,/VAN
 University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
 African Studies Seminar
 Paper for Monday, 26 February 1979, at 4.00 p.m. in Room CM 319
 MILNER AND THE MIND OF IMPERIALISM
 Jean-Jacques van Helten
 Let me say at once that ... I attach far more
 importance to the general prosperity of the Transvaal,
 to the development of its industry and its agriculture,
 to making it a great country, the home of thousands of
 working British people, carrying on an ever-increasing
 trade with their fellow-workers over here.
 Kilner, The Nation and the Empire, 106.
 ... to direct a steady outflow of men of British stock
 to the younger countries of the Empire must thus be a
 constant object of Imperial policy. Of greater
 importance still is the quality of the emigrants. And
 that depends upon the character of the nation from
 which they are drawn. Thus the consistent Imperialist
 is inevitably led to concern himself with those
 influences which affect the condition of the mass of
 our people here at home. He cannot help being a
 zealot for social improvement.
 ibid, xl.
 Capitalist development in Southern Africa, particularly in Kimberley and on the Rand,
 was very much the result of the penetration of British and foreign capital as well ac
 the rapid growth of commercial interests. The continued expansion of the mining
 industry, with its huge amounts of initial capital outlay, particularly after 1893
 when the deep levels came into operation, depended upon the state of the capital
 markets of Europe: speculative booms in "kaffir" shares not only lined the pockets
 of investors but also provided new working capital, for little capital was raised by
 the issue of debentures, (l)
 This meant, at the South African end, that mining companies often had to
 operate under constraints inherent in their financial structure; short-term profit
 maximization was needed to create new working capital and pay out dividends, thus
 raising the company's speculative appeal, enabling it to raise yet further working
 capital by share issues. In addition, the Rand was a fast growing urban and
 industrial market, which attracted a wide variety of commercial interests and export-
 orientated industries, many of which had progressively been excluded by tariffs from
 some of the more remunerative industrialized European or North American markets.
,';<r- \ - 2 -
 At the London end, however, the very ability of the various mining houses
 and holding companies to play the London stock market and raise working capital
 depended upon the state of the British economy and the predilections of portfolio
 holders. (2) This also applied to some of the British export-orientated industries
 with interests on the Rand, whose performance depended very much on their ability to
 raise working capital through new share issues, thus allowing them to manufacture new
 product-lines attuned to the needs of the market.
 The state of the British economy, however, was not robust, particularly with
 respect to trade and the manufacturing industry. The effects of the Great Depression
 had been the subject of a Royal Commission in 1896, but even so between 1883 an<i 191?
 the share of world trade in manufactured goods in British hands dropped from 57.1 per
 cent to 24.4 Per cent, whereas Germany's proportion rose from 17.3 per cent to 23 per
 cent, and America's from 3.4 per cent to 11 per cent. (3) Throughout the 1880s and
 1890s neither government nor industry were unaware of this trend; Chamberlain in
 particular made British trade and export performance the subject of yet another number
 of enquiries and commissions. (4) The national press, too, exploited the theme of
 Britain's relative economic decline to the full and more often than not Germany was
 portrayed as both the country's main trading and, by implication, political rival. (5)
 As world industrialization proceeded at a high rate of some 3.8 per cent per
 annum between 1870 and 1913* the rate of growth of British exports and trade was bound
 to be subject to pressure (the T/Y ratio of foreign trade as a percentage of Rational
 Income declined from 59.0 per cent in the 1880s to 55.8 in the 1890a). (6)
 It can be argued that this pressure, however, could have been diluted in a
 number of ways. Firstly, Britain could have developed new export categories and/or
 produced specialized and high-grade types of existing goods. This strategy required
 a high propensity to innovate and a resources-transfer from old established into new
 sectors, such as electrical engineering, at home.
 Secondly, industry could have attempted to improve competitive ability in
 existing trading goods by reducing costs. In the European markets, however, such a
 cost reduction would have been cancelled out "by higher tariffs and in any case price
 competition was not the only form of competition. Indeed, in the case of the Rand
 market, marketing techniques, after-sales service, packing, etc., were regarded by
 many agents as far more important than the undoubted quality of British
 manufac ture s. (7)
 The third solution to the challenge of industrialization abroad was to
 continue to produce the same goods in more or le?s the same way, but to redirect
 exports to new markets such as the Rand with the assistance of capital exports.
 Indeed, it is arguable that the declining relative importance of industrial markets
 in favour of an expansion of trade in certain primary producing markets over the
 period 1890-1914 helped to maintain the obsolescent structure of Britain"13 export-
 orientated industry and failed to provide opportunities for long-term growth, partly
 because the absence of rivalry from other exporters in these markets was only
 temporary and existed as.long as world trade continued to grow. (8) The massive
 influx of German and American manufactured products to the Rand after 1895
 illustrated the volatile and unprotected nature of Britain's "new11 markets. (9)
 The link between Britain's industrial performance between 1880 and I9I4 and
 the rate and direction of British overseas capital investment is moz*e than just a
 tenuous one. In January 1899 Rothschild advised Rhodes, who apparently had an excess
 cash fund of ?500,000, to invest in a whole host of long-term, fixed return bonds and
 Consols, including the Ottoman 4% 1891 and the India 3s$6 rupees 1854-5. Rothschild's
 timely advice may undoubtedly have reflected the general apprehension felt in
 financial circles about the state of affairs on the Rand, for he did not believe that
 any gold mining company was worth investing in; his recommendations were, of course,
 "a list1 of what I should buy for a favoured client if he entrusted me with the"
 investment ...". (10)
- 5 - ?
 In fact, Lord Rothschild, who was no mean speculator, echoed more than
 anything else a broad trend within British foreign portfolio investment. The rates
 of return on British overseas investment portfolios during the period 1880-1914
 averaged about 4 per cent, which is consistent with the description of the aggregate
 portfolio as bond-laden (usually railways or local government) and chosen to suit the
 tastes of both conservative rentiers and evidently, if Rothschild is to be believed,
 of speculators.- Although' many domestic industrial equities generated higher average
 rates of return - though, of course, they were correspondingly riskier - investors
 generally preferred the decidedly less risky foreign portfolios, (ll)
 That the risk preferences of British investors directly affected the
 performance of British industry is particularly noticeable when one considers that
 during periods when foreign investment was temporarily less remunerative, e.g. 1890-1
 and 1895-6, rentiers increased either their consumption, their holdings of money
 balances or their mortgage investments. (12) At no time was a slackening in overseas
 investment reflected in a corresponding upswing in,domestic equity investments, which,
 after all, were the main means of access by companies to new working capital. Unable
 to increase their capital formation, British export industries could not develop new
 export lines or meet the varying demands of new markets.
 Finally, patterns of foreign investment also affected the structure and
 level of domestic demands. Foreign investment importantly affected the export sector
 and-directly, or indirectly, large amounts of foreign lending were translated into
 extensive orders for exports, (lj) However, as the main beneficiaries of increased
 demand for exports were generally well established industries, foreign investment
 reduced the incentive to diversify through the creation of new lines of goods, because
 new lines usually depended on domestic markets for initial developments and marketing
 appeal. Generally speaking, the tendency for export production to be less diverse than
 production for domestic use was further reinforced by the concentration of, for example,
 engineering export markets in the less industrialized countries with their more
 rudimentary requirements, at least during the initial stages of their capital
 development.
