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African Studies Seminar Paper to be
presented at Seminar in RW 319 at
4.00 p.m. on Monday, 11 August 1986

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INTERPRETATIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT / LEGITIMATIONS OF THE RACIAL
ORDER: THE HOLLOWAY AND TOMLINSON COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

by Louwrens Pretorius

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Commissions of inquiry are, as Merton (1975) pointed out, both users and producers of sociological knowledge. Because commissions deal with political issues, their reports reveal some of the ways in which such knowledge is used for political purposes. In other words, their reports provide excellent material for the analysis of ideology. The concept "ideology" refers to more or less coherent sets of ideas, or modes of discourse, which serve "to sustain relations of domination" (Thompson 1984). Ideology operates in many ways. Of these, legitimation is probably the one which is most often implied when the concept is used. Another is the dissimulation of the interests which are served by the state, or some other political formation, and by the ideology itself. In this paper I shall attempt to show how (quasi-) scientifically excogitated ideas were used, by the two commissions identified in the title, to legitimate the racial order in South Africa. The main thrust of the argument is quite simple: Socio-cultural interpretations of social "problems" were used to justify a political order which is structured along racial lines, and to (at least) obscure the interests which benefit from racially based domination.

This paper is not presented here because I pretend to any novel insights into the content of the "ruling ideology". We are all familiar with the central components of segregationist and apartheid ideology. I think, however, that the intensive analysis of ways in which ostensibly "scientific commissions" employ interpretations of social problems as "legitimation theories", is a relatively new theme on the agendas of South African social scientists. Recent publications focus on current "adaptations" in legitimating discourse (e.g. Buckland 1982, Stadler 1984). This paper will, I hope, at least contribute some historical perspective towards the study of current forms of "technisist" legitimating discourse(s). My own project entails studying the aetiology of the ruling ideology as it is refelected in commission reports.

One component of the project is an attempt to understand the "argumentative structure of (ideological) discourse" (Thompson 1984, 136). It will become obvious, however, that my "method" does not have much in common with various forms of methodologically self-conscious discourse (and hermeneutical) analysis. In this regard I can only say that I try to understand the nature of the "legitimizing theories" by looking at the relationships between the various components of the reports of different commissions which dealt with particular perennial issues in South African politics; and by reading the reports with refernce to the historical contexts in which the commissions operated. (I have not yet given attention to the relationship between commission reports and the evidence and other types of information on which they are based).

Because we are familiar with the relevant history of circumstances and ideas, I shall only briefly identify and comment on the contexts within which the two commissions conducted their investigations. Information regarding the immediate origins and composition of the commissions is provided. The purpose of this is primarily to highlight the ostensible "scientific" intent of the commissions. In contravention of the rules of academia, the paper contains no separately stated conclusions. I avoid formal "conclusions" because they tend to be mere repetitions of statements already made and, especially, because this paper is incomplete in the sense that it consists of severely abridged excerpts from a study which dealt with five commissions' reports (Pretorius 1985).

In the paper I deal with two commissions whose interpretations of social "problems" are primarily "socio-cultural" rather than "structural". The distinction between these two types of interpretations is taken from Portes and Ferguson's (1977) discussion of "ideologies of poverty". Socio-cultural interpretations explain social problems with reference to the normative, attitudinal and behavioural traits of the people who experience the situations which are regarded as "problems". (1) Such interpretations appear in both individualistic and collectivistic variations. The former is exemplified by the Puritan and Victorian tendencies to blame poverty on the defects of the individual pauper. The collectivist variation is, in its strongest form, embodied in the notion of a "culture of poverty" (Lewis, 1966). Structural explanations can also be dichotomised: on the "moderate" side we find explanations of (e.g.) poverty with reference to certain "dysfunctions" in otherwise adequate economic systems. Examples include explanations with reference to cyclical movements in the economy and with reference to discriminatory labour practices. "Radical" structural explanations are best represented by Marxist (and other?) theories which blame social problems on "the system" (to put it crudely). It is necessary to emphasise that this typology of interpretations should not be seen as suggesting anything more than analytical distinctions. Actual interpretations tend to combine elements from the different categories. Lewis's interpretation, for example, combines collectivist socio-cultural and (quite radical) structural components. The interpretations which I shall outline presently, are primarily of the collectivist socio-cultural type, albeit with some moderate and subordinated structural elements.

The preceding comments probably indicated that I tend to use "interpretation" as a synonym for "explanation". But I also use it quite loosely to refer to other dimensions of quasi-theories - such as the "diagnostic", "prescriptive" and "recommendative" (! - for lack of a better single term) dimensions of commission reports (see Smith and Stockman, 1972).

A note about references: In the case of the Holloway report I cite the appropriate paragraph numbers. The references to the Tomlinson report combine chapter and paragraph numbers. Most of the references to the Tomlinson report are to the complete report. I translated some of the quotations from the original Afrikaans. Quotations followed by a reference such as "(S par. x.y)" were taken from the English version of the Summary of the Tomlinson Report. (The Summary is not a good substitute for the

complete report.) I shall quite often refer to "Holloway" and "Tomlinson" rather than to "the Holloway Commission" and "the Tomlinson Commission". Where the Dr. Holloway and Prof. Tomlinson are themselves the subjects, I use their titles.

THE HOLLOWAY COMMISSION (1930-1932)

THE COMMISSION

The broad historical context, within which the Holloway report should be read, can be identified with "Great Depression", "Pact-government" and "Joint Councils" as the keywords. (2) Viewed in terms of socio-economic and political processes, the context can be delineated by thinking of industrialisation, impoverishment, urbanisation, changing stratification patterns - with the emphasis on proletarianisation - and the ascendancy of segregationism during the late twenties and early thirties. The immediate circumstances which led to the appointment of the Holloway Commission were, at the time, probably seen as circumstances of crisis. For example: The beerhall-events in Durban (June 1929), Pirow's legislation and his tax-raid in Durban (November 1929); the events in Potchefstroom (December 1929); a failed attempt at a general strike, but many isolated ones and police reaction thereto; ANC activity in the Boland area of the Cape; and even a protest march in the environs of the Houses of Parliament (March 1930). Die Burger wrote about "communist agitators" (11/3/1930) and The Cape Argus thought that some of the demands of black leaders were "reasonable" even though some of their statements were "ill advised, possibly unlawful" (17/3/30). There were, of course, many calls for the appointment of a commission of inquiry.

The origins of the Holloway Commission predate the events of 1929/30. Commissions of inquiry often recommend the appointment of more commissions of inquiry. The appointment of the Holloway Commission can be traced to a request by the Economic and Wage Commission (1925). It asked for a commission which would collect facts about the economic position of black people. This call was taken up by the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives. Many of the leading figures in this movement believed that scientific social research could provide solutions for socio-political problems (Rich 1984; Legassick 1976). (3) Thus the National European-Bantu Conference of February 1929 asked for "a thorough scientific investigation by trained experts ... as a necessary preliminary to all efforts to deal adequately and usefully with the many problems connected with the development of the Native People" (NEBC 1929). In the Cape Times, Alfred Hoernlé wrote that "the facts and statistics" had to be "thoroughly and systematically investigated" before policy is framed (7/5/1930, in Legassick 1976, 23). Perhaps the most interesting formulation came from an anonymous contributor to The Round Table (probably someone connected to the Joint Councils):

If we have succeeded in giving a fair picture of the state of ignorance in which legislators have set out to solve South Africa's native problem, the need for the comprehensive survey of the economic condition of the native people ... is obvious. A Select Committee of the House of Assembly, unversed in the technicalities of economic, anthropological and sociological research, has been unable in two years to do much more than reveal the immense gaps in our knowledge. What is now needed is the appointment of a commission of experts who will know what information to seek, what questions to ask of witnesses, if the true position is to be ascertained. More depends on the drafting of questionnaires and the cross-examination of witnesses than upon the perusal of memoranda voluntarily submitted by local guidance as to what is relevant. Not only South Africa, but the whole African continent, would be enabled by such a survey to plan its Native policy on lines which would secure both continuity and progress (RT 1930, 431).

