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## CHAPTER NINE

### 9.1 "INCONCLUSION" - WHY REAL REFORM MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE

As described in Chapter One, today peacekeeping is more necessary, more desired and more possible than ever before. Peacekeeping became more necessary because, with the end of the Cold War, the weak political institutions of many less developed countries were more frequently overwhelmed by ethnic or other tensions. The breakup of the Soviet Union only added more newly independent and inexperienced governments to the pool of potential political failures. The result has been a growth in armed conflicts, not between states, but within them - the so-called "tea cup wars."

Peacekeeping became more possible because the UN ceased to be used as a venue for Super Power competition and confrontation. Instead it was converted into a organization where Russia, the United States and other major powers worked together toward the common goal of a more peaceful and stable world. In addition, the growing number of NGOs provided the means through which governments found a mechanism to provide the

humanitarian and other kinds of assistance necessary in peacekeeping situations.

Peacekeeping has become more desired than in the past partly because of the CNN effect, where the suffering in any remote corner of the globe could be viewed in living rooms around the world as it happened. Again the NGOs came into play, as they created a powerful lobby for the point of view that something had to be done to alleviate the suffering of the innocent civilians in such situations. A PKO frequently became the "something" with which the international community responded.

As peacekeeping became more necessary, more possible and more desired, its greater use resulted in the Expansion Period. This growth in the number, size, and cost of PKOs was reversed by the peacekeeping failures during the first half of the 1990s, however, and the Contraction Period began. The changing nature of war required peacekeeping to evolve and to take on more complex tasks, and the UN's ability to do it did not keep pace.

In its early years, the UN was confronted almost exclusively with interstate conflicts. Classical peacekeeping, as it came to be known, in these

conflicts meant the UN simply had to separate two conventional armies belonging to two states along well-defined battle lines in a specific area. The UN then had only to monitor a ceasefire until the parties could negotiate a permanent peace.

In the post-Cold War era, the UN has had to deal increasingly with intrastate conflicts where the battle lines were as blurred as the distinction between soldiers and noncombatants. The opposing troops were almost always lightly armed, poorly trained and rarely disciplined. To make peace possible after a civil war of this type required rebuilding the country through a PKO with multiple goals. This involved operations that were much larger, much more expensive and far more complex than classical peacekeeping. The inability of the UN and the international community to deal with this complexity and to achieve the many intended goals led to peacekeeping failures and a loss of both confidence and the willingness to take risks and casualties.

As a result, peacekeeping has fallen into relative disfavor compared with the beginning of the decade. The scenes of suffering on CNN now provoke concern and debate about what level of suffering warrants international intervention, but not the dispatching of

blue-helmeted troops.<sup>1</sup> In this latest period of peacekeeping, the international community seems interested only in limited commitments of limited duration. The operations undertaken are mainly small, observer missions. There are exceptions, but these occasional larger efforts have been initiated because the interests of at least one of the great powers are directly involved.

The UN's annual review of peacekeeping described this present era:<sup>2</sup>

*As 1996 ended, some 26,000 military personnel and civilians were serving in 16 UN peace-keeping operations at a total annual cost of about \$1.6 billion. Clearly, the pendulum has swung away from the heady days of what some have referred to as peace-keeping overstretch. Only a year before, in 1995, some 60,000 personnel were serving in 17 UN peace-keeping missions - including three in the former Yugoslavia - at an annual cost of some \$3.5 billion.*

Certainly one way to avoid one's reach from exceeding one's grasp is not to aim to achieve very much. How long the international community will continue to impose its own self-limiting constraints on peacekeeping's application will depend in part on whether the causes of failure that brought about the current era can be corrected.

Whether this situation can be corrected is a question without an easy answer. Chapters Three, Four and Five discussed how peacekeeping can fail before, during or after the peacekeepers are deployed. The problem having been described, together with its causes and the implications of the current trend for the future, it is appropriate to draw some conclusions and tentatively suggest some solutions.

The current situation exists, however, not because there has been a lack of assessments of what is wrong and how to remedy it, but because there is always resistance to change, and "solutions" to this problem are not easily adopted. Even though change might improve the chances for peacekeeping to succeed, the *status quo* serves someone's interest and that someone will see change as detrimental to those interests. Protectors of the *status quo* can include the member states of the UN, the UN bureaucracy or NGOs.

One might begin by asking whether reform is possible, and who and what should be changed. Because the UN is both a bureaucracy and an organization made up of 185 member states, there are many different attitudes toward and definitions of reform. Improving the efficiency of the bureaucracy will amount to little if it is not accompanied by changes in the actions of the

member states, including what they ask of the organization. Some are skeptical that changes can be made. Applebaum in 1993 wrote:<sup>3</sup>

*Reform is a constant topic among the UN's top bureaucrats. Yet from year to year little seems to change. In a bureaucracy which is responsible to everyone and no one, even press scrutiny has had little impact. Individuals who try to reform the system from within risk ostracism and loss of their jobs.*

The new Secretary General did announce a much-heralded set of proposals for overall reform of the UN in July 1997 however. While the official US Government reaction was cautiously positive<sup>4</sup>, US congressional leaders and others expressed disappointment that the proposals did not go farther.<sup>5</sup> The skeptics questioned how a reform proposal that cut neither jobs nor programs could have much effect. Others questioned whether the first Secretary General to have risen up through the ranks of the UN bureaucracy could implement the reforms necessary. In fact, when briefing his fellow UN employees, Secretary General Annan is reported to have said that he would be bringing in outside management experts to review work practices but that: "It is not their reform. It is our reform."<sup>6</sup> Others questioned how he could implement real change while balancing the competing interests of UN employees, the bloc of Third World countries that form



a majority of the member states and the various fiefdoms that each UN agency has become.<sup>7</sup> Despite the skepticism from some quarters, the General Assembly the reforms and Deputy Secretary General Frechette was appointed to implement them.

Everyone seems to agree that reform is necessary, but no one agrees on what that means. One UN ambassador, in commenting on the issue, observed that:<sup>8</sup>

*No one in this assembly can seriously question the need for reform. Unfortunately it appears from working groups it has different connotations for different states, and different groups' failure to make reform efforts has generated tension and mistrust among ourselves that we must endeavor to diffuse.*

The ambassador was not the first to remark that reform in the UN means different things to different people. In 1992, Muller observed:<sup>9</sup>

*Reform has acquired a particular meaning at the UN and is viewed in at least four different ways: first, as a response to new challenges or emerging concerns of member states; second, as an attempt to undermine the interests and concerns of member states which consequently react to preserve the status quo; third, as a process through which economies can be achieved by cutting activities often without concern for substance; and fourth, as a conspiracy on the*

*part of the secretariat to enhance its position or on the part of some member states to promote their interests at the expense of others resulting in stalemate and an exchange of accusations.*

The inherent resistance to reform within the organization has not precluded some attempts to improve its ability to perform peacekeeping. Several institutional changes have been made to improve the technical capacity of those elements of the organization involved in peacekeeping. A Mission Planning Service within the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations was established to design plans for multidimensional operations and to coordinate with other departments. A Situation Centre was set up to provide 24-hour contact with peacekeepers around the world. A Policy and Analysis Unit, a Training Unit and a Civilian Police Unit were created to deal with those aspects of PKOs.

