

**LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND LOCAL  
OWNERSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF POST-CIVIL WAR  
MOZAMBIQUE**

**By**

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## ABSTRACT


The concept of local ownership and participation emerged as contextually sensitised responses to the criticisms of the liberal peace approach to issues of local legitimacy and the need for context specific peace building solutions. Given that local ownership is often viewed as an afterthought by foreign actors, it continues to be an elusive concept that is widely considered to be a necessary ingredient for durable peace; yet the very same concept has gained wide ranging criticism due to the manner in which it still relies on fundamental liberal concepts. Through a qualitative enquiry, this study explored the dilemma of the two concepts by placing it within the post-Civil War Mozambique context.

There appears to be little consensus on the subject due to the role the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) played in ending hostilities and ensuring the first multi-party elections. Thus, the mission is regarded as having been successful in those areas by garnering an acceptable level of local buy-in due to the peaceful nature of the first elections and the relative peace that the country has maintained since the UNOMOZ exit. Thus in terms of the research question, it is clear that Mozambique highlights the complexity of the liberal peacebuilding and local ownership debate, thus requiring a nuanced approach where both concepts are approached with a high level of objectivity.

The study found that UNOMOZ can be said to have been successful in its ability to secure peace and cultivate equitable governance structures, even though they were isolated to a specific elite. However when taking the local ownership dimension of the debate, UNOMOZ's limited mandate and time constraints rendered it to be a process that entered the country with a cultural blind spot which by design excluded locals and eventually rendered them as essentially disempowered pawns in the reproduction of power structures that continue to limit wide spread, equitable civic participation.

## DECLARATION

I declare that this research is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any other qualification in any other university. The research is submitted in fulfilment of the Master of Management in the field of security at the University of Witwatersrand.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke, positioned above a dashed horizontal line.

Shamiso Nomsa Hlatshwayo

January, 2022

## DEDICATION

This research study is dedicated to my parents Abigail and Leonard Hlatshwayo, they continued to remind me of my commitment throughout the years.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, I appreciate your guidance, support, and patience.

I also thank Ayanda Nyathi, who was my support structure throughout this journey. In you, I have found a friend, a sister, and a study partner. I would like thank Kennedy Manduna, your support through the years has been a source of strength throughout this journey.

Lastly, I dedicate this to my daughter Nweti, I was pregnant with her when I started this journey. Her presence gave me the motivation I needed to endure, even in the worst of times.

All thanks to the Lord Almighty for giving me the strength to complete this study.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACC	All African Council of Churches
ANC	African National Congress
CCM	The Mozambican Christian Council
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique or Mozambican Liberation Front
GPA	Rome General Peace Accord
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
UNOMOZ	The United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PBR	Peace Building and Reconstruction
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance or Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SAP	Structural Adjustment Policies
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	UN Departments of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOHAC	UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1. Introduction

Mozambique is one of the most unstable countries in Southern Africa, having undergone almost three decades of continuous armed conflict (Frey, 2020).. The country's genealogy of armed conflict is characterised by the war of independence against colonial master Portugal, a civil war at the height of the Cold War and facing hostility from apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, then allies of Portugal and committed to preventing 'black rule' in Southern Africa as the last strongholds of white settler/colonial rule. The seeds of the Mozambican Civil War are attributed to the hard-core Marxist-Leninist stance, in line with the USSR ideology adopted by the newly ruling Liberation Front of Mozambique or Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) government in 1977. The ambitious program of modernisation that was to be achieved in ten years produced some success in education and the provision of healthcare. However, failure in agricultural policy quickly revealed that the programme for rapid, centrally planned and heavily capitalised development was unrealistic and led to economic strain. Drought and growing insecurity by insurgent aggression from a budding Mozambican National Resistance or Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in the central and northern countryside of the country only exacerbated the situation (Waterhouse, 1996). Despite these problems, the country stands out as one of the rare examples in which the United Nations (UN) peace-keeping and peacebuilding missions have been met with some level of success. Mozambique has thus been traditionally portrayed as a 'success story' because, differently from other African countries, political stability has endured and the previous rebel group has been fairly integrated into the political arena while accepting electoral results over the years, even if reluctantly (Maschietto, 2015).

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) beginning in December 1992, was established in the wake of the famed United Nations (UN) Agenda for Peace era. This resulted in what would become the lead instrument of the UN in implementing the Rome General Peace Accord (GPA) that ended Mozambique's sixteen-year civil war



waged between the ruling Frelimo and Renamo. UNOMOZ, with the assistance of other UN structures and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) was mandated with the overall responsibility in four primary areas: political, military, humanitarian and electoral affairs (Juergensen, 1998; Fitzduff, 2001; Bush, 1996; Donais, 2009). Militarily, UNOMOZ was tasked with monitoring the cease-fire, demobilisation and demilitarisation of soldiers from both armies who would not serve in the unified defence force; ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops; provide security along the country's four main transit corridors and key infrastructure (UNOMOZ,1995). Politically, it was required to enforce the GPA's fundamental principles and ensure that stipulated timetables were recognised and adhered too. As such, legislative and presidential elections were to be held one year after the GPA was signed and were also to be organised, monitored and verified by the UNOMOZ (Juergensen, 1998). Renamo was also to be declared and assisted to become an official political party that would peacefully participate in the elections (Chachiuu & Malan, 2010). From a humanitarian perspective, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) established the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) to assist the UNOMOZ with the reconciliation effort (Juergensen, 1998). The UNOHAC was tasked with coordinating, and monitoring all humanitarian assistance operations, with a particular focus on refugees, internally displaced, demobilised military personnel and the affected local population (Juergensen, 1998). All these tasks were to be carried out and implemented over a sixteen month period.

By the time the UNOMOZ mission officially ended in February 1995, the UN supported six thousand military and civilian personnel, and contributed US \$500 million to the peacekeeping operation and \$775 million to the humanitarian effort (Juergensen, 1998). Funk (2012) argues that the introduction of a large foreign presence to a conflict zone tends to engender a number of conditions that are not necessarily conducive to long-term peace. These conditions include the failure to tap or cultivate local talent, an economy that develops a dependency to catering for the needs of foreign specialists, friction between internationals and locals, popular ambivalence about the trajectory of political change, and a debilitating sense of dependence on powerful outsiders (Funk, 2012). One could argue that post-accord contexts create environments in which external actors

promote standard templates for institutional reform that do little to activate local capacities and instead only make superficial contributions to the relief of long term psychological, social, and economic impacts of violent conflict. Despite the well-meaning efforts of UN agencies, funds and technical expertise that nurtured Mozambique's transition created a situation in which the progress of peace became mechanically evaluated " as if one is checking off items on a simple list of indicators: "Economic growth, check; democratic elections, check; a functioning opposition, check; and a military out of politics, check!" (Wienstein, 2002, p. 150). Wienstein's (2002) analysis on Mozambique best captures the country's current dynamics by stating that the process was assessed to be stable and a peacebuilding success by following a mechanical check list. This approach failed to consider the fundamental historical, ethnic and geographical realities that existed in Mozambique before and after the sixteen year civil war.

Funk (2012) further asserts that peace can easily become a series of events that happen to the general population rather than a participatory initiative that enables members of a divided society to tap local resources, rediscover their own vernacular language for peacebuilding and become active agents in the construction of a new reality. As a result, the liberal peace building project becomes an inflexible regimen of reforms and institutional fixes that are exported to areas of conflict and implanted without local roots. This leads to serious power imbalances between outsiders and insiders, which create conditions of paternalism and dependency that plague the country long after the purveyors of peace are gone.

One could argue that Western states and other international actors have assumed leading roles in peacebuilding, with the result that local dynamics and factors have often been side-lined. Lederach (1997) was one of the first to argue that top-down statist approaches needed to be augmented by more sensitive approaches that emulated bottom-up prescriptions and the turn to greater local participation. This argument aptly capture the manner in which peacebuilding in post-civil war Mozambique was approached, as it sought to prioritise foreign interests over those of the concerned local parties.

This study sought to understand the liberal peacebuilding and local ownership dilemma by locating it within the post-Civil War Mozambique context which set the backdrop for

the expression of the UN Agenda for Peace through the 1992 Rome GPA. Given the resumption of pockets of conflict since the Rome GPA, Mozambique can no longer be referred to as post-conflict, thus for the purpose of accurately capturing the country's present context, post-civil war will be used throughout the research paper.

## 1.2 Background

Mozambique is a Southern African state whose history has been marked by struggle and resistance. Houser and Shore (1994:6) aptly state that, "The forms of resistance changed, but the resistance itself remained. Sometimes it was cultural in form, sometimes directly political, and sometimes it erupted into military action. Sometimes it was open and overt, at other times clandestine. Most often, it was all of these combined." As was the case with most African states, Mozambique was colonised by a European state in a bid to partake in its rich natural resources. Mozambique's coastal location gives it geographic and strategic importance not only regionally as it provides a corridor for trade to other markets, but also on the continent linking Africa to the east (IPSC, 2020:2). Weinstein (2002:142) adds that "Mozambique has long occupied a strategic position. In colonial times, and even before, as traders made their way up and down the Indian Ocean, Mozambique's abundance of rivers and natural harbors held the promise of unparalleled access to the African hinterland." This made Mozambique the ultimate settler's dream and an attractive destination for any would be coloniser. However, when the first Portuguese settlers arrived in northern Mozambique, at the turn of the fifteenth century, their main aim was the lucrative gold trade in the area, not colonisation. It was only at the end of the century, when the 'Scramble for Africa' began that Portugal sought to extend administrative control throughout Mozambique (Waterhouse, 1996:5).

In 1964, inspired by the independence of other African nations such as Angola and Guinea Bissau, Mozambican natives under the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) began a protracted armed struggle against Portugal's colonial rule (Funada-Classen, 2013:2). In 1974, on the tenth anniversary of the war of liberation in Mozambique, a significant event in Portugal changed the fortunes of Mozambique and its freedom fighters. According to Houser and Shore (1975:5);

In the early hours of April 25th, an army uprising began in Lisbon which, by that evening, had deposed the Caetano government and was in full control of the country. During the months that followed, important and deep-rooted changes took place in Portugal, the independence of Guinea-Bissau was recognised as an accomplished fact, dates were set for independence in Angola and Mozambique, and Frelimo was recognised as the rightful and sole legitimate spokesman for the people of Mozambique.

After gaining independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, Frelimo under the leadership of Samora Machel established a single-party regime in Mozambique. Frelimo initially enjoyed widespread support because of its struggle for independence against the Portuguese as well as its call for national unity, emulating the post-colonial political experience of several other newly independent African states (Manning, 2002). In 1977, the government adopted a Marxist Leninist platform and in the same year, a civil war broke out between Frelimo and the rebel group, Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) (Manning and Malbrough, 2009:79). Frelimo, riding on the legitimacy of being the liberation fighters that had led Mozambique to independence embarked on this program without bothering to obtain popular consent. On adopting the Marxist Leninist agenda, Weinstein (2002:145) adds that "Frelimo openly touted the Marxist-Leninist agenda, cultivating close relations with the Soviet bloc and opening its borders to other liberation movements, particularly those challenging the white-run regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. Moreover, belief in this new agenda was made mandatory. Political freedoms were curtailed." However, in 1987, under increasing pressure from external donors, Mozambique embraced the transition to a market economy and joined the Bretton Woods Institutions. Richmond and Mitchell (2011:328) add that "Although this appeared to be widely accepted on the ground among elite voices which became dominant partly because of their support for this model during or after the peace processes, it did not tally with the ideology of customary groups, some elite groups, or the often socialist-inspired liberation movements. Nor did it sit well with citizens influenced by socialism." Side effects of these reforms included rising unemployment and the impoverishment of a large group of people working in the state sector. Disruption of the already fragile economy was also evident, as imposed credit restrictions hit the agricultural sector, leading to the closure of several factories (Hanlon and Smart, 2008:13). Pugh (2010:262) adds that liberalisation

of the economy 'has broadly favoured entrepreneurship over employment and commercial over social contracts in welfare policy', and it has also failed to respect locally existing welfare arrangements and this was the effect liberalisation had on Mozambican economy. Pugh adds that liberalisation had negative effects on the economy because "Liberalisation does not benefit the majority because they cannot claim compensation for trade adjustments and income losses from a state whose economic functions are shrinking." Richmond and Mitchell (2011:328) add that a socialist past given citizens expectations of state intervention for their welfare and services and had also given people the sense that they have a right to participate widely. With Frelimo seemingly sinking under the weight of trying to manage the state, the socio-economic woes only seemed to strengthen support for Renamo.

Renamo managed to quickly build a strong support base because Frelimo was struggling. Decolonisation was both unexpected and rapid, leading to a near collapse of state functions which left the new nationalist government grappling to manage the state. According to Sabaratnam (2012:4), "State power was handed over to the Frelimo movement that had been fighting an anti-colonial guerrilla war, who had to find ways of building up state functions, authority and capacity from a low baseline. Much of the human capital, in the sense of people with secondary education and administrative experience, had left the country." As a means to cement its place and hold on to power, Frelimo established a socialist one-party state and a series of revolutionary reforms. The aim was to dismantle colonial power and institute forms of collective modernisation and development (Ibid). However, these backfired and added to the list of grievances against Frelimo. The increasingly authoritarian character of Frelimo's government also played a role in sustaining violence and promoting internal division (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). Lauriciano and Waterhouse (1994) add that while Frelimo tried to hold on to the status quo, Renamo worked hard to add a political structure to its military movement and started campaigning countrywide.

Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe) seeking to destabilise the Mozambican government and undermine its support for Rhodesia's liberation, backed the guerrilla group Renamo, as did the South African apartheid regime (Hall and Young, 1997). South

Africa's interest in Renamo was the same as Rhodesia and part of the apartheid regime's program of systematic weakening of neighbouring countries' majority rule. South African support helped Renamo to significantly expand its activities in Mozambique and to become a more public and structured threat to Frelimo (Ibid). "In addition, right-wing backers in Europe and the United States assisted Renamo in developing a clear political agenda, advocating a capitalist approach to development and a transition to multiparty democracy, that by late 1984, Renamo was operating in every province of Mozambique and had grown eightfold, from 2,500 to nearly 20,000 soldiers" (Weinstein, 2011). Although Renamo was initially encouraged by outside forces, the group soon took advantage of widespread dissatisfaction within Mozambique over time and managed to "build a political platform that won considerable support in postwar elections" (Manning, 2002).

According to IPSS (2020:2), the civil war (1977-1992) resulted in the death of nearly one million people and the displacement of a further five million. The war in Mozambique officially ended in October 1992, when Renamo and the government of Mozambique signed the General Peace Agreement in Rome. The war ended because of a combination of factors that made continuing the fight increasingly less attractive for both sides. A severe drought that began in the early 1980s made it harder for Renamo to sustain itself through the help of the local population. In 1984, the South African and Mozambican governments signed the Nkomati Accords, which aimed to put an end to South African support for Renamo and although that agreement was largely unsuccessful, by the late 1980s, the looming end of the apartheid regime in South Africa threatened to cut off remaining external aid for the movement (Manning and Malbrough, 2009:79). In combination with the dramatic economic decline in Mozambique resulting from external shocks and disastrous economic policy decisions by the government, the drought also forced the Frelimo government to turn toward the West for economic support (Manning, 2002). After the Rome peace agreement in Rome, Mozambique held its first pluralist elections in 1994 which ushered in the multi-party era political system with Frelimo and Renamo as the major actors.

Zartman (2000:226) states that there are two approaches to the successful resolution of conflict;

Firstly parties resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement between their positions, either along a flat front through compromise or through the search for positive-sum solutions or encompassing formulas. Secondly when alternative means of achieving a result are blocked and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable and costly predicament, they at that point grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive.

It appears that the latter approach applies to the circumstances that placed both warring parties in a situation in which coming to the negotiation table proved to be inevitable. By 1990, international and regional geopolitical realities such as the end of the Cold War and the imminent end of the apartheid regime in South Africa made support for Renamo increasingly difficult. The Frelimo government had already begun talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) for economic reform and loans as early as 1987 (Wienstein, 2002). Thus by 1990, as Zartman (2000) states, warring parties were ready to begin talks. This also prompted Frelimo to draft a new Constitution that would pave the way for a multiparty system with periodic elections and guaranteed democratic rights. By June 1992, coincidentally four months after the UN's Botrous-Ghali watershed Agenda for Peace address, the Rome GPA that would end the sixteen year Mozambican Civil war was signed in Rome, Italy. The location of the GPA is significant in that Rome as the centre of Christianity, clearly reflects the role religious leaders and churches played in bringing about direct negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo. The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM), Sant' Egidio, the Catholic Church, All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the World Council of Churches were all instrumental in reaching a consensus that resulted in peace being achieved.

The GPA was a milestone victory for peace as it was the first concrete agreement ever reached between the two warring parties. By the time the UN advance teams arrived in Maputo in late October 1992, the new United Nations (UN) Peace Building and Reconstruction (PBR) agenda had also begun to gain momentum (Juergensen, 1998). As a result, the UN and its agencies were credited for staging the largest and most successful emergency relief and PBR effort in Africa (Juergensen, 1998). The peace process was cited as a model UN peacekeeping and peace-making operation which could

be adapted to post-conflict situations elsewhere (Chachiua and Malan, 2010). However, the conflict situations that have since unfolded in the country appear to point to the contrary. Yet, as the research will prove, UNOMOZ was more of a successful political and humanitarian mission, than one which reflected Security Council responsibilities for creating a greater degree of long term 'peace and security' (Chachiua & Malan, 2010, p. 18).

Darch (2018:4) takes this view further by attributing Mozambique's fragile peace to its state and political evolution, stating that periods of peace have been in the medium and long term. That even after the GPA the "material and political conditions for further conflict were still present – the opposition party, Renamo still controlled a small army, as quantities of arms and ammunition had never been surrendered, the administrative structure remained highly centralised in what was effectively a winner-takes-all system, and the growing exploitation of significant mineral and natural resources raised high elite expectations of access to "windfall" rents" (Darch, 2018:7). This assertion by Darch speaks to what appears to be an incomplete DDR process as well as a political elite framework that remained largely unchanged and ultimately became the basis of which peace in the country would remain fragile.