The plea - and rumours that the appointment of a commission was imminent - was taken up by newspapers in early March 1930 (RDM 12/3/1930; PN 12/3/1930; CA 19/3/1930). When the matter was raised in Senate by F.S. Malan, a clearly unhappy N.C. Havenga (Minister of Finance) admitted that a commission would be appointed (DS 20/3/1930, col. 462-5, 478-80). The formal commission was issued on 9 June 1930. The responsible Minister was E.G. Jansen (Native Affairs).

The Holloway Commission was heavily loaded with state functionaries. The expert-interest dimensions of the membership can, however, be stated in various ways - as the following abbreviated vitae will suggest. At the time of the investigation, the chairman, Dr. J.E. Holloway, was Director of Census and Statistics. He was also a former Dean of Commerce at the University of Pretoria. Later he served as Ambassador in Washington and as High Commissioner in London. Dr. A.W. Roberts was an astronomer and educationalist (Lovedale College). Between 1920 and 1935 he was a member of the Native Affairs Commission, and he later served as a Senator. P.W. le R. van Niekerk was a Nationalist parliamentarian and a member of the Native Affairs Commission. F.A.W. Lucas was an advocate and judge, leader of the Labour Party in the Transvaal Provincial Council, of his own Farmers and Workers Party and, at the time of the investigation, chairman of the Wage Board. H.C.M. Fourie was a theologian, "oudstryder" (1899-1902) and "rebel" (1914). With his thesis (at Utrecht) on the Religieus-sociaal leven van die Amandabele ..., and other "Native studies", he served as the resident anthropologist. Major R. Anderson was a Natal farmer - and during Lord Milners' time he had served as Auditor General of the Orange Free State. A.M. Mostert was a farmer and member of a labour advisory board.

The Holloway Commission was asked to investigate the "economic and social conditions" of blacks; wage and industrial legislation; "the economic and social effect upon the European and Coloured population ... of the residence in urban areas and the measures, if any, to be adopted to deal with surplus Natives in, and to prevent the increasing migration of Natives to, such areas"; and matters pertaining to public revenue. The contentious issue of the franchise was visibly absent from the brief. This can be accounted for

with reference to Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog's opposition to the idea that commissions should deal with overtly political questions. Another factor is, I suspect, the liberal establishment's seeming reluctance to raise such matters at conferences and commissions. (4) Also absent from the formal terms of reference was the equally contentious issue of land. But this was rectified when the Commission obtained official permission to include the rural areas within the ambit of the investigation. At the time it was apparently not general practice to ask commissions for recommendations. Their function was limited to investigation. (Hence the tendency to refer to "fact finding commissions".) But the Holloway report does contain many policy proposals which may be read as formal recommendations.

The Commission pursued its investigation by employing procedures which derive from both judicial and social scientific practice. The details of these procedures are, perhaps, of less importance than the role of the liberal establishment in the process of investigation: J.D.R. Jones, acting for the South African Institute of Race Relations, "spent nine months or more moving around the country ahead of the Commission to encourage and assist Native and other groups in preparing evidence" (SAIRR 1935). He also used the opportunity to activate Joint Councils. In this way those who asked for an "independent", "expert" and "objective" inquiry could do much to direct the evidence which was submitted to the Commission. The resultant report reflects the reception of a "theory of culture contact" by the liberal establishment and the state (see Rich 1984). (5) If the report of the Carnegie Commission is taken as a contemporary model for social research, the Holloway Commissions' work left much to be desired. Unlike the Carnegie investigators, the Holloway commissioners did not place much emphasis on "science". They did, however, suggest that their chosen strategy of "adaptation" (i.e. segregation - see below) would be a more "economic" and "scientific approach to the problem" than approaches which "disregard" the "traditional" institutions of blacks (par. 200-04).

On the whole, the Commission was unanimous in its findings and recommendations. But on certain issues - I shall refer to some of these - there was a split between Lucas, Roberts, and occasionally Anderson, on the one side, and the rest on the other side. Lucas and Roberts adopted a "liberal" line. The political inclinations of the majority can be regarded as having been in tune with emergent Afrikaner Nationalist thinking. On issues regarding labour, Lucas was decidedly the most "radical" member. Roberts was the only commissioner who rejected the principle of segregation. I would, however, be reluctant to emphasise possible ideological differences between the commissioners. With respect to the central themes of the report the differences were relatively unimportant.

/ THE REPORT: ECONOMIC "UNDER-DEVELOPMENT" AND SEGREGATION

THE REPORT: ECONOMIC "UNDER-DEVELOPMENT" AND SEGREGATION

Commission reports often contain more or less explicit formulations of the commissioners' own conceptions of the socio-political "problems" which they investigated. Those formulations sometimes camouflage the "real" concerns of the commissioners - and of their sponsors. (1) In such cases, of which the Holloway report is a good example, it is advisable not to take the commissions' own formulations of problems too seriously when analysing the reports.

Holloway phrased the "problem" as follows: "The Native economic question is ... how best the Native population can be led onward step by step in an orderly march to civilization" (par. 14). This is, in fact, a formulation of an intermediate policy objective. Upon reading the relevant paragraphs in the context of the report as a whole, it becomes clear that the Commission was primarily concerned with the consequences, for whites, of large scale black urbanisation (including labour migration), and the attendant changes in social stratification. These effects were presented as the consequences of a number of more or less causally related processes: the "economic underdevelopment" of the reserves leads to urbanisation; urbanisation causes "chaos" in the labour market; conditions in the labour market are related to changes in stratification patterns; and all of this entails a serious "threat" to white interests. To overcome the threat, segregationary and discriminatory measures were proposed. The proposals were in line with the tendency towards an intensification of racially based domination. According to the Commission, the basic cause of economic underdevelopment was to be found in the attitude and behaviour patterns of black people. It is this explanation which was employed, implicitly or explicitly, to justify the proposals, and thereby the segregationist political order.

The first substantive paragraph in the Holloway report suggests that economic underdevelopment was interpreted in structural terms - as a consequence of "conflict" between an industrial economy and a pastoral subsistence economy (par. 8). Particular structural factors which contributed to underdevelopment, such as taxation and the limited amount of land available to blacks, were also identified. The structural causes were themselves reduced to socio-cultural factors. So, for example, the suggestion that underdevelopment was a result of "conflict" between the industrial and subsistence economies, was qualified under the heading Fundamentally the Problem lies in the Reserves:

It is important that the country should clearly visualize not only the problem, but the steps necessary to deal with it in a rational fashion. ... The Native economic question is not primarily a problem of a small, vocal dissatisfied, semi-civilized group of urbanized Natives; it is primarily a problem of millions of uneducated tribal Natives, held in the grip of superstition and of an anti-progressive social system (par. 16).

The implication is that blacks were themselves seen as the cause of underdevelopment. Stated more precisely: economic underdevelopment was caused by the socio-cultural characteristics of blacks. Before this reduction of an ostensibly structural explanation to socio-cultural factors is outlined in somewhat more detail, it is necessary to pose the question: for whom was underdevelopment - and its consequences - a problem? The answer lies in the Commission's formulation of its primary policy objective: "Your Commissioners endeavour to indicate in this Report some of the ways in which the apparently conflicting interests of black and white may be harmonized in the cause of national progress" (par. 19). The principle in terms of which the interests were to be harmonised, makes it clear whose interests were to be decisive:

On its European side no useful approach can be found by allowing an undermining of the standards which the white community has built up by centuries of effort. The European is the bearer of civilization in South Africa, and anything which retards his civilization will ultimately react detrimentally on the Native as well (par. 17).

