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Chinese Associations and Associational Life in South Africa's Gauteng Province Since the End of Apartheid

by

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in the Department of History, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand.

February 2019

D e c l a r a t i o n

This study represents an original work by the author and has not been submitted in any form to another university. Where use has been made of the work of others it has been duly acknowledged in the text.

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A b s t r a c t

Chinese Associations and Associational Lives in Gauteng, Post-Apartheid

by

Willem Johann Pauw

Supervised by: Dr Arianna Lissoni and Dr Prinisha Badassy

This research focuses on Chinese associations in post-apartheid South Africa. It argues that Chinese associational life during this period has been shaped by the democratic transition in 1994, the emergence of a third wave of Chinese migration, the strengthening of South Africa-China relations and development of new media technologies. The beginnings of Chinese associational life in South Africa date back to the period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries; and can be located in the practice of petitioning by Chinese freemen and contracted labourers against colonial oppression. The first formalised Chinese associations emerged in the early 1900s in response to the increasing regulation and anti-Asiatic legislation enacted by British colonialists and thereafter, through Union government rule. The apartheid government exacerbated racial oppression in the second half of the twentieth century and this subsequently led to the centralisation, and shift away from militancy, of Chinese associations under one national organisation. The influx of Taiwanese migrants in the 1980s saw them establishing their own associations – predominantly business orientated – which was made possible by the preferential treatment they received from the apartheid government. Since 1994, these original associations, which draw their membership from the South African-Born Chinese, have transformed to focus predominantly on community and cultural pursuits. This is the result of political shifts and the increasing freedoms guaranteed to all races by democracy, although their membership is declining. Newer associations established by recent Chinese migrants in the democratic era are principally, although not only, business-orientated. This is in the context of new economic opportunities presented by the growing relations between South Africa and China post-1994. Thus, the democratic shift in 1994 transformed SABC associations from being politically orientated towards more social and cultural enterprises; and alternatively, it has allowed for and encouraged the new associations, established by recent Chinese migrants, to have commercial interests. Some of the themes covered in the thesis include associational life, social capital, migration studies, Chinese diasporic studies, Africa/China relations, community, identity, acculturalisation. This project contributes to the growing literature on the history of the Chinese in South Africa; Chinese diasporic communities; associations/associational life; migration studies; Africa-China relations and the impact of social media on migrant networks.

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A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

I have much to be grateful for and would like to extend my appreciation to each and every one who played a part in helping me finish this project. Thank you to my parents, who helped develop my passion for history and have supported me throughout my academic career. Thank you to both my supervisors, Dr Arianna Lissoni and Dr Prinisha Badassy, for giving me much needed advice and guidance. To my beautiful wife Tanya, not only did you support and encourage me through all the obstacles with my work, but you also always made sure that I enjoyed it immensely. Lastly, I thank God for His favour and unconditional love, without which I would never have finished my project.

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Zapiro, 'Chinese Take-away in Africa', *The Times*, 8 December 2015.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
B-BBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CASA	Chinese Association of South Africa
CCASA	Central Chinese Association of South Africa
COSCO	China Ocean Shipping Company
CRI	China Radio International
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
ICASA	Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
KMT	Kuomintang
NP	National Party
OCIG	Oriental City Investments Group
ORC	Orange River Colony
PCA	Pretoria Chinese Association
PCS	Pretoria Chinese School
PECCC	Pretoria Evangelical Chinese Christian Church
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
RUC	Rosebank Union Church
SABC	South African-born Chinese
SACCPCC	South African Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre

SACSA	Southern Africa Chinese Sports Association
SAPS	South African Police Service
SFA	Shunde Friendship Association
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
SSACC	Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce
TCA	Transvaal Chinese Association
TCAG	The Chinese Association of Gauteng
YCCL	Young Chinese Cultural League

Introduction

The Chinese in South Africa have significantly grown in number in the post-apartheid era, reflecting the broader trend of the international Chinese diaspora. This thesis examines the associations and associational life of the Chinese community in South Africa. This is a diverse group that can be divided into three broad categories: South African-Born Chinese (SABCs), Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants.[1] The project traces the historical development of Chinese associations, in what is today the Gauteng Province, from the first wave of Chinese migration to Southern Africa in the 1880s to the third wave of in the contemporary post-apartheid period.[2] Although the Dutch had brought in Chinese convict labourers to South Africa from as early as 1660 – never numbering more than 50 at any one time in the Cape – it was not until the late 1800s that the Chinese began arriving in large enough numbers, as free men, to signify the first wave of migration.[3] These independent immigrants were part of a broader international migration pattern initiated by the global mineral revolution. Many were drawn to the prospects of finding gold in places such as California, Australia and South Africa, and were largely from the Cantonese speaking Guangdong Province of China.[4] However, with this increase in Chinese migration to South Africa, which also coincided with Indian indenture and the settlement and migration of an Indian trading class, the Chinese experienced escalating racism and discrimination in the form of anti-Asiatic legislation enacted by the British governments of the Cape Colony and Natal Colony; as well as from the Boer Republics. It is to this first wave of migration that most South African-born Chinese (SABCs) today trace their ancestry. By the early 1900s, immigrants from the first wave of migration had begun putting down roots in South Africa, with many living in the Witwatersrand.

[1] Some literature uses 'new' instead of 'recent'.
[2] Gauteng is one of the nine provinces established after the democratic transition in 1994. It contains the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria, making it the most populous province and the economic hub of South Africa.
[3] James C. Armstrong, 'The Chinese at the Cape during the Dutch East India Company Period', presented at the UNESCO Slave Route Project Conference (1997), p. 5.
[4] Darryl Accone, '"Ghost People": Localizing the Chinese Self in an African Context', *Asian Studies Review,* 30 (2006), p. 261.

With the Boers' defeat at the hand of the British in the South African War (1899-1902), the Transvaal became a colony of Britain. During this period of British rule, specifically between 1904 and 1907, over 60 000 indentured Chinese mineworkers were contracted to South Africa to work in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand.[5] However, most of these labourers returned to China when their contracts expired because stringent contract regulations enforced repatriation.[6] There was a small number of workers who managed to evade repatriation, but no conclusive numbers are available.[7] Moreover, further large-scale migration from China was halted with the passing of the Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 and Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, in the Cape Colony.[8] Despite these restrictions, the migrants of the first wave remained in the country and formed some of the first Chinese associations in South Africa during this period.[9] Furthermore, many Chinese had begun living on Commissioner Street in the Johannesburg Central Business District and subsequently formed the first Chinatown in the country. During the period of British rule, Chinese and Indians came under increasing regulation. These stringent racial laws would spark the start of the passive resistance movement in which both Chinese and Indians participated. However, the subsequent rule of the Union of South Africa after 1910, introduced further segregationist legislation despite protest.

By mid-twentieth century, the National Party (NP) was victorious in the 1948 election and apartheid became the firmly entrenched system of government. Building on earlier prejudicial laws and policies that was directed towards African, Coloured, Indian and Asian people this new government introduced harsher racial legislation. The Chinese responded to this increasing restriction by forming a national association in 1954, the Central Chinese Association of South Africa (CCASA). Chinese migration to South Africa was halted in 1953 when the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act was passed. However, this changed by the 1970s when the second wave of Chinese migration, specifically Taiwanese immigrants commenced. South Africa had become a global pariah and was eagerly searching for

[5] Melanie Yap and Dianne Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), p. 130.
[6] Karen L. Harris, 'Chinese Merchants on the Rand, c. 1850–1910', *South African Historical Journal*, 33, 1 (1995), p. 159.
[7] Accone, '"Ghost People"', p. 261.
[8] K. L. Harris. (2014). 'Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933)', *Kronos*, *40*(1), p. 133.
[9] Their history will be detailed in Chapter One.

international allies. Taiwan had a similar marginal status, as the United Nations changed its recognition of China to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971. The NP government then pursued building relations with Taiwan in an attempt to strengthen their position globally. This endeavour signalled the beginning of a strong political and economic alliance between the two countries that lasted until the NP's defeat in the 1994 democratic elections.

Following this, many Taiwanese immigrants arrived in South Africa *en masse*, as they were granted immunity from the Immigration Regulation Amendment Act, and drawn by government incentives for foreign investment in the 'homelands'.[10] By the 1990s, Taiwanese businessmen had set up 150 factories across the country amounting to USD 300 million investment capital and the number of Taiwanese immigrants reached approximately 30000 – as opposed to the 10000 or so SABCs.[11] Taiwanese people, however, were not subjected to the same racialised laws as the SABCs and essentially treated as unofficial 'honorary whites', which caused much tension between the two different Chinese migrant communities. As the Taiwanese community grew and established permanency in South Africa, new social, cultural, financial and sports associations were set up for their community distinct from the already existing associations.[12] They also played a role in establishing a then-fledgling second Chinatown in Cyrildene, Johannesburg East – which would eventually come to be dominated by mainland Chinese migrants.

The late 1980s saw the early beginnings of the third wave of Chinese migration to South Africa. Hong Kong migrants had been increasing since 1987, and in 1992 a total of 1847 migrants from the island arrived in South Africa.[13] Many were driven by fears of a 'communist takeover' as Britain was set to relinquish its control of Hong Kong in 1997. The year 1992 also saw the *de facto* leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Deng Xiaoping lifting restrictions on the movement of Chinese nationals, which in turn allowed for

[10] Tu Huynh, Yoon J. Park and Anna Y. Chen, 'Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to Present', *African and Asian Studies*, 9 (2010), p. 291.
[11] Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 291.
[12] Greg Houston, Marie Wentzel, Ke Yu and Elma Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind: Tracing the Social Roles of Association in Chinese communities in Pretoria, South Africa', HSRC Project Report. (Pretoria, South Africa: HSRC, 2013), p. 9.
[13] Xin Xiao, 'Free Chinese Immigration to South Africa in the Twentieth Century: Survival and Opportunity', (PhD Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2016), p. 55.

greater migration from mainland China to the rest of the world. Whereas migration from Hong Kong to South Africa declined after 1992 due to the global financial crisis and general uncertainty towards the end of apartheid, a new wave of migration from the mainland was spurred on in 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) won the first democratic elections in South Africa, and this new government expressed interest in forming strong relations with the PRC.[14] Economic opportunities attracted middle-managers, entrepreneurs, professionals, investors and well-connected business people with access to capital and investments, largely from the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and cities of Beijing and Shanghai.[15] In contrast, these political developments led Taiwanese migrants to believe that their favourable status in South Africa, as a result of its political ties to Taiwan, was dissipating, and many returned home.

In 1997, South Africa ended its political relationship with Taiwan and switched its recognition to the PRC according to the 'one China' policy.[16] This strengthening relationship would continue into the twenty-first century when South Africa joined other developing nations to form the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) emerging economies alliance.[17] The third wave of Chinese migration intensified in the post-2000 period, largely comprising of peasants hailing from the Fujian Province arriving in South Africa. The Fujianese have a long tradition of migration and increasing levels of economic competition have played a part in their mass exodus from China to other parts of the world in the twenty-first century.[18] They are by far the largest group of Chinese migrants in South Africa and now constitute an approximated two-thirds of the estimated 200,000-300,000 Chinese currently living in South Africa.[19] With the declining numbers of Taiwanese but increasing figure for Chinese migrants, the Cyrildene Chinatown soon became the social, economic and cultural hub of the Chinese in Johannesburg, far surpassing the now dwindling SABC community that still lived in the old Chinatown. Evidently, there has been a dramatic shift in

[14] Accone, '"Ghost People"', p. 265.
[15] Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 289.
[16] Christopher Williams and Claire Hurst, 'Caught Between Two Chinas: Assessing South Africa's Switch from Taipei to Beijing', *South African Historical Journal*, 70, 3 (2018), p. 15.
[17] Sébastien Hervieu, 'South Africa Gains Entry to Bric Club', *The Guardian* (29 April 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/19/south-africa-joins-bric-club, accessed on 12 March 2019.
[18] Zai Liang and Wenzhen Ye, 'From Fujian to New York: Understanding the New Chinese Immigration', *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives* (2001), p. 198.
[19] Phillip Harrison, Khangelani Moyo, and Yan Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immigrants and Diasporic Spaces in Johannesburg, South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38, 4 (2012), p. 904.

the demographics of the Chinese in South Africa since 1994, from being a relatively small group comprised mostly of SABCs and the Taiwanese, to growing significantly in number and becoming predominantly recent Chinese migrants from mainland China.

This project presents the history of Chinese migrants in South Africa through the lens of associational life. Associational life has emerged as a significant concept in the international literature on migration, due to migrants' tendency to form associations.[20] Associational life generally refers to the phenomenon in which individuals rely on social networks and kinship relations to survive, produce social capital and access resources.[21] Typically, this is done through conventional associations – which are hierarchically organised bodies or institutions with a physical presence. The associational life framework has been applied to African urbanisation and migration but never to the instance of Chinese migration to urban centres in South Africa.[22] Thus, this project looks at how Chinese migrants have and continue to establish and participate in associations in Gauteng. This helps uncover the ways in which Chinese migrants in South Africa construct their identities in response to their new settlements by forming associations to preserve culture threatened by migration, displacement and assimilation.