 By reducing the level of demand for British engineering goods and by
 deflecting what demand there was away from new, market-orientated lines, British
 foreign investment thus depressed the profitability and retarded the expansion and
 diversification of domestic engineering firms relative to what might have been
 reached with more extensive domestic investment. The incomplete structural
 development of Britain's engineering industries with regard to new lines is particularly
 noticeable when one considers the industry's performance on the WitwaterBrand market;
 by the early 1900s British companies, which had been unable to raise sufficient working
 capital to switch their production of rock drills based on the reciprocating piston
 principle to axial-feed water drills, had lost their earlier near-monopoly to American
 manufacturers. (14)
 In other word3, by the 1890G British capitalism was confronted by a
 structural crisis with a severe lack of capital formation at hone compounded by a
 slack export performance even in the less industrialized markets, where, like in South
 Africa, a standard line of products was actually being pushed out altogether by
 foreign competition. Continued domestic capital accumulation was jeopardized by the
 risk preferences of investors, who remained unenthusiastic about pouring funds into
 domestic equities. (15)
 Both Chamberlain, as a Midlands industrialist, and Miner, as an economist,
 former secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Chairman of the Board of
 Inland Revenue, were aware of at least some of the structural problems hampering
 sustained economic growth. Chamberlain, in particular, recognized that if the
 industrialized markets of America and Europe were being progressively closed to
 British trade by the imposition of tariffs, then this trade would have to be directed
 towards the less industrialized formal, or informal, empire, where competition was
 slight and consumer demands less at variance with what British industry could, and
 would, produce. (16)
- 4 -
 I have argued elsewhere that the desire to incorporate a burgeoning Rand
 market more firmly into the British commercial orbit was, at least, a contributory
 cause of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer conflict: a British administration on the
 Rand would not only safeguard the existence of a more open market for British
 manufacturers but would also guarantee long-term uninterrupted capital accumulation
 within the mining industry, which was largely dominated by British capital
 interests. (17) .Indeed, it was argued that, with the establishment of British rule
 over the Rand, "costs per ton of ore milled would be reduced by 5/- to 6/- and the
 immediate effect of such an action would be a) to increase the total tonnage and
 gold value by reason of the addition of Main Reef ore, the grade of which in the past
 fell below the pay limit b) excess profits attributable to this cost reduction would
 be upwards of ?550,000 ...". In addition, the Rand would bring "some comfort in view
 of the uneasiness about the future of British trade"; the total Transvaal import- -
 export trade in I899 was estimated at ?30,000,000 per annum and, in view of the
 exhortation that "the English people should spread themselves out and get elbow-room",
 the obvious implication was that this trade was at least potentially secure for
 British industry. (18)
 In 1900 Chamberlain expressed himself in a similar enthusiastic vein about
 the future of British trade in South Africa, when he informed a meeting of the
 Imperial Institute that
 there will be great numbers going to develop not only
 the mineral resources of this country -which have
 already been opened up, but those still greater
 resources which we know to exist. In every kind of
 business occupation - manufacturing, industrial,
 mining - there must of necessity be great development
 and this country will be drawn upon for the majority
 of those who will carry out that development ... (19)
 Milner wholeheartedly agreed, and added that the Transvaal was "a magnifican!; estate
 which has been woefully mismanaged ... it requires no extraordinary statesmanship, it
 simply requires ordinary, decent government and a reasonable liberality in public
 finance". (20) Milner's optimism was mirrored in a flurry of publications and
 reports by governmental commissions to South Africa.
 Both W. Bleloch's The Mew South Africa. Its Value and Development (1901)
 and Henry Birchenough?s government report, The Present Position and Future Prospects
 of British Trade in South Africa (Cd 1844? 1903) described in fulsome tezms Britain's
 commercial and industrial opportunities on the Rand. Ben Morgan's influential Report
 on the Engineering Trades of South Africa for the National Industrial Association
 (1902) was, however, rather more pessimistic and tended to reflect the tenor of
 domestic trade reports such as the one published in 1903 by the Board of Trade on
 British and Foreign Trade and Industry. Both Morgan and the Board of Trade dwelt on
 the nature and vigour of foreign competition, the noticeable lack of new machinery
 and products by British manufacturers and, more importantly, the fact that many
 British manufacturers refused to market products attuned to the specific and'varied
 needs of local consumers. (21)
 In Britain the national press was aware of the country's precarious
 economic position and proceeded to publish, throughout the period I9OO-4, numerous
 articles on "Doomed. British Shipping","The Economic Decay of Great Britain" and, of
 course, "The Growth of German Exports". (22) In so doing the press was instrumental
 in fostering the emergence of the ideology of "liational efficiency" which lambasted
 the relatively poor export and trading performances of Britain.
 At the same time, this "efficiency" ideology provided a framework within
 which notions about Imperialism and the need to "protect" the .Empire against unfair
 commercial competition as well as semi-scientific concepts about race superiority,
 strong administration (e.g. Hilner's regime in South Africa after 1900), social
 reform, militarism a la Wilhelmian Germany, etc., could flourish. (23)
? 5 ?
 Efficiency was also a kind of ideological response to the laissez-faire
 individualism which had been the hallmark of British capitalism for several decades.
 State interventionism in both the economy and social relations in the form of a
 redirection of productive capital's markets, urban planning (miner's particular fad)
 or state pensions, became ideologically respectable among hard-pressed Midlands
 industrialists and certain sections of the ruling class. The methodical application
 of state intervention required a carefully structured administration, necessitating,
 in Milner's words, "a prescient mind and resolute will" (24), but which would then be
 able successfully to confront the generally acknowledged socio-economic crisis facing
 the country.
 Within Britain the government's response to the crisis in productive capital
 was lack-lustre and led to a number of commissions on shipping, foreign competition,
 etc. (25) Within the context of the newly conquered South African colonies, however,
 Whitehall's response after 1900 was of an entirely different and radical nature.
 Chamberlain's most forceful attempt to drag British industry screaming and kicking
 into the twentieth century was by ensuring that Milner pushed several multi-million
 pound orders for the newly established Central South African Railways (CSAR) and the
 land settlement schemes via the Crown Agents in the direction of British industry.
 As "the purchases of the New Colonies ... will be exceptionally large,
 British manufacturers shall have preference, other things being equal, in the
 expenditure of funds". (26) Considerable sums of money were involved in these
 purchases; originally some ?10 million had been earmarked for "development purposes"
 in the Transvaal, which largely meant railways,and although by 1904 this sum had been
 whittled down to ?7 million - "precious little" in Milner's opinion (27) - the South
 African Minest Industries and Commerce Journal did note, in 1903. that "large and
 important orders have recently been placed by the Crown Agents in England for rolling
 stock and rails for the CSAR. Seventy-four locomotives ... are now in course of
 construction". (28)
 In fact, in order to ensure that the CSAH's orders would only benefit Britieh
 industry, Chamberlain informed both Milner and Sir Percy Girouard, the initial head of
 the CSAR, that only the Crown Agents and its sub-agents in Birmingham (sic) should be
 contacted. The Milner regime and the CSAR were "not [my italics] to purchase goods
 from local (i.e. South African) agents and store-keepers as all our experience is
 against an arrangement of this kind unless in exceptional circumstances". (29)
 By 1903 both Chamberlain and Milner had become convinced that Tariff Reform
 would greatly assist British trade and industry and give it the apparently necessary
 protection and guaranteed markets against foreign competition. In May 1903 Milner
 told Chamberlain: "I need hardly say that personally I watch the struggle at home
 [over tariffs and preferential trade] with the deepest interest and, of course, with
 the heartiest sympathy with the line you have taken ..." (30) In fact, Milner promised
 to "push for a preference of 25 per cent in favour of products of the British-Empire1'
 at the Bloemfontein Inter-Colonial Conference of early 1903. Although his policies on
 preference were strongly supported by the Rand and opposed only by "a few Cape Town
 and Port Elizabeth merchants of the mugwump variety" (31). their reception in Great
 Britain was one "of apparent complete indifference ...".(32)
 With respect to the British explosives industry, however, both Chamberlain
 and Milner were slightly more successful. Prior to I899 the mines had been obliged
 to purchase their explosives from the Nobel-owned Zuid Alrikaansche labriek voor
 Ontplofbare Stoffen (ZAFOS) at highly inflated prices. (33) After the Boer War, the
 mining industry, anticipating correctly that, in the words of Georges Rouliot in 1902,
 the British administration would "lead to a proper application of local laws" (34),
 successfully called for the immediate abolition of the ZAFOS monopoly. In 1903 the
 mines were consuming some ?750,000 worth of explosives per annum. As many companies
 were still developing their mines for production and did not operate any ancillary
 plant as yet, their main working costs were in the mine; this meant that for many ?
