

SAFETY, SECURITY, AND THE RISING  
PRESENCE OF SECURITY NETWORKS IN  
JOHANNESBURG'S SUBURBS

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*Interrogating the security networks' legitimacy*

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## Declaration

I, Lily Cara Manoim, declare that this Research Report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in Organisational and Institutional Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.



\_\_\_\_\_ (Signature of candidate)

25 May 2020

## Abstract

It is widely recognised that security is performed by a multiplicity of actors, rather than purely the public police. Together they constitute ‘networks’ of security. These ‘security networks’ are often taken for granted as legitimate sovereign bodies within Johannesburg’s wealthy suburbs. This research investigates the processes whereby these security networks come to be largely regarded as legitimate, which it does through case studies of two differently constituted suburban communities. It argues that firstly, the internal-network dynamics of co-operation and incorporation play an important role in legitimising the security networks. Secondly, the network is legitimised through how it responds to the needs of the ‘community’ and utilises existing community structures. Finally, keeping a flexible relationship with legal structures whilst maintaining the existing social order also plays a role in serving to legitimise the security networks.

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## Acronyms, abbreviations, and colloquial words

CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CPF	Community Policing Forum
ISP	Integrated Suburb Patrols (the pseudonym for the private security company in Case A)
JMPD	Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department
NGO	Non-governmental organisation – A company that is officially registered as not for profit. Used interchangeably with ‘Non-Profit Organisation’
JPA	Jewish Protection Agency (the pseudonym for the security non-profit company in Case B)
PSIRA	Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
SAPS	South African Police Services
Shul	Vernacular (Yiddish origins) for Synagogue
Vlei	Afrikaans word for a grassy area around a river/marsh

# SECTION 1: INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION, LITERATURE, AND METHODOLOGY.



*Figure 1: A flat block with three different boards of three different private security companies. Manoim, 2019*



*Figure 2: An example of the new Artificial Intelligence CCTV camera infrastructure, called 'Vumacams', being installed, Manoim 2020*



# Chapter 1: Introducing the Study

## 1.1 Introduction

Do you want safety? Do not let the strangers in and yourself abstain from acting strangely and thinking odd thoughts... There is a price to be paid for the privilege of 'being in a community' ... The price is paid in the currency of freedom, variously called 'autonomy', 'right to self-assertion', 'right to be yourself'... Missing community means missing security; gaining community, if it happens, would soon mean missing freedom. Security and freedom are two equally precious and coveted values which could be better or worse balanced, but hardly ever fully reconciled and without friction

- Zygmunt Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (2001:4)

The relationship between 'security', 'community' and what Bauman calls 'freedom' is a complex one. Whilst security is a fundamental need of all humans, it comes at a cost. For Johannesburg's wealthy suburban communities, that cost is often financial. But 'freedom' is also part of the trade-off. One key aspect of 'freedom' is privacy, and there is a degree of ambivalence about this trade-off, as one interview participant illustrates, "People are flipping out about the new cameras because they think their privacy is going to go out the window". Privacy, even for the 'consumers' of the security, is also compromised in other ways. As the head of a private security company jokingly boasted "...you can ask my reaction officers which man is having an affair with which woman, they will tell you". Alongside privacy, autonomy is also often sacrificed for security. As one participant, an ex-chairperson of a suburban religious community institution, had explained - "I would prefer security to be done by members of the community. If you rely on hired or external people or companies to protect you, you have less input on how things are enacted. We should be able to determine our own values". When those values include a desire to interact and relate with those from outside the community - a desire many participants had expressed- those values are also sacrificed for security. She further explains, "as a community we have become more suspicious and more exclusionary".

Whilst to some extent, security for these communities has "been paid for in the currency of freedom", such as privacy and autonomy, it is worth noting that, as Bauman continues "... freedom sacrificed in the name of security tends to be other people's freedom" (Bauman, 2001:14). In wealthy suburban communities, this can play out in subtle ways. In one form of community - a religious suburban community- a security briefing for the volunteers at a place of worship contains the following instructions: "When someone comes to the gate who we feel doesn't belong there, we need to have our questions ready... we need to have all sorts of questions for people who don't belong". In another form of a suburban community, a residential community 'emergency' chat-group contains the following

exchange between a resident, Mr Wiesenbacher<sup>1</sup> who runs a medical practice in the area, and the control centre of the local armed response company:

Mr Wiesenbacher: 10 people in black clothes in front of number 14 Foxtrot street<sup>2</sup>. Please chase them!

Control: A vehicle is on route

Mr Wiesenbacher: Never mind, they all went in at 16 Foxtrot. Some party or something

These two previews into the security dynamics of different suburban communities highlight the way in which the freedom sacrificed to maintain security is often the freedom of others. People who are perceived as ‘strange’ or ‘strangers’ to the community are turned into a potential security threat and responded to with security measures by a range of security actors.

In many suburban neighbourhoods of Johannesburg, security seems to be a large part of everyday life. Visible security infrastructure continues to grow rapidly. Houses, in particular, are secured through electric fences and burglar alarms. Businesses often employ guards. Even community centres are hidden behind high fences. Over the last few years the suburbs have seen a sharp growth in the ‘public-space policing’ model of armoured private security vehicles or resident volunteer cars ‘patrolling’ the streets, and new technologies of surveillance such as the rapidly expanding networks of CCTV cameras using ‘machine learning’ (Wicks, 2019). Beyond the presence of security infrastructure, security also seems to take up a large amount of people’s thoughts and conversations. It is a huge part of local community newspapers; it connects people through social media - particularly neighbourhood WhatsApp groups - and as community members are constantly reminded to ‘keep an eye out’ for anything suspicious, they have security on their minds all the time.

Although security is important for everyone everywhere, wealthy South African suburban neighbourhoods are famous for their security - particularly private security - which has generated a lot of research<sup>3</sup>. South Africa has arguably the biggest private security industry in the world (relative to the size of our country and economy<sup>4</sup>) (Diphorn, 2015a). Yet private security constitutes only one aspect of a whole interconnected array of security providers that include the public police, and ‘community-’/ volunteer-based initiatives, amongst other organisations, groups, and individuals, as well as technological devices, information-sharing-forums, and more, all inter-connected in a variety of

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<sup>1</sup> Not his real name

<sup>2</sup> Not the real street name

<sup>3</sup> See literature review.

<sup>4</sup> According to Diphorn (2015) South Africa’s private security industry is the largest in the world when compared with our GDP. Comparing the personal employed in officially registered private security companies as a ratio of the total population results in a very high number, 534 289 active and employed security officers (PSiRA, 2019) but not the highest ratio world-wide. The industry is also growing rapidly: there were 1 616 new security businesses registered during 2018/2019 compared to 1 301 registered in 2017/2018 (PSiRA, 2019:68). There are of course also many unregistered businesses too (PSiRA, 2019).

different ways. In the literature these are referred to as security networks (Newburn, 2001). Whilst the majority of participants I interviewed said that there was something about the security networks they were uncomfortable with, they all agreed that some degree of security provided by a multi-layered network is essential.

Not only are the security networks in the suburbs large and visible, but their legitimacy extends to the authority they have over 'communal' life. As different actors in the security network perform policing roles, they are given the authority to decide who does and who does not 'belong in the community', and who is and who is not considered 'suspicious'. Their legitimacy and authority can extend even beyond a traditional 'policing' role, where the security network comes to have a degree of authority over the daily life and decisions of 'community members'. One such example from the data I gathered in a residential community, is an armed-response company's role in a community petition to stop a mixed-income housing project from being established. In a different community organised around a religious community centre, actors in the security network completely changed the 'visitor-policy' for the entire community.

Whilst every human's life is characterised by constant choices, the choices the majority of South Africans face are highly constrained. Their freedom is very limited, and their privacy is very limited. In the upper-middle class suburbs of Johannesburg, people enjoy a substantial amount of freedom due to their position in society determined by factors such as race and/or class and/or the area that they can afford to live in, and/or the community places that they can afford to join. This research investigation centres around the thought-provoking phenomenon that occurs when they choose to give up some of their freedom, privacy, time, money, and particularly some degree of their autonomy over certain aspects of their lives, based on the legitimacy that they give to the authority of a vast network of security. Naturally the most obvious reason this might be the case is because of the high levels of crime and violence in the country (SAPS, 2018). However, the literature shows that there might also be other factors contributing to the on-going commitment wealthy urban communities make to this trade-off. This research report agrees with Thumala et al. (2011:281) that it is very important to understand that security is not just any industry providing a service. Rather, it is "...a set of institutions that exercise power and regulate conduct... to which considerations of legitimacy quite properly apply".

Through two case studies, this research aims to investigate what processes legitimise the security networks in two different communities in the Johannesburg area. It will look at the role of relationships within the network, the functions of 'community identity', and finally look at how the legal system and social order all contribute towards the processes that serve to legitimise the power and authority of these security networks.

## 1.2 Research Questions

**In Johannesburg's wealthy suburbs, security providers (which operate as a network) are largely viewed by both the state and the suburban 'communities' as a legitimate sovereign authority. What gives them so much legitimacy?**

Sub-questions:

1. What do the security networks look like?
2. Who legitimises the security networks in different types of communities? Specifically, what is the role of: a) the state, b) the security providers themselves and c) the 'consumers', and d) the existing 'social order', in legitimising the security networks?
3. How does the form and identity of the 'community' affect the way in which its local security network is legitimised?
4. What are the implications of the security networks being (largely) regarded as legitimate sovereign authorities?
  - a. How does it affect those deemed 'inside' and those deemed 'outside' of the community, and how does it contribute to the enforcing of those boundaries?
  - b. How does it affect the social order?
  - c. What does it mean for non-state policing agents to be regarded as (contested) legitimate sovereign bodies?

## 1.3 Rationale

This research comes out of a growing field of work that understands the importance of looking at how the legitimate use of force and violence (which in these cases is largely symbolic rather than physical) is not solely in the hands of the state, but rather in the hands of a range of security providers who operate as a 'security network'. This network includes the state alongside private, communal, and other security-providing-bodies. This research report interrogates the processes and factors which result in the legitimisation of the security networks. Although legitimacy is always contested - even the legitimacy of the public police (Comarof and Comaroff, 2016) - it is evident that the power and authority of the security networks in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg are to a large extent regarded as legitimate, by both the state and the 'communities' in which they operate.

Evidence of this can be seen through their vast and growing presence, and the extent to which their actions are accepted by 'consumers', public institutions, the media, and even the seemingly competing organisations within the security network. Examples include the normalised, everyday presence of armed men on the streets outside places of residence or places of worship. The idea of suburban community members being vigilant and 'security conscious', always looking out for 'suspicious' people, and then reporting those deemed suspicious to private security, police, security volunteers, or the local WhatsApp group, shows the legitimacy of the security networks. The key role that security-actors play in collective decision-making is also telling. The type of discourse used and how it is

generally accepted, points to the legitimacy given to the security network. For example, terms like ‘crime-fighters’ and ‘intelligence-gathering’ are used to describe the roles and tasks which I later argue are not clear-cut, but based on assumptions about what is and is not seen as acceptable, measured against the existing social order.

This legitimacy imbues them with a great deal of power, authority and sovereignty, which has important broader implications. For private and ‘community’/voluntary security groups to be seen as the legitimate authority on what is and is not a security issue, and be given the authority to address the issue - such as to make an arrest, or to question or search someone, or take or circulate pictures - is an important part of creating or maintaining a certain social order. Many scholars have investigated the implications of shifting the authority of policing away from a ‘democratic’ state into private hands (Kempa et al, 1999), which has particular implications for urban geographies (such as Landman, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Lemanki, 2006). In addition, there are important implications for the fact that security has become an increasingly large part of everyday life in these areas. With the growth and prominence of wide security networks, security begins to permeate all aspects of life. ‘Security’ becomes a key factor in defining the everyday and becomes fundamental to state policies. It is also present in a more abstract way as security becomes a social value. With security taking so many different forms, and for the security networks to be given so much legitimacy, ‘security’ as a way of organising life (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016), begins to seem less and less like an abnormality, necessary only in crisis-like situations, and becomes more and more normalised and institutionalised.

The literature on security makes this clear, as the implications of calling something a ‘security issue’ means that there can be a ‘security response’ to it. Securitisation theory of ‘speech acts’ (Buzan et al, 1998)<sup>5</sup> says that “framing something as a ‘security’ issue allows things that might ordinarily be politically untenable to become not only thinkable but widely acceptable...” (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016:5). This means that an action perceived as being ‘for security’ is seen as legitimate, even if such an action (such as an arrest or a shooting) is not acceptable otherwise.

It is therefore important to better understand what the processes are that grant the networks of security so much legitimacy. Whilst the literature offers some suggestions for the ways in which specific security providers are legitimated (see literature review), in specific contexts, this research aims to explore how an entire local network of security is legitimated in wealthy urban spaces - the suburbs of Johannesburg. This study therefore aims to use empirical work, in the form of case studies, to explore what contributes to the legitimisation of these security networks as their legitimacy should not be taken for granted and has important and wider implications for society.

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<sup>5</sup> Discussed further in Chapter 2.

## 1.4 Introducing the sites of study

The research question will be answered by looking at the security networks within two different suburban communities: one residential and one religious. These two communities were researched as case studies and then analysed relationally, in order to understand the extent to which there are common patterns across differently constituted communities.

### 1.4.1 Case A: Residential Community – referred to as ‘Uptown Park’

The residential case study is looking at “Uptown Park” (a pseudonym for) a north-western suburb in the Randburg area of the Johannesburg municipality. The ‘community’ define themselves as the over 3000 ‘official’ residents (mostly homeowners, and some tenants) of Uptown Park, although some define it as being made up of residents from a conglomerate of neighbouring suburbs with a similar class constituency.

**The area:** Uptown Park is a green, low-density suburb which is largely residential. There are a few small shops, but no significant commercial spaces. It is largely comprised of small free-standing houses with gardens. There are very few blocks of flats. The resident’s profiles are fairly homogenous, where the vast majority are white and upper-middle class, and most have been in the area for more than 10 years. There are also many upper-middle class Muslim- Indian<sup>6</sup> families, most of whom have lived there for less than 10 years and many of whom moved there from Mayfair<sup>7</sup>. The municipal ward in which it falls is predominantly but by no means only white<sup>8</sup>. Data on the municipal ward in which Uptown park falls shows that the average income was almost 360%<sup>9</sup> more than the average income in Gauteng (StatsSA, 2011). The Quality of Life survey conducted by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) in 2015, gives the ward an index of 7.23, which is significantly higher than the Johannesburg average of 6.27 (GCRO, 2015).

**The ‘Community’:** Community activities are very much centred around security and safety; such as community mass-patrols, a Halloween party organised by the private security company, and community ‘clean-up’ initiatives in the park. Other important community aspects include belonging to chat groups like WhatsApp<sup>10</sup> and Facebook groups of the suburb, some of which are specifically ‘emergency’ or security related whilst others are more general. On these groups, members can connect as a community through discussing issues affecting the area such as load-shedding, sharing recommendations for service providers such as plumbers, advertising home-made donuts, or reporting missing pets, as some key

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<sup>6</sup> As the participants self-identified .

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Aunty Aliya, community member, 2019.

<sup>8</sup> The demographic data for the ward shows that out of a population of around 24000, the racial breakdown was on average, Black (6000) White (13000) Indian/Asian (3000) (Stats SA, 2011).

<sup>9</sup> Compared, for example, to Ward 103 which covers the northern parts of Sandton, where the average income is 488%. (Stats SA, 2011).

<sup>10</sup> as well as Telegram, a variation of an instant-messaging platform. The main chat group has 250 members, an ‘emergency’ group has over 340.

examples. Whilst the Muslim residents have other communal engagements such as a ‘mass iftar’ in the park, other opportunities for most residents to connect are mostly through discussions on these chat groups. There is a community newspaper for the surrounding area, and a monthly newsletter from the private security company which includes a list of recommended suppliers for various services.

**History:** The suburb was part of the post-World War II ‘suburban boom’ in the 1950s. It was amongst the number of suburbs created through state support, to house the returning white volunteer forces who fought against Germany (Mabin, 2014). There has been an attempt by the municipality in the last decade and a half to try and densify the northern suburbs generally (Mabin, 2014). However when this was attempted in Uptown Park in 2017, the residents petitioned against it and it did not materialise.

**Security network history:** Since the turn of the century, the security network in Uptown Park has been gradually growing, diversifying, and strengthening its connections. A few years before 2015 there was a small private security company in the area, which was owned and run by one man, who was known as ‘a real cowboy’<sup>11</sup> for his methods of crime prevention. He was well known in the community for having robbed banks, and the narrative behind his company was that after he was released from prison he wanted to ‘give back to the community through fighting crime’<sup>12</sup>. His company started as an informal paid ‘patrol’ service in the area, and later become a registered company with 10 employees and 3 old cars<sup>13</sup>. In 2016, the company was taken over by ‘Veronica’ and ‘Jack’ and now has over 200 employees, and 38 professional vehicles<sup>14</sup>. The majority of the residents in Uptown Park have a contract with that company, although other private companies also operate in the area<sup>15</sup>. Parallel to this, the residents of Uptown Park had started a community WhatsApp initiative around 2014, after the murder of a resident<sup>16</sup>. The WhatsApp group’s purpose “was residents responding to other residents”<sup>17</sup> for medical and security emergencies. This further developed into community chat-groups, as well as an informal structure for residents to patrol the neighbourhood.

**Fears:** As evidenced by the interviews conducted, the community is very scared of violent contact crimes, as well as house break-ins. This is in line with the national statistics from the Victims of Crime Survey 2017/2018 (StatsSA) which reported that “the most feared crimes” were residential ones, (rather than strictly violent crimes), and included both contact and non-contact crimes<sup>18</sup>. Within the wider ward, the data shows that in the year 2012, 20.4% reported being a victim of crime in the year, whilst

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with Veronica (pseudonym), head of private security company, 2019.

<sup>12</sup> The resident’s association of a neighbouring suburb posted an article on their website in 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Veronica.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Veronica.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Mr Gilbert, Resident and volunteer patroller, 2019.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*

<sup>18</sup> According to the VoCS, “total of 60,8% of households in South Africa fear housebreaking/burglary the most, followed by home robbery (47,2%) and robbery outside the home (46,3%)”. Housebreaking is when there is no one home, whilst robbery involves contact with the victim (Stats SA, 2018)

the average in Johannesburg was 20.7%. However, the crime rate in Uptown Park is quite low with less than 40 crimes reported within a 12-month period<sup>19</sup>, very few of which were violent<sup>20</sup> crimes. Personnel of the local police station were quite adamant that Uptown Park is very safe, particularly in comparison to other neighbourhoods within the police precinct<sup>21</sup>. It is likely that the community's fear of crime is rooted in a broader context of high crime rates both regionally in Johannesburg and nationally (Stats SA, 2018). Most people, regardless of who they are or where they live, are worried about themselves or their families being victims of crime. Naturally, the worries are not all the same and neither are the crimes (Stats SA, 2018). Nevertheless, even having a limited number of crimes in the area can make residents fearful. Although some participants credit the low crime rate to the heavy presence of the security network, this research interrogates the complex relationship between security networks and crime and understands it to be multifaceted. Whether or not the crime rate is relatively low, we should not underestimate that the fear of residential crime is still an important factor to consider.

#### 1.4.2 Case B: Religious 'community' - referred to as "the Synagogue"<sup>22</sup>

While also a suburban community, this case is not based on a residential area, but rather on a religious/cultural community structure. The community is self-defined as approximately 650 official members<sup>23</sup>, along with regular attendees at the religious centre: a Jewish Synagogue in an upper-income suburb of Johannesburg. The synagogue is colloquially referred to as a 'shul', the Yiddish word for synagogue, which points to the Eastern European origins of its members.

**The area:** The area in which it is located has some Jewish residents, particularly in the neighbouring suburbs, but is not considered a predominantly Jewish suburb. Although the area is predominantly white, it is fairly demographically heterogeneous<sup>24</sup>. The data for the ward also indicated that it is an upper-middle class area, notable by data such as the average income being over 400% greater than the average income for Gauteng (StatsSA, 2011), and that there is an insignificant amount of 'informal' housing<sup>25</sup>. Furthermore, the GCRO's 'Quality of life' data indicated that the ward has a mean score of 7.16, which is higher than the Johannesburg average of 6.27. In the GCRO Quality of life survey, they found that 20.9% of people in the ward were victims of crime, which is slightly higher than the

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<sup>19</sup> The Crime stats of the local police station for the period of July 2018 to July 2019, reported 38 crimes for the suburb and 67 for the neighbouring suburb that year. The same police precinct also reported 119 crimes for the year for the neighbouring suburb which is much more upper-class. Other nearby suburbs in the precinct included a lower-class area, well known for its drug and gang problem, which reported 922 that year, along with a more mixed area reporting 378 that year.

<sup>20</sup> 'Violent crimes' as defined by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) as crimes which harm or threaten harm against a person. In the crime stats discussed above, the suburb in question had only 5 that year.

<sup>21</sup> Visit to the local police station, 2019.

<sup>22</sup> As mentioned, names of identifiable people and places are kept anonymous

<sup>23</sup> Synagogue Annual General Meeting notes 2018

<sup>24</sup> Data from the 2011 Census for the ward in which the suburb falls indicates that the racial make-up of residents are: black (4900) white (9300) Indian/Asian (1500). (Statistics South Africa, 2011)

<sup>25</sup> Census 2011 data for 'number of households in formal/informal dwellings' (Statistics South Africa)



Johannesburg average of 20.7%. This suburban area is therefore also a fairly generalisable upper-middle class area.

**The ‘Community’:** The communal activities at the Synagogue are mostly religious prayer services, but there are many other communal activities hosted on the Synagogue campus including talks, meals, celebrations of festivals, and cultural events. Some are explicitly open and advertised to the broader public, while most cater to the existing members<sup>26</sup>. Although there are many other uses for the large synagogue campus, (it gets rented out to church groups, schools, and meeting groups) they are not considered by most to be ‘part of the community’. For some, the community extends beyond the synagogue to the broader South African Jewish community. This is characterised by official and unofficial institutions, such as a Jewish Newspaper, lobby groups, broad communal events, shops that sell kosher food, a Jewish section in the cemetery, and various communal organisations such as orphanages, retirement homes, a home for disabled people, and a burial society. For others, ‘community’ is defined more by membership to this synagogue specifically, which is largely the definition that this paper will broadly follow.

**Security history:** Although the broader ‘community’ of Jews have always had numerous communal voluntary-based institutions, security was never one of these until the 1990s (Steinberg and Marks, 2014). In terms of the Synagogue in this study specifically, the introduction of a team of security volunteers has evolved and formalised slowly. “20 years ago we didn’t even have radios”, the head of the team pointed out<sup>27</sup>. In the early 2000s security concerns increased after a Jewish cemetery in Cape Town was desecrated. About 10 years ago, the Jewish Protection Agency (JPA)<sup>28</sup>, a non-profit Jewish security organisation, came and offered to train people<sup>29</sup>, such as Mr Schneider senior<sup>30</sup>, who was informally in charge of the ‘security team’. What had begun as a group of friendly, politically conservative, retired older men who would stand at the gate and welcome attendees, slowly turned into a “professional”<sup>31</sup> security volunteer team. About 7 years ago his son, Mr Schneider (junior), offered to take over the team along with some peers, and they became deeply integrated in the JPA structure, particularly through their attendance of 6 month long advanced training courses. The private security company that is contracted to the Synagogue has also changed a number of times over the years. Despite

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<sup>26</sup> Observation, 2019

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Mr Schnieder, 2019.

<sup>28</sup> None of the names of people or places are real.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Moira, an ex-chairperson of the Synagogue, 2019.

<sup>30</sup> Not his real name.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Mr Schneider, 2019.

the general ‘threat update’ received weekly from the JPA (see figure 3), the Synagogue itself has never had any major incidents or attacks<sup>32</sup>, although there have been several occasions of theft.




Figure 3 Clipped section of a weekly threat update from the JPA, sent to all buildings under their protection, such as the Synagogue. The weekly 'threat level' is indicated on the top

Security in recent years has also become somewhat of a divisive subject within the community, as there had been disputes regarding policies of whom to grant access, to the extent that a special ‘discussion forum’ was held in 2017<sup>33</sup>.

**The Synagogue’s history<sup>34</sup>:** The history of the Synagogue is fraught with tensions. The property was bought and turned into a Synagogue in 1954. In the 70s, its charismatic, outspoken leader had taken an anti-apartheid stance, which led to many of the members leaving the congregation, and a police raid on his house, likely tipped off by a community member. According to an informant, in 1976 “the Jewish Community collapses, as there is massive immigration out of South Africa”. Its further ‘collapse’ was caused by the “semi-gration” in the 1980; where white bourgeoisie people generally started moving away from the inner-city, draining more congregants, particularly as new synagogues opened further north. There was an “attitudinal difference” between those who moved north and those who remained. After 1990 there was another major split, involving a different, highly charismatic Rabbi (Jewish religious leader). There were already many tensions regarding his approach to religious and cultural practices, but the main rupture occurred when he invited Nelson Mandela to speak at the synagogue. As a community historian explains, “there was lots of unhappiness. Right wingers said he’s a terrorist, and liberal Zionists were angry because he hugged Yasser Arafat”. Many right-wing congregants then moved to other synagogues. Post-apartheid, they had a new Rabbi who was ‘unpolitical’, and he slowly built the congregation up again. (History interview with community member, 2019). Today, three Rabbis later, political tensions remain a recurring theme.

**Fears:** Unlike most synagogues in Johannesburg, this one is fairly diverse both in terms of race and social class, however the majority of the members are upper-middle class, and the majority are white,

<sup>32</sup> Ibid

<sup>33</sup> Community newsletter, 2017.

<sup>34</sup> This history was constructed after a ‘community history’ interview was conducted with a member of the Synagogue who has done vast research on Jewish history. All the quotes are from this interview. 2019.

descended from either German or Eastern European ancestors who came to South Africa as refugees. European Jews have endured long histories of discrimination, even in societies in which they have been fairly well integrated<sup>35</sup>. Therefore, having a constant existential fear of attacks is possibly historically rooted. In South Africa, there have been very few targeted attacks against Jews post-apartheid. The South African state upholds freedom of religion. Combined with the privilege that many white Jews inherited alongside other whites benefitting from the apartheid era, the majority of white (European descendant) Jews in South Africa find themselves part of the broader white elite. Additionally, Jewish communal organisations, like other religious organisations, have a fairly good relationship with the state. However, with the recent history of the Holocaust, and a longer history of pogroms and persecution in Eastern Europe, the community remains a fearful one. Aside from the general fear of crime and suburban robberies, many Jews still have a fear of large-scale public violence and anti-Semitic attacks<sup>36</sup>. This is particularly heightened as beyond South Africa's borders, particularly in the global north, anti-Semitism is on the rise along with all forms of racism and xenophobia<sup>37</sup>.