The Holloway view of the socio-cultural characteristics of blacks is contained in its description of the "social system of the Abantu", which is itself part of a section entitled The Tribal Background of the Problem. This clumsy - and often banal - piece of cultural anthropology states that the "traditional" socio-political formations of blacks were embedded in, and constituted by, a complex of "reactionary", "stagnant", and "anti-progressive" attitude and behaviour patterns. These manifested themselves in conservative agricultural practices, in the high religious (rather than economic) value ascribed to cattle, in the strong paternalistic authority structure of family units, and in status ascription on the basis of consanguinity.

The relationship between such descriptions of the essential features of social formations on the one hand and preference for a segregationist order on the other, is in itself, not remarkable. However, it is put in some perspective if one keeps in mind that the Holloway Commission's contemporary, the Carnegie Commission, described poor whites in very similar terms. But then Carnegie also distinguished between the attributes of different categories of poor whites (and, while it ultimately based its recommendations on a socio-cultural explanation of white poverty, structural factors in impoverishment were granted independent explanatory significance). In the Holloway report one finds very few notable attempts at differentiating between groups of blacks. When a distinction is made between "reserve Natives" and "more advanced Natives", it is eventually qualified by the statement that many of the "more vocal and advanced Natives" are not characterised by a "great sense of perspective" (par. 85-6, 684).

The Holloway commissioners did have sufficient historical and sociological insight to realise that before "contact" with whites, the "social and economic organisation" of blacks was "well developed" - given the people's needs and circumstances (par. 21). Such insight must, of course, highlight the structural effects of white conquest: it changed "all the essential conditions on which their social system was founded" (par. 64). This admission of the importance of structural factors was qualified: the effect of "contact" on the "tribal system" was to "show up its weakness", and the "cause of this weakness is (their) attitude towards their environment" (par. 61). Whatever structural connotations might have been read into the initial statement of the effects of "contact", were, thus, ruled out by blaming those effects on the socio-cultural characteristics of the victims of conquest. For the victims there was only one solution to the problems created by their collective traits:

Unless the tribal natives can change this attitude for one which will permit progress, theirs will be a dark future. Their survival as a people depends on their ability to adapt themselves to the new environment created by a higher civilization (par. 62).

As suggested above, the recognition of structural factors in underdevelopment is not absent from the report. Amongst these were mentioned the exclusion of blacks from land (par. 65-6). The general thrust of the argument, throughout the report, however suggests that the "attitudes" of black people and the agricultural practices which derive therefrom were more important than limited access to land (cf. par. 92): The "baneful effects of primitive subsistence economy" (par. 75) was more important than the shortage of land.

The Holloway Commission argued, in effect, that white intrusion accompanied negative economic effects on blacks, but that the causes of these effects were to be found in attitudinal and behavioral patterns which constituted "traditional" social formations.

The "threat" which underdevelopment supposedly entailed was mediated through the processes of urbanisation and proletarianisation. A number of factors which contributed to the urbanisation of black people are identified in the report. These range from economic conditions to the wish of young people to escape from "tribal morality" (par. 43, 81, 92-3). The most important "push factor" was economic underdevelopment. The most important "pull factor" was the emerging industries' unquenchable thirst for cheap labour (par. 85, 92). But it was admitted that urbanisation was not necessarily a voluntary process:

In the past difficulty was experienced in obtaining a sufficient supply of labour for the industries of the country. The Native in a tribal reserve, accustomed to a subsistence economy, having, under European rule, peace with plenty (except in a bad crop season) felt no urge to go out to labour. ... The European Governments, wanting labour for their industries, decided to bring pressure to bear on the Native to force him to come out to work, and did this by imposing taxation (par. 532). (2)

Here we have recognition of the fact that urbanisation was a consequence of intentionally structured enforcement. Black urbanisation was designated as a "threat" to white people, but whites encouraged it in order to feed the mining and other industries (par. 92, 669). This admission - an admission of one of the ironies of the "Native question" - must of course be read within the context of the socio-cultural explanation of economic underdevelopment. The Commission pointed out that there were arguments for and against the use of taxation as a lever to force black people into industrial employment. While it suggested that it did not want to express a view on such arguments, it felt the need to present a rather weak, though suggestive, justification for continuation of the practice: "At present it is an integral part of the administrative system of the country and it certainly exerts pressure where a great deal of pressure will continue to be required for a long time if the mass of the Natives is to advance at all" (par. 669).

Urbanisation as such was not the Commissions' only concern. It also gave attention to an important concomitant of urbanisation: changing patterns of social stratification. A close reading of the report suggests that it was the proletarianisation, of both blacks and poor whites, which constituted one important facet of the "threat" which was caused by underdevelopment.

In the Holloway report three different patterns of stratification are distinguished: authority and status differentiation within tribal communities, stratification in terms of labour and racial distinctions, and a categorization of black people in terms of a combination of "geographical" and socio-economic criteria. The descriptions of the second and third patterns constitute important keys to understanding the politics of economic underdevelopment - and the ideological significance of the "theory of cultural contact".

Regarding the second pattern of stratification, the Commission's own terminology provides material for characterising the pattern as a racially based class system. In the relevant paragraphs we find commentary on changing stratification as a result of population increases and increasing "struggle for a share in the material goods". According to the Commission the "natural division of labour", under the circumstances which were prevalent during "the earlier period of contact between the races", was that which obtained between skilled white labour and unskilled black labour: "The European brought the knowledge, the skill, and the capital. The Native had only his untutored muscular strength to contribute" (par. 523-4). Intensified economic competition changed this uncomplicated stratification pattern. As the numbers of "advanced Natives" increased, there also arose "a considerable class of white people, with relativeley low efficiency" (i.e. "poor whites"). Thus we come closer to the essence of the "threat" which, was allegedly created by black urbanisation, and to the real meaning of the "Native economic question":

What are the factors in the labour problem of the Union? We have a small class of skilled white artisans, with a reasonably high level of efficiency and ... relatively high wages. We have, secondly, a very large mass of low paid Native labourers who have such a low level of efficiency that their low wages do not constitute an international competitive advantage. In between these two we have a considerable class of white people, with a relatively low efficiency, albeit higher than that of the bulk of the Natives, but with a standard of living which is difficult to maintain against Natives of a lower efficiency, but a very much lower level of wages. We have in addition a group of natives who have achieved a level of efficiency comparable with that of the poor white man, who aspire to their standard of living but who are, in company with the white man, exposed to the competition of the great bulk of Natives. And we have the Coloured population, who are largely, though not entirely, in the same position. The inevitable result is a chaotic labour market, which has harmful results for both Europeans and Natives (par. 526).

The third pattern of stratification relates to black people in urban areas. The relevant description postulates a distinction between permanently urbanised blacks and "temporary visitors" (migrant workers). The needs and living standards of the latter group was described as that which was associated with tribal life and the subsistence economy. The permanently urbanised people, in contrast, were developing needs and aspirations associated with "the more diversified standard of living of the Europeans" (par. 539).

Black urbanisation, and the proletarianisation of blacks and poor whites, were the essential components of an "economic and sociological position (which embrace) ... the interests of both white and black" (par. 550). The Commission did not explicitly deal with "politics". That was beyond its brief. (1) But if we understand "politics", broadly defined, as referring to the processes and mechanisms through which societies are structured, and if we accept that in South Africa this has always entailed the racial ordering of the society, the political meaning of the Holloway-interpretation of the "Native Economic Question" is disclosed.