 mines, particularly those marginal low grade ore deep-levels opened up during the
 brief 1902 boom, the cost of explosives was a much higher proportion of their total
 working costs. (35)
- 6 -
 Having arbitrarily abolished the ZAFOS monopoly in 1901, however, Miliier
 aoon discovered that he could not really afford to alienate either Nobels or its
 emissary to South Africa, Lord Ribblesdale. (36) The Nobel Trust and its Glasgow
 subsidiary managed to pressurize Chamberlain and Milner into keeping its old ZAFOS
 Modderfontein works open "as a British-run concern" at-least until 1905* when De Beers'
 Cape Explosives Works finally managed to dislodge Nobels from its predominance over
 the Rand market.
 In spite of both Miner's and Chamberlain's earnest attempts, British
 commercial and industrial interests did not move into the Transvaal at an accelerated
 rate after 1900. In April 1901 Milner strongly supported Sir David Barbour's
 recommendation of the total abolition of all 7iif VeT cent ad valorem duties on imports,
 which would undoubtedly have helped to make British imports more competitive. (37)
 Nevertheless, the structure problems confronting British industrial
 performance, with ita low rate of capital formation and its inability to exploit
 successfully varying market opportunities, defeated all attempts at official assistance
 even within the confines of the Rand market, where agents and engineers, if the gputh
 African Mines, Industries and Commerce Journal is to be believed, had a high propensity
 for purchasing British goods. (36) In 1900 British, exports to South Africa comprised
 64.05 per cent of total imports (inflated because of the war), but by 1907 this
 percentage had declined to 56.75 per cent. In absolute terms, too, imports for the
 corresponding period had declined from ?14,778,017 to ?14,331,654. In 1908 British
 imports into South Africa declined even further, to ?13,313,289 or 56.19 per cent of
 total imports. (39)
 In 1907 S. J. Truscott, in The Witwatersrand Gold Fields: Banket and Mining
 Practice, noted that the vast majority of machine drills were either made by Ingersoll
 Sergeant, or the Rand Drill Co, both of New York, and that the "Climax" drill by
 R. Stephens, Sons, of Cornwall, was no longer as popular as before. (40) In fact, as
 early as 1903, the Goch Mine, clearly intent on profiting from the anticipated rise
 in production after the imminent arrival of Chinese labour, purchased the five largest
 boilers south of the equator from the Sachsische Maschinenfabrik, Chemnitz. (41)
 Later in the year, the South African Mines etc. noted that "the outlook for electrical
 plant is as encouraging as that for almost any line of manufacture. The strongest
 bidder for the trade, however, is Germany ...". (42) Much of British industry's
 inability to re-establish its pre-war predominance over the Rand market was due not
 only to its insensitivity to market opportunities but also to the persistently
 sluggish and recession-ridden performance of the Transvaal economy throughout the
 period up till 1914. As late as 1912 Britain still accounted for only 58-03 per cent
 of all imports into South Africa and the Board of Trade Commissioner noted that growth-
 related imports of mining machinery, electrical wires and cables, iron and steel piping,
 etc., were dominated by Germany and America, with 17.99 per cent of total imports. (43)
 II
 It is the indefiniteness of our aim which is at the
 root of our troubles. At present it is really quite
 difficult to say what we are driving at with all this
 immense expenditure of money and energy ... (44)
 Any possible "indefiniteness" in the clear pursuit of restructuring
 capitalist relations of production in the post-war Transvaal was quickly brushed
 aside by Milner's administrative freneticism. His concern to frame his actions in
 accordance with a long-range and comprehensive objective and his opposition to the
 traditional empiricism, which he stigmatized derisively as "drift", was firmly rooted
 in the Edwardian ideology of national efficiency as well as in his own experiences as
 an administrator in Egypt. (45)
- 7 -
 Milner had been the Egyptian Under-Secretary of State for Finance between
 1889 and 1892. In 1891, in a lengthy interview with The Scotsman, he pointed out
 enthusiastically that "the British administration had removed the whip, interrupted
 the bribe, controlled the water supply .,.". Mindful, as ever, of the considerable
 economic benefits for Britain of Lord Cromer's benign rule in Cairo, Milner quickly
 added that "two-thirds of Egypt's exports are taken to British ports. Nearly one-
 half of her imports are derived from British factories. Agricultural revival in
 Egypt means a larger and cheaper supply of cotton for the British market ..." (46)
 Undoubtedly Milner viewed the Transvaal of the 1900s as analogous to the Egypt of the
 1880s. Certainly Miner's main apologist, Basil Worsfold, extensively touched upon
 the many similarities between Egypt and the Transvaal and noted the need for strong-
 administration in both countries. (47)
 Central to his resuscitation of the "woefully mismanaged estate" and any
 subsequent economic benefits accruing to Britain, however, was the development of the
 Transvaal gold mining industry. In early 1903 the mining industry was, once again, in
 the throes of a depression. Many of the mining houses had been left with a large
 number of newly opened deep-levels which were unworkable because of their low-grade
 properties. The share markets of London and the Continent were "kaf fir "-weary and so
 such losses could not really be recouped through manipulation of the stock-market,
 though, of course, a sizeable reduction in working costs with the aid of the Milner
 regime might ease the most pressing production problems.
 Milner was only too pleased to assist the mines. As ea^ly as 1902 he had
 agreed not to make the new Gold Law retrospective and allowed the aimiig companies to
 deduct war costs from the next year's (1905) tax liabilities. IJurinj the same year,
 Patrick Duncan had commented that "whatever stimulates the mining industry is an
 indirect benefit to the whole community". (4Q) With this resounding aphorism in mind,
 Milner set out to assist in every way the mining industry's attempts to restructure
 its productive process along more cost-effective lines. Aware that "what water was
 to Egypt, unskilled labour was to the Transvaal" (49), Milner vigorously supported
 the Chamber of Mines1 attempts to reduce African wages and import Chinese labour. (50)
 Indeed, he cajoled the initially reluctant Colonial Office and lambasted local
 opposition, claiming that "industrial development, irrigation, railways, etc., and
 the loyalty of the I>utch all depended upon Chinese labour ...". (51)
 While some of the constraints under which the mining industry had to function
 during the period 1902-6 have been more extensively dealt with elsewhere (5?), an
 additional and important constraint inherent in the financial structure cf the mining-
 houses made it imperative for capital to call upon The Mil nor regime in itr. attempts
 to effect cost minimization and control over its labour force.