In addition, the UN established a Lessons Learned Unit in April 1995, which was supposed to help the organization avoid repeating the same mistakes from one PKO to the next.<sup>10</sup> This attempt to create an institutional memory which can be applied to future operations consists of an office of eight people. The Unit has put out four reports since its creation and is

gathering material for assessments of the efforts in Yugoslavia and Angola.<sup>11</sup>

Ironically, at the same time the UN was making these efforts to improve its peacekeeping capacity, the political will of the organization to use that capacity was waning. Compounding the lack of political will is a continuing lack of confidence in the UN's ability to undertake peacekeeping despite the organizational changes. The lack of confidence reflects, in part, the fact that reform is easier to announce than to implement. Despite the establishment of a Lessons Learned Unit, it is unclear to what degree the organization has been able to incorporate what has been learned. Even with the experience of ONUMOZ in demining, the Security Council in August 1996 felt it necessary to point out that operational demining should be an integral part of peacekeeping mandates. It also called for improved coordination and a clear delineation of responsibilities between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs - the same two departments whose bureaucratic squabbling prevented ONUMOZ from lifting any mines for so long.<sup>12</sup>

Even if organizational changes were successfully implemented, it is clear that correcting the flaws in

the bureaucracy alone is not likely to be sufficient to make peacekeeping a more effective instrument. As one UN document noted:<sup>13</sup>

*No amount of tinkering with procedures and machinery is enough. Only agreement on the scope of UN operations and a commitment by member states to support them politically with feasible mandates and financially with the resources necessary will allow the UN to respond effectively to future distress calls.*

## 9.2 THE KINDS OF PEACEKEEPING THAT ARE NOW POSSIBLE

Given the five different types of peacekeeping operations, as defined by Lewis and described in Chapter One, one might ask what kind of distress calls the UN will answer in the future and to what degree each of these five types of operations need reform. Peace-making, often called preventive diplomacy, will continue because it requires few people and little risk or expense. The biggest challenge of this kind of peacekeeping is to pick a special envoy who can play well the UN's limited role in helping to broker a peace. That role is limited by the constraints on the UN's capacity to be an effective mediator as described by Touval in Chapter Three. It will also be limited by the degree to which the international community is reluctant to backup the special envoy with punitive economic, political or military measures against those

who prevent peace and those who support them. Nonetheless, this should continue to be a type of peacekeeping which the UN can and will carry out.

Peacekeeping in Lewis's definition is classical peacekeeping and the UN has shown that it has the experience and capacity to carry that function out as well. The only difficulty is that, with the change in the nature of the world's conflicts, classical peacekeeping is rarely necessary because interstate wars have become the rare exception rather than the rule. The endless, classical PKOs the UN is currently engaged in are therefore unlikely to increase in number.

One recommendation for reform that need not be made is with regard to peace enforcement operations. If the UN has learned anything, it is that those types of distress calls should be answered by others. While the former Secretary General expressed the wish to create such a capacity within the UN in the long term, he recognized that neither he nor the Security Council had the ability to deploy, command or control operations for enforcement purposes.<sup>14</sup> Talk of creating such a capacity is still heard, but not acted upon.

There seems to be general agreement, in the wake of

Bosnia and Somalia, that peace enforcement operations should be left to military coalitions that have the blessing of the UN, but are not under direct UN control. As Daniel observed:<sup>15</sup>

*When the UN is in the direct chain-of-command, the prospects for success seem to be generally limited only to consensual peacekeeping, whether traditional or multi-functional. Peace enforcement under UN control simply runs too much against the grain of what the organization and its members can or are willing to support administratively, financially, or politically.*

The remaining categories of operations - protective engagement and peace-building - unlike peace enforcement are still within the realm of the possible for the UN. They nonetheless have an uncertain future because they still pose difficult challenges to the UN.

A UN Special Committee that was charged with reviewing peacekeeping operations stressed in its report to the General Assembly that for peacekeeping to succeed the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense were essential.<sup>16</sup>

Protective engagement is unnecessary if all the parties consent. Furthermore, if the peacekeepers are allowed to use their arms to defend only aid workers and themselves, they will be reduced to mere observers as innocent civilians are attacked.

Given the nature of today's conflicts, and the humanitarian disasters that they cause, situations requiring protective engagement are sure to arise. CNN will be there to cover them, and the NGOs and others with an interest in humanitarian assistance will pressure for the UN to act. The UN does not appear to have a response to these situations at the present and it is clear technical reform won't provide one. For protective engagement to become possible, political will, not simple administrative or logistical efficiency, is required.

The last of the five types of PKOs, peace-building, presents another dilemma to which the UN in the Contraction Period does not have a ready answer. To be effective, peace-building would have to encompass both the deployment and post-deployment phases. A multidimensional PKO would normally incorporate peace-building measures as it strives to rebuild institutions that make a lasting peace possible. Peace-building in the post-deployment phase is what has previously been referred to as PCPB (post-conflict peace-building). Given that the international community is presently interested in limited commitments of limited duration, multidimensional PKOs are unlikely to be undertaken, especially if the expectation is that the peacekeepers will stay indefinitely. By their nature

multidimensional PKOs are large affairs with several goals. While their termination may be tied to certain events, such as elections, because such events are so often delayed, these PKOs can be of uncertain duration. Once the peacekeepers do depart, there will always be much in the way of PCPB left to do. It is at that moment, however, that the international community begins to lose what unity of purpose it may have had while still trying to end the conflict.

Only in cases like Haiti and Albania, where the interests of a major power are directly affected, does there seem to be sufficient support for major operations in the Contraction Period and even those are of decidedly limited length. In Haiti, after landing 20,000 troops in September 1994 to restore President Aristide to power, "The United Nations mandate that made the intervention possible has been allowed to expire, a casualty of international exasperation with a lack of progress here."<sup>17</sup>

In Albania, as noted earlier, the peacekeepers departed rapidly after the elections. Because of its quick, albeit limited, success, some have suggested that Operation Alba (as the PKO was called) may become a model for the large PKOs that might take place during the Contraction Period. The Secretary General, in his



tinal report to the Security Council, concluded:  
"Operation Alba has been a good example of how a political and military operation of international stabilization can be undertaken with responsibility and solidarity."<sup>18</sup> In the Security Council's meeting to review the operation upon its termination, several speakers praised the regional cooperation involved in the initiative, as well as its success.<sup>19</sup>

In his comments, the Egyptian delegate struck a much more cautionary note. He said that the operation's success could not be viewed as a substitute for the UN role in containing a variety of world crises, particularly in Africa.<sup>20</sup> His point is an important one, as there will be no African Albania. Operation Alba was unique in several respects. It involved the troops of 11 European nations (nine of which were from Western Europe) in helping another European country. Over half of the 7215 troops deployed were Italian. The operation benefited from the assistance of an alphabet soup of European organizations, including the OSCE, WEU, EU, NATO and the Council of Europe.<sup>21</sup> They made major contributions to the organization and monitoring of the elections and other objectives of the mission.