#### 1.4.3 Residential and Religious communities – relating the case studies.

As argued by Mabin (2014), researching the changing northern suburbs of Johannesburg gives us important insight into the city in terms of both spatiality and social relations. The importance of studying security networks in a residential community is that it contributes towards a deeper understanding of the urban condition. The way in which non-state security has shaped the urban spatial patterns, particularly in residential areas has been well documented. Clarno, (2013:1192) argues that disputes over governance, including security governance, do not only take place at the national scale, but have been “rescaled” down, and therefore neighbourhoods should also be studied as sites of contested sovereignty. He argues that “white elites have attempted ...to shift the terrain of struggle in order to re-establish power and re-claim “white space” at the neighbourhood scale”. Especially on this scale, networks of security providers also “...play an increasingly important role in urban governance” (Clarno, 2013:1200).

The middle and upper-class Northern suburbs of Johannesburg are home to many residents. The suburbs are also where many people work, many of whom come from outside the suburban area. There are also many businesses; small and large, informal and formal, ranging from large shopping malls to private doctor's rooms to informal fruit sellers on the street corners. The suburbs also have public facilities such as parks, pools and schools, or private-communal facilities, most notably places of worship and religious communal centres. The case study of the residential suburban community will be looked at relationally with the case study of the religious community. The significance of studying security networks in a religious suburban community is to understand the suburbs as multifaceted, and not purely

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with the Chairman, 2020.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with the head of the security volunteer team, 2019.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with ex-chairperson, 2019.

residential, which will contribute to a broader understanding of security networks at different scales and in different spaces. Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012) argue that security should always be understood "...as an eminent power over spatial and social dynamics". The social dynamics vary across differently constituted communities, where a security network for a culturally and religiously organised suburban community is likely to be different to a security network serving a community of residents united by common interests. 'Zooming in' on one of each of these communities is useful for understanding not only how security networks shape spaces but also how they shape the different communities which make up society.

## 1.5 Overview

This research report aims to find out what gives the security networks so much legitimacy. In order to address the research question, the report will begin by providing the relevant background and context to the research and to the sites of study, in order to contextualise the data. Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature in which this research is grounded. Chapter 3, the methodology section, will address the ways in which the research was conducted, and the manner in which the data was obtained. Section 2 of the research report, notably chapters 4, 5, and 6, is where the key findings in the data will be discussed and analysed in order to address the research questions, as follows:

Chapter 4.2 will show how the fact that security operates as a **network**, means that the different organisations and individuals (or 'nodes') within the network interact with each other. 4.3 will show how these frequently co-operative network relationships lead to security organisations strengthening one another, as well as the network as a whole. Therefore the 'networked' nature of security has an effect of renewing and further legitimising itself. 4.4 will examine the role of the state within the network, particularly the numerous ways in which the state legitimises the broader network. 4.5 will discuss the way in which 'consumers' are incorporated into the security network, and how this can result in legitimising the network on a micro level.

Chapter 5 will discuss the concept of '**community**' with regards to security, by exploring how 'security' often operates on the scale of the 'community', and is entangled with articulations of 'community'. 5.2 will look specifically at how the community is structured, and how it is connected to the security network, thereby showing in 5.3 how 'security' messaging gets spread in such a way that legitimises the security network. Bringing that all together, Chapter 5.4 will discuss the ways in which security and community become entangled notions since the role of 'security providers' has shifted, as well as discussing how community gets built around security, where both notions of 'inside' and 'outside' legitimise the security networks. The chapter will also provide evidence for how 'security consciousness' gets institutionalised through the abovementioned processes.

Finally, Chapter 6 discusses ‘**law and order**’ by addressing the implications of a legitimised security network, as well as the legal and ‘moral’ ways in which the network legitimises itself, due to its authority over policing ‘law and order’. 6.2 provides evidence for the ‘flexible’ ways in which the security network relates to legal structures in a way that serves to enhance its authority and legitimacy. 6.3 discusses how both the structure and the actions of the security network are *shaped by* the existing order, whilst they simultaneously are seen as *authorised to police* order, which they do in a way that often *maintains existing social relations* and enhances their own legitimacy. The chapter also demonstrates the way in which ‘security’ has also become an ordering principle and shapes the popular understanding of both legality and morality, in a way that serves to legitimise the security network.

The paper will therefore demonstrate that whilst the high crime rate might be one factor in depicting the security networks as the legitimate sovereign authorities, there are a multiplicity of other processes which serve to legitimise them. In particular the endogenous processes within the networks themselves, that are key in the processes of legitimation.

# Chapter 2: Literature Overview

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter will situate this research within the broader bodies of literature, highlighting how it fits into the various fields, while putting different authors in conversation with one another in order to introduce some key concepts that emerged out of the literature.

It will begin by discussing the concept of security, in order to then introduce the literature on security networks that have greatly informed the research. It will move on to introduce the field of literature on security networks - notably of those with a 'community' element - showing both the existing literature, as well as the gaps. Finally, it will discuss the literature on sovereignty and legitimacy with regards to security.

## 2.2 Studying and theorizing security networks

This research looks at security through the frame-work of 'security networks'. In the broader sense, the concept of 'security' exists in the literature in ways that are both "produced by particular social and spatial forces" as well as being "a productive process in its own right, acting as a major force transforming institutions, states, spaces, cities, subjects and social life in the contemporary world." (Glück and Low, 2017: 281).

This research starts from the understanding that the concept of 'security', is subjectively understood by each participant. Security is something that can be performed, felt, and used as a powerful discourse. To this day "...what exactly is understood by 'security' in particular cultural contexts, the ways in which security practices and notions of security chisel each other in localised contexts... remained largely under-researched" (Ivasiuc, 2015: 53). It is this gap that serves a useful starting point for my study.

This inquiry into security will be done specifically through looking at 'security networks'. Before discussing how security can be understood as a 'network', it is important to begin by introducing the various facets of security- as a *practice*, an *idea* and a *feeling*.

### 2.2.1 Security as a practice

Security as a practice is about actions performed by actors to provide security, such as a small business installing CCTV cameras. It could be a resident calling out his armed response company, a community organising to get a neighbourhood enclosed, or a security employee manning his post, to name a few practices frequently carried out in suburbs. Concepts such as 'policing' refer to security as a practice, although policing also refers specifically to how security is governed (Kempa and Shearing 2002).

Ivasiuc (2015) discusses how security as a practice is often performed through using security discourse. Buzan et al. (1998) in their seminal work on ‘securitization theory’ use the term ‘speech acts’ to argue that calling something ‘security’ is to make a ‘securitizing move’ or a security act, “... it is the utterance itself that is the act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). Crawford and Hutchinson (2016: 5) explain the theory of securitization - “framing something as a ‘security’ issue allows things that might ordinarily be politically untenable to become not only thinkable but widely acceptable...”. It is therefore clear that security-talk is very much a part of security practices, as well as security ideas. Similarly, Caldeira (2000) talks about ‘the talk of crime’. Whilst talking about crime is not a practice of security, she argues that it does far more than that: it legitimises certain violent security practices and actors, and it also ‘reorders the world’, affecting “the urban landscape and public space”(2016:19) and social order more broadly.

### 2.2.2 Security as an idea – both deep and shallow

How the concept of ‘security’ is understood, differs greatly from person to person on the ground, as well as amongst scholars (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016). Loader and Walker (2007) argue that there is both a ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ understanding of security as an idea. The deep one, which they call ‘ontological security’, refers to a profound sense of wellbeing, and a sense of comfort in the world (Steinberg and Marks, 2014). This aspect of security is inseparable from the ‘shallow’ sense of ‘freedom from physical harm’ (Loader and Walker, 2007: 16). Bauman (2007) too, makes a similar distinction between ontological security and the physical security of people’s bodies and possessions, yet argues that they are closely related. Since it is almost impossible to attain existential security, that of one’s ‘place in the world’, people instead seem to be driven to spend a lot of money to secure their bodies and possessions as a proxy for the ‘deep’ security that they cannot attain (Bauman, 2007). Many scholars (such as Dirsuweit, 2007; Steinberg and Marks, 2014; Bauman, 2007, 2001) have pointed out the paradox of security - where often (shallow) security measures in fact deepen ontological insecurity. Dirsuweit (2007) has argued that some (shallow) security measures -in her case, road closures in Johannesburg “...serve to construct and reinforce ontological (in)security by... the implications these closures have for the way in which the city and its residents deal with difference.”

Throughout this paper, the term ‘security’ is used to refer to the ‘shallow’ definition of security. This was guided by the fact that most research participants used the term ‘security’ in that way. Glück and Low (2017:281) show the clear link between subjective understandings of security and how such understandings translate into practice, by defining security as “... a modality of constructing danger, enemies, fear and anxiety, and the measures taken to guard against such constructed threats”. Therefore, the idea of security is also political. Subjective understandings of *who is a threat* versus *who is in need of protection*, and what form of protection is appropriate, all constitute ideas of what security is.

### 2.2.3 Fear and (in)security as a feeling.

Feelings of security and feelings of insecurity are two dimensions of the same thing (Ivasuic, 2015), leading some scholars to use the term “(in)security” (Dirsuweit, 2007; Ivasuic, 2015). They are often directly related to one another; increases in insecurity and fear often leads to an increase in security measures (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2015).

Practices of security both influence and are influenced by the consumer’s ideas. Naturally, “...the condition of security is not independent of the common understanding we come to have of it” (Loader and Walker, 2007: 168). Whether the growing presence of security in certain communities makes people feel safer or less safe, can have profound consequences for individuals, with relevance to democratic practices in the broader sense (Loader and Walker, 2007). “Fearful citizens...tend to be unconcerned about or even enthusiastic for the erosion of basic freedoms” (Loader and Walker, 2007:8). At the same time, a sense of security can produce “forms of trust and abstract solidarity...it can under the right conditions create inclusive communities ...” (Loader and Walker, 2007:8).

According to Bauman (2007 :2) “Fear is the name we give to our uncertainty, to our ignorance of the threat and of what is to be done... to stop it in its tracks or to fight back if stopping it is beyond our power”. Often, the desire to ‘fight back’ against our fears or uncertainty takes the form of securitization practices. Understandings of security are often rooted in people’s fears and emotions, which in turn are grounded in their experiences (Schwell, 2015). However, these links are not always direct. Research has shown that “Security measures... can... increase perceptions of insecurity and fear... feelings of (in)security are not inherently linked to direct acts of violence and high crime rates, but are also shaped by indirect political forces...” (Diphorn and Grassiani, 2015: 10).

Humans, like all other creatures, have a ‘fight or flight’ response to immediate threats and dangers (Bauman, 2007). But further, Bauman (2007) explains the idea of ‘derivative fear’ as follows: “A person who has interiorized... a vision of the world that includes insecurity and vulnerability, will routinely, even in absence of a genuine threat, resort to the responses proper to a point-blank meeting with danger: ‘derivate fear’ acquires a self-propelling capacity.” (Bauman, 2007:3). The implications of this are that people can be acting out of fear, and experiencing fear, even when they are not under threat. If they are responding out of fear, they might choose ‘fight’ or ‘flight’, and securitization could arguably be seen as both. Building high walls can be understood as a ‘hiding away’ response to fear, and paying armed guards or becoming an armed security volunteer could be understood as ‘fighting back’ against an object of fear.

Security is related to feelings of fear and insecurity in important, complex, and often ‘problematic’ ways (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2015). In addition, there is evidence that “...security for one does not necessarily mean security or safety for another” (Diphorn and Grassiani, 2015: 10). Bauman points



out that in fact, often it is “other people’s security” or “other people’s freedom” that are sacrificed for greater security and freedom. It is therefore important not only to study the effects of security on a particular community, but also to understand the effects security has on those deemed to be ‘outsiders’, which many scholars (such as Samara, 2010; Ivasuic, 2015; Ballard, 2004; Lemanski, 2004) have argued.

#### 2.2.4 Security as a network

‘Networks’ is a concept which encapsulates the inter-relationships and the diversity of the providers which constitute it (Newburn, 2001). Newburn (2001:8301) uses the term to refer to the “increasingly complex and differentiated patchwork of security provision”. ‘Security networks’ emerged as a concept amongst many others within literature that looks at how the role of policing and security has moved away from the state and is then shared amongst a variety of different actors, including, but no longer confined to the state (Dupont, 2004). Along with ‘security networks’ other similar concepts which speak to the plurality of current policing actors include concepts such as ‘assemblage’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010), ‘policing nodes’ (Shearing, 2001, 2003; Kempa et al. 1999), a ‘pluralized landscape’ (Loader and Walker, 2007) amongst other concepts that are now widely accepted in the literature.

These theories might see the state as the most important (Loader and Walker, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008) or might see it as merely one amongst many actors, and indeed this is still an idea that many scholars of ‘pluralised’ policing continue to debate (Kempa et al., 1999; Glück and Low, 2017; Goldstein, 2010). Diphorn (2016:11-13) argues that much of the scholarly literature regarding non-state or plural forms of policing is structured around an assumption of ‘state failure’. This is rooted in the Hobbsian assumption of the state being the only legitimate user of violence. She argues that this assumption does not adequately account for the trends around the world - irrespective of the strength of the state - in which non-state policing has increased, and particularly does not account for the connections between state and non-state policing. Dupont (2004:79) argues that “Local security networks are tacit acknowledgements by the state of the limitations and ineffectiveness of its fragmented and monopolistic intervention strategies”.

Diphorn and Grassiani (2016: 431) take the discussion of ‘plural’ policing even further, arguing that it is important to understand the relationships between the actors making up the security networks and how they are negotiated. Further, they argue “that such tools should also attend to non-human security elements, such as technology, symbols and discourses”. Kyed and Albrecht also look at the ‘hybridity’ of actors involved in policing, but focus on their ‘order-making’ functions. They argue that “Not one set of actors monopolizes the authority or sovereign position to enact order, entailing renegotiations over the very definition of what the order is” (2015:1).

Dupont (2004) is largely attributed with the concept of security networks, defining these as “a set of institutional, organizational, communal or individual agents or nodes that are interconnected in order to authorize and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders” (Dupont, 2004: 78). Out of the various ‘ideal types’, ‘local security networks’ specifically are “initiatives that seek to harness the public and private resources available in local communities.” (2004: 78).

This research report makes use of the term ‘networks’ since it talks to the idea of a web of connections and “in the field of security, as in every other area of social organization, networks overlap and intersect on a number of levels” (Dupont, 2004). This overlapping can take place on an individual level, since “organizations consist of various individuals who can be part of various nodes. A private security company owner, may, for instance, also be an active member of a neighbourhood watch” (Diphorn and Grassiani, 2016: 434). Notably the concept of network encapsulates an entire collection of security-providing-institutions, both formal and informal.

As argued by Diphorn (2015a: 1) “It is increasingly the norm that ‘nonstate policing bodies’ ... largely shape the governance of security in the urban realm”. Therefore, studying security through the framework of a ‘network’ has important implications in the urban setting. Landman (2002:8) argues that, “Control over urban spaces in South Africa... is exercised by various groups, including the public police, private security guards, various vigilante groups and formalised management bodies...”, raising the question of ‘spatial democracy’. In a similar vein, Caldeira (2000) argues that whilst ‘the talk of crime’ shapes the social and spatial order in cities, it is an order of segregation, enclosures, and further violence. Clarno (2014) argues that it is important to look at policing actors ‘beyond the state’, if one aims to understand how precarity and marginality are policed in urban spaces. Maneri (2018) looks at diverse forms of urban security through the lens of ‘media hypes and moral panics’, in order to understand security as a discursive and political tool. Lemanski (2004) succinctly argues that “the effect of fear and insecurity on urban space and form is a crucial issue facing urban citizens and policy makers across the world, but in South Africa its implications for re-creating a new form of apartheid, render it a critical area of inquiry”. Similarly, Samara (2010) shows how security partnerships can contribute to reproducing the spatial segregation, in his study of ‘improvement districts’ in urban centres. Dirsuweit (2007) argues that attempts to create security through manipulating the physical environment, such as through road closures, in fact exacerbate insecurity.

Dupont (2004) makes the distinction between ‘structural networks’ and ‘interpersonal networks’. The concept of interpersonal networks, outside of the context of security, is situated within the school of sociological institutionalism. Looking specifically at the work of Granovetter (1985; 1973), ‘networks’ refer to interpersonal social ties, in which behaviour is embedded. Not only do security networks consist of many interpersonal ties, but interpersonal networks are connected to institutions in various other ways. Informal institutions are created and sustained through networks of social relations, and informal

institutions contribute to sustaining formal institutions (Nee and Ingram, 1998). Institutional theories provide a framework of analysis for understanding security networks, which can be understood as a purposefully created informal institution made up of a network of other formal and informal institutions, organisations, and individuals. In line with new institutional theories, this paper does not merely take for granted the existence of institutions, but interrogates it (Nee and Ingram, 1998). In discursive institutionalist tradition, I simultaneously “treat institutions as given... and as contingent” (Schmidt, 2008:314) and therefore I have looked at other institutions beyond security networks which may affect them, such as legality, criminality, state institutions, and the idea of ‘security consciousness’ as well as ‘fear’. These can be read as having been institutionalised, in that they “are classifications built into society as reciprocated typifications or interpretations” (Berger and Luckman (1967), quoted in Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 431).

## 2.3 Security networks and ‘community’

### 2.3.1 Community

Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) looks at various formations within the security network, particularly the ways in which ‘community’ and ‘private’ security are entangled, and argues that “the term “community” is indeed a very powerful marketing instrument, with or without the police support”. Before discussing the ‘community’ aspect of the security network and how this research aims to fill that gap, I will address how the concept of ‘community’ is conceptualised in the literature.

‘Community’ is a concept that is not easily defined, but its use has important implications, particularly for security practices. According to Bauman (2006), ‘community’ is an object of desire more than a reality. More specifically it is a desire for certainty and security in an insecure world (Bauman, 2006). There is evidence that “the construction and maintenance of community identity are well-documented as means to improve a sense of ontological security” (Dirsuwiet, 2007). ‘Community’ is a term that implies some degree of shared values and shared world views, although many scholars critique this (Bauman, 2006; Martin, 2010; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016; Dirsuweit, 2007). Indeed, “terms such as “community” and “community values” are... potentially misleading, as they imply homogeneity of attitudes across a range of often-disparate social groups” (Martin, 2010: 54). Hence, in this report I do not use the term ‘community’ uncritically, but I allow my participants to define ‘community’ for themselves.

Not only is community an important concept as it is so much a part of the discourse used by the state (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016), it is also recognised by scholars as a discursive tool for private security actors to market and/or legitimise themselves (Diphooorn and Kyed, 2016; Diphooorn, 2016; Thumala et

al., 2011 ; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006). On the other hand, "...the concept of community is indispensable to the practice of vigilantism" (Martin, 2010, 54). It is also a key tool in the neoliberal project of the state drawing back from its responsibilities -including that of policing- and forms part of state discourse, as 'the community' becomes "...the signifier of the private sphere collectivised" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 185). Both case studies that form the empirical part of this research report have a large presence of 'community' security groupings. Yet scholars such as Diphorn and Kyed (2016) and Bénit-Gbaffou (2006, 2008), argue that the perceived divide between 'the communal' and 'the commercial' is not clear-cut.

### 2.3.2 Community-policing.

My research emerged out of a gap in the literature regarding 'community' security schemes. While there is a large body of literature that looks at pluralised forms of policing, they mostly concentrate on the role of private security within the network. The majority of studies that do in fact deal with the 'community' aspects of security, see it as an 'alternative' to private security, rather than looking at the interactions between them. There are variations, such as Kempa et al. (1999:211) who look at private security but argue that community policing is a way in which the "active community members... can be conceived as a 'new' form of private agent in the networked policing process". As noted by Diphorn (2016) "only a few studies have analysed the interactions and relationships, both formal and informal, between citizen-based policing initiatives and private security companies worldwide..." (Diphorn, 2016 :161). Furthermore, according to Diphorn (2016), very few have done so ethnographically. As noted by Marks and Wood (2007: 135), "...there is almost no recent writing on ways in which communities are 'legitimately' coming together... to deal with feelings of insecurity."

Although that paper was published over a decade ago, the field is still dominated by studies of what are often understood as 'illegitimate' community-security-formations. Even though there is a vast body of work that looks specifically at 'community' policing, most studies of community policing, including those looking specifically at 'vigilantism', take particular interest in poor urban communities and see it as an alternative to private security in an environment where the public police does not adequately offer protection (Vigneswaran, 2013; Buur and Jansen, 2004; Martin, 2010). Vigilantism is usually conceptualised as poor people, in poor neighbourhoods, who have no options other than 'taking the law into their own hands', largely due to the lack of formal public policing, (Martin, 2010). Comaroff and Comaroff (2016 :193) complicate that distinction: "South Africans with the necessary capital, both cultural and material, purchase protection in the private sector. What they buy extends from elaborate domestic security systems... to the services of whitened, company-registered versions of the "vigilante" organisations that operate in black residential areas. Many... also make collective arrangements...". Diphorn (2016) also argues that the difference between what are seen as 'vigilante' groups, as opposed

to 'private security companies' is the degree of 'permissibility' that their violence is granted by the state.

There is also literature on community policing, such as through state-structures like the Community Policing Forums (CPFs). However, those are dominated by studies on poor, under-resourced areas, where self-policing is seen as a desperate alternative to private security. One such study is Kyed and Albrecht (2015), who focus on 'civilian policing groups'. They argue that these groups act in a way that is 'state-like', specifically in trying to establish authority over a particular group, particularly those located in the 'urban margins'. Theories such as Wilson and Kelling's (1982), 'broken window thesis' also discusses community policing in poor neighbourhoods. It argues that community policing might not reduce crime, but it can increase 'order' and therefore people feel less fearful. With less fear, and more social control or 'order', there can be less crime, the theory argues. In this vein, a lot of community policing initiatives all over the world seem to be more about policing order than reducing crime, in the hopes that that might reduce crime. It is understood by many scholars that, "while private security, security technology and gated communities are often the domain of the wealthy, on the other side of this equation poorer South Africans regularly participate in, or seek security, from a range of non-state groups ranging from community policing forums to self-defence communities, to run-of-the-mill vigilantes" (Vigneswaran, 2010:12).

My research emerges from the gap in the literature that looks specifically at community security formations that occur in wealthy areas already equipped with a high degree of private security presence. It therefore understands community security formations differently; they are not merely an affordable alternative to private security. Therefore, it is worth investigating what they mean, why they appear, and how they come to be regarded as legitimate. Diphorn and Kyed (2016) argue that it is important to "show how [Private Security Companies] and community policing groups engage each other in often informal ways and across socio-spatial boundaries, giving way to different entanglements of actors, practices, and logics" (Diphorn and Kyed, 2016:712).

Bénit-Gbaffou (2006; 2008) is one of the few contributing authors in the limited body of literature, studying networked community security formations, in suburban areas in South Africa. She too, looks at a wealthy suburban area of Johannesburg. She argues that one can understand 'community policing' as a 'third way' between public and private policing (2006). In addition, she argues that the line between 'private' and 'community' is blurry. There are community elements to private policing, and corporate elements to community policing, evidenced by the establishment of officially registered non-profit 'community security companies'. In Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012), the authors look relationally at both a township and a suburban community security scheme. They argue that "...initiatives for community security, far from being autonomous from the state, are shaped, constrained or enabled by political institutions and power struggles ...". Diphorn (2016), although focusing on private security

companies, also discusses how wealthy neighbourhoods have a range of ‘community’ policing initiatives that volunteers participate in. Slightly different to ‘community-security’, other authors look at how organised community formations in wealthy suburbs affect security decisions, often those which impact on the urban landscape (such as Dirsuweit, 2007; Landman, 2002; Clarno, 2013).

In analysing the relationship between the security networks and the ‘communities’ that they are connected to, I draw on what Hall and Taylor (1996) term the ‘cultural’ approach to understanding behaviour within an institution. I try to understand, through a sociological institutional framework, why certain security practices are performed. My research explores the reasons that people might make certain ‘security’ and ‘community’ decisions. I understand these reasons as ‘rational’, in such a way that rationality is constrained (Hall and Taylor, 1996), in that it is informed by “...cultural beliefs and cognitive processes embedded in institutions” (Nee and Ingram, 1998). Some preferences are therefore endogenous (Nee and Ingram, 1998), in that they are shaped from within the security networks the community members are a part of. This informs my underlying assumption that the presence of security institutions strongly affects the public understanding of ‘security’.

#### 2.3.4 Networks of security in Residential and Religious communities

This research paper was inspired by Steinberg and Marks’s (2014) take on ‘community policing’, through their account of the ‘labyrinth’ of Jewish communal security initiatives in Johannesburg, ranging from more to less privatised. Their paper showed how a ‘community’ can create a security network that is broader than a residential area, yet still limited to a small community. Through security initiatives, they argue that concepts of citizenship are reimagined. While other scholars (such as Clarno, 2013) have shown that non-state security, can lead to a withdrawal from the public life, Steinburg and Marks show how it can in fact enhance feelings of national belonging. Steinburg (2008) looked at the same security network in his final chapter and highlighted the network’s complex relationship with the state. Comaroff and Comaroff (2016:202) also touch on the role of religious/faith-based communities in security provision, ranging from certain church groups starting anti-crime initiatives, the South African Police Services (SAPS) holding prayer days and partnering with faith groups, to armed religiously-identified groups claiming sovereignty through violence.

In South Africa, there is far more literature available on residentially-organised communities in the suburbs creating security initiatives alongside other security actors, notably private security. This includes a large body of work on residential enclaves, such as road closures and gated communities (including Dirsuweit, 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2012 ; Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2002 ). Clarno (2013) looks at non-state forms of network governance through the idea of ‘rescaling’, where wealthy white residents in Johannesburg have created their own form of government. Certainly security and fear

shape the urban landscape physically, and in doing so they shape the social order, as scholars such as Caldeira (2000) and Lemanski (2004) argue.

## 2.4 Power, authority and legitimacy: Networks beyond the state

As argued by Thumala et al. (2011: 284)

If one regards private security not simply as an industry supplying services and products to its customers but as a set of institutions that exercise power and regulate conduct, it makes sense to treat private security as a ‘practice of governance’... to which considerations of legitimacy quite properly apply.

I argue that this argument can be extended to all types of security formations, not just private security companies. As such, my research aims to understand how security networks acquire legitimacy. It is founded on the understanding that for many individuals and organisations, as well as the state, security networks have come to be seen as a legitimate sovereign body, but that this legitimacy should not be taken for granted as naturally occurring. Rather that legitimacy is both purposefully (Diphorn and Grassiani, 2016) as well as perhaps un-purposefully acquired, and is always contested (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016).

Even though there is a body of literature that looks at the processes whereby private security gets legitimised, such as Thumala et al. (2011), as well as literature debating the legitimacy of ‘vigilante’ groups in poor neighbourhoods (Martin, 2010), there is a significant gap in the literature which looks at how diverse security networks comprised of community, private, and public elements, attain legitimacy. Two notable exceptions are Dupont (2004) and Diphorn and Grassiani (2016) who draw on his work. They explain how different security actors within a network, draw on various forms of capital as conceptualised by Bourdieu (1999), in order to enhance their legitimacy. These articles however are focused on the internal dynamics of the security network; specifically the contestations between the various actors within the network and how each node in the network seeks to legitimise itself and attain power in relation to the other actors within the network, which in turn affects the way in which the overall network will operate (Dupont, 2004; Diphorn and Grassiani, 2016). In a way this disaggregates the network, without talking about the legitimacy of the network as an institution in its own right. Dupont (2004: 84) however, does point out that “since all actors have invested heavily to enter the network, they have a vested interest in its preservation, hence sharing an “objective complicity” that transcends their divergence”.