 Prior to the Boer War, a great many of the gold mining companies were, in
 part, speculative ventures and additional working capital was largely raised by the
 continual issue of new shares. A considerable proportion of these shares, howevsr,
 were vendor's shares held at, or below, par. In 1899? for example, out of"?15,98?,^9p
 worth of equities issued, a mere ?6,065,081 was actually o>rpended on new cn.pits.1
 developments, while the remainder was held as immobile, speculative capital.
 As the market started moving "upwards", the vendors and insiders tended to
 release their shares, thus capitalizing further on their initial outlays. Moreover,
 the retention of this immobile share capital led to the creation of a highly leveraged
 capital structure, giving relatively ineagre profits to the many and large profits to
 the privileged few. It is not aurprisir^ therefore thai Beit could info in Rhodes in
 1891 that "I rather invest in properties here [Rand] where I can laaktj 15 to 20 per
 cent with money without the risks which are apparent in the diamond mining
 industry ...". (53)
 During the kaffir boom of 1895-6 some ?12,282,660 worth of capital raised
 externally was working capital, while a hefty ?25,810,229 was speculative vendors'
 capital. (54) After 1902, following the untimely demise of the poni-war boo-n, tho
- 8 -
 mining companies found it increasingly difficult to float new ventures. (55) Indeed,
 there is evidence to suggest that the overall shortage of externally raised capital
 for much-needed further deep-level developments and, of course, speculation persisted
 until at least 1906, when Lionel Phillips informed Selborne that "the cost of desirable
 improvements and extensions will, in most cases, have to-be provided out of the profits
 of the concern ...". (56)
 In fact, a certain amount of additional working capital had, of course,
 been raised internally within the industry; during the period 1887-1900 some
 ?4,906,392 or 34 per cent of available profits had been appropriated from revenue for
 reinvestment. After the war, however, as part of a broad statistical trend it can be
 discerned that between 1900 and 1914 ?17,941,824 worth of working capital was raised
 internally, which, compared to a pre-war figure of ?4,906,392, represented an increase
 of no less than 261 per cent (my italics). (57)
 This trend, which points to both an absolute and a percentage increase in
 internally raised working capital, undoubtedly had important repercussions for the
 mining industry. Post-war dividend payments did not register a decrease, but the
 annual appropriation from revenue for reinvestment did show this substantial increase,
 which meant that the mining industry was caught in a vice. On the one hand, the
 industry had to maintain a modicum of returns, if only to satisfy investors and
 stabilize the market. (58) On the other hand, their output had to be increased
 substantially to cover both these returns and the enlarged amount of internally raised
 working capital, for little new capital was raised externally. Only an additional
 1.3 per cent, or ?472,841 worth of working capital, was raised externally after the
 war, compared to pre-war figures.
 Working costs had to be reduced, and Miner's efforts undoubtedly made a
 considerable impact. A straightforward 10 per cent tax on mining profits, a more
 efficient and enlarged railway network, reduced tariffs, an increased ability to
 write off depreciation of machinery against tax returns, etc., all helped to reduce
 the industry's considerable overheads. The mines' largest single cost component,
 however, was still labour,and the additional pressure to raise essential working
 capital internally resulted immediately in the mines attempting to raise further output
 per unit of labour by, in the case of Chinese face-workers, piece-work. (59) Indeed,
 capital, with the aid of the Mlnerite regime, had generally to increase coercion at
 the point of production in order to raise output, hence Milner1s acquiescing to the
 flogging of Chinese labourers in the compounds. (60)
 While both Chamberlain and Miner showed a remarkable lack of understanding
 of the workings and structure of the mining industry and failed to appreciate the
 critical problems which shortages of working capital immediately raised, the latter
 was aware that cost minimization could be effected partly by a reduction in both the
 costs of imported machinery and the overall cost of living. (6l) In fact, both these
 objectives, Milner noted, could partially be achieved by a reliable railway^.
 network. (62) The British administration had set up the CSAE and the railway budget
 formed the largest single item of the Guaranteed Loan of ?35,000,000. Some ?10,000,000
 was to be spent on the "new development" of the two former republics,and of the latter
 sum one-half was assigned to-the construction of the new railway lines. Not
 surprisingly, therefore, Miner could enthuse, in 1903, that "we have ?5 millions to
 spend between the Orange and the Limpopo. The question is how best to spend it? What
 lines are needed most?" (63) Quickly pre-empting any unsolicited answers to his
 rhetorical questions, Milner ensured that the Bloemfontein Railway Extension Conference
 unanimously decided that yet another coal line along the Rand had to be constructed, at
 a cost of ?740,000. Moreover, Miner also pushed through the building of the
 ?956,000 "Grain Line" from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg.
 Any reservations Chamberlain might have had about this scheme, which would
 only benefit the Rand as well as the OFS and Cape farmers, were resolutely brushed
 aside by the High Commissioner, for "the lines themselves are greatly wanted ... to
 promote the economic development of the country". (64)
- 9
 III
 Central to Miner's attempts at assisting the. mining industry and
 strengthening the "British element" was his creation of an administration from which
 directives on the reconstruction of the Transvaal were supposed to emanate. A strong
 administration with clear policy objectives was, of course, linked to the ideology of
 "efficiency" as well as to notions of Imperialism - as Milner once remarked, "this
 country [England] is a country rich in men who have an instinct for governing backward
 races. As long as our Public Schools turn out such Men we shall not be under pressure
 to give up our Empire ..." (65)
 At first he had attempted to attract Uitlanders to his new Transvaal
 administration, but after a number of gaffes he decided to play it safe and return to
 culling his administrators from the ranks of the Oxbridge e"lite. (66) Accordingly, in
 1902, Milner drew up an exhaustive list of potential Transvaal administrators:
 without avail men such as James Watt and Edward Grogan, a Balliol man and recommended
 by Patrick Duncan, had a "bad degree" but were "rowing men who felt that their salary
 was immaterial". (67) His penchant for Oxbridge-educated administrators was, of course,
 not unusual other than that, once in South Africa, the proliferation of these
 administrators led to the emergence of the "Kindergarten" mythology. (68)
 Throughout the early I9OO5 numerous magazine and newspaper articles, aB well
 as speeches "by politicians such as Lord Rosebery and Asquith, publicly bemoaned the
 wide variety of ills that had apparently befallen Britain; Germany m d America were
 stronger economically, and the physical health of the British race had been painfully
 exposed by the high rate of infant mortality and the poor recruitment figures during
 the Boer War. (69) One comprehensive answer to a number of these seemingly
 insurmountable problems lay in a properly governed country free from squabbling
 politicians and run by efficient administrators. A policy of "national efficiency"
 was called for and its main advocate wa3 Arnold White, whose book, Efficiency and
 Empire,had a tremendous impact on early Edwardian ideology. (70) Indeed, in 1905,
 the Daily Mail even editorialized that it would only support Parliamentary candidater
 who "best fulfilled the demands of the great principle - Efficiency". (71)
 Miner and his administration in the T LVinsvaal were socn viewed an the
 embodiment of this efficiency principle: "what the Empire needs now ... is d man, if
 possible, who has thought, who has seen and who knows, a man with an iron will." (72)
