UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
 African Studies Seminar Paper
 to be presented in RW
 4.00pm MARCH 1987
 Title: The Re-Emergence of Political Unionism in contemporary South
 Africa?
 by: Eddie Webster and Rob Lambert
 No. 208
 THIS PAPER I S A FIRST DRAFT ONLY. IT I S NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT THE
 PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL UNIONISM U{ CONTEMPORARY
 SOUTH AhRTTTT?"
 The racially based South African state has always served to
 buttress severe forms of labour exploitation. It has been,
 historically and in contemporary struggles, a cardinal force
 shaping the form, character and goals of the progressive,
 non-racial, trade union movement. This is not to imply that
 the state was, and is, a determining force in this
 regard. Such theorization would deemphasize the dimension of
 leadership and the potential choices that emerge within tactical
 and strategic debates. Our own approach in attempting to assess
 the direction and potential of contemporary trade
 unionism in South Africa, would be to assert the critical
 importance of these tactical and strategic debates.
 We would argue that fundamental differences in the
 perceptions of the trade union role exist, differences that
 have divided the trade union movement since unions first
 emerged in nineteenth-century Europe. The division lies
 between those who discern significant potential in trade
 union activity, and those who argue that such activity does
 not in itself facilitate (indeed some hold that it may even
 inhibit) the transformation of capitalist society. Hyman
 refers to the former as the optimistic tradition and the
 latter as the pessimistic tradition. (1) These differences
 need to be thoroughly debated, for they do have consequences
 for the choices trade unions make in the face of the
 unfolding of the state's reform strategy.
Our central argument holds that two approaches exist in the
 non-racial trade union movement at present: orthodox, or
 collective bargaining unionism, and political, or, social
 movement unionism. By orthodox unionism, we mean a form of
 trade unionism which concentrates almost exclusively on
 workplace issues; fails to link production issues to wider
 political issues; and finally encourages its members to
 become politically involved without necessarily engaging
 itself in the wider political arena, believing that this is
 best left to other organizations more suited to the task.
 The political content of such unionism varies widely, but
 in each instance what is common to this orientation 1s an
 accommodation and absorption into industrial relations
 systems, which not only Institutionalize conflict, but also
 serves to reinforce the division between economic and
 political forms of struggle so essential to the maintenance
 of capitalist relations, in production, in the community
 and in the state.
 The alternate tendency - political, or social movement
 unionism - attempts to link production to wider
 political issues. It is a form of union organization that
 facilitates an active engagement 1n factory-based,
 production politics, ajrt in community and state power
 Issues. It engages In alliances in order to establish
 relationships with political organizations on a systematic
basis. We would contrast this form of trade unionism with
 what we call populist unionism in which trade unionism and
 struggles in the factory are downplayed. The latter is a
 tendency that neglects struggles over wages, supervision,
 managerial controls at the workplace and job evaluation;
 and places in its stead a political engagement that only
 serves to dissipate tough struggle in these areas. This is
 not political unionism at all, for political unionism attempts
 to link the above struggles with community and state power
 issues. Unlike syndicalism, our definition of political
 unionism does not negate the role of a political party, but
 rather asserts the need for a coordinating political body
 that is democratic in its practices and therefore able to
 relate to political unionism in a non-instrumental manner.
 Political unionism emerged within SACTU in the 1950s,
 indicating an orientation that held real promise not only
 for challenging the apartheid state, but also for generating
 a worker consciousness. It was formed in 1955 as a
 predominantly African trade union federation drawing on the
 defunct CNETU - a federation which had concentrated
 exclusively on collective bargaining - but included amongst
 its affiliates the "left1 non-racial strand of the
 registered trade union movement formerly organised in the
 Trades and Labour Council. SACTU's alliance with the ANC and
 the Congress movement resulted in a novel redefinition of its
 trade union role along the lines of "political unionism1.
 Faced by a weak power base in the factories, a hostile state
and intransigent employers, SACTU chose to engage
 politically with nationalism as a means of transforming
 its small factory base.
 Extensive research into SACTU's development during the late
 '50s reveals that it grew most rapidly in those regions
 where political unionism was consciously pursued.(2)
 Political unionism coexisted with orthodox unionism within
 SACTU, despite the general commitment of the federation to
 political struggle through the alliance. Some have argued
 that this engagement in the alliance led to the subordination
 of the trade unions and working class demands to nationalism,
 or populism. We would argue to the contrary: engagement in
 the alliance facilitated the rapid development of trade union
 organization, where attention was paid to the importance of
 factory structures and production politics. This is not to
 deny that in certain unions and in certain regions populist
 unionism existed. However, the most systematic organizing
 work within SACTU was along the lines of social movement,
 or political unionism.
 The 1950s1 experiment in political unionism hardly had
 time to consolidate before it was preempted by the state
 repression of the mid 1960s. South Africa was to
 experience a decade of industrial peace. However , it
 was a decade in which the economy experienced a structural
 transformation financed by a massive influx of foreign
capital, accelerated expansion of industry, a restructuring
 of capital and the growing concentration and centralisation of
 ownership. The extent of cartelisation by the late 1970s may be
 gauged by the information supplied by the Mouton Commission on
 monoplies in 1977. According to the commission a mere 5% of the
 total number of firms in the manufacturing sector between them
 accounted for 63% of the sector's turnover; only 5% of those in
 wholesale accounted for 69% of turnover; 5% of those in
 construction accounted for 63% of turnover; and 5% in transport
 for 73% of turnover.(3)
 Coupled with these changes went a corresponding growth in the
 black working class which brought black workers firmly to the
 centre of the industrial stage . In particular, we see the growth
 in the number of semi-skilled black workers, the organisational
 base for industrial unionism. As Hemson writes,
 ? With the growth of monopoly capitalism and the
 concentration of production in large-scale, highly
 mechanised factories, went a black proletariat neither
 differentiated by traditional skills, nor having
 experienced the benefits of reform. These are the
 conditions for a rapid advance in class
 consciousness as the political resistance to
 apartheid gains momentum '.(4)
 By concentrating large numbers of workers in production,
 the material conditions for a strengthened shop-floor-based trade
 unionism had been created by the early 1970s. It was the mass
 strikes in January and February 1973 in Durban that were to
 dramatically highlight these changes: an estimated 100,000
 workers broke the decade of 'industrial peace1 and took to the
streets to demand wage increases.
 Managerial consultants and state strategists were
 forced to place "the worker", on the agenda as militancy
 destroyed comforting myths and exposed the weaknesses of the 50-
 year-old dualistic system of industrial relations that conceded
 certain rights to non-Africans, while at the same time excluding
 African workers. The exclusion from these rights under the 1924
 Industrial Conciliation Act, was reinforced by a unilateral
 system of control over black workers that rested on the despotic
 power of the supervisor.
 This despotic regime inside the factory was backed up by
 a tight system of control exercised by the state through Influx
 control over black workers outside the firm. This dualistic
 system of control entrenched a dualism 1n the labour market -
 between a predominantly skilled and privileged white labour
 aristocracy, and a non-unionised and vulnerable black and
 unskilled labour force.
