

**THE POLITICS – ADMINISTRATION  
INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA  
BETWEEN 1999 AND 2009**

**By**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The critical observation for public administration and governance in South Africa has been the relationship between senior managers and political officials since the establishment of the democratic government in the country. The first documented observation in the United States of America by Woodrow Wilson marked the launch of public administration as an independent faculty, breaking away from the political sciences. The dominant theory that characterised public administration was that there must be a clear distinction between politics and public administration. This theory suggested that politics had nothing to do with public administration and, therefore, politicians should not intrude into matters of public administration.

For contemporary academia, it is crucial to ask questions about the relevance of Wilson's perspective with regard to the relationship between senior managers and political officials. Nevertheless, contemporary scholars are challenged by the emergent need to study the dual nature of public administration, suggesting that public administration should not be separated from politics, since public administration is merely the expression of the political ideology. Hence, politics and public administration should be inseparable. To refute or reaffirm these notions, this thesis explores this study by reviewing the relationship between senior public managers and political officials through analysing the politics-administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009.

In congruence with the main research questions of this study, the researcher utilises four pre-claims to examine the politics-administration interface and the factors that lead to strained relationships around the interface. The first pre-claim in this study examines the notion suggesting that it is the nature of the political bureau to dominate public

administration. The second pre-claim examines the notion suggesting that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. The third pre-claim is that political officials may have a different political ideology as compared with the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. The fourth pre-claim is that political officials or public service officials or both parties may have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Consequently, this study examines the politics–administration interface in South Africa within the scope of the pre-claims as presented in the introduction to the study.

The study found that the colonial legacy in the Commonwealth Nations with features of the Westminster system of governance perpetuates political bureau dominance over public administration. The study further found that it is conventionally accepted that the political bureau should provide guidance to the public administration bureau and dominate public administration which is only the expression of the prevailing political will. The researcher has examined the pre-claim of conflicting leadership styles between the elected officials and senior public servants. The study found that between 1999 and 2009 there was a transition from the collective leadership of the ruling political bureau to a closed conventional leadership system where political power was centralized in the presidency, resulting in leadership through fear and mistrust.

Regarding the pre-claim on different ideologies, this study argues that public administration is the implementation of political ideologies, and public service managers are at the apex of implementing policies for the benefit of the social classes on behalf of the political bureau, which drives the ideologies of a ruling political party. Therefore, different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau may be one of the factors of a strained politics–administration interface. The study found that in cases (Buthelezi and Masetlha as well as Zille and

Mgoqi) where officials from different political parties attempted to work, the arrangement resulted in a power struggle in the politics–administration interface.

With regard to the pre-claim on disregard for documented rules and responsibilities, the study found that the problem in the interface is not always the neglect of documented rules and responsibilities, but rather that in some cases the documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, resulting in grey or nondescript areas in the politics–administration interface that are ultimately claimed by the political bureau.

This study has further proposed a public service governance structure with an added governance responsibility for the Public Service Commission to oversee the administration in order to distance the political bureau from public administration operations and direct engagement with senior public servants, such as the directors-general.

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God bless.

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to Naomi, Sbongumenzi, and Zoe.  
What would have become of me had God not given me such precious gifts  
in you?

## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the research report *Politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009*, submitted for a PhD degree in Management to the University of the Witwatersrand, apart from the work recognised and duly cited, is my own unaided work. It has not been presented to another institution for any academic requirement or any other purpose.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of the *politics–administration interface* refers to the link between politics and administration; hence the study problem is rooted in establishing the lines of demarcation between these two spheres. The academic discourse on the concept of politics–administration interface became the main academic phenomenon in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and it is still the peculiarity of this correlation that baffles contemporary scholars in public administration and political science faculties (Akers, 2006:3). It is therefore essential that South African scholarship examines this concept in detail, tracing it from its roots in 18th-century literature. This study examines the politics–administration interface through the pre-claims as conceptualised by the researcher in this contribution to the contemporary academic discourse.

The main claim of this study is that there are leadership conflicts between the political bureau and the public service bureau when there are differing views on how service delivery should be executed. The main claim is premised on the political conflict arising in the public service bureau in 2008 between the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki and the then Minister of Justice, Brigitte Mabandla, as well as the then National Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate Vusumzi (Vusi) Pikoli, who was suspended and later dismissed. The first reason for the main claim of leadership conflict is that there is a tendency by political officials to dominate public service functions. The researcher examines the notion that political officials want to dominate public service functions because they want to influence the public service's supply chain and the awarding of tenders. The underlying intent for seeking to control public service

functions could thus be corruption. Another reason for the tendency to dominate public service functions could be that political officials want to enforce cadre deployment in order to retain their political ideology in the execution of service delivery. The second reason for the main claim is that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. If, for example, there are particular personal behavioural traits, as well as leadership styles, that are dominant in a political bureau and not in the public service bureau or *vice versa*, there could be leadership and governance conflicts. Leadership conflict may also occur due to leaders' allegiance to either a closed system or open system of leadership. The third reason for the main claim is that political officials may have a different political ideology compared with the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. If there is such a clash based on political ideologies, there could be conflict between political bureau and public service bureau. The fourth reason for the claim of this study could be that political officials or public service officials or both parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Hence, there could be overlapping actions between political bureau and public service bureau. Such overlap could be related to State and political party overlap, which could be one of the challenges of the one-dominant-party governance model in the Westminster system of democracy. This pre-claim and sub-claims are further elaborated upon in the problem statement of this research. The four pre-claims could be contributing factors to the politics–administration interface challenges. However, this study does not attempt to establish the causes of politics–administration interface conflict and challenges but is limited to examining the politics–administration interface in relation to the above-mentioned four pre-claims as possible contributing factors to conflict between political bureau and administration bureau.

## 1.2 BACKGROUND

It is essential to begin this study by discussing the main concepts as contained in the study subject matter. According to Schaap (2011:4), *politics* refers to a process by which societies take shared resolutions on public affairs involving authority and regulation of social matters within a nation. The word *politics* stems from the Greek word *politikos*, meaning 'for citizens', and *politikos* comes from the parent word *politika*, which stems from Aristotle's book *Affairs of the City*. The word *politikos* was adopted by English scholars in the 15th century to formulate the English word *politics* (Ranciere, 2001:1). Another key term in the subject matter is *administration*. The United Nations (UN) (2006:5) defines *administration* as a public process related to the organisation of government programmes and policies as well as the behaviour of non-elected bureaucrats in the execution of service delivery. It is also important to define *interface* in the context of this study. The politics–administration interface is a view that suggests that there must be a clear distinction between political bureau and public administration bureau (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). Furthermore, the interface is the intersection of leadership roles within a tradition of a dichotomous relationship between political and administrative realms. This definition means that although the roles of politicians are traditionally distinct from those of professional and career civil servants, this distinction is becoming steadily more blurred as the roles intersect at a certain point (Miller and McTavish, 2009:1). The politics–administration interface is a concept that defines the borders of public administration and declares the separation of roles between elected bureaucrats and administrators in democratic governance (Wilson, 1887:18). It is at this point of intersection where there may be conflict between political bureau officials and their senior professionals in the public administration. The contested territory at the point of intersection needs to be carefully defined and managed for the political bureau and administration bureau to work together effectively for the common good. However, it is usually not clear

who should manage the point of intersection. This study therefore examines the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 in order to understand the underlying factors that can be linked to conflict between the political bureau and the public administration bureau.

The study examines the four pre-claims together with the research questions. A pre-claim is an apparently consistent supposition, a reasonable guess or an educated conjecture that tentatively explains the research problem regarding the phenomenon under study (Nartey and Yankson, 2014:23).

The etymology of the word *bureau* stems from the word *bureaucracy*, which was created by the French economist Jacques Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay, who combined the early Greek suffix *kratia* with the French word *bureau*. *Kratia* means ‘power of’ and the French word *bureau* literally means ‘desk’ but can also be used to mean ‘office’. Hence, *bureaucracy* means ‘official authority’ (Grimm, 1813:146). The term *bureaucracy* was reviewed by Max Weber in the 19th century in his literature wherein he discussed official authority extensively (Weber, 1946:196).

The politics–administration interface developed from the four political epochs over centuries. These epochs are: (i) ancient politics and administration; (ii) medieval politics and administration; (iii) modern politics and administration; and (iv) contemporary politics and administration. The concept under review and public administration as an autonomous faculty of practice are as old as the formation of States. However, its recognition as a study emerged only in the 19th century. It is mainly linked with the publication of the article, ‘The study of public administration’ by Woodrow Wilson in 1887. What would later evolve into public administration was governance, which was part of ancient societies. Furthermore, public

administration is rooted in the early study of politics in the ancient Greek era between 500 BCE and 300 BCE, an era in which distinguished political philosophers such as Plato, Socrates and Aristotle emerged (Smith, 1968:88). However, a distinction between political bureau and public service bureau was not realised until the 19th century after Woodrow Wilson had written his article on the subject of the political–administration interface. Ancient politics and administration were an integrated institution premised on tradition and customs of ancient societies (Kennett, 1931:1). Ancient philosophers did not regard the politics–administration interface as a governance problem. However, the medieval epoch followed the collapse of the Roman dynasty and preceded the first part of the modern era, marking the end of ancient politics epoch (Krumbacher, 1897:4). The medieval epoch was marked by the writings of philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, St Augustine of Hippo and Peter Damian, who advocated independent philosophical inquiry that influenced modern philosophy in areas of natural law, ethics, metaphysics and political theory (Gracia and Noone, 2002:1). The medieval epoch, which lasted in Europe from the 5th century to the 15th century, was premised on religion and theological reasoning based on the authorship of the ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (Pearcey and Thaxton, 1994:7). The politics–administration interface in the medieval administration was not scholastically realised until the modern era. Writings on politics and administration in the modern era stem from philosophers such as the political economist and sociologist Max Weber who wrote about bureaucratic administration, which defined complex modern organizations (Allan, 2005:145). Woodrow Wilson (1945:95) also conceptualised the organisational idea in the politics–administration relationship which was established by Max Weber (1946:95) as bureaucracy to formulate the politics–administration interface. According to Akers (2006:2), Wilson believed that partisan politics should not form part of an efficient process of government and with this belief he established the science of public administration. The present study is a contribution to contemporary



scholarship on the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009.

Political leadership implies political guidance and collective duties that are achieved by creative adaptation in line with political ideology in a particular environment and an established social setting (Heifetz, 1994:3). According to Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2009:14), the seven components listed below ought to be considered when defining political leadership: first, the temperament of a leader as well as a leader's moral and behavioural character; second, the personality and moral-cultural charisma of constituencies with whom leaders work together (not forgetting that followers of different leaders interact with leaders of different followers supportively and or competitively); third, the social or structural setting where a leader and follower interacts including the culture of politically awareness, political stability, customs and societies should be considered when we define political leadership. The fourth element is the challenges that the leaders and constituencies are faced with, particularly previous experiences and uncertainties. Fifth is the character leaders' discernment as environments do not reveal themselves but must be defined by leaders' perceptions that are also recognised by constituencies. The sixth element is the attributes of management (that are perceived, material or figurative, permanent or temporary). The seventh component is the tactics (physical and conceptual) utilised by leaders to reach the objectives as well as the objectives of the constituencies; a leader uses such tactics to get public backing in order to execute his/her agenda that appears to also benefit the constituencies (Peele, 2005:192). This study further examines leadership traits and styles as one of the underlying factors for conflict in the politics–administration interface.

This study does not intend to examine all the concepts used in public administration or to examine the suitability or the accuracy of all likely implications provided by numerous writers. It is necessary to clarify that

since the Zuma administration in South Africa, the names of some national state departments were changed; those changes are reflected in this study as they fall within the study period and scope of 1999 to 2009. To circumvent ambiguity and vagueness in the explanation of theories and expressions employed in the study, all main concepts are described. The researcher defines key concepts in the context of this research as follows:

*Administration* is a public process attempting to ensure the organisation of government work and guidelines, including the performance of bureaucrats in the execution of service delivery (United Nations, 2006:5).

*Closed system of leadership* is a traditional and fundamentally discreet leadership style that holds information and strategy at the senior leadership level (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 27).

*Margins* are performance measures for which political officials are accountable and performance measures for which public administrators are accountable (Terry, 1998: 190).

*Politics* is a practice by which groups make joint resolutions of social relations involving authority or power and regulation of public affairs in a country (Schaap, 2011:4).

*Political officials* are elected officials, including the State President, Deputy State President, Ministers of government departments at a national level and Members of Executive Councils at a provincial level (McNair, 1995:164).

*Politics–administration dualism* is a view suggesting that government performs two basic functions, one political and the other administrative (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30).

*One dominant party* is a system in which, despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system and is firmly in control of State power over a fairly long duration of time, so that even opposition parties make little if any impression in the political hegemony of a dominant governing party (Matlosa and Karume, 2004:10).

*Political ideology* means a set of beliefs about the appropriate order of society and how it can be achieved (Erikson and Tedin, 2003:64).

*Senior managers* refer to most senior public servants in South Africa who are at the apex of the interface between administration and politics; this includes directors-general, deputy directors-general and chief executive officers (Miller, 2005:27).

*Open system of leadership* is a modern leadership model that prioritises distribution of information and change in order to maintain relevance and effectiveness in shifting environments (Katz and Kahn, 1978:27).

### **1.3 THE POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE WORLDWIDE AS AN ACADEMIC PHENOMENON**

As further background to the study, the researcher examined the politics–administration interface of a few relatively established governments in the world by selecting a limited number of diverse countries: the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), India, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Botswana. It is useful to note that this study argues that the interface discourse is perpetual because of observed traits of the politics–administration interface where there is interference from the political bureau on administration matters; conflicting leadership styles between political bureau officials and public administration managers; different political ideologies between political officials and public administration managers; and disregard for

documented duties and responsibilities as stipulated in constitutions and public service guidelines.

As in the many different countries presented below, the researcher argues that in the South African context, public administration is a significant part of administrative science, indicating the instrument of the government and the functioning of administrative tools to execute governance for the satisfaction of the ruling class and the pacifying of the constituencies. According to Goodnow (1900:9), public administration is politics and policy in practice; the purpose of the political bureau is to outline the will of the State whereas the purpose of the administration bureau is to accomplish the will of the State.

The *politics–administration* interface is an administrative theory also known as *politics–administration dichotomy* made popular by Woodrow Wilson in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Woodrow Wilson (1887) wanted to protect the functioning of administration from continuous interference from the political bureau, hence he suggested administration should be viewed as public business and should not be at the centre of political struggle. Wilson (1887:18) envisioned shielding “administration from political interference”, hence he argued that, “The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics ... Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration; it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.” Wilson’s view was that administration would not be appropriately categorised within the sphere of politics. Wilson further argued that administrative questions are different from the political questions. Despite the fact that politics provides the background and outlines the functions of public administration, politics must not continuously dominate and manipulate public administration (Wilson, 1887:18).

According to Kettl (2002:17), “public administration without a guiding theory is risky; administrative theory without connection to action is meaningless”. Such gridlock is the bedrock of a conceptual predicament in the study of public administration. Therefore, this study argues that politics and administration should work together for effective and efficient government machinery in the complementary model of the politics–administration interface. The political bureau’s role includes an obligation to serving the public and prioritising the basic needs of the collective, utilising the power of government to enforce government policy resolutions to challenges such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness and poor infrastructure (Bourgon, 2010:34). The administration bureau should focus on implementing the public policy solutions, provide feedback to the political bureau on policy performance, and advise the political office on policy gaps. The contemporary discourse on politics–administration interface stems from the parent governance models, namely the Westminster and presidential systems.

The Westminster system is a parliamentary model taken from the politics of the UK. The term derives from the Palace of Westminster where the Houses of Parliament are situated in London. The Westminster system was adopted by former colonies of Britain around the world. The Westminster system “is characterized by the supremacy of the political bureau that determines the governance of a country” (Burnell, 2004:5). The Westminster system upholds political parties as the most important part of governance, since “political parties are fundamental to representative democracy and to the process of democratisation”. Political parties are recognized by the Westminster system as being an entity that connects society and the state. Burnell (2004:5) argues that the political bureau “socializes citizens into democratic politics and they manage conflicts of interest and, importantly, in societies that have recently experienced violent conflict, they can offer a forum for social and political integration, a tool for nation-building. Thus in the Westminster system,

democracy in the modern world is perceived to be inconceivable without healthy political parties and an effective party system". The governments of the Commonwealth countries today are influenced by the Westminster system that was popular in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, one such example being Canada which was colonized by Britain and whose governance is influenced by the Westminster system. In Canada the Prime Minister seeks permission from the Governor-General when implementing executive decisions, a model similar to that of the United Kingdom. In Canada, Ministers of departments account to the Governor-General for public administration work and not senior public service managers (Roy, 2008:564).

Australian governance is also influenced by the Westminster system; the Queen has ultimate political power embodied by the Governor-General. Furthermore, the Governor-General is closely involved in public administration matters. Section 64 of Australia's Constitution empowers the Governor-General to employ bureaucrats to run divisions of government as the Governor-General in Council may decide. The employed bureaucrats may be in office as long as the Governor-General requires them in office. It is a general expectation that such bureaucrats should be official participants in the Federal Executive Council and they are Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. Section 67 states that the appointment and removal of civil servants is entrusted to the Governor-General, except in cases where the nomination is delegated in Council by the Governor-General or by a regulation of the Commonwealth. In Australia there are few restraints in the Constitution should a political bureau seek to control public administration. The members of the Executive who are also MPs draft legislation for the public administration bureau (Alvey, 2005:167). The Australian government is directed by Parliament through a political agenda and legislation passed by Parliament. Like many countries examined in this study, the political bureau in Australia provides direction for the public service. In the process

of providing direction, it is usually a generally accepted trend to dominate a directed entity. As discussed above, this study argues that the Westminster system in Australia upheld the supremacy of the political bureau over the administration bureau.

In India, section 75 of India's Constitution states that the Prime Minister is employed by the President and all Ministers are selected by the President as advised by the Prime Minister. Schedule 6, item 14(3), states that in assigning the responsibilities of government to the selected Ministers, the Governor can designate one of the Ministers to lead the welfare of the independent regions and independent provinces of the government. Thus India's fate was no exception, as being part of the Commonwealth nations India's government is characterized by the dominant political bureau. As is the case with India, the Westminster system vests ultimate authority of public administration in the political bureau.

The political dimension has always been present in the public administration; politics is the essential part of public administration. The new public management (NPM) has also increased the significance of the Westminster system by upholding that the public service should be loyal to the government of the day, be completely receptive to political bureau direction, and be willing and zealous in the advancement of the government policies (Kernaghan, 2003:5). Therefore a non-aligned public service is considered by the political bureau not as a base for good public administration but as a stumbling block to be eradicated by politicians in the quest for a political bureau agenda (Aucoin, 2006:304). Thus the Westminster system as the root of the politics-administration interface phenomenon perpetuated the generally accepted culture of political bureau domination in public administration matters, particularly in the Commonwealth countries.

According to Blaug, Horner and Lekhi (2006:18), social democracy in the Westminster system “has not left much room for citizen voice and autonomous public administration. Popular participation in government is limited to voting in elections and to involvement in political parties. Citizens can influence policy by selecting the political actor that best represented their political views. With ‘politics’ restricted to the institutions of state and democracy to the periodic selection of autonomous representatives, public managers are expected to somehow achieve what politicians had not; an understanding of constantly evolving public preferences”. Thus the political bureaux could sometimes abuse the public mandate and dominate some faculties of government. The Westminster system as the root of the politics–administration interface phenomenon perpetuated the culture of political bureau domination in public administration matters. According to Gruening (2001:2), the NPM movement stems from the Westminster system of the UK under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the last part of the 1970s and first part of the 1980s. The NPM was first adopted as a consequence of alleged failures of traditional state bureaucracy such as public inaccessibility, excessive corruption and the self-serving agenda of the political bureau in order “to reduce the role of public bureaucracy and transfer resources and services from the public sector to the private sector” (Haque, 2004:3). The NPM intended to shift accountability from the political bureau to the managerial sphere, and from input and processes to output and outcomes (Fatemi and Behmanesh, 2012:1). However, the political bureau dominance on administration remains a prevailing occurrence despite the improved accountability brought in by the NPM. The political bureau supremacy as a feature of the Westminster system could not be eradicated by the NPM because NPM is a service delivery programme and not a governance model. When NPM was introduced in the late 1970s, politicians embraced it as a service delivery programme and took control of its performance in the public service (Hood, James, Peters and Scott, 2005:5). The Westminster system and NPM are characterized by the supreme political bureau.



The peer countries in the emerging economies, loosely associated as BRICS, are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In this study, therefore, the researcher examines peer countries' nature of politics-administration interface in comparison with South Africa. In Brazil, the establishment of public administration can be outlined from the 1930s. Public administration in Brazil had previously tended to be identified with governmental regulation or, according to Muñoz, 'with legislative requirements, restricting its challenge to policy development and execution of policies' (Keinert, 1994:42). The Roman law traditions, introduced by Portuguese colonization, influenced public administration in Brazil until the 1930s, bringing it nearer to what Hood (1995) called 'law-oriented tradition', a feature of Europe as the continent. Despite the traditional governance being based on legislation, in reality public administration was characterized by partisanship (Nunes, 1997:18). However, between 1937 and 1945 the new state underwent administrative reform that attempted to formulate a public service in Brazil in line with the Weberian bureaucracy characterised by values of worth and objectivity that was expected to counteract the patrimonialist nature that previously prevailed within public administration in the country. The American influence was realised when professors from the American universities arrived in Brazil to teach and train public service officials (Fischer 1984:282). According to Morelo (2011:5), Brazil's public administration has evolved from three epochs, namely partisan administration, bureaucratic administration and managerial aligned with NPM. Hence, Brazil's public administration has features of all three models.

During the period 1995 until 2002, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the leading member of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, led Brazil through the establishment of market-oriented economic policies (Gaetani, 2002:1). In the period 2003 to 2010 under the leadership of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, Brazil continued with formulation

and implementation of market-oriented economic policies (Meyer, 2014:3). The political bureau leads public administration in Brazil's politics-administration interface as it is the case with developing countries where administration is characterised by political control. According to Mainwaring (2006:98), despite the managerial regime of public service, the political bureau in Brazil is the supreme authority of the public administration and politicians influence service delivery. Like most Commonwealth nations, as demonstrated in this study, Brazil is characterized by political bureau dominance in public service function. Similar to Brazil, South Africa's public service is influenced by Roman-Dutch law which divides state authorities between the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary (Van Heerden, 2009:48). The public service is part of the Constitution (Chapter 10) in South Africa, which provides guidance on the arrangement and direction of the government departments. In the case of both Brazil and South Africa, the political bureau is ultimately accountable for public administration and provides feedback to the Executive. Furthermore, in both cases the political bureau has a constitutionally justified political interference provided for in the Roman-Dutch law. This study argues that Brazil's Public Administration is influenced by the political bureau stemming from the historic colonialism under the Portuguese culture and control.

Prior to the 19th century, recruitment of public administration employees had characteristics of political patronage, nepotism and favouritism which were acceptable in that era. Public administrators were the eyes and ears of rulers, presidents, kings and empires, until Woodrow Wilson posed questions about politics and administration relations. The separation of politics and administration presented by Wilson continues to play a crucial role in American contemporary public administration (Rabin and Bowman, 1984:51). However, Wilson's views were challenged by Frank Goodnow, Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor. Gulick, for example, developed a comprehensive theory of organisation that

emphasised the scientific techniques, efficiency, professionalism, structural reform and executive control; he presented the duties of administrators with the abbreviation 'POSDCORB', for the words 'planning', organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting'. The new public administration epoch called 'new public management' was presented by Ted Gaebler and David Osborne in their book 'Reinventing Government' (1993:322). The NPM as supported by Vice-President Al Gore during the Clinton Administration advocated for the utilisation of private sector-style models, and modern organisational ideas as well as standards to advance the productivity and stewardship of the public sector (Henderson, 2005:273). Therefore, New Public Management too required the adoption of the political bureau to function; in the case of the US, the Presidency had to support NPM for it to function.

According to Burnell (2004:13), in the Westminster model or presidential model, the variations of a robust or feeble executive, robust or feeble parliament and robust or feeble parties are possible. Some developed countries have a well-constructed constitution but whatever the documented constitutional position, the practical environment can be contrary (Mbondenyi, Ojienda and Hlalele, 2013:3). As demonstrated below, in most countries in Africa the elected officials' domination of the administration is more likely where the ruling party dominates the mode of governance including the democratic system. Africa is challenged by weak multi-party systems and usually the 'winner takes all' during the elections. Where parties do not win the presidency they have less likelihood of having political influence.

#### **1.4 THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AND THE POLITICS– ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE**

In Nigeria a parliamentary system modelled along the lines of the Westminster model operated from independence in 1960 to 1966. However, the country later moved to a presidential system somewhat

similar to that of the United States (Osieke, 2006:1). The political bureau in Nigeria is more dominant where most power rests with the President and State Governors who are the powerful authority in the political bureau (Akindele, Olaopa, Sat-Obiyan 2002:252). The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the elected Head of State, Principal of Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as well as the overseer of the day-to-day administration of government (Kaiser, 2005:19). The political bureau is the power hub in Nigeria. Public administration is mostly driven by the political bureau. However, in principle public administration is neutral and independent of political influence (Omotola, 2008:59). By law civil servants in Nigeria are prohibited from engaging in partisan politics and public officers must resign their appointments before going into partisan politics (Akindele *et al*, 2002:250). The boundary between politics and administration is still the point of contemporary discourse. Public administration is viewed as politics, that is, the political character of public administration. Despite the contemporary theory of New Public Management, the conceptualised non-separability of politics and administration is still the major discourse among academics (Philip and Daganda, 2013:12). In Nigeria, both the presidential system and Westminster system are characterised by the power of the political bureau that influences public administration (Brown, 2013:173). The unanswered question in the contemporary academic discourse relates to the analysis of the contributing factors to the politics–administration interface and how the government machinery can function better in this interface. This study examines the contributing factors to the politics–administration interface through the pre-claims and research questions.

In the Ghanaian public administration, senior public officers are political appointees and they are subject to the vagaries of the political bureau (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010:169). The structure of the Ghanaian State is made up of the executive, the legislature and the Judiciary, although, the ultimate political power is held by the executive whose members are

drawn from the largest political party in parliament, which by virtue of its majority has won an electoral mandate to govern (Kuzu, 2011:5). Developing countries and most countries in Africa are characterized by power that is centralized in the political bureau. For example, while the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in Ghana has the authority to scrutinise all charges of fraud, only the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General can decide whether or not to prosecute cases recommended by the CHRAJ, which is subordinate to the politically appointed Minister of Justice and Attorney General and can disregard the judgments of anti-corruption organizations (Abdulai, 2009:9). Political parties in the African continent “became vehicles for the elite’s ambition to capture power, influence the legislative and executive branches, and control the administrative functions of the State bureaucracy through the political Executive” (Salih and Nordlund, 2007:43). The separation of roles between the political bureau and the public administration bureau is largely unrealized in Ghana, thus the location on the politics–administration interface may become insurmountable. Like many African governments, the political bureau in Ghana is in control of public administration matters and there are no boundaries in the politics–administration interface. Echoing the sentiments suggesting that politics and administration are intertwined to an extent that it is empirically difficult to determine the dichotomy, this study suggests that countries of the world in general and Africa in particular are characterised by the cryptic contributing factors in the politics–administration interface, and Ghana is no exception.

Patterson and Fadiga-Stewart (2005:5) argue that “African nations had authoritarian pasts and it is well known that authoritarian politics is often associated with the political dominance of a single political party”. Hence, there is no identifiable dichotomy in the politics–administration relationship in most African governments. The Constitution of Uganda (Preamble) states that the President is required to report to Parliament and the nation

at least once a year with all possible steps being taken to ensure the realization of Uganda's policy objectives and principles. Section 16 of the Ugandan Constitution further states that the President has the prerogative to appoint board members of the National Citizenship and Immigration Board, and section 51 requires the President to appoint members of the Uganda Human Rights Commission. As in many countries in Africa and the world, governance power is concentrated in the political bureau. The Ugandan Constitution divides powers among the political bureau, the public administration and the people, and depicts that ultimate power rests in the political power, which is the President and Parliament. Uganda has a multiparty government. However, the political bureau dominates the administration function (Juma, 2009:113). Juma, (2009:113) further argues that the "political operatives in Cabinet and Parliament have continued to justify an oversized Executive as necessary to enhance political supervision to ensure effective delivery of government programmes". The influence of politicians in administration continues to be part of the Ugandan public service (Tumushabe, 2009:43). Public administration in the Ugandan public service is dominated by the political bureau, and there is no interface marking the responsibilities of the government bureaucrats and the duties of the political bureau.

In African jurisdictions such as Botswana and other Commonwealth African countries, it can be argued that political "neutrality" does not constantly triumph within the public service, predominantly in cases where there is single party dominance (Maphunye, 2001:33). The separation of powers between the political bureau and the administration bureau has not succeeded as Wilson desired. The commonwealth nations sustained the British colonial legacy of the Westminster government system which puts the political bureau at the centre of administration. Since 1966 the Botswana Democratic Party has dominated politics and administration in Botswana (Cook and Sarkin, 2010:461). The political bureau of the colonial era influenced the present politics-administration interface.

“Botswana’s current public administration benefited from a mixture of French, Dutch and British civil service traditions, which influenced its institutions during the colonial era and which have since strengthened its structures” (Maphunye, 2009:24). Consequently, Botswana’s public administration is dominated by the Botswana Democratic Party, which has centralized policy-making and policy implementation (Lotshwao, 2011:103). Political bureau dominance in the public service function is a general trend in Africa, thus the concept of an independent public administration as envisioned by Wilson is still not a reality in many developing countries, including Botswana. In the absence of empirical evidence of a dividing line between politics and administration, countries are faced with political bureau interfering and dominating public administration. However, it is necessary to comprehend the factors around the politics–administration interface in line with the proposed pre-claims of this study, and provide guidance as to how this relationship can work better.

In South Africa, public administration is exercised in the context of a three-tier structure of national, provincial and local government. The South African Constitution makes provision and provides for roles and responsibilities for public administration requirements and political involvements where necessary. Section 40(1) of the South African Constitution prescribes that “government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”, while Section 41(1) states that “all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres; not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; and exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere”. Thus, in terms of section 195(5),

“legislation regulating public administration may differentiate between different sectors, administrations or institutions”. Section 195(6) states that “the nature and functions of different sectors; administrations or institutions of public administration are relevant factors to be taken into account in legislation regulating public administration”. Section 197(1) states that “within public administration there is a public service for South Africa, which must function and be structured, in terms of national legislation and which must loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day”. The politics–administration interface is an abstract; it is the dual nature of public administration, which is the execution of policies of the government of the day and the fulfilling of the administration role (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010:21). Public service administrators have a constitutional responsibility to implement the official policies and programmes of the government of the day loyally. Thus, the correlation of the political bureau and the administration bureau is the standard feature of government in South Africa and elsewhere as presented above.

## **1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND**

The politics–administration interface theory was developed as the public administration version of organisational theory (Shafritz and Hyde, 2007:28). Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there has had to be a clear separation between the political bureau and the administration bureau. That theory was established by Woodrow Wilson (1886:3) who argued for the importance of a politics–administration interface. Wilson’s perspective places management at the centre of government administration, while making politics irrelevant and undesirable (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). Wilson (1886:3) suggested that the function of political officials was to control or govern, and therefore the politicians should govern and not interfere with administration. However, Frank Goodnow (1900:140), a legal scholar, argued that government performed two basic functions, one political and the other administrative. The political function involves the expression of the ‘State will’ while the administrative function involves the



execution of the State will. Even though these two spheres of government are analytically distinct, in practice the two are not separable. The nature of public administration is that these two spheres are inevitably linked because they both reflect the State will. Public administration is not distinctive because it is devoid of politics but because in government administration considerations take priority over political considerations (Dubnick and Romzek, 1991:30). Therefore, Goodnow's argument suggests that public administration has a dual nature. Senior public managers have an obligation to report to their political heads; the political heads have an obligation to report to the parliament on the manner in which the budget of the department was utilised for the benefit of the public (Pauw, Woods, Van der Linde, Fourie and Visser, 2002:30). Governments are under pressure to maintain power as well as being placed under constant pressure to operate in an efficient and business-like manner. Therefore, governments must create an environment where these two spheres (politics and public administration) can co-exist. For governments to function effectively there must be a good rapport between the Cabinet Ministers and the Directors-General (Muller and Van Rooyen, 1994:194). That is the dual nature of public administration which keeps the administration and policy skills functioning in both the political and administrative sphere. According to Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004:69), public administration is a specialized field of political science concentrating on the manner in which government organisations are administered and how administrative incumbents participate in the political processes of policy formulation and execution. Therefore, this study examines politics and administration relationships (for example, how can politics and administration co-occur), leadership styles, roles and responsibilities in both the political sphere and the administration sphere.

### 1.5.1 The Marxist approach to politics–administration roles and responsibilities

The Marxist scholars Antonio Gramsci (1937:247), Wilhelm Reich (1934:6) and John Plamenatz (1860:40) argued that in the superstructure of society there is a governing class that controls the economic system, a notion that was upheld by Baradat (1984:164). The government is thus part of the upper class controlling what happens in the lower social classes. Public service managers are also at the apex of implementing policies for the benefit of the social classes on behalf of the political bureau, which drives the ideologies of a ruling political party. The main function of the upper class is to assure the bourgeoisie of continued control and to keep the controlled classes in their place. Therefore, public managers are there to satisfy the needs of society through service delivery and to pacify the society so that it remains governable. In a contrasting view, Marxist analyst Raymond Williams (1977:77) argued that the superstructure was not discrete from the base and it could not be understood apart from the base. Williams argued that the elevation of the superstructure over the base was unnatural, since no social class was naturally dominant over other social classes. He argued that while social beings determined social consciousness, it could not be accepted that the base determined superstructure (Williams, 1973:7). According to Appelrouth and Edles (2008:45), *“division of labour expresses itself in the superstructure as the class of intellectual and material workforce so that within the upper class few people appear as the thinkers of the class, while the rest are more passive and receptive because they are active members of the class and have less time to make up illusions and concepts about themselves and governance”*. According to Karl Marx (1845:27), *“division of labour manifests itself in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour”*. This view submits that the interface is determined by the ruling class who are the intellectuals or think tank of the country, while the other classes are passive and receptive implementers of thoughts, ideas and

illusions from the upper class which controls the superstructure. Moreover, analysing social class theory in the politics–administration interface displays the dislodged senior public service manager division in the social classes. Senior public service managers may perceive their class as that of thinkers who are part of the superstructure, whereas the elected officials may see these managers as mere servants who implement policies on behalf of the bourgeoisie who are the think tank in the upper class. Therefore, misconceptions about class positions between the elected officials and the public administrators may result in contestation for authority in the politics–administration interface regarding public policy direction.

The government works to preserve socio-politico-economic stability in a country by developing policies that will persuade the majority of people to retain their confidence in government. The researcher in the present study argues that the government can achieve the goal of retaining its power by working together with senior public managers who comprehend the main agenda of the political bureau. It is important to note that the superstructure is made up of main entities that determine policies and programmes; such entities are the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, among others. Senior public managers are liable for enforcing policies on behalf of the government and advise elected officials on policy performance. It is the ideology that joins the political bureau and public administration bureau in the public service superstructure. This study further argues that senior public managers should monitor the policies and inform the Ministers on policy improvements for better service delivery. Marx's structural division between the intellectual and the implementing class is the basic factor in the formation of false consciousness (Pines, 1993:191). The empirical state of the public administration bureau is that it is the political bureau's means to an end; the end is political power to keep the public under control. As a result, senior public managers bear the weight of political ideology translated into national agenda and political

influence. Furthermore, politics is about maintaining the power of the ruling political party through ideology as the hope of a better life for the people. To further examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa, the researcher scrutinised the social contract theory and identified documented roles for senior public service managers and roles for the political bureau. The documented rules pre-claim below is discussed along with South African researchers’ conclusions after they had examined the politics–administration interface.

### **1.5.2 Social contract theory exploration**

The social contract practice was pioneered in antiquity, in Greek and Stoic philosophy and Roman law, as well as in the biblical concept of the covenant. Social contract theory is the governance model introduced by Jean Jacques Rousseau into academic discourse during the Age of Enlightenment. In the book, ‘The social contract’, published in 1762, Rousseau argued that “the public person was formed by the union of all other persons and took the name of the Republic or body of politics” (Rousseau, 1762:14). However, people cannot all govern at the same time, so people gave up some authority to elected representatives to take decisions on behalf of the people. Such a relationship between the people and government Rousseau referred to as the “social contract”. He argued that the public needed a body of politics to decide for them since they did not always agree on what they needed and what they needed today might not be what they needed tomorrow (Rousseau, 1762:18). The government is in a social contract with its citizens since they are the ones who give it an opportunity to govern through elections. Cloete and Wissink (2000:131) argue that government is bound by the Constitution to serve its people as the Constitution demands. Therefore, the government, its Cabinet Ministers and public administrators are servants of the people who participate during elections. For a democratic government to remain in power it must do the necessary work to improve the lives of the people if that government does not want to be voted out of power by the people. In

accordance with the Constitution the government must fulfil pledges by the Constitution; for example, chapter two of the Constitution is the Bill of Rights ensuring basic human rights for people by virtue of being inhabitants of the country. The government has a duty to comply with ensuring human rights as the Constitution demands. The political bureau employs senior public service managers and administrators to execute the political agenda and pacify the public so that during the elections people will continue to surrender authority to the political bureau to govern on behalf of the people.