 Milner, with his experience as a bureaucrat in Cairo, regarded Empire and
 administration as complementary, if not synonymous, and his beliefs blended in
 naturally with, those of the efficiency ideologues, whose considerable social and
 political impact was enhanced by adherents such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
 H. G. Wells, Grey, Rosebery, Lyttleton Geil and George Bernard Ghaw. (73)
 The empire played a fundamental ideological rolej it would enable Britain
 to withstand foreign competition by providing the country with secure "natural"
 markets. Tariff Reform was, in part, an inevitable 01'fshoot of efficiency. In
 addition, the empire would halt the continued physical degeneracy of the British rase
 by allowing emigration to the healthier climes of tne Antipodes or South Africa. (74)
 The Kindergarten and Milner showed how, like in Egypt, an efficient "British
 administration, free from the shackles of party politics, could attempt to transform
 a country overnight; the Kindergarten graduates were applauded, for "the aristocracy
 is nothing more than the most efficient people in the nation" . Indeed, "the upper
 classes", Arnold White noted, "are fundamentally sound". (75) Milner, who
 consistently kept in close touch with developments in England, was quictcly enveloped
 by the enthusiasm for efficiency and informed Lady Edward Cecil in 1903 that the
 Cabinet was "unwieldy" and that administrative responsibility should be graded
 efficiently so that vital Imperial issues would not become mixed up parish pump issues
 such as "a row in the Guards". (76) In fact, as early as 1900 Milner had been
 involved with lyttleton Gell and Birchenough in setting up the Administrative Reform
- 10 -
 Association with the aid of the editor of The Nineteenth Century. Sir James
 Enowles. (77)
 Milner also felt that "Joe might have to give -way to the pressure of
 parliamentary necessities, of Party and of a rotton public opinion". (78) His
 contempt for party politics was quickly picked up by some members of the efficiency
 cult: Lord Rosebery mused about "putting the British Empire on a business
 footing" (79). while Philip Lyttleton Gell wrote to Milner in 1904, in the aftermath
 of the Russo-Japanese conflict which had greatly excited the efficiency ideologues (80),
 that
 I shall turn Japanese fox they at least can think and
 act and be reticent. I fail to see any Western people
 in a position to set the Japs an example in their
 diplomacy, their strategy, their virile qualities,
 their devotion and their self-control. Above all,
 their national capacity for self-reliant self-sacrifice
 and their silence [sic] . -. (81)
 Milner undoubtedly concurred, and during the same year he returned to the
 themes of reticence, devotion and "control, in a letter to P. H. Congdon, the Secretary
 of the Imperial Federalist Association, when he also said that what was needed in
 Britain and South Africa was "a powerful body of men, and it would have to be very
 powerful, determined at all times ... to work regardless of any other consideration,
 against the man or the party who played ... with the cause of National Unity. I shall
 always do that ... (82)
 Miner's fervent belief in the efficacy of administration was not the only
 policy which found sustenance in the ideology of efficiency. His myriad policies on
 emigration, afforestation, land settlement, etc., also had their tap-root in
 efficiency, though the broader interests of the mining industry were never far from
 the surface.
 Milner hoped that increased emigration to South Africa would numerically
 swamp the Boer element, thus ensuring continued British political supremacy. He
 predicted confidently that, within some five years of the end of the war, the British
 population would be more than doubled. In other words, what he required was nothing
 less than a large-scale exercise in social engineering; again, the mechanism he
 counted upon was "the certainty of a vast and immediate expansion of mining and of
 other enterprises after the war which would enable the economy to support a vastly
 increased population of British workmen". (83) Unfortunately, this economic expansion
 never materialized.
 As he regarded emigration primarily as an arithmetical exercise at the best
 of times, Milner failed to conceive of the possibility of a split among the B'fitish
 population along class lines on such is&ues as Chinese labour. This, however, did
 not prevent him from taking a very keen interest in emigration, and in March 1903 he
 noted with satisfaction that during the first three months of that year South Africa,
 with 11,616 emigrants, was the third most popular immigrant country after the USA and
 Canada. (84)
 Emigration and Empire went together; "if the British population did not
 increase fast enough to fill the empty spaces of the empire, others would". (85) In
 other words, emigration would not only swamp the Boer element but also keep potential
 competitors at bay and help to incorporate the country more firmly into the British
 economic orbit. Unfortunately, although the national press abounded with articles on
 "population is power" and the "future of the Empire and country", which depended upon
 a numerically large population, the birth rate had been declining and infant mortality
 had been rising in Britain ever since the 1870s. (86)
- 11 -
 Not only the future of the empire but of the British race was threatened
 by these particular trends. Here again, a programme based on national efficiency was
 needed, for
 what is the use of Empire if it does not breed and
 maintain in the truest and fullest sense of the word
 an Imperial race? What is the use of talking about
 Empire if here, at its very centre, there is always
 to be found a mass of people, stunted in education,
 a prey to intemperance, huddled and congested beyond
 the possibility of realizing in any true sense either
 social or domestic life? (87)
 These sentiments readily found their response in Milnera He had been involved in
 social reform, however peripherally, since his early days as a lecturer on Socialism -
 "there is nothing terrible or unwanted in it" (88) - in Whitechapel. Miner
 eventually rejected socialism and believed that the evils of contemporary society
 could best be mitigated by efficient administration. He admired Bismaxckian Germany,
 where administration and planning provided workers with houses, welfare, pensions,
 etc. (89) In 1904? one of the efficiency ideologues, T. C. Eorsfall, even wrote a
 popular publication on Germany's superior town planning, entitled The Improvement of
 the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People: the example of Germany. One of his
 other publications, The Relation of National Service to the Welfare of the Community,
 was carefully annotated by Miner in 1904 for "improved ... imperial government, to
 put an end to the slums, the existence of which ruinB the physique of vast numbers of
 our people ...". (90)
 In fact, Miner's concern with National Service, emigration, etc, was
 enthusiastically shared by a number of South African mining magnates and their cohorts.
 C. S. Goldman, a director of several mining companies of the Anglo-French Farrar Group,
 and Henry Birchenough, Board of Trade Commissioner and director of the British South
 Africa Company, were on the National Service League's Executive Committee, (yl) In
 1905 Goldman, in conjunction with such representatives of the Miner-mining industry
 axis as Lionel Phillips, Owen Thomas (Hilner1 s educationalist), J. L. Garvin, etc.,
 published a remarkable volume entitled The Empire and the Century, which explicitly
 revealed at both an ideological and a practical level the extent of social engineering
 mining capital and Miner were prepared to indulge in during the so-called
 reconstruction of the Transvaal, Women's and workers' emigration, land settlement,
 closer Anglo-Transvaal trade, municipalization, etc., were all to be encouraged and
 supported by both government and "interested parties". Indeed, considering the true
 extent of mining capital's involvement in the emigration and land settlement schemes,
 the argument that at least some mining interests regarded Miner's social engineering
 as a quid pro quo for "the great losses incurred by the industry during and after the
 war ..." (92) appears to be a reasonably valid one.