In the somewhat melodramatic paragraph 91 of the report, the Commission wrote that "immigration" created "in the minds of the majority of the European community serious misgivings as to the future of the white race in this country, for which we feel there is only too much justification if the economic position of the Natives in the Reserves is not speedily improved". Black urbanisation was, in fact, also designated as being detrimental to blacks: the process removed "the more advanced Natives" from the reserves, which retarded the development of those areas. This would, in its turn, lead to large scale impoverishment of blacks (par. 85, 93-4). Furthermore: migrant workers could undercut the position of the permanently urbanised blacks because the former could, unlike their urbanised counterparts, supplement low wages by drawing on the products of the subsistence economy. The position of urban blacks (and of poor whites) was also conceptualised in terms of the racially based class system: where "poor whites" and "advanced Natives" meet each other on the Commission's stratification ladder, the "Native economic question" becomes a problem of competition, and:

The European population cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the lot of a large number of their own race, who are forced down to the lower strata of the white community by economic pressure. It would be easy to solve the problem of the urbanized Natives by opening to them the occupations now manned by whites in the lower strata at wages which to them are indeed low, but which to the Native would represent a considerable advance. If there were no colour distinction the weakest would sink to the bottom. It would, however, be unwise to disregard the ideal of the white community that a minimum civilized standard must be maintained. The standard is now being partly maintained by restrictions on the employment of Natives. As the number of civilized and semi-civilized Natives increase, however, this method will bear even harder on them, and will at the same time be less efficacious as a protection to the white man (par. 549).

In the end, the economic difficulties faced by urban blacks and poor whites were blamed on the migrant workers. The migrants' allegedly erratic work habits and limited material needs (par. 551), created a "chronic state of chaos" in "the labour market":

No regular class of urban labour gets a chance to develop because those Natives who remain permanently in town are always subject to the disturbing influence on wage rates of a large supply of unskilled labour. Without some degree of permanence in the labour force no high degree of efficiency can be expected, and the Native urban labour is notoriously lacking in permanence.

State policy, therefore, should be directed at the object of giving more permanence, more stability, to the various classes of labour, and of reducing in so far as possible its casual nature (par. 556-7).

When it is read literally, this refers to urban blacks. When it is read in the context of the Commission's description of economic relationships between urban blacks and poor whites, the implication is that the latter group also suffered from conditions in the labour market. As Holloway described it, the "economic and sociological position (which embrace) ... the interests of both white and black" was manifested in an unstable labour market of which the dynamic element was competition between migrant workers, urbanised blacks and poor whites. This condition was presented as a "threat" to whites and blacks. In the final instance it was, as I shall suggest below, specific white interest groups which were to be served by stabilising the "chaotic labour market". The proposed measures were designed to structure the labour market - and the society - on a racial basis. Provision was also made for a buffer class of urbanised black workers. (2)

The Holloway Commission formulated its broad strategy for the "harmonization of black and white interests" with reference to anthropologist G.P. Lestrade's distinction between "repressionist", "assimilationist" and "adaptationist" policies. The Commission opted for an "adaptationist" strategy, that is, a strategy which would be designed to "(take) out of the Bantu past what is good, and even what is merely neutral, and together with

what is good of European culture for the Abantu, (to build) up a Bantu future" (par. 200). In other words, segregation was chosen. Only Roberts opposed this. In his view there could not "be two civilizations in South Africa". Blacks could only "progress (by) ... assimilating as rapidly as possible the European civilization and culture" (par. 201).

In the report a number of variants of "segregation" were spelled out. The preferred version was a form of "partial economic segregation". This would have entailed the development of the reserves, the stabilisation of a "class" of permanently urbanised black workers, the formation of "a class of more or less specialized land workers", and the rational channeling of temporary labour. Development of the reserves was prescribed as a key component of the strategy. It would, the Commission believed, have had "the effect ... that the classes of urban and rural labour will tend to crystallize to an extent which will enable greater efficiency among both", and "to create a more economical distribution of the labour forces" (par. 695). This, of course, indicates the major interests which were to be served by segregation. The beneficiaries were in fact identified quite explicitly: "In the interest of the efficiency of urban industries it is better to have a fixed urban Native population to the extent that such a population is necessary" (par. 500).

With regard to governmental institutions the Commission argued in favour of "using Native institutions as part of the administration of the country" (par. 204). The development of the reserves had to limit the rate of urbanisation - or, to put it more accurately, provide the conditions for controlling the supply of labour. The harnessing of "traditional" institutions would provide, the Commission hoped, a source of political legitimacy (and instruments for social control) for the racial order. For the Holloway Commission this "adaptionist" strategy embodied both "the point of view of logical and economic administration" and, "if recognition is accorded to (Native) institutions in the administration of the Reserves", the opportunity to influence "(the Natives') whole outlook in regard to the European" (par. 205).

The interests which were to be served by the strategy can be highlighted by way of giving brief attention to the views of the majority faction within the Commission. The "pass laws" were the focus of much of the "unrest" amongst black people which precipitated the appointment of the commission. With opposition from Lucas and Roberts, the Commission supported the retention, though not the expansion, of the relevant measures. This was justified with reference to the need to limit black urbanisation, to regulate labour supply; and, in general, to regulate the movement of black people outside the reserves (par. 724-7, 733). By way of rhetorical questions, the majority (Holloway, Fourie, Mostert and Van Niekerk) rationalised their position on the pass laws as follows:

In our opinion the reason and justification for (the pass laws) must be looked for in the fact of the contact between the higher European civilization and the primitive indigenous society of the Native. In the case of the town, how far can the European social order allow free intermixture with the Native with his generally low standard of living? In the case of the farms, is the Native too irresponsible,

too untied to his employment by his living requirements to be allowed complete freedom of movement without economic disorganization of agriculture resulting from it? And if so, can some form of regulation of his movements be devised without injustice or the creation of intolerable hardship to him? (par. 725).

In evidence it was suggested to the Commission that the introduction of minimum wages in certain labour categories would limit the "disruptive" influence of migrant labour. Anderson, Lucas and Roberts recommended "that the existing laws relating to the regulation of wages and conditions of employment should be made to apply to the Natives in the industries to which those laws are applicable, due care being taken not to proceed so rapidly as to prevent trade and industry from being able to adapt themselves to any changes" (par. 1055). The majority opposed this - because wage regulation would, in their view, encourage urbanisation and because it would have detrimental effects also on those industries which were not directly affected by wage regulation, in particular mining and farming:

These industries have this in common, that the margin of productive enterprise is determined largely by the productiveness of natural resources. An artificially created higher level of urban wages must necessarily increase wages in these industries. This would depress marginal production, of which there is a great deal not only in respect of low-grade ore, but also of all classes of farming, and would thus directly reduce the national income. This would not be to the advantage either of the country as a whole, or of the Natives as a group (par. 1005).

Segregation and discrimination would, of course, not develop the reserves and thereby remove underdevelopment as a cause of urbanisation. A number of practical developmental measures were proposed. In accordance with the socio-cultural explanation of underdevelopment, the core of the plan was, however, to resocialise the people: "The economic development of the Reserves - which postulates social educational development ... of the natives in those areas - transcends in importance every other phase of the native economic policy" (par. 85). It was deemed "necessary in the first instance to change the attitude of mind of a people before the natives as a whole can become part of an orderly advanced economic system" (par. 552).