## **1.6 BACKGROUND TO THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY QUESTION**

According to Torgerson (1986:34), scholarship has failed to provide a universally acceptable theory of public administration. The main philosophy of public administration in contemporary academia, namely the politics–administration dichotomy, faltered because of its binary opposite logic that desired to abolish politics in public administration. Furthermore, in 1965 Robert Parker suggested that there was no subject called ‘public administration’ since there was no science or art identified by that title. This study argues that the epistemological discourse on public administration should concede that the basis of public administration is politics; politics has an element of passion for justice interspersed with passion for personal gratification on the part of politicians. However, public administration in Wilson’s view (1887:209-210) is impersonal and all about professional service delivery. Whether or not public administration has a universally acceptable theory, contemporary academics should acknowledge that public administration deserves its intellectual discipline. The main political question of who gets what, how and when needs to be answered, and it can be better answered in the public administration discipline based on facts and not on emotion. In theory, public administration is the empirical, professional and impersonal side of politics. Empirically public administration is the implementation of political

ideologies. Wilson himself was more of a politician than an impartial administrator. He acknowledged that there was no demarcation line between politics and administration as he stated that “the science of administration is the latest fruit of the study of the science of politics” (Wilson, 1887:198). In Wilson’s analogy it can be deduced that if politics is a plant it can only produce the fruit of its own kind which is the administration, therefore politics and administration are within the same family. However, the critique of Wilson’s article seems to have been biased and mainly highlighted the politics–administration dichotomy, whereas Wilson himself acknowledged the dualistic nature of public administration, that is, politics and administration in public administration.

A theory is a scientifically proven hypothesis that has never been disproved through scientific experiment (Sandoval and Morrison, 2002:380). The universally acceptable theory of public administration is that public administration is the fruit of politics as much as politics is the fruit of protest against a deity and clergy epoch (Himmelfarb, 1962:204). The correlation between politics and administration has never been scientifically disproved. What seems to be the source of contention in public administration scholarship is the demarcation line between administration and politics. This study acknowledges the dual nature of public administration as acknowledged by Wilson (1887:198) and Goodnow (1900:9) and proceeds to examine the impact of the proposed pre-claims in this study.

## **1.7 PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR THE STUDY**

The problem identified prior to this research topic was that political officials and senior public service managers find it difficult to maintain good working relationships as they execute political leadership and administration in the public service.

In a politics–administration interface relationship, conflict occurs when a senior public service manager is not in agreement with a political official about political views or a particular public policy decision (United Nations, 1997:03); for example, in the Ginwala (2006:63) report on the inquiry into the fitness of Advocate Vusi Pikoli to hold the office of National Director of Public Prosecutions, it is stated that the Minister of Justice had complained that Pikoli’s view as the National Director of Public Prosecutions needed greater administrative and operational distance from the Minister, and he did not need to sign a performance agreement or account to the Minister on operational decisions.

The discourse on politics–administration interface suggests that political interference in administration will undermine the prospect of administrative proficiency; the policy-formulation responsibilities of government should be completely disconnected from the administrative responsibilities; and that bureaucrats should have a plain mission of specific goals before they can begin to embark on improving an administrative bureau (Shafritz, 1985:415). The researcher in this study has identified the research gap in his examination of the politics–administration interface, as well as the relationship between public service managers and political officials. The identification of the problem in South Africa’s public administration has resulted in the topic of this research, namely “the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009.”

Although much research has been conducted on the politics–administration interface and working relationships (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1900; Torgerson, 1986; Parker, 1965; Dubnick and Romzek, 1991; Shafritz, 1985; Mafunisa and Maserumule, 2004), little is known about studying margins<sup>1</sup> and overlaps in the political officials’ and senior public service managers’ relationship in South Africa. The researcher has identified the knowledge gap in examining the politics–administration

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<sup>1</sup> Performance measures for which political officials are accountable and performance measures for which public administrators are accountable (Terry, 1998: 190).

interface in South Africa in order to determine who does what, how and when. This study is thus a necessary examination and identification of the margins in political officials' and senior public service managers' roles in South Africa with regard to politics–administration interface theory.

The aim of this research is to scrutinise the political leadership and administration relationship between senior public service managers and political officials. The study also identifies the margins in political officials' roles, as well as senior public service managers' roles in South Africa with regard to politics–administration interface theory.

### **1.8 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

The rationale for this study is to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. From the research problem stated above and research questions, study aims and objectives can be formulated. The overall aims of this study are to examine the interface and identify the margins and overlaps in political officials' and senior public service managers' roles in South Africa with regard to politics–administration interface theory between 1999 and 2009.

In addition to these aims, the research will state the following objectives: to provide a theoretical background and literature review on the political leadership and administration and relationship between senior public service managers and political officials. Another objective will be to examine the application of public administration and politics–administration interface in the South African environment. This study further highlights the examples of case studies where state organs were involved in the public administration and politics dichotomy and conflict in South Africa.

Finally, the study draws conclusions, evaluates successes and failures, and makes recommendations to improve political leadership and administration in South Africa in the future. It is also important to note that



this study is not aimed at ending any tensions in the politics–administration dichotomy relationship. However, it evaluates successes and failures in the politics–administration interface in South Africa, and makes recommendations to improve political leadership and administration for South Africa’s future.

The objective of this study was to examine the politics–administration interface and identify the margins and overlaps in political officials’ roles and senior public service managers’ roles in South Africa with regard to the politics–administration interface theory.

### **1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDY**

The above problem statement identifies the research gap that informs this study. The research questions listed below are analysed in this study as they could lead to a possible resolution of the research problem:

1. What were the political leadership and administration roles of political officials in the rendering of their services to the public between 1999 and 2009? This question provides a basis for examination of political leadership and administration responsibilities of the senior public service managers in the implementation of programmes and policies and the manner of reporting to the political bureau.
2. What political leadership and administration challenges have taken place in the politics–administration interface in South Africa between senior public service managers and political officials since the African National Congress (ANC) government came into power, and which challenges resulted in conflict? These questions reviewed the pre-claims of political dominance, conflicting leadership styles, political ideological differences and disregard for

documented responsibilities as possible contributing factors to conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

3. How has one dominant party in South Africa's democracy affected administration? This question examines the relationship between the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. This question further reviews the effect of ANC dominance in the politics–administration interface and majority power in determining the strength of political bureau dominance.

### **1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

This study has academic value because examining the politics–administration interface may assist academia and the public sector in understanding complementary and conflicting relationship challenges in the public service. It is necessary to understand problems that negatively affect public administration and the public policy process in order to devise solutions to enhance service delivery. This study contributes to the governance and public administration discipline by analysing the politics–administration interface and the relationship between senior public service managers and political officials and to identify the margins and overlaps in political officials' and senior public service managers' roles in South Africa with regard to politics–administration interface theory.

First, this study examines the extent and the impact of conflict between senior public service officials and political officials. Second, the study provides clarity and guidance on the roles of political officials and the roles of senior public managers, as well as how this relationship can be maintained in a manner that moderates conflict. Third, the study presents the state of the politics–administration interface in South Africa and how it has succeeded in functioning or failed to function in good governance. Fourth, the study is aimed at contributing to the knowledge hub within public administration as a faculty of study by adding research input into

contemporary academic discourse on this subject. The author has identified the potential value of the study as adding value to the knowledge base relating to the politics–administration interface in South Africa so as to inform current and future decisions in the public administration.

For contemporary scholarship, it is necessary to ask questions about the complementary and conflicting relationships between senior public service managers and political officials in order to recommend resolutions for effective service delivery in South Africa.

### **1.11 CONCLUSION**

This first chapter provided the introduction to the study by discussing the concept of ‘politics–administration interface’. The background to the study presented the state of politics–administration interface in the world, in Africa, southern African countries and in South Africa. In this chapter the researcher discussed the problem statement, the study questions and the importance of the study. The introduction presented the state of Africa and the world characterized by the politics–administration interface that is generally managed by political bureau through coded or un-coded constitutions of jurisdictions in the world.

The global trends in the context of politics–administration were analysed by reviewing selected countries that have a fairly stable government, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Botswana. Furthermore, the problem statement for the study is presented in this chapter, while the purpose of the research is also discussed and the study questions outlined. The main emphasis of this study is to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The research also examined the theoretical base and review of the politics–administration interface.

This chapter provided the context and justification for the study; problem declaration for the study; study questions for the study; aims and intentions of the study; as well as explaining the importance of the study. The second chapter of the study will present the literature review of the politics–administration interface in different epochs of governance.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter deals with the literature on politics–administration interface. The researcher discusses the significance of the existing knowledge of the study under review. The premise of the study pre-claims are discussed in conjunction with existing knowledge prior to the findings of this study. The existing knowledge on the theoretical framework is outlined by discussing the main concept as argued by Woodrow Wilson and the contrary view of Frank Goodnow. The theoretical framework in this chapter outlines academic knowledge of the politics–administration interface, the closed system and the open system of governance.

#### **2.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF LITERATURE REVIEW**

Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz (1998:65) suggest that literature review is the material part of the research process where a researcher should present existing knowledge in a particular field of study. Before attempting to answer the research questions, the researcher needs to understand what has been done before, the strengths and weaknesses of existing studies, and what they might mean (Boote and Beile, 2009:3). This section examines the academic sources on the subject of politics and administration, the politics–administration interface and the development of theories in relation to the academic discourse. The chapter analyses the politics–administration interface and its existing academic discourse coherent with the pre-claims and the research questions.

### 2.3 THE PREMISE OF THE STUDY PRE-CLAIMS

As stated in the introduction to this research, the main claim of the proposed study is that there could be leadership conflict between the political bureau and the public service bureau when there are differing views on how the service delivery must be executed. The first reason for the main claim of the leadership conflict is that there is a tendency by political officials to dominate the public service function. The researcher examines the notion that political officials want to dominate this service function since they want to influence the public service's supply chain and the awarding of tenders. The reason for seeking to control the public service function could therefore be corruption as an underlying objective.

Another reason for this tendency to dominate the public service function could be that political officials want to enforce cadre deployment in order to keep political ideology alive in the execution of service delivery. According to Gijana (2011:29), the public service in South Africa has been highly politicized since the National Party (NP) took control of government in 1948. The NP deployed its dedicated members to various strategic posts in government departments. According to Fry and Nigro (1996:36), "the senior public administrators deployed were those who understood and were faithful to the party's policies of administration hence the government of the day was always in congruence with the public service". The senior public administrators installed were those who appreciated and were devoted to the NP policies of administration based on skin colour, ethnic groupings, language and gender; thus it was problematic to isolate the government of the day and the public service. The political bureau dominance trend continued, despite the guaranteed independence of state bodies in section 181 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), and the ruling party ensured that people who were faithful to the political party's transformation agenda would occupy strategic positions in the public service (Fry and Nigro, 1996:36).

Furthermore, the claim that political officials seek to dominate the public service in order to dominate public administration is supported by Snowman (2007:5) who believes that ruling party interference may result in the misuse of delegated authority by elected officials for self-gratification, with the intent of advancing domination.

The second reason for the main claim is that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. The Thabo Mbeki presidential tenure – between 1999 and 2009 – was characterized by controversy with regard to ANC policies and programmes. He was inclined towards the classic closed system as opposed to an open system of leadership. His system of leadership was revealed in a number of ANC programmes and policies such as foreign policy; health policy; Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA); and the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), which Singh (2006:164) described as being imposed on the constituency, ANC Ministers and on members of the executive. Singh further argues that the handling of the arms procurement deal since early 2001 has entrenched the suspicion that the government was not only being closed and defensive, but also dishonest in the way in which it was protecting its members from open public scrutiny. Dissatisfaction with the way in which the former President handled the political crisis in Zimbabwe, his rejection of the connection between AIDS and HIV, and the accessibility of nevirapine to pregnant women in the AIDS crisis in South Africa led to the development of grassroots mobilisation from across racial and class boundaries that raised serious questions about Mbeki's closed and defensive leadership style, and his commitment to the needs of the poor. Further highlighting Mbeki's closed and imposing style of leadership, Brecker (1999:1) stated that "Mbeki is much more intellectual than Mandela. More importantly, he has unchallenged control over the structures of the ANC." The present study examines former President

Mbeki's closed system of leadership and its bearing on the politics-administration dichotomy in South Africa.

The third reason for the main claim is that political officials may have a different political ideology compared with the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. For example, Gevisser (2007:109) argues that Thabo Mbeki advocated for the African industrialist stratum as an indispensable requirement for South Africa's transformation, since Mbeki believed that it was essential to encourage an African industrialist stratum and "bring it into the ruling elite and to hold it there with a set of policies and an ideological frame (Africanism) that resonated with its own aspirations". Hence he needed to keep those who perceived his ideology as the ANC ideology close, while rejecting those who "questioned" the corrupt means of joining the black capitalist class; for example, Mbeki suspended the then National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, who tried to investigate and prosecute senior ANC member Jackie Selebi, whose contract as the Commissioner of the South African Police Services (SAPS) was renewed by Mbeki despite allegations of corruption. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:62) define such a leadership style as "neopatrimonialism founded upon Max Weber's explanation of patrimonial authority". A patrimonial political system is rooted in a strong individual who regularly governs on the basis of individual standing and reputation. Klippenstein (2009:12) argues that in a patrimonial political system, followers of an autocrat are associated exclusively based on their attachment to the strongman and the leader rules on a temperament basis as opposed to documented laws. Thus, in providing security and stability utilising positive discrimination and incentives to those faithful to him, followers of the cluster become patrons of the strongman. Therefore, public service managers who act or speak contrary to what the strongman pursues can be sanctioned politically. This could be defined as tension between the political bureau and the public administration bureau.



The fourth reason for the claim of the proposed study could be that political officials or public service officials or both parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Hence, there could be overlapping actions between the two bureaux. Such overlap could be related to the state and political party overlap, which could be one of the challenges of one dominant party in a democracy. According to Klippenstein (2009:12), the dominant political leader, in association with his inner circle (such as Cabinet Ministers or appointed senior public officials), uses particularised and personalised interactions that disregard efficient government administration, constitution and legislation but seek to access government resources for party benefaction. The government becomes influenced by partisan interests where administrators and politicians fail to execute their duties for public service whereas they use their authority and positions to amass affluence and prestige. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:62) argue that neopatrimonialism and disregard for coded laws are the core features of African politics; the other main feature of African States is that they rely on one dominant party model of government dominated by the liberation movements. Disregard for documented responsibilities and engaging in personal relationships are the common attributes of the partisan establishments in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994:455). The proposed study further examines the claim that political officials or public service officials or both parties have disregard for documented duties and responsibilities, and that there could be overlapping actions between the political bureau and public service bureau, and that such overlap could be related to the state and political party overlap which could be one of the challenges of a single dominant party state model.

This study therefore intends to examine the politics–administration interface and how the working relationship between public service managers and political officials has functioned since the Mbeki era in 1999

until 2009, and will make recommendations for improved governance for the future.

### **2.3.1 The premise of politics–administration interface discourse**

The initial academic recognition of the problem of political domination in public service matters emerged in North America. The early 19th century theory of Woodrow Wilson (1886:3) suggested that there must be a distinct separation between public administration and politics. That theory was introduced in Wilson's article "The study of administration", where he argued for the importance of politics–administration interface. Wilson's viewpoint positioned management at the centre of government administration, while making politics inappropriate and even unwanted. Political theorist Frank Goodnow (1900:140) conversely argued that government performed two critical functions, one political and the other administrative. Goodnow stated that the political function involved the expression of the will of the State, while the administrative function involved the execution of this will. Leonard White (1948:48) suggested that politics should not intrude on administration and public administration should be left on its own to accomplish its mission of efficiency and economy, rather than politics that is riddled with a diversity of values. Apart from viewing public administration as being separate from politics, White viewed it as being factual and scientific as opposed to politics that he considered as being value-ridden and embedded in social controversies. Subsequently, Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick (1943:57) and Henri Fayol (1947:81) introduced the principles of administration. They argued that the practice of public administration should be enriched by generic principles that could be scientifically proven to be applicable in all administrative situations, regardless of national setting. These scholars further argued that public administration should be compelled to apply these principles in public agencies in order to accomplish the mission of government. Gulick and Urwick (1943:58) are also known for what is referred to as 'POSDCORB', since they argued that in every organisation there was

planning, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting. Nicholas Henry (1994:63) classified the paradigms of public administration, arguing that the first epoch was the politics–administration interface between 1900 and 1926, the second epoch was the philosophies of public administration between 1927 and 1937, the third paradigm was the public administration as political science between 1950 and 1970, the fourth epoch was public administration as management between 1956 and 1970, the fifth paradigm was public administration as public administration between 1970 and 1990, and the last paradigm was the new public administration since 1990. Throughout these paradigms of public administration, government performed a political function as well as an administrative function (Henry, 1994:63). However, for senior public servants, it had become difficult to determine where politics ends and where administration begins.

The South African National Development Plan (NDP) (2011:366) argues that “all democratic regimes have to balance the need for public servants to be responsive to the priorities of the government of the day with the need for the public service to treat citizens equally and not to discriminate on the grounds of political allegiance”. “There has to be a clear demarcation between the roles and responsibilities of public servants and their political principals”. The NDP (2011:366) further suggests that “where the public service is too insulated from political pressure, this is likely to lead to concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government and is therefore not fulfilling its democratic mandate”. However, “where the public service is insufficiently insulated, standards can be undermined, as public servants are recruited on the basis of political connections rather than skills and expertise, or access to state resources and services become defined by political affiliation rather than citizenship”. Countries have sought different ways to balance these two extremes. The NDP (2011:365) further argues that “following the end of apartheid, there was good reason to give political principals wide-ranging influence over the

public service to promote rapid transformation of a public service that had become closely associated with the apartheid regime”. “Having achieved significant improvements in the representativity and focus of the public service, attention now needs to shift to ensuring the public service is adequately equipped to play its part in transforming society”. One of the key objectives of the NDP is to create a proficient public service that assists government, while being sufficiently independent to be segregated from politicisation of service delivery. Such a state of government necessitates a decisive division between the roles of elected officials and the employed bureaucrats. The government of South Africa has acknowledged the gap in the definition of roles in the interface between the political bureau and the administration bureau. This study provides possible clarification of the problem in the interface as conceded by the South African government through the Planning Commission in the NDP.

## **2.4 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY**

The politics-administration interface and its nature in governments has been the subject of academic research since the postulations by Woodrow Wilson (Wilson, 1887). The upsurge of philosophical discourse in the academic world continues to generate further search for knowledge with regard to the nature of the politics-administration interface. At the centre of philosophy philosophical questions are located about the nature of the politics-administration interface as driven by the researchers' love for knowledge and wisdom. The term “philosophy” is derived from the Ancient Greek word ‘philosophia’, which means “love of knowledge” (Russell, 1945:120). The word ‘philosophia’ was created by merging the binary Greek terms ‘Phileo’ meaning love and ‘Sophia’ meaning wisdom (Crome, 2002:2). Philosophy is thus the pursuit of clarifying the mysteries of creation, birth and mortality, sadness and pleasure (Lewis, 1996:11). Numerous epochs have over time formulated diverse concepts which reveal the mystic regions of the universe and life. The absolute and

ultimate truth is yet to be established about life and the universe. This ongoing search for the truth provides the foundation of philosophy. The commitment to wisdom and knowledge thus provides the impetus for any philosophical examination.

The faculty of philosophy has conventionally been divided into five main divisions of study:

1. Metaphysics (or ontology) is the examination of realism. The term metaphysics originates from the Greek terms 'metá' (meaning 'after' or 'transcending') and 'physiká' (meaning 'physics'), 'physics' denoting the material works (Pihlström, 2006:23). According to Gardner (2006:163), metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science, traditionally cosmology and ontology. Some of the questions that metaphysics deals with are: (1) what is ultimate reality?; (2) Is it one thing or is it many different things?; (3) Can reality be grasped by the senses or is it transcendent?; and (3) What is the mind and what is its relation to the body? (Hull, 1967:311).
2. Epistemology is the study of knowledge which is derived from the Greek words 'episteme' (knowledge or science) and 'logos' or reason (Tennis, 2008:203). This branch of philosophy is known as the theory of knowledge and is the rational examination of all knowledge claims. According to Foucault (1972:191), amongst the questions that epistemology considers are: (1) What is knowledge and wisdom?; (2) Is knowledge and wisdom acquired entirely through the senses or by some other means?; and (3) How do we get assurance that what we observe using our senses is accurate?.
3. Ethics is the examination of right and wrong in human behaviour and actions whereas governmental principles (sometimes called

public ethics or political morality) is the function of deciding on ethical choices about governmental accomplishments, and the examination of such behaviour (Benhabib, 1988:32). According to Cohen and Eimicke (1995:99), as an academic faculty, ethics is allocated into binary subdivisions. The first branch is the moral principles of practice (or professional ethics), concentrates on public bureaucrats and the techniques they utilise. The second subdivision is the moral principles of public policy which focuses on decisions regarding policies and regulations. Among the variety of the inquiries undertaken by the faculty of ethics are: (1) Concept of what is right?; (2) Are there any impartial values as to what is moral and what is immoral?; and (3) Are ethical standards outright or comparative?

4. Aesthetics is the examination of physical or physical-conceptual values, occasionally referred to as conclusions of emotion and perception. Aesthetics is a sub-discipline of axiology, a sub-division of philosophy known as the philosophy of the arts (Walton, 2007:147).
5. Logic is the examination of the values of correct thinking and the main instrument that philosophers utilise to examine realism (Shields, 1995:4). Some of the inquiries proposed by logic are: (1) What renders an argument binding or unbinding?; and (2) What is a valid argument?

Above are the main divisions of philosophy. However, the faculty of philosophy is also utilised as an instrument to examine other fields of life, such as the philosophy of deity, philosophy of faith, party-political philosophy, collective philosophy, philosophy of natural science, philosophy of legislation, and philosophy of public administration (Samier, 2005:9).

The research questions and pre-claims are premised in the philosophical ethos of humanity's sense of wonder and curiosity expressed in the questions such as "What are things really like?" and "How can we explain the process of change in things?" (Stumpf, 1975:3). What prompts research questions is the gradual recognition that things are not precisely what they seem to be, and thus face value differs from reality (Hacker, 2009:2). The suspected gap between what is apparent and imperceptible reality prompts researchers to be inquisitive about the state of things, thus the curiosity of researchers is a major impetus behind scientific discovery (Loewenstein, 1994:75). This study sought to understand the reality of the nature of the politics-administration interface and the factors that contribute to strained relationships between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

La Porte (1971:31) remarked that "our primary normative premise should be that the purpose of public organisation is the reduction of economic, social and psychic suffering, and the enhancement of life opportunities for those inside and outside the organization". The quest to improve public service and ease human suffering thus requires scientific enquiry to assist governments and policy-makers to take informed decisions that will promote the collective benefit of the citizens. Such scientific enquiry is fundamental in this study to comprehend the nature of the politics-administration interface in South Africa in order to propose improved governance options in the public service. This study examines the pre-claims to augment the understanding of the current politics-administration interface. One of the pre-claims examines the notion that one of the contributing factors to strained relationships at the interface could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. The section below discusses the contribution to knowledge by reviewing the open system of leadership in comparison with the closed leadership system in the politics-administration interface.

## **2.5 CONCEPTUALISATION OF PRE-CLAIMS AND KEY STUDY ASPECTS**

Conceptual framework is an organised and comprehensive guideline to define the nature and purpose of studied concepts by considering theoretical and abstract aspects surrounding the concepts under review (Miller and Redding, 1986:98). The conceptual framework is utilised as a tool for organising various factors that affect the politics-administration interface and it is structured using the four pre-claims and the research questions to search for knowledge. The document analysis, case study design and interviews are utilised as techniques to reach conclusions about the nature of the politics-administration interface in South Africa. The pre-claims sought to establish the effects and nature of political officials' dominance over public administration, conflicting leadership styles, different political ideologies, and the disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. This study argues that the main leadership paradigms that may determine successful or unsuccessful working relations in the politics-administration interface are the open systems paradigm or closed systems paradigm. The researcher endeavoured to contribute the open and closed systems paradigm in the politics-administration interface discourse in South Africa.

### **2.5.1 Open-systems paradigm**

Newton's clockwork universe theory was replaced with a world in which the future is open and is characterized by an unstable and non-linear system where the new inquisitive view of reality and linear processes are being replaced (Kotze, 1998:8). An open system is a leadership system which frequently provides information to its surrounding environment. Open systems determine approach to input, processes, output, objectives, valuation and assessment and knowledge management. Features that are significant to open systems comprise the borders, surrounding



environment and multiple ways to achieve similar outcomes. Open systems further acknowledge that the external environment is unstable, chaotic and characterized by the processes of empowerment, horizontal relationships and consensus-building (Daft, 1995:13). The open system in the South African context can also be aligned with the empirical cases of the pre-democracy ANC and Mandela's collective leadership with broad consultation, as witnessed in the case of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) formulation. Similar to South Africa's traditional collective leadership, vigorous open systems continually provide information to surrounding environments, examine the constituency reaction, amend internal systems where necessary to reach the system's objectives and then communicate required knowledge back out to the surrounding environment. The researcher in this study argues that for the political bureau and the administration bureau to uphold a harmonious politics-administration interface they need to enforce an open system of leadership where the general constituency will be part of decisions through consultation and share the leadership and development challenges faced by their government.

### **2.5.2 Axiology of altruism and the open-systems paradigm**

The open systems paradigm is based on accountability and openness to public scrutiny, therefore it is characterised by broader consultation which is in line with democratic principles (Ray and Ray, 2012:3). Altruism is not merely selflessness but is an inclination to act with concern for the needs of other individuals and societies without any concealed intentions (Nigel, 1970:79). The first attribute of altruism is that the act must be undertaken with consideration for others. The second attribute is that a person should not have ulterior motives entrenched in egoism to describe altruistic behaviour. The theoretical development of altruism is rooted in, for example, Jesus Christ of Nazareth, Anselm of Canterbury, Rene Descartes, Thomas Aquinas and Emmanuel Kant. Altruism is criticized for being disconnected from any ordinary motivational organisation in human

life; it is based on the wisdom of individuals and the willingness to sacrifice personal virtues for the happiness of many. Kantianism succeeds under pro-social behaviour with aspirations of an open system of governance, which is also aligned with collective leadership and openness for the good of the people (Warneken and Tomasello, 2009:457). Furthermore, Vandenabeele, Scheepers and Hondeghen (2006:14) suggest that altruism is an ideal virtue for public servants. Altruism is not just selflessness but it is the purposeful consideration of the good of the collective. The primary feature of altruism is that the actions must be based in the consideration of the collective. Selflessness and love for fellow human beings cannot be guaranteed in government to ensure that there will be a collective effort to achieve improved standards of living for as many people as possible. Therefore, the ethical problem that societies constantly struggle with is that human beings will always be tempted to satisfy their own needs first and it remains a social challenge to promote altruism to politicians and public servants who believe their own needs should be addressed and that they are primarily entitled to a better standard of living. This view is supported by the statement by the former spokesperson of the ANC, Smuts Ngonyama, who observes that, “we did not join the struggle to remain poor”. This may denote that private interest is one of the features in some government officials who seek to benefit from access to power and government contracts (Shapiro and Tebeau, 2011:273). The altruistic approach to public service is one of the major features that would ensure a selfless attitude and interacting with great consideration for others in the politics- administration interface.

Gilman (2005:8) argues that officials in the political bureau and in the administration bureau should uphold the code of ethics and conduct and that ethical behaviour should become a lifestyle to allow both bureaucrats and elected officials to evaluate their engagements alongside probable ethical ideals. Maphunye (2009:5) argues that “public administration must be professional; its officials must be selfless in service delivery, be highly

motivated and goal-directed, and have the capacity to support the State's developmental and strategic vision of social transformation". Hence the administration bureau leading the execution of the State will on behalf of elected officials uphold high ethical standards while enforcing best leadership techniques. Therefore, in the public administration occupations there should be good and moral officials complying with the correct processes as well as standards, and ensuring accountability at all times. In the world where collective human behaviour attempts to develop humankind and its standard of living, both the political and administration bureau would harmoniously work towards ethical outcomes. The researcher in this study argues that the open systems leadership paradigm and altruism are the ultimate values that may result in positive outcomes and a progressive politics-administration interface, therefore attempts to improve the politics-administration relationship may focus on installing the open systems leadership paradigm and displaying altruism towards political officials and public administration officials.

### **2.5.3 Closed-systems and conventional leadership parallels**

The conventional leadership is paralleled with the closed-systems paradigm that focuses on impersonal processes and systems for effectively functioning machinery, while it views the constituency as subjects or means to leadership power (Stückelberger and Mugambi, 2007:114). The leadership in the political bureau and in the administration bureau in government can achieve improved standards of living if they understand and manage human nature as well as demonstrating best leadership techniques in various circumstances. The poor leadership trends in modern democratic governance are entrenched in the inclination towards a closed system of leadership. The closed-system models are the outcomes of the challenges and consequent shifts that developed throughout the Industrial Revolution. During the commencement phase of industrial development in the mid-1800s, the initial workshops were incompetent. There were no standardised precise operational methods.

Companies were continuously inventing methods to revive and realise working methods to improve production, whereas the emphasis was principally on internal systems. During the 17th-century there was a rise of scientific intellectualism and material revolution with their spirit of Newtonianism, whereby the world was viewed in mechanistic terms as everything was explained in terms of reference to the machine (Davies and Gribbin, 1991:7). Following the Industrial Revolution, organisations sought management models that would improve productivity and output in the factories. However, the management models focused on the internal aspects of organisations similar to the examination of the engine compartments. The management models that resulted from that era were referred to as closed system models or Newton's clockwork universe model (Hope, Bunce and Roosli, 2011:82). Furthermore, Amagoh (2008:2) argues that "all conventional models and theories of organizations typically embraced the closed systems approach to the study of organizations by assuming that the main features of an organization are its internal elements".

The closed-systems or machine model in the post-modern era is not successful due to the realisation that people cannot behave like machines and they cannot be managed like machines in the mould of the Newtonian paradigm (Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers, 1996:18). Closed-systems standards are not dependent on the exterior surroundings or environment for justification or answers to management questions and challenges; however, they are encircled and impenetrable from the external environment (Daft, 2013:2). The closed-systems approach is therefore impersonal and does not provide constant feedback to stakeholders; it mainly focuses on the effective machinery of the day-to-day functioning of internal processes and systems.

In an ambiguous and controversial turn behind the Presidency's closed doors, Mandela's collective leadership principle entrenched since his

childhood was relinquished without proper consultation regarding the policy formulation. In 1996, President Nelson Mandela declared the closing of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Department. The RDP Fund was passed over to the Ministry of Finance and the duties of the office shifted to various departments while in the same year (June 1996) the Department of Finance produced its GEAR strategy. The ANC government “encountered its first major currency crisis, starting in February 1996 when the value of the Rand plummeted by more than 25%; thus in order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency markets, the government embraced a macroeconomic strategy, referred to as GEAR” (Visser, 2004:8). The Economic Policy Committee of the ANC had been excluded from the drafting process, which led to disgruntlement about the lack of consultation (Wehner, 2000:2). Unlike the RDP, GEAR was formulated by a technical group of 15 officials consisting of bureaucrats from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), three government departments, scholars, and two agents from the World Bank (Kotzé, 2000:12). The RDP bureau was closed and the RDP Office was reassigned to the Office of the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki. In contrast to the RDP, GEAR was not the product of consultation with COSATU and the SACP and would generate considerable internal disagreement within the Tripartite Alliance (Kotzé, 2000:12). GEAR is defined by the members of the tripartite alliance members as the macroeconomic policy that was imposed by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and the World Bank through the Minister of Finance to prioritise macroeconomic growth over poverty alleviation. Furthermore, GEAR is identified as the initial sign of political bureau dominance in governance matters. Moreover, “South Africa is known for having enacted one of the fastest economic liberalization programmes, and for having been pushed in this direction of GEAR by both the World Bank and the IMF” (Agupusi, 2011:38). Thus GEAR became the symbol of macro political power over South Africa’s public service. Mandela’s principle of collective leadership would not survive for

long in governance since the Western authorities are perceived as controlling the developing countries. “We were taken from the bush, or from the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were suddenly in this immense responsibility of running a highly developed country,” admitted Mandela (Sampson, 1999:495). Mandela’s leadership on local economic policy development diminished as he focused on reconciliation and foreign policy, while preparing for retirement. By the time Thabo Mbeki took over as the President of South Africa, the collective leadership style of the pre-democracy ANC and Mandela had already ended with the RDP policy development process and had been replaced with a conventional leadership and closed-systems leadership style that did not consult with the constituency due to powers outside the ANC and its culture, starting with the Presidency during the GEAR policy formulation and the continued trends of authoritarian and closed-systems leadership.

The leadership in the political bureau as well as in the administration bureau will attain their aim of improving standards of living if they understand and manage human nature and apply best leadership techniques in different circumstances. Brooks suggests that “organisational culture should create an environment to discuss sensitive issues openly and to confront differences of view and seek ways of clarifying vague and ambiguous ideas and data” (Brooks, 2003:256). However, the disastrous leadership trend in modern democratic governance is inclined towards a closed system of leadership.

As demonstrated above, document analysis in this study suggests that a closed system which is also aligned with conventional leadership focuses on the internal aspects of organisations and does not promote stakeholder participation; therefore a closed systems model may create conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau in the politics–administration interface and is thus an undesirable feature of leadership.

#### 2.5.4 Egoism and closed-systems paradigm

The normative version of ethical egoism sets as its goal the benefit, pleasure or greatest good of the self alone; the pursuit of personal gratification and own contentment is the uppermost moral drive conflict of life which results in leadership for personal interest to boost one's personal ego or level of happiness (Morrison, 2009:9). Egoism seeks to uphold the greatest good of the self which is the pursuit of his/her own egocentricity and where his/her own pleasure becomes the highest aspiration of life which results in leadership for personal gain to boost personal esteem or level of pleasure (Paul and Elder, 2006:4). The undue sense of self-prominence in the political bureau or in the administration bureau is the basic ingredient of failure of the harmonious politics–administration interface relationship. Most people have one ultimate aim; that is their own welfare. Egoism is less concerned with collective well-being. Egoism submits that each person has one primary aim which is his or her own prosperity. In such a context, constituency is mainly the means to the power and ultimate happiness of an individual. Rousseau argues that “Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs; it leads to the corruption of the legislator, which is an even worse evil than the abuse of the laws by the government; it makes a substantial change in the State, and all reformation becomes impossible” (Rousseau, 1762:34). Hence the aspirations of egoism in public administration may result in hindrance to reformation and successful service delivery. In ideal governance, egoism should not be a major attribute of public administration; government should be driven by aspirations aligned with improved standards of living for the greatest number of people. According to St Augustine of Hippo (05AD:287), God created the human race and gave it authority over animals, but not dominion over others of its own kind. Human beings were envisioned to live together in congruence and egalitarianism under natural rule with a single main dictum which was “do not do to others what you would not want to have done to you”. However, the elevation of personal gratification over the wellbeing of the collective

corrupted human nature and made natural social collaboration unmanageable. According to Kant (1819:231), “the avarice and self-love that distinguish the behaviour of fallen humankind manifest themselves above all in what is a desire to rule and control”. It was such human determination that brought the government into existence, thus the government is the institutionalisation of the human longing for domination, and collective human behaviour in the struggle for domination became known as politics. Hence the politics–administration interface exists in the context of persons whose personal desires are to dominate others of their kind, amass resources and achieve individual gratification. In ideal governance, egoism should not be a foremost feature of public administration; government should be driven by aspirations aligned with improved standards of living for the greatest number of people.

### **2.5.5 Ethical aspirations of politics–administration interface**

Beyond all challenges of a politics–administration interface is the generally desired harmonious politics–administration relationship. In such a congruent relationship, the political bureau would aspire for best leadership to achieve improved standards of living for the greatest number of people (Kant, 1819:231). The political bureau would continually strive to make the world an improved habitation for humans and the human behaviour in the political bureau would endeavour to achieve such ethical postulation. Furthermore, the administration bureau leading the execution of the State would, on behalf of elected officials, uphold high ethical standards while enforcing best leadership techniques (Sindane, 2011:754). Therefore, in the employ of public administration would be good and moral people complying with good processes and standards, and ensuring accountability at all times. In the world where collective human behaviour attempts to make the world a better place, both the political and administration bureaus would work harmoniously together towards the ethical proposition.