An important aspect of associational life is the production of social capital. Robert Putnam defines social capital as the 'features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit'.[23] Essentially, it is the investment in social networks, mutual recognition and acknowledgement with expected returns in access to and use of resources, solidarity and the reproduction of the group.[24] Social capital is largely built through associations as they facilitate the flow of information and resources; create a platform to influence others; encourage the building of

[20]Jose C. Moya, 'Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31, 5 (2005), p. 833.
[21] Marcus Foth, *Handbook of Research on Urban Informatics: the Practice and Promise of the Real-Time City* (New York : Information Science Reference: 2008), p. 52.
[22] For example, in Arne Tostensen, Inge Tvedten, and Mariken Vaa, *Associational Life in African Cities: Popular Responses to the Urban Crisis* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2001); Abdoumaliq, Simone, 'Straddling the Divides: Remaking Associational Life in the Informal African City', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 25, no. 1 (2001), pp. 102-117; and Michael Bratton, 'Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa' *World Politics,* 41, no. 3 (1989), pp. 407-430.
[23] Robert D. Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', *Culture and Politics*. (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2000), p. 225.
[24]Nan Lin, 'Building a Network Theory of Social Capital', in *Social Capital* (2017), p. 30.

personal contacts, reputation and support networks.[25] It is also integral to migrant communities as these groups use social capital to navigate through difficult circumstances.[26] Consequently, this is a theoretical framework which the thesis will utilise as a pivot throughout to emphasise the interconnectedness of migrant communities.

The thesis argues that associations reflect the contemporary political, economic, social and technological state of affairs. The associations created by migrant communities are essential factors in understanding how migrant groups preserve and promote their interests and identity within 'foreign' and unfamiliar spaces, particularly in urban settings. Associations also provide insights into the naturalisation process of such migrant communities. To begin with, this thesis looks at original Chinese associations established by first wave migrants in the 1900s. It shows that their formation and evolution over the course of the twentieth century, in becoming primarily politically-orientated, reflected the increasing discrimination and racial legislation of the British colonial and segregationist states; and that their centralisation was as a response to the unprecedented oppression from the apartheid state.

The project then examines the status of SABC associations, as contemporary incarnations of the original associations, to argue that South Africa's democratic transformation has, in part, diminished the need for civil action by these groups and has led to declining membership. It shows that a similar decline in membership has occurred in Taiwanese associations. It is important to note here that the project does not argue that civil action by Chinese associations has been completely negated after 1994. Instead, it will mention the 2008 court case, spearheaded by the Chinese Association of Gauteng (CASA), that successfully challenged the Chinese's exclusion from affirmative action instituted by the democratic government, and the ongoing criminal court case and hate speech complaint submitted by the Chinese Association of Gauteng (TCAG) addressing racist comments posted on their Facebook page.[27] However, the project will show that while there has been instances of discrimination towards Chinese people post-apartheid, these do not compare to the scale of oppression during apartheid. Furthermore, the new democratic institutions have made it possible to successfully challenge racism and discrimination. Thus, many Chinese

[25] Stephen Baron, John Field, and Tom Schuller, eds., *Social Capital: Critical Perspectives*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 213.
[26] Putnam, 'Bowling Alone', p. 225.
[27] These two issues are discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 respectively.

associations have shifted their focus from political action to socio-cultural issues in the post-apartheid era.

Moreover, the thesis analyses the emergence of new associations established by recent Chinese migrants in the post-apartheid period. It maintains that their business-orientation is vastly different to the social and cultural focus of SABC associations, due to their origins in a distinct wave of migration and development in the new democratic political context.

The thesis also considers instances of recent Chinese migrants who live non-associational lives to contend that migrants with high levels of integration, language proficiency and affluent economic status are less likely to require and participate in associations. Through the examples of SABC, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants, I argue that Chinese associations and associational lives have been shaped and have transformed over time as a result of the changing political, economic, and social dynamics of South Africa and more broadly, across the world. To examine how associations have become dependent on technological advancements, the project further looks at how traditional media like radio and new forms of social media have impacted on associations as well as revolutionised the way people associate in the digital age. Lastly, this study critically engages the use of the above three categories – SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants – which this project itself employs, to explore the persistence of stereotypes of and generalisations about the Chinese in the South African media and the public.

From the outset, the use of the term 'migrant' and immigrant' in this project should be clarified. According to the Oxford Dictionary, a migrant is someone who travels to another place/country temporarily, often for work or financial reasons and is essentially a sojourner.[28] The broader literature on migration studies identifies an immigrant as someone who travels to another country with the intention of inhabiting permanently and who receives the necessary documentation to settle in the country. When using the category 'recent Chinese migrant', which denotes any Chinese that has come to South Africa in the third wave of migration, the division between migrant and immigrant is problematic. This is because there are some Chinese migrants who arrived as part of the third wave that have

[28] According to the Oxford dictionary, accessed: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/migrant

since decided to stay permanently thereby changing their status to that of an immigrant.[29] As a result, this project's interviewees consist of both migrants and immigrants from the third wave of Chinese migration to South Africa. To avoid confusion, the project broadly uses the term migrants when referring to the Chinese people that arrived in South Africa from the 1990s onwards.

Another clarification is this project's use of the term 'community'. Community refers to a social unit of people that are joined through some form of commonality.[30] The term becomes problematic in the case of the Chinese in South Africa as it is often used to imply social cohesion and unity amongst a group of people that is in fact very diverse in terms of class, citizenship status, language, culture and geographical origin. Although the project deals with the notion of 'imagined communities', which has its own discussion in Chapter Five, the project has generally tried avoiding the term.

Literature Review

There are many notable works that extensively detail the history of Chinese migration and settlement in South Africa. Melanie Yap and Dianne Man's *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, Yoon Park's *A Matter of Honour*, Karen Harris' doctoral dissertation 'A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912', Rachel Bright's book *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle* and Darryl Accone's article '"Ghost People": Localising the Chinese Self in an African Context' all trace the history of Chinese migration to South Africa from its earliest beginnings in the late 1600s to the end of apartheid, including identifying and discussing the different waves of migration.[31] These works represent a

[29] Yoon J. Park, 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region', *African Studies*, 69, 3 (2010), p. 467.
[30] Graham Crow, 'Community', in George Ritzer, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology* (2007), p. 617.
[31] Melanie Yap and Dianne Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996); Yoon J. Park, *A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009); Karen. L. Harris, *A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912*. (PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 1998); Rachel Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10: Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2013); and Darryl Accone, '"Ghost People": Localizing the Chinese Self in an African Context', *Asian Studies Review,* 30 (2006), pp. 257-272.

comprehensive record of the Chinese in South Africa and provide a solid contextual and historical foundation for this project.

Karen Harris emerges as the leading historian on the Chinese in South Africa. She has published numerous works on this group that rely on themes of migration, racial legislation, stereotyping, labour, identity, minority studies and many more. Many of her articles focus on the Chinese at the turn of the nineteenth century, especially on the Chinese labour experiment from 1904-1910; which, in some instances, include a comparison to the parallel experience of Indians in South Africa.[32] However, some articles do extend the focus to the apartheid era and contemporary era as well.[33] While Harris has clearly addressed the broad history of Chinese settlement in South Africa; many of her publications present micro-histories which attempt to narrow the historiographical gaps of the Chinese in South Africa. These works cover such themes as Chinese merchants and labourers on the Witwatersrand[34], the Chinese in the Dutch Cape Colony[35], Chinese criminal activity and the criminal underworld, forced removals and relocation through the Group Areas Act, and rhino horn and abalone illegal trading networks.[36] Nonetheless, there is an evident lack of discussion on the theme of associational life both in Harris' and in the abovementioned authors' work. While an historical account of Chinese associations can be found in these works, there is no comprehensive analysis on the development of Chinese associations and associational lives post-apartheid. Thus, this project addresses that gap in the literature by looking at both the historical and contemporary social networks of the Chinese in South Africa.

[32] Harris, 'Paper Trail', pp. 133-153; Karen L. Harris, 'Indentured "Coolie" Labours in South Africa: the Indian and Chinese Schemes in Comparative Perspective', *Diaspora Studies,* 6, 2 (2013), pp. 1-17; and Karen L. Harris, 'Sugar and Gold: Indentured Indian and Chinese Labour in South Africa', *Journal of Social Sciences*, 25, 1-3 (2010), pp. 147-158.
[33] Karen L. Harris, '"Accepting the Group, but Not the Area": The South African Chinese and the Group Areas Act', *South African Historical Journal* 40, 1 (1999), pp. 179-201; and Karen L. Harris, 'BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa: a Legal Historic Perspective', *Fundamina*, 23, 2 (2017), pp. 1-20.
[34] Harris, 'Chinese Merchants on the Rand', pp. 155-168; and Karen L. Harris, 'Private and Confidential: The Chinese Mine Labourers and "Unnatural Crime"' *South African Historical Journal* 50, 1 (2004), pp. 115-133.
[35] Karen. L. Harris, 'The Chinese in the Early Cape Colony: A Significant Cultural Minority', *South African Journal of Cultural History*, 23, 2 (2009), pp. 1-18.
[36] Harris, 'Accepting the Group', pp. 179-201; Harris, 'Private and Confidential', pp. 115-133.; and Karen L. Harris, 'Entangled South African Chinese Diasporas: Molluscs, Ungulates and Equidae', Paper presented at the 26th Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Society (21-23 June 2017).

While the above literature establishes a historical and factual record of the Chinese in South Africa, memoirs such as Darryl Accone's *All Under Heaven* and Ufrieda Ho's *Paper Sons and Daughters: Growing up Chinese in South Africa*, offer a more personal account of the experiences of the Chinese before and during apartheid.[37] The focus is on individuals, yet these memoirs provide insight into the social life of the broader community. They are important because they give voice to 'ordinary' Chinese people and depict the everyday experiences of living in South Africa. Whereas these memoirs are not entirely useful for historical details, they instead capture equally important insights on the opinions, beliefs, culture, social characteristics, traditions, feelings - and associations - of Chinese South Africans. Linking the memoirs to the historical accounts allows for a well-rounded approach to understanding the Chinese in South Africa.

The literature on international migration has extensively dealt with the modern Chinese diaspora. The article 'Recent Trends of Emigration from China: 1982-2000' by Zai Liang and Hideki Morooka sheds some light on the origins of international Chinese migration.[38] While it does not deal with South Africa directly, it contextualises and looks at common trends found in Chinese migration from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Migrants from Guangdong are on average more likely to be well-educated, affluent and from urban areas, whereas migrants from Fujian are more likely to have low education, have low income and hail from rural areas.[39] Furthermore, Fujianese migrants are more likely to enter and live in countries illegally.[40] While much of the academic literature on the Chinese in South Africa concentrates on the pre-1994 period, more recently, various studies have emerged on Chinese immigration in the post-apartheid era. The article 'Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to Present' by Tu Huynh, Yoon Park and Anna Chen isolates the third wave of migration as its focus and highlights two distinct impulses.[41] It delves into the origins of many of recent migrants, the motivations for their movement, the difficulties they face and how they fit into or are marginalised by the more established SABC and

[37] Darryl Accone, *All Under Heaven: The Story of a Chinese Family in South Africa* (Cape Town: New Africa Books, 2004); and Ufrieda Ho, *Paper Sons and Daughters: Growing up Chinese in South Africa* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012).
[38] Zai Liang and Hideki Morooka, 'Recent Trends of Emigration from China: 1982–2000'. *International Migration*, 42, 3 (2004), pp. 145-164.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[40] Liang and Ye, 'From Fujian to New York', p. 189.
[41] Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', pp. 286-306.

Taiwanese communities – thereby showing that these migrants are not a homogenous group and that they encompass diverse origins. This project builds on the argument that there is much diversity within the recent Chinese migrant group, and in turn, contends that this category is inadequate as a result of these numerous differences.

The issues of legal status and crime have become prominent themes in the literature on recent Chinese migrants. In her article 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region', Park examines citizenship and the legal status of recent Chinese migrants who have entered the country illegally, mainly Fujianese migrants who have arrived in South Africa through Lesotho.[42] She contends that the lines between documented and undocumented, and legal and illegal migrancy are blurred in the case of recent Chinese migrants to South Africa. Many struggle with or do not speak English, making the documentation process difficult; others apply for asylum to qualify for work permits; many enter the country without documents, and some of these migrants do eventually register with South Africa's Home Affairs Department. Park also addresses the issue of legal status in her book *A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa*. Here she states that out of the estimated 300 000 Chinese in South Africa during the early 2000s, about 100 000-200 000 were actually in the country illegally. While some associations detailed in this project do interact with undocumented Chinese migrants, no interviewees are from this specific category, both because of their inaccessibility as well as ethical concerns. Instead, the research mainly focuses on legal Chinese migrants in South Africa.

In another article on 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region', Park argues that there are more layers to the question of legal status and citizenship. Interviews conducted by Park show that Chinese migrants are diverse in their feelings and aspirations of belonging.[43] Some see South Africa as their new home while others only view it as temporary. Many have a foot in both South Africa and China, feeling they belong to both, thereby blurring the lines of migrant status and citizenship. Another complication is that many recent migrants have complained that they do not feel welcome or accepted in South Africa, despite many being here legally or

[42] Park, 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions', p. 457.
[43] *Ibid.,* p. 469.

having gained permanent residency or some attaining citizenship, and this undermines their status. This project adds to this discussion by examining what affects recent Chinese migrants' feelings of belonging and how this, in turn, influences their associational life.