Despite the advent of multi-party democracy, the two main political protagonists have largely remained trapped in their liberation/civil war pasts (Darch, 2018). Frelimo's political identity has remained largely reliant on its past as a liberation movement that led the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism and as such has been unable to "shake off the sense of entitlement to power" (Darch, 2018:8). While Renamo has only managed to redefine itself in relation to its enemy Frelimo. This has kept the party from evolving beyond a guerrilla movement and has limited its capacity to fully engage as a fully-fledged parliamentary opposition. This further coupled with the quest for access to state resources has placed increased pressure on the country to maintain peace.

The limited changes observed in the distribution of power despite so many institutional modifications have driven Renamo to resume armed struggle and push for a revision of the 1992 Peace Accords. While clashes have been relatively low intensity and localised, they have nonetheless resulted in both military and civilian victims, causing serious



disturbance in the country's economy (Maschietto 2015:7). In 2013, a low-intensity conflict re-emerged between the government and Renamo when the rebel group attacked a police station in retaliation of a police raid on its local headquarters. A series of skirmishes followed, until the signing of a ceasefire that preceded the October 2014 general elections in which President Filipe Nyusi was elected and Frelimo retained majority status in parliament (Regalia, 2017). Renamo disputed the election results citing irregularities on the government's part and tensions increased significantly until a unilateral truce was declared by Renamo in December 2016. The security situation since then has been aggravated by an Islamist militia group that came up in October 2017 and has since gained traction in northern Mozambique (Morier-Genoud, 2019). Ethnic and tribal tensions have thus made sustainable peace that much more difficult to attain as Weinstein (2002:145) adds that "The borders of Mozambique enclose a vast diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups. These have coalesced into three informal regions divided by political and economic cleavages that have contributed to the country's violent post-independence history." The resumption of hostilities has since brought back to the table the many unresolved issues that have been simmering since 1992 and threatens to undo the fragile peace that was painstakingly negotiated in Rome.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

Literature on peacebuilding in the Global South and more specifically Africa is often approached through a narrow lens and often seeks to implement peacebuilding interventions that seek to prioritise foreign interests over those of the concerned local parties. Liberal peacebuilding efforts in Africa and the rest of the Global South have translated themselves as a series of externally driven interventions that have sought to drive non-contextual reconciliation and reconstruction projects. As such, this has resulted in situations in which broad based peacebuilding efforts that address political, structural and social peacebuilding interventions have to some extent been inadequately implemented and have tended to lead to the resumption of conflict. Intrastate conflict situations present a number of unique challenges due to the number of factors at play and would thus require a lot more local insight and context. As such, liberal peacebuilding in its current form has not been successful in ensuring long-term peace in Mozambique, due to its one size fits all approach of acquiring peace and development.

Some critics take it further by labelling liberal peacebuilding as a “neo-colonial exercise” intended to draw the Global South further into the vestiges of Western imperialism (Sabaratnam, 2013). As extreme as this may appear, it seeks to outline the inherent Eurocentric focus of liberal peacebuilding in so far as it seeks to liberate those who have failed to heed the unwavering gospel of the West (Sabaratnam, 2013). However, even within the critical fold one is confronted with the fact that many of the critics use traditional liberal principles to make the case against liberal peacebuilding. This raises further concerns that relate to our understanding of the world through western lenses and that an alternative view can be firmly located outside the constraints of liberal thought (Paris, 2010). This alternative view seeks to represent the lived experiences of the global South and as such espouses solutions that are tailor made to respond to unique challenges that often go unnoticed by traditional liberal thought.

The purpose of this literature review is firstly, to introduce the concept and framework of liberal peacebuilding. Secondly, it explores the arguments within the debate in so far as

they relate to complex nexus between liberal peacebuilding and local ownership. The literature review concludes by stating that liberal peacebuilding alongside its alternatives and critics only translate into marginal success for durable peace as they continue to operate from a Eurocentric premise. Thus, such concepts and prescripts will continue to lead to an elusive peace, as they tend to pursue policies and social engineering practices that impose largely foreign concepts that seemingly create new avenues for conflict. The literature used in this review was sourced from the library databases of the University of the Witwatersrand.

## 2.2 Conceptualising Liberal Peacebuilding and Local Ownership

In the more than two decades since Mozambique's civil war ended, the country still faces continuous social, political, economic and developmental challenges. Mozambique's extended peacebuilding timeline (1992–present) has involved a diverse array of stakeholders and offers insights into the complex interaction between actors and strategic plans (Reppell et al, 2016:2). Peacebuilding is often misunderstood due to its multi-disciplinary nature, however, for the purpose of this study it can be understood as the process of restoring normal relations between people. It requires the reconciliation of differences, the apology and forgiveness of past harm, and the establishment of a cooperative relationship between groups, replacing the adversarial or competitive relationship that used to exist (Schirch, 2005:8). This definition demonstrates the broad perimeters of peacebuilding as it relates to “reconciliation, regeneration and cooperation among the parties to a conflict to deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute” (David, 1999:28). Peacebuilding is also understood as any ‘efforts at national, local, or international levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies’ (Call, 2008:6) as well as any efforts ‘addressing structural issues and the-long term relationship between parties involved in a conflict’ (Ramsbotham et al..2005:30). From this perspective, key to peacebuilding is redress in the distribution of power, notably in terms of the empowerment of communities that have been directly affected by war (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:215).Peacebuilding's broad perimeters have resulted in a number of theoretical and operational disputes as actors from varying fields and academic

backgrounds appear to have different conceptions of it. Yet, it appears that the gradualist perspective captures it appropriately by emphasising the centrality of rebuilding and transforming relationships between the people, the state and the economy after a protracted conflict. Furthermore, it seeks to specifically locate peacebuilding as “the last step after a political settlement has been reached, peace has been established (‘peace-making’), and a ceasefire agreed upon and observed (‘peacekeeping’) or, if need be, imposed (‘peace-enforcement’)” (David, 1999:27). The United Nations (UN) currently defines peacebuilding as:

“A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”

Upon closer inspection of peacebuilding, it becomes increasingly clear that an essential feature of it is rooted in rebuilding and transforming relationships between people. However, within the literature it appears that there is very little consensus on which aspect of the “people” should be addressed by peacebuilding in order to create conducive conditions for durable peace. As such, two arguments in the literature emerge; there are those who are of the view that the aspect of the people that should be addressed in post-conflict situations is structural, while others perceive it to be psychosocial/psychocultural (Fitzduff, 2001). The debate thus has direct implications for praxis as structuralists emphasise matters of state and governance in so far as they relate to issues of rights, justice, and political issues, while those taking more of a psychocultural perspective place great emphasis on relationships and the need to work on eliminating ignorance, misperceptions, fears, and hostility between groups, often through cooperative activities and encounters (Fitzduff, 2001). The structuralist posture is also commonly referred to as the liberal approach to peacebuilding because its approach to peacebuilding seeks “to bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic governance” (Paris, 2002:638). It does this by advancing inherently liberal notions of democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights and the rule of law. According to this perspective, peacebuilding is about transforming war-shattered polities into functioning liberal democracies, where the liberal

democratic framework is seen not only as the gold standard of good governance, but also as the most secure foundation for sustainable peace (Donais, 2009: 5-6).

The psychosocial/psychocultural approach within peacebuilding, is associated with what has come to be known as peacebuilding from below (Bush, 1996). This distinction is made in order to locate the peacebuilding process within a context in which indigenous actors actively participate in shaping a political, economic and social space that is conducive for a peaceful, just and prosperous society (Bush, 1996). When placed alongside its liberal peacebuilding counterpart which is referred to as peacebuilding from above, it reveals the importance of tradition and social context in determining the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of political order, justice, or ethics. Thus according to Bell (1992:3), any viable resolution to the problems of order and good governance must “derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places.” This approach fundamentally differs to its liberal counterpart in that it seeks to place the immediate victims of conflict at the centre of the rebuilding process.

At the core of this approach is the concept of local ownership, which “refers to the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of political processes in post-conflict contexts” (Donais, 2009:3). Local ownership is the core issue around which the two approaches diverge, since both present very different perspectives of the relationship between insiders and outsiders in peacebuilding contexts (Donais, 2009). The liberal approach to local ownership involves a commitment by local actors to take ownership over a largely predetermined vision of peacebuilding, one that is based on “transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states to control civil conflict” (Paris, 1997:56). Conversely, the psychosocial/psychocultural approach seeks to establish a more substantive understanding of local ownership, in which peacebuilding processes are designed, managed and implemented by local actors in order to guarantee durable peace (Nathan, 2007). As the peacebuilding experience since “An agenda for peace” suggests, much remains to be learned about addressing root causes of conflict and placing societies on the path to sustainable peace.

Local ownership has become a buzz-word in peacebuilding policy rhetoric. However, as with peacebuilding, there are conceptual difficulties in defining and understanding local ownership. According to de Coning (2013);

The discourse on local ownership has been problematic for at least two primary reasons (1) there are different interpretations of its meaning according to different audiences in the international community, and (2) there exists a perception that while it is inherently desirable, it is impossible to achieve. As with many broad concepts, there are narrow and wide interpretations of the term. Three common misconceptions of local ownership that explain why international actors fail to realise it on the ground are framed here as either superficial adoption of local leadership, instrumental implementation of local leadership or essentially well-intentioned but local leadership that is flawed in implementation.

Local ownership is nevertheless an important principle and goal to enable successful peace processes. Local ownership is fostered by a commitment to build the capacity of local actors through inclusive participatory processes that are accompanied by international partners (Interpeace, 2018:1). Ownership of priorities and reforms by local people is “the sine qua non for building and sustaining accountable and effective institutions. Reform processes must be locally-owned and adapted to each context” (Hearn 2015:2). It is a guiding principle for peacebuilding processes and a critical part of restoring trust and consolidating peace and preventing conflict. It recognises that including broad sections of the population and mobilising local capacities is necessary for effective and sustainable mediations which correspond better to the local context (Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 2015). Experience also shows the importance of bottom-up approaches which include community-driven, conflict mitigation strategies with inclusive approaches to defining, re-establishing, and reforming institutions of governance and economic recovery strategies (De Vries, 2016).

Externally-imposed peacebuilding initiatives have, on the other hand, usually failed because they are too technical and have no local buy-in and tend to overlook the processes by which leaders build confidence and achieve consent for reforms and they vastly underestimate the timeframes for building institutions (Pritchett and Woodcock, 2015). External actors have had an important role in different phases of Mozambique’s peacebuilding process. Their role shows the complex interaction between local and external actors, in a constant push-and-pull process of defining priorities and agendas. In

this context, while Mozambique's peacebuilding responses did involve an increased degree of local ownership, external actors have had the leading role in identifying areas in need of capacity development, such as decentralisation (Reppell et al, 2016:24).

Critics of contemporary stabilisation and reconstruction missions have observed that the top-down nature of major international missions mirrors imbalances within the larger world order, and frequently results in a low-quality or fragile peace as a result of deficits in the areas of local empowerment, local ownership, and legitimacy (Donais, 2009). Richmond and Mitchell (2011:326) add that liberal peace building;

Conflates peace with the production of secure and stable neoliberal states, defined by the presence of democratic processes, the rule of law, guaranteed human rights, a social contract guaranteed by a robust civil society, and integration into the global economy. Such processes are exported by key donors, the United Nation (UN), and other international actors and are expected to be accepted unmodified on the ground; if not, conditionalities of various types are deployed to ensure their adoption. This paradigm tends to privilege the goals of international actors, often excluding the needs, goals, and norms of local actors. It is applied in developing states, where such processes of mobilisation are pragmatically implausible and intellectually or culturally alien

Lemay-Hebert and Kappler (2016:7) posit that many peacebuilding interventions fail to deliver sustainable peace because locals do not develop attachment to the ideals and goals of international interventions which offer a version of peace that seems distant from the reality of everyday life at the local level. Peacebuilding is often divorced from local ownership because the stakeholders involved (the elite), believe involving a large number of local people is expensive and time consuming. As such, local ownership involves difficult operational trade-offs and is limited by post-conflict governments' low capacity and weak representation of society. The pursuit of local ownership implies building various types of partnerships which requires time, commitment and funding that often go beyond the typical external aid frameworks. It also involves striking a balance between foreign intrusiveness and responsible self-governance, a task made more intricate by aid conditionalities (Nartens, 2009). Furthermore, international actors only make limited or piecemeal investment in capacity building activities either due to a perception of a lack of absorptive capacity of the local actors or due to limited funding windows that demand results in short periods. In these situations, local ownership is considered as something

that is desirable but does not apply in the day-to-day outcome level objectives of the international actors (Interpeace, 2018:4). Grappling with those challenges, external actors in practice often relegate local ownership to a second tier issue, which is regarded as too complex despite rhetoric to the contrary and is often abandoned altogether. According to Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin (2016:9), the identification of local partners is problematic and tends to favour a small elite group of locals, mainly government and civil society elites, while marginalising important constituencies which are outside these categories. Interpeace (2018:3) adds that, besides pursuing their own interests, international actors normally Western, believe they know best and they have a better understanding of what the problem of that society is, and therefore are in a better position to identify and design strategies to address those problems. As a result, if local ownership is adopted, it is only adopted as a tactic by the West in the belief it is a key part of 'winning-over' local actors to ensure their strategy is successful. In this version of local ownership, participation of local actors is allowed in the implementation only of peacebuilding strategies designed by international actors.

### 2.3 The Myth of Everyday

Richmond (2012:350) states that one of the central tenets of critical scholars within the peacebuilding debate is that of the eroding of local legitimacy of post-conflict states when international actors seek to impose liberal peacebuilding principles of democracy and free market economic development. As such, it often appears that institutional priorities do not reflect local needs and realities. This disconnect is cited as a grave oversight, especially in the context of intrastate conflicts. Although, the process seeks to be contextual by including locals at the technical moment of elections, the process lacks any means of deliberation and dialogue that fosters inclusion and participation to sufficiently generate local legitimacy (Richmond, 2012). Roberts (2011:411) refers to this local legitimacy as "everyday life" since it involves "local participation within the realms of customary law, traditional societal structures (such as village elders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers,



bigmen, religious leaders)” in determining the everyday social reality of large parts of the population in developing countries.

Thus, in this context, the everyday seeks to broaden the lenses by which liberal peacebuilding views security in post-conflict contexts in the global South, in order to prevent it from imposing non-contextual Western ideals of security that often narrowly view it from the context of the state. One could argue that the argument of local legitimacy or local ownership is used by critical scholars to further the idea that in its absence liberal peacebuilding actors are essentially furthering a form of western or liberal imperialism that seeks to exploit or subjugate post conflict societies. This notion is widely held by what Paris (2010:340) refers to as the hyper-critical school of scholars and commentators who view liberal peacebuilding as fundamentally destructive and/or illegitimate. Even though Paris in both his 1997 and 2010 works recognises the inherent flaws of liberal peacebuilding, he takes a very clear stance that proponents and critical scholars within the liberal peacebuilding debate must find some kind of common ground in order to come up with functional alternatives of liberal peacebuilding as it remains the most comprehensive approach to restoring some semblance of peace in war ravaged states. Heathershaw (2013) recognises the impasse that has been reached within the liberal peacebuilding debate, as he argues that nothing concrete such as a paradigm shift has emerged from the debate between the proponents and the critical scholars. New conceptualisations of peacebuilding based on empirical research have set the basis for the introduction of new paradigms such as the everyday, local and hybridity. However, in light of all these ‘developments’ in the debate, very little of it has translated into concrete theories and tangible policy shifts.

The concept of local ownership and participation emerged as contextually sensitised response to the criticisms of the liberal peace approach to issues of local legitimacy and the need for context specific peace building solutions. According to Richmond (2012:356) “local ownership is seen by many officials, academics and policymakers as a decisive condition for the success of international peacebuilding.” Local ownership emerged to negate accusations of intrusion, to enhance the legitimacy of interventions, and also partly as a response to the failure of 1990s liberal peacebuilding development models based on

Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). Such thinking has gathered pace as international law, norms, institutional developments and procedures have recognised the importance of localised factors as they relate to self-determination, human rights, pluralism, political representation, cultural property, indigenous groups, the root causes and structures of conflict, expressions of local identity, and the need for reconciliation and dialogue (Richmond, 2012:359). One could argue that the 'local subject' within the peacebuilding debate is a recognition of identities and subjectivities that go beyond that normally associated with liberal sensibilities of the global North. In theory, it seeks to represent the belief that because local actors are on the ground and know the political, social, economic, cultural and security terrain, they should have an input and set the agenda for the construction of their own polity (meaning self-determination), without the imposition of international actors or donors. Richmond adds that the theory or concept of local ownership at first glance appears to be a recognition of local realities and an attempt to locate liberal peacebuilding within such realities, yet upon closer inspection one discovers that local ownership is conceptualised through liberal thought and functionally administered through the use of liberal institutions.

## 2.4 Conclusion

Sabaratnam (2013:260) states that the growing interest in the everyday, local or 'subaltern' actors in post-conflict societies and their modes of resistance or hybridity critiques have failed to address the systematically deeper problems of the inherent 'Eurocentrism' that is imbedded within the peacebuilding dialogue. It appears that International Relations political theories frame our understanding of the possible through knowledge and realities that are imbedded in Western liberal thought. Even when criticised, one still relies upon liberal forms of criticism. Eurocentrism in this context is understood to be a stance in which Europe is historically, economically, culturally and politically distinctive in ways which have significantly shaped the normative character of world politics. As such, it assumes that liberal or neo-liberal conceptions of politics and development are superior in history, structure and are thus the most suitable to ensure that a country maintains peace in so far as it maintains the global political economic status quo. Liberal peacebuilding interventions may alienate local citizens, or clash with existing

normative or ideological frameworks, in ways that generate locally critical responses. “In Mozambique, the heavy emphasis on market-based development has alienated citizens and organisations whose goals include socialist or other nonliberal (including authoritarian) modes of organisation or reform” (Richmond and Mitchell 2011). Sabaratnam (2013) takes it further by using the liberal thoughts inherent ‘otherness’ lens by exposing the manner in which the concept of Orientalism was purported. As a concept, Orientalism sought to frame the East through negative and/or feminised stereotypes of its culture, political character, social norms and economic agency. This framing casts it as a space of tradition and opportunity to be governed and explored, or alternatively feared, by the rational and enlightened West (Sabaratnam, 2013).