 This system was to trigger off a crisis of control in the
 1970s. The crisis was a result of a multiplicity of forces,
 both economic and political, that led to challenges on the
 shop floor to the managerially controlled liaison system.
 The shop-floor-based unions that emerged in the early 1970s
 eschewed political action outside of production. They
 believed that it was Important to avoid the path taken by
 SACTU in the 1950s. They argued that its close
identification with the Congress Alliance and its campaigns
 was the cause of its demise in the 1960s. The emerging
 unions chose to devote their attention to building democratic
 shopfloor structures around the principle of worker control,
 accountability and mandating of worker representatives, as a
 basis for developing a working class leadership in the factories.
 This strategy was justified in two ways. First, strong shopfloor
 organisation had a better chance of surviving state repression
 which would be directed in the first instance at ?leaders'.
 Second, they argued that at least until 1980-81, Its
 political impact would have been insignifiant, whilst at the
 same time, these fledgling unions had everything to lose by
 adopting a confrontationist stance.
 These challenges were to culminate in the establishment of
 the Wiehahn Commission to investigate industrial
 relations in 1977. Arising out of this investigation, the
 Industrial Conciliation Act was amended to allow for
 the recognition of black unions for the first time
 in South African labour history. It would be better,
 Wiehahn concluded, to allow African trade unions to register
 at an early stage in order to control the pace of union
 development.
 The Wiehahn solution was clearly contradictory. The
 intention was to control the emerging unions by drawing them
 into the established industrial relations structures, in
particular the Industrial Councils, thus pre-empting these
 unions' attempts to establish a shop floor presence and to
 widen the scope of their activities into "non industrial
 relations" arenas. This required giving unregistered
 unions state recognition, enabling them to win space in their
 attempt to move beyond the struggle for recognition to direct
 negotiation at shop floor level. Recognition at plant level
 was not won without struggle, but in the years immediately
 after Wiehahn, a new frontier of control was being defined
 as recognition agreements at plant level became increasingly
 common in different sectors of the economy. :
 In the immediate post-Wiehahn period, South Africa's
 industrial relations practioners embarked on the difficult
 task of attempting to integrate black workers' demands Into
 the new collective bargaining system. Their aim was to
 institutionalise industrial conflict along classical
 pluralist lines. The oft-stated intention was the
 patterning of union development along West European lines, where
 unions confine themselves to workplace issues only. Political
 engagement is left to political parties, which individual unions
 may attempt to influence. State strategists saw the concession
 of collective bargaining rights as the first step 1n a gradual
 reform process that would culminate in certain, yet-to-be
 determined, political rights for blacks. The unacceptable
 alternative for the apartheid state was a radical
 polIticization of labour with an overtly political trade
union movement engaged with the national liberation
 movement.
 It is now seven years since the state introduced
 these reforms - enough time for a tentative evaluation as
 to just how successful the strategists have been in attaining
 their goals. Nearly two million workers - black and white -
 now belong to trade unions affiliated to two major federations
 - CUSA-AZACTU and COSATU. How effective has the state been in
 patterning union development along 'pure' collective bargaining
 lines? To what extent have the new unions been absorbed into
 the industrial relations system in a way that institutionalizes
 the separation between economic and wider political struggle?
 The paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 deals with
 the gains made In collective bargaining in the post-
 Wiehahn period. Part 2 traces the re-emergence of
 alliance politics in the trade union movement. Part 3
 examines some of the obstacles to this alliance.
 In this paper we concentrate on developments in COSATU and
 one of its predecessors, FOSATU.
 PART 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIONISM
 In our view, the results of the reform strategy are
 contradictory. On the one hand, it would appear that
 significant gains are being made in the immediate post-Wiehahn
 period in developing a system of collective bargaining along
traditional industrial relations lines. They can be
 summarised as follows :
 1) An estimated 20% of the labour force now belong to
 trade unions. A major contributing factor to this growth
 has been the dramatic growth of the National Union of
 Mineworkers. The foundations for national-based
 industrial trade unions have now been laid in all major
 sectors of the economy.
 2). Perhaps more significant was the organisational depth of
 these emerging unions. By the end of 1985, these unions
 were organised 1n 3 500 workplaces, had signed 450 plant
 agreements, had an estimated 1 500 shop steward
 committees/councils and over 12 500 shop stewards.
 3) Management's unilateral power to dismiss has
 been curtailed by the emergence of a system of industrial
 legality in the workplace, laying down a set of procedures
 to be followed in the event of dismissal or retrenchment.
 These procedures have been strengthened by the dramatic
 increase in the use of the Industrial Court by trade
 unionists from 20 in 1981 to over 2 000 in 1986.
 4) Strikes are beginning to become a normal part of the
 collective bargaining process, losing many of the sinister
 implications attached to them in the past. This 1s possibly
 best illustrated by the growth in the number of mediations
by the Independent Mediation Service of S.A., from 39 in
 1984 to 131 in 1986. Most strikes continued to be over
 wages. However, dismissals, retrenchment, recognition
 and detention were a major cause of strike action.
 Of particular interest is the growing sophistication in the
 range of tactics used by workers from go-slows and over-time
 bans, to factory occupations and sit-ins.
 5) The post-Wiehahn period has seen the beginning of
 serious collective bargaining in S.A. Many of the emerging
 unions have now joined the Industrial Councils and have
 begun to draw on the skills of professional economists in
 their negotiations. In addition to wage bargaining, a
 number of other issues that have previously been the
 prerogative of management, such as health and safety, have
 become Industrial relations issues.
 6) In the post-Wiehahn period, the state has begun to
 withdraw from two key areas of the labour market - from
 all forms of statutory job reservation except the mines
 and more ambiguiously, from the pass laws in June 1986.
 The latter establishes freedom of movement as a nominal
 right only - residence in urban areas still depends
 on "approved accomodation.' The state now controls
 movement through such Vacially neutral' legislation as
 the Slums Act, Trespassers Act and Prevention of Illegal
 Squatting Act. Rather than controlling the movement of
 people into the urban areas through the pass laws, Cobbett
possibilities, they are also contradictory In a less apparent
 sense. In fighting for, and advancing in this way, the new
 unions are increasingly drawn into an industrial relations
 web, that is not without cost. Collective bargaining, per
 se, comes to dominate. The struggle becomes defined in
 terms of the factory only; immediate economic and production
 politics issues absorb all energy, and the wider political
 questions begin to fade into a more distant realm that
 seems beyond the capacity of a union to engage; political
 engagement is reduced to purely rhetorical flourishes.
 We would argue that there are objective social pressures
 from the state and from capital, pulling the democratic unions
 in this direction so that the impact of these gains is both
 transformative and conservative. On the one hand militant
 industrial unions have made real, albeit limited gains for their
 members, while on the other they have channelled conflict in
 ways that can be contained and institutionalized by the
 industrial relations system. The state has made gains in
 establishing a collective bargaining system that, as with all
 such systems, can seal off reasonably effectively economic
 from political struggles. This is not a startling conclusion.
 Capitalist states have been relatively effective in containing
 trade union pressures and actions within acceptable boundaries.