In order to address the idea of legitimacy, I follow scholars of security / policing in South Africa such as, Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016; Kyed and Albrecht, 2015; Diphorn and Grassiani, 2016; and Diphorn, 2016, in understanding security networks as sites of (contested) sovereignty, in that the government is not the only form of sovereign authority. Sovereignty according to Hansen and Stepputat

(2006:297) is an “... emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed... to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy...”. Therefore, the two ideas are intertwined, since ‘sovereign bodies’ are given authority because they are seen as legitimate, and they are seen as legitimate because they are sites of authority. Thus, when looking into how the security networks acquire legitimacy, and in trying to unpack what that legitimacy looks like, I am looking at the ways in which they are seen as legitimately sovereign bodies. Even the sovereignty of the government itself is not a given, and the public police in South Africa have always had to work very hard to be seen as legitimate. As noted by Comaroff and Comaroff (2016 :11) “...the idea that the state ever enjoyed exclusive control over legitimate force is questionable; legitimacy itself is always a claim, never a given, always open to contestation, rarely unequivocal”. Diphorn (2016) conceptualizes policing “...as the performance of sovereign power” but problematises that some sovereign bodies are regarded by the state as ‘permissible’, and others are seen as ‘non-permissible’. According to Diphorn (2016:16) “non-permissible sovereign bodies” include vigilante groups operating in poor areas, whereas “permissible” ones include private security companies in rich areas. It is therefore likely that the degree of ‘legitimacy’ or ‘permissibility’ given to security actors by the state is socially constructed, and very much related to power positions of race, class, and neighbourhood, rather than any objective criteria (Ballard, 2004).

The literature has offered some insights to the ways in which either private companies, or community security groups, or even the public police have managed to attain legitimacy. These might be useful to contribute to an understanding of how broader networks of security attain legitimacy. Thumala et al. (2011) demonstrate how ‘narratives of professionalisation’ are drawn on by private companies, whilst Diphorn and Grassiani (2016) draw on the work of Dupont (2004), to argue that security organisations within the network actively transform their social and economic capital to legitimise themselves through ‘symbolic capital’. Importantly, Caldeira (2000) argues that the fear of violence is harnessed, particularly through the everyday ‘talk of crime’, to legitimise either private security or vigilante groups. Finally, there is some literature which looks at the role of the state in legitimising other organisations. For instance, Diphorn and Kyed (2016) argue that the state plays a role in legitimising private security companies through regulation or co-operation, and legitimises community initiatives through creating partnerships. Conversely others (Kyed and Albrecht, 2015) have argued that community initiatives can attain legitimacy by positioning themselves as ‘being able to provide what the inefficient or corrupt state cannot’.



# Chapter 3: Research Methodology

## 3.1 Introduction and Overview

The study of security networks and how they attain legitimacy in two suburbs of Johannesburg, was conducted over a period of 3 months using a variety of qualitative research methods.

The research generated two case studies through the use of ethnographic fieldwork, notably observations and interviews, to investigate the ways in which security networks operate as well as the perceptions and experiences of people directly and indirectly related to them.

Studying security networks specifically in the wealthy Northern Suburbs of Johannesburg was done for a number of reasons. Firstly because of the literature gap, where studies of ‘community’ security (and their relationship to a wider network) largely focus on under-resourced areas, yet it is a growing form of security within suburbia (Steinberg, 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2012). However, since the suburbs are a site of privilege and power, critically examining the security formations within them is important to understanding the city more broadly. The security networks in the wealthy suburbs are not only growing but diversifying, and so a qualitative ethnographic study is key to exploring not only what these institutions look like, but what the implications of them are for society in the broader sense.

## 3.2 Research Design – Building case studies through ethnographic methods

The research was designed through using qualitative methods, as the research question was aimed at understanding experiences and perceptions, as well as complex inter-connections. The specific qualitative approach that was chosen was the case-study method, as case studies allow the researcher to understand the context within which the phenomenon of study takes place, based on the understanding that the context plays an important role (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The decision to use multiple case studies was also done following the example of scholars such as Diphorn and Grassiani (2016), as they argue that it is a useful way to look at processes and procedures. The research was done through compiling detailed ethnographic data of two case-studies, which could then be examined together through a relational approach. An ethnographic approach is best suited to studies of this nature (Diphorn, 2015); Dupont, 2006; Ivasiic, 2015). In particular, it was chosen because “ethnographies of (in)security are particularly suited to reveal how security concerns are relationally constructed, voiced, enacted and acted upon within local frames...” (Ivasiuc, 2015: 53).

In order to compile the case studies, I used a range of qualitative ethnographic methods in order to get “a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood...” as argued by Baxter and Jackson (2008; 544). I use the method of producing case studies

critically. Following from the work of scholars such as Hart (2006), I employed a relational approach to both selecting as well as analysing the cases. I did not choose ‘cases’ that are bounded spatially. As argued by Hart (2006: 996), “Instead of comparing pre-existing... places, or identities, the focus is on how they are constituted.... through power-laden practices in the multiple, interconnected arenas of everyday life.”

### 3.3 Site Selection

The two<sup>38</sup>, case studies are located in different affluent suburbs of Johannesburg. Each of the sites meet certain criteria that are useful and important in answering my research question. Each is self-described as a ‘community’. Whilst crime has not increased<sup>39</sup> over the past years, both are quite fearful communities, and have highly visible security networks, whose presence and influence in each community has increased substantially over the past 5 years. Most importantly, although there is a large amount of private security in each area, both cases still have a high degree of community involvement in the security provision activities, the significance of which is discussed in detail. The networks in each case not only share connections but also have similar make-ups. Both contain key personalities, private companies, networks for information sharing, the public police, and both informally and formally constituted groups - to touch on a few aspects of the complex makeup of the security networks in each community of study.

The two cases chosen are different in important aspects. The main difference between them is that they are very different ‘types’ of communities. The significance of Case A is that it is an average and therefore generalisable middle-to-upper-income residential Johannesburg suburb, with a notably low crime rate according to data received from the local police precinct. Case B is significant in giving a wider perspective beyond the residential one, as suburbs are multifaceted beyond merely places of residence. Yet existing studies of suburbs have remained focused on residential communities, and their modes of organising such as through resident associations. The different historical significance and make-up of each site or ‘community’ also has important effects on security concerns, since the security of one’s home is different to the security of a community centre<sup>40</sup>, and the historically rooted fears of persecution that Jewish communities have<sup>41</sup>, are completely different to the fear of residential crime. Another important and interesting difference is the scale of the community studied, as one case study

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<sup>38</sup> Ideally, I would look at a larger number of case studies. See *Ethics and Limitations*.

<sup>39</sup> Neither in the specific suburbs, (Review of reported crime over last 20 months in the specific suburb of study, received from SAPS) nor nationally (Statistics South Africa 2018; SAPS 2018)

<sup>40</sup> The security concerns in a residential area are mostly around fears of residential-based crime, particularly in the context of high inequality and crime rates, particularly residential robberies of which 30% are suburban (SAPS,2018); whilst the ‘most feared crimes’ are residential – robberies and burglaries of the home (Victimes of crime Survey 2017,iss)

<sup>41</sup> The security around a (majority eastern-European descendants) Jewish community centre involves quite specific fears of being a historically persecuted community with a particular historical fear of large-scale public violence, and fear of terror attacks in a global context of attacks on religious sites, even if there have been no such attacks in Jewish places of worship in South Africa. Alongside those specific fears, there is also a fear of crime generally.

looks at a community organised around a single building, and the other case study is looking at a community organised around residing in a particular suburb. However, using relational theory has allowed me, not only to relate the two cases to each other without necessitating a comparison of two discrete units, but also to look beyond the synagogue's perimeter wall or the suburban boundary, in how I understand ideas including 'community' and how I understand security as a network that is unknowably large.

### 3.4 Access to the sites

Before starting my research, I did not personally know anyone in the 'residential community' of Case A. Regarding Case B, I have been a member of the 'religious community', and already knew many of the people personally before undertaking the study.

In Case Study B, the 'community' centre that much of the security provision is organised around was a physical space, and as a member of that synagogue I was easily able to participate and observe. I also signed up to become a member of the volunteer security team in order to do participant observational research there. In Case Study A, although I visited the area and spent some time there during my research, the main way that I carried out ethnographically-inspired observation was through the 'virtual' community spaces, like the WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook groups. Although I was technically an 'outsider' to the residential community, as I did not live there, I was treated to some degree as an 'insider' and was not regarded with suspicion. Therefore, I was added to the various online community groups, and could attend events such as CPF meetings. My acceptance was likely due to my appearance - as a young, middle-class, white, educated woman- everyone seemed to perceive me as 'sweet and harmless'. If I was in a different demographic however, I am sure that my access to the research spaces would have been much more challenging. In Case Study B, I was regarded with slightly more suspicion, even though it was technically my own 'community'. This was probably due to the fact that unlike in Case A, the role of security *within* the 'community' had been much more disputed. Therefore, some community members who were critical of the security approach by the synagogue, saw me as suspicious due to the fact that I had joined the security team. On the other hand, people who were deeply involved in security saw me as suspicious due to what they considered to be my outspoken 'left-wing' position on various issues in the synagogue. However, the fact that I was still technically a known 'insider' of the synagogue community did give participants a sense of confidence.

### 3.5 Data Collection

The data collection was organised around two different groups of research participants, within each of the two case studies, as follows:

*Table 1: conceptual groups of research participants*

CASE STUDY A	CASE STUDY B
Security ‘consumers’ in case study A	Security ‘consumers’ in case study B
Security ‘providers’ in case study A	Security ‘providers’ in case study B

Understanding security as a complex ‘network’, means that there is a wide array of actors involved, often overlapping and interacting in complex ways. For this reason, I refer to ‘security consumers’ and ‘security providers’ as an easy tool of reference, when referring to specific actors in different roles. ‘Security consumers’ is a way to refer to ‘community members’, or members of the public - both individuals as well as formal and informal groupings - who are on the receiving-end of security practices, in that the security practice is being provided for them. ‘Security providers’, on the other hand, are on the providing end. This category formed the bulk of my research participants. They are providing security as a service or a practice to the security consumers. They too might be individuals, formal or informal groups. It is also possible that a single person might in one instant be acting as a consumer, and in another as a provider. Such as a community member who might ordinarily be a security consumer, would act as a security provider when volunteering for a patrol. It is important to note that by using these terms, I use them cautiously and critically, as I am aware that security is often co-produced and could likely be co-consumed by both providers and consumers (Glück and Low, 2017). Scholars such as Schwell (2015), have also critiqued the notion of security ‘consumers’ as she argues that they should not be seen merely as passive recipients. Hence, I look at consumers rather as having agency and being part of the production of security. Whilst the idea of the two categories helped structure the data collection, it became increasingly evident that they are not discrete categories.

**Sampling:**

In order to select participants, I used a snowball sampling technique for both the ‘consumer’ and ‘provider’ category of participant. Beginning with one or two participants that I had identified, I would then ask them for recommendations of other people to speak to. In addition, I also was given permission to post a request for participants on the community telegram groups in case study A, which gave me access to a wider selection of participants. In case study B, since I knew a number of people already, I made an effort to try and interview people with a wide range of views and experiences, in combination with the snowball method.

## 3.6 Methods:

Although my research method was largely based on interview data, I grounded the interview data in the data I acquired from ethnographically-inspired observations, as well as a number of documents that I had collected.

### 3.6.1 Interviews:

The method of in-depth interviews was chosen, as my study was designed around generating rich data about the multifaceted experiences within each case study. In-depth interviews allowed for plenty of detail about the participants thoughts and experiences on a wide range of topics. 16 interviews were conducted in total, 8 for each of the two case studies.

Specifically, I used a semi-structured interview format, and most interviews were between 45 mins to 90 mins. This meant that I could structure the interview around certain questions which had emerged from the existing literature, but it also allowed flexibility, where the participant could provide data beyond my initial assumptions. The interview template (see Annexure A) utilised a list of open-ended questions, which I had compiled for different ‘categories’ of participants. Since, as I demonstrate, the framework of ‘security networks’ allows for a large amount of overlap in the roles of individuals, I had non-bounded categories that were useful as follows:

- community-security volunteers
- members of security companies (corporate and non-profit)
- ‘community members’/ ‘security consumers’

Interviewing community-security volunteers was done in order to understand more about the intersection between the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘the community’, as well as to understand ways in which the security network is linked to ‘the community’. This specific category was also one in which the concept of being a ‘provider’ of security overlapped with being a ‘consumer’. I thought it was important to focus on this category of participant, as it is largely absent from existing studies that focus either on public police or private security. Within the more ‘formal’ category of security providers, being those either employed by or owners of private security companies and non-profit security companies, there were a range of different participants. This perspective was important for understanding what the security networks look like, as well as to get the perspective of those who are deeply involved in them, particularly in the ‘legitimation work’ (Thumala et al., 2011) that they do, and how they relate to other security actors.

I also interviewed some people who were not officially providers of security, but rather were on the ‘consuming’ end of it, as the literature (such as Schwell, 2015; Steinberg and Marks, 2014) had shown that these were key decision-makers in security practices, and who likely had a key role to play in legitimising the security network. Finally, I conducted some interviews with certain key ‘community

members' in order to get a 'community history overview' rather than their perspectives on security. This history was necessary to contextualise and better understand the data on the security networks in each specific case.

### 3.6.2 Observation:

One of the key tools of ethnographic case studies is observations (Baxter and Jackson, 2008). As scholars of 'everyday security' have called for further ethnographies of security, I utilised the ethnographic tool of observation, including participant-observation, which has given me what Diphorn (2015a) calls an 'on the ground focus', therefore allowing me to observe how security is understood, and how its enactment creates new meaning (Diphorn, 2015a). Firstly, looking at 'security providers' specifically, observation also allowed me to see into the security network, establishing which actors and organisations constituted the network and how they were connected. Interviews alone would not have allowed me to see this, as the initial point of not knowing which other groups and individuals were in the network meant that I could not ask questions about them. Observations allowed further data to emerge that was beyond my initial assumptions or understandings. Through observations, I could witness the interactions and the forums of network interaction. Another reason for observation is to understand how security was experienced, and how it was experienced differently by different people, particularly from the 'security consumers' perspective, as well as to see how it might affect people who were deemed to be 'outside' of the 'community'. This method also allowed me to witness actions; *what security practices looked like in reality*. As posited by Crawford and Hutchinson (2015: 6), it allowed me to ground my analysis in an understanding of the "... contested and messy nature of social relationships and practices".

#### **Case A**

In Case A, the observations that I took part in included spending time in the suburb, although this was limited by the time I had available. All of my interviews took place in the suburb at various coffee shops, houses, and places of business. I also spent time driving around the area, taking pictures and looking around. In particular, looking at visible signs of security or visiting different places in the area. I went along on a patrol with a community volunteer for 2 hours. I also spent some time in the control room of the main private security company and informally chatted to the control room operators. One of the other private security companies which has contracts with somewhat fewer clients in the suburb had an 'information evening' where I also had the opportunity to visit their control room. I also visited the local police station and interacted with various officers and spoke to them about my research. In addition, I attended the local Community Policing Forum meeting, which included an election for the new committee.

Besides from these physical opportunities to participate and/or observe, the majority of my observation was in fact done through my presence in a 'virtual' community centre. I was able to join four different

community Telegram<sup>42</sup> groups, and two different community Facebook groups. This draws on methodologies of ‘digital ethnography’, which recognise online spaces as having “potential for new imagined communities... and new identities and networks that can transcend or reinforce traditional understandings of community, nation, and family.” (Bjork-James, 2015). This type of research is particularly important as scholars such as Hallett and Barber (2014:326) argue that “Studying people and organizations without considering the digital spaces where they define, express, and develop communities, images, and relationships would be inadequate.” Since the ‘community’ that make up Case study A are not physically together very often, their online spaces are where a lot of ‘community’ gatherings happen. I found these online forums particularly useful regarding the need to get a larger data sample in a short amount of time, as these forums allow users access to discussions from years back. This also points to the idea of ‘relational’ ethnography, such as the work of Hart (2006), where a ‘case’ is best understood in a way that is not bounded in space nor time.

### **Overlap – Case A and B**



Figure 4- Poster for 'SAPS Open Day', advertising various groups comprising the network- all on display at the event

Using relational theory allows one to see the case study not as a bounded geographical location or discrete unit of analysis. Therefore, some other opportunities for observation which were not specific to the suburb that comprises either case – but is linked to both, included my attendance at a “SAPS open day” event (for a different suburb) where public services, residents associations, and private security companies (far more of them than those shown in the poster) each

had a stall. Various private security companies which were present in both case studies were there, and I got the chance to interact with them informally and watch them interact with ‘community members’ and each other.

Other opportunities for collecting data that overlapped between the two cases included the ‘Civilian Crime Intelligence Network’ annual convention that I attended at the Military Museum in early 2020.

### **Case Study B**

The only existing work of Jewish communal security arrangements in South Africa, being Steinberg and Marks (2014: 245) argued that “...a more detailed account of these Jewish security arrangements

<sup>42</sup> Telegram is an instant-messaging service, similar to Whatsapp, but with more features.

would require more focused participant observation research, and perhaps more interviews”. This call is the key reason that participant observation was chosen. Due to the fact that site access was very easy for Case Study B, as I am a member of the synagogue and am familiar with many people in the community, I was able to do more observations and most notably could do participant observation as I had joined the team of security volunteers. I could, therefore, attend security meetings, be involved in the security team’s WhatsApp group, and not only watch but participate in some of the security activities, such as ‘standing shift’ at the synagogue entrance on security duty. Besides from participation in security, I could also participate in ‘community’ activities and spend a lot of time at the synagogue, attending both religious services and the ‘cultural’ or ‘community’ activities.

### 3.6.3 Document collection:

To enrich the ethnographic data, I also made an effort to collect community documentation such as flyers, local newspapers, and newsletters, which I was able to use to support the interview and observation data.

## 3.7 Thematic analysis

After the data was collected, I used a thematic approach to organising and analysing the data. I went through a process of coding the data by themes, using both an inductive and deductive approach to finding themes.

Deductively, I selected themes that had come out of the literature, specifically: ‘community’; ‘network’ themes of connections and relationships; security provision activities; subjective understandings of security; and sovereignty.

Inductively, themes that emerged from the data includes ‘security consciousness’; ‘criminality’ and ‘legality’; control and order; morality; and fears and perceived threats.

## 3.8 Ethical considerations

As discussed throughout the report, security is deeply connected to fear. Doing research into fear therefore needs to be done in a way that is sensitive. Whilst conducting in-depth interviews, I found that a number of participants who got involved in security indicated that their journey into security was triggered by a traumatic or distressing incident. Moreover, security can be quite a sensitive topic for some, particularly in a country with such high levels of crime, where many of the participants had stories of being victims of crime. I had to ensure that I would be as sensitive as possible to their experiences throughout the interview. I also had to ensure that they understood that they could stop the interview or withdraw consent to participate, at any time.



Security is also a field shrouded in secrecy, and so along with considerations of sensitivity, I had to ensure confidentiality and some degree of anonymity to all participants. This is why the research report does not include the names of people nor of places, or any particularly identifiable traits. All of the names of participants, and references to places within the suburbs studied, are all changed to ensure anonymity.

Finally, doing observations put me in a delicate situation ethically, as I was witness to practices of exclusion and discrimination in which, as a researcher, I was unable to intervene. I was fortunately not witness to any displays of physical violence whilst observing security providers.

With these ethical considerations in mind, I received an ethics clearance certificate from the Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee.

Security networks are made up of multiple, different actors. Yet the top of the hierarchy is largely dominated by powerful white ‘macho’ men, given the nature of the industry and historical relations of power. Whilst these men occupy positions in which they are constantly subjecting other people to their gaze, (since a large amount of security involves ‘using your eyes and ears’, as participants emphasize.) they themselves are seldom the objects of a critical gaze. In embarking on a study of security networks, I decided that the more ethical position to take (particularly given that my research is for degree purposes) was to see these men as the main objects of my research, rather than studying other actors in the security network with whom I might have to navigate complex power dynamics in relation to my own positionality. These men constituted half of my interview participants, and a larger portion of the participants in the observations. However, the process of conducting research introduced me to a wider range of people involved in security. The choice to focus on the white men in authoritative positions was also an ethical limitation, as the results of that decision meant that this research report does not adequately address the experiences of less powerful actors that make up the security network.

### 3.9 Limitations

The study was limited by the amount of time available to do it. particularly for an in-depth ethnographic study, the time constraints really limited the ability to collect data and to understand each community on a deep level. The time constraints also limited the amount of cases that could be studied. As the research aimed to look at how security operates within the multiple functions of suburbs, it would have been beneficial to include a suburban ‘business’ case study. I was also limited by my scope, in that an in-depth focus on specific case studies did not allow adequate engagement with the way in which security networks affect South African society more broadly.

# SECTION 2: DATA ANALYSIS

## Chapter 4: Networks Effects

### 4.1 Introduction

The concept of ‘security networks’ emerges from the literature on policing, such as work on plurality and networks around security, most notably the work of Dupont (2004), and Newburn (2001), as well as literature looking at networks of governance more broadly, notably the work of Shearing (2001: 262) who argues that policing should be viewed as “the outcome of a loosely coordinated network of authority, capacity, and knowledges...” of different policing bodies.

The two cases under analysis confirmed the presence of what can be understood as intricate security networks. In the data I collected, there was a strong theme of relationships both on a personal level as well as on a ‘structural’ (Dupont, 2004) level, those between institutions. There was also a strong theme of networking platforms for sharing information, for example WhatsApp and Facebook groups, newsletters, CCTV camera networks, and annual conventions.

The data consistently showed that security operated as a network, and security provision was carried out by multiple connected actors, institutions, and technological devices, interacting in a network. Although each security network is blurry, internally contested, and hard to know where it starts and ends, it is useful to understand it as an institution - in that it is purposefully created through an environment that is constrained by other institutions (Nee and Ingram, 1998). As such this research aims to investigate what the norms, values, and practices are that sustain and legitimise this institution (Nee and Ingram, 1998).

I argue in this chapter that the very nature of the security network, the *networked* part of it specifically, plays a significant role in legitimising itself due to how the different elements which constitute it interact, connect with and reinforce one another. In the literature, Dupont (2004) and Diphorn and Grassiani (2016) have argued that the various capitals (in Bourdieu’s (1999) sense of the word) can be drawn on to legitimise certain aspects of the security network. Whilst their arguments are mostly centred around the inter-relationships within the network, this chapter will demonstrate that they may be useful to understand how the legitimacy of the network as a whole is enhanced.

I firstly show how the different organisations – such as corporate entities, non-profit companies, and volunteer groups that make up each localised security network per case study- largely relate to one another in ways that result in increasing the legitimacy of the security network as a whole. I then discuss the role of the state and public entities in supporting and extending their legitimacy to a wider security network. While this is a fundamental shift away from the Hobbesian idea of the state monopoly on security, it also serves the state in a number of ways, and has been a policy of the South African criminal justice sector since Apartheid times and continues to be one (Berg and Shearing, 2008). Finally, I will look at the way in which the security network has incorporated civilians into it, which further legitimises it.

## 4.2 Co-operative network relations - Mapping the security networks

Although part of my research methodology intended to try and ‘map’ the security networks in each case study as well as how they might connect to each other, such as is argued for, by Marks and Wood (2007), the data collection process revealed how a proper mapping of the networks was not possible. Informal (and often invisible) connections between organisations and individuals, was one factor which made this difficult. Another was the fact that security actors are a blurry, porous category – in that someone can be a security actor one day, such as when they volunteer to go on patrol, and then not be a security actor the next day. Nevertheless, trying to map and understand the security networks had allowed me to reach several conclusions in how the security networks are legitimised, which this chapter will explore. In particular, the ways in which different actors or nodes in the network relate to one another, can result in legitimising the security network overall.

Although the networks are not possible to properly ‘map’, it is useful to begin with a brief introduction to some of the different nodes which make up the local security network in each case study. Thereafter, the next section will be able to describe and analyse the relationships between each, and their implications for the network’s legitimacy.

### 4.2.1 Security Network in Case A (Residential community)

The key security node through which the broader community connects with the rest of the security network, is a private armed-response company who market themselves as being ‘part of the community’, relatively small scale (covering around 20 suburbs with 38 Vehicles), and only servicing specific neighbouring suburbs, confined to a single area. They are growing rapidly, and according to one of the directors, they are signing up around 40 new clients a month<sup>43</sup>. The pseudonym that I have given them is Integrated Suburb Patrols (ISP). Their office/control room is in a neighbouring suburb, and the company’s directors stay in Uptown Park. Their control room has a radio connecting directly

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with Veronica, co-director of ISP

to the police, alongside more channels of communication linking them with other private companies and community groups<sup>44</sup>. The company is owned and directed by a team of two. A woman in her 60s, and a man in his 30s, who always carries a gun. He is the ‘face’ of the company and participates in many community spaces<sup>45</sup>. He was voted as the ‘security person of the year’ by the local paper<sup>46</sup>.

Integrated Suburb Patrols (ISP), sell hand-held-radios to the residents to keep in their homes, ensuring those residents are always able to contact them (and their neighbours) directly. Every Sunday evening they do a ‘radio check-in’ which apparently builds community spirit, while simultaneously checking that their radios work.

There are other private security companies in the area -who compete quite fiercely- and most seem happy to assist clients and non-clients alike. These include large international companies and other local ‘community’ centred companies<sup>47</sup>.

There are various community chat groups, ‘general’ and ‘emergency’, some on WhatsApp and some on Telegram (a slightly different group-chat platform). The Telegram groups are largely run by ISP, and have their logo, and the ‘emergency’ groups are monitored in the ISP control room. The emergency group for Uptown Park has around 300 participants, which includes clients and non-clients. It largely consists of residents asking ISP (or occasionally their neighbours) to attend to concerns such as seeing a ‘suspicious person’, or people who are a ‘nuisance’ -such as loud drunk people-, alarms going off, traffic accidents, and occasionally crimes in progress<sup>48</sup>.

There are two separate neighbourhood patrol volunteer groups within the Uptown Park area, one on either side, both of which fall under the Community Policing Forum (CPF). The CPF is a state initiative aimed at increasing policing capacities whilst improving their relationship with citizens<sup>49</sup>. The current chairman of the CPF, Hermanus also runs his own small, registered, non-profit medical and tactical response organisation, which often works in neighbouring areas, particularly poorer and more violent suburbs, as well as in Uptown Park.

Occasionally there are ‘community mass patrols’. The patrols are organised by the Community Policing Forum, together with the private security companies, particularly Integrated Suburb Patrols, Hermanus’s company, and the SAPS who drive in the front. The JMPD joins on occasion. The residents follow along in their cars and communicate to each other, the patrollers, and ISP through the hand-held radios.