The issue of criminal activity amongst the Chinese features pointedly in the scholarly works on recent migrants. Peter Gastrow's 'Triad Societies and Chinese Organised Crime in South Africa' is an important study of crime amongst Chinese migrants in contemporary South Africa.[44] This article covers illegal trade, smuggling and gambling, as well as the origins and intentions of various triad groups in the country. The article 'Chinese Immigrants and Underground Lotteries in South Africa: Negotiating Spaces at the Cusp of a Racial–Capitalist Order' by Stephen Louw provides a more historical account by looking at the existence of underground gambling amongst Chinese migrants of all three waves.[45] Another article that deals with crime is 'Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immigrants and Diasporic Spaces in Johannesburg, South Africa', by Phillip Harrison, Khangelani Moyo and Yan Yang. It expands on the problem of Chinese criminal groups by stating that they have created fear and raised suspicion amongst the Chinese community of Gauteng and perpetuated a negative image of recent Chinese migrants, specifically from the Fujian province of China.[46] The researching of criminality and criminal networks can be a dangerous undertaking and requires caution. This project does not seek to investigate illegal activities or such associations for this very reason. Moreover, as seen by these examples, much of the literature on the Chinese tend to discuss the third wave of migration within this framework of illegality and criminality. However, this project focuses on the associational life of a sub-group of recent migrants – Chinese professionals - to bring to light the different experiences of individuals in this category.

There is also an established literature on the stereotypes and generalisations directed towards recent Chinese migrants. The article 'Visual Representations in South Africa of China and the Chinese people', also by Harrison, Moyo and Yang – traces the historical roots of 'yellow peril' and other racist discourses in the South African media as well as the public. Moreover, it analyses numerous mainstream news articles on China in the contemporary

[44] Peter Gastrow, 'Triad Societies and Chinese Organised Crime in South Africa', Occasional Paper No. 48 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2001).
[45] Stephen Louw, 'Chinese Immigrants and Underground Lotteries in South Africa: Negotiating Spaces at the Cusp of a Racial–Capitalist Order', *Journal of Southern African Studies* (2018), pp. 1-20.
[46] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', pp. 899-925.

era to show the prevalence of many racist tropes on recent Chinese migrants in these narratives. My Honours dissertation also provides an analysis of the racist discourses and stereotypes of Chinese people found in an Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Transvaler* in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.[47] The aforementioned article 'Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to Present', highlights the various misconceptions which exist specifically in regards to Fujianese migrants. In this thesis, I also analyse some of the stereotypes perpetuated by the South African media and their impact on Chinese professionals.

Recently, various works have emerged on the production of space among Chinese migrants. Laurence Ma links the international Chinese diaspora to the idea of space and place.[48] He argues that Chinese diasporic spaces are 'network-based spaces with porous boundaries whose real extents are changeable in association with intra-diasporic contexts and events'.[49] Essentially, the type of spaces produced by Chinese migrants is dependent on the experience and context of their migration. Harrison, Moyo and Yang look at how migrants have produced distinct Chinese spaces in Johannesburg as a means of protecting and preserving their identity and interests from the state and other powerful actors. Specific focus is given to spaces like Johannesburg's 'Second' Chinatown in Cyrildene and the larger 'ethnoburb' which includes suburbs like Edenvale, Bedfordview, Observatory and Kensington.[50] Park adds to this discussion by linking the production of space to the creation of borders.[51] Chinese spaces, such as the two Chinatowns of Johannesburg as well as Chinese restaurants, are arguably symbolic representations of the borders between Chinese and South African culture. Nonetheless, Park argues that these spaces are not completely isolated and that through 'cross-border' sharing of culture, language and tradition, they transpire as entirely different to the supposed imitation of 'authentic' Chinese culture.[52]

[47] Willem J. Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses of the Chinese in *Die Transvaler* from the 1960s to early 1980s', (Unpublished honours diss., University of Witwatersrand, 2017)
[48] Laurence Ma, 'Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora' *The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity* (2003), pp. 9.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 914.
[51] Park, 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions', p. 460.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 472.

Park's argument that Chinese spaces in South Africa are characterised by hybridity challenges the popular usage of the term 'ethnic enclave' in immigration settlement studies, particularly regarding Chinatowns.[53] Both Liang Xu and Romain Dittgen agree with this analysis in regards to the Chinatown of Cyrildene, where they argue a process of hybridisation has transformed the space into an open ethnic economy.[54] These authors highlight how important the politics of space is to the discussion of Chinese migrants in South Africa. However, this project only deals with the concept of spatiality indirectly as the research did not reveal any new knowledge on this issue.

Language is a complicated and important differentiating factor for the Chinese population in South Africa. Many SABCs are fluent in English and/or Cantonese. Taiwanese and recent migrants from the PRC mostly speak Mandarin, and migrants from Hong Kong speak Cantonese. Therefore, language is also significant in understanding the differences and divisions between various Chinese groups and how they associate. Yet, this factor has received limited scholarly attention in terms of examining how the various groups interact with each other. Accone's article '"Ghost People": Localising the Chinese Self in an African Context' briefly looks at the 'Mandarin/Cantonese' tension that is emerging in Johannesburg, specifically between the 'new' Chinatown in Cyrildene and the 'old' Chinatown on Commissioner Street,[55] and some other works also touch on the language factor fleetingly.[56] Harrison, Moyo and Yang, on the other hand, analyse the language issue in relation to Chinese migrant struggles with local languages and not as a marker of identity within the Chinese population itself.[57]

The only article found to directly deal with language is 'Speaking or Being Chinese' by is Ke Yu and Elmé Vivier.[58] They examine the link between language and identity for the Chinese

[53] Wei Li, *Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America* (United States of America: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).
[54] Liang Xu, 'Cyrildene Chinatown, Suburban Settlement, and Ethnic Economy in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg', *China and Africa* (2017), pp. 81-104, and Romain Dittgen, 'Of Other Spaces? Hybrid Forms of Chinese Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 44, 1 (2015), pp. 43-73; and Romain Dittgen, 'Features of Modernity, Development and "Orientalism": Reading Johannesburg through its "Chinese" Urban Spaces', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *43*, 5 (2017), pp. 979-996.
[55] Accone, '"Ghost People"', *Asian Studies Review,* 30, p. 267.
[56] Such as Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 32; Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 295*;* and Janet Wilhelm, 'The Chinese Communities in South Africa', *State of the Nation 2005-2006* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006), p. 355.
[57] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 911.
[58] Ke Yu and Elma Vivier, 'Speaking or Being Chinese', *International Journal of the Sociology of*

in South Africa and determine that it is dynamic, shifting between strong and weak correlation depending on other factors such as cultural heritage and preservation, family and community influence, pragmatism and individual needs and motivations. However, the authors themselves state that the study is not large enough to make conclusive generalisations and they have only focused on the experiences of four SABCs. Furthermore, the article does not include the experiences of Taiwanese or recent Chinese migrants.[59] This project adds to the discussion of language by showing how it shapes associations.

Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities has helped shape my analysis of the impact of radio and new social media on associational life. The books *Radio in Africa: Publics, Cultures, Communities* and *Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging* provide context and insights to how radio can create imagined communities.[60] There are also numerous works on the connections between social media and imagined communities; however, these take a quantitative approach. [61] This project, on the other hand, relies primarily on the personal experiences of the interviewees, who are users of social media, and not on statistical data.

One of the important theoretical frameworks for this project is the concept of associational life. The article 'Immigrants and Associations: A Global Perspective' by Jose Moya provides a broad overview of the international literature on the connections between migrants and associations. He analyses how other academic works have approached the study of migrant associations and presents two shortfalls to the existing literature. Firstly, Moya argues that there is a tendency to focus on large and established associations, particularly those that interact with the state, while side-lining small and obscure associations. Secondly, he criticises the lack of attention given to the pre-arrival associations of migrants and their potential for continuity in the new country. This project takes these criticisms into account

Language (2017).

[59] *Ibid.,* pp. 70-71.

[60] Liz Gunner, Dina Ligaga, Dumisani Moyo, Tanja Bosch, Monica B. Chibita and David B. Coplan, *Radio in Africa: Publics, Cultures, Communities* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012); and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, *Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

[61] Androniki Kavoura, 'Social Media, Online Imagined Communities and Communication Research', *Library Review*, 63, no. 6/7 (2014), pp. 490-504; Alessandrio Acquisti and Ralph Gross, 'Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook', *International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* (2006), pp. 36-58; and Anatolly Gruzd, Barry Wellman and Yuri Takhteyev, 'Imagining Twitter as an Imagined Community', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55, no.10 (2011), pp. 1294-1318.

and accordingly includes some smaller, informal and more obscure Chinese associations in order to better represent the diverse interests of recent Chinese migrants. It also looks at the connections to China that exist for these migrants.

Other academic works on Chinese migration relevant to but not focusing on the Chinese in South Africa specifically, include Karen Harris and Jan Ryan's essay on 'Chinese Immigration to Australia and South Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Legislative Control' in the book *The Last Half of Chinese Century of Chinese Overseas* which helps situate Chinese migration to South Africa in an international context.[62] Another chapter in the book titled 'Astronaut Families and Parachute Children: Hong Kong Immigrants in Australia', by Rogelia Pe-Pua, Colleen Mitchell, Stephen Castles and Robyn Iredale, provide insights into Hong Kong immigrants to Australia specifically and on the familial and economic connections that they have with their home country.[63] Another important article, written by Thomas Owusu, on 'The Role of Ghanaian Immigrant Associations in Toronto, Canada' focuses on the role ethnicity plays in Ghanaian immigrant associations.[64] While these articles, and others[65], do not deal directly with Chinese migrants in South Africa, their findings offer useful comparative leads for this project.

The book *Associational Life in African Cities: Popular Responses to the Urban Crisis*, edited by Arne Tostensen, Inge Tvedten and Mariken Vaa, examines the associational life of urban Africans.[66] The authors deviate from the popular trend of using associational life to study migration between countries; instead, they apply it to the migration of Africans from rural areas to urban centres. They identified a literature gap as most works on associational life in Africa centres on the role political associations played in democratisation and thereby side-

[62] Karen L. Harris, and Jan Ryan, 'Chinese Immigration to Australia and South Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Legislative Control', in Elizabeth Sin, ed., *The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998), pp. 373-389.
[63] Rogelia Pe-Pua, Colleen Mitchell, Stephen Castles, and Robyn Iredale, 'Astronaut Families and Parachute Children: Hong Kong Immigrants in Australia', in Sin, ed., *The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas* (1998), pp. 279-298.
[64] Thomas Y. Owusu, 'The Role of Ghanaian Immigrant Associations in Toronto, Canada', *International Migration Review* (2000), pp. 1155-1181.
[65] For example: Edwin B. Almirol, 'Filipino Voluntary Associations: Balancing Social Pressures and Ethnic Images', *Ethnic Groups*, 2, no. 1 (1978), pp. 70-90; Robert T. Anderson and Gallatin Anderson, 'Voluntary Associations Among Ukrainians in France', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 35, (1962), pp. 158- 168; and Stanford M. Lyman, 'Forerunners of Overseas Chinese Community Organization', in Stanford M. Lyman, ed., *Chinese Americans* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 8-28.
[66] Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa, *Associational Life in African Cities.*

lined non-political associations. This project contests the prevalence of political associations in the literature on associational life by incorporating non-political Chinese associations – such as businesses, social groups, sports organisations, and religious gatherings – into the study. It argues that the proliferation of these different types of associations has in part been made possible by the equality and freedoms guaranteed by South Africa's democratic constitution.

Older Chinese associations do feature in the literature on the Chinese in South Africa. Much of their history has been detailed in *Colour, Confusion and Concessions* by Yap and Man. Some journal articles also mention and analyse Chinese associations within their broader context, but never in detail.[67] The project has subsequently relied on this important literature in Chapter One to provide the historical background for the main focus, which is the democratic era. Moreover, the Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) report 'Bodies that Divide and Bind: Tracing the Social Roles of Association in Chinese Communities in Pretoria' and the article 'United We Stand: Chinese Voluntary Associations in South Africa' by Katarína Cavojská, are the important academic works specifically focused on the Chinese associations in South Africa.[68] The HSRC report studied participation in political, religious, educational and cultural Chinese associations to argue that the experiences of Chinese people in Pretoria are characterised by plurality. Their case studies include the Pretoria Evangelical Chinese Christian Church (PECCC), the Pretoria Chinese School (PCS) and the Pretoria Chinese Association (PCA). The report states that there is a need for further research and that the 26 interviews it was based on are not enough to make conclusive observations. Likewise, this project also has a limited scope and therefore, will not make extensive claims about the Chinese in general. Alternatively, the article by Cavojska argues that associations are key to uniting the Chinese community and integrating them into broader South African society. However, it is also small enough in scope, as it only deals with two associations, to demand further analysis.

[67] Such as Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics'; and Yu, and Vivier, 'Speaking or Being Chinese'.
[68] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 9.

Research Methodology and Sources

Oral history is the central methodology applied to this project and therefore, it has relied on interviews with Chinese subjects.[69] These interviews sought to give a range of Chinese individuals, from all three categories, a platform to share their life experiences and to contribute to the shaping of my understanding of the associational life of these different groups in post-apartheid Gauteng.[70] The project consulted 23 interviewees, of which 11 were between the 20-40 age group; 17 were male and 6 female; 11 recent Chinese migrants, 5 Taiwanese, 6 SABCs and 1 American. I decided to give these interviewees pseudonyms, barring those who are public figures. The last names used are either standard mainland China/Hong Kong surnames or Taiwanese ones, depending on the interviewee's origin. The semi-structured interviews that were conducted included a few prepared questions to guide the discussions and narrative but still allowed for some flexibility for the interviewees to emphasise what they felt was important. The prepared questions were specifically structured to open up a conversation and not to determine the discussion.[71] Essentially, my motive was to learn about the participants' life histories with some direction to emphasise their associational life. My interviews included questions on the person's family background and/or migration history; on issues of identity, belonging and language; and on their participation, or lack of, in Chinese associations.