In the scientific realm, philosophy functions in the world where the reality and factual knowledge is examined and re-examined; the desired future remains a desired future until advances in knowledge develop it to reality. The Medieval *Metaphysica* – the title of Aristotle's dissertation on the subject in 350 BCE – from the Greek *meta-physika*, broadly means “the physical works”. Therefore, metaphysics is a division of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality and existence, and includes ontology, cosmology and often epistemology. ‘Metaphysics’ can be defined as the examination of the world’s basic components and concepts as they are understood in the scholastic faculty of empiricism.

### **2.5.6 Categorical imperative**

Socio-political and ethical consensus is rooted in the general proposition that the needs of the collective are more important than personal needs (Anello, 2006:15). Thus what brings the political bureau and administration bureau together are the shared goals of a better society and continually improving standards of living. Despite the personal desires naturally pulling towards personal gratification, it is a collectively understood virtue that all persons put together are more important than the needs of each individual, thus Émile Durkheim (1912:97) argues that the collective is the super-individual. Therefore, human beings in power are expected to use their power for the benefit of powerless communal persons (Brewer, Selden and Facer II, 2000:255). It is the general consensus that sustainable human development can only be achieved through good governance; hence, community leaders (elected or appointed) should primarily be concerned with good governance. In an ideal world, both the political bureau and the administration bureau should agree on human development as the mandate appears straightforward in principle. However, human behaviour towards human development is characterized by a struggle for power and domination which results in inevitable conflict. Since the politics–administration interface is managed and defined by human beings with egoism as a natural attribute, there will be clashing

relationships between these two spheres. The compelling force for the good of many is the collective longing for a better world for all. The political bureau and the administration bureau seek to attract good people, which results in good governance for processes and leadership. The challenge to a tolerant and progressive politics–administration interface is that the human attitude towards human development is characterised by competition for supremacy and dominance which results in unavoidable conflict. In agreement with Pikoli and Wiener (2013:358), this study argues that for the politics–administration interface to fail there would be a bad politician, bad public servant, and a bad private sector official. Therefore, corrupt politicians, corrupt public servants and corrupt private sector officials result in bad governance as well as a struggle for resource control which results in conflicts in the politics-administration interface. For the establishment and maintenance of good governance all three spheres (political bureau, administration bureau and private sector) high ethical standards aligned with principles of altruism should be upheld.

## **2.6 PROGRESSIVE ATTRIBUTES OF THE POLITICS– ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN THE REST OF THE WORLD**

Socio-economic growth as a measure of general success is the centre of countries' general growth concept. This section begins by examining progressive attributes in selected countries to demonstrate positive features in the politics–administration interface. The few countries selected for examination were chosen for their socio-economic growth as a measure of success and the main driving force for efficient public service. Such countries include the United States, Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, India, Singapore, Nigeria and Botswana. It is important to note that the discussion concerning these countries is only for the purpose of demonstration of a progressive politics–administration interface. Developing countries such as Singapore, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Nigeria and Botswana managed to achieve relatively progressive economic growth through active and strategic co-operation

between the political bureau and the administration bureau. In some cases, as demonstrated below, success is attributed to the lack of a professional administration bureau. Administration is thus driven by the political bureau without tensions resulting from professional administrators' ideas.

For over a century, American scholarship and the general public debated the significance of the politics–administration interface. Over the years, the United States reduced partisanship coercion in the public administration context and safeguarded the administration bureau against official favouritism, and this brought about fundamental change in the country's public service (Rosenbloom, 2008:58). Furthermore, public administration in the United States “was distinguished from both partisan politics and politics involving policy-making by asserting that the domain of administrative work is governed by non-partisan principles”. The American public administration functions autonomously of the incumbent political leadership. The stability of the American public service does not necessarily mean that there is no political interference in public administration, but it may mean that politicians and administrators prioritize public administration as an important tool to persuade citizens to support the government led by political authorities. America has provided political ground for socio-economic growth to prevail over political pressures and domination. The common goal that binds the political bureau and the administration bureau is the American dream, which is the national ethos of the United States, or a set of ideals in which liberty means opportunities for prosperity and upward social mobility achieved by Americans working together for socio-economic growth. Over the past years the United States has proven that the political bureau and the administration bureau can work together harmoniously to achieve common goals for socio-economic improvement.

In Japan the employment and monitoring of the Heads of Government departments is managed centrally by the Civil Service Commission and the public administration is removed from direct political control (Matheson, Weber, Manning and Arnould, 2007:52). Japan's politics-administration interface is managed by creating a buffer (which is the Commission) between the political bureau and the administration bureau to ensure that public administration focuses on policy implementation to maintain socio-economic development without political interference. The politics-administration interface that provides separation between politics and administration has proven to have a correlation with successful socio-economic development as shown by the politics-administration interface nature of Japan.

China, however, does not have professional public administration, thus China's public administration is performed by the political bureau. China's governance challenges are complex and unique, as the country does not have a typical governance challenge of managing the politics-administration interface. China is challenged by the management of the relationship between administrators of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee and governors of the administration who are also aligned with the CCP. There is no separation between political party administrators and the governors of the administration, thus the politicized administration works with the CCP to further socio-economic development. Despite the lack of separation between politics and administration in China, the country has managed to achieve remarkable socio-economic growth over the years. The case of China casts doubt on the concept that countries with clear politics-administration separation achieve greater socio-economic growth. The absence of a strong professional administration means that the political bureau manages the administration without disagreements and tension arising from the governors of the administration bureau. When measured by socio-economic growth, China has displayed positive returns from the politicized administration. However,

the country has faced negative impact of labour dissatisfaction, human rights and poor working conditions in the public service which lead to recurrent labour protests (Estlund and Gurgel, 2013:88). The lessons learnt from the case of China is that there are positive elements from the political bureau driving the national agenda for socio-economic growth, although the negative effects of the politicized administration are protests from the employees who feel oppressed by the political bureau.

Russia's public administration model is created "on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles characterized by the political subordination of public administration to the political bureau led by the Communist Party" (Verheijen and Rabrenovic, 1999:8). Thus Russia's public administration is dominated by the political bureau, resulting in a highly politicized public administration. The country has no documented policies to ensure public administration protection from undue political interference; hence public administrators in Russia cannot be innovative or influence policy development. It is a prevalent trend in Russia that the change in political bureau due to elections or re-alignment results in change at the senior management level of public administration (Gill, 2012:176). Russia's socio-economic development expanded notwithstanding the politicized public administration and moved towards the developed country status in socio-economic aspects. The culture of public administrator allegiance to the political bureau is the main attribute that propels service delivery and maintains stability in the politics-administration interface.

In Brazil "senior public servants are not appointed on the basis of political allegiance; however, the country experiences blurred politics-administration interface" (Gurria, 2012:56). To resolve the politics-administration interface challenge of poorly defined roles between the political bureau and the administration bureau and ensure progressive governance, according Vergez, Bertok and Sheppard, (2012:57), "*Brazil had established central integrity authorities within the centralised public*

*administration, including the Office of the Comptroller General, the Public Ethics Commission, the Department of the Federal Police, the Office of Attorney-General of the Union and the Federal Public Prosecutors. The functions of the Office of the Comptroller General include citizens' relations, public service relations and corruption prevention. In 2006 the Secretariat for Corruption Prevention and Strategic Information was established within the Office of the Comptroller General and it has achieved remarkable success in combating corruption in the public service".* The Public Ethics Commission in Brazil was established in 1999 to maintain ethical conduct in government departments. The Commission is further accountable regarding the execution of the Federal Code of Conduct of High Administration and further oversees and co-ordinates decentralised ethics activities in order to ensure competence and ethical standards in the public service (Iyer, 2013:2). The Federal Police has broad powers, both administrative and of judicial police, and its duties are defined not only by the Constitution, but especially in documented constitutional legislation, and include the duty to combat misuse of public resources (Martini, 2011:5). Furthermore, "Brazil's central integrity authorities such as the Comptroller General, the Public Ethics Commission, and the Department of the Federal Police are some of the positive attributes in Brazil's public service and governance" (Martini, 2011:5).

In India, the recruitment of administrators is done on the basis of political allegiance. Upon the recruitment process there is a formal examination required to enter the civil service and politicians can influence promotions and transfers of politically aligned employees (Dasandi, 2014:14). The positive attribute in India is that the government embraced the NPM and achieved economic growth in line with the national agenda of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India's work ethic and culture are based on the objective of common good, which results in efficiency, citizen satisfaction and increased public service productivity (Bajpai, 2014:3).

India has an autonomous Union Public Service Commission at the national level of government responsible for public service monitoring and disciplinary enforcement (Muttalib, 2007:373). Despite apparent political interference, the relative success of India's politics–administration interface is largely attributed to the centralised Union Public Service Commission, national agenda and common good which bind together the political bureau and the administration bureau to achieve shared imperatives.

Another country with features of a progressive politics–administration interface is Singapore, which achieved significant economic growth after attaining independence despite its prevalent blurred boundaries between politics and administration. Singapore's extraordinary success over the past 50 years was in no small part achieved by developing the capacity to undertake long-term planning (Everest-Phillips, 2014:5). Singapore's nation-building agenda was a key pillar of the national strategy after independence in 1965, with the government adopting measures to encourage a collective sense of national identity and a harmonious society that was collectively working to achieve prosperity for Singapore as a whole.

The Nigerian politics–administration interface is characterized by elites in the political bureau dominating the administration. The “elite theory directs attention to the source of policy flow and the identification of beneficiaries of public policies” (Arowolo and Aluko, 2012:800). Furthermore, *“the theory attempts a practical explanation of the source of policy by predicating it on the elite rather than the masses. It also explains the nature and source of policies in Nigeria. Various policies in the public service can also be viewed as emanating from the Nigerian elite, the political bureau, with exclusive influence in administration and economic growth”*. It is rare to find positive attributes in the Nigerian politics–administration interface since the country is known for poor governance and weak democracy. The

main positive attribute in the sustainability of the Nigerian government is the country's wealth in oil production. According to Adewale (2011:4), the energy sector is the driving force of the Nigerian economy since the country is the largest oil producer in Africa. Nigerian governance, which is mainly dominated by the political bureau, recently decided to deregulate the oil industry, which resulted in a more efficient economy, a less politically influenced economy, and less corrupt oil and gas production. Thus the intermittent positive attribute in Nigeria's governance has been due to deregulation and the promotion of non-partisan investors in the oil and gas industry.

In the case of Botswana, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats played a key role in Botswana's democratic developmental success. Some of Botswana's positive attributes in the politics-administration interface include that administrators have an enormous amount of influence in the policy-making process, in terms of the initiation, design and implementation of policies (Dasandi, 2014:7). Furthermore, Botswana's politicians and bureaucrats have a collective developmental ideology which was strengthened by the country's high economic growth rates following independence. Botswana has a progressive politics-administration interface because most of the country's high-level politicians are former civil servants, since the ruling Botswana Democratic Party actively encourages civil servants identified as being politically astute to enter politics at both the local and national levels. Botswana's public servants are thus more aligned with the national political agenda and sensitive to the aspirations of the political bureau.

## **2.7 EUROPEAN POLITICS WITH DOMINANCE OVER ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The research problem and the political dominance pre-claim in this study are rooted in the political and administrative history of South Africa. Conflict between the political leadership and the public administration



bureau has existed since the introduction of the Western form of governance in South Africa. The politics–administration interface phenomenon may have co-existed with South Africa’s public administration since humans began to occupy Southern Africa. However, the written history of the politics–administration interface can be traced from the arrival of Europeans and the establishment of the Western mode of governance in South Africa. According to Theal (1897:45), Afrikaner public administrators rejected the British political leadership that Christianized the natives and abolished slavery in the Cape Colony. This contributed to conflict between the political leadership and the public administration in the public service administered by the Afrikaners. The conflict resulted in the eastward and north-eastward expedition away from the British political leadership in the Cape Colony throughout the 1830s and 1840s, in the migration known as the ‘Great Trek’ (Theal, 1897:62).

Furthermore, the changes in political paradigms in Britain and the Netherlands affected political leadership and governance in the colonies. According to Christopher (2001:2), the reforms in British policy effected in 1832 were to have a profound influence on South Africa since the colonial reformers moulded public administration to suit British needs and aspirations. The political leadership tried to dominate public administration during the colonial governance epoch in South Africa which resulted in the politicization of public administration as a means by the colonial masters to maintain power over their colonies. The problem of conflict between political leadership and governance is thus an old problem with minimal research output in the fields of public management and political leadership.

The Westminster Parliament has full constitutional supremacy (Carney, 1993:5). Westminster governance is regarded as majoritarian and is “characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of the largest party, on the grounds that this promotes accountability with effective

governance; the party in government is empowered to take and implement difficult and tough decisions during its tenure in office, assured of the ability to pass its legislative programme without many checks and balances so long as they can carry their backbenchers with them. At the end of their term of office, the government can be held accountable for the results of their actions and voted out, if unpopular” (Norris, 2000:3). Owing to the limited tenure of the political bureau, politicians utilize their limited time in office to facilitate policy formulation and policy implementation to appease their constituency. Therefore, as discussed above, the political realm in Westminster democracies dominates decision-making in the public administration realm. The present democratic government of South Africa inherited the Westminster system of government, which was dominant in the apartheid era where politics dominated administration (Bond, 2010:13).

According to Saunders, Bundy, Barker, Bell, Duggan, Horler, Leroux and Maurice (1988:7), “the Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Cape of Good Hope, arriving in 1488”. However, “permanent white settlement did not begin until 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a provisioning station in the Cape”. In subsequent decades, “French Huguenot refugees, the Dutch and Germans began to settle in the Cape”. Collectively, they form the Afrikaner section of today’s population. According to Saunders, *et al* (1988), “the establishment of these settlements had far-reaching social and political effects on the groups already settled in the area, leading to upheaval in these societies and the subjugation of the native people”. White people were the embodiment of European political hegemony and white male-dominated governance in South Africa. Hence, the tendency of the political bureau to dominate the public service function is a conventional practice that was already noticeable as early as in the 16th century in South Africa (Saunders *et al.*, 1988:7).

Furthermore, the Western mode of governance began as a colonial authority from Britain and the Netherlands whose governance was meant to provide services only to the white settlers in South Africa. The direction and nature of public administration in South Africa was thus determined by European politics. African communities were deprived of land and natural resources in order to give ownership to the white minority settlers. The African people are the majority in South Africa but they were only considered useful as servants or workers for white settlers. The British settlers gained control of the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of the 18th century as a consequence of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe (Thompson 2001:28). Subsequent to British settlement and governance, the period marked the commencement of extensive conflict between the Afrikaners and the English settlers. Even during this era, public administration was inseparable from European politics.

According to Fredrickson (1981:40), the British political domination continued to gain strength and controlled public administration in South Africa. Commencing in 1836, somewhat to escape British governance and social hegemony as well as partially out of bitterness at the ending of slavery, many Afrikaner farmers (Boers) commenced a northward migration which became known as the Great Trek. This exodus brought Afrikaners into interaction and conflict with African groups in the area, the most resistant of which were the Zulus who countered the European political hegemony at that time.

Chernis (1990:159) states that “in 1852 and 1854, the independent Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State were created; the relations between the republics and the political sphere in the British government continued with being strained”. Saunders *et al* (1988:8) states that “the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870 and the discovery of large gold deposits in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal in 1886 caused an influx of European (mainly British) immigrants and investment”.

In addition to resident Africans in South Africa, many people from neighbouring countries also moved into the area to work in the mines. Hattersley (2007:53) states that “the construction by mine owners of hostels to house and control their workers set patterns that later extended throughout the region”. In this early mining era, Africans began to interact closely with their white oppressors to become part of the economic growth that would only benefit the white population that perceived itself as being superior to the natives. At the centre of political leadership and administration were conflicts between the political sphere and the civil society.

Viljoen (1902:11) states that “Boer reaction to this invasion and British political collusion led to the Anglo-Boer War (also known as the South African War) of 1880–1902”. Wessels (2011:88) argues that “the British forces prevailed in this conflict and the republics were incorporated into the British Empire, hence in May 1910 the two republics and the British colonies of the Cape and Natal formed the Union of South Africa; a self-governing dominion of the British Empire”. The Union’s constitution retained all political control and public administration in the hands of a white elite minority, while it excluded and deprived the majority African people. This resulted in continued conflict between the government and the oppressed African masses.

### **2.7.1 Resistance to colonial political hegemony**

According to Yeboah (2007:8), to counteract colonial political hegemony and discriminatory governance, “in 1912 the South Africa Native National Congress was founded in Bloemfontein and eventually became known as the ‘African National Congress’ (ANC); its goals were the elimination of restrictions based on colour and the enfranchisement of, and parliamentary representation for, Africans”. Despite many efforts to liberate Africans, the government continued to enact laws limiting the rights and freedoms of Africans. Therefore, there was always a close relationship

between South African politics and public administration, which meant that service delivery would only benefit the people of European descent.

Furthermore, Pretorius (2008:53) posits that in 1948, when “the NP won the all-white elections it began passing legislation codifying and enforcing an even stricter policy of white domination and racial separation known as ‘apartheid’ (separateness)”. Lodge (2012:378) argues that “in the early 1960s, following a protest in Sharpeville in which 69 protesters were killed by the apartheid government police and 180 injured, the ANC and Pan-African Congress (PAC) were banned”. Nelson Mandela and many other anti-apartheid leaders were subsequently sentenced and imprisoned on charges of treason.

The ANC and PAC were forced by the oppressive National Party government to go underground and they continued to oppose apartheid through guerrilla warfare and sabotage. According to Van den Berghe (1967:74), “in May 1961 South Africa abandoned its British dominion status and declared itself a republic and it withdrew from the Commonwealth in part because of international protests against apartheid”. Lindelof and Van der Westhuizen (1996:5) states that “in 1984, a new constitution came into effect in which whites allowed coloureds and Asians a limited role in the national government and control over their own affairs in certain areas”. The change of the constitution was seen by the freedom fighters as a sign of government yielding to civil society pressure. However, all control remained vested in the apartheid government. Africans remained disenfranchised and excluded from administration matters, resulting in further expression of civil society dissatisfaction as demonstrated below.

Murison (2002:967) posits that “popular uprisings in African townships in 1976 and 1985 helped to convince some NP members of the need for change”. Clandestine negotiations between the NP government and

Nelson Mandela began in 1986. Hence, “in February 1990, then State President F.W. de Klerk, who had come to power in September 1989, announced the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and all other anti-apartheid groups” (Christie, 2006:373). Two weeks after the announcement, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after spending twenty-seven years in confinement. By this time, some senior public service managers were stealing government assets to save the wealth for the future and in part in protest against coming political changes. While some senior public service managers supported political changes that were proposed by the freedom fighters to end oppression of the African people, there were some white groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) (AWB) that resisted the political changes. Therefore, rational decisions from senior public officials were sometimes in contrast with political decisions (Radaelli and Francesco, 2007:4).

The pre-democratic administration in South Africa was designed by the discriminatory political regime to deprive non-white citizens of basic services. The power of political hegemony was prevalent in regulation and policy formulation processes. According to Lahiff (2003:10), “in 1991, the Group Areas Act, Land Acts and the Population Registration Act, the last of the so-called pillars of apartheid administration, were abolished and a long series of negotiations continued, resulting in a new constitution promulgated into law in December 1993”. “South Africa’s first non-racial elections were held on 26–28 April 1994, resulting in the swearing in of Nelson Mandela as President on 10 May 1994” (Lahiff, 2003:10). That historic milestone became the foundation for the contemporary political leadership and administration that is under review in this study.

### **2.7.2 The new political leadership and administration in South Africa**

In examining politics and administration in the South African setting, it is essential to look at the history and structure of public administration after

the establishment of the new government led by the ANC. Muller and Van Rooyen (1994:194) argue that South Africa went through victimization by colonialism and segregation policies that marginalised the majority of the South African people. South Africa has a history of institutionalized racially informed policies known as 'apartheid', which resulted in the wealth of the country being concentrated in the minority white elite and left the majority black communities poor (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:86). The long-anticipated era came for the new politics and administration in South Africa. Murison (2003:1021) posits that "following the 1994 elections, South Africa was governed under an interim constitution establishing a Government of National Unity (GNU) and that constitution required the Constitutional Assembly (CA) to draft and approve a permanent Constitution by 9 May 1996". "After review by the Constitutional Court and intensive negotiations within the CA, the Constitutional Court certified a revised draft on 2 December 1996; then President Mandela signed the new Constitution into law on 10 December and it entered into force on 3 February 1997" (Powell, 2010:11). The GNU continued in effect until the 1999 general elections. Brooks, (2004:4) argues that "the parties originally comprising the GNU, the ANC, the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) shared executive power. However, on 30 June 1996 the NP withdrew from the GNU to become part of the opposition".

During Nelson Mandela's five-year tenure as President of South Africa, the government devoted itself to revolutionising the country through the RDP. According to Hirsch (2005:2), "the ANC-led government focused on social issues that were neglected during the apartheid era, such as unemployment, housing shortages and crime thus Mandela's administration began to reintroduce South Africa into the global economy by implementing a market-driven economic plan known as GEAR". Furthermore, intending to heal the wounds of the apartheid regime, the new government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Throughout the first tenure of the

ANC's post-apartheid governance, President Mandela focused on national compromise, ceasefire and reconciliation to forge a distinct South African identity and single-mindedness among a diverse and fragmented population, after years of struggle and bloodshed. The decrease of party-political battles after 1994 and its remarkable disappearance by 1996 were testimony to the capabilities of the new government to achieve better political leadership and administration compared to the previous discriminatory political leadership and administration.

## **2.8. SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC POLICY BACKGROUND TO THE POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE**

The ANC outlined democratic South Africa's political economy through their main policy in the RDP White Paper in 1994 (Weeks, 1999:23). The RDP White Paper set a broad framework for the new government's economic and social policy aimed primarily at poverty alleviation through infrastructure and livelihood development. The RDP was formulated in consultation with the affiliates of the three-party coalition that included the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). However, in March 1996, the South African Ministry of Finance, led by the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, announced its budget that laid the foundation for GEAR.

In contrast, before 1994, the Commission for Administration had extensive executive powers. However, in 1996 the policymaking authorities of the new Public Service Commission (PSC) were relocated to the Minister of Public Service and Administration. Hence "the Public Service Amendment Act of 1997 made the Minister of the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) responsible for policy on functions of the public service, determination of policy on conditions of service, salary scales, organisational structure, rank and grades, promotions, and transfers" (Ncholo, 2000:89). The "executive powers were given to the political bureau and not administrators because the new ANC government did not



trust white bureaucrats of the old government who were still occupying high positions in the bureaucracy, thus the executive politicians were required to transform the higher echelons of the bureaucracy” (Cameron, 2009:8). The politics–administration interface has been the government’s concern since 1994 and efforts have continually been made to define responsibilities and functions at the political bureau as well as at the administrative bureau. The Public Finance Management Act 29 of 1999 (PFMA) places the accountability with senior managers, whereas managers are not given sufficient power to manage. According to Levin (2004:13), “a developmental state takes more control of public administration and it is premised on a strong interventionist ‘activist’ approach”. The present study further scrutinises the politics and administration in South Africa, and a politics–administration interface as a government concern and a key structural means to assist government in providing service delivery.

According to Cameron (2009:2), “the NPM has been highly influential in shaping public sector reforms in post-apartheid South Africa”. Furthermore, “in the 1980s, the traditional bureaucratic public administration model of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson was challenged in Anglophone countries and a new model of public sector management emerged in these countries which was called NPM” (Cameron, 2009:3). NPM is the set of ideas that promotes the use of private management in the public service, including greater utilisation of capitalistic techniques such as denationalization, public–private partnerships and customer service (translated in South Africa into *Batho Pele* or People First). The NPM focused on business-like management borrowed from the private sector. The main criticism against introducing the commercial ideal to public governance is that “it introduced privatized individual values in place of common community ideals and decisions that are in the public interest” (Godsell, 2004:151). Crucial to the concept of public administration is the word ‘public’ which relates to ‘open to everybody’, ‘transparent’ and ‘open

to community scrutiny'. Furthermore, Baker (1972:12) argues that the word 'administration' has a Latin parent *administrare*, which means 'to serve', 'to assist' or 'to direct'. The phrase 'to administer' has a relationship with the word 'Minister' which means a servant in various contexts. Therefore, a Minister of a government department is a servant who gets things done, the word 'Minister' does not carry the meaning of being a manager, but it does carry the meaning of being a servant (Baker, 1972:12). Thus the public service is about serving the people instead of dealing with the people as customers. The concept of NPM seemed to move away from the original nature of public administration as a concept of serving the people and being open to public scrutiny.

The background of the South African democracy is the Westminster system. According to Licht and De Villiers (1994:166), the Westminster system of democracy was inherited from the period when South Africa was a British colony. The system was transplanted with some variations to most of the former British colonies when they became independent. The majoritarian structure of the system, coupled with the pre-eminence accorded to the will of Parliament, has not proved conducive to the growth of democracy in many of those former colonies. Among the challenges of the Westminster system is the politics–administration interface in the former colonies. The public policies are developed and owned by the legislature and the senior public service officials are merely employed implementers of policies from the political bureau. In South Africa, for example, Directors-General are deemed to be accounting officers by the PFMA. There is thus a need to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa.

## **2.9. THE PRESIDENT THABO MBEKI ERA IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Reynolds (1999:174) states that "Nelson Mandela stepped down as President of the ANC at the party's national congress in December 1997, when Thabo Mbeki assumed the mantle of political leadership; and Mbeki

won the presidency of South Africa after national elections in 1999, when the ANC won a two-thirds majority in Parliament”. President Mbeki “shifted the focus of government from reconciliation to transformation, particularly on the economic front” (Meersschaert, 2005:9). The politics–administration interface can be raised in the Mbeki period when he was the President of South Africa, since there were noticeable cases of conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau. With “political transformation and the foundation of a strong democratic system in place after two national elections, the ANC recognised the need to focus on bringing economic power to the black majority in South Africa; in April 2004, the ANC won nearly 70% of the national vote and Mbeki was re-elected for his second five-year term” (Piombo, 2004:10). In his 2004 State of the Nation address, Mbeki pledged that his government would alleviate poverty, encourage fiscal progression and combat crime. Mbeki stated that “the government would play a more prominent role in economic development”. However, “defeated in a bid for a third term as ANC Chair in party elections in December 2007, Mbeki was ‘recalled’ by the ANC and resigned as President in September 2008” (Gevisser, 2009:321). The proposed research also reviews Thabo Mbeki’s leadership style to attempt to understand contributing factors to conflicts between the politics and administration during his tenure. According to Wheatley (2005:67), “leaders use primitive emotions of fear and self-interest to get people to do their work, rather than the more noble human traits of co-operation, caring and generosity”. This concept will be examined further in the present study to further understand the politics–administration interface by examining the Thabo Mbeki era as the President of South Africa.

President Mbeki resigned from his position on 21 September 2008. He was replaced by senior ANC member Kgalema Motlanthe who led the country for the rest of Mbeki’s tenure. “South Africa held its fourth democratic election on 22 April 2009 where the ANC won with 65% of the vote followed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) with 16% of the vote”

(Human Rights Watch World Report, 2009:115). Furthermore, the “DA also won power in the Western Cape, which became the only province that the ANC does not govern while the newly formed Congress of the People (Cope), launched by ANC members who were angered by the firing of Mbeki won 9% of the vote”. The “National Assembly elected Jacob Zuma as President, with Motlanthe as his Deputy, following the ANC’s win in the 2009 national election” (Wehmhoerner 2009:1).

The contemporary state of governance means that the segregation history left the present democratic government with a challenge to improve the lives of previously disadvantaged communities. Thus “the structure of the present government with three spheres (national government, provincial government and local government) is designed to better render service delivery to the majority of previously marginalized citizens” (Moeti, Khalo, Mafunisa, Nsingo and Makondo, 2007:68). The South African government runs a developmental state to improve the lives of the people by providing basic needs such as water, electricity and shelter to many people whose income cannot sustain their households. Service delivery is a political mandate facilitated by the ruling party and has to be adopted by senior public managers and their subordinates. However, there can be conflict between public administrators and political appointees (Radaelli and Francesco, 2007:11) and there is a need for the study of political leadership and an examination of governance and the politics–administration interface in the South African governance.

## **2.10 THE STATE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND ADMINISTRATION BUREAU IN SOUTH AFRICA**

According to De Villiers (2008:19), “the Constitution provides that South Africa is a so-called composite state with at least three particular federal features, namely the constitutionally entrenched distribution of powers between the national and provincial spheres, along with the power of the judiciary, specifically the Constitutional Court, to adjudicate jurisdictional

disputes between these spheres and the right of the provinces to enact their own constitutions". South Africa's constitution (section 40(1)) established three spheres of government comprising (i) national, (ii) provincial, and (iii) local governments. The co-operative government power in South Africa comprises the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The power of the executive is bestowed upon the President to serve both as Head of State as well as Head of Government. The legislative control is bestowed upon Parliament, consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The power of the judiciary is entrusted in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as the High Court. While the spheres of government were intended for effective and efficient governance, "the political reality and one-party dominance is such that these spheres are subservient to the national government and the national leadership of the ANC" (De Villiers, 2008:6). The co-operative government structure is dominated by the political bureau. Goodnow (1900:140) suggests that it was the nature of government to be dominated by the political bureau. What is of importance in the politics-administration relationship is to determine how the government system can function better for common developmental goals.

According to Aucoin (2006:298), *"there has always been a political dimension to public administration, as politics is an inherent part of public governance; while at the same time, the new public governance has significantly upped the ante for Westminster systems by insisting that the public service not only be loyal to the government of the day, but that it also be fully responsive to political direction, and be seen to be enthusiastic and zealous in its promotion of the policies of the government. In this context, a neutral public service is viewed by some Ministers not as a foundation of good public administration, but as an obstacle to be overcome by political officials in the pursuit of their agenda"*.

In the South African context, Cloete and Wissink (2000:131) argue that senior public managers such as the directors-general succumb to political bureau influence, and politics is then about maintaining the power of the ruling party. Political power can influence the decision-maker who wants to protect his or her own interests, as well as the political party's interests. As a result of political power, a politically inclined public service manager could satisfy a political need instead of taking the best decision for the public service. In contrast, Du Toit and van der Waldt (1999:150) suggest that public officials may belong to political parties, serve on the management of political parties and attend their meetings. However, the Public Service Act of 1994 proscribes bureaucrats from delivering partisan addresses or working as chairpersons at partisan gatherings. A public official may also not distribute political documents. The vision and direction that a country must embark upon is centralized at the major conferences of the ruling party. Mafunisa and Maserumule (2004:129) argue that it is the mandate of the Ministers to provide political leadership with regard to the vision and policy direction of their departments; ensure that government policies are properly carried out; secure resources necessary for the funding of the operations of their departments; represent their departments in Cabinet and Legislature; give an explanation of the performance and actions of their departments to the public and legislature; and take collective responsibility for Cabinet decisions. The tasks of Directors-General as accounting officers are to advise the Ministers on a variety of issues that pertain to their departments; implement government policies and ministerial decisions; manage their departments in an efficient and effective manner; and give an account to the Ministers, and when necessary to parliament, on matters that concern their departments.

Muller and Van Rooyen (1994:194) identify two public administration models, namely (i) the "political activist model", and (ii) the "professional public administration model". These authors argue that the political activist model is based on political expediency and political patronage and senior

public service managers are appointed because of their allegiance to the ruling party, whereas a professional public manager is an impartial and administratively skilled person who is politically neutral but not politically insensitive and is always ready to serve under any political leadership. Such a manager is a skilled and qualified public manager, a person with impeccable integrity who maintains high ethical standards under all circumstances (Muller and Van Rooyen, 1994:194). Thus both a political activist Director-General and a professional public Director-General in the South African setting have a requirement to work smoothly with political officials such as the Ministers of their departments to avoid conflicts that might result in poor service delivery.

As demonstrated above, the politics and administration, as well as the relationship between public administration bureau and political bureau, have been part of discussions in academic documents, but examining the phenomenon in isolation has been minimal. The researcher has identified the research gap and intends to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 in the sections that follow.

## **2.11 POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

There are occurrences of progressive politics–administration interface in almost all government models which keep governments functioning. The starting point in the politics–administration interface problem discourse should also highlight some progressive attributes as indicators of prospective resolutions. The first attribute that leads to constructive politics–administration interface is the common goal of a better country as a driving force for co-operation between politicians and administrators. Quality leadership that focuses on the common good is one of the key factors that enable countries to realise the visions contained in their national vision statements (Kathyola, 2010:56). For example, harmonious efforts between the political bureau and administration bureau in planning

the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Football 2010 World Cup Tournament in South Africa is an example of the political bureau working together with the administration bureau towards a common goal. Such collaboration between the politicians and the administrators resulted in improved infrastructure in public transport, public sports facilities, such as parks, and the hospitality industry, including accommodation facilities. The common goal of a successful World Cup tournament was embraced by the public, the public administration managers and employees, and by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. The South African politics–administration interface worked well when there was a clear common goal of hosting a successful football tournament. For an effective politics–administration interface, countries should identify common goals for diverse societies and prioritize them as part of their national socio-economic development agenda. As demonstrated in this section, there are features of a progressive politics–administration interface in the South African public service where the country's common goals are prioritized over the generally accepted notion that politics is superior to administration.

The second aspect that leads to positive politics–administration interface is the separation of functions between the political bureau and the administration bureau. Good governance requires separation of the political functions from the administrative or technical ones, while at the same time ensuring a clear point of connection between the two, since both functions are mutually reinforcing (Kathyola, 2010:56). In instances where a Director-General is given sufficient autonomy to implement policies and manage administration in line with the national political agenda, there is generally progressive politics–administration interface. In the case of the Republic of South Africa, the politics–administration interface was the crucial aspect to manage during the transition from the apartheid regime to the post-apartheid era. Consequently, the first democratically elected President, Nelson Mandela, appointed Ministers



and Directors-General who would focus on the transition during the GNU period. The first Minister of Finance<sup>2</sup> appointed during the post-apartheid era in 1994 was Chris Liebenberg, with strict instructions from Nelson Mandela that he would remain non-partisan and assist the then administration in transforming without being politicized. President Mandela further appointed the academic Professor Estian Calitz as Director-General in the National Treasury who would focus on administration matters and manage the non-partisan administration. The public service in the GNU was required to be autonomous and avoid political interference. In 1996, cadres from the ANC were deployed in the public administration, hence the then President Nelson Mandela appointed an ANC member, Trevor Manuel, as the Minister of Finance and another ANC member, Maria Ramos, as Director-General in the National Treasury. The positive rapport and trust between the Minister and the Director-General resulted in the progressive politics–administration interface in the Department of Finance in South Africa. The Director-General was trusted to take decisions in line with the national political agenda and ensure efficient administration in the National Treasury. When Maria Ramos left the National Treasury in November 2003, another ANC cadre, Lesetja Kganyago, was appointed as the Director-General in the National Treasury and assumed duties in 2004. The Minister and the Director-General continued to compatibly work together to establish an efficient finance regime. It has become an established culture that the Director-General in the National Treasury focuses on the technical matters and drafts budget speeches and reports for the Minister to present in Parliament. The administration bureau in the Department of Finance is largely given autonomy to apply technical skills in the administration and report progress to the Minister as required by the National Treasury Regulations. The politics–administration interface in South Africa’s financial sector remains constructive and proactive due to the trust between the Minister and the Director-General which results in autonomous administrators who exercise

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<sup>2</sup> The researcher in this study has been working for and examining the finance sector since 2005 at the National Treasury, then at the South African Reserve Bank.

their administrative skills without interference from the political bureau. The state of South Africa's finance regime suggests that good rapport between the political officials and administration officials results in positive politics-administration interface and largely autonomous Directors-General who are trusted by the politicians to do a good job in the administration. As demonstrated in this section, there is usually a progressive politics-administration interface where government allows separation of responsibilities between the political bureau and administration bureau, and allows the administration bureau the liberty to take administrative decisions in line with professional skills and national priorities without political interference.

The third attribute of a positive politics-administration interface is an administration bureau that is focused on administration but sensitive to political aspirations. Whether the Director-General is apolitical or politically aligned, it is crucial that senior managers in the public administration remain focused on the technical matters of administration and are politically considerate so as to align the administration work with the national policy agenda from the political bureau. The National Treasury in South Africa has been successfully managed by an apolitical Director-General, Professor Estian Calitz, and by politically aligned Directors-General Ramos and Kganyago. Throughout the post-apartheid period, the politics-administration interface in the public finance sector has been successfully managed by prioritising administration and service delivery over the natural supremacy of the political bureau. As demonstrated in this section, the administration bureau's strict focus on administration matters and being sensitive to political agendas may lead to a positive politics-administration interface.

The fourth attribute of a positive politics-administration interface is the mutual trust between the political bureau and the administration bureau. There is significant success in the politics-administration interface where

politicians trust public servants to do their work in accordance with their skills and experience; as well as public servants trusting politicians, particularly the Minister and the President, to protect departments from political interference. Although South Africa has a depoliticized civil service in theory, in accordance with section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, in practice it is not always possible for politicians to trust senior public servants and senior public servants may not trust politicians and view them as a stumbling block in the public service (Kruger, 2010:474). What continuously sustains the positive politics–administration interface in the government departments such as the Department of Finance is the mutual trust between the political bureau and the administration bureau, specifically a Director-General, Minister and President. Despite the political concerns from the trade unions, the SACP and politicians representing the workers, the finance sector has remained bound by the mutual trust between the administration bureau and political bureau. As demonstrated with the finance sector, there are features of a progressive politics–administration interface in the South African public service.