To summarise: The Holloway Commission's most important proposals were predicated on the argument that the economic conditions of black people and, in particular, the instability of the urban labour market, was the consequence of the economic underdevelopment of the reserves. These conditions were themselves ascribed to the socio-cultural characteristics of black people. In order to limit urbanisation, to provide industry and farming with a regulated labour supply, and to safeguard poor whites against competition for jobs, the reserves had to be developed. Development was to be achieved primarily by resocialising blacks - in effect to make them servicable to the needs of capitalism. Because this would be a long term project, "other measures ... which (would) have a speedier effect" had to be considered (par. 562). These included influx control, work reservation and wage regulation. The Commission also prescribed the stabilisation of the

labour market as a precondition for the "creation" of "a class of more efficient urban Natives" (par. 558). It was not phrased as such, but the function of this class would also have been to serve as a buffer between whites and "tribal Natives". With the aid of the buffer, through the ostensible development of the reserves, and by resocialising blacks into appropriate attitudinal and behavioural patterns, the economic and political dominance of whites could be assured. (10)

THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION (1950-1955)

THE COMMISSION

In many respects Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas was an elaborate update of the Native Economic Commission. The context can be described in terms of the same processes as those mentioned with reference to the Holloway Commission. There were also differences: Depression was followed by growth, relatively radical Afrikaner Nationalists came to power in 1948, and African Nationalism was resurgent. Largely as a result of the Second World War, industrialisation accelerated during the decade preceding the appointment of the Tomlinson Commission. This increased the rate of black urbanisation. The needs created by the war led to some slackening of influx control, and there was - at least on the level of political discourse emanating from bodies such as the Social and Economic Planning Council and the Fagan Commission - some promise that segregationary and discriminatory measures were up for review. In the last days of the United Party's reign, reform was in the air - so to speak. In fact, this "reform talk" was part of an agenda for which the Holloway Commission could claim co-authorship. The discourse of reform was, however, contradicted by the intensification of oppression. In the event, the ideological trends embodied in the Fagan report and in the United Party's election platform for 1948, were interrupted by an apparently different trend: the arrival of segregationism in its more radical form - Apartheid.

The National Party fought the 1948 election on the basis of, amongst other things, the policy prescriptions of its own Sauer Commission. Sauer advocated a policy, and an ideology, of apartheid. It was based on existing segregationary traditions and practices. As an ideology, Apartheid was articulated by Afrikaner intellectuals at least since the early forties. After 1948 it became an important instrument in the consolidation of the "Afrikaner volk", and for the legitimation of Afrikaner, and eventually white, rule. The apartheid ideologues could appeal to well established segregationary ideas - and thus to the vast majority of the white electorate. They grafted eclectic segregationism onto cultural and ethnic nationalism and turned it into a coherent set of ideas; the logic of which demanded and justified the total separation of "nations" ("volke").

If the stated objectives of apartheid - territorial separation, the drastic limitation of black urbanisation, the separation of nations - were to be achieved, segregationist legislation would not be sufficient. The Holloway and other commissions found, unsurprisingly, that the reserves could not accommodate all the people who were supposed to stay there most of the time.

The new government's plans required that the reserves should accommodate them. The Tomlinson Commission had to prepare a programme of development which would make this possible.

Segregation and discrimination evoked increasingly strong reaction from blacks. Although opposition against intensified oppression (despite the liberal promises of the UP) - from the industrial action of the forties to the Defiance Campaign - does not seem to have had anything to do with the appointment of the Commission, it affected its arguments. Political movements and ideas grow from action and reaction. Blacks (as well as "coloureds" and "Indians") reacted against increasing segregation. Opposition intensified as apartheid rhetoric and legislation made explicit the mode of domination which the liberal promises of the late forties had attempted to conceal. As we shall see, this opposition was used by the Tomlinson Commission to support its case for apartheid.

The Sauer Commission proposed that "planning committees" be established to bring about a "diversification" of economic activities in the reserves. The need for research-based planning for the development of the reserves also received attention in the 1946 report of the Social Economic and Planning Council. The idea which inspired the appointment of Tomlinson was thus not new. The Commission was, nevertheless, the result of an initiative of the Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-Aangeleenthede. In February 1950 SABRA's Council took a decision containing the main points of an economic programme for "the execution of a positive policy for separate native development" (SABRA 1950, 109-10). The six points contained in the decision represent a good summary of the most important recommendations which eventually emanated from the Tomlinson Commission. The decisions were conveyed, in late March 1950, to Dr. D.F. Malan and his Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. E.G. Jansen. On this occasion "the necessity for comprehensive research" was emphasised. Jansen took the initial steps to constitute the Commission. In October he was replaced by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd who, most reluctantly, finalised the matter. (Verwoerd believed that he and his officials did not need a Commission to lay plans for apartheid (Scholtz 1974, 242) and he actually did his best to obstruct the investigation.)

The Commission consisted of nine members. Prof. F.R. Tomlinson was an agricultural economist at the University of Pretoria (at the time, all members of agricultural faculties were employed by the Department of Agriculture). M.D.C. de W. Nel was a Member of Parliament who concerned himself with "native affairs" and who became Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (1958-1961). C.W. Prinsloo was the assistant manager of Non-White Affairs for the Pretoria Municipality and, later, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Information. J.H. Janse van Rensburg was a farmer, as was G.J. Badenhorst. C.B. Young was assistant vice-secretary (development) of the Department of Native Affairs. Prof. C.H. Badenhorst was an educationalist and theologian. Dr. J.H. Moolman was a geographer at the Council for the Development of Natural Resources (later director of the Africa Institute). The agronomist and genetician, Prof. F.X. Laubscher, resigned soon after appointment. He was replaced by another agronomist, Prof. J.H.R. Bisschop. Only Tomlinson, Badenhorst and Bisschop were "full time commissioners".

It was a commission of experts, albeit with a significant complement of state functionaries. The chairman insisted that the investigation would be thoroughly scientific (Tomlinson 1979, 6; DT 25/11/50). For this, the assistance of a large number of experts were obtained, including economists, business economists, anthropologists, medical experts, sociologists, geographers, and at least one political scientist. The Commission conducted an impressive amount of primary field research - and claimed that the report was based largely on "original research". It also listened to witnesses. In this respect, as in other facets of the investigation - and, in fact, in the authorship of the report - members of SABRA played a key role. The report was presented, explicitly and with much emphasis, as being "scientific". The chairman claimed that the Commission did not base its report on "a political point of departure", and that only chapter 25 was "ideological". For the rest: "Ek het dit my ten doel gestel om die wetenskaplike feite in verband met die vraag aan die volk te stel" (DH 7/5/56, 9, 11).

THE REPORT: ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND APARTHEID

Both in terms of problem formulation and interpretation, the Tomlinson report represents a more sophisticated, and more radical, rendition of ideas which appear in the Holloway Report. Like its predecessor, the Tomlinson Commission investigated the "Native question", and interpreted it in terms of a "theory of culture contact". For Tomlinson, the "primary" cause of the "urgent nature of our Native question" was the "process of integration". This "problem" would be "increased in intensity and scope if the process (was) allowed to continue":

(Dit) sou ... 'n groot dwaasheid wees om die oë te sluit vir die probleme, en die gevare, vir Blank en Bantoe, wat deur die magte van ineenstrengeling ontketen is. Dit is verder klaarblyklik dat die gevare in die eerste plek saamhang met die feit dat 'n toenemende deel van die Bantoebevolking besig is om 'n permanente domicilium in die nie-Bantoegebiede te verkry (par. 25.70).

Integration between whites and blacks was regarded as a "problem" because it would have certain detrimental consequences for whites. The process of integration was described as a manifestation as well as a consequence of "aanraking" ("contact") between whites and blacks. Furthermore, in its later phases "contact" was, through the process of urbanisation, converted into an immediate and serious "threat" for whites. Urbanisation was ascribed primarily - as we may expect - to the underdevelopment of the reserves.