Oral history is essential to this project as it emphasises the voices of those interviewed. One of the key concepts in this project, Chinese associational life, is subjective in nature and reliant on the personal experiences of participants. Through the interviews, I have been able to examine these subjective experiences. As oral history highlights the meaning of events over the factual account of events, as Alessandro Portelli argues, it has been extremely valuable to this project.[72] Moreover, oral accounts also often include information on events undocumented and much new knowledge has been obtained about the Chinese through this process.[73]

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[69] As per Univeristy regulation, ethical clearance for interviews was obtained via the University HREC.
[70] Alessandro Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different?', in Robert Perks and Alistar Thomson, eds, *The Oral History Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 40.
[71] A sample of the questions have been attached as Annexure 1.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[73] *Ibid.*

Various entry points were used to gain access to different Chinese interviewees, groups and communities. Through mutual friends, I was able to meet with a Chinese woman who is part of a Chinese church called the Johannesburg Church of God, as well as a Bible study group linked to the church. She was able to introduce me to numerous members and leaders of this community who were open and available for interviews and observational research. Another entry point was the South African Chinese Community and Police Co-operation Centre (SACCPCC), which has offices based in Cyrildene. Interviews with some of their employees gave both insights into the association as well as the Cyrildene/Bruma Chinese community. Other interviewees were identified on the basis of their role as are either business leaders, public figures or representatives of specific Chinese associations.

The project employed a snowball method approach to further broaden the interviewee base. After interviews, I would ask the subject if they knew anyone who would be similarly open to meeting with me and if they would put me in contact with any such person. Fortunately, this method was successful as many of the interviewees put me in touch with friends and acquaintances of theirs. Although not every lead worked out, the project managed to conduct a substantial number of 23 interviews using this technique. Furthermore, participant observation was also employed in the Bible study group's activities that included their normal weekly meetings, a social dinner, a quad bike adventure; as well as in the 2019 celebrations of Chinese New Year in both Chinatowns in Johannesburg.

There were some challenges in using oral history as the main research methodology in this project. The first major obstacle has to do with being an insider or outsider to the interviewees. Being an insider provides many benefits as interviewees could be more open to disclosing information and an insider is better able to interpret and understand an interviewee because of shared knowledge and culture.[74] However, an insider is also more likely to overlook questions on information they think is common knowledge or avoid questions that could cause personal conflict.[75] Furthermore, while an outsider may lack these benefits, he or she would be more likely to be seen as objective and unbiased by

[74] Sekibakiba Lekgoathi, 'Voices of our Past: Oral Testimony and Teaching History', in June Bam and Clare Dyer, eds, *Educator's Guide to the UNESCO General History of Africa* (Cape Town: New Africa Education for the Ministry of Education, 2004), p. 48.
[75] Mary A. Larson, 'Research Design and Strategies', *History of Oral History: Foundations and Methodology* (2007), p. 112.

interviewees.[76] My position in this research has been as an outsider to the Chinese community, language and culture. This has meant that in some cases it was difficult to gain trust from potential interviewees. Other academic works have also noted that the Chinese community is insular.[77] Consequently, some attempts at making contact with Chinese people in Cyrildene was met with resistance and an unwillingness to participate. Additionally, one Chinese church community in Pretoria, that was initially deemed as a potential entry point in my proposal, turned out to be unwilling to meet with me in person because of trust issues. They were afraid of attracting negative publicity towards the church.

Another problem that emerged was my inability to speak or understand the two main Chinese languages, Mandarin and Cantonese. Initially, I considered making use of an interpreter to assist in interviews and transcribing. However, time and financial constraints made this unfeasible. Furthermore, there are many issues and concerns with using translation and interpretation for academic purposes. As a result, my research has largely been limited to Chinese people who speak English. This created a problem for my research as its potential subject base decreased significantly because of the language barrier. Many interviewees also stated when asked for further contacts that the Chinese people they know do not speak English. Additionally, this also means that the sample group mainly consists of educated and fairly integrated middle-class Chinese migrants, Taiwanese and SABCs. Using English was also problematic as some of the interviewees may have been limited in expressing their opinions in a language that is not their mother tongue.

The snowball method is also problematic because of its reliance on mutual contacts of interviewees. By using the technique to find more subjects, the researcher is often limited to the communities in which the original interviewee is active. There is not much room to broaden out and find subjects that are of different socio-economic positions. I attempted to counteract this challenge by attempting to gain multiple entry points into different Chinese groups and their associations.

Despite these limitations, my sample group of interviewees consists of a range of Chinese individuals from all three categories, who have different geographical origins, age, class, and

[76] *Ibid.*
[77] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 911.

gender. Arguably, my interviewees are not representative of the majority of Chinese migrants, who are peasants from Fujian as only one interviewee hailed from this province. Nonetheless, my research into this group of Chinese provides a perspective on the diversity of Chinese migrants. Furthermore, I partly counteract the lack of Fujianese interviewees by examining the SACCPCC, which is closely aligned with the interests and needs of vulnerable migrants including those from Fujian.

Lastly, memory and imagination also present challenges to oral historians. Interviews are highly dependent on the recollection of the individual being interviewed. However, human memory is fallible as it can be faded by time passing; distorted by nostalgia, exaggeration and repression; and it can be selective.[78] Specifically, in the South Africa context, memory can be shaped by the country's traumatic colonial and apartheid past – and this should be taken into consideration when consulting oral sources.[79] Furthermore, this means that any information transferred through oral testimony needs to be corroborated by other sources. Memories of different individuals also need to be compared and contrasted in order to determine their validity. Nonetheless, these requirements are not unique to oral history but rather all sources need to be corroborated and be approached with scepticism.[80] Furthermore, oral history has its own characteristics and uses its own interpretative tools distinct from archival and written history.[81] Overall, the lack of secondary and archival sources on the contemporary state of Chinese associations has made oral history extremely beneficial to this study. Furthermore, it was significantly helpful in understanding and determining Chinese associational life through its ability to highlight subjective experiences.

As the project also used newspaper articles, albeit to a much lesser extent, it is necessary to examine their legitimacy and usefulness as a primary source. Newspaper articles and reports often have the advantage of being written shortly after events, which is beneficial for historical accuracy and shows the immediate reaction to an event.[82] They are also known

[78] Lekgoathi, 'Voices of our Past', p. 47.
[79] Sean Field, 'Turning up the Volume: Dialogues about Memory Create Oral Histories', *South African Historical Journal,* 60, 2 (2008), p. 191.
[80] Field, 'Turning up the Volume', p. 191.
[81] Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different?', p. 34.
[82] Joseph Baumgartner, 'Newspapers as Historical Sources' *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, *9*, 3 (1981), p. 256.

to be factually detailed presenting information such as names, pictures and locations.[83] However, there are also many drawbacks that need to be taken into account.[84] Newspapers are prone to be influenced by untrustworthy human testimony, sensationalism, censorship and prejudices.[85] These factors diminish the legitimacy of the source. Clearly, newspapers are complex historical sources that have both pros and cons; and will only be used in conjunction with secondary literature. Chapter Five will especially draw heavily on newspaper articles in order to examine their role in perpetuating stereotypes. These articles will not be examined for their merits as an historical source, but rather, through using discourse analysis, to determine the existing power dynamics, silences, bias, propaganda and racial agenda embedded in media.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter traces the historical trajectory of Chinese associations in South Africa, specifically those based in Gauteng, in order to argue that their establishment and development over time towards accommodationist civil rights action was shaped by the increasing racial discrimination and injustices of British colonial rule, the Union government and the apartheid regime. It shows that the early roots of Chinese associations can be found through the practice of petitioning by Chinese immigrants in the Cape colony as early as the eighteenth century and it determines that the conventional Chinese associations of the twentieth century were, amongst other cultural and social reasons, largely established to provide support for Chinese immigrants as well as to campaign against anti-Asiatic legislation which affected the Chinese. Key civil rights associations include the provincial Transvaal Chinese Association and the national Central Chinese Association of South Africa.

The second chapter examines the SABC and Taiwanese associations in the mid to late twentieth and early twenty-first century, in order to determine the impact of democracy on these original associations and the associational life of their members. It argues that the increased freedoms and equality of the post-apartheid era have transformed these former

[83] Robert B. Allen, and Robert Sieczkiewicz, 'How Historians use Historical Newspapers', *Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology*, *47*, 1 (2010), p. 2.
[84] Stephen Ellis, 'Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa', *The Journal of African History*, *43*, 1 (2002), p. 16.
[85] Baumgartner, 'Newspapers as Historical Sources', pp. 256-257.

rights-focused groups, such as the former Transvaal Chinese Association and Pretoria Chinese Association, from having political functions into more socially- and culturally-orientated functions. Furthermore, it shows that this political shift has also led to decreased membership and participation in many of these SABC and Taiwanese associations.

The third chapter focuses on the new associations established by recent Chinese migrants. It examines how and why these groups were created; and puts an emphasis on the business-orientated nature of many of these new associations and the new Chinese economic spaces of China Malls and the Cyrildene Chinatown. It looks at the importance of social capital, in the form of *guanxi* networks, for these new associations. The chapter also examines the reasons why certain Chinese migrants do not associate. It argues that recent Chinese migrants' associations and associational lives reflect their distinct migratory history, as well as the contemporary political and economic climate of South Africa and the broader ties between China and Africa.

The fourth chapter looks at the impact that different forms of media have had on the establishment and functions of associations, as well as on people's associational life. It analyses the use of both radio, through the case of *ArrowLine Chinese Radio of South Africa*, and new social media, specifically WeChat – a multi-purpose messaging app, within the recent Chinese migrant group of South Africa to show that their associations and associational life have been influenced by these technological advancements. It argues that these media platforms have simultaneously extended the reach of associations and their interconnectivity, while to some degree decreasing the depth and interpersonal aspect of associating. Furthermore, through the lens of imagined communities, the chapter shows that radio and social media have developed new forms of associating, that deviate from the traditional sense.

The fifth and last chapter scrutinises the scholarly application of the SABC, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrant categories. It states that the extreme diversity in background, class, language, religion, and other factors, found within the latter category, renders these terms inadequate. The chapter also examines the prevalence of stereotypes in the South African media and public discourse which homogenise the Chinese. By using the example of Chinese professionals, it argues that these characterisations are not representative of the diversity in the recent Chinese migrant group.

Chapter One

Chinese Associations in South Africa: Historical Background

Chinese associations in South Africa have a long history dating back to the early 1900s with the establishment of the Cape Town Chinese Association in 1902 and the Transvaal Chinese Association (TCA) in 1903.[1] The TCA was the forerunner of the contemporary The Chinese Association of Gauteng (TCAG). Since then many more Chinese associations have emerged as major social networks amongst the Chinese in South Africa. This chapter will trace the historical trajectory of Chinese associations in South Africa, with a special focus on the Transvaal and Witwatersrand, in order to provide contextual background to the existing Chinese associations of the twenty-first century in the Gauteng Province. It will argue that these Chinese associations were critically shaped by the racial laws of the British colonial, Union and apartheid governments. The wave of Taiwanese immigrants that arrived in South Africa in the late 1970s and 1980s to pursue business opportunities led to a number of concessions being granted to this group by the apartheid regime, which in turn benefited the existing Chinese community too. While this chapter will use some oral sources, mainly interviews with leaders of historical associations, and a few newspaper articles, it will primarily rely on the rich secondary literature on the history of the Chinese in South Africa. The major themes of this literature that will be drawn upon include migration, labour, liberation politics, community building and apartheid regulation.

[1] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 98.

The Early Beginnings of Chinese Associations, c. Seventeenth to Nineteenth Century

The first Chinese to live in what is today South Africa arrived in the 1660s. They were mainly convicts brought from Batavia (known as Central Jakarta today) to the Cape by the Dutch and forced to work as slaves, but there were also some exiles andsome free and independent travellers.[2] These travellers, exiles, convicts, and the freed Chinese who chose to remain after completing their sentence or being pardoned, only numbered between 50 and 100 until the end of the eighteenth century.[3] The small size of the Chinese population and the oppression they experienced prohibited any major conventional Chinese associations, with organised memberships, from existing during this period. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the Chinese community still associated, most significantly through petitioning – as many subordinate communities did during this time period. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some of the Chinese in the Cape lodged petitions to the Dutch East India Company, which was the governing authority of the time. For instance, in 1733 two Chinese men requested to be relieved of hard labour due to their advanced age and in 1743 a group of 38 Chinese convicts appealed for permission to return to Batavia.[4]

Public petitioning by this Chinese community generally sought for pardons and the freedom to return home. These petitions may be viewed as embryonic associations where Chinese people organised and united around common issues, but not as members of conventional organisations. And while these early forms of organising were short-lived and scantily documented, their role in advancing Chinese rights in response to colonial authority was the foundation on which later Chinese associations were established in the twentieth century. More importantly, these petitions not only allowed for understanding the mindset and opinions of the petitioners themselves but the communities within which they were located. The collection of signatures and mobilisation of support was very much an act of community

[2] Armstrong, 'The Chinese at the Cape', p. 3; and James C. Armstrong, 'The Estate of a Chinese Woman in the Mid-Eighteenth Century at the Cape of Good Hope', *Journal of Overseas Chinese Studies,* Vol 4, no. 1 (2008), p. 112.
[3] Harris, 'The Chinese in the Early Cape Colony', pp. 7-8.
[4] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 9.

making and during these early days, it strengthened the nascent social networks, kinship bonds and social capital between the Chinese in the Cape.