One could argue that liberal peacebuilding in its original format displays continuities between old and new frameworks that are based on ‘civilisation’, ‘race’ and ‘cultural difference’ as they reproduce and reinforce ideas of Western distinctiveness. Western historians see the emergence and practices of modernity in the form of capitalism and industrialisation in the West as the real drivers of history, and non-Western societies as either outside history or as lagging behind Western historical development (Sabaratnam, 2013). This dilemma has led to the growing need for body of works that fall outside epistemic Eurocentrism by recognising the limited nature of inherently colonial production of knowledge about politics, especially in the realm of post-conflict states (Mignolo, 2000). Thus, critical scholars of liberal peacebuilding continue to reproduce largely Western centred alternatives and as such appear to create these as a means of appeasing neo-colonial critics as they rarely propose any tangible theoretical modifications.

According to Maschietto (2015:8), “The persistent use of violence for community justice in many peacebuilding settings is testimony to how the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence cannot simply be imposed through social engineering.” As such, the complexity of the liberal peacebuilding and local ownership debate requires one to look at both concepts objectively, by highlighting each one’s efficiencies in securing sustainable institutions, equitable governance structures and durable peace. Yet in order to do this, liberal peacebuilding must be stripped of its cultural blind spot, which in its quest for peace consequently reproduces neo-liberal states that by design exclude locals and render them

as disempowered pawns. This complexity would be remedied through establishing “meaningful forms of participation for local actors and civil society, not just in political terms, but also ways that address the culture/welfare paradox, if the emancipatory form of peace that liberal peacebuilding claims to be able to achieve offer is to be approximated. As a result, “local participation, even in the form of subsistence peacebuilding, represents ‘navigation points for policy and perhaps more so than any international blueprint can” (Mitrany 1994). Yet more productive would be an engagement with local cultures and customs of peace, and a hybridised approach to peace-building which privileges the local over the liberal, and provides for needs as well as rights” (Richmond, 2009). As such this hybrid approach would both appease the critics and provide sustainable and inclusive solutions, in which the local is not only accommodated, but is an owner of the peace-building process. In 2015, a review of the UN 10-year-old peacebuilding architecture, including peace operations, peacebuilding and the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on women, peace and security concluded that national ownership is of critical importance for the organization’s objective of ‘sustaining peace’ in conflict zones ( Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 2015). As a result, there is need for bottom up approaches which put people at the centre of any approach and will ultimately lead to the prevention of reoccurrence of conflict.

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND KNOWLEDGE GAP

### 3.1 Problem

UNOMOZ was an expression of the liberal peacebuilding project in Africa, and more specifically Mozambique. Its implementation and approach was narrow in that its peacebuilding interventions sought to prioritise foreign interests over those of the concerned local parties and populations. MacGinty (2015) argues that liberal peacebuilding's emphasis on international norms of statehood has alienated the local and resulted in the local being written out of the peace process with the primary roles of peace maker, keeper and broker being awarded to international organisations and coalitions of Western states. As for the democracy component of the liberal peace theory, despite the standard implementation of democratic elections following peace agreements, and despite the active role of donors in pushing for change — especially at the institutional level — it is often the case that the distribution of power between the elite and the majority of the population remains unchanged, meaning the top down approach is maintained (MacGinty, 2006)

### 3.2 Context

Post GPA Mozambique, as the site of UNOMOZ, became the guiding instrument that would seek to solidify the end of the sixteen-year war, establish a multiparty system through elections, and create necessary conditions for the development of democratic institutions and a state guided by the rule of law.

### 3.3 Knowledge Gap

The literature on peacebuilding appears to be quite contradictory in that those who recognise its inherent flaws of ignoring the local, justify them by using traditional liberal concepts such as self-determination and autonomy of post conflict states to determine the terms of their peacebuilding processes. This contradiction therefore leaves much to be desired about what is the most suitable and most sustainable way in which peacebuilding can occur in post conflict societies where the international community can intervene without eroding their autonomy and ability to take ownership of the process in order to maintain durable peace.

### 3.4 Rationale

In the context of post-Civil War Mozambique, Wienstein (2002) states that the United Nations through its funds alongside its western technical expertise and staff, created a situation in which the progress of peace became a mechanical checklist. Through UNOMOZ, it appears that a complex set of socio-political realities were simply reduced to a ceasefire, democratic elections, a functioning opposition and a military out of elections. However, such an approach failed to consider the fundamental historical, ethnic and geographical realities that existed in Mozambique before and after the sixteen year civil war. One could argue that this raises concerns about the fundamental notions of peacebuilding in so far as it relates to an alternative view of peacebuilding that is relevant for the global south or Africa to be exact; one that seeks to represent the lived experiences of the global South and as such espouses solutions that are tailor made to respond to unique challenges that often go unnoticed by traditionally western liberal frameworks.

### 3.5 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this research is to explore the ability of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm to accommodate local ownership of peace processes, using Mozambique as a case study.

### 3.6 Research Questions

*To what extent has the liberal peacebuilding approach in Mozambique been able to accommodate the notion of local ownership?*

- *To what extent has the liberal peacebuilding approach in Africa been successful; with a particular focus on Mozambique?*
- *Did the liberal peacebuilding project through UNOMOZ make sufficient provision for local ownership and if so how?*

## CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 4.1 Introduction

The following chapter will seek to outline the research design that will be employed to conduct the research and further seek to explain the purpose of the chosen design of the study. The chapter will also describe the paradigm best suited for the research study, as well as discuss the data collection method and analysis thereof.

### 4.2 Research Strategy

#### 4.2.1 Qualitative Research

Qualitative research methods involve the systematic collection, organisation, and interpretation of textual material derived from talk or observation. It is used in the exploration of meanings of social phenomena as experienced by individuals themselves, in their natural context (Malterud, 2001). The purpose of this type of research strategy is to obtain insight, discover and interpret social phenomena. Given the nature of the research study, a qualitative research strategy is the most well suited as it is able to provide the necessary tools for rich and in depth exploration and description (Wagner, Kawulich & Garner, 2012). It will also assist in providing better insights into the current dilemma within the literature relating to liberal peacebuilding and local ownership by providing first hand personal and professional accounts of the UNOMOZ process.

#### 4.2.2 Paradigm: Interpretivist

The chosen paradigm is interpretivist due to its emphasis on the multi-layered and complex nature of social life. Its underlying assumption is that by placing people in their social contexts, there is a greater opportunity to understand the perceptions they have of their own activities. The uniqueness of a particular situation is important to understand and interpret the meanings constructed. As such, the interpretivist approach pays attention to and values what people say, do and feel, and how they make meaning of the phenomena being researched. Interpretivism foregrounds the meaning that individuals or



communities assign to their experiences. Patterns, trends and themes therefore emerge from the research process, and the role the researcher should be to understand real-life situations from the point of view of the insider (the members of the target group for the research). This type of exploration and questioning will seek to place peoples' understanding and interpretation of social experiences at the centre of the study.

### 4.3 Research Design: Case Study

A case study design has been chosen for this study for the purpose of investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1989). It is also the most appropriate due to its ability to be concerned with 'how' and 'why' things happen by allowing for the investigation of contextual realities and the differences between what was planned and what actually occurred (Anderson, 1993).

### 4.4 Data Collection

There are three main data collection techniques used within qualitative research and these are: observations, interviews and document or artefact analysis (Wagner et al, 2012). For the purpose of this study an interview data collection technique will be used due to its ability to explore the views, experiences, beliefs and/or motivations of individuals on specific matters (Gill, Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008). Semi-structured interviews with an interview guide will be used as they consist of several key questions that help to define the areas to be explored, but also allows the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail (Britten, 1999). This type of interview approach allows for a type of flexibility for the participant to elaborate on information that may not have been previously thought of as pertinent by the research team (Gill et al, 2008).

### 4.5 Primary and Secondary Data

Primary and secondary data will be used respectively. Primary data will be collected through the use of semi-structured interviews with academics and practitioners who have personal and professional experience with the UNOMOZ process. Given the multi-layered

nature of the study, affected parties such as Renamo and Frelimo members who were recipients of the process will also be included in the interview process. Members of the religious community, such as the clergy from the Catholic Church who were involved in the GPA process will also be contacted. Secondary data will be collected through various sources of literature from University of the Witwatersrand library databases and other policy documents. Given the rising popularity of online platforms, a significant number of the interviews will take place on Zoom and other video chat platforms that will allow one to have a wider reach. Semi-structured interviews dictated by an interview guide will be conducted with each participant to allow for in-depth exploration.

#### 4.6 Sampling Methods: Non-probability Sampling

Given that the research study intends to explore the UNOMOZ process through the personal and professional experiences of participants, each one was selected by the researcher on their personal and professional proximity to post-Civil War Mozambique and the UNOMOZ process. Given the interpretivist paradigm chosen, it is important that there be a variety of participants in terms of their experience of the process. As such it will be important that the participants have unique experiences of the process, especially given the fact that the research seeks to gain further insights on the level of local ownership.

##### 4.6.1 Snowball Sampling

Snowball sampling is used when the participants of the study form part of a special population and generally difficult to locate without the use of referrals (Wagner et al, 2012). Given the specialised nature of the context under study, it is important that participants are selected using a very specific criterion. The pool of participants consists of academics, journalists, practitioners, politicians (including members of both Frelimo and Renamo) and the religious community such as the clergy of the Catholic Church who played significant roles in the GPA process. The selected participants also recommended other individuals with intimate knowledge of post-Civil War Mozambique and the UNOMOZ process.

#### 4.6.2 Criteria of selection of participants and size of sample

The main criterion for the selection of participants was their personal and professional proximity, knowledge and experience of post-Civil War Mozambique and the UNOMOZ process. This will provide insights that reflect the level of in depth investigation and rich data collection. A sample size of eleven participants was selected comprising various stakeholders in the Mozambique peace process. The distinction was made between academics and practitioners due to their unique experiences of post-Civil War Mozambique and the UNOMOZ process, especially given that each group's interaction with the context of the study is directly influenced by their professional exposure. As a result of this, both groups were subjected to the same type of semi-structured interviews in order to maintain a level of consistency that is useful in exposing their unique insights. The interviews were scheduled between one and two hours and took place at a place of the participants choosing. The interview participants includes academics and journalists who have done extensive work on UNOMOZ. It also includes members of civic society, religious leaders and politicians who were part of the UNOMOZ processes.

##### **Interviewee 1**

Interviewee 1 is a British national who is both a member of the Clergy and an academic who had direct involvement with the UNOMOZ process through his role as an election officer with a Human Rights organization called Human Rights Watch, which at the time was referred to as Africa Watch.

##### **Interviewee 2**

Interviewee 2 is a Mozambican National who has worked in both Local Government and Civil Society since the UNOMOZ process. However, the interviewee noted that he did not have any direct involvement with the UNOMOZ process at the time, although he was part of an international youth organization that had sought to facilitate a series of skills transfer workshops and camps for the youth of Mozambique in the hopes that they would use those skills to rebuild the country in the post-Civil War period. Since then, Interviewee 2 has worked in various capacities in Civil Society and Local Government in Mozambique and has thus seen the structural and political impact of the UNOMOZ process.

**Interviewee 3**

Interviewee 3 is a Mozambican national who currently works in the international development and regional organization field. Even though interviewee 3 did not directly participate in the UNOMOZ process, their current work and academic background has placed them in a position where they have a well-rounded understanding of the process and its outcomes.

**Interviewee 4**

Interviewee 4 is a Mozambican national who is currently an Academic at the largest University in the country and also advises members of Renamo. When asked about his involvement with UNOMOZ, the interviewee stated that he played a key advisory role, although he did not go into detail, stating that their level of participation with Renamo at that time was classified information and as such, disclosing the full details would be a security risk. In their current capacity, interviewee 4 continues to be an active member of Renamo, where he has played an instrumental role in the DDR process and holding the ruling party accountable towards fulfilling its commitments of integrating former combatants into the security cluster of the country.

**Interviewee 5**

Interviewee 5 is a South African national who did not have any direct involvement in the UNOMOZ process. However, interviewee 5 in their capacity as an academic, conducted extensive research in Mozambique during the resumption of low intensity conflict in 2013. Interviewee 5 appeared to be well versed in the UNOMOZ process, due to the nature of their research being located in understanding the structural and political dynamics that resulted in the resumption of hostilities.

**Interviewee 6**

Interviewee 6 is a Mozambican National who was directly involved in the UNOMOZ process through a Mozambican government agency. The interviewee was part of the commission organizing the elections as a cabinet director for International Election observers. Interviewee 6 also participated in a UN sanctioned observer mission for the

1994 South Africa elections. The interviewee is presently based in Australia as an academic.

### **Interviewee 7**

Interviewee 7 is a Mozambican national who is currently the head of department for security and foreign policy in a ministry in the Mozambican government. The interviewee was not directly involved in the UNOMOZ process, yet their academic background and current portfolio place them in a very strategic position to share key insights on how the UNOMOZ and its stipulations form an integral part of the security apparatus of the country.

### **Interviewee 8**

Interviewee 8 is a Mozambican national and a former member of the National Army, who served during the Civil War until the 1980's, when they decided to become part of the Clergy. Still retaining their membership within Frelimo, interviewee 8 played a direct role in the GPA and UNOMOZ process on behalf of the Clergy under the banner of Civil Society.

### **Interviewee 9**

Interviewee 9 is a Mozambican national, who having been officially demobilized from the National Army in 1993 went on to found a party called the National Reconciliation Party (Parena).

### **Interviewee 10**

Interviewee 10 is a Mozambican national who is the current president of the Mozambique National Party and was the deputy Chair of parliament in the first multi-party legislature. Interviewee 10 was directly involved in the UNOMOZ process as their party was one of the oldest parties in the country having been formed during the colonial era.

### **Interviewee 11**

Interviewee 11 is a Mozambican national who is a political journalist turned Institute of Security Studies researcher who currently works of peace and security related research.

Interviewee 11 was not directly part of the UNOMOZ process, yet through both their academic and professional experience, they had interacted with the process a great deal.

## 4.7 Data Analysis

Data analysis is central to conducting credible qualitative research. One of the most effective data analysis techniques that one can employ is called thematic analysis. The goal of thematic analysis is to identify themes, i.e. patterns in the data that are important or interesting and apply the themes to address the research. This process seeks to go beyond summarising the data by systematically analysing and interpreting it (Clarke & Braun, 2013). The data obtained through consensual recorded interviews with participants was coded according to themes and interpreted in relation to the relevant conceptual frameworks.

## 4.8 Validity and Reliability

The use of both primary and secondary data will increase reliability and validity to increase the comprehensiveness of a study, and thus provide qualitatively derived richness and achieve a more complete understanding of the phenomenon under study (Greene et al., 1989). An audit trail was used to provide data collection details and coding methods to prove internal reliability of conclusions. The semi-structured interviews will be coded to identify specific themes that emerge and use those in the analysis alongside theoretical frameworks and literature to explore how they relate to the subject in question.

## 4.9 Limitations

As previously mentioned, the use of video chat platforms such as Zoom will play a critical part in executing the research study. As such a significant number of the respondents are currently based in Mozambique and thus it will ensure that the research is conducted efficiently without the requirement of physical travel. However, language may also prove to be a challenge as Mozambique is a Portuguese speaking country.

## 4.10 Ethical Considerations

The chosen participants were provided with a detailed consent form informing them about the nature of the research and assuring them of their anonymous participation. All participants were given a full explanation about the consent form and research study in the language they are most comfortable with. The consent form will provide details on issues of confidentiality, anonymity, permission on recording interviews and researcher bias.

# CHAPTER 5: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

## 5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter will aim to provide data gathered from selected interview participants. The data collected from in-depth interviews, will aim to provide a substantive basis of the study, which seeks to explore if liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique, administered through UNOMOZ made sufficient provision for local ownership. Centering primarily on the premise of the ability of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm to accommodate local ownership of peace processes, using Mozambique as the case study site. As such selected interview participants were chosen based on their personal and professional proximity to post-Civil War Mozambique and the UNOMOZ process. Additionally, it was important that the participants have unique experiences of the process, especially given the fact that the research seeks to gain further insights on the level of local ownership.

Given that the sampling method selected was snowball, interview participants were obtained through referrals. This sampling method was also chosen due to the specialized nature of the study and the security risks some participants face, as the political situation

in Mozambique has proven to be deadly. The rich data collected can be attributed to the varied nature in which each participant engaged with the UNOMOZ process. As a result, participants consisted of academics, practitioners, members of the political protagonists, opposition parties and the clergy.

All the participants were subjected to the same type of semi-structured interview questions in order to maintain a level of consistency that may be useful in exposing their unique insights. The interview sessions followed an interview guide, where there was a probing of certain questions. The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic meant that personal contact in terms of conducting in-person interviews would not be possible. Thus, interviews took place via the use of online and instant messaging platforms such as Zoom and Whatsapp. The interviews were audio-recorded with the consent of all the participants. All eleven participants gave their verbal consent after careful explanation of the study was provided. The full interview schedule and consent form can be both found in appendix 1 and 2 respectively.

## 5.2 Profile of Interviewees

This section of the chapter will serve to give an overview of the participants, and how they answered certain questions in the interview guide. This section also provides the reader with a better understanding of each participant's background, proximity to the UNOMOZ process, understanding of the UNOMOZ process and at what level did the process include local ownership.

### **Interviewee 1**

Interviewee 1 was a British National who is both a member of the Clergy and an academic who had direct involvement with the UNOMOZ process through his role as an election officer with a Human Rights Organization called Human Rights watch, which at the time was referred to as Africa watch. Interviewee 1 highlighted three major themes that through the use of coding methods were found to be expressed consistently throughout the interview. In addition to those three major themes, there were sub-themes that also emerged, which can be said to both corroborate and contradict the major themes. The



first major theme that Interviewee 1 expressed was related to Political Pluralism. This theme first emerged when Interviewee 1 was asked about the if the UNOMOZ process was well suited to assist a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy? In response, Interviewee 1 stated that that the UNOMOZ process was “designed to provide a kind of guarantee for a political pluralism for an electoral contest”. Interviewee 1 also mentioned political pluralism in the context of UNOMOZ being a process by which to provide the means both structural, political and technical to ensure a Monitored transition as well as provide peacekeeping forces to maintain peace while peaceful elections are held.