The operation accomplished its limited goals quickly

(from April 15 to August 11, 1997), successfully and without having a single peacekeeper killed or even attacked. It also helped that Albania was a small, poor country with only 3.5 million people and that the conflict was not an ethnic one. Even though President Berisha would have liked to use the PKO to help him cling to power, he was so thoroughly repudiated by his people that he was left with no other option but to step down.

Several speakers in the Security Council session mentioned that another factor in Operation Alba's success was:<sup>22</sup>

*Strict compliance with the three golden rules of updated peacekeeping operations: the request and consent of the legitimate government; absolute impartiality of the peacekeepers; and no recourse to weapons by the peacekeepers except in self-defense.*

Almost none of these factors are likely to be present in an African context or in much of the rest of the Third World or in the former Soviet Union where PKOs take place. The troops will not be predominantly First World soldiers who are well-trained and come with their own logistics, communications and transport. No single major power is likely to contribute over half of the troops and lead the operation. The distances involved area covered and population to be assisted will all be

much larger. There won't be a host of well-funded organizations looking for an opportunity to prove their relevance and ability to assist. The loser of the elections will probably not go quietly. The conflict will be a civil war with ethnic overtones in which the legitimacy of the government will be a fundamental question. The warring factions, when not attacking each others' civilians, will not hesitate to attack the peacekeepers if they see it as in their interests or if they lose control of their troops. The obstacles to a lasting peace will not be quickly nor easily resolved, allowing the peacekeepers to depart rapidly and leave the country to its own devices.

The use of peacekeeping will therefore continue to be very constrained with little likelihood that it will be used as frequently as it has in the past. Were the UN to improve its ability to conduct peacekeeping, it might be applied more frequently. This presupposes that reform is possible or has already taken place.

### 9.3 THE KIND OF REFORM THAT IS POSSIBLE

The desire for "reform" has prompted changes within the bureaucratic structures of the UN and the addition of units designed to deal with specific aspects of conducting peacekeeping where the UN was weak in the

past. Because of the limitations on the operations that the international community is willing to undertake, these may be solutions to a problem that no longer exists. If protective engagement and peace-building are unlikely to be attempted, the UN's ability to carry out such operations is a moot point. If the UN is to conduct more than small observer missions, more than administrative changes will be necessary. Changes in the attitudes of the member states and particularly those on the Security Council are a more important, but still missing, element of reform.

A lack of political will to undertake more ambitious operations and a lack of ability to efficiently carry them out are mutually reinforcing. If this situation is to be changed, success of peacekeeping has to become the overriding objective. While successful peacekeeping may seem an obvious goal, capability and realism seem to take a back seat to other considerations.

For instance, in recent UN debates on peacekeeping much has been made of the problem of "*gratis* personnel" on loan to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>23</sup> Of the Department's 400 staff members, only 55 are paid for from the UN's regular budget with the rest being loaned from, and paid for, by governments. Over 80% of

these 345 personnel on loan came from developed countries. The General Assembly, with the support of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), asked the Secretary General to reduce the number of *gratis* personnel, saying the practice undermined the equitable geographical representation and international character of the Department's staff.

The concern voiced in the argument was not that the practice reduced the Department's capability, just that it reduced its representation from the Third World. While the UN Charter speaks of the principle of geographic equity, PKOs are neither distributed nor paid for on an equitable geographic basis. The troops that participate in them are volunteered by member states, not drawn from an equitable geographic one. It is unlikely that an equitable geographic distribution of the peacekeeping troops would have improved the chances for success in Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia. Yet when it comes to employment in New York, even when it is planning PKOs, apparently many believe the principle of geographic equity should prevail over the ability or cost to the organization.

One of the main functions of government is to provide jobs to a country's elites, especially where the local economy has trouble absorbing them. Perhaps for some,

the UN should do the same. Viewing the UN primarily as a source of patronage jobs, or simply a mechanism for transferring resources from the developed to the underdeveloped world, will continue to weaken its capacity to carry out important responsibilities such as peacekeeping.

Capacity may be undervalued at the UN because the organization suffers from a lack of accountability and difficulty in measuring its own performance. The UN spent the first 49 years of its existence without a serious internal audit capability. Although an Office of Internal Oversight Services was finally established in September 1994, its initial efforts were criticized as lacking vigor.<sup>24</sup> The corruption and waste the Office has uncovered has not been enough to threaten the success of a PKO, but does nothing to build the image of an institution that can conduct one efficiently. In its most recent annual report, the Office noted that:<sup>25</sup>

*In Angola, acceptance of delayed defective and short supplies from a vendor resulted in excess payments of \$288,000 and losses of \$980,000. There was also serious irregularities noted in the contracting of an aircraft. Internal control weaknesses resulted in extensive abuse of communications facilities.*

The effectiveness of the organization is hard to gauge

because the tasks it performs usually defy easy measurement, the exception being UNHCR, where mortality rates among refugees give clear indications of when its efforts are inadequate. In addition, the UN bureaucracy resists measurement and accountability because it answers to 185 members who all pursue their own national goals, leaving the UN civil servants potentially open to criticism from every direction. The lack of accountability minimizes the risk of criticism, but also creates a culture where accomplishment equates with the absence of criticism. This often gets translated into keeping the government happy in the country where a program is being conducted even if it affects the effectiveness of that program.

Some may find that judgement harsh, but demining in Mozambique provides an example of the phenomenon. The UN's assessment of its efforts on this problem noted that:<sup>26</sup>

*It is not the number of square meters cleared which has been the measure of success of the Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) to date, it is more the development of the Mozambican staff from the headquarters to the field.*

In other words, demining is not an important measure of the success of a demining program in the UN's view. It is the capacity created within the local government.

While creating capacity is a worthwhile goal, pursuing it may not accomplish much unless the main objectives are to give the UN a program to administer and the local government access to jobs and other resources. As noted earlier, the UN's demining efforts neither supported the peace process in Mozambique nor contributed to the success of ONUMOZ.

Even if one accepted the idea that capacity building within the local government is appropriate as the most important goal, the demining program in Mozambique fails even by this measure of performance. While ONUMOZ was brought to a conclusion over three years ago, the UN's efforts at demining continued after the departure of the peacekeepers. Demining experts agree, however, that the Mozambican Government's demining organization after five years of UN effort is still in complete disarray and anything that has been accomplished in demining has been due to the work of NGOs.<sup>27</sup>

Despite this track record, some still see capacity building as a critical element of a PKO. In suggesting six elements for successful peacekeeping at the conclusion of his study of ONUMOZ, Synge includes capacity building. He reasons that: "A general policy of support for key government structures, rather than



one of displacement, should help to provide sustainable management capacity for the political and administrative authorities at the end of the process."<sup>28</sup> Capacity building takes decades, however, and today's peacekeeping mandates don't afford the luxury of staying that long. If capacity is to be created, it will have to be part of post-conflict, peace-building measures.