The nineteenth century saw the demographics of the Chinese change dramatically in South Africa. Both the shortage of cheap labour and the Dutch loss of the Cape to the British in 1806 prompted the smuggling of some Chinese artisans out of China to work as contract labourers in South Africa.[5] A man named William Assaw[6] emerged as the first leader of the Cape Chinese population during the early nineteenth century. He often spoke on behalf of the Chinese in the Cape, as he was articulate and well-connected, and Cape officials identified him as the representative for the Chinese group. He petitioned for the right to have a Chinese cemetery, increased allowances for struggling and vulnerable Chinese labourers and even helped collectively raise money for the cemetery.[7] This example shows that again, while not necessarily being a formal association, William Assaw's role as one of the leaders of the Chinese in the Cape was the beginning of community organising, unity and solidarity.

While the Chinese population initially hovered around the same number as when under Dutch rule, due to many of the ex-convicts returning to China – Karen Harris states that this changed in the second half of the century.[8] Between 1849 and 1882, the British colonies of the Cape and Natal dabbled in the importation of Chinese indentured labour at a small scale.[9] Chinese people were indentured by farmers, agents and government departments and brought to South Africa to provide labour at a low cost. The importation of Chinese labour was met with strong opposition in the Cape and Natal colonies and proposals of large-scale importation were regularly shot down. For example – in 1874, the deliberations by the Cape parliament to use Chinese labourers for the building of railways came to nothing.[10] Many white settlers also held racist fears of being 'overrun' by Chinese people

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[6] William Assaw appears under different surnames (Assue and Assier), in various records. However, Yap and Man conclude that the relation and coincidence is too strong for these to be different people and suggest that the surnames were spelt differently due to how individuals heard it. Unfortunately, not much is known about his personal life.
[7] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 15.
[8] Harris, 'A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912', p. 91.
[9] Accone.'"Ghost People"', p. 261.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

and petitioned against their importation. [11] As a result, their numbers remained so small that no identifiable and distinct Chinese groups emerged during the late nineteenth century.[12] Many of these migrants eventually integrated into the larger cosmopolitan Malay society (Javanese, Indians, Singhalese and Arabs) through inter-racial marriages.[13] The dispersal of these migrants clearly hindered the development of formal associations during this period and it is only with the new immigrants from the 1870s onwards that the first formal Chinese associations were established in South Africa.

First Wave of Chinese Immigration – Independent Immigrants

Many of the Chinese who came to South Africa from the 1870s onward were free, independent immigrants, who would eventually become the forefathers of the South African-born Chinese.[14] Spurred on by the global gold rush of the time and the mineral revolution in South Africa, these immigrants hoped to make their fortunes before returning to China. They mostly came from the Guangdong province of China and can be ethnically distinguished as either Cantonese or Moiyeanese – they had different dialects, customs and initially eschewed each other.[15] As these immigrants chose to come to South Africa, unlike their predecessors who were brought to South Africa mostly under coercion as bonded labourers, it is important to examine the context which led to them leaving China.

The mid-nineteenth century was a turbulent period in China, specifically for the Guangdong province. China incurred devastating losses in the Opium Wars fought against Britain and that defeat left China vulnerable and under the control of Western powers. Serious droughts and famines in Guangdong in the mid-eighteenth century coupled with civil upheaval, the bloody Taiping Rebellion and rampant unemployment brought chaos to the province. [16] As a result, many Chinese saw emigration as an opportunity to escape their current circumstances. The California Gold Rush and discovery of gold in various other

[11] Yoon J, Park. 'Shifting Chinese South African Identities in Apartheid and Post-Apartheid South Africa', (PhD Diss., University of Witwatersrand, 2006), p. 68.
[12] Park, *A Matter of Honour*, p. 11.
[13] Harris, 'A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912', p. 92.
[14] Accone, '"Ghost People"', p. 261.
[15] Park, *A Matter of Honour*, p. 18.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

countries in the nineteenth century drove up Chinese migration rates to these parts of the world.[17] When gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, it similarly experienced a boom in Chinese immigration. [18] Many of these immigrants came as 'sojourners', either on their own or in groups of two or three, looking to acquire riches with which to return to China. These riches never really materialised and most of these sojourners never returned to China.

While the Chinese population in the British colonies of the Cape and Natal remained small, it nonetheless experienced a growth with the arrival of these new independent immigrants drawn by the new capitalist economy. In 1891, the number of Chinese people in both the Cape and the Natal Colony was 292 and by 1904 this number had grown to 1544.[19] In response to the growing number of Chinese and a growing Indian population, spurred on by an influx of indentured labourers and so-called 'passenger Indians' that had reached an estimated 46000 in the Natal Colony alone by 1893, the alarmed British colonial authorities began introducing anti-Asiatic measures to combat alleged 'unfair competition'.[20] The term Asiatic was used by colonial officials to refer to both Indians and Chinese. Legislation was introduced in Natal that restricted Asiatic immigration and trading rights with the Immigration Restriction Act 1 of 1897 and the Dealers' Licensing Act 18 of 1897 (which required so-called Asiatics to pass a 'European' language test and prohibited them from participating in parliamentary elections).[21] Furthermore, it became very difficult for both Chinese and Indian migrants to bring their wives and relatives across to South Africa to join them, exacerbating the already skewed gender ratio in these migrant groups; and they were required to always carry domicile certificates with their fingerprints to prove their resident status. These stringent controls and regulations, directed toward so-called Asiatics in Natal, set the example which the Cape Colony and the two former Boer republics that were now controlled by the British, the Transvaal Colony (TVL) and Orange River Colony (ORC), soon followed.

[17] Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10*, p. 10.
[18] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 70.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 87. These numbers exclude Chinese mineworkers.
[20] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 44.
[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 44-45

The Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 mirrored the legislation against the Chinese in Natal by expecting all potential immigrants to the Cape to be able to write and read in a European language.[22] This put an almost complete halt to Chinese immigration. At the time, the Transvaal was contrastingly seeking sanctions from the British Colonial Office to allow for large-scale Chinese labour importation – but this stoked 'anti-alienism' rhetoric in the Cape.[23] The restrictions in the colony continued through the 1904 Chinese Exclusion Act, the first legislation directed specifically towards the Chinese.[24] It was born out of fears of a 'yellow peril' arising from the planned importation of Chinese labourers to the Transvaal gold mines in that same year.[25] The act was comprehensive and far-reaching – it prohibited the Chinese from entering and living in the Cape Colony and enforced a system for the registration and control of those who were already residing there.[26] Furthermore, under the constant threat of fines, imprisonment and deportation, Chinese people who were already living in the Cape had to carry 'Certificates of Exemption' to allow them to stay, often derisively referred to as a 'dog licence' by the Chinese.[27]

Some of the far-reaching consequences and provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act included that any Chinese wanting to acquire a liquor, mining, general dealer's, importer's, hawker's license or wanting to hire property would have to possess a Certificate of Exemption. It further stipulated that Chinese people could not receive Certificates of Naturalization; officials could search the premises of Chinese migrants; and that Chinese people requesting Certificates of Exemption would have to submit fingerprints and undergo a physical examination.[28] Overall, the law contained 36 sections and was evidently extremely harsh, demeaning and oppressive. The 1904 Chinese Exclusion Act, and other segregationist laws of this period, isolated and marginalised the Chinese and soon they started organising against these measures. Significantly, many of the local Chinese associations in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and East London merged to form the Cape Colony Chinese

[22] Harris, 'Paper Trail', p. 140.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 75.
[25] The importation of Chinese labourers to the gold mines will be discussed at a later stage.
[26] Park, *A Matter of Honour*, p. 22.
[27] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 62.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 63.

Association in 1906 as a direct response to this oppressive legislation.[29] Furthermore, the Consul-General Liu Yu Ling and his successor in 1908, Liu Ngai, regularly voiced the concerns of the Chinese communities to the government.[30] The specific racial laws of the Transvaal will be discussed further down in this chapter.

Early Chinese Communities in Kimberley and the Witwatersrand

Some of the earliest examples of Chinese community building come from Kimberley. The town played a central role in the mineral revolution, as diamonds were discovered there in 1867, and consequently became a destination for some of the independent Chinese immigrants. Over time their numbers grew – the Chinese population numbered around 185 in 1891 and 214 in 1904, and the Chinese, who were mostly men, worked as shopkeepers and laundrymen.[31] However, they were ostracised by the town's white inhabitants, local newspapers referred to the group as 'Heathen Chinee', a common derogatory term at the time[32], and they experienced verbal abuse in the form of racial slurs, stereotypes and false accusations from white traders who saw them as business threats. Their situation was much the same as Indian traders in Krugersdorp, who also experienced intimidation from white traders as an attempt to drive them out of business.[33] The white traders in Kimberley also sought to restrict the 'Chinese invasion' by limiting their trading to specific locations.[34] Additionally, the local newspapers published numerous letters that used terms such as 'Chinese deluge', 'Yellow Invasion', Asiatic plague', and 'vast horde of uncanny Mongols' despite their small and insignificant numbers in Kimberley.[35] These racist terms would continue to dominate media discourses for most of the twentieth century.[36]

[29] Harris, 'Paper Trail', p. 144.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 145.
[31] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 87.
[32] 'Chinese at Work', *Rand Daily Mail* (2 July 1904); and 'Lourenco's Plague Spot', *Rand Daily Mail* (31 December 1908).
[33] Charles F. Dugmore, 'The Making of Krugersdorp, 1887-1923' (PhD diss., University of Witwatersrand, 2008), p. 281.
[34] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 50.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 51.
[36] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 30.

In response to this racist and antagonistic atmosphere, three Chinese men sent a letter in 1890 to the *Diamond Fields Advertiser* newspaper that defended the Chinese against accusations levelled against them.[37] These men were the representatives of the Chinese shopkeepers and their actions illustrate how social, cultural, linguistic, and economic exclusion had begun to drive Chinese immigrants towards forming inclusive groups that offered protection. While this letter stressed the legitimacy of Chinese traders, as some were even naturalised British subjects, who obeyed the rule of law, the antagonism towards the group continued and escalated. The unrelenting resentment directed towards Chinese people drove them towards grouping together more and soon a community began to form. Chinese residents of Kimberley started to meet for social reasons, to gamble and to converse in their mother tongue. In 1895, the Chinese community in Kimberley raised money to build the Chinese Benevolent Society or *Kaiyin Fee Gon*.[38] This building acted as a central club and venue for all Chinese people to gather. Evidently, a tightknit and well-connected Chinese community emerged in Kimberley largely as a result of the discrimination faced by the group.

The discovery of gold in 1886 on the Witwatersrand also drew Chinese prospectors and diggers to the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) which, unlike the Orange Free State (OFS), the other autonomous Boer Republic, allowed for the entry of Chinese people.[39] The local press greeted them with a similar paranoia as their counterparts in Kimberley and authorities refused to permit digging licenses to the Chinese. As the numbers of Chinese and Indian migrants grew, formal steps were taken against these groups and the Gold Law No. 15 of 1898 prevented any so-called 'coloured person', including the Chinese, from prospecting. Furthermore, by this stage Chinese people were restricted from becoming citizens of the ZAR; were unable to own land or any fixed property; were prohibited from trading in towns; were forcibly moved to 'locations'; were expected to carry a special pass under threat of fines or imprisonment; and many more restrictions as a result of Anti-Asiatic legislation, which also affected Indians. [40]

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 50.
[38] *Ibid.,* pp. 53-54.
[39] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 87.
[40] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 76.

Once again, the harsh treatment experienced in this period sparked the beginnings of Chinese community building and associations. This is seen by the numerous petitions sent to the government to complain about the restrictions placed on the Chinese. Examples include the 1897 petition by 420 Chinese who asked to not be moved from Johannesburg to a 'location' as it would take away their businesses and an 1898 petition by 172 Chinese who asked that the restrictions placed on them be loosened.[41] Consequently, these early collective actions show that by coming together as a group they were more effective in resisting some of the discriminatory laws and social practices of this period. This notion played a key role in the establishment of the Cantonese Club in Johannesburg in 1898. The Cantonese Club was similar to the Chinese Benevolent Society of Kimberley, as it catered to all the Chinese in the Transvaal and presented a central gathering point.[42] The club was located on Commissioner Street, Ferreirastown,[43] and while its purpose was mainly social, it also operated as a recognised institution that mediated between government officials and the Chinese.

The late nineteenth century witnessed intensifying social, economic, legal and political discrimination directed towards the growing Chinese population in South Africa by both the British colonial government and the two Boer Republics. Consequently, the period also saw the emergence of community mobilisation and the coming together of the Chinese as a group to combat the oppression they experienced and to further their interests. As the segregationist and racial laws targeted specific groups – these groups would respond by organising along the same racial divisions. While petitioning, clubs and other forms of associating transpired during this period, the even more stringent laws forced upon them (and others) as a racial group in the early twentieth century by the British and Union government gave way to conventional forms of associations.

[41] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 93.
[42] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 89
[43] The first Chinatown was also established here and its history will be dealt with in more detail at a later stage in the chapter.