The second major theme highlighted by interviewee 1 is that of a Premature Exit. This theme was raised by the interviewee when asked if they thought the UNOMOZ and GPA process were a success. This question was placed in the interview guide to probe interviewees into reflecting on the UNOMOZ and GPA process as successes in relation to the resumption of conflict in 2013. Thus by responding that the UNOMOZ deployment “did not do well in disarmament”, the coding theme of a quick exit then emerged as it alludes to a failure to remain long enough in the country to ensure that the demobilization of former combatants as stated in the GPA was properly enforced. In addition to a quick exit are sub-themes related to a successful mission, which surfaced in response to how UNOMOZ performed in relation to similar missions that were taking place on the continent at the time. This emerged due to UNOMOZ’s ability to maintain peace and conduct peaceful multi-party elections for the first time since the country obtained independence.

Another sub-theme that emerged was that of local buy-in. This sub-theme became apparent when the interviewee was asked about the extent of local ownership, where they then responded by stating that local people were consulted, by stating that “without local people buy-in, it does not work”. The Interviewee further made this point by highlighting the third major theme, which is Political Will. This theme emerged when the interviewee stated that there was Political Will amongst the main protagonists of the conflict, which were RENAMO and FRELIMO. This point was made to illustrate that the UNOMOZ and the GPA respectively were able to yield a series of results due to both Political Will and Conflict Fatigue from the general population, who by virtue of the brutality

they endured during the war, they as the locals supported and participated in the UNOMOZ process.

### **Interviewee 2**

Interviewee 2 is a Mozambican National who has worked in both Local Government and Civil Society since the UNOMOZ process. However, the Interviewee noted that he did not have any direct involvement with the UNOMOZ process at the time, although he was part of an International youth organization that had sought to facilitate a series of skills transfer workshops and camps for the youth of Mozambique in the hopes that they would use those skills to rebuild the country in the post-Civil War period. Since then, Interviewee 2 had worked in various capacities in Civil Society and Local Government in Mozambique and has thus seen the structural and political impact of the UNOMOZ process.

Through the use of coding methods, three main themes were extracted from the interview with interviewee 2. As a native Mozambican who has worked both in local government and Civil Society, interviewee 2's responses highlighted the following themes; local context ignored, ruling party politics and the role of the local inhabitants. These three main themes were further accompanied by sub-themes that when closely examined relate closely to the three main themes. Interviewee 2 repeatedly made mention of the Local Context Ignored, Inadequate DDR process and Ruling Party Politics. The statement on the Local Context being ignored came up several times when probed about the UNOMOZ process. The first instance when this theme was raised was when interviewee 2 was asked if they thought the UNOMOZ process assisted in the peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, where interviewee 2 stated that the UNOMOZ process failed to take the historical cultural, regional and political dynamics into account. Interviewee 2 further stated that UNOMOZ came into the country for a limited period, with specific objectives that appeared to be aligned to FRELIMO, which was and continues to be the Ruling party. This according to interviewee 2 contributed to the continued marginalization of RENAMO, which interviewee 2 attributes to on-going tensions in the country.

The same theme was also highlighted when interviewee 2 was asked to describe their professional and personal experience of the UNOMOZ process. In response to this question, interviewee 2 also mentioned two other sub-themes that relate to the Local

Inhabitants/Native Mozambicans and Traditional/Grassroots leadership. These themes were highlighted through interviewee 2's statements on how the Local Inhabitants were not considered as key political actors due to the inadequate levels of public consultation that took place. As such, these largely rural Local Inhabitants, many of whom had never interacted with Europeans and still suffering from the trauma of Civil War, had very little choice in being receptive to UNOMOZ, yet the dynamics of the post-UNOMOZ period indicate that very little was done in terms of engaging them on their desired outcome of the objectives of the UNOMOZ and how best it would serve them.

Another sub-theme that was raised was that of a Premature Exit, which according to interviewee 2 was what made the UNOMOZ process flawed. Interviewee 2 was adamant that the 2 year period in which UNOMOZ operations took place in the country, was in fact insufficient to adequately deal with the impact of the Civil War. This reference was also made when interviewee 2 pointed out the continued tensions between the ruling party and RENAMO, who according to the interviewee continue to turn to violence as a means of highlighting their exclusion, as the terms of reference of the GPA have not been fulfilled. RENAMO's reliance on violence also indicates that the continued proliferation of arms which points to an inadequate DDR process, which was meant to demobilize and integrate RENAMO insurgents into the country's police and military.

### **Interviewee 3**

Interviewee 3 is a Mozambican national who currently works in the International development and regional organization field. Even though interviewee 3 did not directly participate in the UNOMOZ process, their current work and academic background has placed them in a position where they have a well-rounded understanding of the process and its outcomes. Through the use of coding methods, four main themes that relate to the UNOMOZ process were identified. These themes are namely Peace Keeping, Political Pluralism, Ruling Party Politics and Local Involvement/Buy-in.

When asked if UNOMOZ was well suited to assist with establishing a multi-party democracy, interviewee 3 mentioned that the objective of UNOMOZ was not multi-party democracy, instead it was a peace keeping mission that would ensure that the terms of reference of the GPA were upheld. Interviewee 3 further stated that democracy and free

and fair elections were part of the objectives prescribed in the GPA, as such the role and the responsibility of elections and democracy did not lie with UNOMOZ. This assertion by interviewee 3 also highlighted another sub-topic that emerged which relates to a Monitored Transition, which according to the interviewee was the prescribed role of UNOMOZ. When probed further about the role of UNOMOZ, interviewee 3 stated that the UNOMOZ mandate was to monitor the transitional period of peace, with the major benefit being that UNOMOZ ensured that pockets of instability across the country were halted, especially in FRELIMO and RENAMO strongholds.

Political pluralism was the second theme that was highlighted by interviewee 3. This theme was raised throughout the interview where the interviewee sought to clarify the role of UNOMOZ as a mechanism for peace building and ensuring that all those involved in the Civil War, primarily RENAMO and FRELIMO would adhere to the terms of reference of the GPA. As such UNOMOZ was instrumental in creating the necessary conditions to hold free and fair elections where RENAMO could contest as a legitimate political entity. It is also ensured that the people of Mozambique would be able to participate in the democratic practice by choosing their party of choice. According to interviewee 3, UNOMOZ was a success due to its ability to maintain the sovereignty of Mozambicans. Interviewee 3 attributes this to the manner in which it maintained its mandate to monitor and secure peace, while creating the necessary conditions for both RENAMO and FRELIMO to engage in a political process that was both transparent and democratic. The presence of UNOMOZ gave local Mozambicans a sense of hope and renewed trust in a political system that had long been dominated by a single force. Thus allowing locals the opportunity to engage in a democratic election where they had a choice to actively participate in crafting a new Mozambique.

In terms of the third and fourth theme, interviewee 3 made various statements related to ruling party politics and how they have shaped the current political realities in Mozambique. The interviewee made sure to mention his intimate knowledge of these dynamics due to his role as a diplomatic advisor to the second most voted candidate in Mozambique and former vice President of the Internal Affairs Committee in Parliament. According to Interviewee 3 UNOMOZ did not bring democracy in Mozambique, as the

ruling party has remained in power since independence. Even though UNOMOZ was instrumental in ensuring multi-party elections, it cannot be attributed with bringing about systemic change. Interviewee 3 further stated that the relative stability and peaceful elections that have taken place since 1994, have been the result of Local Involvement/Buy-in from Mozambicans, which according to the interviewee indicates a certain level of political autonomy that exists in the country, even in the absence of UNOMOZ.

#### **Interviewee 4**

Interviewee 4 is a Mozambican national who is currently an Academic at the largest University in the country and also advises members of RENAMO. When asked about his involvement with UNOMOZ, the interviewee stated that he played a key advisory role, although he did not go into detail as they stated that their level of participation with RENAMO at that time was classified information as it was a security risk to disclose the full details. In their current capacity, interviewee 4 continues to be an active member of RENAMO, where they have played an instrumental role in the DDR process and holding the ruling party accountable with fulfilling its commitments of integrating former combatants into the security cluster of the country.

Through the use of coding methods four main themes were identified. These themes are namely Premature/Quick Exit, Inadequate DDR process, RENAMO transformation and Political Pluralism. Interviewee 4 appeared to have well established sentiments about the UNOMOZ process, especially when viewed in relation to RENAMO and the clauses of the GPA. This is well reflected throughout all four themes. With regards to the first theme of a Premature/Quick Exit, Interviewee 4 first made mention of this when asked about UNOMOZ as an adequate tool of establishing multiparty democracy. The interviewee responded by stating that it was effective to a certain degree by ensuring that a monitored transition took place through the hosting of free and fair elections, upholding the peace agreement and immediate demobilization. However, it failed in that the two year period under which UNOMOZ took place was insufficient time to oversee the transformation of RENAMO from a guerilla movement into a fully-fledged political party that was well equipped to participate in the process of long term political administration. According to

the interviewee, had the tenure of UNOMOZ been extended, RENAMO would not have resorted to violent means to pressure the ruling party into upholding its commitments to the GPA. In relation to the first theme of a Premature/Quick Exit, interviewee 4 also stated that one of the other consequences of UNOMOZ's tenure was the cosmetic nature of the process, where the primary concern was the visible elements of collecting weapons and hosting elections. Even though this was important, it took much needed attention away from seeking to understand what the underlying issues that led to the conflict were and what impact those dynamics would have on a multi-party post-civil war Mozambique. This according to the interviewee would have required UNOMOZ to stay longer and fully engage at all levels, particularly at grass roots and ex-combatant level, where they could begin to understand the dynamics, trauma and grievances in order to contribute to the construction of a post-civil war Mozambique that has future proofed itself to avoid violent conflict in the future.

The second theme is closely related to the first, in that it highlights the security oversights created by the Premature/Quick exit. The inadequacy of the DDR process was consistently mentioned by the interviewee, given their active participation in the process, it is unsurprising. However, this participation revealed several oversights that occurred during and after UNOMOZ. According to the interviewee the biggest oversight of the UNOMOZ process was that it left Mozambique before the GPA was fully implemented. One of the most important clauses of the GPA was for the integration of guerillas or ex-combatants into the security forces i.e police and military, this did not happen and as a result RENAMO found itself as an organization with an identity crisis, with a large number of unemployed ex combatants who in the absence of integration still considered themselves to be guerillas and on the other hand it was a political party that was required to participate in political processes with very little administrative support.

As noted in the assertions made by the interviewee, RENAMO transformation also appears to be a key theme in that they made numerous references to RENAMO's inability to transform itself, by even stating "UNOMOZ failed to help RENAMO transit from a military group into a political group. They left that task to RENAMO itself which was not possible for RENAMO to transform itself. It needed the support of UNOMOZ which was

the organization best placed to help the ex-combatants and RENAMO understand the new dynamics of the democratic process and the political gain". The former quote by interviewee 4 indicates the internal dynamics within RENAMO and the level of unmet expectations both from the GPA and UNOMOZ. Interviewee 4 went further to state that the unmet expectations and the ruling party's perceived flouting of the GPA, RENAMO did not fully demobilize and instead retained combatants in their Central province bases of the Sahana in Gorogosa. This is what subsequently resulted in the resumption of low intensity conflict in 2013, which was according to the interviewee a culmination of years of discontent, marginalization and an unfinished demobilization process.

In terms of the last theme of Political pluralism, interviewee 4 made mention that another consequence of UNOMOZ's two year tenure in Mozambique was the continued dominance of the ruling party. This dominance and the incomplete transformation of RENAMO into a fully functional political party, resulted in a flawed democracy that eventually led to the resumption of RENAMO taking up arms again. According to interviewee 4, the ruling party's monopoly over the state and its resources meant that RENAMO continued to be on the periphery of mainstream politics, which was evident during elections. As a result of this RENAMO's efforts to peacefully contest elections was hampered by resource constraints and at times fell short due to perceived election rigging which was done through delaying election materials in traditionally RENAMO strongholds. Thus, interviewee 4 was of the view that if UNOMOZ had stayed longer than two years, they would have contained the dominance of the ruling party, ensured that election support was fair across the board and that both RENAMO and FRELIMO constituencies were adequately resourced.

### **Interviewee 5**

Interviewee 5 is a South African National who did not have any direct involvement in the UNOMOZ process. However, interviewee 5 in their capacity as an Academic, conducted extensive research in Mozambique during the resumption of low intensity conflict in the 2013 period. Interviewee 5 in their current capacity as an Academic appeared to be well versed in the UNOMOZ process, due to the nature of their research being located in

understanding the structural and political dynamics that resulted in the resumption of hostilities. By using coding methods, four main themes emerged from the interview. These four themes are namely Premature/Quick Exit, Inadequate DDR Process, Ruling Party Politics and Elite Political Actors.

The first theme related to that of a Premature/Quick Exit, interviewee 5 indicated this through their explanation of UNOMOZ in the context of the resumption of hostilities in 2013. Interviewee 5 mentioned that the Premature/Quick Exit of UNOMOZ was a direct consequence of the thinking of that period, which was at the time in which the Cold War had ended and International Organizations were of the view that multi-party democracy was the most suitable way of resolving conflict. This according to the interviewee was based on establishing a kind of procedural Democracy that was cosmetic in nature in that it sought to maintain peace long enough to ensure that free and fair elections were conducted and that rebel or guerilla movements were transformed into Political parties that could compete in a multi-party democratic system. This according to interviewee 5 was a shortcoming of UNOMOZ in that "it failed to fundamentally change the nature of the state of Mozambique". However, the interviewee highlighted that at the time of its exit, UNOMOZ was lauded as an International Peacebuilding success, yet that changed shortly after 2013, where closer focus was placed on the shortcomings of UNOMOZ and what took place in their absence. Interviewee 5 further stated that at the time of its exit, UNOMOZ had sought to ensure the sovereignty of Mozambique by leaving the rest of the GPA commitments to both RENAMO and FRELIMO to implement.

Interviewee 5 also went on to mention that another short coming of UNOMOZ was that RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama was allowed to retain armed body guards in return for his participation in the process. This according to the interviewee was a mechanism used by the RENAMO leader to ensure that the political questions were resolved before agreeing to a full disarmament. Interviewee 5 indicated that by retaining those forces, RENAMO did not fully undergo the DDR process as stipulated in the UNOMOZ mandate and this coupled by the delays in the integration of those demobilized, it created the necessary conditions for the resumption of hostilities in 2013. Interviewee further stated that the delay in integration and the inadequate nature of the DDR process meant that



RENAMO continued to be a guerilla movement, with access to arms and an old enemy that had refused to honor its commitments to the GPA.

In terms of the third theme of Ruling Party politics, interviewee 5 stated that UNOMOZ although effective in ensuring peace at a critical period, it failed by leaving the fundamental structure of state largely unchanged. This fundamental structure according to the interviewee relates to the manner in which FRELIMO, the ruling party continued to dominate all spheres of public life, leaving very little room for growth and transformation of RENAMO. These ruling party dynamics remained largely unchanged, particularly in terms of the political structure of the state, especially with regards to the monopolization of state power and resources by FRELIMO. Interviewee 5 highlighted that issues related to massive electoral fraud, voter registration irregularities and non-transparent ballot counting were the dynamics created by the ruling party, which contributed to the marginalization of RENAMO. Interviewee 5 further made this point by stating that “On the other hand, Frelimo has the support of everybody in the civil service in the remote rural location most of the people who are skilled and literate work for the government and they see their duties to the government as supporting Frelimo politically”. According to the interviewee, this has created a condition in which the Mozambican state is overwhelmingly identified with a single party, which is the ruling party. As such, even in the areas where RENAMO is popular, the hold that FRELIMO has over the functionality of the state means that those areas are systematically excluded.

The last theme contained in the statements made by interviewee 5 is related to that of Elite Political Actors. This theme was raised when asked about the levels of local ownership or local participation in the UNOMOZ process. Interviewee 5 highlighted that UNOMOZ was an elite driven process in that the role of local people was never really considered, as this was automatically considered to be the role that holding elections would fulfill. According to the interviewee, this may have been the result of the thinking at the time, which rarely considered the role of local people, which may have looked like extensive public consultation across the length and breadth of the country. Interviewee 5 further stated that this was a shortcoming of UNOMOZ in that it failed to consult widely, which as a consequence political leaders and negotiators did not have a “clear sense of

how ordinary working class people or rural people understood political power”. As a result, interviewee 5 stated that geographical and ethnic fault lines remained unchanged, even after elections as local people continued to hold the same beliefs they had during the civil war which has made reconciliation difficult. According to Weinstein (2011:151)

Mozambique is deeply divided along geographical lines as Frelimo draws its support largely from the south and the far-northern province of Cabo Delgado, while Renamo supporters cluster in the central region and parts of the north. In a democracy, geographic divisions as such need not be especially worrisome. However, in Mozambique, they mirror patterns of economic inequality. On the street, people say that the south is nine times richer than the center and the north. The Mozambican government’s own poverty statistics reveal that the three poorest provinces—Sofala, Tete, and Niassa—all lie in the center and north, with the first two registering more than four fifths of their respective populations below the country’s official poverty line.

This shows the inequality that has been perpetuated by the government and one of the reasons why Renamo continues to pose problems for Frelimo. Another consequence of this was that there was no public consultation on what the expectations of democratic Mozambique would like and the role political parties and citizens alike would play. This point by interviewee 5 was also captured by asserting that “On the other hand, there is a school of thought that says asking complicated political questions only delays things, the priority is to end the war as soon as possible and then talk about democratization later on”. Which according to the interviewee displayed the elite nature of the process, as the most important actors were already perceived to have been engaged, thus excluding a significant percentage of the population, which is the direct opposite of what is intended to take place in a multi-party democracy.