## **2.12 CONCLUSION**

This chapter has presented literature on the conceptual argument for a politics–administration interface, as well as the literature contrasting that interface. Authors such as Frank Goodnow dismissed the theory of politics–administration interface as an imaginary dichotomy. They argue that it is in the nature of the political bureau to dominate public administration. In this chapter the literature explains that European politics driven by colonial masters held dominance over public administration in South Africa, hence there was intense resistance to colonial political hegemony. The contemporary scholarship also depicts the new political leadership dominating administration in South Africa.

The premise of the pre-claims in this chapter is supported by the literature suggesting, firstly, that political officials want to dominate the public service function since they want to influence public service. Secondly, the literature presented above also suggests that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. Thirdly, the literature also argues that political officials may have a different political ideology compared with the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. This chapter has also outlined the ethical dilemma rooted in personal egotistic aspirations and the need for the categorical imperative of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Lastly, there is a view proposing that political officials or public service officials or both parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This section clarifies the practice applied in this study and specifies the choices that have been made and the criteria followed for selecting possible options. This chapter describes the research design and methods, and discusses the reasons for using the qualitative method, the overall strategy and the specific design elements. The qualitative enquiry in which the researcher was directly involved is outlined. The objective of this qualitative enquiry was to collect data utilising the comprehensive content-based explanations of society, occasions and circumstances by drawing on various methods to ascertain the participants' behaviour and to examine the collected information; and, lastly, to deduce the conclusions in the form of a theory or contextual realisation. Qualitative research is compatible with this study which examined the politics–administration interface in the public service in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. This is because qualitative enquiry is a multi-concept method in relation to politics-administration interface. Hence, this study used a multi-concept tactic or various qualitative procedures and information collection techniques to establish truthful knowledge. Conger (1998:108) argues that “quantitative research cannot produce a good understanding of a social science phenomenon such as politics–administration interface that involves multiple levels of phenomena, possesses a dynamic character and has symbolic components, elements better addressed with qualitative methodologies”.

Although qualitative and quantitative analysis represents binary authentic techniques to examine politics–administration interface, examiners utilising one or the other approach practical examination in different ways. Everett

and Louis (1981:386) explain the suppositions that distinguish two research positions, namely 'inquiry from the outside', which is usually implemented through quantitative studies, and 'inquiry from the inside' through qualitative studies. In "the 'inside' or qualitative approach, the researcher aims for a holistic picture from historically unique situations, where peculiarities are crucial for meaning, and the examiner thus utilises an inductive mode, letting the data speak". In contrast, "outside or quantitative researchers aim to isolate the phenomenon to reduce the level of complexity in the analysis and to test hypotheses derived from previous studies". The researcher in this study used qualitative method and multiple case studies as a research method and information gathering techniques namely document analysis and open-ended individual interviews to obtain data.

As stated above, this study is mainly intended to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa. The study was conducted through qualitative research using document analysis of primary sources, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group Committee meeting minutes and Special Commissions reports. The study further reviews original books about the concept, as well as journal articles on the concept of politics–administration interface. Research problems and research questions provide an important guideline for the researcher in selecting the appropriate research methodology or method design. This study is therefore compatible with qualitative method, case study design and document analysis. Specifically, the study uses case study research design and document analysis as the main data collection method as elaborated below.

Document analysis was utilised as the main qualitative research method in this research. Document analysis is "the methodical examination of academic documents and official documents to better understand a particular occurrence" (Chism, 1999:38). Document sources were

consulted from libraries with public administration documents and from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website, Hansard reports and National Government department websites to examine administration and politics in the context of the politics–administration interface in South Africa. The researcher had access to parliamentary committee meeting minutes and commission reports since they are archived on the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website. The researcher used a qualitative research method to subject literature to analysis and examine relevant public administration theories in the context of South Africa. Qualitative research denotes the broad methodological method in the research of social action using, among other methods, document analysis, which was the main approach the researcher undertook to research this study.

Furthermore, qualitative research can also entail case study research design. According to Neuman (2011:41), “most case studies use a qualitative approach”. In the case study research, the researcher carefully selects one or a few cases to illustrate an issue and systematically studies the cases in detail. The “use of case studies for the examination of theories in social sciences was used by the sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss who presented their research method called the grounded theory” (Strauss, 1987:72). There is no projecting philosophy in social science. Social science has failed to produce broad, context-independent philosophy and has therefore nothing to contribute than material, context-dependent information. Campbell (1975:179) argued that “the case study design is especially well suited to produce qualitative knowledge”. Case studies often “contain a substantial element of good narrative that typically approach the complexities and contradictions of real life” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 21). The familiarity of the case study to actual circumstances and its numerous facts are necessary for comprehension of real life and development of knowledge. Therefore, this study also examines three cases of tensions between senior public managers and political officials since the ANC government came to power. Dogan and

Pelassy (1990, 121) argue that “a researcher can validly explain a particular case on the basis of general hypotheses”. In this study, the case studies are examined together with the four pre-claims as presented in the introduction to this study. First, the main case of the former head of state, Thabo Mbeki, and the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusumzi Pikoli, who was dismissed in 2008, was examined to demonstrate strained rapport in the politics–administration interface. Second, the case of the former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who is the leader of the IFP and Director-General, Billy Masetlha, who is a senior member of the ANC was discussed. Third, the case of Wallace Mgoqi, who was the ANC-appointed Cape Town City Manager and the Democratic Alliance (DA) leader who also led the Western Cape as Premier, Helen Zille, was reviewed. As stated above, the main focus is political leadership and governance at the national level. However, the cases of Buthelezi and Masetlha, and of Mgoqi and Zille were used to compare the main unit of analysis, that is, the case of former President Mbeki and Advocate Pikoli. The multi-case study design is used to better understand South Africa’s politics and administration during the period under review.

### **3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

To achieve aspects of the research objectives, this research required the use of the most efficient methods available. A wide range of mechanisms is accessible to social science examiners, including public administration and management academics. The “design of the study involves specifying who or what is going to be studied, when, how and for what purpose” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:90). Furthermore, Mouton (1996:107) states that a “research design develops subsequent to the formulation of the research problem”. In this illustration, the key purpose of the research design is to assist the examiner to identify the most suitable research approach to maximize the legitimacy of the final results. Mouton (1996:107) further defines ‘research design’ as “a set of guidelines and procedures to be followed in addressing the research problem”. The



guiding principles used to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 are outlined to determine the state of governance during the early stage of democratic governance in South Africa. The research design in this study comprises qualitative research, case studies, document analysis and open-ended interviews.

### **3.3 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHOD**

The study uses a qualitative research method to appropriately respond to the phenomenon of politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. Since the nature of the study problem of the research is qualitative, this study likewise employed qualitative techniques of research. Richards (2010:20) argues that “in order to understand the qualitative nature of a study, the research approach requires description, analysis, interpretation and evaluation of collected data”. The nature of the study problem posited in this study could be viewed as a generally articulated problem. The problem is stated as examining the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. This is appropriate in that the nature of the study is qualitative. Leedy and Ormrod (2001:149) states that “the research problem in a qualitative study does not remain general throughout, but as the study unfolds, it becomes increasingly better to ask specific research questions”. De Vos (1998: 240) argues that “qualitative research should be regarded as a multi-perspective approach (using different qualitative techniques and data collection methods) to social interaction”. In this qualitative study method, the methodological aspect of the study is authoritative in drawing the study direction and classifying applicable tools to be utilised during the course of the study, as well as the objective of the study.

According to Mouton (1996:35), “while the epistemological dimension addresses the aspect of what constitutes knowledge, the methodological dimension deals with the question of the manner (the ‘how’ part) of acquiring knowledge and identifying ways in which the research goal could

be reached”. Thus, the rationalisation for obtaining factual knowledge requires qualitative study to be carried out. In many qualitative studies, a “restricted number of components of examination, such as an individual, group or institution, are examined in detail” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:149). The “qualitative research methodology is suited to a study in which occurrences are studied within their context” (Yin, 1994:41). In the current study, qualitative analysis was used to extract concepts and actions from multiple cases and documents to embark on a study of politics–administration interface in South Africa.

Choy (2014:102) argues, however, that in a qualitative study there are limitations, including the following: first, the researcher’s views may be biased, as he or she becomes involved in the study. Second, the perceptions and views of the examined subjects may not be interpreted accurately and the researcher must use multiple approaches to data analysis. Third, participants may not be willing to reveal necessary information, believing that they may be misinterpreted or misunderstood. The researcher therefore needs to create trust between himself or herself and the stakeholders. Qualitative study, concerning its ontological, epistemological and methodological aspect, is not a reliable occurrence specifically because it syndicates diverse categories of enquiry, for example a case study design, lifetime history and document analysis. Qualitative investigation is understood as containing simple practical data, obtained in the study process, which is orally pronounced or described. This study was conducted mainly through qualitative research design, using the document analysis approach to access publicly available primary sources. The shortcomings of this qualitative research were mitigated by applying multiple approaches to the study, and case studies and document analysis as well as open-ended personal interviews were employed to conduct the study and analyse data.

### 3.3.1 Case study research design

This study adopted case study design as a step towards obtaining the relevant data for the purpose of examining how choice and decision-making impact on the reality of political leadership and governance in the public service. Case study research design is one of the qualitative research designs. According to Yin (1994:52); “in the case study design, the researcher is directed towards understanding the uniqueness of a particular case in all its complexity”. Since a case study involves the intensive study of a restricted number of components of examination in one setting, it is considered appropriate for this enquiry. The objective of a case study is typically to examine the changing aspects of a phenomenon, usually of a social environment such as, for example, an organisation, family, community or group. However, the strength of the case study method in this study was in providing an in-depth analysis of the politics–administration interface in South Africa. The participants were allowed to express their experiences. This has a disadvantage in that it is open to the perceptual bias and subjective interpretations of the researcher. If a single individual is studied in a case study, he or she should be highly representative of a particular population. Such an individual should be an extremely rare case of the phenomenon being studied. When a researcher examines a group or institution, he or she usually conducts fieldwork. This implies that the examination is conducted under natural circumstances. The “component of examination does not certainly have to be a person, however may also involve documents such as diaries, minutes, letters and records” (Welman and Kruger, 2002:83). These authors also highlighted the following aspects that justify singular reference concerning case studies: first, the case should be clearly defined or determined, and its boundaries should be identified. In some instances, the researcher may find it necessary to adjust the boundaries that were in any case initially arbitrarily determined. Second, any procedure is utilised to collect information, the aim is not just to define what is being observed, but to

search for recurring patterns and consistent regularities. Case studies can be beneficial when the examination objective is to define the occurrence or predominance of a research subject as a phenomenon or when it is to be projecting about certain conclusions. Case studies are suitable for the investigation of prevalent political attitudes or examination of historical events by analysing archived data. (Yin, 2003:6).

A case study design is a detailed research of a particular occurrence rather than a broader statistical survey. A case study method may not answer a question completely. However, it gives indications and allows further elaboration and theory creation on a particular subject. The case study method is “appropriate when a researcher defines research topics broadly to encompass appropriate or multifaceted multivariate environments and not merely isolated theories and to depend on various foundations of evidence” (Yin, 2003:70). According to Yin (1984:58), “case studies are used to test scientific theoretical models by using them in real-world situations and case studies may be conducted alone or in combination with the document analysis method, as all have complementary strengths and weaknesses”. Case studies have historically been one of the most commonly used techniques of piloting a study for utilisation in public policy, in the private sector and public administration. Multiple cases are “authoritative means to craft theory since they allow replication” (Eisenhardt, 1991:620). The study used case study design in collaboration with document analysis to ensure replication. This collaboration assisted the researcher in perceiving patterns more easily and lessening result association with chance. Different cases emphasize complementary aspects of an occurrence. By piecing together the examined subject patterns, the researcher could draw a more complete theoretical picture. The combination of case study design and document analysis assisted the researcher in generalizing the findings.

The case study research design focuses on specific cases. According to Yin (1984: 63), this is done to examine a scientific theory with a typical empirical case. “Evidence for case studies may come from six sources: (i) documents, (ii) archival records, (iii) interviews, (iv) direct observation, (v) participant observation, and (vi) physical artefacts” (Yin, 1984:83). The evidence for case studies in this research comes from document analysis, archived records from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group and peer-reviewed journals. The researcher identified three case studies on political leadership and administration tensions in the public service. Each case is independently examined and then cross-case conclusions are drawn. The cases are examined in relation to the politics–administration interface concept and politics–administration dualism theory on governance. The researcher collected data from the selected case studies and examined them to address the following research questions:

1. *What were the political leadership and administration roles of political officials in the rendering of services to the public between 1999 and 2009?* This question provided a basis for examining the political leadership and administration responsibilities of the senior public service managers in the execution of their duties to the public and reporting to the political bureau.
2. *What political leadership and administration challenges have taken place in the politics–administration interface in South Africa between senior public service managers and political officials since the ANC government came into power; and which challenges resulted in conflict?* This question sought to examine the pre-claims of political dominance, conflicting leadership styles, political ideology differences and disregard for documented responsibilities. The pre-claims in this study are examined to determine their impact on the politics–administration interface.

3. *How has one dominant party in South Africa's democracy affected administration in South Africa?* The question examined the relationship between the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. This question further reviewed the effects of ANC dominance in the politics–administration interface and the majority power in determining the strength of political bureau dominance.

### **3.3.2 The conceptual framework background and premise of the case study design**

This study adopted a case study design as one of the steps towards obtaining relevant data for the purpose of examining the politics–administration interface. The main claim in this study was conceptualized and developed through a chart-like outline known as a ‘storyboard’ where the main claim was established using the main case of the phenomenon (i.e. politics–administration interface) which is under examination in this study. The main claim in a storyboard represents the core argument and is supported by reasons and evidence (Booth, Colomb and Williams, 2003:130). The four pre-claims of this study are further discussed and supported with reasons and evidence from other studies in the literature review below.

### **3.3.3 Research approach**

Wessels and Pauw (1999:36) state that “research in public administration and management is a contribution to the body of knowledge”. These authors further argue that

*“the approach is aimed at identifying strategies and methods by which the scientific character and credibility of the results may be enhanced. Two of the central problems that are essential to participate in the tactic or methodology are linked to the following characteristics: How should the research be planned? How should*

*the structure of the research be? How should it be executed to fulfil the demands of science in public administration and management?"*

The answers to the abovementioned problems should be proposed to support the researcher in crafting a technique for the complete study project. The study methodology further requires consideration of the preparation, organising and implementation of enquiry so as to conform to prerequisites of reality, impartiality and legitimacy. The methodology or procedure that the examiner has to embark upon to complete the research project utilises some of the following questions to control research conclusions, as indicated by Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28):

*"... first, which decisions need to be taken as the researcher progresses? Second, which methods and techniques for data collection and data analysis should be selected? Third, which factors play a role in the design of the research project? Fourth, what influence does a particular purpose of the research project have on the selection of methods and techniques? Fifth, which factors play a role in the process of research and how do these factors influence the methodology of the researcher?"*

Such questions are applicable in all categories of research since there is continuously a requirement to comprehend not only the methods or techniques applicable to a specific category of research, but similarly by what means to utilise such tools in the various stages of research. Therefore, the study design and methodology is considered as a methodical and cautiously premeditated examination that focuses on the methodology utilised to authenticate the legitimacy, trustworthiness and dependability of the data collection. This is an effort to think through the epistemological element of the study problem. Mouton (1996:35) argues that "research involves the application of a variety of standardized methods and techniques in the pursuit of valid knowledge". Therefore, since researchers seek to present honest and factual information, they are

dedicated to the utilisation of impartial techniques and procedures that promote the probability of legitimacy.

This study mainly intended to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The problem identified prior to this research topic was that political officials and senior public service managers found it difficult to maintain good working relationships. In the politics–administration interface, tensions occur if a senior public service manager is not in agreement with a political official about political views or a specific public policy decision.

Furthermore, research problems and research questions provide an important guideline for the researcher in selecting the appropriate research methodology or design. This study is compatible with qualitative method, case studies design, document analysis and open-ended interviews to collect data.

### **3.4 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RESEARCH**

Validity and reliability are intrinsic methodological issues in qualitative research. Rudestam and Newton (1992:17) maintains that one cannot separate the investigator from the object of inquiry. ‘Reliability’ refers to the replication of similar situations and similar studies, so that related conclusions can be developed. In this research the subject of reliability was considered by multiple instruments to identify and correct shortcomings and undertake careful analysis of the behaviours and decisions taken by examined subjects. The shortcomings of document analysis were mitigated by using open-ended questionnaires and case study design to obtain and analyse data. ‘Validity’, according to Stanfield (1993:69), “addresses itself to the truth of an assertion that they make about something in the empirical world”. Discrepancies in data control and data interpretation are expected, as a case study perspective is subjective and interpretative (Millon and Diesenhaus, 1972). The validity of the study



depends on the observational and inferential skills of the researcher and this cannot be considered free from bias. Though this may be a multiple paradigm form of research, problems around interpretative bias remain unsolved. The validity issues of this study were dealt with in a similar manner to the reliability problem, namely to test the instruments thoroughly and analyse the responses carefully. The issues of reliability and validity in this study are dealt with cautiously by using multiple methods of obtaining and analysing data to avoid bias in the study.

### **3.5 DATA COLLECTION**

For a researcher to understand the procedures and techniques of data collection utilised in this research, two main components were acknowledged, namely design and structure. Such components are explained in detail below with regard to how they were utilised in the research.

#### **3.5.1 Design and structure of open-ended personal interview questionnaire**

The design and structure of a questionnaire provide an outline for confirming that participants comprehend the reasoning of the questions asked. Thus participants can freely state their understanding and opinions with comprehensive reasoning (Boyce and Neale, 2006:5). This study used open-ended personal interviews to obtain data that responded to the study questions, particularly the nature of the relationship between political officials and the senior public service managers with regard to administration in the public service. This guarantees that the examiner has participants in mind when formulating the questions. Open-ended individual interview survey questions are flexible in order to permit collaboration with the assessor and clarify interview questions. The formulation of the survey questions in this study took into account the interests, needs, subject matter and language of the participants.

### **3.5.2 Administration of open-ended personal interview questionnaire**

The researcher in this study interviewed a total of twenty-five participants. The participants were senior academics, elected officials, senior public officials and authors who are reviewers of ANC governance and administration. The twenty-five participants comprised ten professors in the study of governance from four different universities in South Africa and ten senior public officials with experience in the South African politics–administration interface, as well as five elected officials to determine the politics–administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. Prior to meeting with the participants and directing open-ended individual interviews, the questionnaire was sent through electronic mail (e-mail) to participants for preparation. Each questionnaire was complemented by a covering letter clarifying the intention of the interview, confidentiality, suggested questionnaire arrangement and the contact information of the examiner for additional information where necessary following the conversation.

### **3.6 OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS DATA ANALYSIS**

Leedy and Ormrod (2001:159) states that “interviewing in a qualitative study is rarely structured and it is either open-ended or semi-structured while revolving around a few central questions”. These authors further argue that “an interviewer should ask questions relating to the study with regard to any of the following: people’s beliefs about facts, motives for undertaking certain decisions, present and past behaviours, the standards for behaviour (what people think should be done), and conscious reasons for actions or feelings”. The open-ended personal interviews in this study were embarked upon to ask these questions in the context of the state of the politics–administration interface in South Africa.

In public administration and management research, dialogues are usually utilised as opposed to various other techniques of collecting data. According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:32), “this is so because interviewing allows the researcher to explain questions whenever participants are not clear about the questions”. In this study, the researcher conducted open-ended personal interviews with directors from the public service and academics in the field of public administration and management. The researcher has verified, interpreted and clarified supplementary data or examined certain assumptions.

The outcomes of the open-ended individual interview questionnaires were examined to ensure that the contributions of the participants were properly understood and summarized into study conclusions. This is necessary to correctly analyse compound views, perceptions and experiences of participants, particularly the members of the public service and the political bureau. A detailed examination and explanation of facts is provided in Chapter 5 to further augment the information in this segment.

### **3.7 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION AND PRESENTATION METHOD**

When analysing data, the researcher might start with questions such as the research questions in the introduction to the study instead of starting with data analysis exclusively (Yin, 2009:130). The researcher should start with the study question first and then identify the acquired evidence that addresses the question. The researcher can then draw tentative conclusions based on the weight of the evidence, also asking how the researcher should display the evidence so that readers can check the researcher’s assessment tools. The process can be repeated until the researcher is satisfied that the research questions are fully addressed. This study was conducted through qualitative research using document analysis of primary sources, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group Committee meeting minutes and Special Commission reports. The study

further reviews original books on the concept and peer-reviewed journal articles on the politics–administration interface concept.

The document analysis method is unobtrusive and it can be utilised without imposing on contributors. Documents can be tested and re-tested for consistency. According to Taylor and Bogdan (1998:98), “*document analysis involves several steps: the first step is selecting material relevant to the research subject (the sampling frame) and then sampling the material to be analysed from that sampling frame. The second step is an undertaking to define the categories of contents that are going to be measured, the topics of interest within the documents. The third step is to choose the recording unit and decide how to divide the content into standard units for analysis (e.g. a single word, paragraph and page). The final step is deciding the numeric values that are used to code each category in each recording unit*”.

Benefits of document analysis as outlined by Taylor and Bogdan (1998:99) are that “*the documented record permits access to matters that may be problematic or unmanageable to study using direct, individual interaction. Second, raw data are usually nonreactive. Third, sometimes the record has existed long enough to permit analyses of political occurrences over time. Fourth, the written record often allows one to increase the sample size above what would be possible through either interviews or direct observation. Fifth, costs are low because they are borne by the record keepers, not the researcher*”.

However, there are limitations to document analysis as discussed by Yin (1984: 67): “*... first, record keepers may not preserve all pertinent materials but rather selectively save those that are the least embarrassing, controversial or problematic. Second, large gaps in time exist in many archives due to loss of records or failure to collect records. Third, the written record content may be biased by record keeping that is inaccurate*

*or falsified. Fourth, some written records are unavailable to researchers, like classified documents. Fifth, the written record may lack a standard format because it is kept by different people*". Finally, the major problem is that documents may not have been written for the same purposes as the research and, therefore, conclusions were not drawn from document analysis alone. In this study, the disadvantages of document analysis were mitigated by combining document analysis with open-ended personal interviews and case study examination, using a combination of document analysis and case studies to improve the validity of the study.

Document analysis, as utilised in this study, is the logical scrutiny of academic and official documents in order to better comprehend a particular phenomenon (Chism, 1999:38). Document sources were accessed from archives with public administration literature and from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website, Hansard reports and National Government department websites to examine the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The researcher in this study obtained access to parliamentary committee meeting minutes and commission reports as published in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group website. The researcher employed a qualitative research method to subject literature to analysis and to examine relevant public administration theories in the context of South Africa. Qualitative study denotes a broad methodological approach to the enquiry of social action using, among other methods, document analysis which is the main approach the researcher undertook to conduct this study.

### **3.8 POPULATION AND SAMPLING**

The 'total population' refers to the "entire set of elements, persons, occurrences, happenings that are the centre of the study and with which the examiner seeks to conclude some characteristics" (Mouton, 1996:134). To guarantee that data gathering undertakings are carried out and finalised, a sample from the target population is typically identified. The

target sample in this study was comprised of twenty-five participants, of whom ten were senior academics in the fields of politics and public administration, who are also political analysts and reviewers of governance. The sample also included ten senior public officials and five elected officials.

Sampling is defined as “*the process of selecting objects or phenomena when it is practically impossible to have knowledge of the entire population of the phenomena; it is also regarded as the process of drawing conclusions about unknown population parameters from the unknown sample statistic*” (Mouton, 1996:133). Sampling permits examiners in the social sciences, public administration and management to expedite a methodical assortment of items from the overall population. Unlike the quantitative examiner, the examiner in qualitative study does not take a decision based on the scope of the sample prior to commencing the study. Contributors are not employed on a representative basis but for their professional understanding of the investigated phenomenon. In this study, the researcher selected participants who have experienced the politics–administration interface under investigation. In qualitative research sample, participants do not statistically represent any meaningful population but they represent social concepts (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:94).

Non-probability sampling was applied in this study; “non-probability sampling technique cannot continuously pledge that the sample scope identified is a representative sample” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:78). In this study the non-probability sampling utilised was purposive sampling that was employed throughout the personal interviews.

Finally, purposive sampling was applied in this study. Selecting a sample “*on the basis of knowledge of the population and the purpose of the study is sometimes appropriate and could be referred to as ‘purposive sampling’*”.

*This sampling method is based on the judgement of the researcher regarding the characteristics of a representative sample. An approach is to select units that are judged to be the most common in the population under investigation. However, the danger associated with this type of sampling is that it relies heavily on the subjective consideration of the researcher rather than on objective criterion*" (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:79). In this research, the selection of the participants was done employing such a purposive sampling methodology for the twenty-five participants that were interviewed, the senior academics, politicians, former senior public officials and commentators who authored books to critique the ANC administration. The officials interviewed were targeted or purposively constituted in scope of the sample for sampling intentions.

### **3.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The researcher has attempted to ensure the following ethical considerations as stated by the Social Research Association (2003:48): first, *"the principle of voluntary participation requires that people not be coerced into participating in research. Second, prospective research participants must be fully informed about the procedures and risks involved in research and must give their consent to participate. Third, ethical standards also require that researchers not put participants in a situation where they might be at risk of harm as a result of their participation"*. Fourth, the researcher must ensure the participants' confidentiality. Fifth, the researcher must ensure the participants' anonymity. The researcher provided the consent form to all participants with the ethical considerations outlining the ethical aspects of qualitative research. The people who participated in this research were not coerced into participating. The participants were advised of the techniques and processes in this enquiry and their approval to contribute was obtained by the researcher. The confidentiality of participants was upheld by using interviewee codes instead of names of interviewed persons.

### **3.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The qualitative research data analysis relies on the researcher's objectivity. Hence, the researcher must be ethical and apply a combination of research approaches to ensure validity. Open-ended questions result in too much data which, in turn, results in an increased workload as the researcher is required to intensively analyse and exclude the irrelevant data from the study. The researcher must clearly determine the relevant data from the total of collected data. Furthermore, even though the researcher pledges to ensure confidentiality of the participants, confidentiality cannot be fully guaranteed because certain views and concepts are generally associated with certain authors, individuals and groups. The use of document analysis can have limitations since document guardians may fail to retain all relevant resources but instead selectively retain data. Thus the researcher utilized the combination of approaches, operational and theoretical research to ensure the validity of the study.

### **3.11 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY**

This study focused on the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. The observation of the study topic is from 1999, the period when the GNU ended and the new administration under President Thabo Mbeki and the ANC government began to develop new public policies aligned with the political ideology of a developmental State. This study encompasses a ten-year review of the politics–administration interface in the post-apartheid South African public service.

In further examining the demarcation of the research, the following features received consideration: the hierarchical dimension, time, and geographical region.



### **3.11.1 Hierarchical dimension**

The senior academics, political analysts and authors analysing the ANC administration were all participants who responded to the open-ended questions on politics–administration interface and conflicts between the political bureau and the administration bureau. This examination focused on the political bureau and the administration bureau in South Africa. This study reviewed elected officials and senior public service managers in South Africa who are responsible for maintaining the relationship between administration and politics.

### **3.11.2 Time period**

The period element for the research was the epoch between 1999 and 2009. Thus it was a ten-year review of the Mbeki era in the context of politics and administration and the politics–administration interface. This demarcation in terms of time dimension provided a focus on politics and administration in South Africa since President Thabo Mbeki came into power. Although the study has a limited scope and time period, it provides politics–administration interface implications for the current state and the future of governance in South Africa.

### **3.11.3 Geographical region**

The theoretical base of the study was developed in the 19th century in the American public administration. However, this study focuses on a similar phenomenon in the context of South Africa.

## **3.12 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE**

In this study document analysis and open-ended personal consultations were utilised to collect information from the contributors, mainly to establish the landscape of the rapport between political officials and the

senior bureaucrats concerning the administration in the public sector. The open-ended personal interview questionnaire was designed to be flexible to allow interaction with the interviewer and clarify interview questions. The design of the questionnaire has been considered in line with the following aspects as outlined by Bless and Higson-Smith (2000:113): *“first, do not begin to develop a questionnaire by drafting questions. Second, always take into account the needs, interests and problems of the participants. Third, the researcher should give serious attention to the wording of questions. Fourth, the researcher should structure questions cautiously”*. The survey questions were designed with eleven open-ended questions to allow for comprehensive responses from participants.

The researcher in this study interviewed a total of twenty-five participants. The twenty-five participants are comprised of ten professors in the study of governance from seven different universities in South Africa, and ten senior public officials with experience in the South African politics–administration interface, as well as five elected officials to determine the politics–administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. The researcher received responses through questionnaires from twenty-five participants who shared their knowledge and views on the politics–administration interface phenomenon in South Africa. Of the twenty-five participants, the researcher met fifteen participants face-to-face for sequel discussions. Prior to meeting with the participants and directing open-ended individual interviews, the questionnaires were sent through e-mail to participants for preparation. All questionnaires were complemented by a covering letter clarifying the intention of the meeting, confidentiality, suggested arrangement of the questions and the contact information of the researcher for further information where necessary following the interview. The researcher conducted the research himself with all twenty-five participants to ensure that the response rate and participation was satisfactory. The participants were senior academics, politicians, senior public officials and commentators on ANC governance and administration.

The fifteen participants provided responses without face-to-face communication but only by documenting their responses and e-mail to the researcher. Furthermore, ten participants were met by the researcher to discuss responses that were initially provided in the questionnaires to follow up and engage in a face-to-face discussion to obtain further information.

The researcher in this study has undertaken to protect the identity of participants by coding participants for confidentiality in congruence with research ethics. The *“use of study codes is a valuable technique for guarding the confidentiality of research participants. Study codes can be used on data collection tools in place of identifying information to protect participants. Furthermore, in the event that a data document is lost or stolen, having the data protected by a study code may prevent readers from determining the participant’s identity. The researcher must ensure the separation of data from identifiable individuals and store the codes linking data to individuals securely”* (Wiles, Crow, Heath and Charles, 2006:4).

### **3.13 INTERVIEWS AND MAIN QUESTIONS**

The dialogue questions were intended to address the study questions in order to refute or confirm the study pre-claims. The first pre-claim sought to examine disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. The second pre-claim attempted to establish the notion that it is a generally accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public service function. The third pre-claim examined conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and the administration bureau possibly leading to strained politics–administration interface. The final pre-claim suggested that there could be different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau leading to strained politics–administration interface. Furthermore, the research questions of the study were examined together with the pre-claims as outlined in the questionnaires.

### 3.14 DATA ANALYSIS

The questionnaires analysed in congruence with the study questions and the concepts from the questionnaires were categorized to form an argument to answer the research questions. According to Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003:2), the first steps in qualitative questionnaire analysis are to read and re-read the text and document the impressions coherent with the research questions; consider the quality of data; and determine the data of greater value. Secondly, the researcher seeks to identify themes, patterns, ideas, concepts and phrases, and categorizes concepts into coherent arguments in accordance with the study questions. In this study the researcher analysed the questionnaires and extracted concepts that address the three research questions as presented above. This study utilized a qualitative research method, the data from questionnaires was analysed and findings were made based on the questionnaires, document analysis and case study analysis. A qualitative document analysis approach to data analysis involves reading and re-reading transcripts, and looking for similarities and differences that enable the researcher to develop themes and categories (Kawulich, 2004:104). In qualitative research, data are analysed with the purpose of answering the research questions in line with the study theory. It is important to analyse the data in terms of the research questions to enable the researcher to answer the questions posed within the study. The answers and quotations related to the same topic are categorized by research question and can assist the researcher to recognize patterns found in the data. Wolcott (1994:11) argues that the researcher should highlight the findings by emphasising some data more than other data and summarizing what is important to the study. This study also gathered data to respond to the concepts presented through the pre-claims as demonstrated below.

### **3.15 CONCLUSION**

Chapter 3 presented the study design that was utilised in this study. Data collection and analysis and data presentation were discussed in this chapter. The chapter also presented the reliability, validity and the limitations of the study. The ethical considerations, including the researcher's pledge of confidentiality, were explained. The research design and methodology, and the rationale for the research choices made were then discussed.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **DOCUMENT ANALYSIS RESEARCH DATA REVIEW**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The first pre-claim of this study attempted to establish the notion that it is a generally accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public service function in order to provide direction. The second pre-claim sought to examine conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and the administration bureau, possibly leading to strained politics–administration interface. The third pre-claim suggested that the different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau could lead to strained politics–administration interface. The fourth and final pre-claim sought to examine the disregard for documented duties and responsibilities of the political officials and senior public administrators. This study argues that the ultimate governance responsibility is vested in the political bureau through a social contract. Thus the political bureau dominance over public administration is justified as further discussed below.

The study also argues that the interface is an imagined concept that is difficult to locate in the politics–administration relationship. It examines the leadership approaches conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau as well as the leadership trends between 1999 and 2009 in South Africa’s public service sector. The impact of differing political ideology on the politics–administration interface is reviewed by examining the political parties (the ANC, the DA and the IFP) and the politics–administration relationship cases to demonstrate the state of governance during the period between 1999 and 2009. The findings of the four pre-claims are presented in this chapter on the basis of the document analysis research output.

The study further examines documented roles and grey or nondescript areas or contested roles and unclaimed roles which may be the contributing factors that strain working relationships in the politics–administration interface. The study argues that despite documented rules and responsibilities, there are unclear areas in the interface, and such unclear areas can be claimed by either the political bureau or the administrative bureau, depending on who is strong enough to win control of such areas.

The chapter presents the findings mainly from the document analysis, and the combination of document analysis and case study design is utilised to reach conclusions that are later confirmed or refuted in the next chapter when the data from the interviews is presented.

#### **4.2 DOMINANCE OF POLITICAL OFFICIALS OVER PUBLIC SERVICE FUNCTION**

The political bureau interference justification is based on the legislative requirements for political officials to account in parliament regarding the failure or success of the public service. The “Guide to tabling of papers in Parliament” (2011:8) states that “when papers are delivered to the office of Clerk of the Papers for tabling, the departmental officials must have obtained approval for tabling of such papers from the Minister and the Director-General. As such, the letter sent to Parliament for tabling of a paper must be signed and dated”. Policies are drafted by senior public managers in consultation with the political bureau that is represented by the minister or the deputy minister. Public managers are appointed to implement public policies for the public good using the resources of the public. Everything public managers do is therefore public and open to public scrutiny, and they should account for themselves in relevant political forums. All the committees that provide a supervisory role in public service work seek to ensure that decisions made by public bureaucrats are

intended to develop and improve the lives of the citizens. However, it is important to note that public administration will always take place in a political environment. This is because politics is the main force behind paradigm shifts in the public administration and there is thus a thin line between politics and public administration. For example, one would not be surprised to see a Director-General attending an ANC conference as a delegate. The former President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, who is celebrated as the founder of public administration was a multi-disciplined public administrator who was a politician, administrator and academic. This is because public administration is the science of who gets what, how and when. The 'what' and 'when' are political questions since they address matters of race, gender and citizenship, among others. The involvement of politics in public administration necessitates the rectification of historical imbalances and ensures accountability for public resources used for the people's development.

#### **4.2.1 Political bureau role in the bureaucratic structure**

Max Weber (1919:13) suggested that "the role of the political bureau in government machinery is to give direction to public policy and expression of a policy agenda". Weber further argued that "the responsibility of political office bearers lies in their personal, ethical responsibility for their actions, which was to take a stand and to be passionate about social fairness". In contrast, public service managers are expected to exclusively participate in the unbiased management of their bureaux. The nobility of public servants is seen in their capacity to implement meticulously the legalised guidelines of higher political office. In executing their responsibilities, a drive of stewardship and duty should be more significant than individual political opinions. The responsibility of public servants is an impersonal, passionless application of the rules stemming from the political policy agenda set by the political bureau. While Weber (1919:3) defined the interface, he also posed a crucial question: *"The question is whether or not the power-holder in the political bureau directs and*



*organizes the administration while delegating executive power to personal servants or personal favourites and confidants who are directed by the power-holder in the political bureau.”* In this question, Weber raises another contributing factor to strained politics–administration relationships in the politics–administration interface, namely that politicians appoint senior public service managers who are aligned with prevailing political agendas. In the South African setting, this appointment is referred to as ‘cadre deployment’. This study found that the problem with cadre deployment is that it is founded on the conjecture that a senior public service manager will remain faithful and submissive to the political bureau. The relationship becomes strained when the senior public service manager decides to take a share of power, and become creative and innovative outside the ideology and agenda of the political bureau. One of the examined pre-claims in this study suggested that the tension in the politics–administration relationship is exacerbated when the roles and responsibilities are not clearly articulated in the documented guidelines such as the constitution, policies and legislation.