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<sup>44</sup> Observation field journal, 2019

<sup>45</sup> Interview, 2019

<sup>46</sup> Local newspaper, 2019

<sup>47</sup> Observation field journal, 2019; and Interview with Aunty Aaliah, 2019

<sup>48</sup> Observation field journal, 2019

<sup>49</sup> Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008

#### 4.2.2 Security Network in Case B (Religious community)

The key security node that indirectly connects The Synagogue community with the broader security network, is a registered non-profit organisation (rather than an official, corporate, private security company) which I will refer to by the pseudonym ‘Jewish Protection Association’ (JPA). It markets itself as existing to protect the broader Jewish community of South Africa<sup>50</sup>. Unlike Case A, most community members are not connected to this organisation directly. Many are connected to it indirectly; either through their connections to other Jewish organisations, or through the synagogue’s security volunteer team, but most ‘community members’ are aware of the JPA<sup>51</sup>. The Jewish Protection Association functions in a similar way to a private security company in that they have highly trained and armed people that they send out to respond to situations, including a dog unit, although they are not technically a private security company<sup>52</sup>. They have direct links to the police, as well as certain private security companies and are part of a variety of intelligence networks. They also are closely connected to a sister organisation for medical emergencies which has two parts – one which responds to normal emergencies, and one which is trained to be able to deal with a ‘mass casualty’ situations. Both are also largely voluntary and non-profit<sup>53</sup>.

The synagogue volunteer security team is comprised of anyone who wants to join it, whether or not they have had previous training. To some extent it is one amongst many other voluntary ‘committees’ that make up communal life in the synagogue. However, the team is largely dominated by men, and the majority go for training with the Jewish Protection Association<sup>54</sup>. Most community members make no distinction between the volunteer team and the JPA<sup>55</sup>. The Synagogue volunteer team has very close links with JPA, including personal relationships, particularly those formed through the variety of free training programs that JPA offers. Although the JPA are an external organisation, they are also present on the security volunteer WhatsApp group and take part in decision making regarding security protocols, as well as whom to grant access. One participant suggested that the head of the volunteer team technically acts in his capacity as a member of the JPA<sup>56</sup> - whilst on the other hand the chairman of the synagogue see the JPA as an external organisation who can be called on when needed<sup>57</sup>. Over the last 3 years, the security team has also been represented in the Synagogue’s management committee. The volunteer team interact with the synagogue community beyond their presence at the entrance. Last

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<sup>50</sup> Website of JPA, accessed 2019.

<sup>51</sup> Observation field journal, 2019. Interview Mary, 2019.

<sup>52</sup> Interview Mr Schneider, 2019.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid* ; Website of JPA, accessed 2019.

<sup>54</sup> Observation field journal, 2019.

<sup>55</sup> Interviews with community members, 2019.

<sup>56</sup> Interview, 2019.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Chairman, 2019.

year they ran an evacuation drill with the entire community, to prepare for the possibility of a fire, but they also hope to run an ‘in-vacuation’ drill to prepare for the possibility of an attack from the outside<sup>58</sup>.

There is also a private security company that is contracted to provide non-armed foot-guards. The company also provides a tactical armed response team which do patrols around the neighbourhood, seeing as they are contracted by many businesses and residents in the area<sup>59</sup>.

So far, a simplified map of the nodes in the network as discussed, can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 5 Case A (Residential) – Simplified map of Key node




Figure 6 Case B (Religious) - Simplified map of Key node

### 4.3 Co-operative Network relationships

Cooperation between different points in the network is one of the key features. Uncovering the co-operative relationships is instrumental to understanding their role in legitimizing the security networks. As argued by Dupont (2004: 84) “...simultaneous relations of power and cooperation determine the existence and functioning of security networks as much as external circumstances and constraints”. Dupont (2006: 182) also raises a more complex and ethical question of legitimacy – whether the co-operative network relationships allow certain organisation in the network to be able to evade being

<sup>58</sup> Observation field journal, 2019.

<sup>59</sup> Observation field journal, 2019; Interview with Johnson- employee of private company, 2019.

delegitimised. He asks, “by facilitating the offloading of certain tasks to other nodes of the network which are under lower levels of scrutiny, do security networks undermine democracy by diluting the effectiveness of mono-institutional control mechanisms?”. Diphoom and Berg (2014) mentioned how private companies might want to have a cooperative relationship with the police as a way of marketing themselves with more legitimacy, but they also discuss many non-cooperative, conflictive forms of relationships.

Firstly, it is worth noting that cooperation within the network is not without tension. This is especially the case for private companies, who are profit driven and, - in a saturated and extremely lucrative industry- compete heavily with one another for clients (Diphoom, 2016). The data has shown that there is even competition between the voluntary organisations and groups, as they seem to compete over having authority over an area. Finally, there is competition between the state and non-state, since there is a threat to state sovereignty. As the head of a private company put it, “We are employing more guards, and we have more guns. If we turned on the government, we would overpower them”.

Although all these tensions exist, there are ways that the security network has managed to mostly work together and manage the tension. They use both formal and informal co-operative strategies in a way that frequently results in legitimising the entire network. Most of the security actors in the network thereby benefit from this, as they appear legitimate to the ‘communities’ that they serve and to the public authorities. And through cooperation, the network as a whole begins to resemble one single authoritative federation, and is thus recognised as a legitimate sovereign authority on ‘security’ matters.

Both in Case A and Case B, there seems to be a key node in the security network which connects the average person to an unknowably large network. In Case B, this key node is a registered Non-profit Organisation, I call by the pseudonym ‘Jewish Protection Association (JPA)’, and in Case A, the key node is a private security company which I call by the pseudonym ‘Integrated Suburb Patrol’ (ISP).

[Jewish Protection Association] have got direct communication with all the relevant police stations.... but not only with the police: security companies, local emergency services, they have direct contact, radio linked contact, with all these other institutions... anything where we need help, we contact [JPA]

(Interview with ‘Mr Schneider’, head of the synagogue volunteer team)

In both case studies, contact with further services, even medical services as well as the police, goes through the key node in the network. The contacts and resources of the key node in both case studies make other security actors want to co-operate with them. Many participants in both case studies expressed how they felt that a relationship with the key node was vital to accessing broader security services as well as other ‘community’ services (which will be looked at further in the next chapter).

Through their ability to connect community members with access to wider services, the authoritative power of the key node is legitimised.

Some community members speculate that the JPA have connections which reach even further and internationally, as four participants hinted that they are likely connected to the Israeli national intelligence agency, *Mossad*. According to one participant, "...If *Mossad* wants to know what's going on somewhere, I'm sure they go through [JPA]. It's a good way of entering". Although impossible to determine whether or not this is true, the image of this network relationship can increase the legitimacy of the network as it inflates its importance, and particularly in a community where at least half, if not most of its members are politically Zionist. A relationship with the Israeli intelligence, or even the perception of one, can increase the local networks legitimacy to those members. It is also worth noting that there can be serious implications for privacy and for state sovereignty if it is the case. This tension seems to be managed through *the lack* of information about the potential relationship, leaving participants to speculate and leave the networks legitimacy intact.

The volunteer team is connected to JPA through a direct radio -a control room whose number everyone is encouraged to have on speed dial- and there is also a JPA representative on the security volunteers WhatsApp group<sup>60</sup>. In addition, JPA provides training to both volunteers as well as the security guards employed by the private security company<sup>61</sup>. Although JPA is a non-profit company rather than a corporate security company, it works very closely with specific private companies. One large South African private security company that was founded in predominantly Jewish suburbs, initially used to share a control room with JPA, until it become too big and now covers many suburbs all over Johannesburg (Steinberg and Marks, 2014).

These relationships that the key security node in Case B (religious community) has with other organisations shows how a non-profit organisation, such as JPA, can have mutually beneficial (and thus legitimising) relationships with private companies, other voluntary groups, and public organisations. JPA can be understood as playing a 'dominant' role in the network (Dupont, 2004), and their power in the network means that others would benefit from cooperation with them.

In Case A, dominated by a private corporate, it seems less intuitive that there would be such good relationships, as private companies are profit-driven and are known to compete heavily with one another. However, the data shows how private competitor companies manage their tensions and ensure that the image of both companies will benefit.

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<sup>60</sup> Observation field journal, 2019.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with a privately employed security worker.



One example of co-operation between private companies can be seen from this quote, where Veronica, the co-director of Integrated Suburb Patrol (ISP) explained how they offered to help a competing security company when their staff went on strike “...they were struggling, so we phoned them and we said this is our control room number, if you have calls in our areas we can help, let us know, and so we did all their calls. We help them, and we said one day if we have a problem they will help us.”

This co-operative relationship is beneficial for the competitor company, as their clients were still provided with a service, given the equivalent of free ‘scab labour’<sup>62</sup> during a strike to ensure their clients were not upset, and to pressure the striking workers to go back to work without having to meet their demands. Furthermore, this co-operation was also likely very helpful for ISP, who got the chance to advertise their services to the clients of their competitors, likely in the hopes of winning them over. This relationship reinforced the legitimacy of both security companies, and by preventing a breakdown in communication between residents and the key network node, it also reinforced the legitimacy of the network as having an image of being ‘united in the fight against crime’, rather than merely disconnected, competing, profit-driven businesses. Undoubtedly in this instance, the image of both companies benefited whilst the plight of the workers - who are the actual providers of security services - was ignored. This example also raises the problem of how often this type of ‘legitimation work’ (Thumala et al., 2011) comes at the expense of the workers from both companies: whilst the strike of the competing company was being broken- the workers for ISP had to work double as hard for the same pay.<sup>63</sup>

In my interviews with residents of Case A in their capacity as ‘community-members’, as potential clients they were aware of some degree of tension between competing private security companies, but this tension seems to be managed through what one participant called a “gentlemen’s agreement” between companies. This refers to a set of informal understandings or principals in which each company respects each other’s authority, such as the extent to which they are allowed to respond to the requests of *‘someone else’s’* client’s. The idea of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ also shows how the inter-network relationships often have an important personal, class, and gendered dynamic.

The idea that there are unspoken, informal rules which everyone in the security network knows and respects, allows them to have amicable relationships which leads to strengthening the security network as a whole. Even though there are tensions, to the outside they look like a united front, and therefore like a legitimate authority in the ‘fight against crime’<sup>64</sup>. The mutually beneficial relationships also exist

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<sup>62</sup> In order to break a strike and continue production, outside workers are often employed by companies when their own workers are on strike, known as ‘scab labour’.

<sup>63</sup> Whilst the role of security workers is very important for a proper analysis of security networks, it is beyond the scope of this limited research report. Literature which addresses the experiences of workers include Diphoom (2016).

<sup>64</sup> discourse of ‘crime-fighters’ if often used when referring to the security network as a whole. It is discussed in the next section.

between volunteers and private companies. In Case Study A, there are two separate groups of community patrollers. In one part of the suburb the patroller group is strongly associated with the CPF, and in another part of the suburb they are more autonomous. Patrollers are volunteers who go on 'patrols' in their own cars around their neighbourhood. They developed before the private company got involved, and although there is some degree of tension, they too have a working relationship based on informal, mutually beneficial understandings.

So, at that time when we moved in, it was still predominantly white. And those guys had control of the area, including this area. Now when our guys started (their own patrolling group), they were concentrated here. So *those* guys used to fight us... So we used to have a lot of conflict, they didn't want us to come into that side, it was their side, it was their territory, so there was a lot of that conflict and a lot of anger... if there was a crime scene happening, "oh no we were there first, oh we caught the guy, no it was us that caught the guy", it still happens... what the hell, you know. Just get it done. You caught the guy, great. Why do we have to know who did what? So yeah there's that, like internal power struggles, but in the end of the day, when it's serious, then they all join in... they will sort out the problem. Which really in the end is all that you want

(Aunty Aaliah, Interview 2019)

This quote by an ex-member of one of the community patroller groups in Uptown Park, who was introduced to me as 'Aunty' Aaliah, illustrates not only the tensions between different elements of the security network, but also the usefulness of the cooperation between different elements of it. From the consumers perspective, such as that of Aunty Aaliah, she understands the security network as a one institution. Although it is made up of different and often competing fragments, she expects the network to "just get it done". When one group within the network manages to 'catch the guy', the network as an umbrella institution gets credited with that success, and therefore legitimated.

Private companies, as well as other organisations in the network, also share a lot of information or what they call 'crime intelligence' on the expansive network of online chat groups<sup>65</sup>, which will be discussed in more detail. Even if individual companies or groups in the network are reluctant to co-operate, their co-operation ends up benefiting them, since being connected to a security network that is seen to be successful and powerful improves their own image. There also seems to be some degree of competition regarding who gets to claim the victory, known as 'making the arrest', but then this too is managed by informal agreements. As 'Piet' (Interview, 2019), the control room operator for IPS explained:

The Civilian Crime Intelligence Network" WhatsApp group is quite simple, most crime fighters are on the group. It's mostly CPFs, so most control rooms (i.e. of private security companies) keep quiet. But then if someone says, 'there is a hijacking in [Uptown Park]', we will reply to say we are sending a vehicle. Then other

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<sup>65</sup> Such as WhatsApp groups, Telegram groups, and Facebook groups.

companies, if they are closer, they will also respond on the group to say they are also proceeding. Even if it's not their client. That's how it works. Everyone respects the rules. The first one who catches the suspect fills in the forms - you made the arrest, thank you very much, and then they leave.

The same patterns seem to be the case with Case B, the religious community. In Case B, there is also exists a substantial amount of co-operation in the security network, particularly between the volunteer groups and the private companies. If there are tensions, they are much less evident in the data collected. A field note made during my security shift at the Synagogue with Martin - an accountant, who is around 65- details the conversation we had after our chat with the heavily armed tactical response men who patrol the area, whom had come by on their rounds. My field note (2020) explains the context:

The tactical response/ patrol guys came by, and asked us how everything is, and they stayed to chat, clutching their huge guns. Apparently, some expensive items were stolen off the property last week... apparently there were lots of response vehicles that came when the alarm went off.

I transcribed the conversation that I had with 'Martin' about the event, where the conversation led to him trying to convince me that private security companies work together. He said:

Well, why do you think there were so many vehicles that responded? There must have also been some sent from other companies. I'm telling you, there are certain private security companies that work together, and that also work with [the JPA] ... Not only do they send out vehicles, such as in our case, but they work together on intelligence.

I asked him to clarify, how he knew how it all worked, and who is it that 'works together', to which he replied:

Well, no one is going to tell you that! Anyway, we can never know what intelligence looks like, just like we can never know the algorithms that program the public space CCTV cameras. But look at the banks. They are all competitors. Yet it's in their interest to share information to combat fraud. So, in the same way, why wouldn't security organisations also benefit from information-sharing?

(Field note, Security shift at the Synagogue, Jan 2020)

As this extract shows, whilst it is very hard to know exactly how the different organisations in the local security network work together, particularly since there seems to be much secrecy around it, there is a good deal of cooperation. One particular form of co-operation evident from the above extract, is what members of the security network refer to normatively as 'intelligence-sharing'. This will be discussed further along with the role of technology.

## Technology

Another important element is that of **technology**. Through technology new nodes are formed, that are key in making connections within the ever-expanding network of security. As already mentioned, WhatsApp groups (and other similar platforms) play a vital role as a technology of security, particularly for information-sharing, such as the neighbourhood ‘Emergency’ group, as well as groups like the ‘Civilian Crime Intelligence Network’ as discussed. As argued by Diphorn and Grassiani (2016), and Diphorn and Berg (2014), sharing ‘crime intelligence’ is the most important form of collaboration. I have also mentioned how radios remain central to security networks, even as technology has advanced. In both case studies, radios were central to communication within the security networks. My fieldnote below pertains to the use of radios at the Synagogue.

When we go on shift we have to sign out two radios – the radio which is a direct line to the [JPA], and the local radio. I have learned some radio code, although I have not yet had any reason to use it. I feel too shy to say “I’m going bravo” into the radio when I go and walk around the perimeter of the property – I would rather just tell the guy I’m standing next to that I’m going.... When we report on shift, we have to phone the [JPA] control room to let them know. We can’t radio them unless it’s an emergency.

(Field note, security shift at the Synagogue, 2019)

The use of technology, including radios and online chat platforms, as a vector of co-operative relationships between different nodes in the network, was most visibly striking and evident in the control room of Integrated Suburban Patrol. My field note below was from a reflection after visiting IPS:

The control room was small and there were only 3 operators, and not many computers, particularly compared to (a different company’s) control room that I had visited. Yet the room was filled with radios and other transmission gadgets that I didn’t fully understand, and there was a computer screen projected over an entire wall which showed all the WhatsApp groups and Telegram groups that [IPS] was a part of. They were a part of many neighbourhood/resident groups, emergency and otherwise. But they were also part of many huge ‘intelligence’, ‘security’, and ‘crime-watch’ WhatsApp groups, a visual illustration, or perhaps a present-day example of a visible network through an online chat-platform. Some of the groups, which I have since googled, included many with other private security companies (whom I had thought would be their competitors) and also included individuals and representatives of voluntary organisations including NGOs, neighbourhood ‘patrollers’ or their umbrella CPFs.

‘Piet’ a friendly, awkward white guy who seemed like he could have been even younger than me, was the head controller. I asked what the strange looking device was- he said it connected the radios straight to the police, and was probably part of ‘the E2 Project’. According to their website, the E2 Project is “A joint crime fighting

initiative between the South African Police Service, Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA) and the Private Security Industry<sup>66</sup>

It is clear that even within the one company's control room, there are different 'sections' of wider security networks, which are tapped into through different technological devices. These wider 'intelligence-sharing' sections of the security network, no longer confined to a single locality or 'community', are open to all groups classified as 'legitimate crime fighters', and likely overlap between the two security networks of case study A and B. Access to such informational-networks is theorised in the literature as a form of 'cultural capital' (Diphoom and Grassiani, 2016).

Another such example of how the role of technology is further strengthening security networks, is through security apps, like CASI, which appeal to private companies through the idea of the network, as is advertised on their website: "CASI network access: Build your brand and expand your client base by servicing the CASI customer network."<sup>67</sup> I was introduced to CASI in the control room of ISP

'Piet' showed me a map of the area on the screen, covering a few nearby suburbs. When I asked if the little icons all over the map were their clients, he said "no these are not our clients, this is CASI. So, all the users using CASI are now also clients.

It took me a while to understand how they can be 'not clients' and 'clients' at the same time, so I looked up 'CASI', which is one amongst a variety of similar mobile applications. An individual pays a subscription fee to CASI rather than an armed-response company, and then if there is an emergency, any of the security companies that are partnered with CASI<sup>68</sup> will send a 'tactical response' car.

Through apps like these, the security network grows, and private companies become more connected. The new network of artificial-intelligence cameras, notably 'Vumacam' cameras, that are going up around Johannesburg, is a striking example of how technological innovation creates more links between different organisations in the security network, whilst visibly promoting, and thus legitimising the security network. Having privately-owned camera polls going up on public infrastructure and surveying public spaces, promotes the idea that private companies can police public space in a way that seems to have been sanctioned by the state and the citizens. 'Vumacam' is a private information-technology company that provides the infrastructure and rents out access to footage to any number of recognised security organisations. This also shows how a different type of company or security actor, such as the aforementioned IT companies Vumacam or CASI, start to become incorporated into the security network. As one security volunteer from Case B explained, "Vumacam only supply the footage through rental contracts to *legitimate organisations...*", therefore for a security company (private or non-profit)

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<sup>66</sup> Available online at <https://e2.bac.org.za/Landing> [Accessed 06 January 2020].

<sup>67</sup> Available <http://www.casi-app.com/> [Accessed 16 January 2020].

<sup>68</sup> (Alfreds, 2016)

to contract with Vumacam, not only do they already need to be considered ‘legitimate’, but then their relationship with Vumacam serves to give outsiders an impression of their legitimacy.

### **Formal and informal connections**

Whilst technological devices allow for a different type of interconnection between the different points in the security network, particularly formal and visible ones, most of the connections are informal and somewhat invisible. People from different organisations within the network often know each other personally. Some might have been police reservists together (which seemed to be a theme in both case studies), others might meet up often at a crime scene or a training program. Companies might have informal agreements with one another. The different companies, NGOs, voluntary groups, and police departments may have developed a common understanding and working relationship with one another. There are also some connections between the different actors that are visible and formal, such as the radio lines as discussed, as well as training sessions, and meeting forums. These different modes of connection create the opportunity for cooperative relationships to be formed.

Training programs are an important site of visible networking and co-operation opportunities. JPA runs various training sessions. Through bringing together different key actors, organisations and employees of different security companies all attending training with JPA, they are able to co-operate much more in a way that further legitimises the network as a whole and benefits all parties. They run training sessions for community security volunteers, community members who aren’t security volunteers (which usually results in encouraging them to become volunteers, see next section on incorporating consumers into network) and also for the private company’s employed security guards, who are present at community centres. According to Johnson, an employed security guard (working for a private company) at the Synagogue, his training with the JPA was different to ordinary private security training, as they train guards to deal with different types of threats, such as “not only looking at eye level, but looking down for suspicious parcels, and looking up towards the sky”, which shifted his ideas about the particular security concerns for this community – rather than robberies, they are concerned about attacks like bombs.

Having trained with the JPA also introduces individuals to beneficial networks, as was the case with ‘Mary’. She discussed how having had quite a lot of training with the JPA allowed her to be a security volunteer at her daughter’s Jewish school, and at the previous synagogue she used to attend, and then finally at the synagogue in Case B when she joined it. She was also then elected on to the management committee of another Jewish communal institution, the local Jewish Board of Education, where she could then fill the position in charge of security due to her training. Training therefore expands the reach of security networks and creates more and more linkages, and, as demonstrated, the links within the network are often the ways in which it increases its legitimacy.

Training is also carried out by numerous private companies and can attract private clients. For example, ‘Jason’<sup>69</sup> (Interview, 2019) who was initially trained by the JPA, found out that opening his own private Krav Maga<sup>70</sup> training centre, was a good business opportunity. Particularly since:

“...a lot of people are very concerned about the police in South Africa, and about private security. And so a lot of people want to take responsibility for their own security. And that’s what I do, I take an individual like yourself and upskill you. And if I can give you that skillset then you won’t be hijacked or you won’t be raped. Or even for someone who stands shift outside the synagogue or a church – if someone approaches you, do you know what to do?”

This discourse is useful for legitimising his work, in that it makes one’s safety one’s own responsibility. If something happens to me, it is my fault, I should have gone to Krav Maga classes, this quote implies. Individualised training is also a way in which un-connected individuals can be incorporated into the security network. Although he refers to the inefficiency of the police and private security in this sales pitch, he also implies that individual training should be used alongside those actors.

Finally, though the role of the police in legitimising the rest of the network will be discussed in the next section, it is also important to understand the extent to which the rest of the network support the police. Often, they do this in order to improve their own legitimacy. Whilst usually the agreements between the police and private security companies are formal and official, there are also very important elements of their relationship which take place informally and unofficially. Veronica (Interview, 2019), the co-director of ISP told me about how much the police rely on private security companies, particularly those like Integrated Suburb Patrols. “They have never made our life difficult because we always work within the rules...and there are times when they need our assistance. We have had deputy sheriffs of the courts say they need assistance to hand out the summons because they are scared to go to a place, and we do it”. On the one hand, this shows a lack of legitimacy that the SAPS -which is just one point in the network– have in areas outside of suburbia, particularly in areas where they have been historically unwelcome, and where there are plenty of gangs. Since the police might be attacked in those areas, the state manages to get its job done through relying on external organisations, in this case IPS, and therefore holds on to some degree of its legitimacy; the summons at least, get delivered.

Veronica also describes an incident when people were protesting against the police and had effectively blockaded the police inside the station.

...they were fighting with the police and they even wanted to bomb them, so the police were all inside and [IPS] was there to guard them from the outside, until they brought in the riot squad and then they opened fire with rubber bullets....They phoned

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<sup>69</sup> Jason is not a member of the Synagogue in Case B, but he was referred to me by a participant in Case B, who had met him through the JPA. He put me in touch with Jason due to the fact that he has been a member of the JPA, had worked in sales for a private security company, and had opened his own Krav Maga school.

<sup>70</sup> Krav Maga is an Israeli Martial Arts form. It is an aggressive form of hand-to-weapon combat. Whilst many other martial arts have a variety of principles and values, Krav Maga is taught purely for defence purposes.

us and they said they can't get out and they have nothing to eat there, they were hungry. So, we got platters from Olivia's Cafe and delivered it to them - so you know when they need help, we're there, when we need help, they're there.

This camaraderie paints the picture of a united force of the entire security network, with state institutions and private institutions supporting one another. However, it also highlights the very informal nature of some of the private-state co-operation. Opportunities to help one another are useful, in that they often warrant a returned favour. Whilst the employees of IPS were 'guarding' the police, the management of IPS security delivered the sandwiches. This example also shows that when the legitimacy of the police was being challenged through protest, it was a private security company who came to their defence, along with other sectors of the state police such as the 'riot police' squad, and together worked to reassert the authority of the united security network by suppressing the protest.

Both examples also challenge the concept of 'consumers' that had informed this research. Whereas the public police claim to provide for *citizens*, and private security claim to provide for *clients*, in these cases it is evident that the private security was rather *providing for the police* in reality - which can also be seen as providing for the wider security network. I will move on to discuss how the public police legitimise private or 'communal' security in the next subsection, after this section has demonstrated how the 'legitimation work' (Thumala et al., 2011) that private companies do, also serves to legitimise the security network as a whole.

To sum up this section on co-operation within the network, in both case studies there are both informal and formal, visible and invisible ties between the different actors and organisations in the security network. In both cases, there is one 'key node' that plays a major role in connecting the 'consumers' of security or the 'community' with the rest of the security network. Whilst there might be some tensions between different groups and some degree of competition -particularly in Case A- the data has shown how the different elements in the network manage their tensions and largely have co-operative relationships. In Case B, since the JPA is somewhat of a monopoly on security within the Jewish community, there are less network-tensions and co-operation is easier. This co-operation, evident in both cases, not only strengthens the individual organisations within the network, but it contributes to further legitimising the security network as an institution in its own right.

#### 4.4 The state legitimises the network

With their increasing corporate capture, states have ceded to the market control over many of their signature functions, most of all their monopoly on force. As a result, vertical structures of authority are giving way to a lateral montage of partial, overlapping sovereignties, making it ever more difficult to separate government from business.

(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 217)



Classical theory, such as of Hobbes' Leviathan, paints a picture of the state as having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and using that to protect its subjects, in return for their loyalty. This is certainly not the case in any country, and particularly not South Africa. As summarised by Marks and Wood (2007: 152) "...what we have are public police bodies with serious fiscal and resource constraints trying to reassert their authority in a manner that is incoherent and ineffective". Not only do non-state security actors provide security, (with the private security industry outnumbering the public (Diphoorn, 2016)), but they too are often involved in making security decisions. As Berg and Shearing (2008) argue, "...this certainly challenges a pure conception of the Hobbesian dream where the Leviathan is both the monopoly governance auspice and provider" and is associated with the move towards neoliberalism (Berg and Shearing 2008). This has implications for state sovereignty and legitimacy, since if security is now being provided by a diverse network of actors rather than just the state, scholars (such as Diphoorn, 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016; Hansen and Stepputat, 2006) have argued that they become sites of sovereignty. In chapter segment 4.4, I will discuss the implications of that, whilst this segment shows the way in which the state is forced to support these alternative forms of sovereignty, as a way to improve its own legitimacy. "The idea of security as a common good is relatively widespread across the urban contexts. The state is delegitimized by failure to live up to this ideal" argue Diphoorn and Kyed (2016). Since the state has accepted that the public police are only one of many different policing actors, existing together within a security network, the state works to strengthen the legitimacy of the security network *in order to strengthen its own legitimacy* (Diphoorn and Kyed, 2016). They therefore spend a lot of time not only in collaborating with other actors in the security network, but also in creating visible displays of partnerships, as will be illustrated.