### **Interviewee 6**

Interviewee 6 is a Mozambican National who was directly involved in the UNOMOZ process through a Mozambican government agency. The interviewee was part of the commission organizing the elections as a cabinet director for International Election observers. Interviewee 6 also participated in a UN sanctioned observer mission for the South African elections, which also took place in 1994. The interviewee is presently working as an Academic currently based in Australia.

Interviewee 6 made mention of three themes, which through the use of coding methods was namely a Successful Mission, Political Pluralism and Local Buy-in. In relation to the first theme, interviewee 6 stated that they believed that UNOMOZ was a successful mission in that it managed to fulfil its mandate adequately until the end, which was to host free and fair elections. Further mentioning that UNOMOZ was able to deal with the issues that came up during the process until all the mission objectives were fulfilled. The Interviewee also mentioned that the primary goal of UNOMOZ was to oversee the implementation of the GPA, which was to implement the peace and oversee multi-party elections. According to the interviewee UNOMOZ's mandate remained within the confines of the GPA and that if UNOMOZ tried to do something different from what was stipulated in the GPA it would have complicated the process and probably resulted in the resumption of conflict. This theme also came up when the interviewee was comparing UNOMOZ to other UN missions on the continent that were taking place in the same period. According to the interviewee, UNOMOZ was able to secure peace, host elections and exit the country within the stipulated time period, while other UN missions in Angola for instance failed to yield the same results and instead resulted in the resumption of hostilities.

The second theme was that of Political Pluralism, which was stated by the interviewee when they described the consensus that UNOMOZ between RENAMO, FRELIMO and the local Mozambicans as the recipients of the UNOMOZ process. Interviewee 6 stated that he appreciated that UNOMOZ made a calculated effort to bring some kind of reconciliation between the two warring parties, by creating consensus over different issues. According to the interviewee UNOMOZ was able to create understanding between RENAMO and FRELIMO, through peaceful mobilization, which was instrumental in creating a renewed sense of pride for Mozambicans as well as International observers who claimed that they appreciated the way that UNOMOZ tackled all the differences between the two parties until the fulfillment of their objectives. The interviewee further stated that UNOMOZ was unique in that it was not viewed as a strange entity as seen in other peacebuilding processes that were taking place on the continent at the time, as it was welcome due to its ability to forge relations with both RENAMO and FRELIMO. The consensus built with RENAMO and FRELIMO was an important part of the UNOMOZ process, as both parties cooperated due to the manner in which the process sought to

manage expectations and ensure that the commitments of the GPA were implemented. Interviewee 6 also stated that the presence of UNOMOZ was so well received that at the end of the mission, Mozambicans wanted the mission to continue.

The previous statements made by interviewee 6 appear to support the third theme related to local-buy in which speaks to the wider appreciation shown by local Mozambicans and not necessarily located to RENAMO and FRELIMO. Interviewee 6 statements related to local buy-in were raised when asked the level of participation of local people, where they stated that UNOMOZ clearly received local support in comparison to other peacebuilding missions that were taking place on the continent at the time. According to the interviewee, this support was displayed in the manner in which democratic principles of multi-party elections were well accepted by local people. This was displayed in the manner in which there was very little reluctance and elections took place peacefully, especially given that RENAMO and its supporters had rejected the notion of election prior to the involvement of UNOMOZ. Interviewee 6 further stated that UNOMOZ understood the integral role in involving people from the very beginning of the process. This according to the interviewee was done through ensuring that local people understood the role and purpose of UNOMOZ, which in this case was that it was a process that would entail restoring peace and facilitating reconciliation. It was also important to ensure that local people understood that UNOMOZ was not coming in support of RENAMO or FRELIMO, but for all Mozambicans. Lastly, interviewee 6 stated that UNOMOZ was able to be a success due to the manner in which it ensured that local buy-in was acquired as its absence would not have translated into durable peace.

### **Interviewee 7**

Interviewee 7 is a Mozambican national who is currently the head of department for security and foreign policy in a ministry in the Mozambican government. The interviewee was not directly involved in the UNOMOZ process, yet their academic background and current portfolio place them in a very strategic position to share key insights on how the UNOMOZ and its stipulations form an integral part of the security apparatus of the country. Interviewee 7 made mention of three themes, which through the use of coding

methods was namely an Inadequate DDR process, Elite Political actors and local context ignored. The insights gathered from this interviewee were unique in that they were the first to express that the GPA and by extension UNOMOZ must be recognized for their efforts in ensuring that peaceful multi-party elections took place; however, this must not be confused with peace building. The interviewee stated that “ the problem with the GPA is the peace building process. Its main objective was to legitimize the elections. We did not have a genuine peace building process. We don’t have it even now. We never talked about reconciliation”. This is an interesting point in that it highlights a key component of a peace building process, which is reconciliation. Which as will be further explored in the upcoming chapters is one of the reasons why UNOMOZ is often cited as having had certain shortcomings, especially when viewed in relation to the South African transition which was taking place at around the same time as UNOMOZ. Thus, for the interviewee Mozambique will continue to find itself in a situation of fragile peace due to the missing aspects of reconciliation, which by design in relation to the peace building process work towards rebuilding a key aspect of social cohesion and national consensus in order to foster durable and self-sustaining peace. Given these sentiments, it is thus unsurprising that one of the other themes the interviewee also mentioned was related to the local context being ignored or the absence of local buy-in.

According to the interviewee UNOMOZ did not adequately engage locals and as result they played a “marginal role”. The interviewee further stated that even in the current context of the Mozambique political milieu, locals are often cited as being central, yet they are never really involved in key decision making processes. A consequence, which the interviewee attributes to the UNOMOZ process, which should have been a key component at the beginning in 1992 and 1994 respectively. These sentiments also lead into the third theme in which the interviewee states that UNOMOZ was firmly located within the parameters of Elite Political actors. These were the main protagonists which were Renamo and Frelimo, who remain the central actors within the political, economic and security landscape of the country. The interviewee is quoted as saying “the process was a top down process” in which the political elite, were the ones considered to be the most important actors in the process and as a result they then imposed their agreements as well preferences on locals, who had been the victims and worst affected by the Civil War.

Lastly, the interviewee stated that even though “UNOMOS did well to reconcile the government and Renamo but the problem was that both parties wanted to go to elections without resolving the problems related to the DDR”. Given the current role of the interviewee, it is clear that the inability of the ruling party to deliver on the commitments of the GPA related to the DDR continue to be a source of discontent and by extension a periodic source of conflict. The interviewee also stated that the terms of the last peace agreement may be on going; however tensions are likely to persist as Renamo desires the trappings of the State that Frelimo continues to enjoy.

### **Interviewee 8**

Interviewee 8 is a Mozambican national and a former member of the National Army, who served during the Civil War until the 1980's, when they decided to become part of the Clergy. Still retaining their membership within Frelimo, interviewee 8 played a direct role in the GPA and UNOMOZ process on behalf of the clergy under the banner of Civil Society. Interviewee 8 is presently the head of the council of congregations of all religious groups in Mozambique. According to the insights obtained from the interviewee, three themes were identified through the use of coding methods, they were namely Inadequate DDR process, Ruling Party Politics and Local Ownership deficit. With regards to the first theme interviewee 8 began first by giving a timeline of conflict in the country, “we had a conflict that ended in 1992, the other ended in 1994 and there was another one that started in 2013 that began because of the DDR”.

According to the interviewee the Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama reverted back to the bush due to the shortcomings of the DRR process. It was particularly interesting that interviewee 8 stated that DDR is not only a physical process, which given the current circumstances was clearly not done correctly; yet in addition to this, gorilla fighters “are not only soldiers because they have weapons, there is an essential psychological element that must be addressed”. The interviewee went further by stating that had the DDR process been carried out correctly, Renamo would have been found to still be in possession of weapons. However due to the focus on multi-party democracy and elections, durable peace continues to be elusive for the country as Renamo is still in possession of weapons. The second theme was raised when interviewee 8 was asked if

they thought UNOMOZ was a success, to which they responded by stating that “UNOMOZ was a success in that it brought an end to the Civil War and was able to facilitate talks between the warring parties. It also gave technical and financial support. It was a success”. However, the interviewee then went on to state that since 1994 the electoral process has not been fair due to the ruling party and the centralized nature of the state and its institutions.

Interviewee 8 is quoted as saying “The party that comes to power takes advantage of the opposition over the resources. The electoral officers are controlled by their bosses (government). The voting process is controlled by the police that answer to the government. The people who count the votes belong to the ruling party. That gives advantage to the ruling party. The process of voting was unfair. These are the reasons which made the opposition parties to protest. This is what led Dhlakama to go back to the bush”. This statement by the interviewee indicates that there is a trust deficit that exists within the country’s electoral framework, which can be attributed to the level of control exerted by the Ruling party over key institutions that by design are required to be independent bodies to ensure that free and fair elections take place. It is for this reason according to the interviewee that Renamo tends to take up arms after elections, as they consider the election results a tick box exercise that is deliberately staged to maintain Frelimo dominance over all spheres of the Mozambican state.

The third theme was that of Local Ownership deficit, the interviewee raised this when asked if they believed locals were involved in the UNOMOZ process. In response to this question interviewee 8 stated that the “was politicized. The other parties which were not part of the peace process (including the society) were marginalized. The debate was between both sides (Govt. & Renamo). So, the society was not involved”. This is of particular interest due to the interviewee’s role in the process; they went even further into detail and stated that UNOMOZ only engaged the clergy in detail with regards to assisting with the hand-over of weapons and fostering relations with local communities to except demobilized fighters. This according to the interviewee minimized the role of civil society in the long term democratization process and this could be one of the reasons the country continues to experience conflict. Lastly, interviewee 8 much like interviewee 7 also stated

that peace will continue to be elusive for the country until issues of reconciliation are addressed. The interviewee mentioned this in the context of the continued mistrust between Renamo and Frelimo, who according to the interviewee still make reference to the “wounds of the conflict”, which indicates that both sides are still holding on to the past and that remains the basis of their political engagements.

### **Interviewee 9**

Interviewee 9 is a Mozambican national, who having been officially demobilized from the National Army in 1993 went on to found a party called the National Reconciliation Party (Parena). Interviewee 9 stated that the Civil War had left him increasingly disillusioned with the Ruling party and having seen the devastating impact conflict had on the local population, they sought to create a political alternative that would seek to put the needs of the people first. In their capacity as an opposition party leader, interviewee 9 was directly involved in the UNOMOZ process and was provided with funding and technical support to contest the first multi-party elections in Mozambique. The interviewee raised three main themes identified through the use of coding methods, they were namely an Inadequate DRR process, UNOMOZ a Successful Mission and Ruling Party politics.

In response to the question, regarding if they thought the UNOMOZ process was a success, interviewee 9 stated, “UNOMOZ played a fundamental and strategic role in the pacification and democratization of the country. They brought a trust fund that allowed some parties to be created and participate in the democratization process. I am thankful for the presence of UNOMOZ”. It is unsurprising that interviewee 9 provided this perspective; given the level of support, they received through their journey from demobilization, reintegration, forming a political party and contesting an election. Interviewee 9 can be said to be a physical example of what UNOMOZ set out to achieve. Parena has since participated in all the elections as one of the smaller parties. The interviewee went on to state that even though their political party has been able to participate in elections, they have faced numerous challenges as a direct result of Ruling party politics. They stated that “politics in Mozambique is controlled by Frelimo, they decide who gets what and when”, which points to a similar point made by interviewee 8 about the centralized nature of the Mozambican state. Some of the other challenges the



interviewee cited related to Ruling party politics was that the lack of financial and technical support they received in comparison to Frelimo and Renamo. The Ruling party was also described as having significant control of over the logistics of the election process, which has resulted in a situation where Parena only has the means to contest local and not national elections.

In terms of the third theme, the interviewee stated that even though UNOMOZ was a success, one of its failures was to adequately implement DDR. The interviewee raised an interesting point by stating that the DDR process was hampered by their split focus, where former National Army soldiers were pushed to the “front of the line for demobilization and reintegration” and were given options of employment due to their proximity to the Ruling party. While those who were part of Renamo were not given the same amount of support and many of whom found themselves with very few options after demobilization, especially in light of the GPA stipulations on integrating former guerilla’s into the State security apparatus. The interviewee also noted this one of the main reasons conflict resumed in 2013 was directly linked to this, as many of what should have been former guerilla fighters eagerly joined Dhlakama due to the poor conditions in which they found themselves, especially after they had been promised employment opportunities within the National Army and Police.

### **Interviewee 10**

Interviewee 10 is a Mozambican national who is the current president of the Mozambique National Party and was the deputy Chair of parliament in the first multi-party legislature. Interviewee 10 was directly involved in the UNOMOZ process as their party was one of the oldest parties in the country having been formed during the colonial era. This was interesting given that after the end of the colonial era, opposition parties were not allowed, thus the interviewee stated that their party remained largely on the margins of political life and opted to affiliate itself with the Ruling party. According to the interviewee, the advent of multi-party democracy brought by UNOMOZ facilitated their re-entry back into mainstream politics. Interviewee 10 shared the same sentiments as interviewee 9, who given their similar backgrounds, praised UNOMOZ for the financial and technical support they provided to all political parties. Interviewee 10 explained that the support provided

by UNOMOZ was so significant that it enabled their party to form a coalition with two other smaller parties, where they able to win nine seats and propel them to the position of deputy. Interviewee 10 led the work of parliament until the end of the first ever-democratic administration.

Interviewee 10 made mentioned of three main themes, which were namely UNOMOZ as a Successful Mission, Local Buy-in and Premature Exit. With regards to the first theme interviewee 10 stated that “UNOMOZ unconditionally supported the Mozambicans technically and financially. Thanks to UNOMOZ because the electoral process went very well. I took part in that process”. This statement from the interviewee points to the level of support the UNOMOZ process provided to new and old political actors, which is not widely covered by mainstream literature on the process. The first hand accounts from both interviewee 9 and 10, provide an interesting perspective on how UNOMOZ through its programs and commitment to multi-party democracy were able to provide much needed financial and technical support for smaller political actors. Even though it is widely accepted that the main protagonists were indeed Frelimo and Renamo, UNOMOZ appears to have also engaged other parties in order to foster a dynamic political environment. According to the interviewee “I lived the process, I was part of the process. Some processes are imposed, ours was not imposed. The other processes like the one that was taking place in Angola at the same time failed because it was imposed. We can’t say UNOMOZ failed. They did not”. This statement from the interviewee also illustrates an important perspective, in that they emphasize the role that they played in the UNOMOZ process, which alludes to the second theme related to Local Buy-in.

The statement made by the interviewee speaks to the manner in which UNOMOZ was able to engage various local actors, which in this case are the smaller political parties who as previously mentioned were provided with both financial and technical support. The notion of imposition is also very thought provoking in light of the topic being explored highlights that the understanding and thus the engagement of the local is circumstantial. As such the interviewee’s experience of UNOMOZ was positive in that they were a direct beneficiary of the process. The interviewee took it further by stating “Yes, local people played a role. If the people don’t play a role, the process fails. The people played their

role because they might have been afraid of the weapons, or they might not have known much about what should have been their role. The political parties played their role". The interviewee appeared to place their personal and by extension professional participation at the center of local ownership. As such, they were able to display a new layer of local ownership which may have not been previously explored in the literature. Thus, this expands the lenses through which local ownership can be viewed and thus further explored.

Interviewee 10 mentioned the third theme by stating that, "The process ran very well, even though there were problems. It fulfilled its role and moved out. But when it moved out, there were gaps. That is why Renamo went back to the bush. But that was not the fault of UNOMOZ. It was the failure of some aspects of the peace agreement that was signed. Nobody can contest that". The third theme related to a premature exit and according to the statement made by the interviewee it is clear that they were somewhat biased in their critic of the UNOMOZ process due to the manner in which they were able to benefit from the process. As such they were cautious of how they phrased their opinion on the level of success, especially when looking at the circumstances that resulted in the resumption of conflict in 2013. Given the statement, it is clear that UNOMOZ left prematurely in that there were a number of circumstances or rather commitments specified in the GPA, like the DDR stipulations that were not adequately carried out. It also raises another perspective on who the onus lay with in terms of enforcing the precepts of the GPA 21 years later.

### **Interviewee 11**

Interviewee 11 is a Mozambican national who is a political journalist turned Institute of Security Studies researcher who currently works of peace and security related research. Interviewee 11 was not directly part of the UNOMOZ process, yet through both their academic and professional experience, they had interacted with the process a great deal. The interviewee highlighted that through their time as a political journalist they had interacted quite significantly with high-ranking members of both Frelimo and Renamo, as such they had a well-rounded understanding of the process. Interviewee 11 made

mention of three key themes, which were identified through the use of coding methods. Two themes were identified, namely UNOMOZ as a Successful Mission and Local Ownership deficit.

With regards to the first theme which was that UNOMOZ as a Successful Mission, the interviewee indicated the following “UNOMOZ played an important role in facilitating peace in Mozambique. It was a success. It was important because we had 21 years of peace. It failed because our leaders did not want to implement the peace agreement”. The interviewee was clear in their understanding of the prescripts of the UNOMOZ, by stating that the role of UNOMOZ was to facilitate peace and it delivered on its mandate at the time. The interviewee took it further by raising that due to the 2013 conflict, UNOMOZ has had the unfortunate consequence of taking the blame for the resumption of conflict; when in fact their mandate was temporary in nature and thus cannot be held liable for the failure to deliver on the GPA mandates, which essentially lay with the protagonists of the agreement. Thus according to the interviewee, cannot be attributed to UNOMOZ, but must be placed upon the main actors, especially Frelimo, who continue to remain in power.

With regards to the second theme interviewee 11 made mention of the following “Local people were not in leadership positions. Participation was difficult because not many people were educated. There were only two universities in Maputo”. This statement by the interviewee is interesting in that it provides a further layer into the local ownership debate by highlighting the complexity of defining the local. As such, their insights place a spotlight on the limits on the extent to which “local people” can be involved in what is largely considered to be complex political process. Which given the proclamation that the “local” majority were not educated enough to engage in complex political processes is also another perspective to consider when engaging with the literature on local ownership. Interviewee 11’s statement on access to education and the proximity to power adds another layer of complexity to the “locals” discussion, which may elude to what appears to be a disconnect in the manner in which said locals are required or are expected to engage in complex peace building processes.