 While the state has attained a degree of success in this
 regard, it has also seriously undermined its own reform
 programme. Historically, capitalist reforms have only
gained a reasonable degree of success when collective
 bargaining concessions were backed by political rights, as
 happened in 19th century Britain. The institutionalisation of
 industrial conflict presupposes the early (and relatively
 peaceful) attainment of formal social and political rights by
 significant sectors of the working population.
 Production as a consequence, Wood argues, ceases to be an
 immediate political issue.(7) The roots of 'economism'lie in this
 necessary shift of conflict to the point of production. The
 struggle over appropriation appears not as a political struggle,
 Wood argues, but as a battle over the terms and conditions of
 work. In South Africa, the state's Intervention 1n production
 makes its racial form clear for all to see, linking directly the
 politics of production with global politics. Although Wiehahn
 foresaw the necessity for political rights, the South African
 state has been unable to move in a direction that is acceptable
 to the black majority. The contradiction in the Wiehahn reforms
 is now clear - it created the legal space for the rapid growth
 of industrial unions while failing to provide the conditions for
 their political incorporation. Instead o^ accepting the
 universal franchise which has always served as a useful
 integrating mechanism, the state has moved hesitantly towards
 a racially based restructuring that still excludes Africans,
 while maintaining white control. This has led to an
 Intensification of the demand for national liberation. At the
 same time, the recession has deepened, producing high levels of
 youth unemployment. It is above all this social category - along
with students - that has led township resistance since 1976.
 Trade unions have therefore been more sharply confronted
 with a dual challenge since 1984: they have been forced to
 confront the question of national liberation, and they have
 been forced to relate to the youth-led civil war in the
 townships. These pressures have forced union leaderships to
 think through the relationship between trade union, factory-
 based struggles, and broader political struggle. The
 resolution of this central question has been twofold:
 firstly, certain unions have thrown their resources into
 broader-based resistance; secondly, a vigorous debate
 has opened up within the unions, which still leaves a more
 strategically thought out response to the question of the
 trade union role and the precise form and content of national
 liberation unresolved for the present.
PART 2 THE RE-EMERGENCE OF ALLIANCE POLITICS.
 The economy has been in recession since 1982, resulting in
 closures, retrenchments and mass unemployment. The falling
 rand has fueled internal inflation and threatened the
 balance of payments. For the state, the effect has been
 to provoke a major fiscal crisis which in turn restricts
 its ability to finance "reform1.(8).
 The crisis has been met by unprecedented levels of
 mobilisation and resistance in the factories and
 communities over economic and political issues: the highest
 strike levels in South African history; rent strikes; bus
 boycotts; consumer boycotts; school boycotts; anti-constitiional
 campaigns and stay-aways; all these forms of resistance became
 permanent features of the political terrrain between
 1984 and 1986. Moreover, this phase of resistance has been
 marked by new organisational, ideological and political
 alignments. This was most clearly evident in
 November 1984 when unions, community as well as
 student organisations joined together in the massive
 Transvaal stay-away.
 This is not to say that a struggle within the union movement
 to define its political role began only after 1984. This
 would ignore earlier attempts to engage politically and the
interesting debates that accompanied these struggles.
 The debate over the relationship between trade
 unions and politics was to re-emerge in 1979, when the Food
 and Canning Workers Union called on the community to support
 their union in a dispute with management in the Fattis and
 Mom's plant in the Cape. Later that year the formation of
 the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) was to
 force community issues onto the shop floor when African
 workers In the Ford Cortina plant went out on strike in
 support of their community leader, Tozamile Botha. This was
 to lead, In 1980, to the establisment of MACWUSA which,
 along with the formation of SAAWU in East London a year
 earlier, forced the unions to confront national politics.
 The Food and Canning Workers Union argued in an article
 written in 1982 that while there was a need to become
 involved in community issues, a separate form of organisation
 was required:
 ? We do believe that separate forms of organisation are
 needed for these struggles. A trade union is not a
 community or political organisation. A union which tries to
 be a community or political organisation at the same time
 cannot survive1.(9)
 At the same time FOSATU entered the debate with a keynote
 speech by their General Secretary, Joe Foster. Foster's
 speech called for the building of a workers1 movement, much
 more broadly defined than simple collective bargaining trade
 unionism. It made provision for alliances and joint
 campaigning with other progressive organisations and called
on union members to become involved in community and political
 organisations. However, Foster went on to warn against
 unions' being drawn into political action which was not worker
 controlled but was "populist ' in character. Anti-populism
 was to remain an important political perspective of many of
 the FOSATU unions.
 Foster's speech reaffirmed the principles of worker control
 but now applied these to political action beyond production.
 However, the guidelines set down were of a general nature,
 allowing for very different interpretations: the criticism
 of populism reinforced a narrow ? workerism1 in some
 quarters; the provision for alliances and community
 involvement was welcomed by those with national- democratic
 leanings; whilst references to * workers control ' were
 interpreted by the SACP as a form of syndicalism.
 The debate came to focus on whether or not trade unions
 should affiliate to the United Democratic Front, newly
 formed in 1983. Unions such as MACWUSA and SAAWU articulated
 a position which favoured affiliation on the grounds that
 workers were also members of the community, and that unions
 must also fight for their members' interests outside of
 production. They also argued that trade unions encompassed
 only a part of the working class, and further that a
 successful political challenge to the state demanded
 alliances with other social groups, and the widest possible
 unity of those who are oppressed under apartheid. The GWU on
the other hand, asserted the need to ensure democratic
 structures and worker control. The argument was that the
 UDF was made up of activist-based organisations, with no
 structures for mandating and acountabilty. The trade unions
 would be swamped by a host of organisations, with equal
 voting power, but often little real membership. Furthermore,
 the UDF represented a multi-class alliance. Its very
 style and language were at variance with the traditions
 established in the unions, and did not contribute towards
 working class leadership. These arguments became the rally-
 ing cry of the anti-populist tendency.
 While these issues were being debated, new forms of
 organisation began to emerge on the ground. On the East
 Rand, the shop stewards councils spearheaded agitation
 against the destruction of shacks by the authorities.
 In the Eastern Cape - and to a lesser extent in the Western
 Cape and Natal - trade unions played a major role in the
 anti-tricameral election campaign in 1984. In the same year
 FOSATU locals led by certain FOSATU unions began to meet
 with student and youth organisations to exchange views.
 Simultaneously, community-based subsistence struggles led
 by unionised workers - as in the case of the one-and-a-half .
 year long East London bus boycott - pointed to the possiblity
 of a more direct role for unions in politics.
 However, these efforts remained localised and partial. In
the main, trade unions did not develop a unified national
 approach to the question of political action . The movement
 reained divided in its approach : the community unions ,
 particularly SAAWU , engaged in direct confrontation with
 the authorities ( the Ciskei "government'especially) . Some
 Fosatu unions such as SFAWU and MAWU moved cautiously onto
 this terrain on the local level. Others , such as the NUTW,
 maintained an anti-populist stance , concentrating on
 collective bargaining issues in the factory. Foster's speech
 was not concretised , leaving a political vaccuum and
 intensifying divisions inside the labour movement.