In contrast to Holloway, who largely camouflaged the essentially political contents of the "Native question", Tomlinson stated it quite explicitly: "Permanente domicilium van enige bepaalde gebied skep 'n prioriteitsreg vir sodanige persoon en sy afstammeling om as volledige burgers van dié gebied aanvaar te word" (par. 25.70). Tomlinson held that the "Native question" could only be resolved by following a "total approach". "Fragmentary approaches", such as those adopted by other commissions (apparently the Fagan Commission, in particular), "necessarily gave rise to a limited view and unsatisfactory recommendations". Tomlinson wanted to avoid such

shortcomings by insisting on "a clear and purposeful policy, as well as the logical application and co-ordination of the principles laid down" (S par. 25.3). For Tomlinson the desirable, and the only possible, policy was one of "separate development" or "apartheid". (11)

As in the case of the Holloway Commission, The Tomlinson commission's "theory of culture contact" holds forth a particular view of the collective characteristics of black people. Tomlinson's exposition of these characteristics can be found in chapter 1 of the report. It is, essentially, a more detailed, and a more self-consciously anthropological ("volkekundige" rather than "sosiaal-antropologiese"), essay about social phenomena such as those described by Holloway. The description of the other "element" in the "process of contact" - the "Europeans" - does not contain, interestingly enough, much anthropology. It is nevertheless clear, that the core of the interpretation is the notion of a clash between "civilisations" or "cultures". The following quotation summarises the Commission's views on the essential difference between the two "civilisations":

In 'n bespreking van die kultuur van die Bantoe moet in gedagte gehou word dat hulle tot die primitiewe volke van die wêreld behoort. Hiermee word bedoel dat hulle 'n eenvoudige en natuurlike lewenswyse handhaaf, wat nog tot 'n groot mate staties is en nie die dinamiese elemente openbaar waardeur moderne gemeenskappe gekenmerk word nie (par. 1.35).

The exposition of the process of culture contact begins with a "historical survey" (par. 2.5-121). For our present purposes, this is of less importance than the more "analytical" components of the interpretation. Since the survey provides an excellent example of historiography as ideology, a few remarks are, nevertheless, in order. The survey is a biased, euro-centric rendition of white occupation of South Africa and of the evolution of white policies vis-a-vis blacks. It provides case material for a study on Afrikaner nationalist historiography (cf. Thompson 1962, 1966). The Commission's own formulation of conclusions (par. 2.171-121) reveals the purposes of the survey: (i) It had to justify whites' claims to 87% of South African territory; (ii) it had to prove that whites reserved the reserves for blacks in the interest of blacks; (iii) it had to prove that "the principle of territorial separation" had previously been recognised by all white South African governments, and that apartheid thus had historical legitimacy; and (iv) it had to prove that relationships between whites and blacks - and thus whites' claims to the "European area", as well as to "the principle of territorial separation" - had a contractual basis.

The ostensibly scientific rationale for apartheid is cast in the form of a quasi-theoretical construction which predicts biological assimilation as the "inexorable" ("onverbiddelelike") consequence of "unhindered" contact between different "nations", and of the consequent "acculturation" and "enculturation" of the nations. The exposition, as we find it in chapter 2 of the report, is in fact a somewhat haphazard admixture of concepts and ideas which were drawn from a variety of anthropological and race relations studies.

In the Commission's "theory", the concept "volk" refers to the most comprehensive real and desirable societal form. A "volk" is "an organism" which consists of "a number of persons grouped together on the basis of a common cultural possession" ("gemeenskaplike kultuurbesit"). A "volk" is more than a collection of individuals: The norms, attitudes, and behaviour patterns of the individual derive from "his integratedness in his society". This organic conception of society made it possible for the commission to argue that "contact" and "amalgamation" ("vermenging") upsets the "balance" between nations as well as that of their individual members (par. 2.122). This contention was supported with recourse to the structural-functionalist anthropology of, i.a. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1952). Following a quotation from his work, it was claimed that the "meeting and amalgamation" ("sametreffing en vermenging") of nations leads to a "dysnomic social condition". Consequently "various events take place": firstly "tensions" and "clashes" occur within and between nations; secondly, "one or both the 'volksorganismes' disintegrate"; thirdly, a condition of "eunomy" may return through "the total extinction of one organism", or through the complete absorption of one organism by the other without significant modification of the remaining organism's culture, or through "reintegration to a new organism" (par. 2.123-4).

With reference to the work of P.A.F. Walter (1952) and R.F.A. Hoernlé (1945), the "inexorable process of integration" was presented as proceeding through successive phases. Hoernlé provided the model with the most local content. In his view the process would proceed from cultural through economic, social, and political integration, to eventuate in biological assimilation (par. 2.129). This conception is itself analogous to a key assumption of systemic and structural-functional theories: the notion that change in one component of a society leads to changes in the others. It is this sort of conception which compelled the theoreticians of apartheid to insist on separation between black and white in all sectors of society.

The commission attempted to bolster its interpretation with reference to a variety of authors' works. In this way it repeatedly found different concepts for saying the same thing (e.g. par. 25.25). The essence of the message was that the process of culture contact - i.e. integration - would lead, unfailingly, to biological assimilation. In the work of Herskovitz (1949), however, a way was found to neutralise the immanent "law of integration":

Dat hierdie "cultural drift" deur doelbewuste optrede, of deur iets anders wat voorval, in 'n ander rigting gestuur kan word, word deur vooraanstaande volkekundiges soos byvoorbeeld deur Herskovits erken (par. 2.131).

It was possible, after all, to avoid the unavoidable. (12) But before the means to this end could be presented, the dynamics of integration had to be described in more detail. This was done by discussing various factors which could influence the process of integration. These include the nature of the "contact situation", differences in "cultural level", population ratios, "racial differences", "psychological differences", the tempo of socio-economic change, "cultural distance", and "Europeans' resistance to

assimilation" (par. 2.132-58). Regarding this discussion of factors the following comments will suffice: (i) It confirms that the Commission interpreted socio-political processes primarily in terms of "culture". The structural dimensions of "contact" received no recognition. (ii) The purpose of the discussion was simply to reaffirm that all the factors would contribute to acute "disnomy". Population figures, in particular, were used in arguments which had to evoke fear of various "threats" - such as a perpetually conflictual relationship ("strydverhouding") and "the collapse of the superior culture". (iii) Such evocative arguments were strengthened by placing emphasis on whites' resistance against integration. They were also bolstered by stressing black opposition to discrimination - a feature of the social order which, it was claimed, could be removed by "total apartheid".

In the penultimate section of chapter 2, the Commission presented its own view of historical "phases in the process of contact". For the Commission's purposes, the critical phases were the third and the fourth, i.e. the "urbanisation phase" and the "reaction phase". The "urbanisation phase" was described as follows:

As the result of the intrusion of the European into the living sphere of the Bantu during the second phase, a need for the cultural possessions of the Europeans arose among the Bantu. But the means for obtaining these possessions were not to be found in the Bantu Areas, and therefore, an exodus of Bantu workseekers ... to the European Areas took place. Owing to the cultural distance between the European and the Bantu ... the European now refuses to admit the Bantu to the heart of his own sphere of life, and the Bantu thus becomes a mere independent "squatter" in the European living area (S par. 2.92; par. 2.259)

The "reaction phase" is the one in which blacks react(ed) against their "exclusion" from the "European sphere of life". According to Tomlinson blacks did so in three ways - of which "attempts at intrusion" and "nationalistic movements" were singled out for special attention. "Attempts at intrusion" is a Tomlinson codeword which means resistance against white domination. The description of resistance entails little more than scapegoat and enemy labelling: "Attempts at intrusion" were led by organisations in which "communist elements" were present, and the "desire for intrusion into the European community and the consequent levelling ('gelykmaking')" was "completely in accordance with the the ideal of communism" (par. 2.229). "Nationalistic movements" were embodied in the "independent" and "sectarian" churches. These aimed at the establishment of a separate "sphere of life" for blacks (par. 2.230-4). The "attempts at intrusion" would lead to an intensified "strydverhouding". That is, unless "the European" was prepared "to allow the Bantu to enter into the core of his sphere of life and, in so doing, to surrender his own identity" (par. 2.254). With reference to the nationalist tendency, the fear was expressed that it would develop into a powerful anti-white nationalism. But in this possibility the Commission also saw an opportunity for the realisation of apartheid:

Die Kommissie meen egter dat dit wel moontlik is om die omstandighede te skep waardeur hierdie (nasionalistiese) aspirasies .. in die regte bane gelei kan word. Indien byvoorbeeld aan die Bantoe die moontlikheid gebied word om in sy eie tuisgebiede sy eie nasionale bestaan te voer ..., kan hierdie drang tot selfuitlewing en handhawing 'n heilsame verloop hê, aangesien die strydverhouding daardeur verminder word (par. 2.258).