Another feature of the UN that limits its effectiveness is the fact that the vast majority of the member states make little financial contribution to the UN's budget. This is certainly justifiable to a degree, since poorer countries with underdeveloped economies have little ability to pay to support the organization. It creates, however, an "expense is no object" attitude on the part of those who don't have to pay the bills, but who often receive the benefits. For that reason, NAM representatives can argue that *gratis* personnel should not be accepted, and budgetary constraints should be no excuse for the lack of greater employment opportunities in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The linkages between those paying the bills (generally the taxpayers of the First World), those spending the money (the UN bureaucracy) and those receiving the benefits (in peacekeeping, those in underdeveloped

countries) are sufficiently weak to have a negative effect on both the efficiency and the accountability of the organization. The UN has no legislature closely monitoring its efforts, little close scrutiny from the press and no outraged tax payers demanding an end to waste when they observe it. An organization that serves everyone in reality answers to no one.

The Office of Oversight Services established three years ago is beginning to uncover some of the organization's faults and attempt to deal with them. According to one article, the Office's third annual report released in October 1997 revealed:<sup>29</sup>

*A pattern of sloppy management in which contracts are awarded and money disbursed without reference to the organization's financial regulations or accepted rules of accounting. It describes a world of petty criminality, where cash sometimes seems to be sitting around for the taking. In this freewheeling atmosphere, diverting money is relatively easy.*

The article also indicates one of the reasons why real reform of the situation is hard to achieve:<sup>30</sup>

*Furthermore, national governments put pressure on UN officials to hire or promote - but never dismiss - citizens of their countries who clamor for the prestige of jobs in the organization, and then find ways to enhance their incomes by manipulating travel allowances or salary advances. UN employees have provided numerous accounts of*

*officials being transferred rather than dismissed after being caught breaking the rules.*

This lack of accountability and measurable performance has been compounded by peacekeeping's failures, which brought additional focus on the need for reform of the UN. If the reform required for improving the chances for successful peacekeeping is perceived at the UN in any of the last three of Muller's definitions, it will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. If instead it is taken to be a way to better respond to the new challenges posed by the situations created by today's intrastate conflicts, it may have some chance of being implemented.

Assuming the latter case, the three phases of peacekeeping - predeployment, deployment and postdeployment - can be reconsidered to see where improvements might be made and also speculate why they might not be. Whether at this point in its history the UN (in the form of its bureaucracy or of its member states) is ready to respond to new challenges, or is only intent on not repeating the failures of the past, is an open question.

#### 9.4 AVOIDING FAILURE BEFORE STARTING

The chances of success in peacekeeping depend in no

small measure on what kind of peace there is to keep. As described in Chapter Three, peace can come in a variety of ways - when one side defeats the other; when it is negotiated, but both sides continue to seek victory; when it is imposed by an outside party; or when an agreement is negotiated that is accepted by both parties and supported by the external actors who may have instigated or supported the conflict.

An imposed solution won't work, according to the British Ambassador at the UN in 1982, Sir Anthony Parsons. In his judgement the UN is not an instrument for providing collective security, but an instrument of persuasion. *According to Parsons:*<sup>31</sup>

*The UN is not, and should not try to be, a forum for the solution of disputes. If I have learned anything from my experience, it is that problems can ultimately be resolved peacefully only through direct negotiations between the parties themselves. It is no use expecting outside bodies, including the UN, to draw up detailed blueprints and to impose them on recalcitrant parties to a dispute. It simply does not work.*

If direct negotiations between the parties are necessary, does the UN have a role? Chapter Three pointed out that the UN Charter permits the Secretary General to bring to the Security Council's attention any matter which may threaten international peace and

security. While the Secretary General can use his influence to get the parties to negotiate, as Touval has pointed out, the UN is not the best mediator, since it lacks many of the tools necessary to bring the parties to an agreement. To say someone else should play the role of mediator assumes that there is someone willing who is also able to do the job. Durch (1993) listed three requirements for successful peacekeeping: the consent of the parties, their desisting from attempts to win everything and the support of the Great Powers. Ideally at least one of the Great Powers should take up the task of mediator and be willing to invest its time, prestige and resources in seeing the process through until the right outcome is achieved.

A mediator should strive for an outcome that is durable, which implies a peace agreement that results in power sharing. As one African expert explained: "One should ask do the parties have a deal, at least an implicit one, giving the loser a stake in the outcome and hope in the future."<sup>32</sup> As was seen in Angola, and may yet be seen in Mozambique, a winner-take-all scenario provides little incentive for the loser.

When the UN is invited to become involved in implementing a peace agreement it did not design and that may be destined to fail, it finds it difficult to

insist on the changes necessary. It could develop a checklist to see that the agreement contains the critical elements essential for successful implementation. This would also put the parties and any mediators on notice that such elements were necessary for the UN to consider becoming involved.

These elements should include provisions to give the UN sufficient authority and responsibility, and to keep the cost of the operation down. Such provisions can be spelled out in the status of forces agreement (SOFA), which the UN concludes with the government of the country to which the peacekeepers are being dispatched. Negotiating this agreement can take time and can delay the arrival of the peacekeepers. If the UN feels a greater sense of urgency to conclude the SOFA than the government, it will be under pressure to make concessions to government demands.

The Secretary General's July 1997 reform proposal describes the problem and suggests a solution:<sup>33</sup>

*Considerable difficulties are also at times encountered in negotiating and properly implementing a SOFA. Amendments proposed by certain host governments sometimes constitute fundamental departures from the customary practices and principles applicable to UN peacekeeping operations, and negotiating on such a basis delays the conclusion of an acceptable*

*agreement. A time frame prescribed by the Security Council for the conclusion of the SOFA and an inclusion in the resolution establishing the operation of a provision to the effect that the model SOFA shall apply provisionally, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, would contribute to expediting its conclusion.*

This attempt to shift to the Security Council the responsibility for putting pressure on the host government demonstrates that the Secretary General feels himself in a weak bargaining position when it comes to negotiating a SOFA with a country about to receive a PKO. If a government is more interested in a SOFA that it finds acceptable than in the welfare of its citizens, even the Security Council may not have enough leverage to bring the negotiations to a conclusion so that the peacekeepers can be dispatched. What happens when the time period established by the Security Council runs out without an agreement is not clear. The UN could deploy the peacekeepers without a SOFA and assume the host government will honor the model one, even though the government has not agreed to it. Or the Security Council could extend the time period for concluding the SOFA, draw another line in the sand and agree to remain seized of the matter. When under pressure to do something to alleviate the situation, the UN finds it easier to make concessions than to resist the urgings that it become immediately

involved.

One element of a SOFA should be that the PKO is exempt from any local levies or taxes. The host government will often see the PKO as an economic opportunity and a revenue source. In Mozambique, for instance, civil aviation authorities attempted to insist that planes carrying election materials pay exorbitant landing fees. A PKO's chances for success will be improved if the parties to the conflict not only do not make money from it, but pay a portion of its costs. Shifting the costs of the PKO to the parties to the conflict is difficult, however, especially since the "tea cup" wars tend to take place in underdeveloped countries where the parties are busy destroying what few resources there are. Nonetheless some of the billions that Angola earned from oil and diamonds and spent on weapons or sent to bank accounts abroad, could have been used to reimburse the UN. It would have provided an incentive to the parties to help keep the costs of the operation down and its duration short.