 The development of shop steward councils during this period
 illustrates the contradictions and political hesitancy at
 this stage. Shop steward councils in East Rand townships
 such as Katlehong, grouped shop stewards who lived in the
 same area, but who worked in different factories and in
 different industries. They took up township problems as
 well as organizing solidarity for particular factory
 struggles. There was a strong tinge of syndicalism in their
 politics: unions could extend their structures Into the
 community and embrace all issues. However, while FOSATU
 generally took a positive attitude to this development ,
 these councils failed to develop a structured
 response to the township and wider political problems.(10).
 Significantly when UMMAWSA split from MAWU in June 1984 ,
 the break was justified in terms of MAWU's and FOSATU's
alleged lack of political involvement and leadership.
 By August 1984, when the SADF invaded the townships , the
 industrial unions were facing numerous pressures that
 forced them to reconsider their organisational and political
 strategies. On the one hand , there was increasing militancy
 on the shop-floor as strike levels escalated , while on the
 other hand , there was a need to consolidate their organisational
 capacity in the face of a deepening recession. In addition,
 the crisis in the townships and the general level of
 nation-wide political mobilisation had forced the unions to
 take an appropriate stand. Organised workers demanded a
 direct Involvement in the struggle for political rights and
 urban change. However, in the absence of one united
 national trade union federation, there was no unified
 strategy in response to these pressures. Consequently,
 strategies were shaped at a local level. This can best be
 illustrated through the first-hand accounts of activists
 in a particular area - we will focus on the East Rand after
 the invasion of the townships in August 1984 but similar
 processes were at work in other townships in the Transvaal
 such as Alexandra.
 The SADF invasion of the townships had a dramatic impact on
 the lives of workers, as the journey between township and
 factory became extremely hazardous. A SFAWU shop steward
 from Tembisa township spoke of the new set of questions this
posed for the unions:
 "The streets of the township are (normally) more or less
 flat with lots of people moving up and down all the
 time. Then the soldiers came carrying guns and
 raiding the houses. They would just come in
 without permission. When they tried to put the
 rents up from the 1st of August, pamphlets were
 distributed calling for a rent boycott. At night
 the SADF raided the houses of those not paying
 rent and took whole families to the police
 station. They would release one and tell him to
 go and get the rent.
 It was a terrible experience. We had no voice.
 All the community organizations had been banned.
 We had no platform to raise issues and we realized
 that the trade union was our only platform. We
 had to learn to use our power at the workplace on
 these issues". (11)
 In the ensuing months, workers du[ use their workplace
 power. This took the form of stay aways. In this the
 student organization, COSAS, was a catalyst. When student
 demands were not met, COSAS took the initiative and called
 for support from community and trade union organizations. A
 positive relationship existed between youth and sections of
 the organized workforce as a result of the Simba Chips
 boycott that served to establish a working relationship
 between youth and employed workers. As a shop steward
 commented,
 "This was an eye opener to many of the workers who
 had not taken youth seriously. For instance, I
 discussed with some of the youth in the townships
 and I was surprised to hear them talking in terms
 of class struggle and being clearer than many of
 the workers themselves".(12)
 Unions and community organizations responded to the COSAS
 call. They set up parent-student committees in a number of
 townships. In the Transvaal between August - November 1984,
 a working relationship between community/student
organisations and trade unions began to emerge. This led to the
 November 1984 stay-away. It was the beginning of united mass
 action between organised labour, students and community
 organisations, with unions sometimes taking a leading role.
 For key sectors of the democratic union movement, it
 marked a decisive break with absentionism. The sheer scale
 of the stay-away must be understood in terms of the build-up
 of conflict and struggle in three key areas - the townships,
 the schools and the factories.
 (See appendix 1 : black workers' stayaways 1984 - 1986.)
 The significance of this joint action is that alliance
 politics were being forged in the process of intensified
 struggle , where workers confronted the township crisis daily,
 rather than in refined political debate as to the
 problems of populism. Organized workers, students,
 unemployed youth, and other township activists gained
 experience in working together as they faced issues daily;
 township rents and the need for an organized response to
 this crisis; police and army action, arrests, deaths of
 'comrades' and the need to organize funerals and local
 stay-aways in protest.
 This was to begin a process of redefinition of the trade union
 role and prioritized the question of national liberation.
 These pressures were moving sections of the trade union movement
 towards political unionism. It was however only the
 beginnings of a process that would require systematic
debate and a more permanent structured response, rather than
 ad hoc relationships in response to particular problems.
 Also, other areas, particularly in Natal, that did not
 experience township occupations as in the Transvaal, did not
 move in the same way. The emergence of political unionism
 was therefore partial, uneven and embryonic at this point in
 time. It was still as if the union movement was being
 pulled in opposite directions: a primary focus on the
 factory and the need to bargain more effectively, win higher
 wages, preempt dismissals, resist retrenchments; a focus on
 township issues that could no longer be ignored. The
 problem at this point was that the union leadership was
 divided on how to respond to this. One union General
 Secretary commented,
 "The situation is getting out of hand. Township
 issues are distracting us from our real work as
 trade unionists".(13)
 In contrast to this negative response that saw in every
 township involvement another example of "nationalism
 dragging the trade union movement along by its shirt tails",
 others were far more positive in their assessment. For
 them, the township demands had led to a creative
 response on the part of organized labour, a response that
 opened the way for the union movement to engage with
 national liberation. The issue of the trade union role
 remained in the melting pot - its direction undecided.
 Much depended upon whether, and on what basis, a new
unity could be created
While November 1984 was an historically important moment
 in which united mass action took place , during the coming
 months a number of obstacles and problems emerged which
 inhibited the realisation of this potential unity. Many of
 these problems came to the fore when the non-UDF unions
 opposed the PEBCO call for a Black Week-end consumer boycott
 (March 16/17 1985) and a stay-away ( March 18 , 1985) as a
 response to the political and economic crisis in the Eastern
 Cape. PEBCO identified the following issues: mass
 retrenchments , the AMCA-Ford merger and increased petrol
 prices, with the last becoming the final focus of the stay-
 away.
 The non-UDF unions gave a number of reasons for opposing the
 stay-away at that time. In particular , their public
 statements were concerned that a call made by PEBCO - an
 African community organisation - would exclude 'coloured '
 workers; a local response to what was a national problem was
 likely to be ineffective ; there was inadequate
 consultation with the workers ; and workers 1n smaller and
 unorganised establishemnts would be vulnerable.
 In the event , the stay-away was successful among African
 workers but had limited success among 'coloureds '(See
 Appendix 1.).These differences reflect the reality of a
 divided working class - divisions that find organisational
 expression in the previous division between PEBCO and the
 FOSATU trade unions . In addition , the recession -
particularly severe in the auto industry which has been
 concentrated in the Eastern Cape - affected workers
 in different ways. While unions such as NAAWU were concerned
 to consolidate their position - seeking to preserve jobs and
 the gains already made through collective bargaining -
 unemployed workers , many of whom were members of the Port
 Elizabeth Youth Congress - PEYCO - played an important role
 in the mass protests in the townships.