The Commissions' representation of reaction against domination served to focus attention on the specific and immediate "threats" which continued integration would entail for whites. As such, the representation could underscore the following decision: whites had to choose between "two poles of thought" which "have arisen in consequence of contact", namely "apartheid" and "liberalism", or, "between the maintenance of separate identities and the process of coalescence, between the traditional African way of life and the Neo-Western way of life" (S par. 3.29.ix).

Even the most ardent adherents of socio-cultural interpretations of political processes cannot ignore the fact that the history of "contact" between white and black in South Africa had structural dimensions and consequences. There are, thus, some structural accents in the Tomlinson history. The Commission however reduced the structural dimensions of conquest and domination to talk about changes in "views of life" ("lewensbeelde"). This is especially visible in an exposition of the "results of contact" in the third chapter of the report. The only significant reference to the structural consequences of conquest appears in the conclusion that the "social division" (which was imposed "because the cultural difference between master and servant was so great") acquired, "with the onset of industrialisation and the influx of Bantu labour, an economic meaning". The division became "a protective measure for the European worker and a barrier against disturbing the traditional pattern of race relations"; a "colour bar" which "tied the culturally backward Bantu to unskilled and semi-skilled jobs" (par. 3.141-2). That discrimination as an instrument for the exploitation of cheap labour was not an issue for further consideration. On the contrary: the existence of a capitalist economy was presented as a "threat" to the "integrity" of "die Blanke volksorganisme", because "the inclusion (of Bantu) in one sphere" would, "according to the law of integration", inevitably lead to integration "in other spheres of life, and eventually also in the biological sphere" (par. 3.150). By way of this line of argumentation, the commission came to stating the white fears concerning urbanisation and changing patterns of stratification:

Daar is ... 'n stygende getal (Bantu), veral diegene wat reeds die tweede of derde generasie van stedelike bewoners vorm en sommige wat moontlik deur onderwys "progressief" geword het, wat hul toekoms en belange in die breër ekonomiese verband van Suid-Afrika sien, en wat hoër aspirasies het as net die beoefening van ongeskoolde werk. Hul persoonlike ambisie laat hulle strewe na beter werkkringe en groter inkomste om groeiende behoeftes van westerse oorsprong te bevredig.

Sulke Bantu probeer ook om langs politieke weg hulle ideale te bereik. Hulle probeer om hul sosiale aansien te verhoog, en beter status in die samelewing te verkry. Die ou verhouding tussen heer en diensbode begin onder stedelike en geïndustrialiseerde omstandighede vervaag.

Hier is 'n ander distribusie van rykdom: daar is baie Blanke "armes" en baie Bantoe "rykes". Hier begin die Bantoe neerkyk op sommige Blankes en sommige Blankes begin opkyk na sommige Bantoe. Die handhawing van afsonderlike woonbuurte verhinder tot op sekere hoogte dat hierdie proses van styging aan die een kant en daling aan die anderkant sy volle uitwerking het. Die reeds lankalbestaande skeidslyn tussen swart en wit het ook nog sy effek maar dit begin sy krag verloor (par. 3.163-5)

In chapter 25 of the report, the concern with changing stratification (and its political implications) is reflected in one of various lists of consequences of "evolutionary" integration. Integration would lead to (i) "cultural assimilation", (ii) "the removal or disappearance of all economic measures differentiating between the two groups ... (which would) lead to the development of a socio-economic stratification based not on colour, but on purely social-economic considerations", (iii) "cultural and economic equality leading to political equality, and the creation of a common society in the political sphere", (iv) "increased social contact and association", leading to "personal relations" being "based upon socio-economic preferences or prejudices" and, finally, (v) "complete racial assimilation" (S par. 25.13, par. 25.25)

The Commission recognised that urbanisation was a universal process; that it was a consequence of the interaction between opportunities created by industrialisation in the urban areas and the lack of such opportunities in rural areas (par. 7.33). It described the reserves as "underdeveloped" (par. 26.3), and its findings on the "geographical income" of the reserves could have served as devastating commentary on the lack of development since the Holloway Commission. This underdevelopment had to be reversed in order to prevent "one or more" of the following: "increasing poverty in the reserves, increasing migration of labour, and "permanet emigration of inhabitants especially to the European cities" (par. 24.65). Tomlinson explained economic underdevelopment in much the same way as Holloway did. However, by virtue of its composition and the vast resources of scholarly expertise to which it had access, the Tomlinson Commission was also a much more sophisticated tool of investigation than the Holloway Commission. Perhaps for this reason, its explanation of underdevelopment also had a solid, albeit moderate, structural component. As the commission saw it, the impact of the external economies which resulted from the original localisation of industries, was one of the more important causes of the underdevelopment of the reserves (par. 26.7). Furthermore, the placement infrastructure, relative to the location of the reserves, as well as the "mobility" of black labour, was aided by the "neglect" of the reserves: planning and the provision of infrastructure was largely limited to the "European areas" (par. 26.11-2). Other factors which were mentioned included the lack of opportunity for blacks "to exert the necessary pressure in

favour of the establishment of infrastructure in the reserves", whites' reluctance to invest there, the system of reservation which itself precluded white investment, and the limited financial resources available to the state and to the inhabitants of the reserves (par. 26.12-8).

Tomlinson did not exactly dwell on two of the more important causes of underdevelopment: taxation and the drastic limitation of blacks' access to land. The role of taxation as a factor in the supply of black labour, and thereby in urbanisation, was recognised (e.g. par. 2.192). There are also references to the limitations placed on access to land. These references are, however, incidental footnotes to the socio-cultural components of the Commissions' interpretation. Certainly the Commission's explanation of black urbanisation is, in this respect, in no way comparable to Grosskopf's (1932) thorough analysis of the structural causes of white urbanisation. In the Tomlinson scheme it was, in any case, the culture rather than the economy of blacks which was disrupted by tax.

Besides the "theory of culture contact", a variety of other argumentative devices were employed to justify apartheid. Amongst these we find statements of principles regarding the "moral duty and right" of nations to existence - and the moral duty of nations not to deny other nations that right (25.37). In the process of providing such justifications, the Commission also emphasised the political consequences of integration - thus making explicit the political purposes of apartheid: if integration was allowed to proceed it would lead to a situation in which blacks would "eventually constitute the majority of the electorate". This would terminate "the European 'orientation' of our legislation and government ('bewind')" (par. 25.31). The Commission concluded that there was no middle road between total apartheid and total integration. (Commissioner Bisschop did not support the most overtly ideological of the Tomlinson chapters - chapter 25 - but his opposition entailed little more than doubts about the feasibility of apartheid. He supported the principle (par. 25.93).)

The Commission's terms of reference asked for the formulation of a development programme for the reserves. They did not ask for justifications for either apartheid or a development programme. The unsolicited justification for apartheid, however, also became a justification for economic development. The logic of the theory of culture contact, and of the way in which urbanisation was interpreted, demanded the development of the reserves. If economic underdevelopment of the reserves was the immediate cause of urbanisation, and if urbanisation created the conditions for integration, integration could only be avoided by developing the reserves. Without such a "fundamental reorientation of our economic structure" (par. 25.74), the plea for total apartheid would in any case have been recognisable as a blatant prescription of white domination. In other words, the theory of culture contact provided the intellectual rationale for apartheid, while economic development of the reserves had to provide the material conditions for separate socio-political structures and the acceptance thereof by blacks. The ideological nexus between apartheid and economic development is thus reciprocal: the one justifies the other. But the maintenance of white domination, at least over the greater part of South African territory, was stated by the Commission as a precondition for the development of the reserves. This needs to be emphasised because it draws

attention to the legitimating function of the programme for development - and of economic development as such. After the publication of the report, commentators tried to break the link between the development programme and the prescription of apartheid. As Sheila Van der Horst (1956, 111) put it: "The fact bears repeating that the acceptance of the ideology of separate development by the Commission is not a ground for rejecting its practical recommendations for economic development." (See also Ballinger 1969, 326.)