#### **4.2.2 Important relationships in the politics–administration interface**

Since 1994 there has been an increase in power of the political executive over Directors-General. The Directors-General, rather than being their Minister’s administrative counterpart, are made to some extent subservient and accountable to the Minister in terms of performance agreements and the PFMA (1999). The PFMA has made Directors-General more accountable as regards financial management of their departments, but has limited the role of the Minister to ensure the department complies with the Act, which is “to report on the financial transactions of the department to Parliament and to hold the Directors-General accountable for financial management of the department” (Public Finance Management Act, 1999: sections 63 to 65). Therefore, since the commencement of democratic governance in South Africa it has become essential that the Directors-General and their Minister should have a good working relationship and

share a common understanding of the administrative and political environment.

In the post-1994 era, more demands are being made on Directors-General; they are responsible for the management of financial and human resources and policy advice; and are functioning within an increasingly complex social, economic and political environment. The role of Directors-General has been evolving as each political dispensation introduces measures that impact upon the Directors-General in order to ensure the balance shifts in favour of the political leadership (Miller, 2005:95). Directors-General in the post-1994 era function in a predominantly political environment and have a significant responsibility to serve the political office well as and when required. Directors-General should uphold the political mandate to promote fair labour practices as consistent with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the values of the ANC's labour alliance. The appointment of a Directors-General is based on a five-year contract with further performance contracts intended to hold them accountable for performance (Public Service Amendment Act 86 of 1998). The contract may include any agreement that the Minister and Director-General enter into, but should include the following: the particular duties of the Director-General; the specific performance criteria for evaluating the performance of the Director-General; the grounds and procedures upon which the services of the Director-General may be terminated before the completion of his or her contract; and any other matter that may be prescribed by the Minister (Public Service Amendment Act, 1997, section 9). The legislative wording "any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister" provides a Minister with the power to impose ambiguity through law.

The selection process for a Director-General involves the advertisement of the vacant post as decided by the Minister and an interview by a selection committee consisting of at least three Ministers (Public Service

Regulations, 1999:23). The selection of the suitable candidate is based on the following considerations: “information based on valid methods, criteria and instruments that are free from bias; the training, skills, competence and knowledge necessary to meet the requirements of the post; the needs of the department; and a preference for affirmative action appointees” (Public Service Regulations, 1999:24).

According to Mafunisa (2003:86), the “ANC has deployed some of its members to key public sector positions with a view to promoting loyalty and service delivery”. The belief of the ruling party is that “effective service delivery depends on people who understand and are loyal to its policies and programmes” (Twala, 2014:159). Owing to the history of South Africa, the country’s service delivery has been subject to political sabotage by the supporters of the previous regime and other opposing forces. Hence, service delivery requires the backing of the political office with its political mandate. Political values refer to policies formulated by political office bearers, whereas ‘administration’ refers to the provision of goods and services to members of the public with the help of the administrative and auxiliary functions (Mafunisa, 2003:86). It is important to note that administration functions consist of policymaking, categorising, funding, personnel setting up and deployment, determining work techniques, and control. The principal role of senior public managers is to translate political goals into administrative practice. Therefore, it is prudent that in a developing country a senior public manager appreciates the political ideology of the day. However, the politicisation of service delivery should only last until there is a high level of professionalism that will drive public service to a complementary relationship between public service managers and political office bearers (Mafunisa, 2003:86). “Complementarity stresses interdependence along with distinct roles, compliance along with independence and respect for political supremacy, along with a commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest. Political office bearers could theoretically dominate

administrative practice, but they are constrained by a respect for administrative competence and commitment. Senior public servants could use their considerable assets to become self-directed, but they are controlled by a commitment to accountability in the complementary relationship. Overhead democracy executed by citizens and politicians can work, but only if it is accompanied by undergirding responsibility from senior public servants” (Mafunisa, 2003:86). There is an intersection between the ‘domains’ of the bureaucrats and that of elected officials. Complementarity is a conceptual outline that recognises various duties and accountabilities but also understands the necessity for interface and working relations as a substitute for the politicization of service delivery.

#### **4.2.3 Public service managers in a democratic South Africa**

Public administration exists in a political environment and the present public administration is a result of changes that were part of reparations to rectify the shortcomings of the apartheid era. Miller (2005:27) argues that “Directors-General were themselves subject to changes”. The role of the Director-General was formulated in the early 1980s and particularly during the 1990s their role increased in complexity, both administratively and politically. They had to support changes in political dispensations and the polity, at times a difficult change for those who served during the transition period and for those who served in the latter part of the 1990s. These changes increased the complexity and demands of the most high-ranking positions in the government departments. The post of the Director-General was created during the rationalisation process under President P.W. Botha. The new post of Director-General was a re-definition of the responsibilities and changes in senior management. The post effectively gave Directors-General more responsibilities in managing a larger organisation and finances. During the rationalisation process, no public servant retired, resigned or was dismissed but became part of the new political and administration dispensation. The Public Service Act 103 of 1994 gave effect to one National Public Service and nine Provincial

Administrations. This Act made provision for the “amalgamation of the National Public Service, the Public Service Commission, the composition and organisation of the public service, and career incidents of public servants in the new South Africa” (Public Service Act 103 of 1994). The Public Service Amendment Act 47 of 1997 introduced a number of revolutionary changes. First, it adjusted the authorities and duties of the Public Service Commission as consistent with the Constitution (1996), and shifted policy matters relating to the government departments to the Minister for Public Service and Administration, thereby increasing his or her powers over public service. Policy matters relating to the public service thereby shifted from a neutral custodian such as the Public Service Commission to the Minister and therefore the Cabinet. Second, it decentralized the organization, administration and staff matters of departments rather than a central institution. Third, it introduced performance management into the public service with section 12 specifically focusing on senior management and Directors-General. Fourth, it changed the role of the Provincial Director-General and heads of departments. The Act also introduced affirmative action and a Code of Conduct for the Public Service. Since the post of the Director-General in South Africa was initially created by the political bureau in the apartheid government under President Botha, such is evidence that the organisation and restructuring of the public service is driven by the political bureau.

Miller (2005: 87) argues that an important development in South African public administration is that the appointment of a Director-General is by the authority of the President (Public Service Amendment Act, 1999: section 1). This shifts the most senior public service echelon from a career to a political appointment system. The reason for the introduction of the presidential appointments of Directors-General is to achieve two objectives, namely (i) administrative expediency, and (ii) political clout. The objectives of administrative expediency are to expedite the transformation of the government departments in terms of representation and leadership

of the public service transformation process; increase the recruitment of diverse skills by appointing persons from outside the public service; redeploy Directors-General so that their valuable expertise would not be removed from the government once they have served five years or if there was a problem between the Director-General and the Minister; depersonalize the relationship between the Minister and Director-General; and save the State costs in paying out a Director-General who did not complete his or her contract should the Minister not wish to retain the services of a Director-General who could be deployed to another department.

The Explanatory Manual on the Code of Conduct for the Public Service (2002:20) states that “as far as the Public Service is concerned, all its clients must be served equally in accordance with the policies of the government of the day. An employee must therefore clearly understand the difference between his or her responsibilities towards the government of the day and becoming directly involved in party political issues; for example, employees are expected to actively support their respective Ministers in preparing documents, among other things, which will be used for official purposes, such as debates on draft legislation. Employees may, however, not become involved in preparing and drawing up documents to be used by a Minister for party political purposes”. In contrast, “managers must be given the flexibility to manage, within a framework that satisfies the constitutional requirements of transparency and accountability” (National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 2000:2). This means that senior public service managers must be accountable to the political bureau, particularly the Minister.

#### **4.2.4 Public managers as accounting officers to the political office**

It is the basic principle for every public office to have accounting officers (i.e. the Director-General) to be responsible for public finance

management and account to the political authorities concerned. The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA) states that,

*“the accounting officer is there to ensure that the department maintains effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial risk management and internal control. The accounting officer is also there to ensure the maintenance of a system of internal audit under the control and direction of an audit committee, complying and operating in accordance with regulations and instructions prescribed in terms of sections 76 and 77 (PFMA, Act No. 1 of 1999: section 36). It is expected of an accounting officer to ensure an appropriate procurement and provisioning system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Among many things, an accounting officer is responsible for the effective, efficient, economical and transparent use of the resources of the department; collect all money due to the department, prevent unauthorized, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure or loss resulting from criminal conduct; manage available working capital efficiently and economically”.*

All management decisions taken by an accounting officer are made available for scrutiny by appropriate committees and offices such as the Office of the Auditor-General on behalf of the public. According to the PFMA,

*“an accounting officer bears reporting responsibilities such as to keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the department in accordance with any prescribed norms and standards and to prepare financial statements for each financial year in accordance with generally recognized accounting practice. The accounting officer must submit the financial statements within two months after the end of the financial year to the Auditor-General and the Treasury to consolidate financial statements. The Auditor-General must scrutinise the financial statements and submit an*

*audit report to the accounting officer within two months of receipt of the statements”.*

An accounting officer is thus guided by legislation stemming from constitutional law which is mostly a political document. Accounting officers work in a political environment and they are bound to report to the political office.

The “financial data are leading indicators of performance, but the accounting officer must also include non-financial indicators, which are produced quarterly” (National Treasury: PFMA Guide for Officers, 2000:11). The

*“non-financial indicators should be stipulated in the performance agreement between the accounting officer and executive authority, and endorsed by the portfolio committee in the legislature concerned. Thus the monthly monitoring reports will be consolidated and published in the national Government Gazette, in line with international best practice. Such reports will facilitate the compilation of the year-end financial statements and the annual report. The annual report must review performance and achievements against the plan and budget approved by the legislature at the start of the year. It must include the financial statements of the department, together with its achievement against the service delivery indicators agreed at the time of the budget. The report must also quote the “audit opinion” of the Auditor-General, based on the external audit. Once published, the annual report will be tabled in the appropriate legislature and will be available for scrutiny by the public accounts committee concerned. Portfolio committees should also consider such reports to ensure that accounting officers address any issues raised in the audit report or any recommendations of the public accounts committee”.*



The guidance for accounting officers clearly reveals that the work of public managers is dependent on political direction and guidance.

The PFMA Guide for Accounting Officers states that “no accounting head can carry out all the operational responsibilities in the department, thus the PFMA allows the accounting head to delegate any authority of responsibility in writing to a proficient bureaucrat (National Treasury: PFMA Guide for Accounting Officers, 2000:26). Nevertheless, the delegation does not strip the accounting officer of the responsibility for exercising the delegated power or duty, thus the delegator must ensure that systems and processes are adequate to document, monitor and review the exercising of those powers or assigned duties. All officials in the department are accountable for their specific areas of responsibility”. The accounting head whose appointment was approved by the Minister of a department remains the official accounting officer in the political forum, such as Parliament.

The Division of Revenue Act 2 of 2006 (DoRA, section 24) states that an accounting officer has a duty to “monitor expenditure and non-financial performance information on programmes funded by an allocation; and does not impose any undue administrative burden on receiving provinces and municipalities beyond the provision of standard management information”. Public managers have responsibility enforced by political office through legislation to manage public money correctly, and guard against wasteful and fruitless expenditure.

The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 clarifies the “division of responsibilities between the Head of Department or the accounting officer and the political head or the Minister”. In terms of the Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA (National Treasury, 2000:2) the political bureau “is responsible for policy choices and outcomes, while the accounting officer implements the policy and achieves the outcomes by taking responsibility

for delivering the output defined in the departmental budget”. Accounting officers are granted powers through the PFMA to manage their budget and achieve the defined output. The Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA states that “the accounting officer’s performance contract must be consistent with the output defined in the budget”.

The PFMA empowers accounting heads to manage and simultaneously make them answerable for the assets they utilise; for example, “accounting officers have authority to write off losses, but they must report and justify their decisions to the Auditor-General or to the public accounts committees” (National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 2000:2). The same guide prescribes the “strategic planning process to ensure commonality of purpose between the accounting officer and the political bureau in pursuit of government objectives and outcomes”. Senior public service managers account to the Minister and they together account to the executive and the legislature. The guide states that “the accounting officer must submit regular monthly management reports to the Minister and such responsibility must be documented in his or her performance agreement” (National Treasury: Guide for Accounting Officers on PFMA, 2000:11). The PFMA grants some powers to the accounting head, while the accounting head’s primary obligation is to account for resources entrusted to him or her and justify his or her decisions to the political bureau.

#### **4.2.5 Limited power of senior public service managers**

In line with Rousseau’s (1762:12) social contract theory, it is the political bureau that is accountable to the public. Senior public service managers are merely employed by the political bureau and they account to the political bureau. The citizens have no contract with the administrators or senior public service managers. Citizens hold the political bureau to account for authority granted to the political office through elections. Hence, when citizens protest for better service delivery, their protest

should be directed to the Union Buildings as the seat of government, a Minister's Office, a Premier's Office and rarely to the Director-General's Office. The senior bureaucrats are not mandated by the electorate to deliver services. However, senior public service managers are employed by the elected political officials to deliver services on behalf of the political bureau. When this understanding of the social contract is lacking on the part of the senior public service manager, he or she might equate his or her authority with that of an elected official, whereas elected officials have full jurisdiction over public policy direction. Senior public service managers are employed servants for a limited period, and their continued employment depends on performance and reporting to the political bureau in accordance with documented protocol (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2008:2). Senior public service managers carry the political command not the public order to provide services, whereas elected officials carry the public mandate from the people who elect a ruling political party during the elections. Since senior public service managers have no public mandate, they have no power to quarrel with the elected political authorities; public officials such as Vusi Pikoli at NPA, Wallace Mgoqi at City of Cape Town and Mamodupi Mohlala at the Department of Communications had unsuccessfully tried to challenge the elected officials on the basis of the constitution and laws guiding the independent institutions and departments. Thus senior public service managers can only question their terms of employment and present the facts on their performance, but they cannot change the political agenda or force the political bureau in a particular direction. Senior public service managers carry only the political mandate and not the public mandate to provide services, whereas elected officials carry the public mandate from the people who elect a ruling political party during the elections. Since senior public service managers have no public mandate, they have no jurisdiction to engage with the elected political authorities. Thus senior public service managers can only address their terms of employment and present the facts on their performance, but they cannot change the political agenda. For example,

the independence of the SARB is guaranteed in the Constitution, but the Governor cannot decide to change the country's economic policy of inflation targeting, since the country's policy agenda stems from the political bureau and cascades down to the administration level. When senior public service managers comprehend jurisdiction as understood in the social contract relationship, there would be no tension in the politics–administration interface. Nevertheless, politicians will continue to dominate the administration which means the sustained challenge of political interference in administration may not be resolved. The conclusion regarding the authority of senior public service managers is that it is ordinarily limited to contractual terms of employment and performance agreement.

#### **4.2.6 Public managers as political beings**

This study argues that senior public service managers have a right to political affiliation but are expected to remain impartial when they execute their duties in the public service. The Public Service Commission (2002:35) states that “the Public Service and its employees stand in the service of the country as a whole and may not, in their functioning, advance the interests of any particular political party”. All citizens may enjoy the right to their political opinions and freedom of affiliation to any political party; however the Public Service should remain apolitical. The Republic of South Africa's Bill of Rights, in chapter two of the Constitution, outlines human rights or natural rights which include political and socio-economic rights. Public servants are also political beings working in the public service that is situated in the political environment. The general assumption is that when the accounting officer shares the same school of thought as the ruling party policy makers, service delivery will flow with minimum setbacks. Hence the political office bearers appoint accounting officers who are politically aligned and appreciate the political priorities of that time. However, the challenge is to determine where the political function ends and allow the autonomy and critical thinking of the

accounting officer to take precedence. The political arena must afford the accounting officer room for creativity and entrepreneurship that can maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. At the same time, political office bearers cannot leave service delivery responsibilities only to senior public managers. Cloete and Wissink (2000:157) argue that policy decisions “are subject to the limitations of human behaviour that are determined by the individual’s value system. Each decision is influenced by the public manager’s attitudes, prejudices and personal point of view”. Thus the parliamentary oversight role as a watchdog for effective and efficient service delivery becomes crucial.

#### **4.2.7 Senior public manager temptation**

There is some pressure for senior public managers to exclusively satisfy the masters in the political bureau and operate entirely in the political realm instead of being innovative and decisive in their role as managers. Managers may work only for the gratification of their personal needs, and to obtain what they want, they learn to pacify the politicians. Political power can thus influence the decision-maker who wants to protect his or her own interests (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:158). As a result of political power, a public manager could merely satisfy a need instead of taking the best decision in the interest of good service delivery. It is not always a good public service manager that succeeds in the public service; it may be a manager who simply knows how to have politicians on his or her side. For a strong administrative bureau, managers must manage with full professionalism and modern management techniques. Public managers need to be diligent and know how to deal with pressure exerted by the politicians, the trade unions, the media and the general public. At the same time, a public manager must appreciate the relationship with the political office bearers when dealing with policy matters. To avoid public managers becoming ineffective in management and being compelled to approve policies developed by politicians, they are also required to answer to the Auditor-General and Parliament. Public managers should also aim for

cordial relationships between political office bearers when dealing with policy matters (Svara, 1985:226). However, their priority should be to ensure effective and efficient public administration. A good public manager will be an agent of a work ethic that will result in critical thinking and innovation and well-developed decisions for effective policy performance. Senior public service managers are challenged by the temptation to satisfy elected officials even when the politician's view may not be the best for public administration; or they may refuse to comply with the demands of a politician and take the best professional decision for improved service delivery.

#### **4.2.8 The independent public servant as an exception**

Koehler and Pankowski (1997:8) argue that government bureaucracies are rigid and formal, and political officials often believe that they can formulate the policies and then simply hire administrators to impose them. These authors further argue that political officials cannot continue to believe that it is their job to reinvent government but rather to entrust and expect the leaders in government agencies to develop management systems that meet or exceed the expectations of the customers they serve. The essence of public administration is encompassed in the Latin word *administrare*, which means "to serve" or "to assist" (Stivers, 2003:214). A Minister is a servant, for example, as in the church a Minister is a servant of God who serves or assists the people of God. Similarly, the Minister of a government department is appointed to serve the people. The connotation of the word 'serve' is rooted in an ethical dimension driven by the rule of the "greatest happiness for the greatest number of people". The need to serve the people is clearly realized in the political context rather than a business context. The main concern with the idea of divorcing public administration from politics is that public administration will lose the element of serving the people and government departments will become business-like institutions, viewing citizens as customers or clients.

Therefore, a view that divorces public administration from politics is not practically suitable for a developing country such as South Africa. It is political pressure that forced the paradigm shift in South Africa's public administration and it is the political force that drives improvement of the country's financial status for the benefit of the South African people. Political force also drives globalisation and provides the global context for international economics (Maharaj, 2008:5). Separating politics from public administration would neglect the facts that led to the majority of African people being excluded from economic opportunity and continuing to live in poor conditions. From the political context stems the supreme law of the country, the Constitution, which is the foundation for public administration as outlined in Chapter 10 of the Constitution. Public administration is the vehicle for service delivery and distribution of scarce resources, albeit that the distribution of resources and the promotion of livelihoods has always been a political duty.

The involvement of political officials in public administration makes public administration a public institution rather than a private sector matter. The main variance between the public sector and private sector is the role of the political office that ensures accountability, transparency and service delivery to the people as required by the Constitution. Klein, Mahoney, McGahan and Pitelis (2009:5) suggest that public managers should study and strategize the entrepreneurship concepts and advise Ministers on policy matters. Ministers are servants who serve the people, whereas public managers are employees who direct such service to the people on behalf of the political bureau, thus on behalf of the people. Consequently, a Minister is sworn into office since the Minister's role "to serve" is spiritual and ethical, whereas public managers are appointed for their strategic management of service delivery expertise on a contractual basis. The responsibility of serving the people is a constitutional order to government not to individualise public professionals or the private sector. Ethical standards with respect to public office and public service apply at the very

least to those who hold high-ranking positions in the government departments and to those in any form of elected political office (Philip, 2014:24). Farnham, Horton, Barlow and Hondeghe (1996:32) argue that public managers operate not in a market context but in a political environment, hence the researcher in this study argues that political officials and public administration officials' implementation of policies should be characterized by the inclination to serve the public.

The work of public managers should be guided by stewardship and the prioritising of the government agenda in line with the public interest and public finance guidelines, as well as being formulators and advisers on policies; and facilitating the provision of goods and services. Part IX of the Public Service Regulations states that public servants should strive for "an efficient, non-partisan and representative public service". Hence public servants should be able to execute meticulously official instructions from superior political authorities. Eventually it is expected that a political bureau will be held politically accountable in an egalitarian society. Public managers work under the scrutiny of political officials, the media, trade unions, the international community and the public who are the tax-payers. At the same time, public managers are expected to be innovative, creative and entrepreneurial (Blaug, Horner and Lekhi (2006:17). The extent to which a public manager may be free to employ his or her creativity in the public administration is a grey area that needs more academic discourse. Cloete and Wissink (2002:160) argue that decision-making by public managers "requires discernment, discretion, knowledge and creativity. However, the importance of creativity in public administration is often underestimated, particularly with respect to unprogrammed decision-making".

From the discussion presented above it appears that ultimate power to manage governance and government departments is entrusted in the political bureau, whereas the role of bureaucrats is performance-based for



a period as stated in the employment contract. According to Ballart and Villamayor (2009:2), the challenge that remains within the government machinery is that “civil servants have to be entrepreneurial in pursuing effectiveness but they are not politically elected and thus their discretion is filtered by political actors and rules”. This challenge seems to be an inherent tension of the government machinery. What appears certain is that the political bureau has a responsibility entrusted to it by the public through the social contract relationship which is established through elections in a democratic government. Therefore, the expectation of an independent public servant would be a deviation from the inherent nature of government machinery in democratic governance.

#### **4.2.9 The political power over legislations**

In this section the study argues that the political bureau is the ultimate authority over documented legislations; the claim is based on the example regarding political decisions below. One of the first actions by Thabo Mbeki when he became President of the Republic of South Africa in 1999 was to announce the urgent establishment of the crime fighting unit within the National Prosecuting Authority, the Directorate of Special Operations or DSO (known as Scorpions). Berning and Montesh (2012:2) argue that as soon as the “Scorpions” was established in 2001 they began to investigate the arms procurement process known as the Arms Deal. The arms deal was concluded in 1999 and valued at R43.8 billion. It was allegedly a corrupt process undertaken with the collusion and knowledge of high profile bureaucrats and elected officials in government. When the administrative bureau created by the political bureau became bigger than the political bureau it became undesirable at the political bureau level. The monster had grown strong and began to devour its owner. The manner in which the Scorpions operated was referred to as unconstitutional by the political bureau, including, for example, the gathering of intelligence and counter-intelligence information, leaking of information to the media, and public investigations and arrests on camera, as well as the use of

prosecutors in investigations and prosecutions (Schönsteich, 2014:9). Due to such objections, President Thabo Mbeki established the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry. Although the manner in which the Scorpions undertook their duties was found by the Commission to be of concern, the institution itself was found to be constitutional. In paragraph 12.1; Khampepe stated that, “the argument that the legal mandate of the DSO to investigate and prosecute serious organised crime is unconstitutional within the meaning of section 199(1) of the Constitution is without merit” (Khampepe, 2006:41). The Khampepe Commission also found that “*the Directorate lacked political oversight thus the Scorpions were too independent. Section 43 of the National Prosecution Act 32 of 1998 made provision for the establishment of a Ministerial Coordinating Committee to develop regulations and standard operating procedures (SOP) for the members of the DSO. However, the same section did not make provision for the establishment of a structure or institution to oversee the DSO, which the Ministerial Committee was not expected to do*”. Berning and Montesh (2012:2) argue that “mistakes by the Scorpions themselves, the failure of the law and executive to determine appropriate oversight over the unit, as well as intense political pressure as a consequence of pursuing investigations that involved high level politicians, all contributed to the downfall of the Scorpions. During December 2007, the ANC held its 52nd National Policy Conference, where it was resolved that the Directorate of Special Operations should be incorporated into the South African Police Service. In 2009 the crime fighting unit to replace the Scorpions was formed, namely the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation known as the Hawks. However, a few months later the Constitutional Court found that the Hawks did not meet the legal obligation of sufficient impartiality since it was open to political interference.

In the case above there is a question of balance between independence of the administration bureau and oversight from the political bureau. When the Constitution refers to independent institutions, how independent should

they be, considering the fact that such institutions are established by the political bureau and their senior managers are appointed by the political bureau? The independence of the administrative bureau is a pursuit, a generally desired state in the politics–administration interface. However, the administrative bureau cannot be completely independent, thus the review of legislation is undertaken to alleviate ambiguity as a necessary starting point. The document analysis in this study reveals that the political bureau has ultimate authority over documented legislation.

#### **4.2.10 Locating the interface**

Interface is an imagined concept and its location is indistinguishable, depending on who determines it, whether the argument is for politicians or for managers. Svava (1998:52) argues that interface is “an aberration and not the founding concept of public administration”. Politics–administration is the dual nature of government; politics is inherently comprised of administration as an outcome upon which the success or failure of political bureaux can be established. For hundreds of years it has been difficult for researchers to locate the interface. Despite documented roles for the political bureau and the administration bureau, the roles remain overlapping in different degrees across governments and may be indistinct for any researcher who tries to locate the interface.

Interface in politics–administration relationship is an aberration; it is unusual to expect separation between administration and politics. The interface between administration and politics is an imagined shifting boundary, and trying to distinctly locate this interface has challenged researchers who have dedicated their lives to studying government machinery since the 18th century. From Wilson’s understanding in “The Study of Administration” to contemporary scholars, none have persuasively established the location and nature of the interface due to the dual nature of government machinery, which is both political and administrative. Since this interface is a concept, locating it depends on

who does the examination. The binary opposites approach to the politics–administration relationship has failed to separate what is naturally inseparable. Hence Uwizeyimana (2013:170) argues that “it is impossible to create or imagine totally apolitical government institutions”. Therefore, the problem is not necessarily a tendency from political officials or public service officials or both parties to have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities, but it is the fact that documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to gratify the electorate lest the political office loses the confidence of the people. The challenge is that there is no concrete demarcation between politics and administration other than the conceptualised interface in the academic perception. The political bureau and the administration bureau should strive to work collaboratively and prioritise efficient and effective governance instead of contesting for power and control of public administration space.

#### **4.2.11 Blurred boundaries between politics and public administration**

Document analysis revealed that there are indistinct boundaries between the party and the State. The South African Constitution (section 236) provides for the funding of political parties from the public purse for their legislative responsibilities in the multi-party democracy. Similar to senior bureaucrats, politicians are funded by the public purse and they are legitimate stakeholders in the public service. There are blurred boundaries between politics and public administration. The ANC members who worked for their political party in exile such as Ayanda Ntsaluba, Vusi Pikoli and Mavuso Msimang also worked in the public administration as Directors-General between 1999 and 2009. Furthermore, most of the post-1994 Directors-General operated in the non-governmental sector before they were employed in the public sector, while some were involved in political activities on behalf of the ANC while in exile or in prison (Miller, 2005:97). The ANC political leadership recruited persons into senior management positions who were qualified (academic qualifications and

background) as well as officials who were more sympathetic to the ANC's agenda. Remarkably, the advance of public administration in the post-apartheid South Africa is characterised by limited boundaries between public administration and politics. The rapport between the political bureau and the administration bureau has become more crucial in the post-1994 period than any previous era in South Africa because both parties exist to correct the injustices of the past governments. This study argues that the second phase of transforming the South African society through public administration requires the review of governance structure and the role of elected officials to focus on oversight instead of operations in the public service. The public administration in the post-1994 era is rooted in the expression of State will which is largely a political mandate, hence elected officials are structurally too close to the directors-general. The Director-General in the present era would be expected to oversee the execution of the State will through the public administration and report directly to the Minister. Hence for the public service to succeed in the current structure, the Director-General should be able to work well with his or her Minister for good governance and successful service delivery to the people, since failure to manage such relationship in the politics-administration interface results in problems associated with strained relationships in the interface. However, the congruent relationship between ministers and directors-general may mean indistinct boundaries between politics and public administration.

#### **4.2.12 Conflicting roles in the democratic government**

Since the beginning of the new democratic era in 1994 there has been an overlap in functions between the Minister and Director-General. For example, as prescribed by the Public Service Amendment Act of 1998, the Director-General is responsible for labour practices. However, it is the Minister who acts on behalf of the State to manage labour negotiations, conclude collective agreements and mediate in labour disagreements (Public Service Regulations, 1999:32). Furthermore, it is the Minister who

is responsible for administrative matters and should the labour dispute involve wage negotiations, it is legally the Minister's mandate to resolve the disagreement which has implications for the financial management of the department, which is the accounting officer's function. Consequently, the Minister of Public Service and Administration is the key political official in public service strike negotiations. Hence documented legislative guidelines such as the Public Service Regulations not only support blurred boundaries but they also promote overlapping responsibilities between the ministers and public administrators.

#### **4.3 LEADERSHIP STYLE: CONFLICT AND IMPACT ON THE POLITICS–ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE**

This section examines the leadership styles and impact on the interface, starting with the case of Advocate Vusi Pikoli's leadership and political interference during the Mbeki tenure. In the introduction to this study, the researcher stated that the study would examine cases of political dominance and tension between senior public service managers and political officials since the ANC government came into power. First the main case of former Head of State Thabo Mbeki and the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Advocate Vusumzi Pikoli, who was later dismissed by President Kgalema Motlanthe, is examined in this chapter as the unit of analysis.

According to Pikoli, his controversial job started with a meeting with President Thabo Mbeki in January 2005. On Friday 21 January 2005, government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe issued a media statement stating: "The President wishes to announce that he has appointed Advocate Vusumzi P. Pikoli as the National Director of Public Prosecutions with effect from 1 February 2005" (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:125). Pikoli's appointment came after Bulelani Ngcuka had resigned in 2004 after investigating the then Deputy President Jacob Zuma for fraud and corruption as Zuma had been implicated in the arms deal through his

relationship with Durban businessperson Schabir Shaik. Pikoli argues that Ngcuka was asked by the political bureau to resign and there was too much political pressure and too much tension between him and then Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:124). Pikoli argued: "I accepted the job because the mandate is defined in the legislation; all I had to do was to carry out my responsibilities in terms of the NPA Act and the Constitution" (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:25). Pikoli underestimated the political power that usually nullifies documented guidelines. He went on to do his job according to the National Prosecuting Authority Act and the Constitution. Among other decisions, he decided to continue with the investigation and prosecution of Jacob Zuma. He, however, became more controversial when he investigated and acquired a warrant of arrest for then Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi. In a letter dated 18 September 2007 from then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Brigitte Mabandla to Pikoli, the Minister castigated Pikoli for acquiring a warrant of arrest for the police commissioner who had close relations with underground drug syndicates and was a close ally of President Thabo Mbeki. "The potential political interference in the National Prosecuting Authority by the hands of those in power posed a depressing threat and real reminder that the slope is a slippery one" (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:185). "I knew Mbeki and Selebi were friends and had been close since Lusaka; but I felt that irrespective of the president's relationship with Selebi we had to do what was right" (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:237). The warrant of arrest of Selebi was issued. However, Mbeki suspended Pikoli just before the arrest was effected, and five days after Pikoli's suspension the Presidency requested Acting National Director Mokotedi Mpshe to apply for cancellation of Selebi's warrant of arrest (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:277). Pikoli's understanding of his role as the senior public administrator can be inferred from his statement: "Those in government and the ANC leadership didn't expect me to refuse to resign ... but they confused two important issues: my political allegiance to the party and my oath of office; to me the Constitution and the law come first"

(Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:279). He further stated: “Some felt I was being defiant and disrespectful to the president ... those accusations didn’t worry me as I felt that those people were not able to draw a distinction between the State and the party” (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013: 287).

According to Pikoli, the political bureau interferes with public administration, hence politicians generally appoint pliable senior officers in public administration to maintain the whim of the political bureau; whatever the President or Minister says is applied, and in such a situation, cadre deployment become crucial. As can be seen in this case, political interference in public administration can be used to protect cadres who are in contravention of the law and liable for prosecution. Pikoli further suggests that problems in the ANC include issues of corruption, cronyism and promotion of self-interest (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:346),

*“We see people in positions for which they are ill-suited and cadre deployment is resulting in people being appointed to support principals when they are not qualified to do so... they are put into positions because it is known they can approve certain tenders that will benefit comrades ... politicians use revolutionary-sounding phrases and appear militant, yet they act in a way that is counter-revolutionary”*

Pikoli further argues that the driving forces behind the corruption are the combination of three bad factors: (i) a corrupt civil servant, (ii) a corrupt politician, and (iii) a corrupt business person (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:358). This suggests that corruption can be countered when there are honest and just civil servants and politicians. The challenge is that the concept of an honest and just politician is at present an oxymoron. More crucial is the general comprehension of the responsibility of the political party and the responsibility of the government whose distinction is constantly emphasized by Pikoli. When the political bureau enables fraud and corruption for personal gratification, they do so outside the mandate given by the constituency through votes that constitute a social contract. The Pikoli case is testament to this study’s claim that political bureaux



continue to dominate and interfere in public administration at different spheres of public administration.

Gevisser (2007: 109) in his memoir about Mbeki argued that “*Thabo Mbeki advocated for the black capitalist class as the forefront of democratic change. He felt that it was important to nurture a black capitalist class and bring it into the ruling elite and to hold it there with a set of policies and an ideological frame (Africanism) that resonated with its own aspirations*”. Hence he would need to keep those who perceived his ideology as the ANC ideology close, while rejecting those who questioned the corrupt means of joining the black capitalist class; for example, Mbeki dismissed the National Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli, who tried to investigate and prosecute a senior ANC member, Jackie Selebi, whose contract as the Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS) was renewed by Mbeki despite allegations of fraud and corruption.

#### **4.3.1 Open system of leadership finding**

In line with the conflicting leadership styles pre-claims, document analysis in this study reveals that an open system approach to leadership may result in positive outcomes in the politics–administration interface. Scheider and Somers (2006:353) argue that “in the open system positive outcomes in an organization can be reached from various circumstances and in different ways”. Therefore, the open system of leadership may allow for the utilisation of multiple approaches to solving a problem instead of trying old conventional methods. The “open systems perspective views the complex organisation as a set of interdependent parts that together constitute a whole which in turn is interdependent with some larger environment” (Zeithaml, Varadarajan and Zeithaml, 1988:38). Consequently the open system leadership considers the complex and interactive nature of organisations and provides multiple approaches to leadership for progressive outcomes. The open-systems leadership suggests that organisations are influenced by their internal and external

environment. Thus a leader in the open-systems approach considers all elements with potential to adversely or positively influence leadership outcomes (Bastedo, 2004:1). The closed-systems or machine model, also known as the 'Newton's clockwork universe', was replaced with the more progressive open system which promotes the sharing of knowledge and broad stakeholder participation (Kotze, 1998:8). An open system is a leadership model that constantly interacts with its interior and exterior atmosphere, including peers, employees, governments, countries, intellectuals, political parties, the media and opponents. Furthermore, characteristics that are fundamentally significant to the open systems leadership model take into account the margins, outside atmosphere and multiple methods to accomplish the same result (Grove, Kibel and Haas, 2005:4). Open systems further acknowledge that the external environment is unstable, chaotic and characterized by the process of empowerment, relationships and consensus building (Daft, 1995:13). Since the open systems approach considers all factors that may affect leadership outcomes, promotes the sharing of knowledge and considers multiple methods to accomplish the same result, it may result in positive outcomes in the politics–administration interface.

#### **4.3.2 Mandela's collective (participatory) leadership style and transition to a closed system**

Mandela began developing his collective leadership style during his early childhood years while observing his guardian, Jongintaba Dalindyebo, who was the regent to the Thembu people. Mandela documented this fact in his book "Long Walk to Freedom" (1995, 24–26) where it was stated that "*Mandela's later notions of leadership were profoundly influenced by observing the regent and his court. He watched and learned from the tribal meetings that were regularly held at the Great Place. Everyone who wanted to speak did so*". Mandela argued that "*such meetings were examples of democracy in its purest form*". Gauthier (2006:2) argues that "collective leadership was the leader's efforts of leading together with other

leaders and constituency as partners, the capacity of a group of leaders to deliver a contribution in service of the common good through assuming joint and flexible leadership, according to what is perceived and required. Each collective leader feels no need to personally stand out or impose his or her views, but cultivates the ability to know or sense what needs doing". Collective leadership was seen in the formulation of the RDP policy document, which was drafted in consultation with mass organisations, trade unions, private organisations, and academia. In 1994, President Mandela prefaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) policy document in a manner that bore testament to collective leadership: "*The process now under way is that of developing the detailed policy and legislative programme necessary to implement the RDP. In preparing the document and in taking it forward, we are building on the tradition of the Freedom Charter. In 1955 we actively involved people and their organisations in articulating their needs and aspirations. Once again we have consulted widely*" (Mandela, 1994). However, the aspirations that were integral to the transformative vision enshrined in the RDP had become increasingly rare; not only had the language of managerialism and cost recovery displaced the language of participation and social justice but the ANC had rapidly disengaged itself from civil society (Heller, 2001:150). The collective leadership concept had been replaced with the centralised and closed leadership that focused on the free market economy as the ANC agenda in the context of GEAR.