 In 1903 Chamberlain informed HiUner that women's emigration was now
 government-aided and supervised by a specially appointed Government Secretary who, in
 turn, liaised with the South African Expansion Committee (S/EC). In fact,"by January
 1903, the SAEC (in mid-1903 it became the South African Colonisation Society [SACS]}
 was apparently sending out some 100 women a month to South Africa. (9) The London
 committee of the SAEC numbered amongst others as its members Mrs C. S. Goldman and
 Mrs Lionel Phillips, while the Johannesburg advisory council included Sir Percy
 Fitzpatrick, Mrs Drummond Chaplin and i;trs Sidney Jennings. (94) The SAEC's
 Johannesburg Secretary, Mss Russell, frequently called upon Mi.lner to discuss and
 iron out any unforeseen problems in the otherwise relatively smooth but limited flow
 of women emigrants to the Rand. (95)
 The activities of the SAEC were indirectly financed by Rhodes and Rothschild;
 the mining industry had quickly realized that the emigration of women, both as
 domestics and as wage-earners, would not only ease the demand for domestic labour and
 push out the African house-boys into the mining labour pool but would also help to
 stabilize the transient White labour force. (96) The mining' industry's close
 involvement with emigration was apparent as late as 1906, when Lionel Phillips
 informed Selborne that Wernher Beit would no longer financially assist the emigration
- 12 -
 of British labourers to the Rand until the political climate had become more
 conducive to the industry's interests. (97)
 In 1900-1 both Rhodes and Abe Bailey were prepared actively to support
 Milner's land settlement schemes, which had been the subject of a Lands Settlement
 Commission. (9&) The mining industry evidently felt that British settlers in the
 countryside would help to increase the so-called "British element". At the same
 time it was assumed that the settlers would farm intensively, thus providing at least
 some of the foodstuffs for the Rand market, while paying rent for the extensive
 landholdings of the mining companies. (99) In spite of extensive propaganda both in
 England and the Transvaal, land settlement was a manifest failure. (100) Milner's
 land settlement organizer, Owen Thomas, in a fit of hyperbole, even remarked that
 "migration from one part of the Empire to another should involve no greater uprooting,
 no further loss of English sentiment to a colonist than the transference of residence
 from London to a village in Hertfordshire ...". (101) Potential settlers were
 evidently unimpressed, for by 1906 there were still only 517 in the Transvaal. (102)
 In fact, much of the government-owned land which was actually allocated to
 the settlers was agriculturally useless; moreover, the wages on the Rand mines were
 fax more attractive than the anticipated returns on isolated farms in the veld. As
 with the majority of Milner's schemes, land settlement suffered from acute shortages
 of funds almost from its inception - "the plain fact is that the Thirty-Five Million
 Loan is insufficient to do what it was intended to do ,..". (103)
 Both Milner and the mining industry had noted that much of the wood needed
 for railway sleepers and supports in the mine-shafts had often to be imported from
 abroad (104), and accordingly, in 1904, the Department of Agriculture recommended
 the planting of vast forests as the railways alone "require 30,000 sleepers
 yearly ...". (105) By this time, however, the Chamber of Mines was evidently too
 involved in the Chinese labour issue, which in any case would result in a more
 substantial reduction in operating costs than a more effective supply of timber.
 This left Miner musing about afforestation in the sure knowledge that, had it
 succeeded, he would have "done something of real momentum when one's paltry efforts
 and struggles are forgotten ...". (106)
 Milner's activities in the Transvaal had, of course, been far from "paltry".
 His intimate liaison with mining capital in its attempts to control the labour supply
 and restructure its modes of production now that access to large amounts of cash was
 rather restricted, set the pace for the further development of state-capital relations
 via the 1907 strikes to the Rand revolt and beyond. At the same time his overall
 desire to co-operate with capital, which in any case has only selectively been touched
 upon in this paper, was not total in that at all times throughout his sojourn in South
 Africa Milner kept in close touch with British political and economic developments.
 He 3hared with Chamberlain a reasonably clear perception of the crisis of British
 productive capital; indeed, he was probably, as a former Secretary to Goschen, aware
 of the severe shortage of gold bullion in the Bank of England prior to 1902", and the
 impact that this had upon the Discount rate and domestic capital formation. (107) To
 a certain extent he also shared with Chamberlain, who, in 1899? called for "an
 alliance between the Teutonic race and the two "branches of the Anglo-Saxon
 Race ..." (108), the belief that the British race was enfeebled and that vigoroiis
 administration was the key answer to this problem and a whole gamut of related issues,
 from eugenics to falling birth rates and emigration.
 As such, even though a certain amount of what he had set out to achieve in
 1900 never fully materialized, his enthusiasm for administrative reorganization for
 covering the hills of the veld with tree plantations, or, more importantly, for
 promoting British economic interests on the Rand, were, to a certain extent,
 reflections of both an ideological and an economic crisis in Britain.
 ?0O0-
22) P.Barry, "Doomed British Shipping", Westminster Review, Vol.158, 19O2(
 J . E l l i s Barker, "The Economic Decay of Great Britain", Contemporary Reviewf
 Vol.79(1901; E.Bernstein, "The Growth of German Exports", Contemporary
 Review^ Vol.8l,19Q3. ; Also The ifopire "Review,, Vols. I-VI on "Trading
 Centres of the *>npire, Glasgow, Bristol , Belfast" by J.R.Fisher.
 23) Garoth Stedman Jones, Outcast LondonfLondon 197l)i oh.VI.; A.M.HcBriar,
 Fabian Socialism and English PoliticsfOxford I962), Ch.V.;. G.R.Searle,
 The_Quest for National EfficiencyCOxford 1971), esp. 55-72.
 24) Milner Mss. 76 f.20, Miner to F.C.Montague, 14 Feb.l88l.
 25) Cd.750(1901-2), Reports from the Select Committee on Steamship Subsidies,
 26) Milner ties.171?f.308-18, J.Chamberlain to Milner, 25 April 1903.
 27) Milner Mss. 171 f-390, Milner to Lyttleton, 28 August 1904-
 S.A.Mines 1 Industries and Commerce Journal(hereafter SAMICJ), 9 May 1903.
 29) Milner Mss. 171 f-315, Chamberlain to Milner, 25 April 1903- Also Milner
 Mss. 171 f-322, iiemo as to buyin/; through the Crown Agents rather than
 through local agents or merchant:; by The Crown Agents, 23 April 19O3<
 30) Milner Msn. 171 f-297-300, Milner to Chamberlain, 31 May 1903.
 31) ibid.
 32) Milner to Chamberlain, 27 March 1903t quoted in Cecil Hcadlam, The Milner
 Papers(London 1933), Vol.11, 451.
 33) J-J .Van-Helton, "A bunch of Hamburger Shylocks - the ca-;e of the 3outh
 African Dynamite Trade 1881-1914", African Studies Asso iati^n of the
 United Kingdom Annual Conference Paper, 20 Sept. 1978, 3-5.
 34) The Times, 29 April 1902.
 35) See also G.Blainey, "Lost causes of tho Jameson Raid", gcqn.Hist. Keyiew,
 2nd scr ies , 18(1965), 356-78.
 36) Milner Mss. 177 f.U'3-4, Milner 1,0 Fitzpatrick, 21 Bee. 1902.
 37) Milner Mss. 322 f.^0, Report on lhe Finances of the lVansvaal and the
 Oranpe River Colony by Sir David Barbour, 29 March 1901.; Milner M3.S. 322
 f.16, Milner to Chnmberlain, 18 April 190].
 38) SAKXCJ, 12 March 1^ 0 3.
 39) These firurea have been compiled from s t a t i s t i c s in The Brit ish and^South
 African Export Gazette, June 1901, and Cd.702^(1912), Repoi-t to "the" Board
 of Tratie on the tr-'.de of the Union of South Africa* 18.
 40) S.J.Truscott, ?p...cit., 377.
 41) SAl-iiCJ. 21 Karen lfj03-
 42) SAMICJ, 15 Aup. 1903-
 43) Cd.7023(1912),Report to the Boart; of Trade e t c . , 24*
 4^) Lord Milner, 'l[he Nation and the ! wpire_( London 1913)) XLII1.
 45) ?ric Stokes, "hiilnericm", Historp calJTpurnal, V, 1(1962), 47-60.
 46) Interview v:ith The ..Scotsman, tiuotcd by J.Marlowe in Milnnr, .Apostle of
 Ehipire(London I976), 19.
 47) Basil Worafold, rrh.c_ .Heconfrtructic a of the New Colonies.under .Lord Mi
 (London 1913), Vol.XI, 1-2.