In South Africa, the state is not always seen as legitimate, and the police force especially are not given complete legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy given to not only the state, but especially the criminal justice sector, is distributed unevenly over different 'communities'. There is a strong history of delegitimising the police in townships specifically, but in areas that are mostly white and have historically been classified as white, the justice system and police are given a fair amount of legitimacy, and were overall treated as legitimate during apartheid (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016). The data showed how most suburban participants still seem to believe that whilst corrupt and inefficient, the police are a legitimate authority and their rules should be respected. Other actors in the network do too, and as Dupont (2006: 276) points out, "The legitimacy of the police (is) confirmed by the efforts of all other actors to maintain a privileged relationship with it". This legitimacy that the state automatically has, has been extended to security networks through the state's active support and collaboration in the networks, both with private security as well as with 'community security'. Indeed, "different entanglements between civilian policing actors and the state police not only reconfigure sovereignty, but also blur the state/non-state and formal/informal divides" (Diphoorn and Kyed, 2016). This

collaboration increases the legitimacy of the state to some extent, by making it more functional or by outsourcing responsibility. It also transfers the states legitimacy to the security network.

The two case studies illustrate ways in which the state, its policies, and its institutions, all play a part in legitimising the network. The state is not only a key part of the network (such as the various policing departments) but the state's policies, practices, and institutions, both formal and informal, serve to present the security network in its entirety (rather than purely the public police) as the legitimate authority on justice, policing, security, and law and order. Whilst this seems to be the case in these communities studied, as well for other 'well resourced' non-state policing bodies (Marks and Wood, 2007), it is often not the case in less-resourced communities (Marks and Wood, 2007).

Drawing heavily on the work of Diphorn and Kyed (2016) to analyse my data, I argue that the state legitimises the network (and thus also itself) through these three types of involvement in network: Collaboration, neoliberal values of citizen participation, and regulation.

#### 4.4.1 Collaboration

Diphorn and Kyed (2016) argue that the state collaborates with both 'community' initiatives as well as the private security industry, as a response to the threat that non-state policing poses to the state's authority. They argue that most of these forms of collaboration are informal, but there are also formal attempts to work together. According to Murray (2020: 52) this has created what he sees as "...an uneasy alliance of unstable partnerships. Although these partners share a common interest in security and protection, what lurks below the surface are competing goals and different understandings about achieving those ends". Jack, the head of Integrated Suburb Patrols, explained the concerns of the government:

The biggest concern, getting back to the subject of guns, like why there was a whole thing last year where they wanted to disarm the public from self-defence, and don't want security companies running around with rifles and all that. The whole reason was because the government and SAPS is being outnumbered by security companies, so it's a threat for them. We are employing more men, and we have more guns. They are concerned that if we turned on the government, we would overpower them.

(Interview with Jack, 2019)

It is likely that this is one of the reasons for intense collaboration between the state and private security companies. The government has accepted the reality of the presence and power of private security and therefore would like to ensure that relationships are kept amicable (Marks and Wood, 2007). It is also a likely reason for the strong state support of non-private elements of the security network, as these are easier to bring under the control of the state, and thus strengthen their power in relation to private security (Marks and Wood, 2007).

As noted by Diphorn and Kyed (2016), and was evident in my data, the state collaborates both with private security companies, as well as with various ‘community’ formations, in order to improve policing capabilities and maintain the legitimacy of the state. Not only do these forms of collaboration legitimise the state, but they also result in strengthening the legitimacy and authority of the security networks. The states existing authority gets shared with its partners in the network.

What was once perceived as the role of the police has shifted to become the role of ‘crime-fighters’, which includes, but is not limited to the police. ‘Crime fighters’ is powerful discursive term that many in the security network use to describe fellow actors in the security network - a term that simultaneously unifies and legitimises them. As already discussed in the section on co-operative network relationships, there are collaborative platforms for ‘crime-fighters’ of which the public police form a key part. These platforms, such as the E2 (“Eyes and Ears”) project described in the previous chapter, allows ‘security’ information to be shared amongst businesses, community voluntary initiatives, official non-profit organisations, and of course private security companies. CPF meetings also provide a platform for collaboration, and will be discussed further in the ‘Community Policing Policy’ section.

The “Civilian Crime Intelligence Network” (CCIN) is one collaborative platform which was a non-state initiative, and has been heavily supported by the state- at least in appearances. I attended the CCIN annual convention, which included a vast range of official participants including private security companies, various civil society groups, private medical groups, many CPFs, and the SAPS.



*Figure 7 CCIN Convention 2020. SAPS Demonstration. (Mackenzie, 2020)*

After a woman from an NGO against child abuse spoke, they handed out a few more awards in different categories, like ‘intelligence person of the year’, and then out of the blue, a guy in a suit presented what sounded like a sales pitch for his company which ‘discretely’ armours your car- not just bullet-proofing but also an extra feature that shoots pepper-spray. Finally, we had the key-note address from a police Major General.

(Observation field journal, reflections on the CCIN convention, 2020)

As is evident from my field journal entry, as well as the picture above, the police not only collaborate with a very wide range of security actors in the network, but they also often make a public display of doing so. Inviting the Major General to be the keynote speaker of a ‘civilian initiative’ shows how this network pays its respects to the state and upholds the state’s legitimacy, in return for being recognised as legitimate by the state.

In the case study data, there is also evidence of public displays of the state’s collaboration with the security network. In the case study of the residential community, which has much more evidence of collaboration with the public police than the religious community, the security company and security volunteers, along with other active community members host an Annual Halloween event in the local park. There is always a strong presence of the private security company, and in 2018 the boss was the MC of the event. Mr Gilbert who is a volunteer patroller and administrator of the security Telegram groups is a main organiser. But there is also a strong presence of public institutions at the event, as Mr Gilbert describes: “So the kids get to climb on a fire engine, the fire engine shoots water out, they get to ask the fireman questions, they get to get into the back of a police van, not that anybody wants to do that hahaha! ER 24 comes, they climb in the back of an ambulance, they see how oxygen works...” According to another participant, a few years ago the ‘police van’ that formed part of the interactive display for the children to climb around in were ‘Nyalas’ - armoured public order police vans armed with weapons (Interview with Veronica, 2019). Public displays of collaboration serve to reinforce the message that there is a state-sanctioned broader security network who are jointly responsible for policing and security. Such a display also normalises extreme and militaristic aspects of security, which become an accepted part of everyday life. This topic will be looked at in chapter 4.2

Since the ‘residential’ case study looks at a community whose communal activities are much more organised around security than the ‘religious’ case study, the same displays of state policing are not as evident in the data from the latter case. It is interesting that whilst the security networks operate in very different ways, with very different relationships with the state, both are still regarded as legitimate by the communities that they serve – with or without these large displays of police endorsement. Dupont’s (2004:85) work might explain this. He argues that the public police have the most symbolic capital, particularly as they have the most political capital based on their “...proximity... to the machinery of government”. However, it is likely that in a small, culturally defined community, an organisation like

the JPA holds far more symbolic and political capital, in the eyes of ‘the community’, due to its proximity to the organised Jewish communal bodies.

Police collaboration with the rest of the security network also takes place in other ways. What most community members have found is that in order to reach the public police one needs to go through the security network, who essentially act as gatekeepers. According to Veronica, the co-director of IPS in the residential case, “Normally if you phone the police you have to wait at least an hour or two - we phone straight to the Brigadier and she has a vehicle dispatched”. In this way, the security network makes the police more accessible to some people, even if it does so in somewhat of a privatised, exclusionary way. The key nodes in the security network who have this role of the intermediary are well aware of this.

Mr Schneider (Interview 2019), the head of the shul<sup>71</sup> security volunteer team, explains how he does not even have contact with the police and so he must rely on the JPA.

So I have a problem with our shul, because I have tried on numerous occasions to get in contact with various police stations and just introduce ourselves.... I go there and the station commanders are not there. Then I am referred to a different police station and it’s the wrong police station. [JPA] have got direct communication with all the relevant police stations.... they have got direct contact, direct people that are involved.

By prioritizing communication with ‘recognized’ security organisations and private companies<sup>72</sup> through collaborative understandings with them, over communication with the broader public, the police force further legitimises security networks, by making them the first point of call only after which the police can be contacted.

In the literature, Dupont (2004: 85) discusses how various capitals are harnessed to legitimise security providers, one of which is political capital. “*Political capital* derives from the proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives”. It is therefore evident from the data discussed above, how the network as a whole increased its legitimacy due to the political capital it has from its inclusion of the public police. Since the state collaborates not only with private security but also with community security, the next section will look more in detail at how the state policy of ‘citizen participation’ can be understood as a project of the state and of the security network.

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<sup>71</sup> shul- vernacular (Yiddish language) word for ‘synagogue’

<sup>72</sup> interview with head of ISP on Chai FM, where he says “the police prioritize us”. Links to the interview are not provided for anonymity reasons.

#### 4.4.2 Community Policing Policy:

While ‘privatisation’... is still sometimes controversial, ‘civilianisation’ (enhancement of community participation) is seen in a positive light as a way to enhance local democracy and participation, even though the latter process frequently involves private interests

(Béni-Gbaffou, 2008: 3)

Diphorn and Kyde (2016: 715) argue that ‘community policing’ is the most notable way in which “neo-liberal values of citizen participation... (have) been used to re-assert state legitimacy by filling the vacuum left by an under-resourced state police” As noted earlier, due to the desire to increase the legitimacy and power of the police in an environment of being under-resourced and under-staffed, particularly compared to the size of the private industry and compared to the extent of crime, the state has a policy of encouraging citizen participation in policing (Béni-Gbaffou, 2008).

This shift towards a ‘community policing’ model is not unique to South Africa, and has occurred in many countries, particularly in the global North, along with a more general shift towards greater liberalisation (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 184; Béni-Gbaffou, 2008). In South Africa this model was particularly championed during the transition period, “when its rhetoric of rights and popular empowerment was devoted to the task of restoring the nations confidence in the criminal justice system” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 184). Whilst an adequate discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper, the history of policing in the Apartheid era also paved the way for this model. Both the success (or at least presence) of ‘community’ based justice systems , as well as a history of an illegitimate public criminal justice system, pushed the South African Police Services (SAPS) into “..appealing to the model of Community Policing in order to build legitimacy...” and bring popular justice under its control (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 186). This community policing policy takes shape in various ways.

Firstly, part of their policy of encouraging community policing is trying to get communities to help with reporting crime. This pamphlet got handed out to all of us who attended the CPF meeting for the sector of Case A:




Figure 8 The pamphlet handed out at the CPF meeting, 2019

The CPF is the most notable way that the police essentially outsource some of their functions to civilians. Under the CPF, there are voluntary policing initiatives like neighbourhood patrollers. Patrollers have certain rules and regulations which will be discussed later, such that they must fall under a CPF constitution, and technically they cannot carry guns or respond to crimes-in-progress. In Case study A, even the neighbourhood patrollers need to first go through the private security company in order to get to the police<sup>73</sup>. The community volunteers or ‘patrollers’ need to get an official ‘Observation Number’ from the SAPS in order to go on a patrol, even if a patrol is just a drive around the neighbourhood. In Case A, many participants reported that this Observation Number gets assigned and recorded by the private security company. According to Mr Gilbert who is a volunteer patroller, Integrated Suburb Patrols “...does that as a favour, otherwise we would have to go to the police station, tell them we are going on patrol, come back, do the patrol, then go back to the police station to tell them we are standing down.” It is therefore clear that the official policy of community policing comes with a set of regulations, but it also comes with informal practices which rely on a broader network of security providers to support the relationship between the SAPS and the community policing system.

<sup>73</sup> This is quite possibly an exception rather than a common occurrence across suburbs

The state also actively encourages community policing through providing free training, such as to the patrollers. The metro police department, a separate public policing body, generally seem to be regarded as fairly useless and unreliable, such as noted by Mr Gilbert “JMPD is only sitting behind bushes with cameras....so a bunch of residents go to JMPD to learn how to direct traffic, so that they can direct traffic... because JMPD don’t”. However, even with - or perhaps as Mr Gilbert hints, *due to* - their underperformance, they still provide training to community volunteers rather than providing the services themselves.

Although there are many things that community patrollers are not allowed to do in their capacity as registered community patrollers with the CPF, when they do ‘joint-operations’ with the police then the rules apparently change. According to one community patroller in Case study A, being with the police, such as on a joined patrol with them, entitles community patrollers to search “trolley-pushers”<sup>74</sup> as well as motorists. The police, by allowing civilian patrollers to do a function that is ordinarily reserved only for officers of the law, make a public display that the patrollers are legitimate authority figures. You would not allow someone to search you (or your car or your trolley) unless either they threatened you, or you saw them as an authority figure carrying out their legitimate duty, or perhaps (which is most likely to be the case here) a combination of the two.

Community Policing Forum channels also function as gatekeepers between civilians and the SAPS, in the same way that private companies do, as discussed earlier. According to Ibrahim (Interview, 2020), a very active community patroller in Uptown Park, when ‘the community’ wanted to evict homeless people and prevent them from settling in the nearby park, he explained how “rather than just going in and forcefully removing them we actually work with SAPS, and all the necessary government bodies such as the department of social development, and we actually legally had these people relocated... initially what we did was we used the CPF as a platform... we worked through the CPF guys, who approached the government entities to assist us.”

According to Murray (2020) “CPF patrolling represents a kind of performance infused with tactical displays of bravado and commitment. In short, playing at policing has a great deal of symbolic value but does very little to reduce crime...” (Murray 2020:231). It is impossible to know whether or not it does in fact reduce crime within the case study. When I attended the CPF meeting for the residential community, the chairman as well as the police officer for the sector forum certainly insisted on the effectiveness of CPF patrolling, during a meeting that seemed just as Murray had described.

The speaker keeps encouraging everyone to join, although he is definitely preaching to the converted... there is a speech about “people do not want to get involved with the CPF, and they only come when there is an incident” .... Apparently, there has been a success at reducing ‘crime and vagrancy’ (without distinguishing between the

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<sup>74</sup> a derogatory term for people who work as informal recyclers/waste pickers



two) in the park due to the patrols, and that they have “pushed them further up North” ... We are all invited to the next patrol, tomorrow morning at 5am, where we can walk or bike through the park.

(Field journal excerpt, Case A observations, CPF meeting, 2019)

This excerpt highlights the use of bravado which legitimises the work of the CPF and the variety of organisations which contribute to it. It also shows their attempts to grow the security network through shaming people for not joining. As Marks and Steinberg (2014) note, ‘shame’ holds an important place in the provision of security. This extract also draws attention to the ‘reduction of crime and vagrancy’. The conflation of crime and vagrancy in security discourse allow the security network to be legitimated by giving them a success in the eyes of their community – the success at ‘reducing vagrancy’ is equated with the success of reducing crime. This can also be understood with reference to the work of Caldeira (2000:1) who argues that non-state violence is legitimised through fearful narratives, some of which are about crime, “But they also incorporate racial and ethnic anxieties, class prejudices, and references to poor and marginalized groups” .

Although the community volunteers in Case Study B, the religious community, are not an official community patrol group in that they do not fall under a CPF, the model of state-sanctioned community policing allowed community volunteer groups like those in Case B to exist and be regarded as legitimate. Although, as discussed, the volunteer group themselves are very disconnected from the SAPS, the model of community policing generally encourages civil society groups, including religious ones, to police themselves, and particularly to support the CPFs (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016: 202). The fact that the Synagogue security in Case B is so disconnected from the local CPF is also likely due to the fact that the synagogue is not located in a predominantly Jewish area. In those suburbs there is far more representation of other synagogue’s security on the CPFs<sup>75</sup>

Another fieldnote that I took during the (2019) CPF meeting for Case A reads: “They need to put in nominations for the next CPF exec committee. Jack, the head of ISP, got nominated, and most people agreed. They all seem to love him. Jack seems to be loving it, but he politely declined. The guy in front of me got voted onto the committee instead”. Whilst CPF’s are designed to encourage community/civilian participation, the fact that the head of ISP was the preferred candidate shows the way in which even CPF platforms also create opportunities for private security companies to show how they are ‘part of the community’, which Bénit-Gbaffou (2006:7) argues is a “powerful marketing instrument”.

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<sup>75</sup> Thomas, C. (Pres.) 2020. ‘Interview with the Noorwood CPF Sector Leadership’ *The Confidential Brief*. Radio program episode, Chai FM. 24 February 2020. Available at <<https://www.chaifm.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020.02.24-The-Norwood-CPF-Sector-Leadership.mp3>>

Another key institution of ‘community policing’ that the state has created to increase their capacity, is that of police ‘reservists’. Although this was an invention from the Apartheid regime, it has continued although it has decreased substantially. Reservists are unpaid trained volunteers who occasionally join in police duties and can then act as full members of the SAPS. A more in-depth study of this institution would likely be useful but is beyond the scope of this project. Reservists seem to play an important role in both case studies. The co-director of Integrated Suburb Patrol was an ex-reservist, which he agreed has strengthened the relationship of his company to the police. The head of the CPF in Case A was in the process of applying for his reservist licence. In Case B, the ‘second in command’ on the security volunteer team is also a (retired) reservist. Although he was a reservist during the height of apartheid, rather than currently, it was one of the main reasons that he quickly rose up the ranks of the security volunteer team. Whilst his formal association with Apartheid policing might be thought of to lower his ‘capital’ and delegitimise him in the broader community, within the security network it does not seem to be problematised.

The extent to which the state collaborates with other organisations or encourages civilians to assist in policing, take place in ways that are highly regulated, as it is a tricky area for the state to ensure that working within the security network strengthens the states legitimacy and doesn’t end up diminishing it.

#### 4.4.3 Regulation:

As argued by Diphorn and Kyed (2016: 719) “State regulation of the industry further attests to state legitimization of private security companies”. I would extend that argument to also include the other elements of the security network which are regulated, such as the patrollers. Following on from the discussion around the state’s encouragement of community policing, it needs to strike a delicate balance to ensure that it maintains control- and this is the role of regulation. As Jack, the co-director of ISP explained (Interview, 2020), the legal procedures for shooting someone are complex:

...that’s why there’s so much legislation over the guys on the CPF running around with guns. Because they don’t understand the ramification of if they cross that line, they’re in big big trouble. And the police don’t want to be seen as condoning the CPF running around with guns and responding to armed robberies, because if they do, and something goes wrong, then the members will say ‘well the police said I can do it’.

The patrollers (in one half of the neighbourhood) of Case A have been around for 6 years, and apparently, they were founded based on a shared understanding that the police could not be relied on. However, now the local station ‘has been cleaned up’ and has a new station commander.

“...and you know, the confidence in... (the local) station has grown the point where just 6 months ago, we actually took our entire lot of 55 patrollers and we just got vetted... to be patrollers. So SAPS has a thing where you have your neighbourhood watch right, and on an official basis, to get the backing of SAPS, all of your members

must be vetted as community patrollers.... and by doing that SAPS now are more willing to assist us when there is a situation”

(Interview with Ibrahim, 2019)

This quote shows that the police will work with the other organisations in the security network only if they play by the rules of the police. This process of vetting and registering as patrollers allows the police to have some degree of authority and control over the patrollers. In strengthening their relationships, it strengthens the legitimacy of the network. Patrollers are given legitimacy from the state, and are no longer seen as vigilantes, as they used to be seen by other community members, as an ex-patroller recalls “the patrollers used to attack, they used to attack quite a bit if they felt something wasn’t right, they would go straight in. And *ja*, so there was a lot of issues, they were calling us vigilantes, and all that” (Interview with Aunty Aaliah, 2019). The image of the patrollers has since changed and the wider community view them as more legitimate, which is likely due to their newfound relationship with the SAPS. (Diphorn, 2016: 17) discusses how the “...conceptual and perceptual difference between vigilantism and private security illustrates how state law defines particular sovereignties as illegal or legal...” where private security violence is seen as ‘permissible’ due to state regulations. This of course also applies to community patrollers, as is evident from the data in Case A.

The private security sector has many regulations attached to it. PSIRA stands for Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and is a “...state-led regulatory system that stipulates how the private security industry must operate and determines forms of (judicial) punishment in the event of misconduct.” (Diphorn, 2016:17). All private security companies have to be registered with it and comply to their rules, as does everyone working in security, along with other businesses. Even companies such as the Jewish Protection Agency in Case B who are not officially private security companies (they are a registered non-profit) need to be registered with PSIRA.

PSIRA was formed out of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act No.56 of 2001 in order to try and bring the industry under the state’s authority, and to function as a watchdog. PSIRA is one of many other ways in which the private security industry is regulated. Scholars (such as Diphorn, 2016 and Diphorn and Kyed, 2016) note that a large part of the reason the government supports the industry, aside from those mentioned, is that it is in line with its economic policies, and “...to acquire government support today, the discourse of private security has changed... it is now obtained by marketing security as a commodity” (Diphorn, 2016:52).

The data gathered in both case studies confirms the argument mentioned earlier, that state regulation is a way to legitimise the security network.

Jack, the director of ISP explains how his staff and company are regulated:

Jack: PSIRA governs us, but we answer to the police as well

Interviewer: So, you mentioned that a CPF patroller can't 'drive around with a gun'. So the reason that he can't, but a security reaction officer can, is because..?)

Jack: It's because, 'A', he is a registered security Guard with PSIRA. 'B', he has got his course for armed response and is entitled to carry a weapon. 'C', because we are a registered entity with the SA police as well...

Jack: All security companies need to have an institution code with the South African police, and that allows the security company to possess weapons and to issue weapons. All security companies *have to* be registered with PSIRA.

Although there is a key policy of encouraging community policing, the regulations are made in such a way that the state is far more supportive of coercive violence carried out by private security companies. Indeed, the data seems to show that "...the use of coercion by private security officers is... regarded as an extension or outsourcing of state coercion that operates within the legal parameters of the state" (Diphorn, 2016:17).

#### 4.5 Incorporation of consumers into network

...everyone is a potential securitising agent to differing degrees, as everyone is under the impression of security discourses and potentially, and often even unwillingly, reproduces them

(Schwell, 2015: 107)

The most obvious security providers in the security network are the private security companies (including armed response, guarding, or those selling technological products such as CCTV cameras), the police, official non-profit security organisations, and the community security volunteer groups. When begun this research, I had categorised potential participants into two categories; 'consumers' of security services, and 'providers' of security services, relating to one another in that consumers are 'community members' who are being provided with security from the various actors in the network. However, after looking at my data, I would now argue that those are not two distinct categories, since most of those whom I thought were 'consumers' are in fact themselves security providers as they are also a part of the network, and they also perform security functions.

Being a consumer works somewhat different in each of the two case studies. In Case A, the residential community, 'consumer' is a more literal term, as the majority of the community of residents pay for some of their security provision and are therefore connected to the security network primarily as clients. Though not all residents pay for private security, many are regarded as 'potential clients' according to the directors of ISP. The 'consumer's' relationship to other aspects of the security network such as the patrollers or police is of course different, and is more similar to Case B.

In Case B, the religious community, the consumers of security are just ordinary members of the Synagogue who do not pay for security directly. Some pay membership fees to the Synagogue which in turn is a client of the private security company, but as discussed, the private company is not a predominant feature of the security network. The services of the shul volunteer team, and of the JPA, are all free. Without a contractual relationship however, there is also less accountability.

The data that I gathered from both case studies shows the way in which ‘consumers’ of the network are absorbed into the network. The following is a field note from an interview, and a transcribed conversation from Case Study A.

Dorris is a journalist in her 60s. She doesn’t get very involved in the community. She is a client of ISP, and she said that she really trusts them, when she goes away she gives Jack (the boss) her keys. Apparently, she used to get into heated debates on the Emergency Telegram group, as she used to complain about the racism and racial profiling that she said occurred on the group, she tells me. She says that she doesn’t strongly identify as being part of ‘the community’, although she does seem to chat a lot on the community chat group. She told me that she has never even reported anything ‘suspicious’ on the Telegram group

However, this exchange took place on the ‘Emergency’ group:

Concerned Man : “Was followed early this morning in M\* road by a white fiesta with two men inside. Followed me all along B\* road as well. ISP, please be on lookout”

ISP Control Room : “Noted, we will keep an eye”

Dorris: “I saw a notice earlier from [a Neighbouring suburb] Facebook page about two men in a white Sandero trying to block a driveway. Maybe its the same pair and confused identification of the car?”

This very simple, helpful exchange on the neighbourhood ‘Emergency’ group does not paint a picture of Dorris as an active security provider. However, the exchange has shown that even Dorris forms part of a network of security, even if she would like to think she does not. She had assisted in sharing security information from one network platform (a Facebook group from a different suburb), to another platform (being the community emergency group of Uptown Park), and is advising fellow residents and the security company on what potential security threat to look out for, and contributing to the network’s ‘crime intelligence’ gathering through sharing that information, albeit in a way that’s likely not particularly helpful.

As ordinary people become more and more involved in the security network, their ideas around security are influenced accordingly. Chat-groups like in the example above are an important way in which messaging about security are sent out to the consumers. Mr Gilbert, an active security volunteer in ‘Uptown Park’ the suburb in Case A, explains how the community has become far more ‘security conscious’ in recent year.

Interviewer : “When you say that residents are involved, what are the factors that cause people to become more or less involved?”

Mr Gilbert: “We kind of drum it into them, because they have to be involved...”

Interviewer: How do you ‘drum it in’?

Mr Gilbert: “We try and get as many people to get involved. And those are the rules of the group (probably referring to the Telegram group). If you see something you must say something.”

The security network in both communities constantly gives out messaging as discussed, constantly sharing information about potential threats and encouraging people to become more ‘security conscious’ and to become generally more involved in security. Throughout my data collection process, ‘security conscious’ was a term I encountered a lot. Security providers were always telling community members to be more security-conscious, and community security volunteers were often very proud of how ‘security conscious’ the community that they serve had become. Whilst in the residential case it gets ‘drummed into them’, in the religious case Mary points out that ‘awareness of security’ gets “drilled into them”. Whilst being conscious of security concerns is something that takes place on an individual level, the security network is key in promoting it within both communities of study, and the incorporation of community members into the network is an important way in which it takes place.

Another example from Case A is that of Marlene, whom, compared to Dorris, is an even more active part of the security network.

Marlene is a middle-aged resident who loves her cats and has a part time job in the education sector. She considers herself to be a client of the private security company, although she points out that she only got the ‘cheap package’. Marlene sometimes likes to participate in the community mass patrols, where they all go in their own cars and drive around the suburb, communicating on the radio.

This participant is quite actively strengthening the visibility and presence of the local security network through her participation in the community mass patrols.