The Early Chinese Associations of the Transvaal: Responses and Objections to British and Union rule

The increasing discrimination and intolerance that the Chinese faced in the late 1800s and early 1900s across what was to become South Africa coming under British rule following the South African War led to a wave of Chinese associations being established in various regions. The Chinese in the Transvaal had stayed neutral during the war, with some fleeing to other parts of the country or back to China.[44] When it ended, there was a general hope that restrictions against them would be relaxed by the British government. Instead, British rule brought further restrictions and this, in part, led to a wave of conventional Chinese associations being established. The first of these included the Cape Town Chinese Association, and the Transvaal Chinese Association (TCA)[45], founded in 1902 and 1903 respectively. In the following years, the Uitenhage Chinese Association (1904), the Port Elizabeth Chinese Association (1905), the Transvaal Chinese United Club (1909), the Chinese Association of Natal (1909) and the Pretoria Chinese Association (1931) were also established.[46] For the purposes of this project, only the associations based in the Transvaal will be examined in detail. This section will first deal with how the Chinese labour experiment on the Witwatersrand gold mines played a role in the perpetuation of racial stereotypes and the hardening of regulation towards the Chinese population. It will then examine these early associations, through secondary literature and oral interviews with some of the contemporary leaders of these groups, to show how they took on a political role in the early twentieth century as a response to oppressive British and Union rule.

Exclusion, Racism and Violence – The Plight of Chinese Gold Miners, 1904-1910

The 'Transvaal Experiment' was the mass importation of Chinese indentured labourers by the British colonial government to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand due to the labour

[44] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 94.
[45] The TCA, currently The Chinese Association of Gauteng, is very important to this research and its history will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
[46] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 95.

shortages they experienced at the end of the South African War.[47] The attempt to fill the demand for cheap unskilled labour with Chinese miners was highly controversial at the time and had far-reaching consequences. Even though at the end of this 'experiment' in 1910 most of the Chinese labourers were repatriated[48], their presence nonetheless had a significant impact on South African history. This section will discuss two such consequences that had long-term effects for the Chinese in the country.

The first significant consequence has to do with the violent and oppressive nature of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand. African mineworkers, who constituted the majority of the labour force on the Rand, experienced violent protests, factionalism, segregation along race and ethnic origins, abuse by supervisors, and the prevalence of criminal gangs.[49] The Chinese faced similar issues. As with African mineworkers, the conditions of their stay included single-sex housing in a prison-like environment.[50] They had to work an average of ten hours daily, six days a week, and it was illegal for them to leave the Witwatersrand magisterial district.[51] Any refusal to work, absconding, changing of employers and lack of a mine passport while not being on the premises were deemed illegal actions and punishable. Furthermore, law and order was maintained by indentured Chinese police on the mines – similar to the induna system for African workers.[52] These Chinese policemen were often corrupt, involved in criminal syndicates, and had much power over common Chinese labourers as the authorities supported them. Furthermore, gambling was rife amongst the compounds and this culture led to violent settling of disputes, mounting debt and extortion schemes.[53] This unstable and nefarious climate created a cycle of violence where some indebted labourers would commit robberies and murders because they owed gambling

[47] Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10*, p. 23.
[48] The myth that these labourers are the forefathers of South Africa's current Chinese population has been firmly debunked by authors such as Karen Harris, Melanie Yap and Dianne Man.
[49] Gary Kynoch, '"Your Petitioners are in Mortal Terror": The Violent World of Chinese Mineworkers in South Africa, 1904–1910', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *31*, 3 (2005), p. 532.
[50] Kynoch, '"Your Petitioners are in Mortal Terror"', p. 546.
[51] Gary Kynoch, 'Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-1910', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 36, 2 (2003), p. 311.
[52] Tu T. Huynh,'"We Are Not a Docile People": Chinese Resistance and Exclusion in the Re-Imagining of Whiteness in South Africa, 1903-1910', *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, *8*, 2 (2012), p. 140.
[53] Kynoch, '"Your Petitioners are in Mortal Terror"', p. 540.

syndicates money.[54] Chinese labourers received no help in these situations as the mining authorities would refuse to accept responsibility for such violent occurrences.[55]

The harsh nature of everyday life on the mines on the Rand and a desire for community in a foreign space led some indentured Chinese to form 'secret societies' or brotherhoods.[56] This phenomenon was not exclusive to South Africa but occurred amongst other Chinese migrant labour populations in Australia and the United States of America (USA). These groups operated as surrogate clans, imitating the familial connections these migrants left behind when coming to South Africa. While these secret societies were known to be subversive and hostile to authority, they operated peacefully on the Rand.[57] However, this did not stop the widespread fear and apprehension about the existence of such groups amongst Chinese miners.

Fear of secret societies and violence on the mines soon became ammunition for anti-Chinese lobbyists who attributed criminality and delinquency to the Chinese 'race' as a whole. These opinions were reinforced by the racist sentiments of white immigrants from Canada, Australia and the USA, who warned against the use of Chinese labour.[58] There also were instances where illegal activities spilt over to neighbouring white communities thereby furthering such racist views. While a white farmer was murdered by a Chinese man in 1905, it was mostly small-scale burglaries that affected the white community.[59] Nonetheless, these instances led to regular police patrols on the lookout for Chinese deserters and offenders; and they also led to a disproportionately violent backlash from the white communities.[60] What emerged from this situation was a racist belief amongst whites that the Chinese were criminal and dangerous. These harmful 'yellow peril' beliefs reinforced racism directed towards the Chinese in South Africa and continued to do so long after the majority of Chinese labourers had been repatriated in 1910.

[54] 'Chinese Robbers: Brutal Assault', *Rand Daily Mail* (22 August 1908).
[55] Kynoch, 'Controlling the Coolies', p. 313.
[56] Harris, 'A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912', p. 73.
[57] *Ibid*., p. 170.
[58] *Ibid*., p. 126.
[59] Kynoch, '"Your Petitioners are in Mortal Terror"', p. 544.
[60] Huynh, '"We Are Not a Docile People"', p. 160.

The second consequence was that of negative media portrayals of the Chinese. Harris argues that the decision to import Chinese workers was highly controversial at the time, with many members of the white public lobbying against it. [61] They saw the previous importation of Indian labourers to Natal in the mid to late nineteenth century as a massive failure – claiming that the government had opened South Africa up to so-called deplorable elements and feared the same would happen in the case of Chinese migrants.[62] The naysayers were successful to an extent, as the conditions of the Chinese Labour Importation Ordinance were far more constricting than the terms of Indians were imported under, but eventually the Chinese importation carried on.[63] Consequently, the press coverage Chinese labourers received was largely negative and racist. This became especially true after the 1906 Bucknill Commission, which spoke about an 'unnatural vice' amongst this group of labourers.[64] For instance, derogatory terms such as 'catamite coolies' were used to describe Chinese miners who were suspected of homosexual activities.[65] Furthermore, cartoons published by the popular press around this time portrayed Chinese miners as aggressive and sinister thereby propagating the 'yellow peril' discourse (see Figure 1).[66]

[61] Harris, 'Paper trail', p. 137.
[62] Harris, 'Indentured "Coolie" Labours in South Africa', p. 7.
[63] Harris, 'Sugar and Gold', p. 154.
[64] Harris, 'Private and Confidential', p. 130.
[65] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 2.
[66] Harrison, Yang and Moyo. 'Visual Representations', p. 30.



Figure 1

D.C. Boonzaier, 'Looking on haplessly', *South African News*, 1904.[67]

Racial representations and narratives on Chinese 'inferiority' were strengthened through these orientalised, threatening and homophobic discourses.[68] Furthermore, Harris argues that these racist representations also coincided with a broader international anti-Sinicism trend in the late nineteenth century.[69] Evidently, as a result of the violent nature of the Chinese compounds and of racist media discourses, various anti-Chinese and 'yellow peril' moral panics proliferated state, media and popular sentiment.[70] These beliefs and discourses led to further social exclusion and racist legislation – in the form of restrictions on the acquiring of liquor, mining, trading, hawking, building and fixed property licenses – for the Chinese population as a whole.[71] Hence, it is clear that despite the 'Transvaal

[67] Daniel C. Boonzaier, 'Looking on Haplessly', *South African News* (1904).
[68] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 2
[69] Karen L. Harris, 'Anti-Sinicism: Roots in Pre-Industrial Colonial Southern Africa', *African and Asian Studies*, 9, 3 (2010), p. 221.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 75.

Experiment'[72] only lasting six years, it had a defining impact on the Chinese group in South Africa that continued well into the twentieth century.

The Transvaal Chinese Association (TCA) – Passive Resistance and Community Support

The formation of the TCA in 1903 has its origin in the social, legal, economic, and political discrimination directed towards African, Indian and Asian people in South Africa at the time. As shown earlier, between the late-seventeenth and late nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants launched petitions and appeals, individually and collectively, to oppose the discrimination they faced. In some cases, petitions were successful; however, this did not stop the escalating segregationist and racial laws implemented by the British colonial and later Union government. Arguably, it was the renewed determination in 1903 of the British government to enforce the Anti-Asiatic Law 3 of 1885, which restricted Asiatic residence rights and limited trade to specific locations that triggered a move by the Chinese to form the first political Chinese association of South Africa.[73] Thus, the TCA was established as a formal association that sought the protection and advocation of its members' interests and rights.[74]

One such way in which the Association advocated for its members was through passive resistance. When the Asiatic Law Amendment Act no. 2 of 1907, which affected both Indians and Chinese, was about to be enacted, the TCA took a leading role, in the Chinese passive resistance movement.[75] They also allied themselves to the Transvaal British Indians (led by Mahatma Gandhi) in passive resistance, as the two groups fought a similar battle.[76]

The Act would require all those classified as Asiatic to surrender their old permits and re-register by recording their fingerprints.[77] Anyone who was to be found without these new

[72] The name given to the mass importation of Chinese labourers between 1904-1910 on the Witwatersrand.
[73] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 98.
[74] Interview with Erwin Pon in Sandton, Johannesburg (24 July 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[75] Harris, '"Strange Bedfellows"', p. 22.
[76] Karen Harris has challenged the misnomer that the Chinese joined the Indian passive resistance movement. While these two movements collaborated in many respects, they remained distinct from one another.
[77] Harris, 'Chinese Merchants on the Rand', p. 163.

certificates would be punished by fines, imprisonment or deportation. This oppressive law reinforced the passive resistance movement as many Chinese and Indians refused to re-register. The TCA played a key role in this movement as they sent a representative to London to appeal to the Emperor of China's ambassador; they distributed pamphlets that translated the legislation into Chinese and called upon their members to resist the Asiatic registration law and held regular community meetings. Furthermore, a resolution was passed stating that if any Chinese or Indian trader were to register – their business would be boycotted by the Chinese community.[78]

During this time, Leung Quinn became prominent as the chairman of the Cantonese Club[79] and the acting chairman of the TCA. He was very involved in the movement and was an outspoken activist for the Chinese.[80] He was jailed numerous times and ultimately deported for his actions but still served as an inspiration for the Chinese community in the Transvaal. When the deadline for registration arrived in 1908, many members of the passive resistance movement were arrested, including Quinn and Gandhi. Over 153 passive resisters who were arrested, were set free after two weeks in jail.[81] After failed attempts at compromise over this period – divisions began emerging within the Chinese community in the form of two rival factions within the TCA. One faction sought compliance and one sought continued resistance. Tensions rose until 18 April 1909, when a violent battle took place in the Chinese quarter of Ferreirastown in Johannesburg.[82] Fights broke out with members attacking each other with revolvers, knives, and makeshift weapons, leaving four in hospital and 29 arrested. Those who supported passive resistance, largely of Moiyeanese origins, reorganised themselves and dominated the Cantonese Club, while those who supported compliance established the Transvaal United Club. This rift devastated the TCA for a while, and it was only in 1917 that it was reconstituted.

Yoon Park argues that because of this split in the community, the Chinese would never again participate in protests or militant political action as a visible group in the twentieth century and that the non-confrontational approach going forward made them into a law-abiding and

[78] 'Indian Law Breakers: More Marching Orders', *Rand Daily Mail* (15 January 1908).
[79] A Chinese organisation formed after the TCA spilt, primarily to assist the passive resistance movement.
[80] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 143.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[82] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 97.

passive group.[83] Melanie Yap and Dianne Man echo this statement by speculating that the Chinese became disillusioned with militant methods after the rift.[84] Another reason could be that the Chinese preferred to maintain a low profile in order to stay out of the cross-fire. This is seen in their use of diplomatic channels, such as the Consul-General and Liaison Officer, to approach the government regarding their grievances.[85] Many different overseas Chinese communities have also taken similar approaches.[86] It is important to note that Chinese associations did not abandon their civil-rights purpose – rather the methods they used to achieve this goal changed. This discussion will be further highlighted at a later stage.

Another way in which the early TCA helped its members was through community support. Erwin Pon, the current Chairman of The Chinese Association of Gauteng (previously the TCA), states that the Association was set up to serve the needs and interests of the Chinese community in the Transvaal.[87] Examples of this community support included assisting Chinese migrants with settling in South Africa, helping them with the language barrier, and assisting people to write letters to relatives and friends in China. The TCA also helped raise awareness on the horrendous conditions of labour on the gold mines in the early 1900s and warned people to stay away.[88] When the Association was reconstituted in 1917, it resumed this supporting role by appealing against the liquor law in the Transvaal, addressing problems that Chinese people faced when bringing their families across to South Africa and writing testimonials to prove the reputation of individuals.[89]

[83] *Ibid.,* p. 99.
[84] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 168.
[85] Karen L. Harris. 'Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese', in Bernard P. Wong and Chee-Beng Tan (eds), *China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 81.
[86] Yelena Y. Sadovskaya. 'Ethnically Diverse Diasporas and Migrations from China to Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century', in Bernard P. Wong and Chee-Beng Tan (eds), *China's Rise and the Chinese Overseas*, (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 157.
[87] Interview with Erwin Pon. Darryl Accone's book, *All Under Heaven*, details his childhood growing up in the Asiactic Bazaar district.
[88] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 99.
[89] *Ibid.,* p. 230.