The peace agreement and the mandate given the PKO must unequivocally put the UN in charge, with all the power necessary to accomplish whatever tasks are required and to minimize the obstructionism that the parties will occasionally display. The UN should also have the



authority to destroy any weapons that are in excess of the needs of the army, and to destroy all land mines. Effective disarmament could be the key to sustaining the peace, not only in the country in question, but in the region.

Giving such discretion to the UN may become a problem for the host government, which will use the sovereignty argument to protect its prerogatives. However, the UN should not accept the responsibility for a peace process without the authority to ensure that it succeeds to the maximum extent possible.

The UN must also have the ability to communicate directly with the people of the country via radio to explain its actions and counteract the propaganda that the parties will be intent on distributing. This is not a role that the UN has always been comfortable with, as was pointed out by one participant in UNTAC: "I do not believe that anyone could now deny the criticality of Radio UNTAC to the whole process. In my view, this was obvious from the start and only the UN bureaucracy delayed it."<sup>34</sup>

Boutros-Ghali also recognized in his "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" the need for a PKO to have its own information capacity.<sup>35</sup> It was also called for in

UNAVEM III's mandate. And yet, despite the propaganda war that both sides in Angola continue to engage in, the UN never overcame the resistance of the parties or its own inertia to set up such a capacity of its own. Whether it wanted to keep its costs down or simply yielded to the Government's intransigence, by not having its own communication capability the UN did not improve its chances for success.

One of the easiest criticisms when a PKO encounters problems once it does become operational is that there was a lack of planning. The UN has improved its ability to plan, as indicated by the expansion of the number of personnel, albeit most of them *gratis*, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. One aspect of planning which is not likely to change is the suggestion that was made by the general in charge of UNTAC's military component: "Regrettably, for almost everyone in UNTAC, the process was one of on-the-job training, while implementing plans prepared by someone else. Plans need to be prepared by the people who will be responsible for their execution."<sup>36</sup> There is no indication that the planners in New York stand in any danger of having to become the implementers in the field, even if there were enough of them. The general had good reason to complain about the plans for UNTAC. Righter points out that: "As for the UN's tiny

peacekeeping department, suffice it to say that the Cambodia operation was sketched out by a Nigerian desk officer in an afternoon."<sup>37</sup>

Another simple suggestion that is difficult to implement is that the right people should be picked to do the job. This applies to the SRSG, the civilian staff and the military units. Such decisions, more often than not, seem to be subordinate to other considerations such as bureaucratic politics, interests of key member states and a desire to avoid embarrassing anyone. The UNTAC military commander again provides an example of this:<sup>38</sup>

*The UN Secretariat alone reserves the right, in the light of the views of the Permanent Five, to decide which troops come from which countries. This is done in accordance with the Secretariat's priorities, which in the case of UNTAC, were not always consistent with the needs of the mission.*

While the right military units are important, the key personnel decision lies in choosing the right SRSG. This is often the most political of all the appointments. That person needs to be given the power to select key staff members, and should have the responsibility, authority and resources to achieve the mandate of the mission. This should include authority, not only over the members of the PKO, but over the staff of the UN agencies that are operating in the

country as well. Coordination of the humanitarian relief efforts of NGOs should also be part of the SRSG's responsibilities. This is again easier asserted than accomplished. UN agencies tend to act as fiefdoms free from the direct supervision of the Secretary General. Their field offices are therefore unlikely to take orders from an SRSG. The many NGOs that are typically present have diverse agendas and funding sources, and are even more resistant to control or even coordination.

Another suggestion that is more difficult than it sounds to put into practice is for the SRSG to be replaced if found not to be up to the task. For such a decision to be possible, it is necessary that New York be able to measure with some degree of confidence the performance of the person in the field. That is not easy, since the information that headquarters has will often come from the SRSG or from the parties. The latter will measure the SRSG's performance strictly in terms of whether or not it serves their interests.

Changing bureaucratic procedures is not the entire solution, however. UN officials, with some justification, often blame the lack of success in peacekeeping not on their organization, but on a lack of political will and economic resources in the member

states. When Secretary General Annan presented his proposals for overall UN reform in July 1997, one article quoted UN officials as saying:<sup>39</sup>

*The bureaucracy has been made a scapegoat for recent UN failures in Somalia, Bosnia, Congo and Cambodia that were the fault not of UN workers, but of the unwillingness of the international community to confront the problems head-on. These are failures that cannot be corrected by turning loose management consultants to draw revised organizational tables and flow charts.*

Confronting problems head-on should include confronting all of the possibilities that may lead to a solution and devising realistic mandates. The member states, particularly those on the Security Council, should not dump on the organization jobs just because they defy solution elsewhere. The member states should not instruct the UN to launch an operation simply to give the appearance that something is being done, but because they expect the UN can succeed.

Getting agreement between member states about common goals and common means is not easily accomplished. As Chayes noted with regard to Bosnia: "Even like-minded allies have often failed to reach consensus. Although they may agree that 'something must be done,' they are not always able to concur about what that 'something' is. This can lead to paralysis or palliative

measures."<sup>40</sup> Getting countries to act with some unity of purpose is necessary, however, so that the peacekeepers have a chance, once deployed, to accomplish their mission. This is again easier said than done, since it requires countries to put the common good ahead of their individual interests. Maximizing the chances for success need not supersede a country's interests, but should become one of them.

#### 9.5 AVOIDING FAILURE WHILE DEPLOYED

Having a strong mandate, adequate resources and the right people will give a PKO a good chance of achieving the objectives of the mission. The SRSG must have the foresight and the authority to pursue the mission's priorities diligently. Secondary objectives like creating local capacity and taking a long-term developmental approach to problems, must take a back seat to more immediate goals like demining key roads, disarmament, rapid demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and moving ahead to elections.

If the elections are to be the culmination of the process, the UN has to be in a position to ensure that they are free and fair. The local actors will have to do much of the organization, but the international community will be paying the bills, so it must be able

to ensure that the process is neither gold-plated nor obstructed by the parties. Election monitors should be primarily local rather than international. They are far cheaper and it is important that they, rather than outside observers, be satisfied that the process has been free and fair.

The SRSG, together with the commander of the military component, should have the flexibility to adjust assignments and units to reflect the dynamic situation on the ground. Being bound by a plan drawn up in New York months before is a prescription for having the wrong troops in the wrong place doing the wrong things. This would have to be coordinated closely with the unit's government, however. That government may well prefer its men assigned to a riskless and useless task rather than to one that accomplishes something, if it endangers the soldiers involved. It is unclear that New York would be willing to delegate such authority to the field, however, or that troop contributors would go along with the reassignments.