## 5.4 Themes

### 5.4.1 Political Pluralism

The major theme most of the respondents raised was that political pluralism was an essential part of the UNOMOZ process in Mozambique. Pluralism is a key concept of democracy that states that in order for peace to prevail, people with different beliefs and backgrounds should coexist and be able to equally participate in the political processes of the state. Yumantle (2015:8) states that political pluralism enables relative power leverage of different groups and the unique, commanding position of the state in shaping and inducing preferences among competing groups. The role of the government has expanded with time as societies are now more diverse and differences in opinion continue to provide the rationale for democracy and plurality. Bellamy (2010:198) also adds that, “Pluralism of ideals, interests and identities are inescapable features of contemporary polities. The tasks of governments have multiplied and become increasingly complicated as they seek to regulate ever more diverse areas of social life, each with its own peculiarities and norms.” Issues such as locality, gender, and ethnicity, religion play into how states are governed and to ignore these would result in a fragile state that is susceptible to crises.

This theme first emerged when Interviewee 1 was asked if the UNOMOZ process was well suited to assist a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy. In response, he stated that the UNOMOZ process was “designed to provide a kind of guarantee for a political pluralism for an electoral contest”. According to Alden (1995) UNOMOZ was given the responsibility of implementing the key provisions of the GPA, which were primarily to facilitate the process of demilitarization and the movement of democracy. In the context of the post-GPA period, the movement of democracy would be the securing of peace as a means of holding the first democratic elections. When describing the establishment of multi-party democracy by the UNOMOZ process Manning & Malbrough (2009) state that all of the economic, political, and social preconditions of democracy were absent when

Mozambique began the process of post-conflict democratisation. As a result of this UNOMOZ was able to provide the necessary conditions for the consolidation of peace and democracy due to its ability to serve the interests of all parties. Thus the assertion that UNOMOZ ensured political pluralism is correct in that the “ultimate political objective of the intervention was to oversee a transition to multiparty politics: the UNOMOZ mandate included several actions to prepare and provide political guidance for Mozambique’s first democratic elections” (Manning & Malbrough, 2009:83).

Interviewee 6 also stated that they appreciated that UNOMOZ made a calculated effort to bring some kind of reconciliation between the two warring parties, by creating consensus over different issues. UNOMOZ was able to create understanding between Renamo and Frelimo, through peaceful mobilisation, which was instrumental in creating a renewed sense of pride for Mozambicans as well as international observers who claimed that they appreciated the way that UNOMOZ tackled the differences between the two parties to the fulfillment of their objectives. Doyle and Sambanis (2006:325) argue that UNOMOZ was crucial in ensuring that both of the formerly warring parties fulfilled their commitments. This was achieved by playing “an active, quasi-sovereign implementing role through a variety of commissions for disarmament, elections, and humanitarian activities, and that UNOMOZ actually helped to organize a political party as well as to employ demobilized soldiers in building roads: a true capacity infrastructure-building effort” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; 325).

The interviewee further stated that the mission was unique in that it was not viewed as a strange entity as seen in other peacebuilding processes that were taking place on the continent at the time, rather it was welcome due to its ability to forge relations with both Renamo and Frelimo. The consensus built between the two warring parties was an important part of the peacebuilding process, as both parties cooperated due to the manner in which the process sought to manage expectations and ensure that the commitments of the GPA were implemented. Interviewee 6 also stated that the presence of UNOMOZ was so well received that at the end of the mission, Mozambicans wanted the mission to continue. According to Chachua and Malan (1998:22) the humanitarian component of UNOMOZ established a critical linkage between conflict resolution and

peacebuilding in Mozambique. “The various programmes – dealing with issues such as the reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life, humanitarian assistance, and the resettlement of refugees and displaced people – were undertaken without looking at the political affiliation of the beneficiaries” (Chachia and Malan, 1998:24). This resulted in the reunification and reconciliation of individuals who had been separated by years of conflict and different political opinions. By helping to establish relationships between individuals supporting different parties in the conflict, UNOMOZ ensured that the social base of the conflict became a strong peace constituency.

According to Cerny (2006:110) political pluralism as a paradigmatic concept is not static. It is fragile, because it is rarely realised in practice and depends upon political practices and institutional rules of the game for its stabilisation and continuity. As a result, the lack of continuity and conformity with regards to pluralism has led to the inadequacy of liberal peacebuilding policies in post-civil-war Mozambique as alluded to by most of the interviewees. Interviewee 2 was asked if they thought the UNOMOZ process assisted in the peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, and responded that the UNOMOZ process failed to take the historical cultural, regional and political dynamics into account. According to Darch (2018), the GPA may have been broadly successful in bringing an end to fighting for a prolonged period, it failed to prepare a solid base for processes that would constitute positive peace in the fullest sense in so far as the democratisation of the state, political accountability and transparency, decentralisation in both political and administrative senses, as well as a better life for the majority of Mozambican citizens. This has overtime prompted minorities to seek greater autonomy, a situation compounded by the weakening of the state's capacity to control either the economy or security within a more global environment. This has seen insurrection in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado which a government official described as “essentially a protest against socio-economic asymmetries and inequalities” (International Crisis Group interview, 2021:17). The failure by the government to acknowledge diversity has led to the failure of the peacebuilding initiatives in the province as its inhabitants feel aggrieved due to inequality and their political exclusion. According to the International Crisis Group Africa Report of 11 June 2021;

Activism in Cabo Delgado has an Islamist tinge. Militants have pushed for alcohol bans while opposing the enrolment of children in state schools and the right of women to work. But it has also been fuelled by their economic exclusion amid the discovery of rubies and natural gas. They resented, too, the influence of liberation-era generals who have business interests in the province and are drawn from President Filipe Nyusi's Makonde ethnic group.

In essence, political pluralism, though difficult to be realised in its pure form has the power to build peace and stop conflict ridden zones from cascading into full blown conflict. The situation in Cabo Delgado is rooted in the notion that the central government has ignored their grievances by excluding them in the socio, economic and political set up of the state. Acknowledging pluralism, as a complex array of individuals and groups operating within multi-level state – and other institutional – structures with “multiple points of access” can go a long way in solving ethnic conflicts (Truman; 1951).

#### 5.4.2 Ruling Party Politics

Closely related to political pluralism is the internal politics in Mozambique. In 1994, Mozambique held its first pluralist elections, which consolidated the formation of a two party political system, with Renamo and Frelimo as the major political players. However, despite managing to conduct systematic elections, the country's post-war democratic project remains weak. Mozambique is frequently classified as 'partly free' by Freedom House due to lack of political rights and civil liberties in the state. The 2019 elections which were resoundingly won by Frelimo and President Filipe Nyusi were marred by violence, irregularities and were denounced by opposition parties, external observers and civil society (Freedom House, 2020). The country is firmly controlled by Frelimo and distrust between the government and the main opposition, Renamo, remains high. The democratic model negotiated in the peace accords privileged a winner-takes-all outcome with a strong executive, which has historically favoured the dominant party. Moreover, while formally independent, the judiciary has not been immune to party politics, thus contributing to a setting where there is little space for political contestation from inside the system (Maschietto, 2015). Weinstein (2002:152) adds that, “The problems caused by Mozambique's violent recent history, are all sharpened by the country's political



structure.” The divisions that drove Mozambique’s civil war are regional and local and a presidential system without any devolution of electoral power to the local level can only strengthen these divisions, laying the groundwork for future conflict and instability (Ibid). Interviewee 5 states that UNOMOZ although effective in ensuring peace at a critical period, failed to set Mozambique towards the path to democracy by leaving the fundamental structure of the state largely unchanged. This fundamental structure according to the interviewee relates to the manner in which Frelimo continues to dominate all spheres of public life, leaving very little room for growth and transformation of Renamo. In order to understand this key dynamic of Mozambican statehood, Sumich and Honwana (2007) use Moore (1966) to argue that the form of colonialism they experienced and their relationship to this external power is crucial to state-building after independence. In light of this they assert that the end of Portuguese colonial rule left an elite vacuum that created a situation in which as the only political party allowed in the country, meant that they automatically became the dominant social force. As a result, upon assuming power, Frelimo became both the state and the nation Sumich and Honwana (2007). This dynamic characterised much of the post-colonial and civil war period, which by the time of the GPA and UNOMOZ, Frelimo had firmly entrenched itself as an inseparable part of the nation and the state.

These ruling party dynamics remained largely unchanged, especially with regards to the monopolisation of state power and resources by Frelimo. Interviewee 5 highlighted that issues related to massive electoral fraud, voter registration irregularities and non-transparent ballot counting were the dynamics created by the ruling party, which also contributed to the marginalisation of Renamo. This has created a condition in which Mozambique, though lauded as a multiparty democracy, is in essence a one-party state. As such, even in the areas where Renamo is popular, the hold that Frelimo has over the functionality of the state means that those areas are systematically excluded.

Morier-Genoud (2007) captured this by stating that the transformation of the political system from one-party socialism to multiparty capitalism without dialogue with the rebels, gave Frelimo the opportunity to design the system and create ways to structurally disadvantage Renamo. Interviewee 3 in echoing the same sentiments, agreed that ruling

party politics has shaped the current political realities in Mozambique. Interviewee number 5 made sure to mention that his intimate knowledge of these dynamics is due to his role as a diplomatic advisor to the second most voted candidate in Mozambique and former vice President of the Internal Affairs Committee in Parliament. In addition, Interviewee 4 made mention that another consequence of UNOMOZ's two year tenure in Mozambique was the continued dominance of the ruling party. This dominance and the incomplete transformation of Renamo into a fully functional political party, resulted in a flawed democracy that eventually led Renamo into taking up arms again. According to Interviewee 4, the ruling party's monopoly over the state and its resources meant that Renamo continued to be on the periphery of mainstream politics, which was evident during elections. Juergensen (2000) states that since winning the first national elections Frelimo has been acting as a one-party democracy, paying little attention to the opposition parties. In support, Richmond and Mitchell (2011:329) state that;

The fusion of authoritarian modes of governance and liberal peacebuilding strategies has led to conditions that generate social unrest and this is the case for political elites which gained their power on a platform of national liberation, in close alliance with international actors such as the World Bank, have managed to build local and international legitimacy while also maintaining a control of political institutions verging on authoritarian.

Unlike the African National Congress (ANC's) stance in South Africa, Frelimo rejected any power-sharing agreement with Renamo and so the elections were a winner-take-all proposition. As a result, the opposition's efforts to peacefully contest elections have been systematically hampered by resource constraints and at times fell short due to perceived election rigging which was done through delaying election materials in traditionally Renamo strongholds.

Thus, interviewee 4 was of the view that if the mission had stayed longer than two years, they would have contained the dominance of the ruling party, ensured that election support was fair across the board and that both Renamo and Frelimo stronghold constituencies were adequately resourced. In addition, interviewee 8 adds that;

The electoral process was not fair. Africans are not used to relinquishing power. They will use every trick in the book to try and stay in power. The party that comes to power takes advantage of the opposition through the distribution of resources. The electoral officers are controlled by the government. The voting process is

controlled by the police that answers to the government. The people who count the votes belong to the ruling party and that gives an unfair advantage to the ruling party. The process of voting was thus unfair and these are the reasons which led the opposition parties to protest.

Frelimo's stance against political pluralism can be attributed to the notion of nationalism. According to Chichava (2010), the success that Frelimo achieved in uniting various competing liberation movements to achieve independence, is seen as evidence that only this party has the ability to govern Mozambique and that many of the problems in the country stem from multiparty democracy. This one-party stance and way of thinking is not limited to Mozambique and FRELIMO alone but is very common among African states that were colonised and waged wars of liberation. The liberating parties have generally struggled with accepting multiparty democracy and are inclined to one party states as they believe it is their right to rule since they liberated their respective states, resulting in a general lack of political tolerance within these states. Sullivan et al (1982:2) define political tolerance as "a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes". Alden (2001) captures this dimension of the situation in Mozambique, by stating that in spite of having held systematic national elections and deeply flawed municipal elections, in many respects democracy in Mozambique appears to retain the characteristics of an outside imposition, directly attributed to UNOMOZ. Thus the unwillingness by the government to pursue the South African solution, which is, power-sharing, can be viewed as symptomatic of the absence of ownership of a process that was promoted by the international community.

As such, most of the interviewees agreed that Frelimo's way of ruling has had negative effect on the state's development and has ultimately contributed to the resumption of conflict as the ruling party and state apparatus are conflated, coupled with a heavy centralisation of power and endemic corruption. The manner in which Frelimo's internal politics play out has consequently affected the state and Mozambique is still a long way off from being labelled as an actual democracy.

### 5.4.3 Premature Exit

There was a consensus from the interviewees that the issue of premature exit had a negative bearing on the state's stability as UNOMOZ left before the state was stable enough to be self-sufficient. The implementation of most of the key provisions of the GPA was entrusted with UNOMOZ with the mission considered a peacekeeping success as in the two years in operation, it managed to bring an end to the civil war and guided Mozambique to its first democratic elections. However, there is a general feeling that the mission could have done more had it stayed beyond the two years. Originally envisaged as a one-year operation, the mandate of UNOMOZ was twice renewed due to logistical, political and other problems which required extensive negotiation between Renamo, the government and the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) (Armon et al., 1998, p.97). The mandate of UNOMOZ expired in December 1994 after elections took place between the 27<sup>th</sup> and the 29<sup>th</sup> of October 1994. Considering that the mission had completed its GPA given mandate which was to establish the necessary conditions for successful elections, the UN subsequently withdrew its forces from Mozambique.

The main argument here is that if the values of liberal peacebuilding were implemented widely and sufficiently in post-conflict societies there would be a greater chance of lasting peace in those countries. At the same time this would allow them to become part of the interdependent global democracy, hence further limiting the likelihood of conflict (Tziarras, 2012). This theme was raised by most of the interviewees when asked if they thought the ONUMOZ and GPA process were a success. This question was placed in the interview guide to probe interviewees into reflecting on the processes as successes or failure in relation to the resumption of conflict in 2013 and most of them thought the failure by the mission to remain long enough in the country to ensure that the demobilisation of former combatants as stated in the GPA was properly enforced was unfavourable.

Interviewee 2 reiterated that the mission leaving after only two years was what made the UNOMOZ process flawed. Interviewee 2 was adamant that the period in which UNOMOZ

operations took place in the country, was in fact insufficient to adequately deal with the impact of the civil war. The respondent also added that continued tensions between the ruling party and Renamo, which according to the interviewee continue to turn to violence as a means of highlighting their exclusion, show that the terms of reference of the GPA have not been fulfilled. Interviewee 7, who works in the department of security and foreign policy stated that, "Personally, UNOMOZ did their best for the peace process of Mozambique in their allotted time. However, professionally I think they left some details of peace building incomplete. They missed the opportunity to guide Mozambique to the peace process, which given sufficient time would have minimised chances of future conflicts." Renamo's reliance on violence and use of arms therefore points towards an inadequate DDR process, which was meant to demobilise and integrate Renamo insurgents into the country's police and military.

UNOMOZ was given insufficient time to oversee the transformation of Renamo from a guerrilla movement into a fully-fledged political party that was well equipped to participate in the process of long term political administration. According to one interviewee, had the tenure of UNOMOZ been extended, Renamo would likely not have resorted to violent means to pressure the ruling party into upholding its commitments to the GPA. Additionally, interviewee 4 stated that one of the other consequences of UNOMOZ's tenure was the cosmetic nature of the process, where the primary concern was the visible elements of collecting weapons and hosting elections. Even though this was important, it took much needed attention away from seeking to understand what the underlying issues that led to the conflict were and what impact those dynamics would have on a multi-party post-civil war Mozambique. This according to the interviewee would have required UNOMOZ to stay longer and fully engage at all levels, particularly at grass roots and ex-combatant level, where they could begin to understand the dynamics, trauma and grievances in order to contribute to the construction of a post-civil war Mozambique that would be able to avoid violent conflict in the future.

Interviewee 5 indicated this theme through their explanation of UNOMOZ in the context of the resumption of hostilities in 2013. Interviewee 5 added that the quick exit by the mission was a direct consequence of the thinking of that period, which was at the time in

which the Cold War had ended and international organisations were of the view that multi-party democracy was the most suitable way of resolving conflict. This according to the interviewee was based on establishing a kind of procedural democracy that was cosmetic in nature through seeking to maintain peace long enough to ensure that free and fair elections were conducted and that rebel or guerrilla movements be transformed into political parties that could compete in a multi-party democratic system. This according to Interviewee 5 was a shortcoming of UNOMOZ in that “it failed to fundamentally change the nature of the state of Mozambique.” Vines (2018:9) in alluding to the premature exit of the mission states that after the withdrawal of UNOMOZ in 1995, crime rates increased in Mozambique.

The premature exit meant UNOMOZ did not sufficiently undertake the disarmament process which has overtime led to the resumption of hostilities in Mozambique. Similarly, the premature exit of peacekeeping missions elsewhere has had dire consequences in those areas and resulted in the escalation of conflict. In 2019, General Mark Milley, the United States’ Army’s chief of staff, who serves as the president’s principal military advisor, stated that a premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan would be a strategic mistake and added that the war should eventually be brought to an end through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban (Reuters, 11 July 2019). Furthermore in 2020, after the US formally announced its intentions to withdraw its troops from the war-torn Middle East state by the end of 2021, many Afghans were of the view that the move would embolden terrorists and hamper Afghan military efforts to fight off the Taliban (Phillip Walter Wellman, Star and Stripes, 17 November 2020). These fears have now come to life as the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021 after sustained withdrawals of US troops, leaving them at their lowest since the war began in 2001 (New York Times, 2021). The Mozambican case as with Afghanistan shows the importance of peacekeeping troops and how their premature withdrawal can result in more problems and hamper peacebuilding endeavours.