The Pretoria Chinese Association (PCA) and the Pretoria Chinese School (PCS)

The demographics of the Chinese in Pretoria in the twentieth century differed from the community in Johannesburg. Their numbers remained much lower, with only 227 Chinese people living there in 1936, and many stayed in the Asiatic Bazaar district of the city centre.[90] The PCA was established in 1931, initially with the purpose of allowing members to draw a 'fee' (take out a loan) but it soon evolved into an organisation that also addressed the political discrimination faced by South Africa's Chinese population. It continued to maintain its social and cultural aspect – and many events, such as the Double Ten celebrations[91] and other gatherings, were hosted by the Association. The Association also collaborated with and was linked to the TCA in the 1930s and 1940s. Eugene Kamson, who is the current chairperson of the PCA, states that the Association also helped the Chinese community in Pretoria with raising funds according to different needs and consulted lawyers on behalf of people in need of legal help.[92] He also stresses that the Association's constitution stipulated that it would help wherever it could and in whatever manner it could.

The Pretoria Chinese School (PCS) was established in 1934 in Boom Street next to the Asiatic Bazaar, by the Young Chinese Cultural League (YCCL). The YCCL had managed to buy a property through the Consul-General Feng Wang, as his diplomatic status allowed land to be registered in his name, and here the Chinese were able to have a school with physical premises.[93] The main purpose of the school was to deliver quality education to Chinese children, as they were excluded from white schools and only allowed to join Coloured or Indian schools.[94] Evidently, this school became a way that the Pretoria Chinese community could minimise the legal discrimination they faced while simultaneously ensuring that the next generation of Chinese in South Africa would retain their language and culture. Later on, the PCA would also use the school's premises as its base which shows how these various organisations were connected to one another.

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[90] *Ibid.*, p. 242.
[91] This refers to the National Day celebrations for the Republic of China.
[92] Interview with Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue in Wingate Park (5 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[93] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, pp. 242-243.
[94] Interview with both Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue.

Kuomintang – A Political Association

The Chinese Nationalist Party, otherwise known as Kuomintang (KMT), was a significant political party that set up its headquarters in the city of Canton in the Guangdong province in 1920. It would eventually become the dominant ruling party under Chiang Kai Shek in 1928. Considering that the party was based in the province from which most Chinese immigrants came from, many Chinese in South Africa had a strong allegiance to it. Branches of the KMT begun emerging in the major cities of South Africa from the 1920s onwards, including a branch in Johannesburg.[95] These political associations largely focussed on issues affecting China and not in South Africa – some of their aims included to advocate for the constitution of a republic, for democracy, for socialism and to obtain international recognition.[96] Members of the KMT held a strong patriotism towards China and wished to see it united under one ruler. One way to do this was through donations and fundraising events to support the KMT's cause.[97]

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 stoked a nationalistic fervour amongst many of the Chinese in South Africa – leading to increased popularity of these KMT branches and other sympathetic associations, such as the Chinese Women's Relief Fund Committee. When Japan attacked the United States of America in 1941, the Sino-Japanese War became part of World War Two. Consequently, the allies' eventual victory in 1945 brought about a renewed sense of patriotism to China amongst the Chinese in South Africa and reinforced their cultural identity. Hence, it is clear that through the KMT branch, many Chinese living in Johannesburg in the early to mid-1900s retained close political, as well as social and economic, connections with China.

[95] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 98.
[96] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, pp. 244-245.
[97] *Ibid.,* p. 245.

Chinese Associations under Apartheid and the formation of the Central Chinese Association of South Africa (CCASA)

The regulation, discrimination and control over African, Coloured, Indian and Asian people in South Africa increased with the coming to power of the NP in 1948. This was done through the application of numerous racialised laws passed by the apartheid state that affected these groups. [98] As a result, Chinese social and political life was heavily restricted; and they were required to live in specific areas according to the Group Areas Act of 1950. Stricter restrictions enacted by these laws further repressed the freedom of Chinese people in South Africa.[99] In response, the Chinese called for stronger forms of association to represent and protect the Chinese communities across South Africa.

The National Chinese Representative Body – Solidarity and Unity

The idea of a singular, nation-wide association that would represent all the Chinese in South Africa emerged in 1950, directly as a response to the implementation of the Group Areas Act. Essentially, this act compelled people to live and work in areas that were designated according to their race.[100] It ensured that whites received preferential parts of urban areas whereas other 'races' were confined to undesirable areas. The act had devastating consequences as people were forced to uproot their lives and businesses to comply with this legislation. It was especially detrimental to the Chinese as many of them were small traders who had been living in racially mixed areas.[101] As a response, representatives of Chinese associations from all over South Africa met together in Johannesburg that year and agreed to establish a central body that would speak for the whole Chinese population. They needed a platform significant enough to be able to engage the government, as well as other political actors, such as the Chinese Consul-General.[102] Gradually plans were put in place and funds were gathered and in 1954 the Central Chinese Association of South Africa

[98] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 3.
[99] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 321.
[100] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 114.
[101] *Ibid.,* p. 68.
[102] 'New Envoy has a "Security Plan" for the Chinese', *Rand Daily Mail* (20 March 1959).

(CCASA) was formally constituted.[103] While the purpose of the Association evolved over time, the 1960 Preamble to the Association's constitution gives a broad understanding of its aims and objectives. These included the desire to preserve Chinese culture; to seek economic, social and political rights; to use peaceful methods and negotiation; to coordinate events with its membership; to promote education, and lastly to ensure that Chinese people lived harmoniously with other racial groups.[104] The key theme throughout their objectives was self-preservation – which showed a gradual shift from the more militant politics of the TCA in the early twentieth century.

One of the major ways in which the CCASA fulfilled these objectives was by appealing for the Chinese to not be constrained by the Group Areas Act of 1950. This law devastated many Chinese traders by eliminating much of their client base, and many Chinese people lost their businesses and property because of it.[105] Thus, there were continuous appeals from the CCASA for concessions on the Group Areas Act – some of which were granted in the 1970s. The CCASA also appealed against the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which made it illegal for them to use white amenities.[106] This situation highlighted how ambiguous the Chinese's position in society was at the time. After the law was enacted, some establishments continued to permit Chinese people while others did not. Even government officials were often unsure of how to treat the Chinese. As a result, the CCASA appealed in 1954 that the Chinese be exempt from this law due to the inconsistency in its application. While the government did not grant this, they conceded to be sympathetic to the Chinese in their application of this law.

Another example of how the CCASA supported and protected the interests of its members was its involvement in appealing the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act of 1953, which completely prohibited Indian and Chinese immigration to South Africa. Using an argument that limiting the size of the Chinese group would lead to more mixed marriages, it is clear that the Association was playing the apartheid government at its own game.[107] The law was damaging to the Chinese community as many men had wives and children who were now

[103] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 3.
[104] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 323.
[105] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 115.
[106] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 359.
[107] *Ibid.,* p. 349.

unable to join them in South Africa.[108] Inevitably, illegal immigration rose as people tried to join their families in South Africa and because China itself was going through turbulent times with the communist revolution of 1949. The CCASA pleaded that these illegal immigrants be treated humanely as refugees, which initially won sympathy from the apartheid government.[109] However, in September 1966, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd was murdered by an undocumented assassin, Dimitri Tsafendas, and this led to a 'Red Scare' in which hundreds of illegal Chinese immigrants, specifically those with suspect connections to communism, were persecuted, detained and arrested.[110]

The CCASA, led by Dr Norman Yenson at the time, worked closely with the Consul-General Lo Ming Yuan and other Chinese leaders to both encourage illegal immigrants to come forward and to plead with the government that these immigrants were fleeing communism and were not communists themselves.[111] These efforts helped gradually calm the situation and numerous illegal Chinese immigrants were able to become South African citizens.[112]

All these examples show that the CCASA sought to improve the standing of the Chinese in South Africa through showing unity; pooling together resources; mobilising community support, and advocating for more rights and concessions for the Chinese - until its dissolution in 1967 as a result of mounting factionalism. However, this also demonstrates that the associations present before apartheid were not wholly adequate in addressing the segregationist and racial laws implemented after 1948. Instead, a new national organisation focused on civil rights, had to be established to adequately represent the Chinese. Evidently, the CCASA and similar organisations, reflected the unprecedented levels of oppression Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Asians experienced under apartheid.

There are two further contextual observations to account for. One is that the Chinese identity of the CCASA is, in part, the product of the racial nature of apartheid laws. Another is the transition from passive resistance in the early twentieth century, where associations like the TCA joined a larger liberation movement, to a more accommodationist approach

[108] Yoon J. Park, 'White, Honorary White, or Non-White: Apartheid Era Constructions of Chinese, *Afro-Hispanic Review*, 27, 1 (2008), p. 127.
[109] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 351.
[110] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 4.
[111] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 126.
[112] *Ibid.,* p. 126.

where Chinese associations, such as the CCASA, sought special favours and inclusion into white society. The shift to self-preservation has its origins in the failings of previous attempts at passive resistance[113], apartheid's forced segregation and a consensus amongst Chinese leaders that addressing the issues of apartheid required a different approach.

The central association was revived in the 1980s under the name the Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA). CASA was founded so that the Chinese could respond with one voice after the mixed reaction to the offer of a place to a Chinese representative on the President's Council.[114] The Association asked that the Chinese population be excused from the council as their population numbers were too small to warrant participation over larger groups.[115] Many Chinese agreed with this sentiment of keeping a low profile and avoiding political confrontation.[116] Clearly, CASA functioned much the same way as before by using an accommodationist approach, albeit with fewer member organisations. CASA continued to play an important role in campaigning for political rights for the Chinese and will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

The Taiwanese Case – Further Concessions and Further Confusion

South Africa's racial policies of apartheid made it an international pariah by the 1970s. Being ostracised in this manner urged the ruling NP to look for similarly isolated allies in international fora. Taiwan emerged as a potential ally to South Africa as they were cast out of the United Nations (UN) in 1971 after Western countries changed their diplomatic recognition of China from the Republic of China (ROC), which was based in Taiwan, to the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was based on the mainland. Both South Africa and Taiwan recognised their instability in the international arena and begun forming stronger diplomatic, economic, political and social ties during the 1970s.[117] The extent of these

[113] As in the case of the TCA's passive resistance campaign in the early twentieth century.
[114] The President's Council was a 1980s' proposal for the introduction of a new consultative body that would consist of 60 members nominated by the state president. These members would include white, coloured, Indian and Chinese representatives but Africans, the majority population group, were excluded.
[115] Harris, 'Rising China', p. 86.
[116] 'The Twighlight People', *Daily News* (27 March 1980).
[117] 'Taiwan en S.A. Groter Vriende', *Die Transvaler* (27 October 1971).

connections was shown in 1976 when South Africa and the ROC exchanged ambassadors.[118] As the ties increased, so did Taiwanese immigration to South Africa. However, it was in the 1980s that the second wave of Chinese migration truly began. In this decade, Taiwanese investors and business people were attracted to South Africa by an industrial development policy that encouraged foreign investment in the so-called 'homelands'. The apartheid government saw this investment as central to the upholding of the bantustans[119], which were financially dependent on Pretoria. In addition, the favourable exchange rate, low start-up costs, tax incentives, and cheap labour made Taiwanese immigration even more attractive. Thus, a wave of newcomers, largely industrialists and businessmen, arrived from Taiwan during this period and, by 1988, 2500 Taiwanese immigrants had settled widely in South Africa. By 1989, these Taiwanese industrialists had set up approximately 150 factories with investment capital reaching close to 300 million US dollars.[120]

Changing Dynamics – Concessions and Ambiguity

This significant development in the migration and settlement of the Taiwanese in South Africa meant that the position of the Chinese gradually changed in the 1960s and 1970s towards a more privileged place in the apartheid's racial hierarchy and social structures. The process that started the gradual change was that the Japanese were given concessions after trade links grew intensively between South Africa and Japan in the 1960s. [121] The Japanese were often unofficially regarded as 'honorary whites'.[122] At the time, this policy was confusing under the Group Areas Act, as many people could not differentiate between a Japanese and a Chinese person. This ambiguity turned out to be a doubled-edged sword, as there were many instances of Japanese people being denied access to 'white' amenities but also various instances in which local Chinese people were able to access similar 'whites only'

[118] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 417.
[119] Bantustans were partially self-governing areas set aside during the period of apartheid, as a form of segregation, for a particular African ethnic group.
[120] Accone, '"Ghost people"', p. 264.
[121] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, pp. 121-122.
[122] It is a misnomer that the either Japanese, Taiwanese or Chinese ever received an official honorary white status.

services.[123] The concessions granted to the Japanese stirred on the Chinese community to campaign for similar rights and this was the beginning of the process that saw the Chinese gain more concessions from the apartheid government.[124] Many newspapers and opposition politicians also began questioning the NP on this issue which further aided this process of integration with South Africa's white community.[125]

As mentioned previously, the 1970s and 1980s saw a massive influx of Taiwanese immigrants. Like the Japanese, they were treated as unofficial 'honorary whites' with special privileges. This further exacerbated the confusion surrounding Chinese identity and eventually, they received various concessions in the 1980s.[126] These included the improvement in South Africa's treatment of Chinese immigrants, specifically in granting residence permits to Taiwanese investors; and discontinuing the practice that saw white women who married Chinese men being reclassified as Chinese.[127] Lastly, the state put pressure on the provincial authorities of the Orange Free State to stop the ban on the Chinese from living and starting businesses in the province.[128] These new privileges began blurring the categories of 'white' and 'Chinese'. Park argues that while the Chinese did make practical use of their new found rights, they did not assimilate into the white community and still saw themselves as a distinct community.[129] Furthermore, using their privileges often came with embarrassing circumstances, such as having to ask approval from whites to live in their residential areas.[130] It is important to note that the Chinese remained legally classified as 'non-white', and they never had the right to vote until 1994.[131] Despite these drawbacks, the social status of the Chinese in South Africa was clearly improved as a result of the apartheid state's strengthening of ties with Taiwan.