If police observers are to be used to monitor the conduct of the local police, prevent human rights violations and investigate those that occur, they will have to do a better job than the police that took part in ONUMOZ and UNAVEM. The UN has succeeded at one such

mission. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was without precedent in UN history in that it was "the first mission to accomplish its tasks of verification and observation of respect for human rights and international humanitarian law during an internal conflict."<sup>41</sup> The UN took on this responsibility almost as an afterthought. When the Salvadoran peace talks ground to a halt in July 1990, the negotiators proposed having the UN conduct human rights monitoring. Not only was the idea accepted, but "it succeeded in breaking the logjam in the negotiations."<sup>42</sup>

ONUSAL accomplished this by interpreting its mandate "as giving the highest priority to the protection of the civilian population and to the study of select cases involving humanitarian law."<sup>43</sup> ONUSAL's mandate gave it the powers to do so, as it was given the capacity to: verify respect for human rights; receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or body complaining of human rights violations; visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice; interview freely and privately any individual, group of individuals or members of bodies or institutions; and make recommendations to the parties on the basis of the conclusions it reached with respect to cases or situations it may have been called



upon to consider.<sup>44</sup>

The result of this mandate, effectively carried out despite the problem of diverse nationalities and inadequate training, was that the people of El Salvador were given a greater sense of security and confidence in the peace process and in the UN. The mandate, the performance and the results of the ONUSAL experience all contrast sharply with what occurred in Angola and Mozambique.

ONUSAL had one other very significant advantage, at least over UNAVEM and many other PKOs. As Flores points out:<sup>45</sup>

*The willingness of the parties to reach an end to the armed conflict, a permanent characteristic of the Salvadoran negotiation process, has to be stressed. Absent in other peace negotiations, the desire of the Salvadoran parties for a peaceful solution is definitely one of the keys to the success of the ONUSAL mission.*

The conduct of the local actors and the external actors, along with the country's internal resources, constitute the three factors discussed earlier which the UN cannot completely control. It can attempt to influence all three, but generally does not do it well. In Mozambique, Ajello had a strong mandate and was willing to confront the parties when they failed to

live up to their obligations. The dependency of Mozambique on donor aid gave the UN considerable leverage. Leverage means little, however, if the UN and the international community are unable or unwilling to use it.

Another source of leverage that there is normally great reluctance to use is humanitarian aid. The selective provision of such aid helped end the war in Mozambique. However, the use of humanitarian aid in that case arose out of the consensus belief among the NGOs that RENAMO, because of its gross violations of human rights abuses, did not deserve to have food aid delivered to areas under its control. Such a consensus was not orchestrated by the UN and might be difficult to achieve in other instances.

In eastern Zaire, where the different use of humanitarian aid might have helped bring about a different result, not even the genocide committed by some of those receiving the aid was enough to create such a consensus. Finally, the Government of Rwanda stepped in to prevent those responsible for genocide in Rwanda from using relief aid to provide themselves a base of support in Zaire. One could argue that innocent people would have suffered if aid were withheld, but many innocent people suffered after

Rwandan troops and Zairian rebels forced people out of the refugee camps. The UN subsequently put great pressure on President Kabila to allow UN investigators the freedom to determine how many may have died, but it is likely the extent of the killing will ever be known.

The UN also needs to address the question of outside actors in a peacekeeping situation. If the neighboring countries or regional powers play a positive role, they should be recognized and encouraged. If they play a negative role, they should be identified, chastised and, if necessary, subjected to sanctions. This negative role can be an active one, where the outside actor is assisting one of the parties to continue the conflict. It can also be a passive one, where the outside actor simply ignores the fact that its territory is being used for the transshipment of arms.

#### 9.6 AVOIDING FAILURE AFTER THE FACT

Donors could use their aid both as a carrot and a stick to ensure that the parties live up to their peace agreement and implement it during the deployment phase. The international community usually finds this difficult to do, as national interests or humanitarian objectives take precedence. It finds using this

leverage in the post-deployment phase even more difficult, though it may be necessary to ensure that what has been built while the peacekeepers were present is not destroyed after they have left. Most donors are reluctant to dictate to a sovereign government, even after the huge investment involved in a major PKO.

In the case of Cambodia, Shawcross noted in 1996 that:<sup>46</sup>

*The donors of aid to Cambodia have not just the means but also, under the Paris Agreement, the responsibility to link assistance to the government's respect for its own expressed commitments to the rule of law. If they do not do so, violence, corruption and abuse of power will continue.*

It is now clear that they did not. Although the Cambodian Government received almost half of its annual budget from the donors, few strings were attached.<sup>47</sup> Even after Hun Sen demonstrated how little respect he had for human rights and the rule of law, some donors showed no inclination to use the leverage aid provided to improve the situation and salvage some of the accomplishments of UNTAC.

If there were sufficient commonality of purpose and political will, there would still be the question of how the coordination among donors would take form in

the field. The traditional instruments of development assistance are not easily geared toward conditionality. Once programs are established, the bureaucracies responsible for them do not take well to the programs being turned on or off because of political reasons much less to do so in a coordinated way with other donors.

One of the Secretary General's July 1997 reform proposals was to have all the UN agencies in a country work from one office in order to better coordinate their programs. UN workers in the field will be even less willing than those in New York to tell governments things they don't want to hear, however, since they have to deal with those governments every day. Given the principle of sovereignty, the UN finds it difficult to be assertive, even when the government in question is putting peace at risk.

Aside from political will and common purpose on the part of the international community, a new definition of sovereignty may be required to allow the UN to play a stronger post-deployment role in a country that has benefited from peacekeeping. The traditional concept of sovereignty has eroded in recent years. Makinda (1996) notes that:<sup>48</sup>

*The message that Haiti, Northern Iraq and Somalia*

*have conveyed is that the UN is probably ready to implement a broader concept of security that, among other things, includes economic development, social institutions, and good governance. They also indicate that the UN has recognized that respect for state sovereignty ought to be balanced against other issues, such as the provision of basic needs, respect for fundamental freedoms and, where necessary, a guarantee of minority rights.*

Makinda's three examples were all cases where the United States had led the coalition of forces that intervened because there was no government or one that was seriously abusing its own citizens, and because the US saw its own interests at stake. In today's world, a country like Haiti from which refugees directly onto the shores of the United States would still be likely to merit such action. Because the Kurds in northern Iraq were imperiled, in part, because of the Gulf War, the US might feel obligated to act under similar circumstances. However, under the Presidential Decision Directive issued after the deaths of the peacekeepers in Mogadishu, it is extremely improbable that the US would be willing to lead another operation like UNOSOM. Rwanda demonstrated that even in the face of widespread suffering, there is now greater caution about launching such an initiative.

The question of a country's sovereignty after a PKO

departs has probably not changed enough to permit the UN to play a sufficiently strong role to ensure that what has been built is not destroyed. Makinda describes the limitations of this changing definition of sovereignty:<sup>49</sup>

*While a growing number of policy makers and analysts have been calling for a reinterpretation of state sovereignty and international security, uncertainty in the post-Cold War international system, past practice, and political imperatives in both the industrialized and developing worlds suggest that there will be no formal redefinition of these concepts. However subliminal and normative factors will continue to erode Westphalian sovereignty.*

This erosion will probably not be sufficient to permit the UN to take on a role with which it would still be uncomfortable. The irony of inviting several thousand blue-helmeted troops into a country to end its civil war will not prevent governments from resisting suggestions about how to sustain the peace after they have left.