#### 5.4.4 UNOMOZ as a Successful Mission

Another sub theme emanating from the premature exit theme is the apparent success of the UNOMOZ mission in Mozambique. This surfaced in response to how UNOMOZ performed in relation to similar missions that were taking place on the continent at the time. Despite there being feelings that the peacekeeping mission exited prematurely, this mission was viewed as successful by most of the interviewees. This success was mainly accorded due to UNOMOZ's ability to maintain peace and the conduct of peaceful multi-party elections for the first time since the country obtained independence. The UNOMOZ mission is thus regarded as a successful mission, albeit a short term one, as it managed to bring peace to Mozambique. In addition, Mozambique is often lauded as an exceptional case of post-war democratisation for having held successful presidential and parliamentary elections and being a good example of how a fragile society can become an effective state (Manning and Malbrough, 2009). Weinstein 2011 adds that UNOMOZ was a success and "can rightfully claim credit for much of Mozambique's initial transformation. UN funds, technical expertise, and staff time nurtured Mozambique's transition—demonstrating the payoff that can come from making a sustained commitment in a country moving toward peace."

According to Interviewee 3, UNOMOZ was a success due to its ability to maintain the sovereignty of Mozambicans. Interviewee 3 attributes this to the manner in which it maintained its mandate to monitor and secure peace, while creating the necessary conditions for both Renamo and Frelimo to engage in a political process that was both transparent and democratic. (Weinstein, 2011) adds that "International assistance provided financial incentives for soldiers to demobilise and for Renamo's leadership to end the conflict. In particular, foreign donors established a trust fund to transform Renamo into a political party. These resources gave the Renamo leadership a realistic chance of competing in the multiparty elections." UNOMOZ is praised for creating and enabling a level playing field for the first democratic elections by making sure that both parties were ready for the elections. The presence of UNOMOZ gave Mozambicans a sense of hope and renewed trust in a political system that had long been dominated by a single force by allowing locals the opportunity to engage in a democratic election where they had a choice

to actively participate in crafting a new Mozambique. UNOMOZ was instrumental in creating the necessary conditions to hold free and fair elections where RENAMO could contest as a legitimate political entity. It also ensured that the people of Mozambique would be able to participate in the democratic practice by choosing their party of choice. Interviewee 9 is of the view that UNOMOZ played a fundamental and strategic role for the pacification and democratisation of the country through a trust fund that allowed for the creation of political parties. Interviewee 9 adds that thanks to UNOMOZ, he was able to establish a political party called National Reconciliation Party (Parena). Another respondent admitted that even though the transition to democracy was not flawless, UNOMOZ played a significant role that should not be understated. Interview 7 adds that, “the UN mission did their best for the peace process of Mozambique and even with serious challenges, we had peace for 25 years. That shows that UNOMOS played an important role.”

Interviewee 4 was of the view that despite its previously mentioned shortcomings, the mission can be deemed as a success to a certain degree as it ensured that a monitored transition took place through the hosting of free and fair elections, upholding the peace agreement and immediate demobilisation. Interviewee 6 stated that they believed that UNOMOZ was a successful mission in that it managed to fulfil its mandate adequately until the end, which was to host free and fair elections, further mentioning that UNOMOZ was able to deal with the issues that came up during the process until all the mission objectives were fulfilled. The interviewee also mentioned that the primary goal of UNOMOZ was to oversee the implementation of the GPA, which was to implement peace and oversee multi-party elections. Furthermore, UNOMOZ’s mandate remained within the confines of the GPA and that if UNOMOZ tried to do something different from what was stipulated in the GPA it would have complicated the process and probably resulted in the resumption of conflict. This theme also came up when the interviewee was comparing UNOMOZ to other UN missions on the continent that were taking place in the same period. According to the interviewee, UNOMOZ was able to secure peace, host elections and exit the country within the stipulated time period, while other UN missions in Angola for instance failed to yield the same results and instead resulted in the resumption of hostilities.



Interviewee 11 who has conducted extensive research on the Mozambican peace process in his capacity as an academic and journalist, states that the main role of UNOMOZ was to facilitate peace, with the help of the Catholic Church. He adds that UNOMOZ played an important role in facilitating peace in Mozambique and helped in the destruction of most of the dangerous weapons and mobilised the return of displaced people to their lands. He reiterated that UNOMOZ was not to blame for the resumption of conflict and places the blame on politicians who did not want to implement the peace agreement. "Our conflict started 15 years after UNOMOZ left. It failed because our leaders did not want to implement the peace agreement. The agreement was important but the implementation meant something different." Interviewee 8 adds that "UNOMOZ was a success. UNOMOZ gave technical and financial support to Mozambique and they had a lot of meetings with the parties to agree on the peace process. They did their work with excellence. Apart from the mistakes of the process, the work of UNOMOZ was valuable."

#### 5.4.5 Local Ownership of the Peace Process

Local ownership has often been conflated with 'national ownership', vaguely defined, without addressing problems of power asymmetry in policy practice (Donais 2012). Moreover, the concept has mostly been used in reference to the relation between external and national/ local agents, with little analysis as to the diversity and issues within the 'national/local' (Richmond 2011). As such, it is important to differentiate between the local as 'national elite' and other types of 'local' which mainly pertains to the general populace. It is also essential to consider how peacebuilding reforms, including political and economic liberalisation, may affect each of these differentiated groups (Donais 2012). However, fortunately, most respondents were aware of, and understood the difference and. The first instance when this theme was raised was when interviewee 2 was asked if they thought the UNOMOZ process assisted in the peaceful transition to multi-party democracy. In response, interviewee 2 stated that the UNOMOZ process failed to take the historical cultural, regional and political dynamics into account. Interviewee 2 further

stated that UNOMOZ came into the country for a limited period, with specific objectives that appeared to be aligned to Frelimo, which was and continues to be the ruling party. This according to interviewee 2 contributed to the continued marginalisation of Renamo, which interviewee 2 attributes to on-going tensions in the country. Interviewee 2 further explained how the local inhabitants were not considered as key political actors due to the inadequate levels of public consultation that took place. As such, these local inhabitants, most of whom live in rural areas and had never interacted with Europeans and still suffering from the trauma of civil war, had very little choice besides being receptive to UNOMOZ. Interviewee 4 also added that the dynamics of the post-UNOMOZ period indicate that very little was done in terms of engaging locals on their desired outcome of the objectives of the UNOMOZ and how best it would serve them. According to interviewee 7, locals only played a marginal role and were not involved in the broader sense. "Local people from the communities that are affected by the conflict, e.g. people from Manyika, Sompala and Nyatsa were not informed about the peace building process. The peace building process was a top down process. Even now, the local involvement is important, but they are not involved. We lost the opportunity in 1992, 1994 and even now. The locals do not have any opinion about peace building." Krause and Jutersonke (2005) add that "peacebuilding has been criticised for not placing enough emphasis on local ownership while ignoring local dynamics of power and local alternative expressions of social organisation." Indeed, a central problem of liberal peacebuilding has been its top-down character and the lack of local engagement both in the processes of definition and in implementation of the policy agenda (Donais 2012; MacGinty and Richmond 2013).

Interviewee 5 highlighted that UNOMOZ was an elite driven process in that the role of local people was never really considered, as this was automatically considered to be the role that holding elections would fulfil. According to the interviewee, this may have been the result of the thinking at the time, which rarely considered the role of local people, which may have looked like extensive public consultation across the length and breadth of the country. Interviewee 5 further stated that this was a shortcoming of UNOMOZ in that it failed to consult widely, which as a consequence political leaders and negotiators did not have a "clear sense of how ordinary working class people or rural people understood political power". As a result, Interviewee 5 stated that geographical and ethnic

fault lines remained unchanged, even after elections as local people continued to hold the same beliefs they had during the civil war. Another consequence of this was that there was no public consultation on what the expectations of a democratic Mozambique would look like and the role that political parties and citizens alike would play. However, interviewee 5 believes lack of time may have contributed to the lack of extensive public consultation by asserting that, "On the other hand, there is a school of thought that says asking complicated political questions only delays things, the priority was to end the war as soon as possible and then talk about democratisation later on". This, according to the interviewee, displayed the elite nature of the process, as the most important actors were already perceived to have been engaged, thus excluding a significant percentage of the population, which is the direct opposite of what is intended to take place in a multi-party democracy.

Interviewee 7 adds that civil society was not consulted and the peace process remained exclusively between the two warring parties. While the Catholic Church played a minor role, the process ultimately utilised a top down approach. Interviewee 11 adds that local people were not in leadership positions nor consulted and local participation was difficult because not many people were educated and were mostly ignorant with regards to the GPA processes. Interviewee 9 adds that the main players were those representing Renamo and the government on the agreement process. According to Interviewee 9, the process was highly politicised. "The general populace, including the civil society were marginalised. The debate was between the government and Renamo, everyone else was side-lined. This is why after many years we returned to war." Most interviewees were of the view that a top down approach that was utilised in the process was not UNOMOZ's doing but part of Frelimo's efforts to maximise their power in the negotiations This is in line with an assertion by Hughes et al (2015:820) who state that "another school of thought, for instance, criticise the lack of engagement of the local population with power dynamics within the local."

However, some of the interviewees believe local people were indeed consulted, and added that "without local people buy-in, the process would not have worked as well as it did". Interviewee 3 further stated that the relative stability and peaceful elections that have

taken place since 1994, have been the result of local involvement/buy-in from Mozambicans, which according to the interviewee indicates a certain level of political autonomy that exists in the country, even in the absence of UNOMOZ. Interviewee 6 also added that UNOMOZ clearly received local support in comparison to other peacebuilding missions that were taking place on the continent at the time. According to the interviewee, this support was displayed in the manner in which democratic principles of multi-party elections were well accepted by local people. This was displayed in the manner in which there was very little reluctance and elections took place peacefully, especially given that Renamo and its supporters had rejected the notion of election prior to the involvement of UNOMOZ. Interviewee 6 further stated that UNOMOZ understood the integral role in involving people from the very beginning of the process. This according to the interviewee was done through ensuring that local people understood the role and purpose of UNOMOZ, which in this case was that it was a process that would entail restoring peace and facilitating reconciliation. It was also important to ensure that local people understood that UNOMOZ was not coming in support of Renamo or Frelimo, but for all Mozambicans. Interviewee 10 adds local people did indeed play a role in the process and that “If the people don’t play a role, the process fails and UNOMOZ was a success.” This view is supported by Adedokun (2017:49) who states that local participation and local ownership of the peace process coupled with the credible and impartial international support through the United Nations and an inclusive political settlement are largely responsible for persistent peace in Mozambique.

Peacebuilding interventions should therefore accommodate and seek to provide autonomous and free space for local actors to engage in critical responses such as the ones discussed here, rather than merely focusing on external driven programs. While UNOMOZ was regarded as a success, it failed to engage with the general populace and conflated national (elite) participation with local participation. As a result, locals in areas in which conflict was centralised were not aware of the peacebuilding initiative as alluded to by interviewee 7. If peacebuilding interventions are to be effective, sustainable and ethically defensible, international actors might discard the dichotomies of top-down agency and conditionality: of acceptance/rejection on the part of local actors and the

success/failure of implementation that shapes their policy making decisions (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011).

#### 5.4.6 Political Will

Political will, both in its presence and absence, has had a bearing on Mozambique's transition from civil war to peace. This theme emerged when one of the interviewees stated that in order for UNOMOZ to operate in Mozambique, political will was required between the main protagonists of the conflict; Renamo and Frelimo. This point was made to illustrate that UNOMOZ and the GPA respectively were able to yield a series of results due to both political will and conflict fatigue from the general population, who by virtue of the brutality they endured during the war, realised the importance of engaging in the UNOMOZ process.

On the other hand, the lack of political will has also affected the peacebuilding initiatives in Mozambique. Frelimo in a bid to maintain its hold on power has continuously failed to engage with Renamo on its grievances which has only exacerbated the tensions over the years. Interviewee 11 adds that "When UNOMOZ left, we started to fight after 15 years of peace. Our politicians did not want to implement the peace agreement. Our conflict started 15 years after UNOMOZ left. They did not contribute to instability. Our leaders did." There has also been an unwillingness to initiate earnest reconciliation which is essential towards lasting peace. Reconciliation has not been prioritised decades after the war. According to Interviewee 8, "the problem of reconciliation should have been done from the onset. It has been 30 years since the end of the conflict, but the politicians still speak about the wounds of the conflict. This means that there is no reconciliation. They closed the camps, but the wounds are still open."

On the regional front, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has been criticised for being slow to react to crises within the region. The bloc only agreed to deploy troops to Mozambique in July 2021, after nearly a year of intense fighting in Cabo Delgado which has left thousands dead. SADC reached this agreement after months of deliberations and disagreements on the right course of action to take (Al Jazeera 23 June

2021). The agreement was reached after Rwanda, which is not a member of SADC had already deployed troops made up members of its defence forces and officers from its national police to northern Mozambique to assist the national force (Africa News 1 July 2021). The lack of political will within SADC to act is usually associated with the solidarity that exists between former liberation movements that now make up national governments within the region. According to Africa News (2020), “Ruling parties such as the ANC in South Africa, ZANU PF in Zimbabwe, Frelimo in Mozambique and SWAPO in Namibia tend to shield one another from interference or criticism. This ‘brotherhood’ allows some regimes to get away with murder.” As a result, political will has been credited both for the successes and failures of Mozambique’s trajectory towards long lasting peace.

#### 5.4.7 An Incomplete DDR Process

This theme highlights the security oversights created by UNOMOZ’s premature/quick exit. Some of these shortcomings also occurred during the mission’s tenure in Mozambique. One of the stipulations of the 1992 GPA was to implement Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process which was to be overseen by UNOMOZ. All of the interviewees were of the view that the DDR process was one of the mission’s biggest shortcomings as they left Mozambique before the disarmament processes were fully implemented. In supporting this view, the Institute of Peace and Security Studies (2020) adds that the major concern is that Renamo managed to circumvent the DDR process and hid stockpiles, fears that were substantiated during the resurgence of conflict in 2013, when it easily managed to get re-armed. One of the most important clauses of the GPA was for the integration of guerrillas or ex-combatants into the security forces, primarily the police and military. Protocol IV (Military questions) of the GPA (1992) on “Activities of private and irregular armed groups” lists that “CCF shall monitor and verify the disbanding of the private and irregular armed groups and shall collect their weapons and ammunition. CSC shall decide the final disposition of the weapons and ammunition collected.” This provision failed to materialise and resultantly, Renamo found itself as an organisation with an identity crisis, with a large number of unemployed ex combatants who in the absence of integration still considered themselves to be guerrillas despite now being classified as

a political party, required to participate in political processes with very little administrative support.

Vines (2018:11) adds that the disarmament clause was largely neglected, and UNOMOZ missed an opportunity with regard to this. After its withdrawal, the opportunity to disarm diminished and only a small percentage of weapons were given up through official and NGO efforts. According to interviewee 7, UNOMOZ did well to reconcile the government and Renamo but the problem was that both parties wanted to go to elections without resolving the problems related to the DDR. "The DDR process was neglected with both Renamo and Frelimo more concerned with the elections. After losing the landmark elections, it was easy for Renamo to resume fighting because they still had their weapons." Interviewee 8 adds that, "We had a conflict that ended in 1992, the other ended in 1994. There was another one that started in 2013 and these were massively aided by the negligence and failure to complete the DDR process." The failure by the involved parties to disarm was always going to present problems for the future which has seen the continuation of conflict in Mozambique. Interviewee 7 further states that the Frelimo government did not involve Renamo as part of the government and this pushed Renamo back to fighting in order to have a voice in the government. The availability of weapons made locals wary as "no one believed that the peace would last. People believed that the war would come anytime."

Renamo's transformation was also a recurring theme as observations were made towards its inability to transform. Interviewee 4 stated:

UNOMOZ failed to help Renamo transit from a military group into a political group. They left that task to Renamo itself which was not possible for Renamo to transform itself. It needed the support of UNOMOZ which was the organisation best placed to help the ex-combatants and Renamo understand the new dynamics of the democratic process and the political gain.

This view indicates the internal dynamics within Renamo and the level of unmet expectations both from the GPA and UNOMOZ. Interviewee 4 went further to state that due to the unmet expectations and the ruling party's perceived flouting of the GPA, Renamo did not fully demobilise and instead retained combatants in their central province bases of the Sahana in Gorogosa. This is what subsequently resulted in the resumption

of low intensity conflict in 2013, which was according to the interviewee a culmination of years of discontent, marginalisation and an unfinished demobilisation process.

Interviewee 5 also went on to mention that another shortcoming of UNOMOZ was that Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama was allowed to retain armed body guards in return for his participation in the process. This according to the interviewee was a mechanism used by the Renamo leader to ensure that the political questions were resolved before agreeing to a full disarmament. Interviewee 5 indicated that by retaining those forces, Renamo did not fully undergo the DDR process as stipulated in the GPA and this coupled with the delays in the integration of those demobilised, created the necessary conditions for the resumption of hostilities in 2013. Interviewee 5 further stated that the delay in integration and the inadequate nature of the DDR process meant that Renamo continued to be a guerrilla movement, with access to arms and an old enemy that had refused to honour its commitments to the GPA. While recognising that Renamo would never have handed over all its weapons to UNOMOZ, more effort during the mission would have reduced stockpiles further, especially if international partners had continued to support disarmament and support to alternative livelihoods of ex-combatants in Mozambique (Vines, 2018.p.11)

#### 5.4.8 Peace Keeping

After emerging from the civil war, Mozambique was hailed as a post-conflict success story as it managed to achieve close to 20 years of relative peace and stability before the resumption of hostilities. Most of the interviewees added that it was important to note that UNOMOZ was a peacekeeping mission and that it is important that it is not given any overarching roles that might have impacted on Mozambique's fragile position. UNOMOZ's fourfold mandate was essentially meant to facilitate a smooth transition from civil war to a peaceful state by helping to lay the foundations for sustainable peace that would be able to restore representative democracy. The United Nations Charter in Chapter 1, Article 1 (2) states that one of its purposes is to develop friendly relations among states based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination. While it is necessary for the UN to create peacekeeping missions, the body is also aware that a conflict-ridden state



has a right to self-determination and the right to chart its own path. When asked if was UNOMOZ well suited to assist with establishing a multi-party democracy, interviewee 3 mentioned that the objective of UNOMOZ was not multi-party democracy, instead it was a peace keeping mission that would ensure that the terms of reference of the GPA were upheld. Interviewee 3 further stated that democracy and free and fair elections were part of the objectives prescribed in the GPA and as such, the role and the responsibility of elections and democracy did not lie with UNOMOZ. This assertion by interviewee 3 also highlighted another sub theme that emerged which relates to a monitored transition, which according to the interviewee was the prescribed role of UNOMOZ. When probed further about the role of UNOMOZ, interviewee 3 stated that the UNOMOZ mandate was to monitor the transitional period of peace, with the major benefit being that UNOMOZ ensured that pockets of instability across the country were halted, especially in Frelimo and Renamo strongholds. Therefore, the role of the mission was peacekeeping and facilitating a smooth transition and this was to be done in a manner that would accord Mozambique self-determination. Interviewee 5 further stated that at the time of its exit, UNOMOZ had sought to ensure the sovereignty of Mozambique by leaving the rest of the GPA commitments to both Renamo and Frelimo to implement.