 This again illustrates that the emergence of social
 movement unionism is not necessarily a smooth progression
 from one form to another. During this phase, instances of a
 tense and conflictual relationship between trade unions
 committed to collective bargaining gains, and community
 organizations striving to assert a wider political
 engagement, were not uncommon. Transcending this divide
 would be a central challenge that the newly formed
 federation, COSATU, would have to face.
 The launch of COSATU in December 1985 represented a broad
 shift of key trade unions towards a more direct concern
 with non-factory issues. COSATU identified publicly with
 the national liberation struggle early in 1986 after a visit
 by a COSATU delegation to Lusaka. The joint ANC-SACTU-COSATU
 statement acknowledged the independent existence of COSATU,
 while at the same time viewing trade unions as an essential
 component of the national struggle.
 "As a representative of our working class, COSATU
is seized with the task of engaging the workers 1n
 the general democratic struggle, both as an
 independent organization and as an essential
 component of the democratic forces in our country".(14)
 This statement of intent by the COSATU leadership,
 based on the November 1985 Congress resolutions, was
 an attempt to come to terms with the crisis in the
 townships. Essentially, this meant thinking through the
 relationship with the national liberation movement and
 the relationship between students, unemployed youth and the
 organized workforce.
 The SFAWU National Executive Committee had, in an
 earlier discussion paper influenced by the events on the
 East Rand in 1984/ 85, attempted to come to grips with this
 issue. The document argued that in the context of a deepening
 economic and political crisis, the country had entered a
 "phase of uninterrupted struggle. It is the youth who are at
 the vanguard of that struggle. It is the youth that are
 demanding through their struggles fundamental change and a
 restructuring of society. In this flow of struggle the
 organized power of workers is crucial".(15)
 The document continued:
 "Township struggles are being waged and determined by
 youth...who also constitute a major part of the masses
 of the unemployed".
 There was therefore a need to work for a "convergence" of
 workplace and township forms of struggle, rather than the
 existing situation where such struggles were being waged in
 parallel.
 The document argued further that such alliances should only
be formed on a principled, or disciplined basis, that is,
 the union movement should spell out the terms upon which it
 is prepared to enter such an alliance. These terms should
 include a recognition of the following:
 the right of workers to control society, since
 they produced the wealth; consequently other
 groups in an alliance would have to recognize
 that the interests of workers could not be
 subordinated to the interests of other social
 classes.
 During 1986 the COSATU leadership began to spell out what
 such control could mean in practice. It would emerge, they
 believed, out of the organizing style that the unions had
 developed.(16). This was based on the "absolute control" that
 workers exercised over all "decision-making in the organization".
 This could be achieved through constitutions that entrenched such a
 principle; through shop steward elections in each department
 of a shop, factory or mine; through such leaders' only acting
 on the basis of mandates from the membership and regular
 report backs; and by structures of the unions that would
 incorporate a worker majority at all levels. This, COSATU
 believed, would lay the basis for developing an "alliance between
 students, youth and worker parents", that would point the way
 foward to "people's power", that is, the power of an alliance
 of classes, rather than the working class striving on its
 own. This required the development of forms of organization
 appropriate to the different terrains of struggle. These
 included SRCs in the schools, civics in the townships,
 unions in the factories and the organization of an
unemployed workers union, so that the various spheres of
 struggle could be linked and not "fought on isolated and
 individual fronts".
 PART 3 CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
 How did this strategy unfold during 1986? COSATU has
 encounterd a number of challenges in attempting to put Into
 practice alliance politics: strong opposition to alliance
 politics on the part of a section of COSATU; further
 debate amongst the larger COSATU affiliates as to the
 precise content of the general principles outlined by the
 leadership; the failure to meet the unrealistic deadline of
 one union one Industry within six months; an ongoing search
 for appropriate forms of organization for the unemployed ;
 and finally, meeting the challenge of the state of emergency
 and debate forms of self defence that could be effective
 under the new conditions.
 Opposition to alliance politics was to emerge openly
 in the months following the COSATU launch among a section
 of the leadership that were critical of COSATU's new
 political direction. They charged that this new political
 direction was "misdirected", and that this "rush" to espouse
 "alliance politics" might result in a situation where years of
 painstaking work might be swept aside and the working class
 again be without democratic trade unions. (17) The essence
of the argument is that populism and nationalism, which have
 gained increasing support during the current crisis, stand in
 absolute contradiction to a working class politics. The
 organizational styles and political content of each are so
 different, it is argued, that any involvement of the working
 class in such politics can mean only one thing: the abandonment
 of independence and with it the abandonment of working class
 politics. Alliance politics which stresses "the people" and
 not the working class is a non-class based politics that fails
 to prepare the workers for socialism. Unions that become
 embroiled in populist campaigns will lose their organizational
 independence, because they will find themselves unable to
 control such campaigns. Populist organizations, it is
 argued, are anti-democratic in character because the actions
 of the "leaders' are not accountable, as no recognizable
 membership exists.
 The anti-populists are also concerned with what they
 see as the inability of the unions to control the
 "confrontationist" strategy of the populists. The personal
 attacks of some of COSATU leadership on Buthelezi is cited
 as an example of the consequences of such a strategy as it
 has caused problems for unionists in Natal. These
 practices, it is argued, will "exhaust" the unions rather
 than their opponents as unionists get "dragged into each and
 every adventurous action that is initiated". Critics of
 alliance politics have seen evidence of such "adventurous
 action' in the poor response to COSATU's call for a 'day of
action1 on the 14th July 1986 to protest against the State
 of Emergency.
 Increasingly, the larger unions have been far more
 interested in giving specific content to the rather general
 and abstract principles outlined by the COSATU leadership in
 its early phase than debating whether or not alliances are in
 the interests of the working class. Such debate now
 centres on the form such alliances should take, the
 definition of socialism, and Its relationship to national
 struggle. The Metal and Allied Workers Union , for example,
 at its congress in July 1986 committed itself to building socialism
 in South Africa in a struggle spearheaded by the working
 class. The resolution argued that :
 Worker leaders are increasingly playing a leading role In
 the community. The lack of initiatives, and the confusion
 that exists within the community itself on political issues
 arises from the lack of a working class programme.
 The union went on to set itself the task in the
 coming period,* of beginning to define what we mean by
 socialism1.(18)
 Similarly , the leadership of NUM at their congress 1n March
 1987 began to give content to their notion of alliance
 politics by inviting Winnie Mandela, wife of the jailed ANC
 leader and Honorary President of NUM, Nelson Mandela, and
 Murphy Morobe, acting publicity Secretary of the UDF, to speak
 at the opening of the congress. James Motlatsi, NUM President,
 spelt out his understanding of the political direction
of the union:
 Attempts by the governemnt to impose the tricameral
 parliament system and community councils have failed
 totally. Its reform plans have been met with large scale
 opposition from every part of the country - urban and rural
 Today the state 's plans lie in ruins Only a
 democratic socialist order , which uses the country's
 resources for the benefit of its people will solve the
 crisis We must build firm , discplined and effective
 alliances with the democratic organisations.(19)
 It is significant that these debates are taking place
 amongst the larger, industrially-based affiliates of COSATU,
 for it is here that real power lies. This power
 consolidated during 1986, when mergers took place in the
 transport sector (the merger of TGWU with GWU to form the
 new TGWU ) the food sector( the FCWU ,SFAWU and RAWU into
 the FAWU), and the absorption of a plastic union in the
 Western Cape into the CWIU. Although COSATU failed to meet
 its ambitious deadline, the principle of mergers has now
 taken hold. A major merger in the metal industry is expected
 soon; a S.A. Railway and Harbour Workers Union, which will
 merge into TGWU, has now been launched, as has the new
 construction union, CAWU; plans are proceeding with a
 nation-wide agricultural union.