#### 9.7 SOLUTIONS THAT MIGHT NOT WORK

Many suggest that one of the problems of the UN is that it is undemocratic, in particular because of the power given to the Security Council and especially to its five permanent members. In "Agenda for Democracy",

Boutros-Ghali wrote: "Democracy will not succeed if it is limited to within member states. We need democracy among member states. If global problems are solved by authoritarian means and national problems are solved by democracy, it will not work." Among the proposals to democratize the UN are expanding the Security Council, making more of its deliberations public and shifting some of its authority to the General Assembly. It seems clear that the Council will eventually be expanded, if a formula can ever be devised that satisfies those left off it as well as those selected for the honor.

It is unclear whether an expanded Security Council, whatever its makeup, will make consensus on future peacekeeping operations and their mandates easier or harder to achieve. A bigger Council, with greater Third World representation, may have more advocates for action. It also may have more countries that are reluctant to get involved in the tea-cup wars of the future. An expanded membership may make it difficult to maintain the collegial spirit which Hume observed among the 15 current members and therefore make agreement on future peacekeeping harder to create.

What the advocates of democratizing the UN don't point out is that most UN members are, at best, limited



democracies themselves. President Clinton in his 1997 address to the General Assembly noted that for the first time in the UN's history, there were more member states whose people live under democracy than did not. His speech writers must have used a liberal definition of democracy. Freedom House, a human rights organization, in their annual ranking of countries, puts each nation in one of three categories depending on its degree of democracy - free, partly free or not free. In 1995, of the UN's 185 members 72 were considered free, 60 only partly free and 53 not free.<sup>50</sup> At the end of 1996, Freedom House noted that more countries were free societies than ever before - 79 of a total of 191 countries were free. The population of those 79 amounted to only 1.25 billion people, however, with 2.26 billion living in the partially free countries and another 2.26 billion in those states considered not free.

To make the UN more democratic by giving more powers to more of its members is therefore to attempt to make a democracy out of a group comprising representatives of mainly authoritarian governments. If democratization in the strictest sense were the goal, it might be more appropriate to suggest that semi-free states have partial voting rights, and states that are not free have none.

The civil wars of today, that peacekeeping might help end, are a feature of the Second and Third Worlds - the former Communist countries and the underdeveloped nations of the world. There have been no PKOs in the First World. However, 97% of the cost of peacekeeping is born by the industrialized countries of the First World.<sup>51</sup> Since the majority of the members of the General Assembly are from the Third world or the Second, peacekeeping is a solution that can be advocated by this majority secure in the knowledge that they will not have to pay for it. One of the major reasons for the erosion of support for peacekeeping in the US Congress has been the mushrooming costs of such operations, over which it had no control. A redistribution of the financial burden of peacekeeping might bring about more realism in considering how PKOs can be done better.

The financial burden is being redistributed in the UN, but not in a way that leads to more responsibility and realism. Third World countries have successfully lowered the dues paid by the poorest nations from \$110,000 a year to \$13,000.<sup>52</sup> This move may further exacerbate the strains between the American Congress, which has been demanding no growth in the UN's budget, and the vast majority of UN members. American efforts to lower its current obligation of 25 percent of the

UN's regular budget collapsed after the Congress failed to approve a measure to pay up some of the US arrears to the organization.

Even if the financial aspects can be worked out and the burden distributed in a way that people can agree upon, the confidence in the UN's ability to perform peacekeeping must be strengthened. In part in recognition of the limitations on the UN, one proposal has been put forward for dealing with situations in Africa that require peacekeeping which has been named the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Originally called the African Crisis Response Force, it was renamed because some found the use of the term "force" to be objectionable as a name for a group to be used for peacekeeping.<sup>53</sup>

The ACRI is designed to use the African troops under OAU or UN auspices with logistical support from the major powers. The attraction of the idea is that it provides the international community with an intermediate option between doing nothing and sending in their own troops. In the post-Somalia world of peacekeeping there is no enthusiasm for complicated, open-ended mandates or for casualties. African countries recognize this, and are ready to act on their own behalf. As one OAU official said at a meeting of

OAU defense chiefs to work out the details of the Initiative: "From Burundi to Liberia, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Congo Brazzaville, we have seen evidence of increasing reluctance of the rest of the world to become involved in African peace support operations."<sup>54</sup>

But even if some African countries are less sensitive to taking casualties in African peacekeeping operations than other nations, will they have better chances of success? The challenges will be no less daunting. If the task were quick and easy, there would be no shortage of nations willing to try. Can an under-funded army, depending on someone else's logistics and training, respond adequately? How can the "three golden rules of updated peacekeeping operations" apply if the legitimacy of the government is the central question, if the troops will often not be looked upon by their fellow Africans as impartial, and if the soldiers can protect only themselves when innocent civilians are most often the targets of attack?

The ACRI is clearly not the solution for all situations. In fact, there may be very few problems for which it will be an adequate answer. It may be one of the few responses available, however. Former UN Under Secretary General Brian Urquhart spoke at a UN

conference on peace with the theme "Looking to the Future" in September 1997. Urquhart observed that the failure of only three of 17 recent UN peacekeeping operations has produced a "disastrous mood swing" towards cautiousness among member states enabling such unfortunate concepts as "coalitions of the willing" and "the reluctant sheriff - the US" to take hold at the UN.<sup>55</sup>

The future may be limited to coalitions of the willing, such as in Albania, or the reluctant sheriff taking on only those situations where the American public can see a direct interest, such as in Haiti. The ACRI may play a part, but even if all the details are worked out, it will remain a solution looking for a problem it can solve. The future is likely to contain more attempts to use humanitarian aid as a substitute for political or military action such as protective engagement. The result will be more situations like eastern Zaire and Congo Brazzaville, where the regional actors such as Rwanda and Angola step in to assert their own interests and impose a military solution. In both cases, Angola intervened actively with men and arms as a means of stopping Savimbi from using these countries as transit points for his weapons shipments. As one article about the Angolan involvement in the latter country pointed out: "The United States and European governments - and

the international institutions they dominate, such as the UN Security Council - have to a large degree become marginalized as African leaders decide on moves, including military actions, designed to further their own national interests."<sup>56</sup>

In November 1966, then Under Secretary General Annan told a UN committee that:<sup>57</sup>

*When the parties to a conflict were genuinely interested in achieving a settlement, mountains could be moved in the interest of peace. But even when they were not, that was not a reason for the rest of the world to neglect its responsibility towards international conflict areas.*

That is exactly what has happened. The failed attempts of the UN to deal with these situations through peacekeeping has brought about the Contraction Period where ignoring the problem may become the option of choice. In this era when the use of peacekeeping is so limited, *ad hoc* local solutions by local powers will be more frequently used, as has happened in both the Congos. Human rights, the welfare of refugees and democracy will be among the victims of such conflicts and such solutions. And barring an outbreak of collective amnesia among the international community or a strengthening of its political will, a new era of peacekeeping won't begin.