#### **4.3.3 Collective leadership as the post-conventional leadership**

Cook-Greuter (1999:232) in discussing the Leadership Development Profile states that "conventional leaders (approximately 90%) tend to conform to society's rules of conduct and expectations". Furthermore "conventional leaders pursue coherent understanding, focused on things that could be measured accurately and have a time horizon from one to three years. Conventional leaders search for the most effective, efficient or right way and achieve organizational goals through complex co-ordination

of efficiently performed tasks”. Conventional leaders are inclined to be “ethno-centric”, that is, “concerned with the well-being of a specific group of people – and react critically to action logics that are different from their own, believing that their own worldview is the valid one” (Davies, 1980:255). Conventional leadership is paralleled with a closed-system paradigm, which focuses on impersonal processes and systems for effectively functioning machinery.

However, according to Hannary (2008:8), “*a post-conventional leader does things ethically to keep the system complete. They pursue wisdom and are aware of the limitations of the rational mind. They have a time horizon that can extend to decades or multiple generations and prioritize options by viability and long-term consequences. They manifest empathy, maturely handle conflictual situations and see more of the whole dynamic system. They collaborate with diverse stakeholders to optimize among competing goals across generations. They tend to be world-centric, that is, concerned with the well-being of all living inhabitants of the Earth, and see all stages of development as equally legitimate and useful to an organization or community*”. Komives and Dugan (2010:112) posit that post-conventional leaders “are able to communicate with every other action logic in a way that can be understood and accepted and open the door for further development. The key shift between conventional and post-conventional leadership is at the level of awareness and the capacity to be fully present to what is, rather than filtering it through mental models or past experience”. Cook-Greuter (1999:232) argue that “as learners, post-conventional leaders are aware of who they are at their best, inquire continually into their worldview and engage others in learning together. They keep cleaning, refining and tuning their own “inner instrument” and often ask themselves: what is trying to happen through me? They are willing to change the way they use their will, by both exercising it and surrendering it to a larger will” (Cook-Greuter, 1999:232).

Collective leadership in the pre-democratic ANC under the leadership of Mandela and the leadership of his predecessors epitomized post-conventional leadership through collective leadership which was centred in the well-being of the collective and did not elevate individuals. Nominating Mandela to be the leader of the masses was also a decision of the collective ANC leadership as De Waal (2013) explains:

*“Mandela and his comrades were reluctant to give a single personal face to their mass movement. The ANC was run by a collective leadership in which individuals were required to submit to party discipline. It was profoundly averse to any personality cult. Nonetheless, at the insistence of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement which convinced the ANC that the global campaign against Apartheid required a uniting figure, they contributed in creating Mandela’s stature to serve as a portrait for their cause”.*

In line with the aspirations of democratic governments, collective leadership that requires broad consultation is the main feature of post-conventional leadership.

#### **4.3.4 Dominating leadership character from the political bureau**

A domineering elected official can take over the public administration and responsibilities of a senior public official if it is in the character of that elected official to control everything. According to Miller (2005:111), a strong political leader can control public administration and take on the work of a public administrator. Miller (2005:111) further argues that the dynamic of a strong Minister and weak Director-General is when the Minister not only provides policy direction and leadership, but is actively involved in the formulation of the policy and takes upon himself or herself some of the Director-General’s policy and sometimes implementation responsibilities. The Director-General is usually weak and generally provides advice that supports the Minister’s views and does not seriously challenge the Minister in an advisory capacity; in other words, the Director-

General merely agrees to policy decisions or is complacent in the formulation of policy and/or implementation. The dynamic of both a strong Minister and Director-General may not necessarily be a problem, but does become a problem when both are uncompromising in their fixed positions so that acrimony, frustration and, at worst, conflict develops, such as in the case of then Communications Minister Siphwe Nyanda and Director-General Mamodupi Mohlala.

The dynamic of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is also manifest in South Africa's politics-administrative interface. The result of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is that the formulation of policy is of poor quality and administrative capacity is lacking. This relationship may exist if the political leadership is preoccupied with politics or lacks the capacity to undertake the portfolio, while the Director-General lacks the capacity to manage the department and engage in policy formulation. The case of the weak Minister and weak Director-General was observed during the Minister of Health Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang's tenure, when she controlled the Department of Health through then Director-General Thami Mseleku. Justice Edwin Cameron (2007:105) outlined "the extent of the shortcomings, ranging from strategic planning and leadership, through to financial management and monitoring and evaluation during the tenure of the Health Minister, Tshabalala-Msimang, and her Director-General". Schulz-Herzenberg (2007:18) argues that "the mismanagement of South Africa's HIV/AIDS battle stemmed from Mbeki's questioning of the link between HIV and AIDS, and the politicisation of the pandemic". Tshabalala-Msimang and Director-General Mseleku were implementers of political bureau concepts which lacked accurate advice on medical facts regarding HIV/AIDS. What followed from the weak health policy formulation were health crises and the death of 900 people per day in South Africa (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2007:15). A dominating leadership character from the political bureau may take control of the administration

of the public service, and decide on formulation and implementation of public policies.

#### **4.3.5 Authoritarian / autocratic leadership**

In an attempt to scrutinise the pre-claim suggesting that there could be conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and the administration bureau leading to strained politics–administration interface, this section examines the autocratic or authoritarian model of leadership. Hoyle (2006:295) suggests that “authoritarian leaders make decisions autonomously with little or no contribution from the rest of the group”. Decision-making is usually less creative under authoritarian leadership. Kurt Lewin (1973:85) conducted a leadership study and established that “*it is difficult to move from an authoritarian style to a democratic style. Abuse of this style is usually viewed as controlling, bossy and tyrannical*”. Gastil (1994:955) argues that “autocratic leaders make decisions without consulting the group, and people in the group may dislike that they are unable to contribute ideas”. Authoritarian leadership is most functional in small groups in circumstances when there is limited opportunity and time for collective deliberations or in cases where the leader is the most knowledgeable participant of the collective. Authoritarian leadership is aligned with a closed system of leadership and conventional leadership due to its lack of stakeholder participation and domineering nature. Writing on the Thabo Mbeki era under review in this study, Klippenstein (2009:80) argues that “whether Mbeki saw himself as a big man is difficult to say; a democratizing figure under Mandela, he quickly centralized control, muzzled criticism and displayed decidedly autocratic behaviour once gaining the presidency”. Such claim is testament to the closed system and its features during the post-Mandela era. Ongoing cases of politics–administration interface tension even outside the parameters of this study point to the continual occurrence of averting stakeholder participation and autocratic tendencies. This study argues above that after the RDP, in

GEAR formulation and onwards, there appeared tendencies of an authoritarian and closed-system leadership paradigm.

#### **4.3.6 Participatory / democratic leadership**

Yukl (1999:35) argues that “participatory leadership, also known as ‘democratic leadership’, is generally the most effective leadership style”. Egalitarian leaders with participatory leadership ideals provide direction to the collective while they also contribute in the collective engagement and facilitate contribution from the members of the collective. Participants under a democratic leadership are usually “less productive than the members of the authoritarian group, but their contributions are of a much higher quality” (Weibler, 2004:332). Caroline, Ramona and Daniel (2003:24) argue that “participatory leaders encourage group members to participate, but retain the final say over the decision-making process. Group members feel engaged in the process and are more motivated and creative”. In the South African setting, the process of developing the RDP was participatory under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, it took a long time to get consensus and it went through six drafts to produce the seventh as the final document. However, it was generally accepted as South Africa’s socio-economic policy framework and the public felt that they owned the programme due to the nature of its formulation. Autocratic leaders easily become frustrated by the continuous consultation and discussion on what in an autocratic environment would be a matter of taking decisions, giving instructions and obtaining quick results. Leadership on a grand scale such as in the government of a country requires participatory leadership in order to avert conflict, political intolerance and civil wars. Nations of the world generally are in pursuit of democratic ideals in governance, and in government systems and structures. Participatory leadership is aligned with the open-systems leadership style, which is also linked to post-conventional leadership.



During the period 1999 to 2009 which is under examination in this study, South Africa's leadership veered further from meaningful collective leadership or participatory leadership. Descriptions of President Mbeki during this period have ranged from "debonair", "eloquent", "sophisticated", "enigmatic", "suave", "articulate", "intellectual" and "poetic" to "elusive", "cold", "ruthless" and "expedient" (Daniels, 2007:31). Klippenstein (2009:64) explains that, "*Mbeki controlled and centralized power, which led to diminished accountability and corruption, and the leadership succession brought to light how extensively Mbeki had alienated the ANC grassroots supporters*". The present researcher further argues that ongoing cases of politics–administration interface tension even outside the parameters of this study point to the continual occurrence of averting stakeholder participation and autocratic tendencies. Therefore, overlooking and undermining the constituency and diminishing participatory leadership cannot be solely attributed to the period under review or to the person of Thabo Mbeki; these challenges are dormant in the ANC cadre waiting for deployment.

#### **4.3.7 Conflicting leadership styles case**

The researcher presented key leadership styles and argued that in South Africa there have been all affinities of leadership in government: the closed system, the open system, conventional leadership, post-conventional leadership, democratic leadership trends and autocratic leadership inclinations. Among the cases that depict conflicting leadership styles is the main case of this study, namely that of Vusi Pikoli in his post as the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Head of State at that time Thabo Mbeki, as well as the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Brigitte Mabandla. The focus of this study is not on the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, since the National Director of Public Prosecutions is hired or fired by the President (Van der Westhuizen, 2012:134).

When Wiener introduced Pikoli's memoir in 2013, she stated "Vusi Pikoli is fiercely independent, stubbornly single-minded and has what some critics may term 'an overdeveloped sense of justice'; by his own admission he is also "far too trusting and naïve" (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013).

Pikoli is a public administrator who upholds integrity, does his job in accordance with documented rules and responsibilities, and proved to be sternly resistant to political manipulation while on his public service duty. In the 1990s when he was still in exile in Zimbabwe he was asked to be part of the committee that audited the ANC's assets such as cars, farms and houses in exile. He states Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:92):

*"Controversially, I resigned and left the committee midway through its work simply because I felt that one or two people I was working with on the committee were not honest. There were properties I knew about that were not being declared and I started asking about the ANC assets that weren't being recorded. I knew that there were farms, houses, cars and other assets that hadn't been disclosed and I'm sure some individual members of the ANC benefited at that time - not only in Zimbabwe but in Tanzania, Angola and other places".*

As revealed in Pikoli's statement, he was an administrator who forestalled undocumented political "solutions" or interference in the public administration, whereas public administration naturally exists in a political environment. Senior public servants such as Directors-General report to the political bureau. However, it becomes complicated if the working relationship is political as opposed to professional in accordance with documented responsibilities. The pervasive phenomenon in governance is the politics-administration interface, particularly when the relationship between the political bureau and the administration bureau is strained due to various elements, including the pre-claims of this study. In the case of Pikoli and the then political bureau, there were, firstly, character matters

and secondly, leadership styles that led to an unpleasant politics–administration interface.

The character of Mbeki is presented on the ANC website as a leader who is an independent thinker: “People like to identify Thabo Mbeki as an independent and original thinker, but one who remains close to the more visible leadership” (ANC), whereas Vusi Pikoli is described as “fiercely independent, stubbornly single-minded and has what some critics may term ‘an overdeveloped sense of justice’”. Pikoli’s (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:109) independent thought is revealed in his statement ratifying his advocacy for the independent National Prosecuting Authority: “If we do not have independent prosecutors who refuse to take instructions from political principals, then you will have a partial and unfair application of the law”. Thus these two characters, Pikoli and Mbeki, were the same in a sense that they were both independent thinkers. Hence, Pikoli would not be pliable to the political bureau and take instructions from the President and Minister on how to take certain decisions in relation to public prosecutions. At the same time, Mbeki as an independent thinker in the political authority would not always take advice from a bureaucrat who challenged political power.

In leadership style, Pikoli demonstrated collective leadership with authoritarian features. When he entered the office as the National Director of Public Prosecutions he started by forming a clique of leadership with his deputies. In his memoir he states that he had a series of meetings with his four deputies to discuss day-to-day work or cases under investigation and in court (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:128). Pikoli further states that he had meetings with the Minister and with the President to discuss the main cases on at least ten occasions (Pikoli and Weiner, 2013:264). Pikoli was consultative but when it came to taking decisions in line with the law, he proved to be autocratic and fiercely determined. Mbeki demonstrated a strong and visible leadership that is largely independent, conventional,

impersonal and authoritative. The researcher argues that comparing these two leaders is challenged by the fact that Pikoli led an institution (the National Prosecuting Authority), whereas Mbeki led the whole country. Comparing their leadership styles in these dissimilar environments in terms of magnitude could thus be flawed. However, it is evident that with regard to personality, they clashed due to their fiercely independent thinking. Since they both have features of being authoritative in their leadership, this could have led to the clash of these two robust leaders with similar characters.

#### **4.3.8 Political leadership and administration challenges**

What political leadership and administration challenges have taken place in politics–administration interface in South Africa between senior public service managers and political officials since the ANC government came into power, and which challenges resulted in conflict? This question has attempted to establish if the pre-claims of political dominance, conflicting leadership styles, political ideology differences and disregard for documented responsibilities as contributing factors to conflicts between the political bureau and administration bureau are valid.

On the pre-claim of ‘disregard for documented duties and responsibilities’, this study suggests that the problem is not necessarily a tendency of political officials or public service officials or both parties to have disregard for documented duties and responsibilities, but it is the fact that documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to placate the public lest the political office loses the confidence of the people. This study has argued that there is a constant political element to public management; politics is a characteristic fragment of public authority. Political dominance in public administration has been presented and examined in this study as a typical phenomenon in governance. In the South African context, Chipkin and Meny-Gibert (2012:105) argue that

public administration in South Africa was highly politicised during the apartheid governance era, and furthermore, the NP installed its trustworthy supporters to various high-ranking roles in the government departments, hence political dominance is an old phenomenon in South Africa. In the present epoch, political dominance has been revealed in different spheres, more conspicuously in the case of Vusi Pikoli and President Mbeki as discussed in detail in this chapter. The researcher has also examined the pre-claim of conflicting leadership styles. The study argues that between 1999 and 2009 there was a transition from the collective leadership of the ruling political bureau to a closed conventional leadership system where political power was centralized in the presidency. The conflicting leadership pre-claim is theoretically proven in this chapter, while the study has established that the characters of Vusi Pikoli and Thabo Mbeki clashed due to their fiercely independent thinking.

#### **4.4 DIFFERENT POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES PRE-CLAIM**

One of the pre-claims of this study is that political officials may have a different political ideology compared to the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. If there is this clash of political ideologies, there could be conflict between the political bureau and the public service bureau. For the purpose of this study, *“political ideology means a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved”* (Erikson and Tedin, 2003:64).

The ANC government is in pursuit of the national development premised on redressing injustices of the past, achieving faster economic growth, raising standards of education, and ensuring stakeholder participation (National Development Plan, 2011:2). The ANC ideology of national development is challenged by the general expectation to gratify the social and class expectations of a broadly diverse South African society. A specific political ideology attracts people according to social needs and social class. People who have a “low socio-economic status are more

likely to be drawn to right-wing ideology because of largely social or cultural issues, whereas people who have a high socio-economic status are more likely to be drawn to right-wing ideology because of economic or capitalist reasons” (Jost, Federico and Napier, 2009:131). Therefore, despite relative progress in economic and infrastructural development, the political contestation among South African political parties is around gratifying both the lower and upper divisions of social classes. Owing to the diverse nature of the ANC membership and public service personnel, different personal ideologies may appear in the public service, camouflaged as ruling-party ideologies. Furthermore, members of opposition parties may further party ideologies in public service to sabotage the agenda of the ruling party and elevate opposition parties as an alternative to “fix the mess” created by the ruling party.

Being the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the ANC enjoyed majority support in South Africa, which had led to the political bureau being largely content, allowing poor service delivery in some instances and political superciliousness to persist in the ruling party. Consequently, the ruling party had moved from a culture of broader consultation of stakeholders to a closed system of leadership where decisions were taken by the President and the clique in the upper echelon, with minimum consultation being undertaken. The ruling party dominance in the politics–administration interface and the majority power in determining policy direction had resulted in internal friction and growing opposition. While acknowledging the disarray created by the Democratic Alliance in Parliament and the cases where the ruling party had been challenged in the judicial system, the ANC had attempted to define itself through policy documents and the National Development Plan (NDP), while opposition parties defined themselves in terms of what the ANC had failed to achieve. The opposition party ideology is therefore less strongly defined in South Africa and poor purposefulness and lack of bold policy alternatives from the opposition parties provides space for the dominant party to avoid

blame regarding sub-standard service delivery and egoism. Thus weak opposition results in reduced strength of democracy. Administrators and Ministers who were not aligned with the political ideology of a ruling party were frustrated and continually pressured until they were forced out of office. The discussion below demonstrates cases of conflict that emerged from different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

#### **4.4.1 The case of Zille and Mgoqi and different political ideologies**

While a researcher considers “what the research question will be, he or she must also consider what case or cases are studied as units of analysis together with the research question” (Baxter and Jack 2005:545). Yin (2003:83) argues that “potential data sources may include, but are not limited to, documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts, direct observations and participant observation”. The examiner should ensure that the collected information is combined in an effort to comprehend the whole case, instead of numerous fragments of the case, or the influencing elements that contribute in the case. Conflict usually occurs when there is a clash between two or more major elements of the political culture or political ideology (Feldman and Zaller, 1992:269). Different political parties uphold political ideologies and a particular culture, and this differentiates political parties from one another. The community of a political realm is usually defined by the unique identifiers of political parties and not by their similarities (McClosky, 1964:362). Political parties tend to promote exceptionality that separates them from the rest of the political community. The elevation of the political bureau’s uniqueness may encroach into public administration and result in conflict.

In addition to Erikson and Tedin’s (2003:64) definition of political ideology as a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved; Parsons (1951:24) argues that “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess to provide

both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured". Therefore political ideology interprets the environment as it is and suggests an improved environment. In the political ideology definition, the set of beliefs that are defined as political ideology might be flawed and represent distortion and propaganda. For example, the National Party ideology that underpinned the apartheid system involved a hierarchy of race, an explicit elite group, and the dehumanization of other groups. Stanley (2015:3) argues that "when societies are unjust, for example, in the distribution of wealth, we can expect the emergence of flawed ideologies. The flawed ideologies allow for effective propaganda. In a society that is unjust, due to unjust distinctions between persons, ways of rationalising undeserved privilege become fossilised into rigid and unchangeable belief. Such beliefs are the barriers to rational thought and understanding that political bureau exploits through propaganda" (Stanley, 2015:3). Such beliefs further determine the extent of strained relationship between politicians and administrators in the politics–administration interface. This segment of the study reviews the ANC and the DA set of beliefs and their impact on the politics–administration interface in South Africa.

In 1996 when the ANC took control of the City of Cape Town for the first time the City Manager Keith Nicol of the formerly white government was replaced with the ANC's Andrew Borraine (Edmunds, 2006). When the DA won the municipal elections, Borraine was replaced by Robert Maydon who was appointed by the DA. When the National Party formed a partnership with the ANC, Robert Maydon was replaced by Dr Wallace Mgoqi as City Manager. When the DA won the local government elections in 2006 it replaced Mgoqi with Mr Achmat Ebrahim. The struggle of the politicized public administration due to political party differences had been witnessed in different spheres of government and more particularly in the Western Cape in South Africa. The disorder started "when surrounding municipalities in the Western Cape were combined to form the 'unicipity and



party politics was introduced into local government in 2000". John Williams (2007:19) recalls the case of Mgoqi and Zille:

*"In 2006 in Cape Town, the DA won 90 seats in the 210-member council, the ANC 81 and the ID 2. Following the elections of March 2006 there was a precarious coalition government, under the executive leadership of Mayor Helen Zille. The position of the then CEO of Cape Town, Wallace Mgoqi, was declared unconstitutional by the Cape High Court on 9 May 2006".*

Even before the local elections, "City Manager Wallace Mgoqi knew his future would be insecure if Zille were elected mayor because the validity of his extended contract was already in question" (Hunma, 2007:23). In the run-up to the local elections, Zille had accused Mgoqi of campaigning for the ANC, thus signalling that his future in the administration was in doubt and this led to the break-down in trust between them. Furthermore, the ANC's values and priorities differed from those of the DA (Okecha, 2009:96). However, in the disputes between the DA and the ANC in the Western Cape there is no evidence of clear political ideology differences except for their exploitation of the prevailing politics of identity in South Africa. The ANC values are entrenched in the liberation rhetoric and the development of previously disadvantaged people. Johnson (2003:200) argues that decolonisation and democratisation in South Africa during the 1994 transition brought to power anti-colonial liberation movements that took control of the state machinery and reorganised themselves as political parties; however, the inherited terrain on which the liberation movements found themselves was one they were not prepared for. When the ANC was fighting for the liberation of all South Africans, particularly the Africans and the working class, the socialist movement represented by Eastern Europe, China and Cuba had deteriorated, resulting in the reshaping of the ANC ideology towards Thatcherism and capitalism. By the 1990s, the ANC ideology that was initially based on the ideals of socialism reflected a variety of ideologies including capitalism and liberalism as well as

socialism and communism. Booysen (2012) argues that the ANC's set of values seemed to be characterised by ideological hybrid. According to Terreblanche (1999:3), the South African Foundation (SAF) comprising the fifty largest corporations rejected the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was based on socialist ideals, and proposed a macro-economic policy based on industrialist ideals. Thus the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme was promulgated in June 1996 to replace the RDP. During the period of this study (between 1999 and 2009) the ANC ideology reflected multiple modes of governance with features of industrialist ideologies reflected in the macro-economic programme and socialist ideals in the land reform and social development agenda. Therefore, the ANC ideology is socialist in rhetoric but capitalist in praxis, as evidenced by dwindling support from the working class and the destabilisation of the tripartite alliance.

The DA has its roots in the liberal ideology of the apartheid era in the Progressive Party (PP) which later became the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). The PFP merged with other small liberal parties to form the Democratic Party (DP) in 1989. The DP further merged with the New National Party (NNP) in 2000 to form the DA (Mottiar, 2014:108). During the 1994 campaigns the DP attacked the ANC as it posed as the true adherent of liberal-democratic values; stating that "neither the ANC nor the NP had a deep-seated commitment to either liberal democracy or market-oriented economics" (Pombo, 2009:127). By 2004 the DA's constituency had grown and it became the official opposition party on a liberal-democratic ideology platform. However, the DA's policy solutions were also a hybrid of ideologies overwhelmingly free market, and constituted a policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party's proposal for a Basic Income Grant. It had to portray itself as a liberal-democratic party, yet it also pursued voters who were in favour of the death penalty (Booyesen, 2005:132). The South African politics in both the ANC and the DA is not based purely on governance ideology but on the

politics of identity. Friedman (2015) argues that South Africans across the board tend to vote for parties they feel speak for them, not those that pass an ideological test, thus politics in South Africa is about identities. The DA and the ANC represent different groups in the suburbs, the rural African communities, the white conservatives, the wealthy and the middle class, the poor, and the township communities. What is important for both the ANC and the DA is obtaining or maintaining political power, and that is done by attempting to obtain as many votes as possible. Therefore, ideology is used by political parties as a tool to appease the electorates, while empirically political parties exploit the racial suspicions and identities of constituencies to gain political power.

Political parties in South Africa tend to thrive on flawed ideologies to entice voters; they use a hybrid of ideologies to sell propaganda disguised as ideology. According to Walton (1997:383), the term propaganda originally referred to a committee of church officials called in Latin the *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) during the meetings of Pope Gregory XIII with three cardinals in 1572-1585 that had the aim of combating the reformation that was being demanded within Catholicism by the Protestants. The term propaganda in its modern connotation is a term of reproach to concealed associations for the spreading of opinions and principles which, if clearly defined and revealed, may be repulsive and aversive (Fellows, 1959:182). Thus in the absence of genuine political ideology within the political parties, politicians utilise prevailing general stereotypes and opinions, and incorporate them into propaganda disguised as ideology. Bernays (1928:9) argues that the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Therefore, the political bureau gains constituency support and power through manipulating the communities using prevailing public opinions. In the case of Zille and Mgoqi, there is no evidence of the study's pre-claim suggesting that conflict over political ideologies is one of the factors

resulting in strained relations in the politics–administration interface. However, it is possible that there might be a contest for the prevailing and better constructed propaganda concealed as political ideology in the politics–administration interface.

The conflict between a governing party and an opposition party is expected and is the conventional nature of such political relationships. According to Hofmeister and Grabow (2011:13), the role of an opposition is less attractive but parties in opposition exercise an important function in a democratic system as a “watchdog” of government and they provide policy alternatives for the future. It is the duty of opposition parties to critique a ruling party and position themselves as an alternative government that will perform better. The DA in 2008 argued that the Western Cape had received a clean audit report except for the departments that were inherited from the ANC’s poor administration under Mayor Mfeketo and the ANC’s lackey, the municipal manager Dr Wallace Mqoqi (Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Hansard Minutes 16 May 2008). Therefore what can be interpreted as conflict between the political parties due to ideology differences is usually a normal political relationship in a democratic governance system. Opposition parties are there to highlight the failures of government and suggest how governance can be improved; hence it is not the duty of opposition parties to praise government but to identify all governance deficiencies.

#### **4.4.2 The case of Buthelezi and Masetlha**

One of the pre-claims of this study suggests that when there are different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau, working relations may lead to a strained politics–administration interface. The case below examines the relationship between the founder of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in government as the Minister in the Department of Home Affairs and his Director-General, Billy Masetlha, who was deployed by the ANC.

Since the Government of National Unity (GNU), Mandela and the ANC had strategically accommodated the founder of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in government as the Minister in the Department of Home Affairs, whereas his Director-General was the former ANC intelligence officer Billy Masetlha. Buthelezi and his Director-General appear to have had a conflicted relationship. Buthelezi argued that the ANC had imposed Masetlha on him (Koopman, 2001). Buthelezi further suspected his Director-General of sabotaging plans by the ANC: “... *he would regularly denounce in Parliament his department’s lack of financial means and present it as some form of political tactics from the ANC against him.* Kabwe-Segatti and Landau (2008:100) argue that “*Despite the underfunding of Home Affairs, numerous reports since 1994 had highlighted instances of serious mismanagement*”. When Buthelezi and Masetlha disagreed over the political agenda, service delivery at Home Affairs was in a poor financial situation.

Masetlha’s contract was controversially extended in 2001 by a year despite objections from Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then Minister of Home Affairs, citing an irretrievable breakdown of relations with his Director-General. Relations between the two men weakened even further, particularly about the Immigration Bill and a number of further other objections, including Masetlha’s alleged insubordination. After the 2004 elections, Thabo Mbeki strategically offered Buthelezi the Deputy Presidency so that the ANC could gain control of KwaZulu-Natal Province which, at that time, was being led by the IFP (Gumede, 2005:313). Buthelezi declined the offer after discussing it with his party. He was thus no longer in the Cabinet but remained a Member of Parliament (MP) representing his party. During the Buthelezi and Masetlha tenure, the conflict between them depicted two centres of political power. Throughout the Mbeki administration, the positions adopted by the government were allegedly not those of the ANC and foreign policy was the area in which

the claim had been repeatedly made (Friedman, 2009:5). The ANC policy adopted since 1996 was that government officials would be supported by the ANC leadership in government. The ANC government felt that the government's approach to African foreigners was not that of the ANC. This was ascribed to alleged evidence suggesting that the Department of Home Affairs was controlled by the leader of the IFP, which meant that the government approach may have not been shaped by the ANC but by one of its opponents (Friedman, 2009:5). The challenges of conflict between Masetlha and Buthelezi were generally interpreted as a struggle between two political parties. The ANC officials questioned the migration policy, when then Minister Buthelezi's team of advisers, "in particular Mario Ambrosini, tried to speed up the policy transformation process by conducting a process of legislation-drafting in parallel with the consultative circuit" (Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 2008:80). Buthelezi surrounded himself with IFP colleagues to propagate policies that were usually challenged by the ANC. In 2002 he accused the Cabinet of ignoring him before publishing regulations on migration (Neocosmos, 2006:97). The rapport between the political bureau and the administration bureau, in this case the Office of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Office of the Director-General, was strained and resulted in a fiercely contested politics-administration interface.

Buthelezi (2009:6) argued that the IFP had no political ideology but would utilise whatever worked for its constituency: "we are not about ideology, labels such as "left", "centre" or "right" do not help in identifying what is needed, we are pragmatists focused on what works best". The predecessor of the Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe which later became the Inkatha Freedom Party was Inkatha kaZulu which was established in 1922 as a cultural organisation founded by Solomon, the son of King Dinizulu (Cope, 1993:218). Therefore, the foundation of the IFP is seen as being the promotion of the Zulu monarchy and cultural values rather than political ideology. The Buthelezi and Masetlha conflict in the politics-

administration interface could not have been as a result of political ideology differences since there is no evidence of extensive political ideology differences between the ANC and the IFP. In the early 1970s Buthelezi claimed to represent the ANC and he had met with the ANC president Oliver Tambo in London to discuss the role of Bantu homelands in strengthening the ANC membership (Sellström, 2002:521). Since Buthelezi's days in the ANC there has been no evidence that he formed any new political ideology for his IFP except for the promotion of Zulu identity and the Zulu Royal exclusiveness. During the Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) in 1993, Buthelezi and the IFP demanded special recognition of the Zulu monarchy and threatened to boycott elections if there were no political recognition of the Zulu nation in a federal arrangement (Fessha, 2010:38). In line with the general state of the South African political bureau, IFP politics is based on constituency identities instead of any distinguishable political ideology whereas the ANC seems to exploits both constituency identities and populism based on socialism rhetoric.

Despite the IFP's promotion of Zulu self-sufficiency, predominantly in KwaZulu-Natal Province, the ANC had managed to attain a strong presence and become the leading party in the province. The populism culture continued to grow within the ANC during the Mbeki tenure particularly from 2005 when the populism movement with the ANC structures and the tripartite alliance blamed Mbeki's leadership for the growing poverty and inequality (Pretorius, 2008:137). The ANC shifted further towards populism leadership that promised to focus on listening to people's demands. Bryder (2009:4) argues that the term "populism" originates from the Latin word "populous" which means "people". Therefore populism is the political communication style of enticing voters into believing the political bureau by exploiting people's opinions of economic injustice and the tension between the working class and the elite class. Populism is usually misconstrued as a political ideology since it is

always associated with the Marxist-Leninist ideals. Hence, despite the populist characteristics in the ANC leadership, there is no evidence that there was ever a political ideology that could result in a strained politics–administration interface. Contrary to the pre-claim of this study, political ideology in the South African politics is not a prevalent feature in the politics–administration interface. Although there had been conflicts between Buthelezi and the ANC over policies such as the migration policy, the political parties utilised constituency identities to define their values and ideals, thus political ideology had not been a major influence in the politics–administration interface conflict.

The case of Buthelezi and Masetlha illustrated that political aspiration to implement political party power is one of the factors resulting in strained relations in the politics–administration interface. However, there is no evidence of political party ideology differences between the IFP and the ANC. The case examined above suggests that where there are different political intentions and power struggles between the political bureau and the administration bureau, conflicting views may lead to a strained politics–administration interface. However, the political power struggle in the politics–administration interface could not be linked to political ideology differences between the political parties. The study concludes that despite the noted features of propaganda and populism in the political bureau, there is no evidence to suggest that the Zille–Mgoqi conflict and the Buthelezi–Masetlha conflict were due to any distinguishable political ideology differences.

#### **4.5 DISREGARD FOR DOCUMENTED RULES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

This study argues that there is no evidence to suggest that there is intent on the part of senior public administration officials or from the elected officials to disregard documented rules and responsibilities. However, in some cases the documented rules and responsibilities are not always



clear, resulting in grey areas in the politics-administration interface that are ultimately claimed by the political bureau. There is a power struggle between the political bureau and the administration bureau in the interface due to a lack of clarity in documented roles resulting in a strained politics-administration interface. In the South African context, political bureau roles and senior public service manager roles are documented in regulatory documents such as the Constitution of South Africa (Chapter 10), regulations and institutional policies. The Public Service Regulations, 2001 (No. R1 of 2001 amended by R9795 of 2012) Chapter 1(G) states that the “Minister may, under justifiable circumstances, authorize a deviation from any regulation and may authorize such deviation with retrospective effect for purposes of ensuring equality”. The challenge with Regulation G is that it refers to “justifiable circumstances” under which the Minister in the political bureau may authorize a deviation from any regulation. Justifiable circumstances can be subjective: what in the Minister’s view are justifiable circumstances may not always be sufficient reason to deviate from the regulations. This provision to deviate from regulations may cause some political bureau officials to encroach on administration territory, and take what on paper is defined as public service manager’s responsibilities.

Furthermore, *Chapter 1 Part II(A) of the Public Service Regulations* requires the “executing authority to provide the Heads of Department with appropriate powers and authority”. The term ‘appropriate powers and authority’ can be subjective. It is thus not clear what authority can be ceded by the executive bureau to the administrative bureau. In the politics–administration interface, there are “grey areas” or regions of intersection. Grey areas can be contested by both parties, that is, between the political bureau and the administrative bureau. Such grey areas may be a contributing factor to strained relations in the politics–administration interface. Further to the phenomenon of the contested grey area, Miller (2005:111) presented the problem of a weak or strong Minister or Director-General as a contributing factor to negative relationship in the politics–

administration interface. She argues that the policy formulation process between a strong Director-General and weak Minister can be explained as follows:

*“The Director-General initiates the policy and discusses it with the Minister who provides the Director-General with the scope to develop the policy further. The Minister and Director-General would discuss the policy and the Minister would approve the policy on the advice of the Director-General’s specialized knowledge and accepts the advice. The Director-General also has an intimate knowledge of political dynamics, is aware of the political needs of the Minister and shares the same ideological values as the political leadership. The dynamic of a strong Minister and weak Director-General is when the Minister not only provides policy direction and leadership, but is actively involved in the formulation of the policy and takes on some of the Director-General’s policy and sometimes implementation and responsibilities”.*

The Director-General is usually weak and generally provides advice that supports the Minister’s views, and does not seriously challenge the Minister in an advisory capacity; in other words, the Director-General merely approves policy decisions or is complacent in the formulation of policy and sometimes implementation.

The dynamic of both a strong Minister and Director-General may not necessarily be a problem, but does become a problem when both are uncompromising in their fixed positions that result in acrimony, frustration and, at worst, conflict. An example of this is the former Director-General for Health, Dr Olive Shisana and Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

The dynamic of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is also evident in South Africa’s political-administrative interface. The result of a weak Minister and weak Director-General is that the formulation of policy is then

of a poor quality and administrative capacity is usually lacking. This relationship may exist if the political leadership is preoccupied with politics or lacks the capacity to undertake the portfolio, while the Director-General lacks the capacity to manage the department as well as engage in policy formulation. An example of this is “the former Director-General of Home Affairs, Albert Mokoena, who was accused of maladministration and Minister Buthelezi who at the time was preoccupied with conflict and politics in the province of KwaZulu-Natal” (Miller, 2005:111). The grey area concern was also raised in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group on 5 June 2013 where it was stated that there was a contradiction that Ministers had no power to hire or fire senior public service managers. Thus, despite some attempts to document roles and responsibilities of the political bureau and of the administrative bureau in the Constitution, Public Service Regulations and Treasury Regulations, some powers and responsibilities are still not clear and are therefore contested by both parties in the politics–administration interface.

What were the political leadership and administration roles of political officials in the execution of services to the public between 1999 and 2009? This question has provided a basis for examination of political leadership and administration responsibilities of high-ranking bureaucrats in the execution of services to the public and reporting to the political bureau. The study examines documented roles and grey areas or contested roles and unclaimed roles that may be the contributing factors that strain working relations in the politics–administration interface. The study further argues that despite documented rules and responsibilities, there are unclear areas in the interface; such unclear areas can be claimed by either the political bureau or administrative bureau depending on who is strong enough to win control of such areas. This study further argues that the ultimate governance responsibility is vested in the political bureau through the social contract. The study also argues that the interface is an imagined concept which is difficult to locate in the politics–administration

relationship. This chapter concludes that the problem is not necessarily a tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to disregard documented duties and responsibilities, but it is a fact that documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to gratify the public lest the political office loses the confidence of the people.