 Apart from consolidating power Industrially, the crucial
 issue of the relationship of organized workers with the
 unemployed remains. While difficult to avoid, it remains a
 challenge that union movements in other societies with
 substantial welfare state provisions, have not had to
 confront in any concrete organizational sense. At present,
the potential for real tension exists between organized and
 politicized, unemployed youth, and unionized workers.
 Political oppression has compounded the generational tensions
 in township households. The attitude of the youth 1s complex
 and contradictory: they recognize that their parents are victims
 of racial oppression and economic exploitation, and therefore
 empathize with them; but they blame their parents for not
 fighting against this with sufficient vigour, and therefore
 feel anger and frustration at what they perceive to be their
 parents failings.
 "Our parents still have that old Image they grew
 up under. They tell us that the white man, Is a
 white man, and what he says is final. When we try
 to argue with our parents they will just say,
 "what do you know, you were only born yesterday.
 You have got to listen to what we are telling
 you?1 We are caught in a trap. What our parents
 don't seem to have is a desire for us to be better
 peoples....If you bring your parents In and sit
 them there, and discuss with them, they just fold
 their arms and say nothing. So now we do
 everything for ourselves without consulting our
 parents because it 1s useless to speak to a stone".(20)
 A potentially antagonistic attitude towards the unions
 exists among some of the youth:
 "Many unions just ask for wage demands and the
 reduction of working hours. I know factories
 where workers just ask for boots and
 overalls...but don't find there's an Importance in
 the struggle. But we are the highly politized ones.
 ....We embrace one cause, we understand what
 the cause is, and we sacrifice, even our lives,
 because we understand what 1s actually happening.
 But workers, ha! If you only receive those boots
 and those boots are being torn up again, then you
 will start boycotting the factory and demanding
 new boots, because this one is a bit old!
 That is why when we call for actions like stay
 aways they often don't understand the importance
 of the stayaway....They are often narrow, and just
 look at the disadvantages of stayaways. They just
 say, "If we don't work for a week, we won't get
money for that week'. So what they normally do Is
 to take another route and walk through fences and.
 jump those bridges to go to work...If individuals
 were highly organized and politicized their
 response would be positive enough. They would be
 able to sacrifice even for the whole month by
 staying away from the factories. Liberation would
 be bought easily. It just depends on how the
 unions will operate".
 The establishment of an organized relationship with the
 unemployed will doubtlessly ease these tensions as the
 youth come to understand trade unionism at a deeper level.
 Much will depend on the way that the trade union movement
 unfolds in the coming years. An alliance has the potential
 to ease these tensions. Orthodox unionism will reinforce
 them. From their vantage point of the streets, youth have
 no stake in any gradual struggle. The longer the struggle,
 the longer their misery. Tomorrow, they say, the struggle
 must be won. It is, some have suggested, a form of '
 "immediatism1. These are the pressures of the township
 that many trade union leaders have had to contend with.
 After the army occupied the townships, protest became
 increasingly militaristic as large numbers of youth began
 engaging the security forces in running street battles that
 claimed hundreds of lives. The militaristic voluntarism of
 this section of the youth has sometimes eclipsed the
 organisational concerns of union activists as the townships
 have become ungovernable. In these cases trade unionists and
 community activists have found themselves sandwiched between
 the militarism of the youth and the terror tactics of the
security forces. Whereas sections of the youth were criticising
 them for being too moderate, the security forces were hunting
 them down and detaining or killing them.
 However, COSAS youth who have had organizational experience,
 do recognize the organizational concerns of unions. They
 recognize the tensions between organization and mobilization,
 as they themselves are confronted with problems arising from
 what they regard as the undisciplined actions of unorganized,
 often anti-social elements in the townships. Once an
 organized relationship is established, the concerns and the
 perspectives of trade union leadership could be articulated
 in a constructive manner. Tensions and potential conflicts
 could be transformed into interlacing and unified struggle.
 That is why they believe an alliance is necessary.
 COSATU has resolved to establish an unemployed workers
 union, and the leadership is presently exploring the form
 that this should take. Unemployed youth are themselves
 involved in this initiative, which will have a significant
 bearing on the type of labour movement to emerge in South
 Africa.
 These challenges are being met in the context of the state
 of emergency and the onslaught of Inkatha in Natal, and
 right wing vigilante terror in other provinces. The second
 state of emergency affected COSATU leadership particularly
 badly . The Labour Monitoring Group's December report
showed that 614 union leaders, about 80 % of them with
 COSATU links , had been arrested in terms of the emergency
 regulations.(21) More than half were still in detention.
 Over 2000 rank-and-file union members suffered the same
 fate in mass detentions during disputes in the second half
 of last year. More disturbing was the murder of two MAWU
 shop stewards as well as some their relatives at Mpophomeni
 near Howick on December 5 and 6 1986 by vigilantes reported to be
 carrying Inkatha flags. The launch of the Inkatha-backed UWUSA
 in May 1986 in direct organisational and ideological opposition
 to COSATU has further sharpened divisions 1n factories In
 certain parts of Natal .
The most effective response to this onslaught is still being
 debated. Some are reflecting on whether it would not be
 wiser to return to collective bargaining unionism.
 "Workers want real gains. They want to be able to
 see concrete improvements, in wages, in working
 conditions and in transport. Before the emergency
 many were caught up in the idea of liberation. It
 seemed as though we were on the move at last. Now
 all of that has changed. We must return to
 tangible gains. Workers can't be kept going on
 ideas". (j?23).
 Retreat could be one important effect of the Emergency. In
 some senses such an option would be prudent - real gains, we
 argued in Part 1 of this paper, have been made by unions in
 the post-Wiehahn period. Furthermore powerful forces both
 locally and internationally are encouraging such a
 direction. One example internationally is the AALC in
 Washington. In a report, written in May 1986, recommending
 the criteria that should be used in selecting which unions
 to give financial support to, the author makes clear
 that the AFL-CIO should only support "business trade
 unionism and not ideological trade unionism...(and that they
 should be ) * careful to avoid any affiliation with the active
 partisans in the political trade union arena'.(23).