That era will begin sooner if peacekeeping can be done better. The ways to do it better are far easier to list than to implement effectively. The international community and the UN need to address both the external and the internal factors in a peacekeeping situation. The factors external to the operation of the PKO - the external actors, the internal resources and the parties to the conflict - are elements which the UN cannot ignore. The neighboring countries, regional powers and other external actors have to be encouraged to play a constructive rather than a destructive role. Internal resources should not be allowed to be exported to sustain the fighting. Pressure must be brought to bear on the parties themselves to live up to the peace agreement that they have signed. Implicit in all these actions is the idea that the international community and the UN not simply be cheerleaders for the peace process, but actively engaged in its implementation and willing to punish those who become obstacles to its being implemented.

With regard to the internal factors that can affect the chances for a PKO to succeed, the UN could perform better during all three phases - before, during and after the deployment of the peacekeepers. Before deployment the UN should accept only a strong role for itself in implementation of the peace agreement reached

and then only after it has convinced itself that the parties in fact want peace and not just a respite from pursuit of their goals by military means. The UN needs to craft a clear and realistic mandate and insist on a SOFA that protects its forces and minimizes its costs. The UN should pick the best people, especially for the Special Representative, as well as for the civilian, military and police units and not simply fill its quota with the requisite numbers with more attention paid to their geographic diversity than to their quality.

During the deployment phase, the UN needs to be neutral, but not impartial if that implies ignoring the transgressions of one side or never calling attention to them publicly. It should vigorously carry out its mandate and not simply cross its fingers. The UN must also insist on the ability to communicate directly and effectively (which usually means via AM radio broadcasts) with the people of the country in question. It also should take into account the effect of humanitarian assistance and coordinate its delivery so that it does not result in sustaining the conflict.

After deployment, the UN must remain active and aggressively push PCPB. It should not accept sovereignty as the reason for why the winners of the elections have the right to go back to the ways of



doing things that brought about the civil war in the first place.

All of these actions may require overcoming the resistance to change in the way peacekeeping is currently conducted. While such reforms are necessary, it is unclear to what extent they are possible given the inherent limitations of the organization and the attitudes of the member states. Adlai Stevenson, the US Representative to the UN in the mid-1960s, once said: "If the UN did not exist, we would have to invent it." To paraphrase him, if UN peacekeeping is to exist, we may have to reinvent it.

Some problems may be beyond resolution regardless of how well the organization improves its peacekeeping ability. Thus while the causes of peacekeeping's failures can be identified and remedies prescribed, the challenge of implementing the changes required rarely gets sufficient attention. Implementation is a problem that frequently is not fully overcome and until it is better understood, peacekeeping will continue to be less of an instrument of the international community than it otherwise could be. The dilemma of protective engagement is one example. How the international community copes with having to be ready to kill some people in order to save others will defy easy answers

regardless of what reform takes place.

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11. "The Lessons Learned Unit", <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko-/llu2.htm>

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14. "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", para. 77
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17. Rohter, L. "Haiti's Woes Persist as UN Troops Depart", New York Times, December 4, 1997
18. UN Security Council Press Release SC/6410 of August 14, 1997
19. *ibid*
20. *ibid*, p. 4
21. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Western European Union, European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
22. *ibid*, p. 1
23. UN Press Releases GA/SPD/96 of November 18, 1996 and GA/PK/145 of April 10, 1997
24. The current Secretary of State, when she was Ambassador to the UN, paraphrasing the American expression "mean as a junk yard dog", referred to the Office of Internal Oversight after its first year of existence as a "junk yard puppy", leaving the impression it lacked teeth and aggressiveness.
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27. Author interviews
28. Synge 1997:174 Synge's employment as a UN consultant may explain his enthusiasm for a strategy that clearly is not key to successful peacekeeping.
29. Crossette, B. "In War on Corruption and Waste, UN Confronts Well-Entrenched Foe", International Herald

Tribune, November 3, 1997, p. 5

30. *ibid*
31. Hume 1994:53
32. Author interview - February 13, 1997
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APPENDIX A

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
As of December 1, 1997

Acronym	Name	Date Begun
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Sahara	Apr 1991
MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	Dec 1997
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	Jul 1997
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights)	Jun 1974
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Mar 1964
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Mar 1978
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	Apr 1991
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec 1995
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	Jan 1949
UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	Jan 1996
UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	Dec 1994
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	Aug 1993
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force (in Macedonia)	Mar 1995
UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	Jan 1996
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)	Jun 1948

APPENDIX B

COMPLETED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS  
as of December 1, 1997

Acronym	Name/Location/Dates
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic May 1965 - Oct 1966
MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala Jan - May 1997
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo Jul 1960 - Jun 1964
ONUCA	UN Observer Group in Central America Nov 1989 - Jan 1992
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique Dec 1992 - Dec 1994
ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador Jul 1991 - Apr 1995
UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia Oct 1991 - Mar 1992
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda Oct 1993 - Sep 1994
UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group Chad/Libya May - Jun 1994
UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission I Jan 1989 - Jun 1991
UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission II Jun 1991 - Feb 1995
UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission III Feb 1995 - Jun 1997
UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia Mar 1995 - Jan 1996
UNEF I	First UN Emergency Force Nov 1956 - Jun 1967
UNEF II	Second UN Emergency Force Oct 1973 - Jul 1979

Acronym	Name/Location/Dates
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan Apr 1988 - Mar 1990
UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Aug 1988 - Feb 1991
UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission Sep 1965 - Mar 1966
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti Sep 1993 - Jun 1996
UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in Lebanon Jun - Dec 1958
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia Sep 1993 - Sep 1997
UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Jun 1993 - Sep 1994
UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia I Apr 1992 - Mar 1993
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II Mar 1993 - Mar 1995
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force Former Yugoslavia Mar 1992 - Dec 1995
UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) Oct 1962 - Apr 1963
UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti Jul 1996 - Jul 1997
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia Mar 1992 - Sep 1993
UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti Aug - Nov 1997
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission Jul 1963 - Sep 1964



## APPENDIX C

### Other Acronyms Used

AA	Assembly Areas
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AWEPA	Association of West European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa
CCF	Ceasefire Commission
CCFADM	Commission for the Joint Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique
CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
CNE	National Elections Commission
COMINFO	National Information Commission
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission
CORE	Reintegration Commission
CSC	Supervision and Control Commission
CG	Consultative Group
DHA	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FADM	Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique
FAM	Mozambique Armed Forces
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GURN	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PIR	Rapid Intervention Police
PKO	Peacekeeping operation
PCPB	Post-conflict peace-building
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SOFA	Status of forces agreement
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
UNOHAC	UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Cooperation
UNRISD	UN Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WEU	Western European Union

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**Author** Jett D C

**Name of thesis** Why Peacekeeping Fails - A Comparative Assessment Of Angola And Mozambique Jett D C 1998

***PUBLISHER:***

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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