#### **4.5.1 Agenda-setting role in the political bureau**

The direction of the public administration and public policy is proposed and decided at the party-political bureau. In the South African setting, the Constitution is the ultimate decree of the country and the basis of the political mandate of the ruling party. McCombs and Shaw (1972:185) argue that agenda-setting is the power to structure issues in public in such a way that people think about what they are told. The State of the Nation Address by the President should be based on the pledges of the Constitution and gives Ministers and senior public managers direction on policy development; for example, on 3 February 2006 then Head of State Thabo Mbeki in his State of the Nation Address focused on the celebration of the Soweto uprising and Bambata rebellion by introducing an economic programme revolution aimed at increasing the pace of human development, introducing ASGISA and JIPSA. The address was followed by a focus on learnerships and internships in government departments to function within the guidelines as set out by the President in his address. The political office bearers and accounting officers develop policies and programmes from such agenda-setting in presidential addresses. Both ASGISA and JIPSA were products of the political direction at that time but these programmes became defunct after the Mbeki administration. Likewise, the concept of public entrepreneurship is driven by the national agenda through the political office; for example, the privatisation of State-owned assets is a political initiative that begins from the ruling party's executive agenda; later a discussion paper is debated in Parliament (Eberhard, 2005:5312). Throughout the process, public managers provide

an advisory role to political officials, but the extent of the role played by public managers is not clear until the stage of implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes. Certainly, public managers are not independent from politics since they are employees appointed to administrate service delivery on behalf of the political office, meaning on behalf of the people.

#### **4.5.2 Political bureau as the ultimate watchdog in public service**


In the context of unclear documented rules and responsibilities for the ministers and heads of departments, the political bureau takes ultimate responsibility. Section 44 of the Constitution of South Africa states that the national legislative authority is vested in Parliament to pass legislation with regard to any administration matter, including matters within a functional area listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution. The political function in public administration is to guide and lead public administration, which is necessary for South Africa's democracy to promote accountability and transparency (Pauw *et al.*, 2002:33). The political office bearers are appointed to execute policies after they have converted them into specific advantages, or outcomes to be received by the people. Where there is failure to provide those outcomes, the public will hold the political party and the specific Minister accountable (Kuye *et al.*, 2002:122). The political arena controls policy direction and service delivery, and provides answers on who gets what, how and when. The agenda setting and policy direction emerge from the State of the Nation Address by the President and political addresses such as the Budget Speech from the Minister of Finance. The Directors-General and other senior administrators of government departments then formulate on behalf of the political bureau, adopt, implement and evaluate policies that stem from the agenda set by the State of the Nation Address and addresses by government department Ministers.

### 4.5.3 Legitimacy of the political bureau

While the documented rules and responsibilities are unclear as to where a head of department stops and where the minister takes over the administrative duties, the politicians' dominance is justified by the social contract relationship with the electorate. According to Rousseau (1762:18), the public surrenders its mandate to the political bureau through elections, and such relationship is referred to as 'the social contract', as explained. In a democratic system, the public grants legitimacy to the political bureau through votes that determine the majority will. South Africa's parliamentary system of the separation of powers between the parliament, the executive and the judiciary provides the basis for political bureau leadership on behalf of the electorate and public participation. The Constitution of South Africa (Section 42) states that "members of parliament are elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people". Section 42 further states that "the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) represents people in the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government by participating in the national legislative process and by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues affecting people in the provinces". The public renders the political party that is voted into power by the majority legitimate to govern on behalf of the people. Section 159 of the Constitution states that "people's needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making". Hence the people's role is to elect government representatives and provide their opinions during the legislative drafting process. People's power is granted to the elected political party and the public also has direct access to governance processes through public participation. The political party does not have the capacity to execute the political agenda and hence the political bureau employs skilled professional individuals to execute the political agenda on behalf of the political bureau. The political bureau comprises mainly elected officials, whereas the administration bureau comprises hired officials. In the South African context, as the Public Service Regulations

demonstrate below, the Minister has more clear authority compared to the hired Director-General.

**Figure 1: Core objectives of government stakeholders (adopted from the “strategic plan for third parliament-RSA”)**



## Core Objectives

- 1 Pass Legislation
- 2 Conduct Oversight
- 3 Public Participation
- 4 Co-operative Government
- 5 International Participation

### 4.5.4 Parliament and its political supervisory role

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides for a “single, sovereign democratic State where governance is brought into

action through Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary”. In the country “legislative authority is vested in Parliament, the executive authority is vested in the President and the judicial authority is vested in the courts”. Parliament’s role and ultimate outcome is to represent the people and ensure government by the people under the Constitution, as well as represent the provinces in the national sphere of government (South Africa, Strategic Plan for Third Parliament 2004–2009, 2008:30). The Constitution established Parliament to pass laws, scrutinise and oversee executive action, facilitate public participation, oversee co-operative government, and oversee international relations. Parliament is the “highest elected authority and legislature in the country that is responsible for ensuring that public services are delivered in the most appropriate, economical, efficient and effective manner” (Pauw *et al.*, 2002:48). Parliament monitors public policy processes and public service delivery on behalf of the people, and senior public managers undertake the actual execution of policies that are manifest in service delivery. Parliament has the supervisory responsibility, on behalf of the public, and needs appropriate mechanisms for reporting by the Executive (Kuye *et al.*, 2002:104). Parliament established parliamentary portfolio committees for each department, including the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). All these committees play a supervisory role and monitor policy implementation on behalf of the people. All divisions of Parliament such as the National Assembly, the NCOP and Committees are established for their supervisory role to ensure that the government machinery functions efficiently. Such committees are established in a political setting to provide the link between the political arena and public administration sphere. The supervisory role of the parliamentary portfolio committees ensures there is guidance for accounting officers so that they take decisions that support the national agenda instead of their own wishes.



#### **4.5.5 Standing Committee on Public Accounts as the political entity guarding public managers**

It is necessary to discuss the role played by SCOPA in ensuring democratic values in public finance management. Section 245 of the Rules of the National Assembly provides extensive control to SCOPA to inspect matters. The committee receives reports of actions taken and not taken by accounting officers, and the committee may endorse disciplinary measures against the accounting head who failed to appropriately manage public finances. Sanctions may range from salary deductions and demotion to dismissal. “In the event of a serious problem, the public accounts committee will want to determine culpability” (PFMA Guide for Accounting Officers, 2000:13). To demonstrate whether an accounting head has committed an offence, the committee will scrutinise whether he or she had utilised the endorsed best practice technique to circumvent the challenge. The SCOPA is thus a watchdog for proper spending of public money for public interests. Kuye *et al.*, (2002:105) argue that “SCOPA oversees the effective, efficient, economical and transparent management of departments, based on the Auditor-General’s report”. Kuye *et al* further argue that SCOPA also makes recommendations on the improvement of financial management in government and in departments. Thus SCOPA performs the parliamentary supervisory function together with parliamentary portfolio committees and the Parliamentary Committee on Finance. All these committees are in a political setting providing supervision and guidance to public managers on behalf of the people.

#### **4.5.6 Auditor-General as an independent watchdog supporting political supervision**

It should be noted that according to section 181(2) and 181(3) of the Constitution, “the Auditor-General is independent, subject only to the Constitution and the law; must be impartial; and must exercise its powers without fear, favour or prejudice” (Craythorne, 2003:241). The Auditor-

General is not guided by political officials and should not be under political pressure. It is within the Auditor-General's remit to decide the nature and degree of an audit, and to request details and statements of account which he or she considers essential. In this regard, the Auditor-General may decide the due date and format in which the requested specifics, reports of justification and fiscal accounts must be submitted. Whenever the Auditor-General exercises authority or performs a responsibility as required by the Auditor-General Act, "he or she may, in writing, require any person in the employment of an institution whose accounts are being audited to appear in person and to produce all such records, books, vouchers and documents in the possession or under the control of such person as the Auditor-General may deem necessary for the exercise of his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties" (Craythorne, 2003:241). Therefore, the Auditor-General is an independent watchdog supplementing the political supervision.

The Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 sections 4 and 5 states that "the Auditor-General may investigate any public entity or audit the financial statements of any public entity". An investigation or audit "may be executed either by the Auditor-General or a person appointed by the Auditor-General". The Auditor-General "may also claim the reasonable cost of performing the duties and annually report to parliament on specific and general findings regarding the accountability of the public entities". The government departments are bound "to keep records of all financial transactions and subject them to external audit firm, especially in the case of large government departments". The Auditor-General is obliged to report on matters where the public interest is at stake and has a general responsibility "to ensure honesty and integrity in the execution of public affairs by the heads of government departments". For example, with regard to the R29.9 – R70 billion arms deal in 1999, the Auditor-General's report queried the government's choice of expensive options with deviations from the accepted procurement procedures (Parliamentary

Monitoring Group, 2000:2). The Auditor-General has a central responsibility to monitor and question government to ensure efficient public service.

#### **4.5.7 Roles of the citizens**

If the citizens feel that they are being cheated by the government, they have a constitutional right to take the government to the Constitutional Court. This has been happening in many instances in the South African context. For example, an ordinary citizen Mr Hugh Glennister challenged the decision taken during the ANC's elective meeting in 2007 to disband the country's elite corruption-fighting unit, the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) known as the "Scorpions". The judgement was handed down on 17 March 2011 stating that the dissolution of Scorpions was illegal (Cameron, 2011:395). Furthermore, in an earlier case "the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) took the Health Minister to court for not giving antiretroviral drugs to HIV-infected patients" (Saloojee and Pettifor, 2005:431). It was a political decision stemming from the deficiency of political will on the part of the Department of Health to provide antiretroviral drugs to patients. The public employees of the department had no power to change the policy and they had to yield to the political leadership. However, the people have the constitutional power to bring change in policies if they feel that the political office representing them is acting contrary to the requirements of the principal law which is the Constitution. Therefore, the Government of South Africa is under pressure to achieve a maximum rate of service delivery to meet the conditions of the social contract. To achieve efficient and effective service delivery, the political officials must be in a good working relationship with senior public managers so that they share the political mandate that informs public policy formulation and implementation. In a democratic system of governance every sector is responsible, the public feel entitled to service delivery, thus the people can also address the politics-administration

interface conflict and create pressure through protests from communities demanding improved service delivery.

#### **4.5.8 The New Public Management and role of politics**

The public administration has grown to increasingly equate itself with private sector business. Consequently, documents such as the King Code of Corporate Governance (King Report, 2002) are vital to both the public and private sector to ensure values of corporate governance are upheld. The King Report had become a key document in government departments to inform the Board of Directors and Audit Committee, to guide financial reporting and internal control, and to inform accounting and auditing procedures. Nevertheless, the King Report is not a guidebook for public finance management matters. It was drawn into public administration to introduce elements of corporate governance and effective service delivery. Public finances are also managed using the new management procedures. Kuye *et al.* (2002:101) argue that approaches to modernising the financial management processes of the public sector have been introduced in governance public administration. The Ministers and senior public managers are seeking modern management techniques to effectively render service delivery to the people. The political bureau therefore requires highly skilled managers with advanced knowledge of modern management techniques and NPM principles. The role of the political bureau is to employ such managers to execute the political agenda translated into service delivery.

#### **4.5.9 Dominant party deliberation**

How has one dominant party in South Africa's democracy affected administration? The question led to the examination of the relationship between the political bureau and public administration in South Africa. *"One dominant party' is defined as a system in which despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political*

*system and is firmly in control of State power over a fairly long duration of time that even opposition parties make little if any dent in the political hegemony of a dominant governing party”* (Matlosa and Karume, 2004:10). The researcher argues that being the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the ANC enjoyed majority support in South Africa which had led to the political bureau being content to allow poor service delivery in some instances and political superciliousness to persist in the ruling party. Consequently, the ruling party had moved from a culture of broader consultation of stakeholders to a closed system of leadership where decisions are taken by the President and the clique at the upper echelon with minimum consultation. This situation has further resulted in a review of the effects of the ANC dominance in politics–administration interface and the majority power in determining the strength of political bureau dominance. In the context of South Africa’s prevalent politics of identity as opposed to politics of principle and ideology, the political opposition that seeks to replay the politics of identity is likely to promote governing party dominance. This study argues that the ANC’s dominance in government is due to its electorate which is passionately attached to the party as a liberation movement; thus the majority of the public identifies with the governing party despite its public inadequacies in government.

#### **4.6 CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, this chapter has explained the four pre-claims of this study. The study has examined the documented roles and grey areas or contested roles as well as unclaimed roles which may be the contributing factors that challenge working relationships in the politics–administration interface. The study argued that despite documented rules and responsibilities, there were unclear areas in the interface, and such unclear areas could be claimed by either the political bureau or administrative bureau, depending on who was strong enough to win control of such areas. This section further argued that the ultimate governance responsibility was vested in the political bureau through the

social contract. The study argued that the interface was an imagined concept which was difficult to locate in the politics–administration relationship.

The chapter concluded that regarding the first pre-claim the problem was not necessarily a tendency from political officials or public service officials or both parties to disregard documented duties and responsibilities, but it was a fact that documented rules and responsibilities were not always clear, whereas the political bureau had ultimate control and was under pressure to gratify the public lest the political office loses public confidence.

Furthermore, the study found that political dominance in public administration may be related to ambiguous documented rules and responsibilities that created grey areas in the politics–administration interface. The study established through the literature examined and the cases reviewed that it was a tendency or at least a generally accepted trend that politicians dominated public administration to control the political mandate in practice.

Drawing on the case of Pikoli and Mbeki, the study concluded that the political bureau could interfere with administration to protect comrades from investigation and prosecution. Thus political interference could be used to protect corrupt colleagues and cronies.

This study further found that the politics–administration interface in South Africa was tainted by corruption, cronyism and self-interest such as access to tenders or government business agreements. The South African political bureau has deviated from the collective leadership to a conventional and closed leadership system, averting stakeholder participation and showing autocratic tendencies. This study found sufficient documented evidence suggesting that certain leadership styles

can result in conflict in the politics–administration interface. Therefore an autocratic Minister can impose on an indecisive democratic director-general; and such a combination of leadership styles can lead to tense working relations. Although theoretical data suggested that conflicts can stem from incompatible leadership styles, there is no case study that compellingly suggests this pre-claim in South Africa during the period under review. However, comparing Vusi Pikoli and Thabo Mbeki is challenged by the fact that Pikoli led an institution (the National Prosecuting Authority) whereas Mbeki led the whole country. Comparing their leadership styles in these dissimilar environments in terms of magnitude could be flawed although it is evident that when it came to their characters, they clashed due to their fiercely independent thinking. Since they both have features of being authoritative in their leadership, this could have led to the clash of the two strong leaders with similar characters. The study further established that different political ideologies from different political parties with different agendas could not exclusively lead to conflict in the politics–administration interface. However, there could be conflicts in the politics–administration interface due to struggle over political control. The study has established that it is the nature of opposition parties to confront governing parties and such conflict could not be linked to political ideology differences. This finding was supported by contemporary scholarship and case studies, in the cases of Zille and Mgoqi, and of Masetlha and Buthelezi respectively. Further to the pre-claim of different political ideologies, this study revealed that the political agenda to implement governance alternatives is one of the factors resulting in strained relations in the politics–administration interface. There is no evidence suggesting that political ideology variance is a factor that influences the politics–administration interface.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS FINDINGS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents the study findings and discusses the findings in the context of the research scope in South Africa between 1999 and 2009. It further discusses all four pre-claims and presents a discussion based on the collected data. The first pre-claim suggesting that there could be a tendency from the political officials or from bureaucrats or both parties to disregard documented duties and responsibilities are presented through the collected data. The second pre-claim suggesting that it is a tendency and accepted norm that political officials should dominate the public service function is presented in the light of the collected data. The collected data also provides further elucidation of the pre-claim proposing that there could be conflicting leadership styles between the political bureau and the administration bureau, which leads to a strained politics–administration interface. Finally, the study presents data to confirm or refute the pre-claim suggesting that there could be different political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau leading to strained politics–administration interface. The response from the public administrators, academics and political officials is presented in line with the pre-claims and the research questions as specified in the first chapter of this study.

The study theory, which is the politics–administration interface, suggests boundaries of politics and administration and declares the “separation of roles between elected officials and administrators in a democratic government” (Wilson, 1887:18). It is at this point of intersection where there is conflict between political bureau officials and their senior professionals in public administration. The contested territory at the point



of intersection needs to be carefully defined and managed for the political bureau and administration bureau to work together effectively for the common good. However, it is usually not clear who should manage this point of intersection. This study examines the politics–administration interface in South Africa between 1999 and 2009 to better understand the underlying factors that result in conflict between the political bureau and public administration bureau.

## **5.2 POLITICAL BUREAU INTERFERENCE**

With regard to political bureau interference, this study found that during the period 1999 and 2009 there was political bureau interference because there was no clear role interpretation for politicians and Heads of Departments to know which roles to assume and which roles to leave for administrators. The senior researcher from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (SO-LMPL0114) argued that “the blurry line between politics and administrative functions at government was due to the pre-1994 culture and values of political activism that result in political patronage or partisanship”. Public administration in South Africa is rooted in the aspirations of the emancipation struggle rhetoric which was facilitated by the political bureau; hence during the democratic government it has become difficult to separate the party from the State.

The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued that “politicians end up interfering because when the portfolio committees either in Parliament or at the legislatures need answers, the political office must be able to answer in most cases not the bureaucrats”. The political bureau is ultimately accountable for success or failure of the public service; hence Ministers work closely with Directors-General to ensure that they are conversant with the progress on policy implementation congruent with the national policy agenda facilitated by the political bureau. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) further argued that “one of the ways of combating political

interference would be to introduce a non-politicised institution between the directors-general and elected officials and such institution would report to parliament”. Such an assertion suggests that the problem around the politics administration interface is fundamentally structural and can be resolved by reviewing the public service governance structure.

The former head of a government department who is a lecturer (PCT-0114) argued that “practical observation reveals that every time there is a change in government such as new Ministers, most of them do not prefer to work with the existing management they find in their new portfolios”. Thus “they will often bring in new people they trust”. The lecturer (PCT-0114) further argued that “some Ministers also frustrate the old management cohort and in some instances transfer them to positions where they become irrelevant”; “politicians even get involved in recruitment processes and tell the department who to hire and who not to hire regardless of interview and vetting results”.

The Professor at the University of Pretoria’s School of Public Administration (PUP-02-14) argued that “it is the nature of government that it contains the political bureau as one of the important stakeholders; however, the politicians’ role is key and desirable if it adds value for good governance that does not promote mismanagement of public funds and mismanagement of government resources. If the governance intentions are not authentic towards ensuring improved service deliver and good governance, public managers can collude with the political officials to mismanage the resources which may result in poor governance”. Therefore, the natural presence of the political bureau in government brings in the political agenda in the public administration, if public officials yield to political influence and become politically discriminatory in the public administration.

The lecturer who is also the former director of a national government department (PUP-0114) made the following points: “executive mayors consider themselves heads of administration (not the municipal managers). Appointments are made based on political affiliation not on merit due to political pressure. Ministers appoint Heads of Department on the basis of political expediency not skills. Heads are dismissed after differences of opinions with the political bureau. There is no possibility of creating or maintaining expertise in administration of government institutions”. This study found that such viewpoints suggest that the politics-administration interface is controlled by elected officials through partisan public servants.

### **5.3 PREVALENCE OF LEADERSHIP TENSIONS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BUREAU**

This study found that political power was prioritized by politicians over documented rules in the Constitution and legislation, resulting in tension between the political bureau and the administration bureau. Among the cases mentioned by participants were the arms deal, the matter of Buthelezi and his Director General at Home Affairs, the Head of the National Prosecuting Authority Vusi Pikoli and the political bureau, former Police Commissioner Selebi disbanding the Scorpions, former Minister Nyanda in the Communications Department procurement processes, former Minister Pule in Communications procurement processes, and Police Commissioner Cele in the leasing of buildings. The Head of Department in the Parliament of South Africa in Cape Town (EOD-1014) stated: “You will also remember the former Minister of Communication Mr Siphwe Nyanda who once locked his Director-General out of the office.” The senior lecturer from the University of Pretoria (PUP-0214) also referred to the case of former Minister Pule as an example of interference that caused tension in the politics and administration relationship. The manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) stated that: “The case of former Police Commissioner Bheki Cele provides

an example of interference in public administration duties.” A lecturer from Wits University (PWU-0114) referred to the case of former Minister Pule in the Communications Department procurement processes as an example of tension between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

The former lecturer from the University of Zululand (PUZ-0114) stated that “the cases of conflict between the politicians and senior public officials are numerous; thanks to the media the public gets to know about them. The case of Director General Masetlha and Minister Buthelezi and the case of Minister Joemat-Pettersson and Director-General Langa Zita are just examples of the prevalence of conflicts between the elected officials and the professional public officials in the politics–administration interface”.

Furthermore, the researcher from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (LMPL-0113) stated that there was interference by politicians to amass tender contracts for themselves and their allies. The researcher mentioned that at the Department of Roads and Transport there was political interference and procurement irregularities; such a finding was also made by the Public Protector<sup>3</sup> in 2012. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) explained that: “The problem of political interference is exacerbated by the political appointment term of office which is only five years. As a result of this period, people want to accumulate more resources before their term of office comes to an end.” The cases cited above signify the prevalence of leadership tension between the political bureau and the public administration bureau.

#### **5.4 POLITICAL BUREAU INTERFERENCE IN THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS CONTROL TO INFLUENCE TENDERS**

This study found that in some instances there is political bureau interference with administration duties for procurement process control to

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<sup>3</sup> On the point about tenders: a report was presented on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and corruption practices relating to awarding of contracts for goods and services by the Limpopo Department of Roads and Transport 2012/2013.

influence the granting of tenders. A former senior public official from the Office of the President (SOPRE-0114) revealed that politicians give instructions to Heads of Department (HODs) verbally for HODs to document the instructions when they give them to staff. When a politician is redeployed an HOD has to account in Parliament for the outcomes of that politician's tenure. The lack of documented instruction from the politicians means that the HODs are accountable for negative outcomes since the political bureau interference usually has no paper trail to show. The former Director from Gauteng Provincial Government (SODGP-0114) explained that due to the unpredictability of a political career and also as Heads of Departments (for example, Pikoli is no longer employable in government and nor is the Reverend Chikane, as stated by Pikoli in his book *My second initiation*); and due to the five-year term of office which is a limited employment period, politicians and HODs may want to accumulate as much wealth as possible before the end of their term of office. Their attitude is: "If I miss this opportunity I might die poor while my comrades are getting rich every day." In the procurement process, people want to establish businesses and get contracts to sustain themselves before the end of their term of office. As one participant from the national government department explained, "If they miss this opportunity where else will they get it?"

The former Member of the Parliament of South Africa, currently a deployed diplomat (EOD:0214) argued that "it is a norm that politicians will want to award government contracts to party loyalists at the expense of quality service delivery". The senior professor from the University of Limpopo (PLM-0113) referred to the expelled ANC youth leader and the Premier who had amassed wealth through tenders from their political connections. The retired MP of the Parliament of South Africa from the opposition political party (E00-0114) further revealed that "politicians will always have conflicting interests in the public administration milieu". This is "because they have to serve the public, their political parties and at the

same time enrich themselves with government resources that are meant to serve the public”. Therefore officials from the political bureau may interfere with procurement process to control and influence the awarding of tenders to applicants who are allies.

“I think politicians do put pressure on senior public officials sometimes in order to get what they want such as awarding tenders to certain people,” argued one senior public official from the Gauteng Provincial Legislature (SOGOP-0114). The lecturer from the University of South Africa (PUN-0114) stated that “the oversight role of the political bureau is not always explicit in legislation.” This presents a gap that is abused by the political bureau. The former MP argued that by pressurising officials in administration to accept particular tenders or make specific appointments, officials may succumb to the request to be able to gain advantages for themselves.

Some of the responses provided on political bureau interference made reference to Auditor-General reports as explained below.

On an annual basis, the Auditor-General informs South African stakeholders of the audit findings in its consolidated general report on local government audit outcomes. Administration is undermined by negative findings of awards of tenders made to persons in the service of the State as well as family members of people in such key positions (Auditor-General, 2009–10). As explained in the Auditor-General Consolidated Local Government Audit Outcomes (2009–10), the key positions relating to these awards included Councillors, Mayors, Municipal Managers, Senior Managers and Supply Chain Managers. Other findings include uncompetitive behaviour or unfair procurement processes, deviations from procurement that are not justifiable and inadequate public invitations (Auditor-General, 2009–10). During the 2009–10 financial year, “irregular expenditure incurred by municipalities as a result of contravention of

supply chain management policy and legislation amounted to R3.9 billion and this made up 94% of the total irregular expenditure” (Auditor-General, 2009–10:70). Furthermore, a significant number of suppliers failed to declare their relationship with the public servants employed at a particular municipality (Auditor-General, 2009–10:39). Municipalities “were found to be awarding tenders to family members of persons in the serving of the municipality without adequately disclosing the award” (Auditor-General, 2009–10). As presented above, the study found that the political bureau may interfere with the public administration process in order to gain control of procurement processes to determine who obtains government projects.

## **5.5 CADRE DEPLOYMENT REVIEW**

This research found that cadre deployment should be based on skills and abilities instead of exclusive political affiliation as a prerequisite for deployment. The manager at the Office of the Premier in Gauteng (SOGOP-0114) argued that cadre deployment would be acceptable if cadres were sufficiently skilled, and able to separate the party and administration. Furthermore, the former Member of Parliament (EOMOP-0114) argued that cadre deployment would be acceptable if deployees would adhere to the constitution and guiding legislation. The professor from Wits University (PWU-0114) stated that the problem with the current pattern of deployment was that jobs were given to comrades who were previously arrested for political reasons, or had been in exile, or were strong supporters of political principals. The problem that was identified is that poor performance of cadres was usually blamed on staff, unless the cadre was no longer trusted by a politician, as explained by the professor of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo. The Head of Department in the Parliament of South Africa in Cape Town (SOCTP-0114) stated that the constructive factor of cadre deployment was that a political party would be able to evaluate policy effectiveness and efficiency for policy direction. Cadre deployment is not necessarily wrong if the

deployee is skilled and sufficiently competent to manage the senior position that he or she is placed in.

In contrast, the professor from Wits University School of Public Health (PWU-0114) argued that cadre deployment negatively affects service delivery as the person is likely to prioritise the interests of the party above the interests of the public. The Gauteng Provincial Government Director (SOGRT-0113) stated that “appointed cadres tended to feel that they owed allegiance to the political parties that put them in office and forgot to serve the public. The State departments could be better if they were run by a board or council as is the case of companies. This will reduce the problem to some extent as the leader of a department will be accountable to a team of people from different backgrounds”.

The senior researcher at Wits University referred to the case of Vuyo Mlokoti vs Amathole District Municipality and Mlamli, where the court ruled that the appointment of a municipal manager was illegal if it was taken as a result of the unauthorized or unwarranted dictates of an outside party structure (Vuyo Mlokoti vs Amathole District Municipality and Mlamli unreported judgement, Case No. 1428/2008, 2008). In this case, the panel tasked by the District Council to appoint a Municipal Manager was advised by the ANC Regional Executive on who should be appointed. This ANC-recommended candidate was less qualified and inexperienced compared to all the other candidates the panel had shortlisted.

As argued above, cadre deployment is not always based on skills and abilities but is driven by partisan factors. The challenge regarding cadre deployment is that it is the extension of the political bureau in the government departments; deployed officials remain committed to serving the political bureau that gave them employment, and they seldom prioritize public administration for improved public service.



## **5.6 POLITICIANS' INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND INCREASE IN CORRUPTION**

This study found that the involvement of politicians in public administration increased corruption. Document analysis revealed that driving forces behind corruption were a combination of three negative factors: (i) a corrupt civil servant, (ii) a corrupt politician, and (iii) a corrupt business person (Pikoli and Wiener, 2013:358). The manager from the South African Local Government Association argued that the arms deal was testament to the negative outcome of political bureau involvement in public administration. Twenty-one (84%) of twenty-five participants argued that politicians should only play an oversight role and give policy direction. The Manager at the Gauteng Provincial Government (SOGOP-0114) argued that people still saw public office as a means to accumulate resources for themselves. The Professor of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo (SOLMPL-0113) suggested that “politicians should [undergo] intensive training to understand their role - perhaps they can be a ‘watch-dog’ against corruption”. The manager (SOSAL-0114) at the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) argued that political bureau involvement could only reduce corruption if politicians acted with integrity and honesty. When politicians are corrupt, political bureau involvement can promote corruption. The Wits University Professor from the School of Public Health suggested that political involvement in administration would not reduce corruption in Africa, since politicians would say that: “We did not suffer in the struggle to come and suffer in our government.” The manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) stated that corruption could be reduced if the country could utilize independent government institutions for policy evaluation and monitoring and take their recommendations seriously. Furthermore, as one senior public service official from the South African Parliament in Cape Town observed, “I don’t see corruption dwindling in Africa because the majority of politicians see government as a wealth amassing vehicle”. . The lecturer

at the University of Pretoria; School of Public Administration (PUP-0214) noted that an incident such as the arms deal in South Africa is another example of corruption that emanated from the involvement of politicians in procurement processes. As discussed above, this research established that the involvement of politicians in public administration results in increased corruption and a politics–administration interface that is dominated by the political bureau.

### **5.7 MANDELA’S LEADERSHIP**

The leadership of former President Nelson Mandela was examined in this study to review the pre-claim suggesting that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a senior public service official. The manager from the Department of International Affairs and Cooperation argued that former President Mandela was a leader who was passionate about equality of people. He was a paternalistic, charismatic leader who embraced fairness, justice and non-discrimination. He was also referred to as the ‘collective leader’ who strove for consensus in decisions taken by the government. Furthermore, the former Member of Parliament (EOMOP-0114) explained that “President Mandela’s leadership traits were very reconciliatory because the primary concern to the government during his leadership was to avert possible civil war in South Africa. The TRC is an example of the reconciliatory nature of Mandela’s leadership. It was important to understand that his leadership was premised on a vision of peace and uniting South Africa. At that point in time it was desperately needed.”

The former member of the opposition in parliament (EOP-0114) argued that former President Mandela sought congruent government machinery and tolerant political parties which was crucial for a positive politics–administration interface. The lecturer at the University of South Africa (PUN-0114) suggested that Mandela was reconciliatory and strong on co-operation and collective leadership. Mandela acknowledged the need to

reconcile divergent views. In examining the leadership styles in the politics–administration interface, this study established that collective leadership during the Mandela era as the President of South Africa resulted in elected officials and public administrators under his leadership feeling they were part of the decision-making processes in government. Incidents of tension in the politics–administration interface became more prevalent after Mandela’s retirement as explained through the cases that occurred between 1999 and 2009.

## **5.8 MBEKI’S LEADERSHIP**

The researcher from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature argued that “former President Thabo Mbeki was a visionary leader who did things independently, his weakness was to succumb to political pressure on matters such as privatisation and dismantling of the Scorpions.” Mbeki compromised on certain policies to please his allies in the political bureau. Document analysis in this study suggests that Mbeki appeared to improperly disregard the provisions of the constitution and wanted to be elected for a third term in office as the President of the party and potentially of the country (Singh, 2006:164). The manager from the South African Parliament (SOCTP-0114) observed that Mbeki appeared to be autocratic, pushing ill-informed health policies on HIV and AIDS. The Wits University professor (PWU-0114) suggested that Mbeki was not a charismatic leader but was somewhat professional. The Member of Parliament (EOC-0113) felt that Mbeki was systems-oriented and passionate about economic growth and stability. The professor from the University of Limpopo noted that Mbeki was a visionary leader who believed more in his ability to lead and that this strong belief in his ability to lead may have been the cause of his downfall.

Mbeki’s leadership focused on economic change and growth for the country, according to the manager from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. The manager from the Office of the Premier in Gauteng

(SOGOP-0114) suggested that the aloofness of his leadership style had alienated many ordinary citizens. The independent researcher of systems thinking (SOGPP-0113) noted that Mbeki had placed emphasis on creating an intellectual elite class, which was not necessarily wrong, but that South Africa was perhaps not ready for such a shift at that time. The manager at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114) suggested that Mbeki's vision was for economic growth and stability in the country, as espoused in the NPM style of government. The lecturer (PUP-01-14) from the University of Pretoria, who is also a former public servant, argued that Mbeki was internationally focused and had lost touch with the rank and file. The lecturer at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (PUK-0114) observed that "Mbeki was an intelligent leader who was always trusted within the ANC; as a result he was handpicked by Mandela to succeed him as President of the ANC. His downfall came due to his centralisation of power and his controversial views on public health policy".

In examining the leadership styles in the politics–administration interface, this study established that domineering leadership during the Mbeki era as President of South Africa resulted in elected officials and public administrators under his leadership feeling excluded in the decisions of government. The cases of tension in the politics–administration interface became more prevalent during the Mbeki tenure as discussed in this study and as demonstrated by the cases from the period 1999 to 2009.

## **5.9 SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION**

The question that emanates from the "politics–administration dichotomy" introduced by Woodrow Wilson, suggesting the separation of politics and administration, was reviewed through open-ended questionnaires. All participants (ten senior public officials, ten professors and five elected officials) acknowledged that politics and administration were practically not completely separable since policy direction and evaluation came from the political bureau. It is the nature of the politics–administration interface

relationship to be complex and dynamic. Participants further revealed that politicians have a final say in administration because eventually they account to their political party and to Parliament. The former Member of the South African Parliament (EOMOP-0114) stated that heads of departments were hired servants employed by politicians so they complied with their superiors and their views were unlikely to take precedence, whereas resolutions taken by politicians mattered. The former Member of Parliament from the opposition (EOP-0114) stated that as long as public officials are accountable to political office bearers there will always be a problem of political interference. The professor at the University of Cape Town (PCT-0114) argued that, to some extent, politics and administration can be separated. However, the separation requires the adoption of policies that clearly explain the role of politicians versus that of public officials.

Document analysis confirmed that the political bureau should be more accountable to the public whereas the former Director of Public Prosecutions Pikoli had argued that South Africa needed a presidential system of government where the public could elect MPs and also elect the President. For the presidential system to succeed it should be more thorough, whereby, after electing members of parliament, the citizens can go further to elect Ministers for different portfolios from among the elected MPs. “We must understand our political legacy to understand that it was absolutely necessary to have a politics–administration overlap post-1994. The issue now is whether that overlap must continue or is so entrenched that it cannot be stopped going forward,” argued a senior consultant and independent researcher in government.

The professor of public administration at UNISA (PUN-0214) observed that “separation of politics and administration could not be to the extent of complete separation because the politics–administration interface was not unique to South Africa”. The former Professor at Durban University of

Technology (PDU-0114) stated that “politics is an inherent part of public administration; we can try to create buffers between these two spheres but it would be difficult to imagine the total separation”. The developed and the developing countries such as the Brazil, United States, Great Britain and Australia are still challenged by the interface but have reached a degree of consensus on the interference. It is time for South Africa to find consensus on the politics–administration interference and therefore the politics–administration consensus study should be a complete study on its own.

This study established that Heads of Departments should be politically sensitive but not political activists. It was further established that it is not entirely possible to separate politics and administration since the political bureau should account to the public through parliamentary processes.

## **5.10 RESPONSE TRENDS SUMMARY**

### **5.10.1 Disregard for documented rules and responsibilities**

The data collected through questionnaires and document analysis is in congruence with the political bureau interference pre-claim, revealing that there is political bureau interference because there is no clear role interpretation for politicians and heads of departments to know which roles to assume and which roles to leave for the other party. The study found that the documented rules and responsibilities themselves are not always clear in order to circumvent political interference. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued that the blurred boundaries between politics and administration are the result of legislation that is not explicit in defining roles and limits for both elected officials and administrators. The uMkhonto we Sizwe veteran (EOR-0113) noted during the discussions that “it is difficult for the government to document every little action that needs to be taken in the public service, but whatever role that is not clear whether it falls within the responsibility of an administrator must be taken by the elected official since he or she is ultimately

responsible to account to his or her peers and superiors in parliament”. This study found that if the documented roles are not clear in determining who takes responsibility between the elected official and the administrator, power struggles and political bureau dominance in the politics–administration interface becomes more likely. The Public Service Regulations (Chapter 1) proved to have ambiguous documented roles resulting to in a lack of clarity and grey areas that are ultimately claimed by elected officials.

### **5.10.2 Political dominance**

The study found that politicians interfered because they knew that they were ultimately responsible when the portfolio committees either in Parliament or at the legislatures needed answers and where the political office would be required to respond rather than the bureaucrats. For example, on 12 February 2008 the Minister of Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, set out the priorities for Social Development, including a comprehensive social security net, a targeted and detailed approach to eradicating poverty and unemployment, establishment of a mandatory retirement fund and coverage of low income groups, and poverty alleviation (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2008). The democratic government structure empowers the political bureau to have jurisdiction over service delivery matters in the public administration, resulting in tension between the political bureau and the administration bureau. Furthermore, questionnaires and document analysis confirmed that politics dominates public administration; the challenge lies in the location of the interface in the politics–administration relationship. Corruption as an underlying intent was also confirmed as a factor that resulted in political interference and conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau. The deployment of comrades in order to award tenders to relatives and friends of politicians was revealed by participants, and more precisely by Vusi Pikoli in cases he witnessed in government.

### **5.10.3 Conflicting leadership styles**

The study established that during the Mbeki era the leadership changed from collective leadership to an independent, closed and centralized leadership system. The cases of strained relationships between the politicians and administrators revealed leadership traits that can result in conflict. However, this study could not conclude that the leadership styles between Mbeki and Pikoli were a major contributing factor to a strained interface relationship. The study revealed the likelihood that the fiercely tenacious and independent personalities of Mbeki and Pikoli resulted in conflict and strained relationships. Through document analysis there was sufficient evidence to conclude that political power was used to manipulate State institutions in order to maintain political power and to protect political allies from investigation and prosecution.