FOOTMOT^ S
 1) S.Herbert P r a n k e l , Capi ta l Investment i n
 (London 1938), 89.
 2) R.A.Lehfeldt , "'The Rate of I n t e r e s t on B r i t i s h and Foreign Investments"
 Journal of t h e Royal S t a t i s t i c a l Socie ty , 76 (Jan.1913) , 196-207.
 3) W.A.Lewis, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Competition i n Manufactures", American Economic
 Review, 47(1957), 579-
 4) Cd.8322(1897)j B r i t i s h and Foreign Trade Memorandum. See a lso J .L .Garvin ,
 Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London 1937), V o l . I I I , 20.
 5) The Times, 2 May I896. Also E.E.Williams, Made in_.Geras.ny(London 1897),
 10-11 . B.H.Thwaite, "The Commercial War between England and Germany,
 Nineteenth Century, Vol.40, 1896.
 6) D.H.Aldcroft and H. W.Hichardcon(eds.) , The B r i t i s h Economy l870-1939(Lor.don
 1969), Table X, 6 4 .
 7) B.Morgan, R_eport on t h e Engineering Trades of South Africa for t h e National
 I n d u s t r i a l AsGOciatipn(London 1902; , 5? 8 5 .
 8) D.H.Aldcroft e t c . ?op_.pi.t? 74?
 9) J . J . V a n - H e l t c n , ' ' B r i t i s h C a p i t a l , t h e B r i t i s h S t a t e and economic investment
 in South Africa 1306-1914", Col lected Seminar Papers(SSA/77/l3) ?Table I l a / b .
 10) .Ks3.Afr .S.228. C8-9?f-4ft W.M.Rothschild to Cecil Rhodes, 23 January I899.
 11) A.K.Cairncross, Homeland Foreign_ Investment_ 1870-1913j Studios in Capi ta l
 ^Accumulation^Cambridge 1953), 232. Also W.P.Kennedy, "For* i/pi Investment,
 Trade and Growth i n t h e United Kingdom, 1870-1913"? Explorat ions .in_Kcqnomic
 i Volumo U , 1973-4, 415-443-
 12) W.P.Kennedy, o n . c i t . , 435.
 13) A.G.Ford, "Overseas Lending and Internal Fluctuations',', Yorkshire Bulletin
 oiC Economic r.nd. Social Research(faay 1965), XVII, 19-30.
 14) S.J.Trur.cott, The VJitv/.iternrEind Gold Fields; Banket and Mining Practice
 (London 1907), 377?"
 15) On the nature of the British economy between I870 and 1914 see also: Eric
 Hobsbavm, In dun try c.nd >i?pire,( London 1969), chs.9 and 12; A.M. Kusson,
 "British Industrial Grovjth during "tlie Grea$ Depression 1873-96; Some
 Comnents", Kconomic HiGtor;/ Review, XV(l962-3), 531-; J.R.Meyep? "An Input-
 Output Approach to evaluating the influence of Exports on British Indus-
 t r i a l Production", JicpJLqr.'vtic-ns in L-ivtrepreneurial Hintory, VlIl(l955-6)?
 10-25.
 16) Cd.8449(1897), Trade of the British Hhpire and Foreign Competition. Des-
 patch from Mr.Chamberlain to Governors of Colonies and Replies Thereto.
 17) J.J.Van-Helton, o p . c i t . , 3-4-
 18) W.Bleloch, _The Now South Africa. It a value and development(l.ondon 1901),
 17,240. .
 19) J.Chamberlain1a nnocch at the Imperial Institute in March 1900, quoted in
 W*Blcloch, _O?.cit., 239*
 20) Cd.l9O2(LXVIl)9O3, no.63. Report oy Milner, 14 December 190i.
 21) Cd.1761(1903). 3?rltjrjh i-nd Foreign lxade and Industry. Memoranda, S t a t i s t i -
 cal Tables and Charts prepared by the }loard of Trade with Reference to
 Various foatt^rs bearing on British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Con-
 di t ions. ;Cd.2337(1904), Second Series of Memoranda, Stat is t ical Tables,etc.
70) B.Semmel, Imperialism and.Social Reform(London i960), 220-225; G.R.Searle,
 op.cit_. , ch. 111.
 71) Daily Mail, 23 March 1903-
 72) Editorial in National Review, Vol. 34(Feb.l9OO), 839.
 73) H.G.Weils in Modern Utopia(London I905) and Bernard Shaw in hio play "Man
 and Superman" touched upon the questions of e l i t e administration, race
 degeneracy and, of course, eugenics. The Fabian^, and the Webbs in p a r t i -
 cular, were at tracted to eugenics and questions of race for they believed
 that poverty caused degeneracy. Social reform and emigration could reme-
 dy t h i s .
 74) J.L.Garvin, "The Maintenance of Bnpire" in C.S.Goldman(ed.), The Empire
 and the Century(London 1905)? 72-81, ; Also a r t i c l e s by H.R.Reade, C.
 Kinlock-Cooke M.P. and Hoi combe Ingleby 1-UP. in The Empire Review, Vols.
 V-VII(19O1-O6), on "State-aided Snigration, Emigration of State Children,
 Upper- and Middle Class animation11 and "State Control of Emigration".
 C76) Milner to Lady Edward Cecil, 25 March 19O3? qouted in C.Headlam, op c i t . ,Vol.11, 448,
 75) Arnold White, op c i t . , 75-
 77)C.Headlam, op cit . ,Vol I I , 157-8.
 78) I'ilner to Lady Edward Cecil, 25 March 1903? quoted in Headlam, op c i t . , Vol
 I I , 449.
 79) Lord Rosebcry, ^i^c_ellanies(London 1921.),Vol. LI, 240-1.
 80) Alfred Stead, Croat Japan. A..Study..of_Naticju:..l l^ficL_oncy_iLondon 1905) ,
 v i i - x l i i . ; national' Rcview,"Vol'.43(i904) 7 709*.
 81) Kilner I'.SG. 5 f .85, Philip Lyttleton Cell to Kilner, 6 Kay 1904.
 8?) Kilner Usn. 176 f.287, Hilner to F.ii.Congdon, 23 Nov. 1904.
 83) CO. /: 17/236, Kilner to Chrwiberlain, 8 Nov. 19C1.
 64) KiJner Kns. 121 f.100, "Comparative Mat oi? UlC Enigrants for the three
 month:> ending 31 *;.o.rch 1903".
 85) Anna Davin, "lnperialir.ni and Kotherhood", Hi..sto.ry rior^Hhop, V(.Spring 1978)
 10.
 86) Anna Dnvin, i b i d . , 9 - 1 3 .
 87) Sir'ncy Webb, "Lord Ror.nbery's E:;cape from Houi:d::iiitch", The ?'.inetegnj,_h.
 Century and After, 00-t. 1.S>01, 375-6.
 08) Milncr Ken. 107, "Kotes on Socialism, 1882".
 39) Kilner Ksr. 6 f.73-y, Kilner to Goochen, 12 March 1836. AI30 Lord Ki
 3Jhe Nation ana the chip i r e , xl i i i .
 90; Kilner i-.r.s. lr;6 no. /[ f./13, "D,e liclition of National Service to the
 of the Com::.unity'. A reaper read at the Harrington Branch of the l-'atir.nal
 Service I.can-ic, 13 J)ec. 1904.
 91) Kilner !.:;-.. V)6 f./i1.1, "Lint of menbora of the K.S.I.. Executive Committee
 in 1904". kliner join^H tho K.:;.L. unon hie return to I'lr.gland in 1906 and
 aloo beenmc an J?:ecut .1 ve Comcii t tec Kcmber.