#### 5.4.9 Role of the International Community in Peace Building

There have been debates over the role that the international community, particularly the West, should play in peace building initiatives around the world. This is mainly due to the failures of externally supported peace building in states such as Iran, Afghanistan and Libya. Some are of the view that peace is a national project and thus should be built individually by states through the involvement of stakeholders such as the government, the general public from grassroots levels and robust civil society engagement. Another school of thought believes peace is a collaborative endeavour and should involve support from external forces including international organisations and external donors. According to Donais and McCandless (2017), “the track record of the international community consolidating peace is mixed. Critics of liberal peacebuilding have exposed the weaknesses of externally supported peacebuilding yet there are situations where local

institutions, structures and actors are unable to deal with issues alone.” Interviewee 10 states that Mozambique has leaders who have capacity and are skilful enough to build peace internally without external influence. He added, “If Africans are left to work freely, they can end conflict. They are capable themselves without outside help.”

Interviewee 11 on the other hand underscored the importance of collaboration with external stakeholders. “I think Western countries can support African countries. It is important to engage everyone. Everyone can contribute to solve the problems.” Interviewee 7 was less optimistic of Mozambique’s lone efforts towards peace and believes that Mozambique is not capable of successful peace building efforts without external help. When asked if Mozambique could achieve peace without the help of the international community, interviewee 7 asserted that “No, we cannot do without them. We don’t have the capacity to conduct the peace process. We must improve our understanding of the peace building process. We don’t have conditions to work without Western countries. We need them to give use support to work on the peace building process.”

## 5.5 Conclusion

From the data collected and the interviews conducted, the consensus was that while the UNOMOZ mission was able to successfully carry out its limited mandate in Mozambique, the peace building process has remained incomplete and fragile. The liberal peace approach adopted in order to stop the conflict in Mozambique has largely proved to be inadequate and has led to the resumption of conflict. The resumption of conflict also serves to prove that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to peacebuilding does not always work and that local ownership of conflict resolution processes is crucial in establishing durable peace. A major cause for concern is the unsuccessful demilitarisation and disarmament process which was left incomplete due to UNOMOZ making a hasty exit before the process was satisfactorily concluded. This has left Mozambique at the mercy of weapon-wielding insurgents who have the power to overthrow the progress that has been made

in helping Mozambique achieve some form durable of peace. Democracy wise, Frelimo remains in control of the country and has failed to accord its citizens political rights and civil liberties which has resulted in the minorities feeling hard done by the top down approach to peace adopted by the state. On the other hand, the role of SADC in post-civil war Mozambique has also come under scrutiny as the bloc has taken its time to respond and has thus failed in its objective to keep the region safe. The situation in Mozambique also has the potential to spill over into other SADC states which should be more motivation for SADC to act more decisively at first instances of tensions. The current events in northern Mozambique highlight the fragility of the state's peace situation and should serve as motivation for the powers that be to address the major concerns so that the country, with so much potential due to its abundant natural resources, can move forward.

## CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Discussion

The aim of the study was to explore the ability of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm to accommodate local ownership of peace processes, using Mozambique as a case study. More specifically the study sought to gain a deeper understanding to what extent the peacebuilding project through the GPA and the UNOMOZ made sufficient provision for local ownership and how those respective processes contributed to the establishment of lasting peace. To help answer this research question, a qualitative methodology was utilised, by gathering data through in-depth interviews with eleven interviewees with both personal and professional proximity to the UNOMOZ process. The insights drawn from these interviews were analysed by the researcher and nine common themes emerged. These themes provided the necessary insights that are best captured by Manning (2002) who states that the fragile postwar political system in Mozambique can attribute its survival to the presence of two contradictory tracks for the management of political conflict. The first comprises of majoritarian democracy, which was instituted as part of the 1992 GPA, while the second consists of the continuous informal negotiating processes involving the top leadership of the two major parties. As a result, these two dynamics have created a process of elite habituation, which is regarded as a necessary consequence of the consolidation process. Thus, in terms of the study, it is increasingly clear that the manner of approach adopted by the GPA and UNOMOZ did not adequately consider local ownership outside of the confines of Renamo and Frelimo.

The first three key findings of the study related to the themes of Political Pluralism, Peacekeeping and Successful Mission highlight the limited nature of the UNOMOZ process. These three themes were reflective of the mandate of UNOMOZ as prescribed by the GPA. Mozambique has often been portrayed in the policy and academic literature as a peacebuilding success story (Alden, 2001; Van Den Bergh, 2009; Manning and Malbrough, 2009; Astill-Brown and Weimer, 2010). It is cited as a success on the basis

of three factors, the first is that unlike other African countries that underwent similar processes at the time, there was no swift return to conflict; secondly Renamo was to some extent successfully transformed into a political party to contest multi-party elections and lastly Mozambique showed signs of remarkable level of economic recovery following the recommendations of the International Financial Institutions (IFI's) (Mazula, 2004). As a result, UNOMOZ when viewed at through its limited mandate can be viewed as a success due to its ability to establish political pluralism, maintain the ceasefire and conduct peaceful elections. Yet as Darch (2018) points out, the political system that emerged after the GPA was a reconfiguration that made room for institutional arrangements as free elections and a multiplicity of political parties, but failed to fundamentally change the existing map of power, which was and remains the major source of tensions.

The cessation of hostilities was an important gain for Mozambicans in general; however, it did not accommodate a substantial change in the political framework which remained elite centered. By focusing primarily on Frelimo and Renamo, the GPA and the UNOMOZ's contribution to the establishment of post-war state institutions were characterised by a considerable 'popular deficit' (Mazula, 2004). Mazula adds that although ordinary Mozambicans contributed to peace at the everyday level by engaging in several grassroots peace mechanisms, there was a clear popular deficit in the formal domain of peace which in turn prevented the creation of more substantial spaces that could have promoted the empowerment of ordinary people. Thus in terms of the topic of the study, the three themes may point to some semblance of UNOMOZ being a success, however in terms of the research question of UNOMOZ's accommodation of local ownership, it was not as successful in that regard as it overlooked local involvement in favour of the elite and created a popular deficit.

The next three themes which were also highlighted in the study were Ruling Party Politics, Premature Exit and Incomplete DDR process. These themes added much analytical value to answering the research question in that it placed increased focus on the failures of UNOMOZ and its inability to fulfil its mandate as prescribed by the GPA. According to Chapman (1995:18), "So desperate is the UN to claim an unqualified success that it almost appears to want to wash its hands of Mozambique before it can be blamed for

anything which does go wrong.” Chapman’s assertion can be said to capture the nature of UNOMOZ by describing it in the same way as asserted by Wienstein (2002) who states that the UN alongside its Western technical expertise and staff, created a situation in which the progress of peace became a mechanical checklist. This resulted in a ruling party structure that remained largely unchanged, where according to Darch (2018:11)

The political system that emerged after the GPA can be best understood not as a radical democratization and abandonment of Frelimo’s framing of the dominant political discourse, but rather as a reconfiguration that made room for such institutional arrangements as free elections and a multiplicity of political parties, but did not fundamentally change the existing map of power.

One of the failures of UNOMOZ can thus be attributed to the ruling party structure that remained unchanged and instead UNOMOZ through the GPA relied on the existing ruling party framework and state architecture to reach its objectives. The consequence of this has been that the GPA and by extension UNOMOZ, did not prepare a solid foundation for processes that would constitute positive peace in the fullest sense; “not merely an end to armed conflict, but the democratization of the state, political accountability and transparency, decentralization in both political and administrative senses, and a better life for the majority of Mozambican citizens” (Darch, 2018. p.9).

As with the themes of Premature Exit and Incomplete DDR, the same notion is applicable in that UNOMOZ’s tight deadline created a situation in which key clauses of the GPA such as Protocol IV were left incomplete. Disarmament appears to have been flawed in relation to the longer term implications of an inconsistent effort of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Mozambique and the sub-region. Even though the GPA referred only to the collection, registration and custody of arms, ammunition and explosives, the UNOMOZ mandate also encompassed the destruction of weapons. Nonetheless, nowhere was it explained how the process was to unfold in practical terms Lala and Ostheimer (2003). Another flaw of the UNOMOZ disarmament component was that there was an absence of clear and practical plan on how the process was to unfold, which in turn created a situation where there was no clear understanding on what disarmament entailed and to what extent it would be implemented, thus rendering the

process weak. Vines (2013:381) highlights this weakness by asserting that disarmament efforts of light weapons had limited success as;

UNOMOZ collected just over 200,000 weapons during and after demobilization but none of these was destroyed. Indeed the UN failed to effect meaningful disarmament during its UNOMOZ operation and Aldo Ajello admitted disarmament was never his priority, as he believed this would undermine the peace process.

The admission by the former UN Special Representative for Mozambique highlights the flaw within the enforcement of disarmament and how it was not a priority, which further proves the limited nature of UNOMOZ as well as its subsequent short sightedness which rendered the peace in question fragile.

According to Alden (2001) the consequence of the flawed demilitarisation programme has been the proliferation of small arms and concurrent rise of criminal gangs, which indicate the failures of the international peace process in putting into place the necessary conditions for lasting peace. Darch (2018) cites this failure as one of the main reasons for the resumption of hostilities in 2013, as UNOMOZ's inability to completely disarm Renamo during its tenure created the necessary conditions for conflict. Given the highlighted failures it is increasingly clear that had the long-term well-being of local Mozambicans been central to both the GPA and UNOMOZ, disarmament would have been given a higher level of priority as the weapons that played an integral role in the war continued to remain in the hands of the perpetrators, who as seen in 2013 could easily use those same weapons against them. In addition to the failure to disarm, UNOMOZ is also cited as having failed to demobilize effectively as the time framework for the implementation of the GPA and for duration of the UNOMOZ operation, which was twelve months until the realization of elections was unrealistic. The operational failures of UNOMOZ in relation to demobilization can further translated into the inability to adequately transform Renamo from a rebel movement to a fully functional political party. According to Lala and Ostheimer (2003) the demobilisation process and the transformation of Renamo were the unfortunate consequence of the negotiating process, where Renamo's conditions for peace required government acceptance that a militarized unit from the party be maintained beyond the elections as a personal guard force for its

leader. These are some of the dynamics created by the GPA and UNOMOZ that firstly rendered the Mozambique's peace fragile and secondly, created the necessary conditions for the resumption of hostilities. The concessions made for the ruling party and Renamo clearly indicate the flawed nature of the UNOMOZ in that elite bargaining only considers the concerns and demands of a political minority at the expense of the larger population. Despite these different instances of external engagement, it should be noted that both Frelimo and Renamo played a strong role in the negotiation process making explicit their own demands and positions towards the mediators and, therefore, claiming ownership of the peace process (Van Den Bergh, 2009, p.36).

In hindsight, it is undeniable that external actors played a fundamental role in the promotion of peace in Mozambique (Cohen, 2000; Manning & Malbrough, 2009). At the same time, UNOMOZ was criticised for its invasive character and lack of flexibility and coordination with the local structures. Synge (1997:45) referred to its activities as being "invasive and destabilising to, rather than creative and supportive of, the shaky structures of the Mozambican state and society" (Alden, 2001: p.90-91). The insights obtained from the interviewees was slightly mixed when referring to the extent of local ownership as displayed by the above quote. There appears to be little consensus on the subject in light of UNOMOZ due to the role it played in ending hostilities and ensuring the first multi-party elections. This is very much attributed to its success and thus by assumption is regarded as having been successful in those areas by garnering an acceptable level of local buy-in due to the peaceful nature of the first elections and the relative peace that the country has maintained since the UNOMOZ exit. There were also diverging views from the interviewees with regard to the role the international community should play in the peace process. Some were of the view that external interference is unnecessary and some favouring external help as they felt Mozambique does not have the capacity to go at it alone. Thus in terms of the research question, it is increasingly clear that Mozambique highlights the complexity of the liberal peacebuilding and local ownership debate, thus requiring a nuanced approach where both concepts are approached with a high level of objectivity. As stated in the literature review section, UNOMOZ as a case for the efficacy of liberal peacebuilding approaches can be said to have been successful in its limited mandate of securing peace and cultivate equitable governance structures, even though



they were isolated to a specific elite. On the other hand when taking the local ownership dimension of the debate, UNOMOZ's limited mandate and time constraints rendered it to be a process that entered the country with a cultural blind spot which by design excluded locals and eventually rendered them as essentially disempowered pawns in the reproduction of power structures that continue to limit wide spread, equitable civic participation.

## 6.2 Conclusion

The purpose of the study was to explore if liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique, administered through UNOMOZ made sufficient provision for local ownership. Using post-Civil War Mozambique as the case study, this research sought to gain insights into the dynamics of the GPA protocols, their subsequent enforcement, as well as implementation through UNOMOZ and how, if at all both processes made sufficient provision for local grass roots participation and by extension, local ownership. Although UNOMOZ is widely regarded as a model UN peacekeeping and peacemaking operation which could be adapted to similar post-conflict situations, this study reveals that the mission did not do enough to ensure that long term peace would prevail in Mozambique as evidenced by the outbreak of violence in 2013. The study has indeed proven the arguments purported by Chachua and Malan (2010:18), that UNOMOZ was more of a successful political and humanitarian mission, than one which reflected Security Council responsibilities for creating a greater degree of long term 'peace and security'. The study further revealed that the manner in which the GPA was conceived and subsequently agreed to, is reflective of the main actors who remained central throughout UNOMOZ. As a result, the inquiry of the study seeking to locate the local outside of the main protagonists of the war, proved to be limited, just as the accommodation of the local people and consideration of the local context was equally as limited. Even though UNOMOZ has been heralded as a success, the mission left a divided state which could at any moment sink into another civil war as old, deep-rooted divisions linger and threaten to grow worse. The structure of Mozambique's political system is uniquely ill-suited to the challenges as Frelimo continues its exclusionary politics tactics.

### 6.2.1 Limitations

The sampling method used in the study was snowball, as interviewees were obtained through referrals and chosen based on their proximity to the UNOMOZ process. However, the specialised nature of the study and the complex political situation in Mozambique as well as the increased constraints posed by the COVID-19 pandemic posed a series of limitations. These limitations resulted in the participation of eleven interviewees and in some instances, face to face interviews were not possible resulting in interviews being conducted via digital platforms such as Zoom and WhatsApp. Four potential respondents who had been earmarked for interviews declined the requests, citing security concerns.

It must also be noted that although some of the interviews were conducted via online platforms, they still proved to be more than sufficient as the rich data collected provided dynamic insights that assisted in providing the required exploration of the cited topic on UNOMOZ and its ability to sufficiently accommodate local ownership. The population sample consisted of academics, politicians, journalists and members of the clergy who by virtue of their proximity and knowledge of the UNOMOZ process provided the necessary insights for the study. The data obtained from the interviewees was used in conjunction with the literature review and conceptual framework which were used as proxies for analyzing data as a means of minimizing personal biases and locating the findings within the adequate confines of validity and reliability. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data.

### 6.3 Recommendations

Thus, as stated in the literature review, the most suitable approach to the liberal peacebuilding and local ownership debate is that of a hybridised approach, which privileges the local over the liberal, and provides for needs as well as rights (Richmond, 2009). This would ensure that there is a balanced approach that makes sufficient room for meaningful forms of participation for local actors and civil society, not just in political terms, but also in ways that address the culture/welfare paradox. In the context of

Mozambique, an approach of this nature would have transformed the power structure and opened up pathways of meaningful civic participation that is not isolated to a bipartisan type of political contestation. It is thus recommended that as the peacebuilding approach continues to evolve, cases like that of Mozambique must be viewed as a lesson in which international peacebuilding approaches must be expanded to accommodate more actors beyond the main protagonists. This will be go a long way in ensuring that the ownership of the peace-building process is expansive, reproductive and thus self-sustaining.

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## Appendix 1: Interview Guide

### Interview Questions

1. What is your nationality?
2. Did you participate in the UNOMOZ process or work with the government and other organisations in Mozambique during the GPA period? – Open ended, will prompt participant to expand on their role.
3. In your opinion was the UNOMOZ process well suited to assist a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy?
4. Who were the primary actors in the transition through the UNOMOZ driven process?
5. How would you describe your experience of the UNOMOZ process, both personally and professionally?
6. Do you think local people played a significant role in the UNOMOZ process?
7. What is your understanding of local people?
8. At what level of participation do think local people must engage with large scale peace processes such as UNOMOZ?
9. Do you think UNOMOZ and the GPA were a success?  
If not, why? And what do you think could have been done differently?

If yes, why? What do you think set it apart from other peacebuilding missions on the continent?

10. Could you say that the UNOMOZ process had an impact on the instability in certain parts of Mozambique?

11. Do you think that African countries and regional organisations can lead successful peacebuilding missions without the direct involvement of western countries and organisations?

If not, why?

If yes, why?

## Appendix 2: Consent Form

**Research topic: *To what extent has the liberal peacebuilding approach in Mozambique been able to accommodate the notion of local ownership?***

1. I confirm that the purpose of the study was clearly explained to me and I understand it. I was also given the opportunity to ask questions for further clarification.
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary, therefore at any point I can withdraw without need for explanations or giving reasons.
3. I give permission to have the interview session tape recorded.
4. I give permission to have my quotations anonymously used.

Participant name	Date	Signature
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Researcher name	Date	Signature
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