 In sharp contrast to this attempt to assert the apolitcal
 tradition of American "business unionism1 is the more
 creative response of some far-sighted managers who
 have realised the disruptive effect of political conflict 6"n
 the delicate industrial relations structures and have tried
 to mediate in these conflicts in order to absorb them into
 the collective bargaining structures. This approach takes as
its point of departure the inevitabilty of the "politicfzation1
 of industrial relations because of the lack of political
 rights in South Africa. Traditional industrial relations
 theory, it is argued, needs to be adapted to the peculiar
 conditions of South Africa where mananagment and employees
 have sufficient common interest to enter into agreements on
 certain political issues.(24)
 Some companies have already begun to put this approach into
 practice. The 1986 Anglo American Annual Report notes that:
 'Several companies have taken the Initiative 1n
 mediating directly between the police and local
 authorities on the one hand, and company
 employees, on the other hand, 1n endeavouring to
 resolve conflicts which have spilled over into the
 workplace. '(25).
 The benefits of this kind of institutionalisation are clear,
 writes a background Anglo American document :
 ?by accepting an involvement in problem-solving
 outside the factory gate, management gains new
 controls over the conduct of its employees and
 simultaneously opens up avenues of common interest
 in which management and its employees can pursue
 common goals.' (26).
 Other managers have embarked on the more conventional path
 of attempting to pressurise the government into a clearer
 ?reform' direction. Increasingly alarmed at the spread of
 radical, even socialist ideas among workers, the business
 community has stepped up its pressure on the government to
 remove some key features of apartheid such as the Group
 Areas Act. The meeting of prominent businessmen with the
African National Congress In late 1985 Is both an index of
 the degree of impatience with the "pace of reform', as well
 as the seriousness with which the business community is now
 exploring and campaigning for their version of a post-
 apartheid society. The most ambitious attempt to date is
 the Federated Chamber of Industries Business Charter.
 Conceived of as an alternative to the Freedom Charter,
 the Business Charter spells out the principles of a free
 enterprise economy and society. Importantly, this includes
 a firm commitment to less Involvement of the state in welfare,
 growing privatisation and deregulation. For some, such as
 Douwes-Dekker of the Wits Business School, the conditions now
 exist for an open alliance between management and labour In the
 form of bilateral agreements involving organised labour and
 organised capital. This, he believes, will provide the base
 for moving towards a more effective industrial relations
 system and ultimately a form of corporatism or social
 democracy.(27).
 Not surprisingly, deep scepticism exists among black workers
 to any notion of an employer-employee alliance against the
 apartheid state. The recession has led to a decline in
 wages in real terms and retrenchment has swelled the ranks
 of the unemployed putting the trade union movement onto the
 defensive. Employers have intensified work through work
 study. This intensification of struggle on the shop floor
 makes an alliance between unions and employers unlikely.
A more significant reason why such an alliance is unlikely
 is that employers are seen by black workers as the chief
 beneficiaries of the apartheid system as well as its driving
 force. They are sceptical of employers1 attempts to
 distance themselves from apartheid. They point to the fact
 that this is not the first time that employers have called
 for the end of apartheid - 1n the immediate post-Sharpeville
 period and after Soweto 1n 1976, employers called for the
 removal of certain racial laws, only to adapt to the dominant
 norms once the unrest had subsided. They do not believe that
 employers have the will or the capacity to remove the apartheid
 state.(28).
 It is significant that NUM has chosen, not to retreat from
 alliance politics, but rather to begin to spell
 out what they mean by an alliance. "Our organisation has
 taken a political stance because in the five years of its
 existence it found politics were responsible for our
 problems1, NUM president, James Motlatsi, said at their 1987
 congress.(29). This is not only important because of NUM's
 size but also because the mining industry rests on the
 political foundations of the apartheid system .
CONCLUSION.
 We have attempted to trace some of the social forces that
 have come to play a part in shaping the trade union role.
 In our view, the alliance is still embryonic. Powerful
 forces are determined to break any attempt to link
 production politics and state politics in the union's
 strategic programme. The entire security apparatus is in a
 state of mobilization to try and contain the vigorous
 movement of resistance that has emerged in the post 1984
 period. Managements strive to integrate demands into the
 industrial relations system. What all these forces have on
 their side is an objective set of conditions that make
 orthodox unionism appear to be a more prudent option for
 union leadership.
 But the lack of political rights and the economic recession
 make such an option diffficult to follow in practice unless
 certain key demands can be met within the forseeable future.
 Many of these demands can only be met by a Lancaster House-
 type negotiated settlement. This Is a conclusion that at
 least some of the businessmen who travelled to Lusaka in
 1985 must have come to.
 Under the specific conditions of South Africa, a new form of
 unionism has begun to emerge. Under these conditions
 the trade unions, in alliance with students, the youth, the
 unemployed and community groups, have begun to play a
leading role in the struggle for democracy and political
 rights in society at large. This new form of unionism has
 the potential to forge an alliance with the popular movement
 on the basis of equality, and a commitment to defend a
 working class, socialist programme in a liberated South
 Africa.
 Structural transformations in the South African economy
 have created this potential.(30). In summary these are:
 (1) The establishment of effective structures of collective
 bargaining through the growth and consolidation of nation-
 wide mass based industrial trade unions in most sectors
 of the economy.
 (2). Accompanying this has been the growth of fully
 proletarianised working class communities, including large
 numbers of militant students and unemployed youth without
 adequate social infrastructure.
 (3).The intervention of the state - particlarly since 1984
 and intensified since the State of Emergency - into a range
 of areas of social life, combined with the lack of political
 incorporation of the black population, has ensured that
 localised grievances are soon translated into confrontation
 with the state. This also, of course, ensures the persistence
 of the national tradition.
 As in Poland with the Solidarity union movement, these
 unions are now taking up the concerns of working people as
 a whole, and posing new horisons for trade union work. In
this they are responding to the needs of working people as
 a whole. Unlike Solidarity, the South African
 union movement has a greater chance of success because of
 the relative strength and durabilty of the shop floor
 structures that have been established in the workplaces.
 When faced, for example, by a direct state attack on its
 leadership, as happened during the State of Emergency, some
 of these unions were able to win significant concessions,
 such as time off for shop-stewards to run the union offices
 when certain leaders were detained. This Innovative use of
 collective bargaining structures in the face of political
 repression has the potential to succeed in the long term,
 if it 1s able to retain the gains made on the shop-floor
 in the post-Wiehahn period, and j_f present debates and
 initiatives towards other social groups shift into the realm
 of structured relationships.
 This is the promise of the new union movement in South Africa
 and the challenge it poses to managers trained in traditional
 industrial relations theory and practice, as well as to those
 in the national movement who see trade unions simply as the
 transmission belt in a future centrally planned
 economy.(31).
FOOTNOTES.
 1). Hyman, R, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism
 (Pluto Press, London, 1971.)
 2). Political unionism is the central focus of Lambert's
 PHD thesis on SACTU/Political unionism in South Africa.
 An analysis of the South African Congress of Trade
 Unions.'
 3). Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation
 of Monopolistic Conditions Act, 1955, March 1977,RP 64/
 1977.
 4). Hemson, D, "Trade unions and the struggle for
 liberation1, Capital and Class 6 , 1976.
 5). Cobbett, W, "Orderly Urbanisation'-.Continuity and Change
 in Influx Control in Popular struggles in South Africa
 (Forthcoming).