48) Duncan Mss. , Duncan to Milner, 14 July 1902, quoted in Donald Denoon,
 "Capitalist Influence and the Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony
 Period 1900-1906", Historical Journal, XI, 2(1968), 307-
 49) Basil Worsfold, op.cit., Vol.11, l.j C.O. 291/3O, Milner to Chamberlain
 6 Dec-1901 on the need for the mines to depress African wages with notes
 by Lambert and Just.
 50) Milner Jiss. 171 f.273-6, Milner to Chamberlain, 6 April 1903, on "the
 feeling in favour of Asiatic labour... hc.s certainly grown very rapidly".;
 Milner Kss. 171 f.285-292, Milner to Chamberlain, 20 April 1903, on " if
 the experiment of Coolie Emigration ... could be fairly tied up here, it
 would be successful".; Also, of course, Peter Richardson, "The Provision
 of Chinese Indentured Labour for the Transvaal Gold Nines 1903-1908"
 (unpubl.Ph.D. thesis, London 1978).
 51) Viomfold MSG. Box 2, f;l8-19, Interview with Nilner, 9 Nov. 1903.
 52) F.A.Johnctone, Clasn, Hace and__Gold(London 1976), 11-13-
 53) Rhodes Kss. C7A no.73 f-156, A.Beit to Cecil Rhodes, 1 Dec. I89I.
 54) Herbert Frankcl, .op^cit., Table 14, 95-
 55) R.Xubice'-r, "Fin.incn C-.pitnl and the South African Gold Kinmr Industry
 1886-1914") Journal of ir.perial and Commonwealth History, V o l . I l l , no,3
 (197S), 386-39'fj.""
 5^)Lionel Phil l ip: ; to Selborne, 24 Jan. 1906, quoted in M..Prnser and Alan
 Jcevos, All th.it ClittoredjEOxford 1?77), 147-50.
 57) 'l'henc fi/"urrr. should he used with caution and can only indi.cp.xe a trend,
 ay they hrwc boon computed from two different seta of s t a t i s t i c s with t h e i r
 ov;n variable;- . ; r.cc Merbort Frank e l , ,0-n.cit. Table 14 and 15, 95-97*
 5?) K.i'ubicek, o p . c i t . , 3''9- In l</03 './crnher Beit set up African Ventures
 Syndicate "with a viow of stonuyinr the market p.nri re/:aininp the confidence
 of the Tr;\nr;va- 1 nines " .
 59) C.O. 291/55, ''.M.'.-.obb, Conrol idated Gold Fields Chief Engineer, to Rudd,
 1 Oct. l?02( copy). African and Write Labour comprised 59 Per cent of to"-=l
 operating cocts .
 60) I am indohtori to Ih-.l-'nter !-!ichard^on for t h i s particuln.r piece of infor-
 np.tion.
 61) n.Kubicek, o p . c i t . , jyo.
 62) r.ilner M53. y<V f . ? 3 , :. Incr to Chrwbe^lnin, 18 April 1903. Al-o D. Donjon,
 A Ornnd 111 un ion(London llJ7"i), 7 1 .
 63) J3acil U'orr.i'olti, op.tv.it., V o l . i l , 10.
 64) Cd.l552(3.(W3), 16.
 65) J ' i l n c r frr,r,. /)(,'; f . ? l , "Kute:- of ;m Addrer:::. on .-^ 'pt and the Sudan, 17 Jvna
 1896".
 66) CO. 417/292, !-iiln<"- to rih.-v-borlain, 11 July 1900, Uitlnnder regiment:;
 mutinied whnn i t \-t:\r, 1'.'< r,covered tliat Uilner t-Tir. ntTc'linj; mine manr-uTcrs bf.ck
 to the ltn.nd in 1900.
 67) Lilnoi- M:-,:-.. 121 f .'dC-'H, ';otn:j nn N;unec of prti-sorr licckinf; employment;
 Native Admini::*.r,-'.t inn, i';ur. 1 ].i.; r i t y wi bh Dutch e t c . . . . ' " .
 6Q) J'J. Stoken, op. n i t . , y)~l.
 69) I'Vederi.ck J-iaunco, "T.'.'itionnl Health, a JJoldier's Study", Contemnora.r^f lie-
 view, Jan. 1903; Arnold IJhitc, rifjTicienQy_.and l^ipir.^London" l ? 0 l ; , ch.IvT"
 Anne Summers, "Militarinm in Great Britain before the Great VJar", History-
 Vtorkghop, Il(Autumn Iff6), 104-123.
92) Lionel Phil l ips to Selborne, 24 Jan.1906, quoted in Fraser and Jeeves,
 o p . c i t . .
 93) Milner Mss. 237 f.56-60. Memo by J.Chamberlain, 20 Jan. 1903-
 94) Charles van 0n3elen, "The Witches of Suburbia. Domestic Servants in Jo-
 hannesburg", Collected Seminar Papers(SSA/77/lO), 10. ; M.Streak, Lord
 Milner's Immigration Policy for the Transvaal 1897-1905(R.A.U.Publications
 Trust, Scries B 1, I969)," 40^52". ?-??< -
 95) Milner Kss. 75, Diary 1904, 21 Jan. 1904.
 96) Van Onselen, o p . c i t . , 10.
 97) Lionel Phil l ips to Selborne, 24 Jan. 1906, quoted in Fraser and Jeeves,
 o p . c i t . , 148.
 98) Cd. 626-7 (1900), Reports of the Land Settlement Commission,; tfilner Kss.
 176 f.136, Abe Bailey to Milner, 7 Sept. 1900.; Milner Mss. 12, IHary 1901
 July 24 " . . . t o see Beit about Land Settlement. Rhodes was t h e r e . . . " .
 99) Donald Dcnoon, A Grand I l l u ^ i * ^ ^^"
 100) A.ft.E. Burton, A Handbook for 3ettlers(Dept. of Agriculture, Pretoria 1902)
 Land Settlement in the Transvaal(Govt.Printing Worhs, Pretoria 1902).
 Owen Thome a, Arricultural and_Pastoral p r o s p e c t s of 5outh_ Af rica_( London
 1904). " " "
 101) Owen Thomas, "Land Settlement r.nd Colonisation in South Africa", in C.S.
 Goldman(cd.), o p . c i t . , 558.
 102) Donald jJonoon, o p . c i t . , f/\.
 103) i-'.ilner l-:ss. 171 f.387, Milnor to Lyttleton, 28 Au .^ l?04.
 1()4) l-'otulen dcr Volksraad, 18 Au^ r. 1892.; K.Z. A. Z.k. Corresp. 189^-99, N.Z.A.ti
 K. to Jr.vr.sohe Bosch libiploitatie Mij., 17 June 1898-
 105) Worsfold KGS. i3rit.;?ip. S./(02 Box 2, f .65, "Keino on Railway Sleepers
 Plantations by the 'i'rnnsvaal Dept. of Agriculture, 19O4"?
 106) Worsfold Kns. Bri t .^ ip . S.402 f.53-60, Milner to Worsfcld, 17 Nov. I9C4.
 107) .Bankers La^azine^, LXVI J i(l899) ? 4- i R.Tr^ffin, 0u_r__Internat iorial, Monetary
 ^ J " T o - d a o ' and To morrow (New Yorl: 1968), 25^31.
 108) P.O. 64/1471? Ck)ur;h to Salisbury, 2 Dec. 18^SJ; P.O. 64/1471, Laccelles to
 Salisbury, 13 Doc. 1899.
sooo i