As demonstrated, in Case Study A, the various platforms for community participation and interaction, such as the Telegram groups or the community mass patrols are ways in which consumers can temporarily become active points in a wider network of security providers. Case study B also has similar platforms for participation, but in addition it also has different ways of incorporating consumers into the network. Recruiting volunteers to the security team is one way of trying to incorporate them, either through word of mouth or weekly announcements at the end of the prayer services. Similar to that of Case A, joining the team is a way in which consumers can feel a sense of connection or belonging, as will be discussed further in the next chapter. However, unlike Uptown Park, joining the team is not a temporary once-off way of participating in the security network, rather it’s a complete incorporation into a key node in the network.

In addition, there is a weekly Jewish Newspaper which is given out for free in many Jewish spaces around Gauteng including in the entrance hall of the Synagogue. The newspaper has many articles about threats and things to look out for, and constantly advises that anything ‘suspicious’ should be reported to the Jewish Protection Agency<sup>76</sup>. By telling ordinary ‘consumers’ what to look out for and where to report it, ‘consumers’ can be turned into security providers within the network, in a similar way to Dorris sharing crime information on the chat group in Case A. Newspaper articles are also an important way in which consumers are encouraged to be more security conscious.

An article published in 2014 in the local Jewish newspaper illustrates the similar process of the security networks trying to incorporate those they deem as community members (the concept of which will be explored in the next chapter) into the network as follows:

When asked what we can all do to assist, Kregel's message was clear: Vigilance and awareness. Suspicious vehicles, suspicious people and anyone taking photos of installations, needs to be reported immediately. We know our areas, we know who belongs and we need to take advantage of that knowledge.

(Feldman, 2014).

Kregel, who was interviewed in the article, was the chairman of an institution called ‘The South African Jewish Board of Deputies’ (SAJBD). The SAJBD is a Jewish and arguably Zionist advocacy and lobby group, which according to participants, has a somewhat tense relationship with the leadership of the shul in Case study B. Nevertheless, this extract also highlights that this specific security network also includes what might be seen as ‘non-security’ organisations. As a community member, when you are looking out for something suspicious, (and understanding suspicious based on what kind of messaging you receive from the security network, which will be covered more in chapter 6) and reporting it to JPA, you are acting as an informant and support of the security network, thus participating in the security network, rather than merely a consumer of security.

The very visible presence of the security volunteer team, combined with messaging that takes place within Jewish networks is the main way that community members in Case B get connected to the security network. It seems however, that this connection is to much less of an extent than in Case A. While many Synagogue community members have the contact number of JPA saved on their phone, they are mostly members who frequent other spaces such as sending their children to the Jewish schools where this gets “drilled into them” (interview with Mary) much more than it does at The Synagogue. Many consumers are not really involved in the local network in Case B, according to Mary who is a highly trained shul volunteer and member of JPA “I think most people in our community do understand the need for security, but sometimes they just think it’s a bit superfluous and over the top, they think

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<sup>76</sup> For example, Belling (2016).

‘well why does somebody have to question me’... I think there are a lot of people at our shul who are not security conscious”.

All the above examples illustrate the ways in which ‘consumers’ or civilians or ‘community members’ have become incorporated into the security networks and often play a quasi-security-provider role. Being a part of the security network naturally results in the network being seen as legitimate to those individuals who are involved. There is therefore a strong effort on the part of actors in the security network to try and ‘educate’ or encourage more people to ‘become security conscious’. In the residential case the security network has been far more successful at incorporating the community into the security network, particularly through opportunities for participation such as the community mass patrols, and most notably the Telegram and Whatsapp groups which are a key tool of the security networks, and in which the whole ‘community’ can participate. In the religious case, although the security network also tried to institutionalise the security consciousness of the community and to incorporate the community, there are less platforms for community involvement in the security network.

#### 4.6 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has shown how the security networks are made up of different groups making up the nodes or points within the network, such as the public police, formally and informally constituted volunteer groups, both corporate and non-profit private companies, and even regulating bodies such as PSIRA, official ‘community’ bodies, whatsapp groups, and many others. They are connected to each other in a variety of ways, formally and informally. Section 4.3 shows how, although there are some tensions between the different organisations, the tensions seem to be managed in such a way that most relationships are cooperative and end up reinforcing the legitimacy of the network. In Case A there are far more tensions in the network, but there are various informal understandings and means to cooperate, resulting in the strengthening of the legitimacy of the network as a whole, as argued by Dupont (2004) that “...since all actors have invested heavily to enter the network, they have a vested interest in its preservation...”. In Case B, whilst there are tensions, organisations like the JPA dominate to such an extent that other nodes in the network have to collaborate with them.

Section 4.4 discussed how the pre-existing legitimacy of the state can enhance the legitimacy of the whole network, which it does through varying practices. Section 4.5 showed how the security network also gets further legitimised due to the way that it has actively incorporated civilians into it, and in particular, it showed how connecting ‘communities’ to the security network contributes to the process of institutionalising a security consciousness, evident in both the religious and residential communities. Whilst the residential community relied on interventions by the security network to create platforms in which to incorporate the consumers, such as the security Telegram groups and the mass patrols, in the



religious community there were existing community platforms such as newspapers, or Jewish schools, which were then utilised by the security networks.

# Chapter 5: ‘Community’ Security

## 5.1 Introduction

The last chapter segment discussed the way in which ordinary people or ‘the community’ have become incorporated into the network of security. This chapter interrogates the concept of ‘community’. It will first unpack the concept of ‘community’ and how it is subjectively understood by participants, and create a working definition. It will then show how each community can be understood as a network of social relations. Since the previous chapter already established that the community is connected to the security network, I will show how ideas can be shared between the security network and the ‘community network’. Finally, it will discuss how ideas of community and security get tangled, through various processes through which the security network gets legitimised

### Defining Community

As noted in the literature review section, Bauman (2001) argues that ‘community’ is something many long for, but in reality, it doesn’t exist in the present. Nevertheless ‘community’ as a concept is important. As argued by Comaroff and Comaroff (2016: 185) the era of neoliberalism has resulted in many institutions being ‘returned to the community’, as responsibility has been outsourced from the government. They argue that ‘community’ has become “the signifier of the private sphere collectivized”. Understanding the concept is also important since discourse around ‘community’ is often drawn on in order to legitimise certain organisations in the security network (Diphooorn and Kyed, 2016). It is therefore important not only to define the concept, but also to understand how the research participants define it themselves.

In both case studies, the word ‘community’ was used often such as in newsletters, newspapers, interviews, and online communication platforms. My research participants defined ‘the community’ in slightly different ways. In Case A, most defined it as being residents of the suburb of Uptown Park (‘residents’ in the narrow, officially-documented sense, meaning tenants and homeowners, rather than homeless people who stay in the area, nor people employed in domestic work who reside on their employers property). This definition of community also didn’t include people who came to the suburb to work. For others, it could be a bit broader. Mr Gilbert mentioned that “If someone, say from Sandton, was driving through the suburb and they had a car accident... we will go help re-direct traffic, we will go help, and assist if medical attention is needed”, and thus his definition of community included an element of being area-specific, but likely included an element of social class-camaraderie since he chose to mention the affluent neighbourhood of Sandton specifically.

Aunty Aaliah defined community slightly differently. She was very connected to some Muslim community networks, and seemed to define community broader than the area, as she mentioned how

since the suburb was near a cemetery, the security volunteers would also assist with Muslim funerals for people from outside of the area, helping not only with security but also with filling the graves.

Marlene makes it clear that to be considered part of the community, not only do you have to have a lease or title deeds, but you also have to subscribe to certain values and behaviour, such as tranquillity and cleanliness:

You know, if people want to live here, whoever you are, we don't really care, I mean we are not going to say you have to be this or you have to be that, but you just have to not be dumping, and fighting and stabbing people and various other things, and if we can sort of raise the, um.. have the whole neighbourhood that wants to keep the neighbourhood clean and a really lovely place to live, then whoever you are that's fine.

The definition that I chose to take from looking at all the interview and observation data, is that most people subscribe to an idea of 'community' that is made up of formally documented residents of a similar socio-economic class, and therefore those with somewhat similar aspirations for how to shape their community and therefore their security. These include particular ideas of cleanliness, law-and-order and abiding by rules, activities that bring those members together and a desire for more connection between them.

In the Synagogue case, 'community' is defined by some participants as being 'paid-up members' of the shul, and others include people who often come to shul, even non-Jewish guests. Others look more at what they call 'the South African Jewish Community' as a whole, which comes with its own contradictions and complications. Others take a narrower position, where community is defined both by membership to the shul, as well as ideological positioning - as there are deep political 'left' and 'right' divides and so some participants only consider politically-aligned shul members to be their community, but might include others from outside the shul. The easiest and most common definition, that I will therefore use, is to keep the idea of community as Synagogue membership, which also has associations of a shared identity and particular practices of Judaism.

## 5.2 Community as a network

The 'communities' that I studied are people who are connected not only by a shared postal code as is the case in Case Study A, or by paying membership fees to the Synagogue in Case Study B - but they are also connected through a network of interpersonal relationships, of what Granovetter (1973) referred to as 'weak ties' in that there is a loose connection between most people. If one understands each 'community' as a *'network' of relationships*, then it is possible to apply Granovetter's theories for how ideas can be spread through the community. This section will therefore explain how each 'community' of study can be understood as a community network, which has implications for how the security networks in each community get legitimised.

Granovetter (1973: 1376) insists that a network is about *ties* rather than about whom you might *choose* to spend time with. Both case studies have communities made up of a network of people who fit into that definition, since they are not communities of friends, and in fact they are communities of people who often don't particularly like each other<sup>77</sup>, but they nevertheless spend time together. In case study A, the residential group, most of the time that they spend together is online or virtual, through the WhatsApp, Telegram, and Facebook groups. When analysing the groups, it was evident that there were many fights, disagreements and tensions, and the interviews confirmed that most people did not know each other personally offline. Yet the majority seemed to subscribe to the idea that they are a community. In Case study B, most people spend some degree of time together physically, in the same building, even if they don't really know each other personally outside of their circles of friends and family.

Many people being connected to one another through invisible ties to each other - such as through one person who knows someone who knows someone who knows someone else, or 'knowing of' someone by sharing a space with them, either physically or virtually, and sharing some interests - can be understood as a network of (both weak and strong) personal ties. This network of personal relationships can be understood as a 'community', particularly combined with other aspects that might make a 'community' such as shared subscription to a niche way of practicing a religion with some shared customs, or a way of identifying with one another through some constructed form of fraternity.

Understanding a 'community' as *a network of personal relationships* can explain how ideas can get spread, which might help to explain why the 'community' can give the security network so much legitimacy.

5.2.1 Case A in relation to Case B- relationship between 'security network' and 'community network'  
Regarding the spread of security ideas through the 'community network', it is important to then understand how the 'community network' of interpersonal relationships is connected to the 'security network' of security actors. The differences between the cases are significant. In Case A, there is far more overlap between the security network and the network of 'community' members, since there are more options for resident participation in security such as the mass patrols, the radios, and the security-focused Telegram and WhatsApp groups.

In Case B, although the 'community network' has stronger ties, the connections with the security network are less direct. Only a handful of members are security volunteers, and the processes whereby the community has been incorporated into the security network (discussed earlier) has not been fully

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<sup>77</sup> (as was evident from a number of disputes in both cases, as well as interview data),

institutionalised – the majority of community members do not directly participate in the security network. The implications of this will be explored throughout the chapter.




Figure 9 In Case B, the community network is only indirectly connected to the security network



Figure 10: In Case A, the ‘Emergency’ Telegram/ WhatsApp groups forms a key connection between the community network and security network

### 5.2.2 Case B: The Synagogue – religious community

In Case B, the ‘community network’ exists in a way that is somewhat independent from the security network. The ‘community network’ is connected to the *security* network through certain key people, particularly security volunteers, as well as through people who might be connected via other external organisations (such as a Jewish school or a Jewish or Zionist communal body). These individuals form key links between the broader community and the security network. The local Jewish newspaper is one such way that community networks and the security network are indirectly yet significantly connected, as the newspaper gives a generous amount of coverage to the security network, and is part of promoting the idea that institutions such as the JPA, or even private security companies operating in Jewish areas, such as CAP, are part of the ‘broader Jewish community’. For example, an article by the editor reads “For the most part, most of our community leads amazing lives. What’s more, the community has created a supportive environment so we don’t have to stress too much... we have organisations like [JPA] and CAP that ensure we are physically secure and protected...”<sup>78</sup>

One participant had a very critical view the role of the local Jewish newspaper (the Jewish Report) and radio station (Chai FM). This participant suggested that the presence of a large amount of security at the Synagogue might cause panic to some community members, because “...people who are not

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<sup>78</sup> Jewish community newspaper article, 2020. Proper citation is not possible for anonymity concerns.

politically sophisticated might be worried, because they might think ‘why do we need so much security!?’ Then they go and read the Jewish Report and listen to Chai FM and think ‘everybody is out to get us!’... I think there is a lot of fearmongering in the Jewish Report, I think it comes from the Zionist Federation...” This also shows the role of these community media platforms in promoting security consciousness along with fear.

Within the Synagogue, people are connected by sitting next to each other during the prayer services or during meals. Some have attended the same events or talks, others are connected from outside of the synagogue structure. Many people who do not attend shul very often know someone who does, and that is how they are linked to the community-network. There is a very strong community identity - even people who only attend shul once a year on special occasions, still identify with it and consider it to be their community.

When asked whether security could ‘build community’, such as the way it seems to do so in the residential case, participants had different responses.

Interviewer: Do you think common security concerns have brought the community together at all?

Shoshana: No. Well, um, it’s brought together the people who identify as right wing. It gives them an identity.

Interviewer: In what way?

Shoshana: Especially from their training, which solidified it as a group, which they are always trying to expand.

This extract (together with observation data) shows how the people who are more directly involved with the security network are a small close-knit group. Yet as they form part of the wider community, they are also instrumental in spreading ideas regarding security to the whole synagogue community.

### 5.2.3 Case A: Uptown Park- residential community

In Case Study A, however, the ‘community network’ is connected to the security network much more directly. Many of the ways in which the residents were transformed from merely being residents into a ‘community’ was due to interventions of the security network, as will be discussed more in the next section. The community ‘networking’ started when some residents decided to create a neighbourhood WhatsApp group for security reasons - to alert each other to emergencies. According to Mr Gilbert: “Before the WhatsApp groups, I didn’t know my neighbours... so we just did it because we needed to know our neighbours. Now, this must be the only suburb that I know of where I know almost everyone, not just my direct neighbours”

Later interventions such as the Telegram ‘Emergency’ and ‘Noticeboard’ groups, created by the private security company, allowed residents of Uptown Park to connect with one another and become much more linked and networked. The ‘community’ being a network of interpersonal relationships, seemed

to clearly grow out of the security initiatives – before the initial WhatsApp group, they were merely disconnected residents, now they are a ‘community’. This has significant effects for how the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘security’ are understood in relation to one another, which section 5.3 will explore.

### 5.3 Spread of (security) ideas through community network:

As many scholars have shown<sup>79</sup>, ideas about security, such as shared understandings about what does and doesn’t constitute a security issue, and what is and isn’t an acceptable security presence or an appropriate security response to a situation, are subjective and constructed understandings. How people talk to each other plays a particularly important role. As argued by Caldeira (2000: 19,20)

It is in... everyday exchanges that opinions are formed and perceptions shaped: that is, the talk of crime is not only expressive but productive... Talk and fear organize everyday strategies of protection and reaction that restrict people's movements and shrink their universe of interactions. Moreover, the talk of crime exacerbates violence by legitimating private or illegal reactions...

As has been demonstrated, there are ‘communities’ made up of networks of people who have what Granovetter (1973) calls ‘weak ties’, connected in a network. In addition, these community networks are connected to the security networks through both direct and indirect personal ties and shared platforms of communication. This has implications for how ideas about security are spread *from the security networks*, throughout the ‘community network’.

The influence of the security network on shaping these ideas and sharing them throughout the network of community ties affects how people understand the concept of ‘security’. Ideas spread quite quickly through the community, as Granovetter (1973: 1366) had proved, “...whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance... when passed through weak ties rather than strong”. This gives the security networks the ability to widely transmit messages which paint them as legitimate. Messages which make people feel fearful, uncertain, and worried that they will be victims, serve to legitimise the presence, the size, and the actions of the security networks (Caldeira, 2000). Interpersonal networks have also been proven to be an important influence in the purchasing decisions around private security. As Loader et al. (2015:863) show “It appears... that the purchase of security takes place, not by way of advertising, branding and promotions on the part of sellers or ‘shopping around’ on the part of buyers, but via recommendations transmitted through informal networks”. If personal networks can influence ideas such as which company is the best to enter into a contract with, they will likely influence ideas around security more broadly.

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<sup>79</sup> Including Glück and Low, 2017; Ivasiuc, 2015; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016 ;Loader and Walker, 2007 ;Schwell, 2015. See Conceptual Framework

I argue that the ideas that people share about security, influenced by the messaging from security networks, contribute to the way in which both fear and a ‘security consciousness’ have become institutionalised. This is made clearer through the data and will be shown in a few examples.

An example of messaging from the security networks affecting ordinary people’s ideas of security and sense of safety can be illustrated by this quote from Dorris (2019):

I’m more scared than I used to be, and I’ve never been scared, but these days, I think because of what happens everywhere else and not necessarily near us. They tend to say things in the local free paper such as “an elderly divorcee living on her own was attacked or killed” or whatever. And elderly now applies to me, I’m 69, and so that kind of woman they are talking about is a “me.

Local newspapers are a source of ‘community’ information sharing, where both ‘ordinary’ community members, as well as those involved in the security networks, can contribute to articles and letters and stories. As is illustrated, messages from the security networks that spread to community members through the paper contribute to the existing fear, anxiety, and safety concerns that residents have, making them more scared, and making them feel like they need to become more connected to the security network. Once someone has an idea, such as those above, like ‘I am a likely victim of a horrible, violent robbery’, those ideas can then be easily transmitted through the community networks, which explains why many might have similar ideas. Newspapers and WhatsApp groups are platforms for mass-communication within the community, and ways to spread ideas within the community.

Ideas about security can be spread from resident to resident, without the direct intervention of the formal security network. Marlene, upon discussing Uptown Park generally, and the community participation, after talking about the different coffee shops, she then described a neighbour, Joyce\*.

The person who lives there on the corner... I’ve never actually seen what she looks like, but she is quite prolific on one of the groups. She will often say ‘the trolley pushers are here sorting the rubbish or leaving it all lying around, or there’s dumping, illegal dumping, or there’s four drunk people hitting each other or whatever, so there is always another set of eyes

This description of Joyce’s contribution shows that Marlene values her input, and pays attention to what she says on the Telegram group, even though she doesn’t know her. Marlene is likely quite influenced by Joyce’s ideas. For example, even though the waste pickers or ‘trolley pushers’ are not usually in Marlene’s street, meaning she has limited interactions with them, she now has a concern about them due to what Joyce has reported. Therefore, Marlene also seems to think that the ‘trolley pushers’ often make a mess. This small example shows the effect of networks of weak ties and spreading ideas. Ideas around fear and informal recyclers will be discussed in the next section.



The same applies to Case Study B, the Synagogue community, where the Jewish community newspaper prints an array of fearful things, and insists that “Your security and the security of your family and your community is your responsibility – act on anything that is suspicious” (Belling, 2016)

By asking people to be constantly looking out for anything ‘suspicious’, security consciousness becomes further entrenched. The respective community newspapers in both case studies publish not only numerous stories about crime, attacks, and fearful situations but they also give plenty of appreciation and platforms to the main actors in the security network. For instance, in the local paper in Uptown Park, the director of ISP was one of the nominees for the newspaper’s ‘person of the year’ award.

Besides newspapers, newsletters, and community Telegram groups, there are other ways that security ideas can be disseminated through community networks. Particularly in a ‘community’ made up of many different personal ties, such as the Jewish community. As Steinberg (2008:163) noted in his account of the formation of the public-space-policing company that was started by the organised Jewish community within the suburb of Glenhazel, his interview participant states “...we opened up our networks. Eighty five percent of Glenhazel is Jewish. You can open up a grapevine very quickly”.

In both communities of study, the two main ways in which security ideas were spread was firstly, via newspapers, chat groups, and other media platforms, and secondly, through the community ‘grapevines’ particularly via the community members who are part of the security network as volunteers. A number of the messages that are given out through these information transmission channels includes messaging that associates the idea of ‘community’ with a specific understanding of security, the topic of the next section.

#### 5.4 The tangling of security and community: Institutionalising security consciousness

Bénit-Gbaffou (2008:13) points out that

The ‘sense of neighbourliness’ does not have the same meaning, nor the same importance, in communities marked by poverty and uncertainty (where the neighbour constitutes a form of safety net), and in richer neighbourhoods (where neighbourliness can be created occasionally to tackle a specific problem such as an upsurge in crime or a problem of street maintenance).

Although ‘a sense of neighbourliness’ or ‘community’ is therefore not essential in richer areas, it still seems to be deeply desired, particularly since community is an idea associated with safety (Bauman, 2001). However, according to Bauman, when people don’t know what to do to make them feel safer from all the fears and anxieties they have, whether global, local, environmental, personal, and the

like...“they invest their last pennies in the safety of their bodies, their possessions, their street...the shelter they are after they call 'community'. The 'community' they seek stands for a burglar-free and stranger-proof safe environment'. 'Community' stands for isolation, separation, protective walls, and guarded gates” (Bauman, 2006:113-114).

Understanding the connotations that become culturally associated with ‘community’ is important in understanding how the concept might be utilised to legitimise the security network, as it has been in other empirical work (such as Diphorn and Kyed, 2016; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006). It is also notable that ‘community’ often has elements of exclusion tied into it (Bauman, 2001; Dirsuweit 2007). The data from my research shows that ‘community’ and ‘security’ were often quite closely related. Whilst discourses on ‘security’ was often a way of talking about staying safe from that which is threatening, I noticed that ‘security’ has also become such an integral part of life, and of ‘communal life’ in particular, that it has become hard to know what is and is not a security issue.

Notably, the idea of ‘security consciousness’ discussed in the previous chapter, is one of the important ways in which ‘security’ becomes entangled with articulations of ‘community’. This is because being ‘security conscious’ is presented as becoming part of the community and protecting the community; the need to “look out for one another” as one participant put it. This chapter argues that this security consciousness is not merely as it is described on an individual, voluntary level but has in fact become institutionalised. A key reason for the institutionalisation of security consciousness is that ‘security’ has become so tied to understandings and practices of ‘community’. It is likely that the security networks have actively worked to institutionalise ‘security consciousness’ amongst the communities, due to the way in which ‘institutionalised security consciousness’ is a key part in legitimising the security networks authority, as will be demonstrated through the data.

#### 5.4.1 Security Providers become community providers

Security providers are those tasked with the provision and enforcement of security for the community. The security providers that make up the security network include foot guards, armed response officers, armed and unarmed security volunteers and patrollers, and police officers. For many of these security providers, however, their role also seems to encompass far more than that, as their role shifts to fill a need for a ‘community’ feeling. Security providers play a key role in merging understandings of community with understandings of security, on the micro level of the every day.



*Figure 11 Anonymised  
Screenshot taken from the  
monthly newsletter of ISP*

The private security company, which I have named ‘Integrated Suburb Patrols’ (ISP) in the residential case study offer what they call ‘additional value-added services’. One such service that you can request is for ISP to send their (trained, armed, tactical reaction officers who patrol the neighbourhood) to come to your house to feed your dog when you are on holiday. According to the co-director of the company “That is the personalised service we offer them. When our clients go on holiday and you have to put your pets in a shelter its very traumatising. So we allow our clients to have their pets on their premises and we go in, feed their pets, water their plants, all those kinds of things we do”. She also mentioned that people sometimes call her and ask her to send someone to fix a punctured car tyre, and other such issues. The company then starts to be associated in the resident’s mind as the go-to for anything that they might need help with. Indeed, this is also confirmed by interviews with residents, such as Dorris, who asked them to come and help her fix the cover of her car-port or help her remove a dead-bird from her garden. Although the examples might be unique to this case study, the general practice is not. As noted by Diphoorn and Kyed (2016: 714) “...Private Security Companies in South Africa articulate notions of community to create and attract collective clients...”

The nostalgia for community, according to Bauman (2001: 2), is the desire for the neighbourly help that doesn’t quite exist. “In a community we can count on each other's good will. If we stumble and fall, others will help us to stand on our feet again. Our duty, purely and simply, is to help each other, and so our right, purely and simply, is to expect that the help we need will be forthcoming”. Instead of asking your ‘community’, such as your neighbours to feed your pets, fix your garage, help change your tyre, you get to feel the sense of ‘community’ good-will from your security providers.

Regarding case study B, this blurring of the role of security providers is less evident, yet it still remains a feature. According to participants, historically there used to be a ‘welcoming committee’ that stood at the entrance gate to the synagogue to welcome attendees. It was this very welcoming committee that then transformed into what is now the security team.

A field note that I took after a shift at the gate, when I was doing participant observation as a security volunteer, reads:

Many of the older shul-goers stop their cars to greet us, and have a chat with the guys who are on shift with me. I imagine this is because they remember the era of the ‘welcoming committee’... Particularly since they have never been regarded as suspicious, they seem rather unaware that the members standing at the gate are there in a capacity as security providers.

Even though the role of the security team is, in essence, to decide who is *not* to be welcomed onto the property, they also fulfil the role of a nostalgic ideal of community, that is the function of ‘welcoming’.

These two examples illustrate the manifold and unclear roles of security providers, particularly how that role is regarded as very important to the community, and contributing to the community beyond just providing security. Both examples highlight a ‘community feel’, the nostalgic ‘community’ conception of your neighbour ‘popping in’ to feed your cat while you are away, or the equally nostalgic feeling of walking into your spiritual home and being welcomed warmly into your community as you enter the gates, both show how security has merged with ‘community’. These examples have also shown how the idea of providing security is not just about protection from threats, and so it raises the question as to what providing security actually means.

Therefore, the line between what is and isn’t a security issue has gotten so blurred that its almost disappeared. This is significant if one looks at the literature on security, as the implications of calling something a ‘security issue’ means that there can be a ‘security response’ to it. Speech act theory says that “framing something as a ‘security’ issue allows things that might ordinarily be politically untenable to become not only thinkable but widely acceptable...” (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016:5). This means that an action perceived as being for security measures is seen as legitimate, even if such an action (such as an arrest or a shooting) is not acceptable otherwise. I argue that by blurring the boundaries between what is ‘security’ and what is ‘community’, then ‘security’ begins to seem less and less like an abnormal, crisis-situation and becomes normal and even warm and comforting. This normalises and legitimises the presence of armed security providers in every-day life. Being warmly greeted at the gates of a prayer-house by a potentially armed man becomes normal, as does having an armed stranger enter your house to water your plants. The role of security providers has expanded beyond merely being there to protect property and lives, but also to protect the fragile construct of ‘community’. There is also more acceptance that security providers have multifaceted roles to play in communal life, which therefore grants them more authority and legitimacy over more than just what might have traditionally been thought of as ‘security issues’.

#### 5.4.2 ‘Community’ gets built around ‘security’

As argued by Bauman (2001) people desire community because they desire a broad sense of existential security and belonging, but since they don’t know how to get that ‘ontological security’ (Walker and Loader; 2007; Marks and Steinberg, 2014) nor that ‘community’ feel, they start to build community based on a narrow definition of security, which becomes a “fortress under siege” (Bauman, 2001: 141).

