices. Similarly, to the other two departments that studied mutual respect, effective communication was re-emphasized. Both heads should understand they are in their respective offices and should understand that to achieve the mandate of the department, they need each other. A good working relationship is when the two consult each other and agree on issues and also plan to play a vital role, when there are disagreements, they must agree to disagree based on realities. For instance, if a need arises for reviews of existing laws due to implementation challenges that may exist, the DGs become a piece of oiled machinery for such deliberations through the Minister and may propose changes to existing laws for government performance to improve. Personal differences should not affect the work of the department. Decisions must be made that would contribute to the growth of the organisation and the betterment of the citizens.

The policy combination model where administrators and politicians co-exist and are co-equals proclaims the ethical commitment of both parties to promote the values of public administration. This avoids the interest of one player who may be politically or administrative toothless. The pertinent role played by EAs and DGs in public administration requires evenness in interaction to address legislative deficiencies in the policy processes. Thoughtfulness has to be placed to avoid greater administrative or political control than is acceptable. The overall policy administration and management lie heavily on the administrative head however, it must be noted that the oversight thereof relies upon the political head. This is a task that must be taken diligently with both hands. In the future with the implementation of the HoPA, the legislation must be clear on the administrative powers, functions, and roles which will reduce possible labour relations matters.

In mapping, these relationships in South Africa, a hybrid approach of interaction that is “functional” and forming a “village” would work better at both levels to eliminate poor relations and start seeing each other within a team setting. I would call it the “functional village” South African hybrid model where the designated (politicians) and undesignated (public servants) are both forming parts of an integrated government (unified state) and are useful elites. This would strengthen their relationships and improve governance and leadership in South Africa. As per the results from participants, the functional model alone would not work perfectly specifically

when there is turbulence. The two leadership members would need to form a village first to be functional and collaborative within a democratic set-up which was discussed and connected to these two models in chapter 2. Caution must be put forward that they must not form a village and collaborate for wrongdoings (corruption, mismanagement, etc.) that will hamper the progress of the institution and country.

Public administration scholars must garner on serious issues such as collaboration, alliance, emotional intelligence, mutual trust, and ethical leadership in managing government resources if the goals have to be a reality. All these important traits were also raised by the participants as good characteristics that would shape the political-administrative phenomenon. The DGs must properly advise the Ministers administratively and therefore they must possess qualities such as flexibility, strength of character, and self-self-assurance to ensure that both of them look good in the public domain.

The National School of Government (NSG) in South Africa has existing induction programmes that could be used to nurture these relationships, mutual respect, and appreciation of the political and administrative worlds. Within a short space, Ministers and DGs should receive compulsory training which gleans more on the expected appropriate behaviours, code of conduct, relationship types, effective interpersonal skills, traits of a good leader, leadership, attitudinal change, and tolerance of each other's views and the whole range of issues like performance management of DGs, ethics, etc. This safeguards a shared understanding of what is expected and appropriate behavior from both of them.

The NSG training structure may capture elements of PAL models designed by the author. The model can also be used by SA or worldwide governments or public administrators and researchers as a dipstick to infer impaired or strengthened relations by testing the types of relationships, management of power dynamics and handling tension, major decision-making processes, conflicts or harmonised environments, and the factors affecting stability in any institution.

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Appendix A

List of Participants in the study on “Assessment whether political-administrative relationships affect stability in South Africa”

Participant Numbers			
Participant 1	Participant 2	Participant 3	Participant 4
Participant 5	Participant 6	Participant 7	Participant 8
Participant 9	Participant 10	Participant 11	Participant 12
Participant 13	Participant 14	Participant 15	Participant 16
Participant 17	Participant 18	Participant 19	Participant 20
Participant 19	Participant 20	Participant 21	Participant 22
Participant 23	Participant 24	Participant 25	Participant 26
Participant 27	Participant 28	Participant 29	Participant 30
Participant 31	Participant 32	Participant 33	Participant 34