 6). Quoted in J Mailer Q Wage bargaining In South Africa1
 South African Review , 4. 1987. (Forthcoming).
 7). Wood, E M, "The separation of the economic and the
 political 1n capitalism1,New Left Review , No.127.
 8). Part 2 of this article is based on joint
 work done during 1985 and 1986 by members of the Labour
 Monitoring Group at the University of the Witwatersrand,
 in particular Stephen Gelb, Jon Lewis, and Mark Swilling,
 9). Food and Canning Workers Union, ?Search for a workable
 Relationship1. South African Labour Bulletin. Vol 7,
 No.8 , July 1982.
 10). The growth of shop steward councils led to two further
 Innovations; the establishment of shop steward
 committees uniting representatives from different
 companies and the establishment of shop steward
 councils for a particular sub-sector such as foundries.
 The Intention behind these innovations was to steer
 shop steward organisation into collective bargaining
 structures.
 11). Interview , SFAWU shop steward and N.E.C. member,
 October, 1985.
 12). Ibid.
 13). Informal discussion with union organiser, May 1985.
14). Joint ANC.SACTU,COSATU statement . South African Labour
 Bulletin. Vol 11 No.5 May ,1986.
 15). Sweet , Food and Allied Workers Union Discussion Paper.
 August , 1985. We would like to thank those involved in
 writing this paper for allowing us to quote from it. The
 quotations that follow are all taken from this
 document.
 16). COSATU General Secretary , Jay Naidoo. Q Building
 People's Power: a working class perspective1, A
 paper delivered at the Grass roots Conference. 5th May,
 1986 .The quotations that follow are from this speech.
 17). We have constructed this critique from a number of
 different sources inside COSATU. The authors prefer
 to remain anonmyous.
 18). South African Metal Worker . Volume 1 Number 4 July
 1986.
 19). Siluma, M, " The birth of a new force for change1.
 The Sunday Star March 1 1987.
 20). These extracts are from a national workshop on youth
 unemployment organised by the Community and Labour
 Research Group, University of Natal, Durban. Moses
 Ngoasheng , Rob Lambert and Ari Sitas were involved
 in organising the workshop from the 2nd to 6th
 June, 1986.
 21). Labour Monitoring Group Report on the effect of the
 State of Emergency on Industrial Relations. 29 th
 December , 1986.
 22). Discussion with the National Organiser of a large
 COSATU affiliate. 27th February, 1987.
 23) Evaluation of the African American Labour Center
 Project in the Republic of South Africa. 12 th May,
 1986.
 24). This construction of the argument has been drawn from
 a number of discussions with a group of managers who
 would prefer to remain anonymous.
 25). Anglo American Company . Annual Report. 1986.
 26). "Managing Political Uncertainity1. Unpublished seminar
 given at an Institute of Industrial Relations Seminar.
 Johannesburg. July , 1986.
 27). Douwes- Dekker, L, Industrial Relations in South
 Africa. Unpublished oaoer delivered at the
International Industrial Relations Association 7 th
 World Congress. September. 1986. Hamburg . West
 Germany.
 28). See Lewis, D, ? Capital , trade unions and the national
 liberation struggle'. South African Labour Bulletin.
 Vol 11 No.4, Feb-March 1986.
 29). Siluma, M, Ibid.
 30). These points emerged in discussion with three of our
 colleagues in the Labour Monitoring Group , Stephen
 Gelb, Jon Lewis and Mark Swilling. Ofcourse we are
 responsile for the interpretation given in this paper.
 31). The idea of a new form of unionism - social movement or
 political unionism -1s developed In a book titled Third
 World Workers and the new international labour studies.
 It is edited by Ronaldo Munck and will be published by
 Zed press 1n July.
H/OC KHCSt 5EUTAUAYS 1334 - 1396
 ro
 l .
 2.
 3.
 4 .
 5.
 6.
 7 .
 8.
 9.
 10.
 U .
 12.
 DATE
 3 Septarber 1984
 17 Septartoer 1964
 22 October 1984
 5 - 6 Novenber 1984
 18 torch 1985
 2 1 - 2 2 Ksrch 19S5
 14 Nfey 1965
 18 July 1965
 10 - 12 Septcrrter
 1965
 9 October 1965
 5 March 1986
 21 (torch 1955
 ACTUAL
 DURATION
 1 day
 1 day
 1 day
 2day
 1 day
 2day
 Up to 1 day stay-
 awqy en East
 Rand. Elsewhere
 short stoppages
 1 day
 1 day
 1 day
 1 day
 1 day
 AREA'
 Sharpeville
 Soteto
 ? Spr ing
 P W a r e a
 Ftrt Elizabeth
 Uitenhage
 East Raid
 Pietenraritzburg
 Cape Town
 Nationwide
 P U V area
 Port ElizEtoetJi/
 Uifertage
 EEMANDS
 Rent
 Solidarity an rents
 Police in tohnsnips
 Studsit dstTBnds
 Student demands
 Repressicn
 COGt of l iving and
 Rents
 RetraTchre-its and
 petrol prices
 Solidarity far
 vtctinB of
 repressicn
 Solidarity stoppage
 over death of
 Raditsela in
 detention
 Support of striking
 SARMXL workers
 Onxstlon to State
 of Emergency
 Bay of Pnver
 Release of detained
 ixuon leader
 (?tees ttiyikeso
 Ccrnntmiurution of
 3iarpeville and
 Langa
 0RGANIZAT1CW
 INVOLVED
 Civic associations/
 shop stewards
 RHC
 Parent/Student Coimittee
 Unions
 Studmts
 Camuuty
 PEBOO *
 FEYCO
 UYOO
 CWIU and
 PC6ATU
 MHUU
 Udear
 Bi^icp Tutii
 MAUU
 LCF
 OOSATU
 E>PLOYERS
 RESPO6E
 to wortt, no pay
 except SASOL *ho
 dianissed a l l 6,COO
 No work, no pay
 No wsrk, no pay
 Dti-ndent on fonn
 o f acciun
 Ho work, no pay
 No work, no pay
 No wcrfe, no pay
 Na work, no pay
 Also authorised
 leave
 EFFECTIVENESS
 60%
 35 - 636
 80%
 8CE6 i n Lnicnized fac to r ies
 Approxinotely 800,000
 90% Afr icans (PE(
 3fflt Af r icans (Uitenhage)
 98% Afr icans
 16K Csloureds
 Pa r t i a l and ineven
 Up to 100.000 took
 sane fonn o f ac t ion
 1CO%
 37% e n 11 Sep te i f ce r
 Overall unsuccessful
 Uhsuccessful
 5EK
 ?9B% African ) , , , t _ L
 836 Coloured) U i t e r h a g C
 99% Afr ican )
 2EK Coloured 1
 SOURCE: Labour ; Gm*i SAIB Volilfft 10 No. 6; Vokmo 10 No. 7;
 Vniirrt 10 tt>. M; VI.IIIIK 11 No. 1;
 V-.lmn I I t l i . J; Viiiiliti II t*>. *l