An extreme way in which this is done can be seen through enclosing neighbourhoods, such as in the work of Dirsuweit (2007:61). She illustrated how “in creating a normative inside and the threat of the abnormalised outside, road closures...offer a very powerful means of securing ontological certainty.

Attendant to this sense of ontological security within the road closure has been a renewed sense of community” Since a community or a fortress will always have an inside and an outside, this section argues that both ‘belonging’ as well as ‘non-belonging’ serve different roles in legitimising the security networks.

### **The desire to belong**

As discussed, scholars such as Bauman (2001) have argued that the modern western world is one where people are anxious, isolated, not in control, and existentially insecure, and this condition even applies to very privileged people. Therefore, to feel safer is also to want to belong and feel like a part of a community. Since security is so intertwined with community, joining in security practices is often a way in which people find belonging and community.

In Case A, George Gilbert is a resident who is a security volunteer and is very active on the Telegram groups, and is the main administrator of the groups. His involvement in the security network in this way has given him a sense of belonging in community.

And now I've got people who drive past and see me in the shops and they say ‘hello George’ that's the weird thing, they know me but I don't know them. Well I know them but they will mention me by name, but I haven't seen their pictures specifically.

In Case B, the same can be said for Mary and her husband, who moved to South Africa in 2001.

We were new, we were looking at ways of getting involved, and getting to know people since we didn't know anybody, so we started [Jewish Protection Agency] training quickly.

Their involvement with security also gave them a sense of belonging and a sense of community.

Another example from Case B, was Shoshana’s opinion on why people dedicate so much time to the synagogue volunteer team, referencing one volunteer in particular.

I think the JPA training is feeding into men wanting to feel macho, to feel that they are protecting people. Until he joined the JPA, he was just another nebbish<sup>80</sup> at the shul. Now he is a ‘somebody’.

All these examples illustrate the ways in which individuals are brought into the security network out of their desire for community, specifically to be known and recognised within the community. Scholars have pointed out that involvement in security initiatives can create an even wider sense of belonging- “... where active involvement in crime control constitutes a criterion for being seen as a “good citizen” (Diphorn, 2016 :8). Steinberg and Marks (2014) also claim that security can lead to greater citizenship. They too looked specifically at the communal security initiatives created by ‘organised Jewry’, and have argued that whilst aiming to protect ‘its own community’- and therefore distancing itself from

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<sup>80</sup> A Yiddish word which can be loosely translated to mean ‘a pathetic nobody’.

wider society - 'organised Jewry' was compelled to share its security with others- and thus its sense of national belonging paradoxically increased.

There are other ways that security creates a sense of community. For instance, in the residential case, the nostalgic way that community is remembered and desired is seen to have been destroyed by crime and insecurity, for which greater presence of the security networks is posited as the solution.

As Ibrahim recalls

But growing up I grew up in a very community- based life, where you could just walk down to your friend's house at lunch time, and the mom puts out a plate for you... now in [Uptown Park] we have pretty much reached the point where... kids are free to run around. Just driving here this morning there was a dad walking down the road with two kids on their bicycles, without a care in the world

In Johannesburg, the lack of safety people feel is a reality that many share, and many participants in both case studies posited that feeling safer would allow them to have more interactions with others. Whilst everyone agrees that that is true, one participant from the religious case, Moira, a former chairperson, explained that there are two different routes that one can take – 'securitization', or "a dream of openness and cultural diversity", a dichotomy that might be more applicable to the religious than the residential community.

In Case A many of the community-building activities open to all 'residents', are based around security. It is however important to note that when 'community' is built through participation in security, it has crucial implications. It raises the question about the type of community that gets built around security.

According to Veronica from Integrated Suburb Patrols, the 'mass patrol' that the ordinary community members take part in, all driving in their own car following the Police, Security, and CPF, is an exciting and momentous occasion for the community not only to unite, but to showcase that it is united. She says "It's like an orchestra of lights. It is *fantastic!* It's something that is just, you know, it's the community coming together."

Unlike Case B, which has a range of community activities around cultural or religious programs, in Case A there don't seem to be any other opportunities for the community to 'come together' that exist outside of the security networks. Even the annual Halloween party for the community is not only organised by key members of the security network, but it is also there to promote the security network, as was discussed in chapter 4, where private companies are actively involved along with patrollers, and children can climb in a police van.

In Case B, although there are far more opportunities for community-building in the Synagogue that are separate from the security-networks, some argue that security has brought the community together in a

particular way. Moira expressed that security has indeed brought the community together to some extent, in that “it has given us something of an inward-looking focus” which she was concerned about. She also expressed how it has divided the community, yet she insisted that it was much better for the security providers to be members, as did a security volunteer, Mary. Mary argues that “we are actually the best people to look after ourselves... we know each other, we know the community...” Since the security volunteer team are considered to be insiders, compounded by their use of discourse such as “look after ourselves” and “the community”, security comes to be deeply interwoven in the fabric of the community. Most notably, the way that ‘community’ is built around security is as a response to fears, anxieties, and insecurities, which the next section will address.

### **Non-belonging: keeping ‘us’ safe from them**

Community plays a significant role in the legitimisation of security networks. As argued by Diphoorn (2016:14) “...claims to sovereignty are essentially about creating communities and constructing social borders – violence is the means by which these borders and these communities are enforced and created”. This is what Kyed and Albrecht (2015) refer to as ‘boundary work’- the separation between insiders and outsiders – since creating a community of insiders ultimately leads to the creation of those deemed to be outside. When discourse around community is tied in with security, it is often used in a way that is exclusionary. The literature points to the particular ways in which this plays out in the suburbs such as Ballard (2004), or Clarno (2013: 1199) who explains that “Many residents of the northern suburbs no longer identify their neighbourhoods in explicitly racial terms; rather they invest the space with a set of middle-class values and find alternative means of determining who belongs and who does not”.

The scenario of the ‘clean-up’ of the ‘vlei’<sup>81</sup> illustrates the exclusionary effects of ‘community’. This is a text from a member of the ‘sector security forum committee’ (emphasis in original):

Thank you to all that came to assist in the cleanup this morning.... we managed to show the people living in the vlei that we are united in finding a solution and cleaning up the area from all the recycling collectors that are using the vlei as their personal sorting plant and leaving hundreds of plastics and metals in the vlei and in the stream.

we found about 16 people in the vlei, and only 1 of those was interested in moving to a safer place. the others were upset that we wanted to clean the vlei as they want to carry on living there and recycling in the reeds. One was aggressive and will be monitored if he returns as he may not be a collector....

As we have upset many of the recycle collectors / vagrants / possible criminals, i would like to PLEASE ask all to be EXTRA vigilant for the next few days and CALL FOR HELP if you find things out of place, as some may retaliate and petty crime / opportunistic crime may increase.

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<sup>81</sup> The ‘vlei’ refers to the river/park area that runs through the suburb.

The invitation on the Telegram group that was sent the day before, reads as follows:

Community Vlei Clean Up, with assistance from JMPD, SAPS, Pikitup - we need the community to join hands, and help us clean up our Vlei...

Bring: \*a laugh\*, a flask of coffee and some \*cookies\*, and a sense of \*community spirit\*

Task: To take back our Vlei and make it a place we can use without fear or restriction.

The 'community' clearly refers to only certain people and is utilised to unite those people against other people, who are deemed to be a threat. By saying that "*we managed to show the people living in the vlei that we are united in finding a solution and cleaning up the area from all the recycling collectors*", it is clear that the 'we' who are united, are residents that would like the vlei to cater to their needs and desires, rather than to the needs of the 'other', in this case being defined as either 'people living in the vlei' or the 'recycling collectors'. The invitation notes that the task is: "*To take back our Vlei and make it a place we can use without fear or restriction*". Therefore, 'the community' want to be able to use the vlei in a way that it meets their needs, probably as a place to walk their dogs, go jogging, and the like, and therefore require that they 'take it back' away from the current occupants of the vlei who would like to use it to meet their needs, seemingly as a place to sleep and to sort the recycling that they collected. It is ironic that they are claiming a desire to turn the vlei into "*a place we can use without fear or restriction*", as the means to do so involve a restriction on the use of it for those deemed to be the 'non-community'.

Contributing even further to the argument that 'community' is intertwined with 'security', and that discourses of one are used to strengthen the agenda of the other, the last few lines of the quote is telling. Note that this message was not sent by someone in their capacity as a resident or community-organiser but was officially sent from an organisation in the security network. Firstly, one of the men who was removed from the public land responded 'aggressively', the message states. This response of his was then escalated to create suspicion around him, and so residents are told that he will be monitored and that he may not be a recycling collector. The member of the security network then proceeds to brand the vlei occupants with a series of ever worsening labels, which can be understood as false equivalents, increasing from '*recycle collectors*' to '*vagrants*' and then to '*possible criminals*'. In particular their potential for criminality is explained as "*some may retaliate and petty crime / opportunistic crime may increase*". Although this kind of crime is not the crime that most participants mentioned being very scared of, (they are more worried about violent, armed, organised break-ins ) it feeds into an existing social order whereby "... the fear of crime is a tool of reactionary politics, whereby residents of formal areas are posited as innocent law-abiding citizens struggling not to drown in 'a tidal-wave of crime'. (Ballard, 2004: 68) Indeed, a problematic discourse around crime being associated with informal dwellers is not unique to Uptown Park (Ballard, 2004). The presence of these people who are deemed to be outsiders, does not really seem to pose a threat of physical harm, rather it seems to threaten certain



values of the 'community' insiders, such as environmental consciousness and cleanliness, as well as threatening aspects of their lifestyle like as their enjoyment of public parks. It also seems to threaten their sense of ownership of the park, in that they feel like the public park 'belongs' to them, and not to the recyclers, as is notable from the phrase '*take back our vlei*'. Ballard (2004: 54), in his paper on the perceptions of affluent white Durban residents on informal settlements, also argued that it threatens their 'sense of place', specifically "their middle-class lifestyle". Therefore, these threats that the vlei-dwellers pose, even if they are not about a fear of physical harm, seem to warrant a 'security response' due to the entanglement of concepts of community and of security, and due to the way that fear and security consciousness has been institutionalised.

In my participant observation in Case B, where I stood shift at the synagogue entrance, I also noticed a similar pattern whereby the response of the person who was at the receiving end of 'security' and exclusion, was then utilised as further justification for their exclusion:

When I asked why we had interrogated that couple before we let them in, I was told that they were acting suspicious. The woman had seemed very upset to have been interrogated, and she did keep fumbling over her answers, but I didn't find that surprising. Her elderly husband didn't say anything, she said he had dementia. I'm sure if me or my partner had just been profiled as being 'suspicious' and felt that we had been treated unfairly, I would also be at a loss for words and angry and confused. Naming someone as 'suspicious' seems like a self-fulfilling prophesy

(Fieldnote journal from security shift, participant observation, early 2019)

In both of these examples, it is evident that whilst there is a sense of community and belonging, it is complicated, because a community consists of a certain group of people, and there are often tensions about who does and who doesn't belong in the community. According to Moira, in Case study B, the security concerns, which have led to stopping non-members from visiting the shul, are in direct contradiction of what she considers to be a key value and desire of the shul which is to be 'open'. Security therefore starts to dictate who 'belongs' and who does not. As explained by Mr Silverstein, who was running a security volunteers meeting that I attended, lectures the volunteers - "When someone comes to the gate who we feel doesn't belong there, we need to have our questions ready... we need to have all sorts of questions for people who don't belong". It was not made clear in that meeting as to what constitutes someone who 'doesn't belong', but it is clear that by 'not belonging' they are seen to pose a security threat. This might be a standard protocol about whom to give access to a premises, but it can have very negative, and particularly racist consequences. According to one synagogue member, Zelda "...everyone is a suspect. If you look *slightly* different, you are going to be asked, you are going to be turned away, you are going to have an inquisition and be interrogated and humiliated and dehumanised. And I have had that experience with my friends, mainly brown coloured people."

The vision of the Synagogue security team, to ‘protect the community’, results in the exclusion of those deemed to be outside the community, to the extent that even those who consider themselves to be part of the community can be excluded on the basis of their difference. According to Zelda as well as other participants, there are many other aspects of the synagogue community that are far more welcoming to ‘outsiders’ like visitors, and where difference does not get treated as a threat. They argue that it is only the security team or security protocol where this exclusion takes place. Yet the way in which they draw on articulations of ‘protecting the community’ is so powerful, that it often manages to supersede the official synagogue policy of openness and inclusivity. The security team operates from the basis of a lot of fear. The meeting which Mr Silverstein was chairing started out with a very frightening and fairly uninformed and factually inaccurate report back from his JPA training about the threat of international terrorism.

These groups, Hezbolah and ISIS and them, we know who they are, have realised that they can’t get at Israel, it’s too strong, the only way that they can get at Jewish people is to attack the international centres that Jewish people go to like schools and shuls. For instance, Woolworths was importing Israeli goods at one stage, so woollies became a target. We have to get hyped up. We must NEVER think it won’t happen to us just because we tucked away in South Africa. We are ALWAYS a target, wherever we are.

Against that backdrop of creating such a sense of fear, (even if the facts are all notably skewed), then the instruction to question people who ‘we feel don’t belong’ seems to be not only acceptable but necessary.

As this chapter has demonstrated from the use of both the data as well as existing literature, people are scared, unsafe, and anxious. Whilst there might be various strategies that can emerge to deal with both the causes as well as the feelings of insecurity, the organisations and individuals who make up the security networks insist that the response should be increased security measures. When the idea of ‘community’ comes to be associated with and built around notions of securitisation, it becomes a community of ‘us’ against ‘them’, which in turn has the potential to lead to a greater sense of fear (Bauman, 2001; Dirsuweit, 2007). Since greater security measures are presented as the solution to insecurity, the security network is further legitimised. In addition, the desire for community and belonging is also taken up by the security network, as many individuals have found a sense of belonging within the network. This too serves to legitimise it.

## 5.5 Chapter Conclusion

Each case study consists of a community, which in itself can be understood as a network, in that there is some degree of interconnection between the members. Since many of the community members are involved in the security network, to different extents, messaging from the security network can be

spread widely through the whole community. In Case A this happens more directly as platforms such as the Telegram groups directly connect the community to the security network. In Case B this happens less directly - the broader Synagogue community is connected to the security network either through other community members or through platforms like the community newspaper. Security consciousness is therefore less institutionalised in Case B than in Case A, yet fear remains prominent. In Case B, the security network relies on the way in which 'community' is entangled with security as a response to fear, and due to the prominence of 'community members' as the most visible aspect of the security network. Security consciousness is key in legitimising the security network, as deeper fear and security concerns make the actions and presence of the network of security providers seem more legitimate. Security consciousness is also connected to a community identity. As security is so integrated in everyday life in both communities, the roles of security providers shift- they come to be understood as 'community providers', and therefore more legitimate. Whilst security leads to both belonging and non-belonging, both of these can be drawn on to legitimise the security networks in communities that are filled with fear.

# Chapter 6: ‘Law’ and ‘Order’ and ‘Security Conscience’

## 6.1 Introduction

Traditionally the state is thought to be responsible for ‘law and order’ through the police and criminal justice system. As these functions shift outward towards a wider network of security providers, which includes, but is not limited to the public services, the network becomes responsible not only for providing security, but also for the entire role of enforcing law and order. This section interrogates the concepts of ‘law’ and ‘order’, and how these concepts come to be defined by, and to legitimise the security networks.

## 6.2 Relating flexibly to the law

Traditionally, the role of the police was not only to provide protection to *people* but also to enforce and uphold *the law*. Since there has been a “shift from the ‘police’ to ‘policing’” (Loader, 2000 quoted in Scarpello, 2015), the security networks are therefore positioned as the legitimate enforcers of the law. This goes beyond *enforcing* the law, and the security networks have in fact been legitimised to effectively *create* the law, as I will demonstrate.

The law is not a straightforward thing. It is not always well understood or well known, and sometimes as technology changes faster than the law there might not be any legislation for certain things, such as the ambiguity around ‘public space policing’ and new technologies of surveillance. For instance, a fieldnote from an observation inside the control room of a competitor private security company reads “...they are very proud of the cameras and are open to any questions, but when asked about the use of footage for court cases, or whether they give the footage to the police, they are very cagey. I haven’t been given a straight answer”. The law needs to be interpreted, such as by courts, but in the field of ‘security’ people are creating interpretations of the law every day. My data shows many cases where the actors in the security network have a fairly flexible relationship with the legal and justice systems in the country- on the one hand claiming to be its vanguard, and on the other hand it seems that the grey areas in the law or lack of knowledge regarding the law are utilised by the security network to create more legitimacy.

### 6.2.1 Using grey areas in existing legal structures to increase authority, power, and legitimacy.

Where the law is not clear, not known, or contains grey areas, actors in the security network can use their knowledge and access to legal and state structures in a way to enhance their legitimacy. In the literature it is recognised that the “space created by the regulatory gaps” (Marks and Wood, 2007:142) often gets taken advantage of by non-public policing actors. In the data, one example of finding a loophole is Hermanus’s attempt to become a police reservist. He runs a non-profit ‘medical and security response’ company in Uptown Park. He said (Interview, 2019) that the reason he has applied for a reservist licence, is:

If I am a reservist, we are not limited, we can react much quicker to certain things when we come to scenes. And it just helps. At the moment, we can’t enter a house if SAPS is not on scene... If people are currently getting robbed you can go in and try stop it, but if it already happened then you can’t go in without permission of the owner or SAPS. So, there is a fine line and we try to stay in the line.

Other actors in the security network who don’t have the authority of the SAPS, such as Hermanus’s NGO, usually try and ‘stay in the line’, even if they don’t think that law is useful. But becoming a reservist is a way to increase his authority, since reservists officially have the same degree of legal authority as ordinary policemen. With greater authority, and thus more power to intervene, his non-profit company will have a higher degree of legitimacy. He works within the legal options to try and achieve this, even though it’s a grey area – according to the regulations, anyone employed in security cannot be a reservist (SAPS, 2014).

Ibrahim (2019) describes a similar process of the patrollers sub-group wanting to legally, formally, and officially attain the authority to take justice into their own hands. He describes the patrollers conundrum of wanting to be able to personally respond to crime incidents, as they did not want to rely on what a few years ago was apparently a very corrupt local police station. The issue is that patrollers are not supposed to personally ‘respond,’ in that they not allowed to carry their guns on patrol.

So how do we protect our families, without being too involved with SAPS? But at the same time, what legal grounds do we have to actually do what we want to do. So, after speaking to lawyers and private security companies, the idea came on board: look at a security company, they can legally engage with criminals, they can legally arrest someone. So if we do the same thing that they do, we have the same legal grounds to work with as the security companies. So PSIRA says yes, you can do it in your personal capacities. So we went out, we did our PSIRA certifications, and we then had the legal standpoint to actually do what we wanted to do.

Attaining PSIRA<sup>82</sup> certification was the legal route that Ibrahim and his team took to increase their official ability to ‘respond’ to incidents. They are not only seen as informally legitimate, but they have formalised their authority to use force, through the obscure loophole of registering as private security guards. Whilst PSIRA was created specifically for the purpose of regulating the private security industry, and the CPF was created specifically to facilitate community involvement, these two institutions are brought together through Ibrahim’s initiative in ways that they were never intended.

Both cases show how existing opportunities from grey areas in the law or the justice system have allowed different actors in the security network to pursue procedures that increase their legitimacy. Whilst Hermanus is trying to attain the status of the public police in order to legitimise and authorise his company, Ibrahim worked to attain the status of private security in order to legitimise his (armed) volunteer community patrol team. Through working around the law, using the legal structures in ways that they weren’t intended to be used, these two men have tried or managed to attain more legitimacy in their roles as ‘enforcers and upholders’ of the law.

#### 6.2.2 Different interpretations of the law for legitimate versus non-legitimate actors.

How one chooses to interpret laws and legality can be used to suit the interests of the security network. In Case B, that of the Synagogue, according to Mary (2019) one of the main things that volunteers need to watch out for is ‘information gathering’. When I was doing participant observation on security shift with her, she was concerned about a young white woman who had parked her car on the street opposite the gate to the synagogue, and so she went to go and speak to her, even though the woman was parked on a public road. I addressed this during an interview.

Me: So last week, that woman sitting in her car was not in our property?

Mary: But she was right opposite the gate, so that was why ... You have to think - is this person taking photos since she had a cell-phone out, is this person gathering information? Because if somebody gets out and starts taking photographs, you need to ask them why they’re taking photographs, and ask them to stop. In that case immediately call [JPA] because its classed as information gathering

Me: Information gathering?

Mary: Information gathering is seen as a prelude to trying to mount an attack. You know, taking photos, taking notes, when do people come in, when is the gate open...”

It follows that ‘information gathering’ is treated as criminal and warrants a security response if it is understood in that way. However, it is interesting when contrasted with ‘intelligence gathering’. The security network makes a clear distinction between the threat of potential criminals being involved in ‘information gathering’, compared with having security actors perform a legitimate role of ‘intelligence

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<sup>82</sup> Private Security Regulation Authority

gathering'. Indeed, as Zelda, a member of the shul who is quite critical of the security team, and used to be a member of a big Palestine Solidarity NGO called BDS-SA, had voiced: "I don't like the [JPA]... Especially from my experience with them in other contexts. When I visited my daughter was on summer camp, they asked her 'who is this woman?' 'that's my mom', she said. They told her, 'well, we have a file on your mother. We have a file on anyone who was in BDS or went to pro-Palestine protests'...I think it's quite scary". In this example, Zelda understandably is unhappy with the fact that she is treated with suspicion and that the 'intelligence gathering' was done on her.

Gathering intelligence for security purposes involves documenting situations including taking pictures and sharing that type of information. As a security volunteer, both in Case A and Case B, you are encouraged to try and take photos of people that you deem as suspicious. Every other week there is a warning going around on the security Whatsapp group in Case B, and (less frequently,) the 'emergency' Telegram group in Case A, with a picture of someone deemed suspicious. In Case A, neighbours are told via the Telegram group that if the garbage collectors are coming to ask for a Christmas gift, they might in fact be imposters pretending to be official garbage collectors, and therefore residents should "get your phone out to take a pic of them and they will run".

The different interpretations regarding laws around privacy and criminality are utilised in a way that the actions of those involved in the security network are seen as legitimate, whilst the actions of others are seen as suspicious. Drawing on discourses of legality, criminality, or security, are ways in which laws can be applied or not applied at the convenience of those who claim an authority. As the 'garbage collectors' are deemed illegitimate subjects, the laws regarding privacy are seen to not apply to them. By describing the possibility of someone outside the synagogue having their phone out in terms of a security issue, it can be responded to with a security response. Yet pictures taken by a security organisation deemed as legitimate, such as the JPA's file on Zelda, mean that the law on 'information-gathering', whilst the JPA is aware of it, choose not to apply it.

These few examples have touched on the way in which actors in the security network relate to the law and to legal structures. They are able to maintain what can be understood as a flexible relationship to legal structures, such as utilising loopholes and taking advantage of grey areas, and of lack of information or clarity on legal structures, as well as the advantage of being selective regarding when to apply the law. This flexibility allows them to increase their legitimacy, power, and authority. Since they position themselves as the authority on the law, the use of flexibility can in effect give them the ability 'make the law'.

Moving on from the legal structures, it is important to understand how law and order are also deeply intertwined. Although 'law' is seen as ridged, and 'order' is seen as socially understood, 'order' is often policed through the use of legal discourse, particularly that of crime. In the urban environment, "public

order' has become one of the primary discursive formations through which neoliberal spaces are policed and non-criminal behaviours brought into the regulatory regime of modern cities and the criminal justice system" (Samara, 2010: 641).

### 6.3 Maintaining the Social Order

Albrecht and Kyed (2015: 16) define social order as "a set of linked social institutions and practices that (seek to) conserve, maintain and enforce particular ways of relating and behaving". The maintenance of social order is a key role that security networks have. As Gluck and Low (2017: 287) point out "...security functions to buttress, maintain, consolidate, or undermine existing institutions and relations of power in society." Some scholars argue that maintaining social order (or the perception of order) is an important part of providing security and reducing crime such as those who subscribe to the 'broken window theory' (Wilson and Kelling, 1982)<sup>83</sup>. Others see the relationship between 'order' and 'crime' as far more complex. Indeed, the "particular conceptualizations of order..." affects the politics of security provision, such as "...who gets to provide, what is being provided and to whom..." (Kyed and Albrecht, 2015: 16). This has important implications for those that are seen as a 'threat' and those who are seen as 'threatened', particularly since "...the state, the police or a social class frame understandings of crime to sustain power relations skewed in regards to class, gender and race" (Scarpello, 2015: 1).

This section will discuss how the security network operate within an existing social order which shapes them, but they are also actively involved in shaping or maintaining the social order. It will also discuss the implications of this for the legitimacy of the security networks.

#### 6.3.1 Patriarchy

Drawing from the definition of social order as '*a set of institutions and practices that seek to maintain particular ways of relating*', patriarchal relations are one set of power relations that are part of the existing social order. In both case studies there was evidence of how the security networks serve to reinforce this order. Looking at Case A, the residential case, the first example of this is how the security network respond, or do not, to 'domestic violence' incidents – which most participants understood to be cases where 'the husband is beating the wife'. In interviews with three different types of providers in the security network – Hermanus, who runs the security NGO; Veronica, who runs the private company; and Mr Gilbert, a volunteer patroller, all had the same response. Hermanus explained that "security are very wary of domestic 'cos it can turn around like this (snaps fingers)". Veronica's justification was that "The wife needs help, we go to help her, we get the husband arrested, and then the next day, the wife lays charges against us- so that's why we stay far away". These extremely dismissive views of incidents of intimate partner violence serve to maintain the existing social order,

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<sup>83</sup> See literature review.



which is permissive to the violence that men impose on women, particularly their partners. With so many of the different actors in the security network supporting one another's stance of non-involvement, the lack of involvement is seen as permissible, and the order maintained. The only actor in the security network who was perceived to need to respond to these incidents was the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD). Mr Gilbert explained- "JMPD must come look at it. It's their job." Whilst all three of the aforementioned participants had previously expressed frustration with JMPD, when called on for other incidents, saying "they don't rock up, they don't care" (Interview with Mr Gilbert, 2019), this perceived incompetence seems to be forgotten when it comes to 'domestic' incidents, where JMPD are then posited as the only legitimate solution. Not only is their lack of response to these incidents of violence presented as legitimate by framing the women's likely response as unreliable, but it is also legitimised through referring to other elements of the security network – the JMPD. This non-response could also be understood in the opposite way of a 'security speech act'. Instead of framing an issue as 'security' in order to warrant a security response, this seems to be an instance where a 'security' issue is framed as 'non-security': instead, its 'domestic'.

Another example of the role of the security network in maintaining patriarchal social relations is in 'policing' marriages. Veronica and Jack are the co-directors of the private security company in Uptown Park, ISP. Veronica explains:

We do private investigations as well. We had a situation where [Jack's] friend asked him to check on his brother's wife because he feels his brother's wife is having an affair. [Jack] investigated and it turned out to be true- but before he could give the news, the lady that he was investigating, her mum's house was burgled and so she became a client. And so what do you do? She's a client and he's a friend, what do you do?