### **5.10.4 Political ideological differences**

Political struggle to control administration was also revealed as a contributing factor to conflict and strained relationships in the politics–administration interface instead of political ideology variance. The former HOD at the Department of Health (SOFDH-0114) stated that “political parties value their cultures and political agenda which makes them claim uniqueness but even the parties with similar values and culture may not work together because of this claimed uniqueness”. This study found that the South African politics is premised more on population identities and less on political ideologies. The political bureau is ultimately responsible for agenda-setting and accounting to Parliament, thus if the Head of Department does not support the political party agenda there could be conflict and strained relationships in the politics–administration interface. Central to the cases of Buthelezi and Masetlha as well as Zille and Mgoqi was the political struggle to control administration with no conclusive evidence of political ideology variance as an influence on conflict in the politics–administration interface.



## 5.11 CONCLUSION

The study found sufficient data to conclude that the political bureau interferes with public administration matters in South Africa. The study further concluded that rules and responsibilities of both the political bureau and the administration bureau are not always explicit, which leaves room for political bureau interference. There was, however, a lack of evidence to conclude that there is a collective intention by the political bureau to disregard documented rules and responsibilities. The study further concluded that it was an accepted norm that the political bureau dominated in public administration since the political official was ultimately accountable to Parliament.

The study could not compellingly conclude from the examined cases that leadership styles are a contributing factor to problematic politics–administration interface relationships. However, the study established that certain personality traits could contribute to strained politics–administration interface relationships. Finally, the study concluded that the politics of identity and political agenda between the political bureau and the administration bureau may be a factor in strained politics–administration interface relationships. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the conflict in the politics–administration interface is linked to political ideology variance between the elected officials and the heads of departments.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

The politics–administration interface concept is the relationship between administration and politics with a study problem that is grounded in establishing the nature of the interface between politics and administration. The scholarly discourse on the concept of politics–administration interface became a strong academic focus in the nineteenth century and it is the distinctiveness of this relationship that enlivens modern day academia in the public administration and political science schools. This study has examined the politics–administration interface through the pre-claims as conceptualised by the researcher in this contribution to contemporary academic discourse.

The main claim of this study was that there are leadership clashes between political bureaux and public service bureaux when there are conflicting opinions on how service delivery must be achieved. The main claim was based on the case of the former Head of State Thabo Mbeki and the National Director of Public Prosecutions in 2008 after a struggle with the political bureau, particularly then President Thabo Mbeki and Minister of Justice Brigitte Mabandla. The first reason for the main claim of leadership conflict was that there is a tendency by political officials to dominate the public service function. The researcher has examined the notion that political officials want to dominate the public service function because they want to influence the public service’s supply chain and the awarding of tenders. Hence the reason for seeking to control public service function could be political authority and corruption as the underlying intent. The second reason for the main claim was that there could be conflicting leadership styles between a political official and a

senior public service official. If, for example, there are particular personal behavioural traits as well as leadership styles that are dominant in a political bureau and not in the public service bureau or *vice versa*, there could be leadership and governance conflicts. Leadership conflicts may also occur due to the leaders' allegiance to either closed systems or open systems of leadership. The third reason to the main claim was that political officials may have a different political ideology compared to the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. If there is a clash with regard to political ideologies there could be conflicts between the political bureau and the public service bureau. The fourth reason for the claim of this study was that political officials or public service officials or both parties have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. Hence there could be overlapping actions between political bureau and public service bureau. Such overlap could be related to the state and political party overlap which could be one of the challenges of one dominant party state model in the Westminster system of democracy. The four pre-claims could be the contributing factors to politics–administration interface challenges. The study was limited to examining the politics–administration interface in relation to the four pre-claims presented above as possible contributing factors to conflict between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

### **6.1.1 Disregard for documented duties and responsibilities or unclear rules**

This study has presented one of the pre-claims suggesting that there is a tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to have some disregard for documented duties and responsibilities. The researcher has studied legislative roles and ambiguous sections as well as the unclaimed obligations that could be the influential elements that contribute to occasionally tense relationships in South Africa's politics–administration interface. The rules and responsibilities for the elected officials and the senior administrators are documented in legislation and

employment contracts, where there is ambiguous interpretation and unclear wording of the rules and responsibilities there could be politics–administration interface conflict. The decisive governance authority is upon the political bureau which accounts to the constituency that votes for the government representatives. The researcher further concluded that the politics–administration interface is a conceptual phenomenon, thus any attempt to measure and identify demarcation marks and overlaps becomes technically problematic. Therefore, even in instances where the political bureau would wish to observe boundaries, the challenge would be that there are no boundaries except for conceptual lines in the minds of governance theorists. Furthermore, the political bureau is under pressure to deliver and show the constituency that it has delivered before the next elections lest the electorate declines to give it further political power to govern. Such dilemmas create haphazard working conditions due to the elected officials' political pressure and the administrators' desire to perform according to contractual agreements. The politics–administration interface conflict becomes unavoidable in some instances where there are unclear or ambiguously documented rules and responsibilities.

### **6.1.2 Political interference, ideologies and leadership styles**

In chapter 4 the study established through the examined literature as well as reviewed cases that there is a tendency or a generally accepted trend that politicians dominate public administration to assure and control the political mandate in practice. The study further established that different political parties with different agendas may have conflict in the politics–administration interface; however, such conflicts were not linked to political ideology variance. The study found that political parties may clash at the politics–administration interface due to the struggle for political control instead of political ideology variance. This finding was supported by contemporary scholarship and the case studies of Zille and Mgoqi as well as Masetlha and Buthelezi. The case of Pikoli and Mbeki suggests that these leaders clashed due to personalities as opposed to leadership styles

although there was insufficient evidence to support leadership styles as an influential factor in the politics–administration interface.

### **6.1.3 Political dominance and unclear rules and responsibilities**

The study found sufficient data to conclude that the political bureau interferes with public administration matters. The study also concluded that rules and responsibilities of both the political bureau and the administration bureau are not always explicit which leaves space for political bureau interference. There was insufficient data to conclude that there was a collective intention by the political bureau to disregard documented rules and responsibilities. The study further concluded that it is an accepted norm that the political bureau dominates in public administration since the political official is ultimately accountable to parliament. The political bureau is part of the public service through the mandate it gives in legislative development. The political bureau accounts for the performance of public administration in parliament, together with accounting officers. Thus the political role in the public administration is justified by the legislative obligations and the government structure of South Africa. Therefore, during the working relations between the elected officials and the heads of administration, politicians dominate the politics–administration interface.

### **6.1.4 Unclear areas in the interface**

This chapter discusses conclusions and recommendations for the politics–administration interface discourse. The researcher has examined ambiguity or contested roles as well as unclaimed roles which may be contributing factors that strain working relationships in the politics–administration interface. The study has reviewed the legislative ambiguity in the politics–administration interface. The researcher concluded that the politics–administration interface is an artificial demarcation as opposed to empirical and concrete segregation. The political bureau is constitutionally authorised through the election processes or the social contract mandate

to represent the public and formulate government policies. Senior administrators are employees appointed on a contractual basis to perform administrative duties on behalf of the political bureau which represents the electorate or the people. The political bureau takes the ultimate authority and control over unallocated supervisory responsibilities in the politics–administration interface.

## **6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6.2.1. Disregard for documented responsibilities**

One of the four pre-claims of this study suggested that there is a tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to disregard to some extent their documented duties and responsibilities. This study found that disregard for documented laws is a common feature of African politics, where dominant political parties assume all authority due to the liberation credentials that they believe will justify their privileged political positions (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:62). Bratton and Van de Walle (1994:455) further argue that “disregard for documented responsibilities and engaging in personal relationships are the base and superstructure of the political institutions in Africa”. However, a senior public official from the Office of the President (SOPRE-0114) noted that “although it can be argued that politicians interfere with public administration, the legislation around governance responsibilities is not always explicit”. Legislation such as the Public Service Amendment Act No. 86 of 1998 was found to have ambiguous wording on the authority of senior public servants relative to the authority of the minister, thereby giving ministers control of administration. Furthermore, the Public Service Regulations provide ultimate authority to the minister as they stated that Ministers could take a decision regarding the transfer of functions between departments (Chapter 1 Part III(H) of the Public Service Regulations). The Minister shall determine rates of compensation for overtime through the collective bargaining process (Chapter 1 Part V(D)). The Minister may

issue directives regarding the training of employees or categories of employees in the public service (Chapter 1 Part IX(C)). The Minister may issue directives regarding the manner in which vacancies must be advertised within the public service (Chapter 1 Part VII(C.2.7)). The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued that “one of the ways of combating political interference would be to introduce a non-politicised institution between the directors-general and elected officials”. This study therefore recommends that laws and regulations should be reviewed in order to have greater clarity and be more explicit and give independent senior public servants powers to implement policies. In the current governance structure, ministers are too close to the day-to-day operations of government departments and some regulations (as demonstrated by the Public Service Regulations) give ministers authority to take professional decisions. This study recommends that matters such as human resource management, training, procurement, payroll and staffing should be the sole responsibility of the administration bureau and be managed by senior public servants who should also be subjected to constant monitoring and evaluation by the Public Service Commission in accordance with the proposed structure in this study. Such change of structure and responsibilities would be aligned with the duties of public administrators which are “planning, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting”, or the POSDCORB approach as outlined by Gulick and Urwick (1943:58).

### **6.2.2 Governance and legislative intervention: review legislation to remove ambiguity**

This study has established that the problem is not necessarily a tendency on the part of political officials or public service officials or both parties to overlook their documented duties and responsibilities, but that this may also be due to the fact that documented rules and responsibilities are not always clear, whereas the political bureau has ultimate control and is under pressure to gratify the public lest the political office lose the

confidence of the people. For example, the Public Service Amendment Act 1997, section 9 states that the services of the Director-General may be terminated before the completion of his or her contract; and any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister. The legislative wording, “any other matter which may be prescribed by the Minister” provides a Minister with the authority to impose through this region of law ambiguity. Therefore, the starting point when seeking to alleviate conflict in the politics–administration interface relationship is to review legislation to clarify any ambiguity regarding responsibilities in relation to borderline or grey areas.

### **6.2.3 Political dominance and generally accepted norms**

Another pre-claim of this study was that the political bureau is conventionally in the forefront of governance and thus it dominates public administration. The Head of Department from the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (LMPL-0113) explained that “the blurry line between politics and administrative functions at government was due to the pre-1994 culture and values of political activism that result in political patronage or partisanship”. The struggle for political change in South Africa was led by the political bureau, thus politicians find it acceptable to take control of all governance and public administration. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) concurred that “politicians end up interfering because when the portfolio committees either in Parliament or at the legislatures need answers, the political office must be able to answer in most cases not the bureaucrats”. Consequently, ministers and MECs usually have ultimate authority over public administration which results in them controlling the politics–administration interface. The researcher therefore recommends a governance structure review to fully utilise the Public Service Commission as the neutral institution between the political bureau and the administration bureau.



#### **6.2.4 Political dominance and leadership styles**

The study found that politicians dominate public administration to safeguard and regulate the political mandate at the implementation stage. The manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114) argued that politicians interfere with public administration because they need to be updated about the operations in order to report to parliament. This study further found that politicians may interfere with public administration processes if they need to protect their colleagues or cadres from investigation and prosecution and conceal corruption. Furthermore, the leadership aspect of a proactive and autocratic minister versus an indecisive democratic director-general was identified as one of the causes of strained relationships in the politics–administration interface. This suggests that leadership characters between the political bureau and the administration bureau may experience tensions which result in strained politics–administration interface when a dominant leader dictates and imposes direction over public administration activities. This study recommends a review of the structure with administrators reporting indirectly to the political bureau through the Public Service Commission in accordance with the proposed public service structure in this study. While there will always be different leadership styles and potential conflicts in any leadership structure, the proposed structure would provide senior public servants with a new focus for administration without intimidation and direct control by the political bureau.

#### **6.2.5 Different political ideologies in the interface**

Another pre-claim of this study suggested that the politics–administration interface could be strained by political officials who may have a different political ideology when compared to the political ideology upheld by a senior public service official. According to Baradat (1984:164), the political bureau is the cradle of ideology and has the obligation to advance policies that emanate from its main ideology. It is expected in a developing country

that a senior public manager appreciates the political ideology of the leading political bureau. However, this study found no evidence of the political ideology difference effect in the politics–administration interface except for political power conflict. The researcher argues that since the democratic government structure of the politics–administration interface had been utilised for more than twenty years and suffered the negative effects of politicised administration, this provides an appropriate time for a new structure of public service governance that will utilise an independent institution as a buffer between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

### **6.2.6 Justification of the proposed non-partisan administrative structure**

According to the manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114), the governance structure is such that “politicians end up interfering with administration processes because when the portfolio committees either in Parliament or at the legislatures need answers, the political office must be able to answer in most cases, not the bureaucrats”. The political bureau is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the public service and Ministers thus work closely with Directors-General to ensure that they are acquainted with the progress on policy implementation congruent with the national policy agenda facilitated by the political bureau. This study found that in the current governance structure, the political bureau had the definitive authority in the public service whereas the government structure locates the political bureau too close to the administration bureau which may contribute to conflict between a director-general and a minister (Public Service Regulations, 1999, Chapter 1). Senior public servants such as directors-general report to the elected officials in the political bureau; the political heads account to the legislature on how the vote of the department is used in the public interest (Pauw *et al*, 2002:30). In the current structure the political bureau is the ultimate authority in the public administration (Public Service Regulations, 1999,

Chapter 1). For example, Chapter 1 Part III(H) of the Public Service Regulations makes provision for Ministers to make a determination regarding the transfer of functions between departments. Ministers may also “determine a code of remuneration for occupational category and an occupational classification system” (Chapter 1 Part III(I)). The Minister may also provide guidance on the work of the public service institutions and departments. For example, Chapter 1 Part III(J) states that “the annual report shall include such information on planning, service delivery, organisation, job evaluation, remuneration, benefits, personnel expenditure, the utilisation of consultants, affirmative action, recruitment, promotions, termination of services, performance management, skills development, injury on duty, labour relations, leave and discharge due to ill-health, as the Minister determines”. Furthermore, Chapter 1 Part III(K) requires Ministers to “issue directives to assess and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the human resource management function and practices in supporting departments to meet service delivery objectives, including assessment tools to be utilised by departments for purposes of assessment and reporting”. In Part IV(B.1), the Minister’s responsibilities are described as being to determine a “job evaluation system or systems that shall be utilised in the public service; determine a range of job weights derived from the system or systems for each salary range in a salary scale; and determine a job or category of jobs that an executing authority must evaluate. The Minister may also review the application of job evaluation in the public service and issue directives on the application of the job evaluation system; and evaluate any job” (Part IV(B.2)). Chapter 1 Part V(B) of the Public Service Regulations specifies that, the “Minister shall determine a salary scale for employees who fall within the ambit of the Labour Relations Act in the course of the collective bargaining process; and for other employees by determination”. Furthermore, the Minister “shall determine rates of compensation for overtime through the collective bargaining process” (Chapter 1 Part V(D)). The Minister “may issue directives regarding the training of employees or

categories of employees in the public service” (Chapter 1 Part IX(C)). The Minister “may issue directives regarding the manner in which vacancies must be advertised within the public service” (Chapter 1 Part VII(C.2.7)).

As demonstrated above, when examining Public Service Regulations it becomes clear that the political bureau is the controlling authority in procedures and systems in the public administration, where ministers are in fact the ultimate managers of the public administration bureau, they employ senior public managers and manage their performance, and if managers fail to perform as expected they lose their job.

This study found that the interface problem is usually structural and influenced by the location of the political bureau and the administration bureau in terms of elected officials and administrators’ proximity in the reporting line. Public administration in a developing country like South Africa cannot be completely isolated from politics since political office is the institution that addresses the question of who gets what, how and when. The political office provides a platform where public managers can better account for the public money for the political office to account for the votes of the constituencies. However, the response to over-politicisation of public administration could be in the further elevation of the Public Service Commission (PSC) to fully monitor and manage public administration instead of ministers. The Manual for the Public Service Commission (2000:2) states that *“the Public Service Commission is an independent and impartial public institution, established in terms of Section 196 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The PSC is the only institution established in terms of Chapter 10 of the Constitution. It derives its mandate from sections 195 and 196 of the Constitution, 1996, which sets out the values and principles governing public administration which should be promoted by the PSC, as well as the powers and functions of the PSC. Its current duties amongst others are to investigate, monitor, and evaluate the organisation and administration of the Public Service. The*


*PSC mandate also entails the evaluation of achievements, or lack thereof, of Government programmes. The PSC is vested with custodial oversight responsibilities for the Public Service and monitors, evaluates and investigates public administration practices. It also has the power to issue directives regarding compliance with personnel procedures relating to recruitment, transfers, promotions and dismissals. The PSC is accountable to the National Assembly but must report on an annual basis to provincial legislatures on its activities in provinces. Five of the Commissioners are based at the PSC's head office in Pretoria. A Commissioner is appointed for a term of five years, which is renewable for one additional term. The PSC is headed by a Chairperson who is the Executive Authority. The Chairperson is appointed by the President<sup>8</sup>.*

The semi-federal structure of the PSC with Offices in the provinces may successfully function when professionalism is the fundamental feature despite the nature of governance in Africa which is characterised by centralisation. However, Cameron (2012:2) states that “decentralising power is often seen as a risky endeavour in Africa within a context of political instability, most notably where ethnic and regional cleavages exist”. Politicians fear that there might be a disconnection between the national structure and provincial structure and this could result in politicians losing political influence to constituencies. However, the researcher argues that South Africa’s democracy may be ready for a professional public administration without politicians managing the public administration operations.

The PSC Manual (2011:2) in accordance with the “Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000” states that “the PSC’s work is structured around the key performance areas; that is, leadership and human resource reviews; labour relations improvement; governance monitoring; service delivery and compliance evaluations; public administration investigations; and professional ethics”. In the proposed structure, the

PSC would be responsible for most of the duties currently performed by the minister. The PSC would maintain accountability “to the National Assembly and report on an annual basis to provincial legislatures on its activities in provinces” as it presently does. This would mean that the Constitution could be amended to give more authority to the commissioners instead of a minister. The Director-General would report to the commissioner who would then report to the Chairperson of the PSC. The five national Commissioners would be empowered with sufficient resources and be responsible for the national government departments. The existing nine provincial Commissioners would be responsible for the provincial administration and report to the national commissioners. From analysing the current Public Service Commission structure, the researcher proposes a national structure that may enhance the work of the commission in a manner consistent with the National Development Plan objectives. Figure 2 below depicts the typical structure to address political dominance in public administration.

**Figure 2: Typical PSC structure to shift the political bureau from day-to-day public administration**



In such a structure the political bureau would be distanced from interfering with public administration, so that politicians can only provide political guidance in line with agenda setting at the political bureau.

### **6.2.7. Public Service Commission and its history of being influenced by the political bureau**

The Public Service and Pensions Act of 1912 established the Public Service Commission in August 1912. The commission was established in congruence with colonial objectives characterised by enforcement of racist laws and was controlled by the political bureau in government. Public services formed part of the control mechanisms for dominating the majority black population (Reuters, 2005:127). However, the objective of the post-apartheid government is non-racialism and to guarantee independence of the Public Service Commission in accordance with section 195 and 196 of the Constitution of South Africa as well as the ideals expressed in Chapter 10 of the Constitution. The guarantee of independence provided by the Constitution does not mean that politicians will cease to seek control of government departments but that the intent of the rule of law would be enforced by the Public Service Commission and by the courts where necessary to maintain an autonomous Public Service Commission.

### **6.2.8 Why the Public Service Commission is best suited for the proposed structure**

The Public Service Commission was established to create a buffer between the political bureau and the administration bureau (Mthembu, 2013:2). The development of South Africa's Public Service Commission is informed by developments in Britain. Following the work of the Northcote-Trevelyan Commission in 1855, a Civil Service Commission was established as the custodian of a meritocratic administration and to secure the accountability of the civil service to the monarch, thereby removing it from political interference (Hughes, 2007:299). The Public Service Commission is suitable for the proposed structure since its mandate as documented in the Constitution clearly confers independence and the supervisory role over the South African public service. The PSC derives its mandate from sections 195 and 196 of the Constitution, 1996, which



outlines the functions, “values and principles governing public administration which should be promoted by the PSC”. The PSC is required by the Constitution to “execute its powers and to perform its duties without fear, favour or prejudice”. The Constitution upholds the PSC’s autonomy resolutely with its neutrality and “no organ of State may interfere with the functioning of the PSC”. The Public Service Commission (PSC) is an autonomous institution established in Chapter 10 of the Constitution with specific focus on the Public Service and a supervisory role over public administration. The importance given to the PSC in Chapter 10 of the Constitution demonstrates its significance as an organisation that binds democratic government as well as the importance of an institution to provide oversight over public administration.

The Constitution stipulates that “there is a single PSC for the Republic of South Africa, consisting of 14 members. The PSC is headed by a Chairperson appointed by the President from the nominated Commissioners. The PSC is accountable to the National Assembly and must report to it annually. It must also report to the Legislature of the province concerned on its activities in each province”. The recommended structure suggests that the PSC is well positioned in government and well authorised in terms of the Constitution to respond to the structural design challenge of the politics–administration interface.

### **6.2.9 Justification for the proposed five national commissioners**

Under the proposed structure, national departments would be grouped into five clusters for purposes of compliance monitoring and evaluation; each national commissioner would be responsible for one cluster of national departments. Therefore, the five commissioners from the Public Service Commission would be responsible for the five national department clusters. The offices of the five commissioners would be staffed with legal practitioners and compliance officers as inspectors of public service to ensure professionalism, objectivity in service delivery, productivity and

appropriate management of public resources. The commissioners would be recruited on the basis of non-partisanship and professional expertise. Furthermore, the commissioners would be expected to uphold professionalism and not participate in political activities. Such professionalism would be documented in the Commissioners' code of ethics that would be enforced and monitored by the bureau of the Chairperson of the Public Service Commission through continuous monitoring. The typical grouping of departments is presented in the table below.

**Table 1: Example of five clusters of national departments**

<p>The Presidency: Governance headed by the President, Deputy President, Minister of the National Planning Commission and Minister of the Public Service and Administration.</p> <p>The executive: The National Assembly NCOP The Judiciary (Justice and Constitutional Development, Office of the Chief Justice)</p>
<p><b>Public Service Commission Commissioner 1: Governance and co-ordination of independent institutions</b></p> <p>Chapter 9 institutions (Public Protector; SAHRC; Commission for gender equality; Auditor-General; IEC; Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities)</p>
<p><b>Public Service Commission Commissioner 2: Public service affairs and social development</b></p> <p>Public Service and Administration Co-operative Governance Communications Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) Telecommunications and Postal Services (previously Communications) International Relations and Co-operation Social Development</p>

Arts and Culture  
 Home Affairs  
 Sport and Recreation South Africa  
 Women  
 Traditional Affairs  
 Public Enterprises  
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  
 Mineral Resources  
 Energy  
 Environmental Affairs  
 Health  
 Labour  
 Human Settlements  
 Public Works  
 Rural Development and Land Reform  
 Small Business Development  
 Transport  
 Water and Sanitation

Each National Government Department with an independent compliance and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner

**Public Service Commission Commissioner 3: Education and public development**

Basic Education  
 Higher Education and Training  
 National School of Government (previously Palama)  
 Planning Monitoring and Evaluation  
 Statistics South Africa  
 Science and Technology

Each National Government Department with an independent compliance and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner.

**Public Service Commission Commissioner 4: Security and rehabilitation**

State Security Agency  
 SA Police Service  
 Defence  
 Military Veterans  
 Independent Police Investigative Directorate  
 Civilian Secretariat for Police  
 Correctional Services

Each National Government Department with an independent compliance and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner.

**Public Service Commission Commissioner 5: Finance, trade and revenue administration**

National Treasury  
 Economic Development  
 SA Revenue Service  
 Trade and Industry  
 Tourism

Each National Government Department with an independent compliance and monitoring office headed by a National Deputy Commissioner.

### **6.2.10 Political interference in the proposed structure and the rule of law**

According to the manager from the Gauteng Provincial Treasury (SOGPT-0114), “there is a justified political interference such as the appointment of senior officials and the monitoring of departmental performance in order to report to parliament”. The Member of the Parliament of South Africa (EOC-0113) argued that “in most cases what is seen as an interfering minister is due to a minister wanting to be updated on departmental performance in line with his or her duty to answer during parliamentary sessions”. Therefore, it is possible that the proposed non-partisan public service might also suffer interference by the political bureau; however, the democratic principle of constitutionalism and upholding the rule of law should prevail. According to Llanos, Weber, Hely and Stroh (2014:6), “in democratic regimes, political actors operate in a particular institutional environment where constitutional rules matter; they define the power of courts as well as how much leeway the elected branches formally have to influence them”. Therefore, in a similar fashion as the chief justice is selected by the Head of State, the chairperson of the Public Service Commission is appointed by the President, although both the Judiciary

and the PSC are deemed to be independent institutions. The PSC in the proposed structure would exercise independence and maintain administrative legal justice despite the possibility of political interference. The South African Constitution (section 1(c)) guarantees the “supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”. The law is binding and should be upheld by both the political bureau and the administration bureau. Consequently, if the rule of law is upheld in the politics-administration interface, the proposed structure will have a positive impact in neutralising the public administration.

#### **6.2.11 Public Service Managers and elected officials in public service**

One of the significant purposes of the National Development Plan is to “build a professional public service that serves government, but is sufficiently autonomous to be insulated from political patronage. This requires a clearer separation between the roles of the political principal and the administrative head”. The National Planning Commission should enact guidelines for public service managers and politicians to assist them to appreciate the dual nature of public administration and that the government performs two basic functions, one political and the other administrative. The political bureau’s responsibility involves the expression of the State will while the administrative function involves the execution of the State will. The word ‘administration’ etymologically stems from the Latin word ‘administrare’ which means ‘to serve’, ‘to assist’, as well as ‘to direct’. The ‘administrare’ element is the politics–administration function ‘to serve’ makes the public sector a serving institution. Public managers and political officials are in place to serve and should have a commitment to serving the public. The political bureau and the administration should work together to minimise and censure personal gratification and promote professionalism in serving the public.

### **6.2.12 The role of provinces in the proposed structure**

The powers and responsibilities of the provinces in the proposed structure are of importance and align with the constitutional structure of governance in South Africa. The Constitution of South Africa (Chapter 6) outlines the provincial authority role in the country's governance structure which includes provincial policy development and assigning legislative powers as a Municipal Council. Chapter 4 of the Constitution defines the role of the National Council of Provinces and the representation of provincial constituencies in policy development and governance. The current Public Service Commission structure includes Provincial Commissioners who promote synchronised administrative efforts in the country. The continued role of Provincial Commissioners in the proposed structure would be essential to co-ordinate governance cascading from the office of the Public Service Commission Chairperson at the national level.

### **6.2.13 Anticipated negative outcomes of the proposed structure**

The change that seeks to distance the political bureau from public administration might encounter resistance from the political bureau in favour of the status quo. This was the case with Canada which upholds political deployment despite the Public Service Commission that promotes non-partisan public administration (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010:68). The political bureau might attempt to influence and control the Public Service Commission. However, the Commission would be able to withstand political pressure and comply with the law if the commissioners and senior public servants are non-partisan employees who are recruited for their professionalism and positive outcome-driven work ethic.

#### **6.2.14 Expected positive attributes of the proposed structure**

The proposed structure would be independent and non-partisan with the focus mainly on public administration and progressive work ethics. The expectation of the proposed structure is that it would minimise conflict between the elected officials and senior public servants since there would be less interaction between these two offices. The Commission-led public service is expected to promote professionalism and be informed by the legislation without undue political influence being exerted. Such a structure would provide a return on investment rather than political favouritism and cronyism, and procurement would be undertaken according to the legislation and protocols. This would enable the Commission to promote accountability rather than opaque processes. Non-partisan public service would be expected to promote public scrutiny of its work and promote an environment that fully reduces any opportunities for corruption and bribery. The non-politicised structure could maintain public administration stability when political leadership changes. Furthermore, the proposed structure could minimise wasteful and fruitless expenditure since there would be constant monitoring of compliance with procedures that are fully documented in policies. Since public administration would not rely on political deployment for strategic positions, the new structure would also improve quality of expertise and productivity in the government departments. It is not the expectation of the researcher that the proposed structure will be without flaws, but that it would be an improved framework that will contribute to the greater efficiency of the public service that avoids under-utilisation of time and resources on power struggles and political differences.

#### **6.2.15 Contemporary scholars and further research**

During this study the researcher identified the following areas that are recommended for further research:

### **6.2.15.1 South Africa reviewed in comparison with non-partisan public services**

Although an attempt was made to compare South Africa with as many relevant countries as possible, in this study the researcher could not find purely non-politicised public administration to compare with South Africa. Therefore, further research is required in the area of progressive non-partisan public administration to learn from such jurisdictions and propose further recommendations for South Africa.

### **6.2.15.2 Political ideologies and the politics–administration interface**

While this study found no evidence to suggest that differing political ideologies between the political bureau and the administration bureau may be one of the contributing factors to strained politics–administration interface, there was not sufficient evidence to prove that what caused conflict in the two reviewed cases was political ideology and not political differences of the political parties in their efforts to control governance using propaganda concealed as political ideology.

### **6.2.15.3 Challenges that may undermine non-partisan public service in Africa**

This study examined certain African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Botswana and Uganda. However, many countries were found to have politicised public administration and were struggling to combat corruption and poor service delivery. The countries in the continent of Africa share a similar history of colonialism and subjugation, except for Ethiopia, and therefore any country's public administration in Africa may be examined in view of the apparent sudden advanced non-partisan administration whereas governance itself is deficient. Further studies should be



conducted to review governance challenges that are unique to Africa with regard to the politics–administration interface.

#### **6.2.15.4 African leadership challenges and the politics–administration interface**

Despite the leadership attributes that may influence the relationship in the politics–administration interface as discussed in this study; there is a need for comprehensive examination of the influence of conventional leadership which might be linked to dictatorship and compromised democracies in Africa.

The academia should be actively engaged in identifying improved governance alternatives to an academic discourse and research output on the relationship between senior public service managers and political officials for the development of public administration contemporary theories in governance.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

To assist the researcher in collecting data in order to examine the research problem through the pre-claims; the questionnaire questions below were formulated:

#### Questionnaire WSG Research 2013

Subject matter: Politics and administration: participants' information

Designation:.....	Institution/organization:..... .....
Date:..... .....	Tel:..... . .....

1. What is your opinion of the political bureau's role in the public administration bureau? Do you think there is a problem of political bureau interference in South Africa's public administration? Yes/No Why:
  
2. Do you know of a case or cases of leadership tension between the political bureau and the public administration bureau in South Africa?  
Yes/No If yes, provide example(s) (e.g. from media):
  
3. Do you think politicians in South Africa interfere with public administration duties (including tendering process or procurement)? Yes/No Why:
  
4. Do you think that cadre deployment to public service by political parties is a good practice in South Africa? Yes/No Why:
  
5. Do you think that cadre deployment to public service by political parties is a bad practice in South Africa? Yes/No Why:

6. Can politicians' involvement in public administration increase corruption in South Africa? Yes/No How:

7. Can politicians' involvement in public administration reduce corruption in South Africa? Yes/No How:

8. How would you define former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki's leadership styles? Key leadership traits (provide example(s))

9. Do you think politicians work beyond their roles and responsibilities to interfere with public administration? Yes/No Why:

10. Do you think there is an overlap between the roles of the political bureau and the responsibilities of the public administration bureau? Yes/No Why:

11. Can politics and public administration be separated in South Africa? Yes/No Why:

## **APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET**

### ***STUDY TITLE***

#### THE POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA

This study is on politics-administration interface in South Africa based on Woodrow Wilson's article in 1887 'The Study of Administration' and the book by Frank Goodnow in 1900 'Politics and Administration'. The researcher is specifically studying the contributing factors to strained relations between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

In this study, you will be asked to answer 11 main questions with follow-up sub-questions. The study typically takes about 30 minutes.

You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without explanation. You have the right to ask that any data you have supplied be withdrawn. You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question that is asked of you. You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered. If you have any questions as a result of reading this information sheet, you should ask the researcher before the study begins.

There are no known risks for you in this study. The researcher will keep your personal information confidential at all times. Only the views will be in the findings without linking them to names or designations of persons. There will be no known benefits to participants; you are voluntarily contributing to this study for the sake of knowledge development and information sharing with contemporary scholarship. Your participation in this study is voluntary thus there is no payment whatsoever given to participants. Feedback and outcome of the study will be kindly provided when request by participants.

No one will link the data you provided to the identifying information you supplied (e.g., name, address, email) the personal information will not be in the report. The collected data in the form of opinions and suggestions will only be used for this study purposes. The collected data will not be used in commercial books or articles outside of academia to generate profit or income in any form. When the data is used for this study, questionnaires will be destroyed; however the compiled data (without names or positions of participants) will be kept in the report at P&DM University of the Witwatersrand.

The information provided in this questionnaire is confidential; therefore the names of participants will not be disclosed in the report or in any discussion. The views presented in this questionnaire are not meant to represent any office or institution; they are treated as personal views from targeted individuals for their experience and opinions in leadership.

## APPENDIX 3: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

### TITLE: THE POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION INTERFACE IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### PROJECT SUMMARY

This study is on politics-administration interface in South Africa based on Woodrow Wilson's article in 1887 'The Study of Administration' and the book by Frank Goodnow in 1900 'Politics and Administration'. The researcher is specifically studying the contributing factors to strained relations between the political bureau and the administration bureau.

By signing below, you are agreeing that: (1) you have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet, (2) questions about your participation in this study have been answered satisfactorily, (3) you are aware of the researcher's pledge of confidentiality and there will be no known risk or rewards to your person as a result of you participating in this study, and (4) you are taking part in this study voluntarily (without coercion).

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant's Name (Printed)\*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant's signature\*

Date

Raymond Shazi

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of person obtaining consent (Printed)  
obtaining consent

Signature of person

*\*Participants wishing to preserve some degree of anonymity may use their initials*

WSG Study, 2014 RS

## APPENDIX 4: STUDY CODES KEYS FOR PARTICIPANTS

### Academic Officials

1. The lecturer at the University of South Africa: (PUN-0114)
2. The lecturer at the University of South Africa: (PUN-0214)
3. The lecturer at the University of Pretoria: (PUP-01-14)
4. The lecturer at the University of Pretoria School of Public Administration: (PUP-0214)
5. The lecturer at the University of Cape Town: (PCT-0114)
6. The lecturer at Wits University: (PWU-0114)
7. The lecturer at the University of Limpopo: (PLM-0113)
8. The former lecturer at the University of Zululand: (PUZ-0114)
9. The lecturer at the University of KwaZulu-Natal: (PUK-0114)
10. The former Professor at Durban University of Technology: (PDU-0114)

### Political bureau officials

1. Retired Member of The Parliament of South Africa: EOMOP-0114
2. Senior member of the uMkhonto weSizwe veterans: EOR-0113
3. Former Member of the Parliament of South Africa, currently a deployed diplomat: EOD:0214
4. Retired MP of the Parliament of South Africa from the opposition political party: EOO-0114
5. Member of the Parliament of South Africa: EOC-0113

### Public Service Officials

1. Director at the Gauteng Provincial Legislature: (SOGOP-0114)
2. The Director at the National Department of Basic Education (SODBE-0114)
3. Senior Manager at Gauteng Provincial Treasury: (SOGPT-0114)
4. The Head of Parliamentary Research Unit in the Parliament of South Africa: (SOCTP-0114)
5. The Specialist Researcher (Government Consultant): (SOGPP-0113)
6. The HOD at Gauteng Provincial Government: (SOGRT-0113)
7. The HOD at South African Local Government Association: (SOSAL-0114)
8. The HOD at The Limpopo Legislature: (SOLMPL-0113)
9. The former HOD from the Office of the President: (SOPRE-0114)
10. Former HOD at The Department of Health: (SOFDH-0114)

**Code Keys**

P: Professor

UN: Unisa

UP: University of Pretoria

CT: University of Cape Town

WU: Wits University

LM: University of Limpopo

UZ: University of Zululand

UK: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal

DU: Durban University of Technology

EOMOP: Elected Official Member of Parliament

EOR: Elected Official Retired

EOD: Elected Official (Diplomat former MP)

EOO: Elected Official from the opposition

EOC: Elected Official currently at office

SOGOP: Senior Official Gauteng Province

SODBE: Senior Official Department of Basic Education

SOGPT: Senior Official Gauteng Provincial Treasury

SOCTP: Senior Official Cape Town Parliament

SOGPP: Senior Official Gauteng Province Private researcher

SOGPG: Senior Official Gauteng Provincial Government

SAL: HOD at South African Local Government Association:

LMPL: HOD at the Limpopo Legislature

PRE: Former HOD from the Office of the President

FDH: Former HOD at the Department of Health

1<sup>st</sup> two digits: interviewee number / 2<sup>nd</sup> two digits: year of the interview