Such judgements ignore the tie between the plea for apartheid and the proposed development programme. As far as the Tomlinson Commission was concerned, the choice was not between apartheid and the development of the reserves, but between apartheid and integration. In chapter 26 the Commission declared the "necessity for development" to be "a function of the socio-economic objectives which are envisaged" (S par. 26.1). The Commission said that its discussion of these objectives emphasised "in the first place ... the economic determinants of social welfare". It did not, however, want "to suggest" that such considerations were "of overriding importance": "Dit is nie alleen ekonomiese oorweginge en ekonomiese beginsels wat in aanmerking geneem moet word nie, maar eweseer ook die daarmee samehangende staatkundige en maatskaplike oogmerke. Trouens, laasgenoemde is van so groot belang dat hulle ten volle die ontwikkeling van die Bantoegebiede regverdig (par. 26.91). The Commission did "emphasise that the development programme would not forfeit value or feasibility if the principle of developing the Bantu areas as a national home is rejected" (par. 51.2, see also par. 51.77). However, these were postscripts in the last chapter of a 3 755 page report in which the choice between integration and apartheid was stated in absolute terms. It was also made quite clear that whites would not support the burden of development if it would "not promote the solution of our Native question" (par. 25.88-90). Some twenty years after completion of the inquiry, Prof. Tomlinson explained "die denke agter die verslag":

Mens ... moet ... jouself die vraag afvra of so 'n groot en omvattende plan nodig was of is. Nou wil ek dit vir u so stel dat, sonder die uitgangspunt van afsonderlike ontwikkeling sou 'n grootskaalse ontwikkelingsplan vir die Gebiede en veral soos ons voorgestel het, onnodig, amper sinneloos, gewees het (Tomlinson 1976, 12).

The Tomlinson-programme can be summarised as follows: Through "apartheid" or "separate development", "total" separation between white and black had to be achieved. The objective of this was to safeguard the dominant political and economic position of whites in 87% of the country. The specific recommendations for the achievement of this objective were presented as part of a comprehensive socio-economic development programme for the reserves. Large scale development of the reserves would require "comprehensive planning" (par. 48.2-9) - planning which had to provide for both the economic transformation of the reserves and the resocialisation of the inhabitants of the reserves. Also implied in the rationale for planning was the reconstruction of "traditional" political structures - but with a view to socio-economic modernisation. This means that socio-economic reconstruction would, in fact, not be directed at the maintenance, or the reconstruction, of "traditional" structures, but at the adaption of such

structures to "Western concepts" (par. 27.3). (13)

I have argued that the commission subordinated economic considerations to political objectives. (14) Apart from the fact that such conceptual splitting of the polity and the economy is itself an ideological stratagem, it needs to be emphasised that the split was performed with reference to an economy which is, as the Commission admitted, reliant on vast supplies of cheap black labour. Arguments which rejected apartheid as being economically unfeasible were charged as being shortsighted because they ignored the political consequences of "economic integration and because reliance on cheap labour might prove to be dysfunctional (par. 25.71). Even if this reply is accepted, one may still want to know what the implications of total apartheid might be for the availability of labour. The Commission found ways of assuring its audience that a large supply of cheap, well regulated labour would be available for a long time to come (par. 35.97, 35.111). Thus the development programme would make it possible for whites to legitimate their domination over 87% of the country with reference to the political and economic opportunities which would be made available in the reserves, while the white ruled economy could continue to grow with the aid of black labour.

The nexus between the theory of culture contact and the development programme seems to be inconsistent. Whereas the interpretation of the process of "culture contact" emphasises social-cultural factors, the programme was directed at the "fundamental reorientation" of the economy; i.e. structural intervention, albeit with inclusion of plans to resocialise blacks. The apparent inconsistency between interpretation and programme can be accounted for in terms of the Commission's concern with processes which had implications for the political-economy. The interpretation of "contact" between whites and blacks in social-cultural terms obscures, but does not conceal, the concern with the structural, political, consequences of urbanisation and changing stratification patterns. Seen in this way, the interpretation and the programme are not inconsistent with each other. They are intertwined sets of ideas which serve to legitimate a comprehensive attempt at social engineering through both cultural (resocialisation) and structural (development, segregation) mechanisms. When the report is read in this way apartheid becomes recognisable as an ideology for the legitimisation of a political order which had to contain processes of class formation and its consequences for political group formation by organising people in terms of the Idea of Culture: Culture is used to fight Class. The "undesirable" correlates of industrial capitalism could, however, not be eliminated without endangering the maintenance that order. Hence it was not sufficient to control black labour through the mechanisms of segregation and migrant labour. Blacks also had to be resocialised in accordance with "western concepts ... while always keeping in mind the Bantu's scale of values". The Tomlinson Commission declared its support for the findings of the Native Education Commission (1951), lamented the fact that black children were not "trained for service in (their) own Bantu community", and declared that education "must provide persons trained in the modern technique of a progressive economy" (S par. 43.1, 43.6, 43.14). I think we know what this meant.

NOTES

- (1) The people who interpret the "problems" are the people who construct the situations as "problems".
- (2) The books by Lacey (1981) and Rich (1984) are essential reading.
- (3) This view was then, as it is now, quite widespread. It also inspired the sponsors of the Carnegie and Wilcocks Commissions.
- (4) The Joint Council movement (largely through the person of J.D.R. Jones) also initiated the Wilcocks Commission. In this case, also, "political" issues were kept away from conferences. The Wilcocks Commission did, despite its limited terms of reference, deal with the franchise - mainly due to pressure from Dr. A. Abdurahman (a member).
- (5) An important early commentary on the report is Brookes (1933).
- (6) The commissioning authority - here the government - and the interest groups who were most closely associated with calling for a commission. I traced the origins of the Holloway to the initiatives of the liberal establishment. Lacey (1981, 148) argues that the "government's purpose, and the NEC's real brief" was the advancement of farmers' interests.
- (7) This was emphasised by Lucas, who gave much critical attention to taxation as an instrument for creating labour supply.
- (8) This reflects the ideological separation of "politics" and "economics". It also reflects Prime Minister Hertzog's reluctance to submit "political" issues to commissions.
- (9) It is a strategem which reappeared in, i.a. the Fagan report and, more recently in the Theron report (with reference to "coloureds"), the Riekert report and reports of the Presidents' Council.
- (10) Cf. Davies 1979, 247-50.
- (11) These labels were used interchangeably.
- (12) From the perspective of logicians, at least, there is obviously some inconsistency in the argument: integration is at the same time ineluctable and unavoidable. For "socio-logicians" this is not necessarily inconsistent. They, like the Commission, (hopefully) recognise that history is made by men. But there is also another side to the Tomlinson argument. The Commission, and other apartheid ideologists, needed to sell their vision. This required that integration had to be represented as being both unavoidable and avoidable. If either of these arguments was left out, the vision would have been much less convincing. The emphasis on the inevitability of integration - if it is not counteracted - points to an

important mechanism of ideological discourse in general. All ideologies (or at least all totalistic ideologies) operate i.a. through enemy labelling and through the evocation of fear. To emphasise that an inexorable process of integration would destroy "European civilisation" serves precisely this purpose.

(13) It must be kept in mind that the "traditional" formations which commissions described were, most likely, formations which had already been "recreated" by conquest and administrative intervention. I have not yet been able to "get into" the literature, but it seems to me that studies such as Hobsbawm and Ranger's The Invention of Tradition and Thompson's The Political Mythology of Apartheid are relevant.

(14) This has always been a major component of Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. Cf. Greenberg 1982, 14, 17-20.

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