In this instance, it seemed that as a 'wife', the woman was not entitled to privacy but was investigated without her consent. Once she became a 'client' of the security company, she was treated better. With key actors in the security network involved in investigating the movements of married women, 'investigations' are seen as being part of security and therefore legitimised. The social order that allows husbands to exert control over their wives is not only maintained but is actively supported by the security network.

Similarly, the private security company intervene in other relationships. As Veronica explains "When you get the girlfriends and the boyfriends doing their business in the park or the car parked under a light bulb, and then the reaction<sup>84</sup> guys have to go and stop it. We are not interested in what they are doing but they are putting themselves in danger". This intervention in a couple's private relationship (which seems to take place in a deserted public area at night) is legitimised by making it a security issue. Veronica argues that 'they are putting themselves in danger', which is why her employees need to

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<sup>84</sup> Reaction Officers – being armed security employees

intervene. Whilst the public police might be legally entitled to intervene, a private security company is not. Yet since this intervention contributes to reinforcing the social order, one in which sex remains reserved for married people inside their home, the private company is given the informal authority to ‘go and stop it’.

Moving on to examples from the data on Case B, whilst the synagogue officially promotes gender equality, the security team itself seems to subtly promote a patriarchal social order. As Steinberg and Marks (2014: 249) have documented, the formation of the JPA “...emerged from a particular tradition whose features are important to note. The historian Yuri Slezkine... has called this tradition ‘muscular Zionism’... It established itself in conscious opposition to the age-old Jewish traits of bookishness, self-doubt and ponderous reflection”. This new type of Jewish masculinity, which was birthed out of the colonial desires of political Zionism, is what the JPA is built on, evident from observations as well as interview data. Not only has the ‘muscular’ approach continued, but Zionism remains a key goal of the JPA and thereby of the local security network.

Most of the interview data regarding the patriarchal practices within the security network referred to those involved within the network already, rather than ‘the community’ more widely. Zelda described the security volunteers – “most of them appear to be young men. they have lots of testosterone. Biologically they should be running around killing saber tooth tigers, since we don’t have that, they drive their cars fast, pick fights... this is a way to use that testosterone to fight the bad guy...” Another participant, Shoshana, said that the JPA “is feeding into men wanting to feel macho.”

Mary, who is in her 60s, is very involved in the security network, and seems reluctant to criticise it although she feels that women should be more involved.

Interviewer: In the training, do you find that it is a male-dominated environment?  
And is it a masculine-centred training program?

Mary: Well, in some ways it felt like that, but there were several women involved at a very senior level. So, there was some understanding there, but it wasn’t probably enough. Age had a lot to do with it... most of the others would have been in their late teens and 20s, and they are a lot stronger obviously. And they aren’t necessarily aware of how strong they are... My friend who is a little older than me...not long ago they were doing the ‘scenario practice’, and somebody hoisted her on his shoulders and cracked her ribs. And that’s very painful believe me

This extract points to the ways in which the young men are trained to become security providers in a way which reinforces the wider patriarchal social order. Their ‘macho’ approach is evident to community members such as Zelda and Shoshana, and even Mary, whom, as older women, have expressed some degree of discomfort with it. Whilst Mary and Zelda see the young men’s machismo as being biological and therefore not their fault, even Mary has pointed out the dangerous consequences it could have. In this example, a woman was severely hurt by a display of machismo, yet the fact that it

was for security purposes, in this case ‘scenario training’, renders it acceptable, as per securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998).

Patriarchy within the security network is commonplace in both cases studied. In Case A, there are two volunteer patrol groups, operating in different parts of the neighbourhood, one predominantly white and secular, and one predominantly Muslim and religious. Aunty Aaliah used to be a patroller for the Muslim group, but then at some point they decided that women were no longer welcome.

Interviewer: Why are there no longer women in the patrollers group?

Aunty Aaliah: “they kind of, um, push them out because apparently it was an extramarital affairs going on between two people. It broke two homes so they decided that, you know what, they didn't want this intermingling of men and women.

Interviewer: But that affair had happened with the patrollers? with the patrolling women?

Aunty Aaliah: It wasn't the patrolling woman, it was the patrolling husbands. But because the group included all the women, the numbers were easily accessible. But it's an Islamic thing as well anyways, there's a preference of not having intermingling of men and women

Since there was a concern about the involvement in security leading to affairs, even though the women patrollers were not at all involved, the response was to exclude the women instead of the men.

The actors in the security network position themselves as not only a police, but a ‘moral police’. This particular conception of immorality is based on patriarchal notions of policing women’s sexuality. Unlike the earlier examples of the private security company policing women’s sexuality in the wider community, these later examples point to the ‘moral-policing’ specifically internal to the security networks.

### 6.3.2 Racism (and classism)

Issues of discomfort are often presented in a way which can quickly escalate them to become a security issue. In Case A, one extract from the Telegram chat group, a resident critiques the JMPD (referred to as ‘metro’) for a range of reasons, mostly their inefficiency, as well as the following complaint “when nuisance window washers are removed, they are encouraged to open cases against us by Metro... such is the levels of support criminals get from some of our tax recipients!” (2018). In this sentence, the resident is explaining what happens when the security providers in the network ‘remove’ the people who are washing windows: The JMPD (who as a state body are the tax recipients) then encourage the window-washers to open a case. Whilst this might imply that the ‘removal’ was illegal, instead the resident then referred to the washers as ‘criminals’. The discourse of criminality implies that the window washers are not only going against the law, but it also hints at immorality. It implies that its wrong for

tax money to go to an organisation which is encouraging window-washers to open a case against those who forcibly removed them. Other studies have demonstrated how the social order in wealthy residential suburbs is one where the upper-class residents have a certain “sense of place and therefore... self-perception as western, modern, civilised people” (Ballard, 2004: 49). A threat to that ‘order’, particularly brought on by the arrival of “difference” as argued by Ballard (2004), in this case the window-washers, who are poor, black, members of the informal economy, is therefore often constructed as a security threat. Thus, security networks, as self-declared agents of law and order, will work to try and maintain that social order.

A more common and everyday way in which race and class are policed in Case A, is through what Diphorn (2015) calls ‘the Bravo Mike Syndrome’, a codified way of racial profiling. Bravo Mike is radio code for the letters “B M”, which in the security network means ‘black male’. On the community telegram group, there are frequent posts where a ‘bravo’ or a ‘bm’ or ‘b/male’, or sometimes a Charlie (referring to racial classification as ‘coloured’) male are reported, such as in figure 12 below:




Figure 12 Various extracts from chat group.

Many people in the neighbourhood who were seen walking (a sign of class, rather than driving) and were labelled as black or coloured, were regarded as ‘suspicious’. Usually reasons were not even given for what made them ‘suspicious’. Diphorn (2015) argues that “black males ... continue to be – the core targets of policing, especially when found in places ‘where they are not supposed to be’.” Both of these examples show how the security network positions itself as the authority to decide who does and does not ‘belong’, They are also able to carry through with this, due to their physical ability to ‘remove’ people, usually through the threat of violence as opposed to physical violence. The social order which sees poor black<sup>85</sup> people as ‘not belonging’ in white suburban spaces is one which remains from

<sup>85</sup> I use the term ‘black’ as defined by Steve Biko (1971) to include all those subjugated by white supremacy

apartheid spatial planning and is reinforced through such exclusionary practices of policing (Lemanski, 2004; Clarno, 2013).

While data from the Synagogue in Case B shows ways in which social order are policed in a way that is specific to the particular community, there is also evident of more typical features of policing the social order, including in regard to race. One (white) participant whose teenage daughter is black, explained that “on a personal level I find that they are racists. My daughter herself has been racially profiled, by people who surprisingly don’t know her, you would think that they would, she is always here”. She mentioned two other young black members who used to be involved in running activities for the Synagogue’s youth group. “They don’t come here anymore because whoever was at the gate interrogated them and wouldn’t accept that they actually belong here.” Whilst the Synagogue is one of the very few racially diverse synagogues in the country<sup>86</sup>, the extract above amongst other data, shows that there is still racism and discrimination which particularly plays out through the security network. It seems that while many in the synagogue community value all their members as well as valuing the racial (and age) diversity, the security operates in a way which excludes young black members, thereby reinforcing the racist social order inherited from apartheid and colonialism. In the synagogue, actors in the security network, though they are not the main authority, do still have a great deal of power and authority at the entrance gate – they are in a position to grant or deny access, and thereby determine who does or doesn’t ‘belong’. As with the previous example from the residential case, exclusion is performed under the principle of ‘security’.

### 6.3.3 Political Conservatism

Finally, the social order that the security network is key in asserting is broadly defined by one participant in the religious community as “security stuff was going to bolster the right wing and make left wing initiatives more difficult.”

Many of the participants refer to a single incident which occurred in 2018 which they felt was a watershed moment that “opened the flood gates”, which I will refer to as ‘The Visitor Incident’. A member of a non-profit Palestinian solidarity organisation<sup>87</sup>, was invited to an ‘open’ event at the shul. The event was specifically open to visitors as it was an interfaith event. There was a clash of opinions and tempers, as the security team was informed by the JPA not to allow this visitor in, as he was deemed to be a ‘security threat’. The management committee of the shul at the time disagreed with the security team, and allowed him access, and there was a lot of controversy that followed.

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<sup>86</sup> Community history interview, 2019 ; Interview with chairman, 2019 ; Observation data

<sup>87</sup> The organisation aims to put economic and political pressure on Israel as part of the global boycott and sanction movement

As Shoshana, who was on the management committee at the time, explained: "... I was saying earlier that I think the training is going to fuel the right wing. They had the propaganda at their fingertips and that's when it came out... It created terrible division..."

One member of the security team, Mrs Ryans, gave a statement on the incident, when the wider community was asked to give input on their feelings. She said "This 'Openness' and 'Inclusivity' seems to have no boundaries... when members of certain organisations get invited who are openly hostile to Jews and the Jewish Homeland, then it raises serious issues for us."<sup>88</sup> This is the mainstream political-Zionist standpoint, which not only conflates Judaism and Zionism, but then uses that overlap to turn a political issue into a 'security issue'. Being critical of Israel is presented by Zionist lobby groups as being 'hostile to Jews', a discourse which is readily taken up by many in the community, such as Mrs Ryans. This turns a political issue into something that is seen as 'an existential threat', thereby warranting a security response. Caldeira's (2000:2) theory of 'the talk of crime' is useful for understanding this process. She argues that "The talk of crime works its symbolic reordering of the world by elaborating prejudices and creating categories that naturalize some groups as dangerous. It simplistically divides the world into good and evil and criminalizes certain social categories." The fact that Mrs Ryans utilised discourse that is readily accessible to her, and that she categorises the visitor as being dangerous, shows how 'crime talk' is successful at legitimising non-state security actors, as Caldeira argues.

This right-wing conflation of security and politics was also raised by other participants at the Synagogue:

I don't think that it's really about security, I think it's about fear. And Netanyahu<sup>89</sup> has taught everybody that: If you make them scared, they will do what you want them to do, and they will support you. They want to keep Jews feeling like they not safe, they going to be attacked, will be unsafe wherever they go. You're only safe in Israel. which of course you're not.

The literature confirmed this opinion to some degree, as Diphorn and Grassiani (2016: 432) explain how in Israel, "'Security'... is a central part of the daily and political discourse in the country, and is naturalized and seen as a 'higher good'". Another way of explaining that, is that security has in some communities *come to be associated with morality*.

Moira, a retired chairperson, expressed her view of 'the visitor incident' that "it was a political issue that has fed into security issues. For instance, there may be people with whose views you passionately disagree and consider immoral- but it doesn't mean that they will bomb you."

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<sup>88</sup> There was an open forum for input, which was thought to ease the tensions. This extract is from her submission to that forum.

<sup>89</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of the State of Israel

As mentioned, there is a blurring between what is considered to be a security issue, and what is considered to be a moral issue. Particularly if a ‘political’ issue is phrased as a ‘security’ issue, morality comes into the debate. As the member of the security team expressed her concern for how ‘openness’ and ‘inclusivity’ were getting out of hand, she simultaneously made a moral as well as a security argument.

Security consciousness has been institutionalised to such an extent that it also comes to be associated with worldviews and values. As argued by Schwell (2015: 100) – “Fear also implies an idea of morality: to fear the bad, one must know what is good”, even in everyday life. Since fear and security are deeply interconnected (Schwell, 2015), the element of fear also affects the perceived ‘moral’ dimensions of security. I therefore argue that security-consciousness (being aware of ‘security’) becomes a *security conscience* (a guide to right and wrong).

The main differences between cases A and B, is that Case A is far more typical. In Uptown Park, the social order that the security network aims to enforce resonates with the order in the country, which includes control over women, control over poor black marginalised class, and control over space. In the Synagogue, the ‘social order’ should be understood as one which speaks to the concerns of a small and specific community, along with the social order of society more broadly. Whilst the data shows that the social order that the security network tries to maintain is also one which privileges certain races, classes, and genders, like in society more broadly, the order is also shaped in a way that is community-specific. The tensions that have come up regarding security at The Synagogue of study, are tensions between being ‘open’ to the outside rather than ‘closed’, and of being ‘conservative’ politically rather than ‘progressive’. In the residential community, there was far less tension and debate – none of the residents problematised the ‘*vlei* clean up’ (discussed in Chapter 5), which too utilised themes of morality in relation to ‘criminality’ to justify an exclusionary practice through the premise of security.

Social order is often policed through the use of security discourse. This is particularly true in a society in which ‘security consciousness’ is so institutionalised, and in which the security networks are so embedded in everyday life, and are so authoritative. Security, or a particular understanding of it, has become so much a part of life, to the extent that it can even be understood as a type of ‘conscience’. ‘Security’ concerns come to dictate a conception of morality, where difference comes to be read simultaneously as outside of morality and as a threat to safety.

## 6.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the implications of a security network being viewed as a socially accepted authority on policing law and order. It has also shown how the network comes to attain and legitimise its authority over the law and the social order. Through the regulatory gaps, lack of popular knowledge, and grey areas, the non-state actors in the security network attain greater power,

sovereignty, and legitimacy. As argued by Caldeira (2000) talking about crime has a profound effect on social ordering, as well as on legitimising certain security actors. Her concept of 'the talk of crime' is about illegality as well as disorder. She argues that "The symbolic order engendered in the talk of crime... makes fear circulate through the repetition of histories, and, more important, helps... legitimate the use of private, violent, and illegal means of revenge" (2000: 38). In both case studies it was evident that discourse around security threats, particular to each community, was a useful tool for the security networks in attaining legitimacy. The security networks also enforced the existing social order regarding race, class and gender, in order to attain greater legitimacy in a society that is based on those principles. Security consciousness has become even more than that –it's become a guiding principle and resembles a type of morality. To draw again on Caldeira (2000: 20), 'the talk of crime' or what I would refer to as a 'security conscience' "...symbolically reorders the world". Evidently this imbues networks of security with a greater degree of legitimacy.



# Chapter 7: Conclusion

Security networks continue to grow, both in Johannesburg's wealthy suburbs and beyond. As they do, they continue to exert a great deal of power over the lives of the 'communities' that they serve, as well as the lives of those considered to be 'outsiders'. In particular, they affect the lives of those who are categorised as 'security threats'. Such a category is shaped by the existing relations of power, the way in which 'difference' has been securitized, and the extent to which security consciousness has been institutionalised. The power and the authority of the security networks comes from the fact that they are recognised by many as a legitimate sovereign body. This legitimacy, as has been argued throughout the research report, should not be merely taken for granted but should be interrogated.

This issue is not new and has been investigated by a number of scholars. Whilst the vast literature on the plurality of the security sector has problematised, or offered explanations for the legitimisation of specific types of security providers within the network, or looked at networks in different urban contexts, there is a limited amount of literature looking at the ways in which very diverse security networks as a whole are legitimised. The work of Dupont (2004) and Diphorn and Grassiani (2016) and Thumala et al. (2011) were especially drawn on, as they argued that the various security nodes drew on different types of 'capital' to legitimise themselves. Chapter 4 of this paper demonstrated the way in which different nodes within the network interact in a way that legitimises the network at large. The work of scholars who have looked at co-operation was helpful for understanding this. Some scholars (for instance, Bénit-Gbaffou 2008; Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012; Wilson and Kelling 1982) looked specifically at the partnerships between the state and the community sector, and others looked at those between the state and the private sector (such as Diphorn and Berg, 2014; Kempa et al, 1999 amongst others). However, the data in this research has shown that cooperation is far more multifaceted, with cooperation being a key tool of enhancing the legitimacy of the network as a whole. Drawing on scholars (such as Schwell, 2015 and Caldeira, 2000) who look beyond 'securitization theory', it is evident that consumers or civilians aren't just passive, they too are essential to the production and legitimisation of security. Chapter 4.5 therefore demonstrated the way in which consumers are incorporated into the security network, and their important role in its legitimisation.

Chapter 5 discussed the role of the 'community' elements of the security network, which filled a gap in the literature which is usually separated by studying community security in poor areas versus private security in rich areas. Institutional theories were drawn on to explain the data, particularly the way in which large communities could be 'conscientized' about security, which results in legitimising the networks. Furthermore, security providers often fulfil the roles of 'community' care-takers, and indeed security is constructed around conceptions of community which draw on themes of belonging to

legitimise the network. Similarly, the fear of outsiders and their threat to community-identity is also used to legitimise the actions of the security networks.

Chapter 6 interrogated the idea of ‘law and order’, which are traditionally thought to be the domain of the public police. The chapter explored the ‘flexibility’ with which the members of the security network negotiate around legal structures, whilst at the same time presenting themselves as the guardians of the law – both these processes serving to present the network as sovereign. Furthermore, in Chapter 6.3 I established how the security networks perpetuate existing social relations, whilst drawing on the way in which ‘security’ has come to be regarded as a guiding conscience. This has the effect of legitimising any ‘security’ issue which the networks choose to address.

The two case studies had both similarities and differences in their community identity and structures, as did the local security networks operating in each. Looking at them relationally was useful for understanding how the different dynamics unfolded. Surprisingly, the general trend was of more commonalities than not. Although both networks were legitimised by similar processes, the main differences were the extent to which some processes dominated over others. Some of the key differences in the processes that legitimated them are highlighted: Whilst the role of the state was more active in legitimising the network in Case A (the residential community), the role of co-ordination and cooperation within the network seemed more seamless in Case B (the religious community). Whilst the incorporation of consumers into the network was more successful in Case A, the role of articulations of ‘community’ was more impactful in legitimising the network in Case B. Though Case A provided much data on the way in which the networks drew on a wider social order, Case B highlighted the role of a particular, community-specific social order as well.

Security networks have positioned themselves as a legitimate sovereign authority, which is particularly evident in Johannesburg’s wealthy Northern suburbs. External processes have contributed to this, but generally the security networks themselves are key in doing ‘legitimising work’. In particular, this is done through drawing on the external environment including the existing social order and the specific fears of communities, and utilising community platforms to promote themselves and to promote ‘security consciousness’. Security consciousness has become institutionalized to the extent that security can also be understood as a form of ‘conscience’ in that it “...symbolically reorders the world” (Caldeira, 2000: 20).

This research has demonstrated that the legitimacy of security networks should not be taken for granted – rather, it should be seen as an actively constructed ongoing process. Understanding them from this vantage point opens up the possibility of further research on security networks. A critical interrogation of non-democratic and non-state sovereign bodies is important, particularly due to the physical and

symbolic power that they have, along with their rapidly increasing and diversifying presence in places such as Johannesburg's suburbs.

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## Appendix A: Research instrument

### A: 'Security Consumers'

Description: *Semi-structured interview with community members, and community organisation representatives.*

#### Community, identity:

- Tell me about your feelings and involvement with community groupings broadly in the (residential neighbourhood/Jewish community)? (include facebook groups, non-security as well as security structures)
- Tell me about your feelings towards, and extent of involvement with community groups in the with the (specific community security initiatives and groups)?
- What role do all these structures have in your life? what do you think they have in other people's lives?
- Has the (key/nodal security structure) brought the community together in any way?
- Have security concerns brought the community together?

#### Security

- What do you do, or what does your community do, to keep you safe?
- What is the role of *\*specific security provider institution\**? what is your experience of having them present in your community?
- What other security initiatives exist?
- What are your feelings towards *\*other specific elements of security network (incl surveillance groups, private security, presence of guards or cameras, etc)\**?
- What do you think about the interaction between *\*different structures/actors in security network\**?
- Which types of security groups do you trust/ have best relationship with
- what other 'community work' are the security groupings involved in (beyond conventional security)?
- What do you do personally to keep yourself (and your community) safe?

#### Insecurity

- What are the main things that you worry about or feel scared of?
- What are some of your main security concerns?
- What do you think other people's main security concerns are?
- How do *\*the various security providers\** contribute to your feelings of safety and security?
- If you can remember, how have your feelings of safety and security changed over the last few years?
  - o to what extent would you attribute this change in feelings to the growing presence of these security (networks)

#### Other

- Do you have any recommendations of other people involved in security that I could be in touch with?
- Do you have any recommendation of other community members that I can be in touch with?



## **B: 'Security Providers'**

Description: *Semi- Structured Interview with initial key 'security provider' per each case study.*

### **Security committee in Case B**

- What is the role/importance of community volunteers instead of private security?
- What are main security threats here, and how do you protect against them?
- What other actors, groups, people do you work with to provide security?
- What other actors/groups/people hinder your ability to provide security?
- What other initiatives do you think also play a role in this communities security?
- Who is the community, and what are your responsibilities towards them?
- What do you think the community's fears are?
- What is this group's main role?
- What are your other security concerns, besides just the major ones?
- How do you feel that the community see this group?
- In what way do you think it is important for community members to be responsible for their own security?
- How has this group contributed to the community, beyond just security?
- What do you understand as 'safety and security'?
- How has the presence of this group changed things in this community?
- Do your security tasks change in public instead of private spaces?
- Do you have any recommendations of other people involved in security that I could be in touch with?

### **Private security control centre in Case A**

- How is your service different to other private security companies?
- What is the role/importance of community volunteers in working with private security?  
What are main security threats here, and how do you protect against them?  
What other actors, groups, people do you work with to provide security?
- What other actors/groups/people hinder your ability to provide security?  
What other initiatives do you think also play a role in this communities security?
- Who is the community, and what are your responsibilities towards them?
- how does this community compare with other communities, companies, or individuals that your company works with?
- What do you think the community's fears are?
- What is this group's main role?
- What are your other security concerns, besides just the major ones?
- How do you feel that the community see this group?
- How has this group contributed to the community, beyond just security?
- What do you understand as 'safety and security'?
- How has the presence of this group changed things in this community?
- Do your security tasks change in public instead of private spaces?
- Do you have any recommendations of other people involved in security that I could be in touch with?

## **C: Participant Observation:**

Things to look out for in participant-observational settings:

- Conceptions of community- Who is to be protected and who is to be removed?
- Conceptions of security and safety – What is considered safe and unsafe? what is considered security?
- How are threats dealt with?
- What are community values that play out in security settings?
- What are interactions with community? how are community involved in ‘security’ provision?
- What other actors are involved in security network?
- How do various actors and different institutions in security network relate to each other?

**D: Document and written material collection:**

Analysis of newsletters, newspaper, and social media, in each community case studys.

Specific things to look out for in collection of material:

- Who are the security actors?
- How do they relate to each other?
- Conceptions of community?
- Conceptions of security and safety – what is considered safe and unsafe. what is considered security?
- What are fears?
- What are impacts of the presence of various security providers?

**E: Community History- In-depth, unstructured interview:**

- brief the history of the community
- history of threats, fears, insecurity
- history of community-institutions
- history of security providers / security network

## Appendix B: Participant information sheets and consent forms

### **Information Sheet**

**Department:** Organisational and Institutional Studies (PARI)

**Title of research project:** Safety, security, and the rising presence of security networks in Johannesburg`s suburbs.

**Student name:** Lily Manoim

**Student email:**

**Student contact number:**

**Ethics Clearance No.** OIS20190601

**Supervisor name:** Dr Federica Duca

**Supervisor email:**

**Supervisor contact number:**

Good day. My name is Lily Manoim, and I am conducting a research study that is looking at communities with various different security structures present, and exploring the experiences, ideas, and feelings that both community members as well as security providers have towards safety and security.

I would like to invite you to take part in this study as it will help us to understand the perspective and experience of community security providers which exist alongside various other security initiatives. This will contribute to research on security and aims to further an understanding about the relationship between security initiatives and community members feelings of safety and security.

### **What does this study entail?**

Your participation in this study will include the following:

- a semi-structured interview for the duration of approximately thirty minutes.
- a potential follow-up interview of approximately one hour.

### **Risks:**

There are very few risks in participating in this study. Although the topic is on security, there will be no interview questions asking for sensitive security information. I will ask you some personal questions about your feelings, ideas, and experiences, as well as your views on the community members experiences. As we will be discussing feelings of safety you might feel distressed or uncomfortable at some point. If for any reason you are not comfortable with the topic being discussed, you can skip a question or chose to stop the interview at any time.

**Benefits:** You may not receive any direct benefit from participating in this study.

**Costs:** There are no costs associated with this research project.

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### **Confidentiality and Anonymity:**

The final research report that I will produce from my research, which includes interviews such as this one, will be written in such a way that the names of individuals, community organizations, security companies, and the like, will not be mentioned. They will either be given pseudonyms or merely broad descriptions. This is done in order to ensure anonymity of research participants, in line with the university's ethical considerations. I will not use your real name but will assign you a pseudonym if I use content from this interview in my final report.

Anything that you indicate to me as confidential will be respected as such, and will not be disclosed to anyone else.

The information that you share with me may be written up in my research report, but you will remain anonymous. I will NOT use any of your personal details and it will not be possible to identify you personally, nor your organization (if applicable) in any of the research reports.

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- Your responses may be made available in an anonymized format for a variety of subsequent purposes, including for future teaching and research projects.
- The information that will be collected is purely for research purposes.
- Participation is completely voluntary; you are under no obligation to take part in this project.
- You may withdraw from this project at any stage; this will not affect you in any way.
- **Do you have any questions?**
- **Would you like to go ahead with being part of this research project?**

**Informed Consent Form**

**Department:** Organisational and Institutional Studies (PARI)

**Title of research project:** Safety, security, and the rising presence of security networks in Johannesburg`s suburbs.

**Student name:** Lily Manoim

**Student email:**

**Student contact number:**

**Ethics Clearance No.** OIS20190601

**Supervisor name:** Dr Federica Duca

**Supervisor email:**

**Supervisor contact number:**

	Yes	No
I have read and understood the participant information sheet, and have had the opportunity to ask questions.		
I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time with no negative consequences.		
I understand that all information will be confidential and my responses anonymised. It will not be possible to identify me in the final report.		
I give consent for my responses to be made available in an anonymised format for a variety of subsequent purposes, including for future teaching and research projects		
I consent to the interview being recorded		
I consent to participate in this study.		

**PARTICIPANT:**

\_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_

Date

**I herewith confirm that I have been fully informed about the study and have given consent to participate as indicated above.**

\_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name

\_\_\_\_\_

Signature

\_\_\_\_\_

Date

**RESEARCHER:**

\_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name

\_\_\_\_\_

Signature

\_\_\_\_\_

Date