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[123] *Ibid.,* p. 123.
[124] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 381
[125] *Ibid.,* p. 381.
[126] 'Meer Vryheid vir Chinese in SA', *Die Transvaler* (20 0ctober 1980).
[127] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 70.
[128] *Ibid.*
[129] Yoon J. Park, 'State, Myth, and Agency in the Construction of Chinese South African Identities, 1948–1994', *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, *4*, 1 (2008), p. 79.
[130] Linda Human, *The Chinese People of South Africa: Freewheeling on the Fringes* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1984), p. 77.
[131] Yoon J. Park, 'Black, Yellow, (Honorary) White or just plain South African? Chinese South Africans, Identity and Affirmative Action', *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, 77, 1 (2011), p. 110.

Taiwanese Associations

The new wave of Taiwanese immigration was accompanied by the emergence of new associations. Many of these had significantly different purposes to earlier Chinese associations. Considering that most of the new immigrants were businessmen and industrialists, in 1986 the Association of ROC Industrialists was formed.[132] The name later changed to the Association of Chinese Industrialists in Southern Africa. This Association was specifically targeted towards helping these Taiwanese immigrants to settle in their new environment. Many of the industrialists also struggled to speak English and this Association assisted them linguistically. However, it is important to note that the privileged status of the Taiwanese played a key role in determining that their associations and networks could have a business focus. Additionally, many of these immigrants were living in remote rural areas in the bantustans with no cultural or religious amenities. In 1993, to address this issue, the first Buddhist temple in South Africa was built in the Bronkhorstspruit area.[133] Thus the new wave of Taiwanese immigration led to the establishment of new associations aimed to cater to their specific needs.

The Taiwanese did not only set up their own associations but also collaborated with and supported some of the already existing associations. The ROC government made a significant loan to the developers of a Chinese Cultural Centre in Bramley Park, Johannesburg and helped many sporting events and cultural celebrations financially.[134] Monetary support was also given to CASA and the TCA in the late 1980s to help with the building of a community centre in Johannesburg. Furthermore, every year Taiwan's Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission coordinated with the TCA to organise a youth tour to Taiwan and Hong Kong which continues to this day.[135] This shows that there was some level of integration and cooperation between the local Chinese and the Taiwanese immigrants. However, their integration remained limited in the twentieth century, largely due to

[132] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 420.
[133] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 313.
[134] Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions*, p. 429.
[135] The Chinese Association of Gauteng Newsletter, (16 June 2018).

disputes and grievances between the two groups.[136] Many of the local Chinese believed that these new Taiwanese migrants were involved in business malpractices and illegal activities – and thus avoided being associated with them.[137]

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the historical roots of Chinese associations in South Africa leading up to the end of the apartheid era, with a focus on the Transvaal and Witwatersrand. It looked at the early stages of Chinese immigration to South Africa and showed how these dispersed diasporic communities grouped together through petitioning against poor treatment and discrimination. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the mineral revolution drew Chinese – amongst many other - migrants to the country and resulted in increasing racial legislation that in part ensured the continued supply of cheap labour. This led to more enduring forms of associating among the different Chinese communities across South Africa. In the early 1900s, associations like the TCA were formed primarily to protest the government's anti-Chinese and Indian legislation and to establish structures of community support. These protestations were initially militant, but a split in the Johannesburg Chinese community saw the TCA adopting a more conservative approach over the coming decades.

At the same time, there was a large importation of Chinese indentured labourers to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand between 1904-1910. Whilst almost all these labourers eventually returned to China through repatriation schemes, the white community responded to their presence with increasing racism and prejudice which affected the Chinese as a whole for decades thereafter. The implementation of apartheid and its racial laws from 1948, many of which negatively affected the Chinese, saw the different Chinese communities unite to create a central association which would contest specific laws, such as the Group Areas Act, and other grievances/injustices on a national level and in an accommodationist stance. The CCASA formed in 1954 to take up such a role and it petitioned for concessions until its dissolution in 1967. However, the national association was revived through the establishment of CASA in the 1980s. Under this new name, the

[136] 'SA Chinese Abhor Fishing Practices', *The Citizen* (6 July 1990).
[137] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 315.

central association has been active well into the twenty-first century, and will be discussed further in the next chapter by looking at its court action against the new South African government's implementation of affirmative action policies.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a new wave of Taiwanese newcomers to South Africa. Their presence transformed the political landscape of the Chinese in South Africa, and the apartheid government brought in various concessions that indirectly eased up the regulation of the older Chinese community as well. The Taiwanese created many of their own associations, which were largely business focussed. Their interests differed, in part, from the original Chinese associations, which were much more concerned with lack of civil rights for the Chinese, because their privileged status under apartheid had already granted them concessions. The Taiwanese nonetheless also gradually mixed and collaborated with other Chinese associations, especially around cultural issues.

The chapter showed that Chinese associations evolved from being insignificant and sporadic during the very early years of migration to becoming more permanent and established in the early 1900s and more centralised in the 1950s, despite a parallel decrease in militancy. The first migrants were dispersed and low in numbers, which restricted them to associate only on occasion. As the first wave of Chinese migrants arrived in South Africa, more distinct communities emerged which in turn allowed for more formal forms of associations. Additionally, during this period racial segregation and oppression were on the rise. Therefore, many of the first conventional associations were concerned with civil rights for the Chinese community and support for newly arrived migrants. Despite the disillusionment in the passive resistance movement, the increasingly oppressive racial laws of apartheid strengthened the need for civil rights associations, although they were in part successful in breaking their militancy. Lastly, the wave of Taiwanese migrants in the 1980s brought change, once again, as their presence led to concessions being given to the Chinese and as Taiwanese associations were established that better reflected the distinct business interests of their group. This shows how Chinese associations have been subject to the evolving social, political and economic situation of South Africa and to the fluctuating migration patterns of the Chinese diaspora. However, the most significant shift was yet to come with the new democratic dispensation in 1994 and Chapter Two will analyse how these original associations were affected by this political shift.

Chapter Two

SABC and Taiwanese Associations and Associational Lives in the Democratic Era

In 1994, the first democratic election was held in South Africa with the African National Congress (ANC) emerging victorious. One of the first orders of business for the new ANC-led government was to draw up a new constitution that guaranteed equal rights and freedoms to all people. While there was euphoria and optimism around the move towards a democratic dispensation in the mid to the late 1990s, there was also a degree of uncertainty around the change. The anxieties included fears of election violence and a coup d'état by Afrikaner nationalists in the South African military[1]; and speculation that the ANC would fail at governing the country, especially considering South Africa's concerning economic outlook after the global recession between 1989 and 1993.[2]

It is in this broader context that this chapter examines the effect democratisation had on identity, belonging and status of SABCs and the Taiwanese. It analyses various SABC associations to find out how the end of apartheid influenced their organisational structure, aims and membership. These groups include the Chinese Association of Gauteng (TCAG), the nation-wide Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA), the Southern Africa Chinese Sports Association (SACSA), the Pretoria Chinese Association (PCA) and the Shunde Friendship Association (SFA). It argues that the granting of full rights to Chinese citizens of South Africa changed the central aims of many of their associations from being concerned with political issues to becoming more focused on cultural and community issues. Furthermore, it shows that there has been a decline in membership and participation in these associations following the democratic transition, but that this is contrasted by the

[1] Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster, 'Challenging Transition Theory: The Labor Movement, Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa', *Politics and Society*, 23, no. 1 (1995), pp. 75-76.
[2] Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee, 'Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa's Transition to Democracy', *World Development*, 28, no. 2 (2000), p. 246.

increased popularity of the Chinese New Year celebrations organised by them, and which have gained popularity among a multicultural public in the post-apartheid era. The chapter also looks at the effects of the third wave of Chinese migration[3], starting in the late 1980s, on SABC groups.

A key element of South Africa's democratic transition relates to the country's changing relationships with Taiwan and China. Whereas the apartheid government developed strong economic and diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the 1980s and up to the early 1990s, the ANC gradually cultivated diplomatic ties with the PRC. In 1997, South Africa joined the large majority of international states in recognising the PRC over the ROC.[4] The ties between China and South Africa have continued to increase, as seen by South Africa's inclusion in the now BRICS economic alliance in 2011. The chapter looks at two Taiwanese associations, Nan Hua Temple and South Africa Hakka Association, to determine their status after 1994 in regards to the changing political and economic relations between South Africa and Taiwan. It argues that these associations have achieved a multicultural character thanks to democracy, but that the perceived loss of political favour from the ANC has led to a decrease in both the Taiwanese population of South Africa and their participation in these groups.

SABC and Taiwanese Identity and Status in the Post-Apartheid Era

Most SABCs trace their ancestry to the first wave of Chinese migration in the late nineteenth century. As the name suggests, this group is no longer made up of migrants but instead of South African citizens of Chinese descent/ancestry. For many SABCs who lived during apartheid, their feeling of belonging to South Africa is a complicated matter. The apartheid state initially classified them as 'Coloured' in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. However, as a result of the regime's close ties with Japan in the 1960s and Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s and the granting of concessions for Japanese and Taiwanese migrants, the status of the Chinese became even more ambiguous. Karen Harris states that while under the law the Chinese were deemed 'non-white', they were generally accepted by white

[3] A brief description of the third wave of Chinese migration is given in the introduction.
[4] See Williams and Hurst, 'Caught Between Two Chinas'.

society from the 1970s onwards.[5] As a result, the Chinese were ostracised from both sides. They were not officially or legally equal to whites and blacks saw them as collaborators of the apartheid government.

The racial segregation and ostracisation the Chinese endured during apartheid made some feel unaccepted and unwanted in the country.[6] Erwin Pon, the current chairman of TCAG, for example, states that his experience of apartheid did not make him feel South African.[7] He was born in 1974 and grew up in the 'First Chinatown' of Johannesburg on Commissioner Street.[8] Towards the end of the decade, his family decided to move to the whites-only suburb of Parkhurst. However, in order to do so, they had to ask permission from the white residents of the area. This was due to a concession granted to the Chinese, which allowed them to live in a white area after obtaining permission from the Department of Community Development, provided none of the neighbours objected.[9] While providing access to white areas, the concession was humiliating, discriminatory and unjust. Erwin adds that he had other painful experiences as a child. These included: 'just going to [private mixed] school being bullied on, going into public swimming pools and getting kicked out, [and] getting kicked out of buses'.[10] As a result, Erwin and some other older generation SABCs, see themselves as Chinese first and South African second.[11] However, he does say that since 1994 his sense of belonging to South Africa has increased.[12]

Many SABCs share this sentiment and today see themselves as fully South African. They were born and raised in this country, of which they are citizens, and have no intention of leaving.[13] Therefore, it is evident that the new democratic dispensation, and the full and equal rights it has provided to all its citizens, has played a significant role in strengthening the sense of belonging of many Chinese South Africans. However, some SABCs have had a radically different response to the changing political system by emigrating out of the

[5] Karen L. Harris, '"Whiteness", "Blackness", "Neitherness" – The South African Chinese 1885-1991: a Case Study of Identity Politics', *Historia*, 47, no. 1 (2002), p. 121.
[6] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 258.
[7] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[8] The first Chinatown's developed is detailed in the introduction.
[9] Harris, '"Whiteness", "Blackness", "Neitherness"', p. 118.
[10] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[11] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 283.
[12] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[13] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 288.

country. They have expressed concerns about a lack of service delivery, insufficient healthcare, crime and future economic growth.[14] This is part of a larger emigration trend among mostly middle-class white families, with whom SABCs share a similar economic status. Between 1991 and 2005, an estimated 796,000 whites emigrated for similar concerns.[15] Interestingly, while young SABCs are more inclined to feel loyalty to South Africa, they are also more likely to emigrate. This is partly because many of the younger SABC generation view belonging as fluid and desire to travel the world; and because of a perception that South Africans of Chinese descent would have limited economic opportunities in the future due to their initial exclusion from the Black Economic Empowerment policies (this issue will be discussed in more detail under the Chinese Association of South Africa section). Consequently, the post-apartheid period has seen a significant drop in the SABC population.

The Taiwanese group in post-apartheid South Africa has also seen a shift in their status in and belonging to the country. Towards the end of apartheid, the Taiwanese received many concessions and economic opportunities as part of the growing ties between South Africa and its bantustans and Taiwan. However, with the new democratic dispensation, the Taiwanese lost the exclusive economic and tax incentives that had initially attracted them to do business here. Furthermore, by 1997, the South Africa had changed its recognition of China to the PRC thereby diminishing its economic ties to Taiwan.[16] As a result, the Taiwanese population dropped from around 30 000 in 1992 to an estimated 8000-10 000 in 2004.[17] More recent sources from 2010 have put their number at an even lower 6000.[18] Of the group that remains, there are both Taiwanese migrants and their descendants born in South Africa. Furthermore, because Taiwan allows dual citizenship – many Taiwanese living in the country are also South African citizens. However, Yoon Park argues that dual

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 283.
[15] Melissa Steyn and Don Foster, 'Repertoires for Talking White: Resistant Whiteness in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31, no. 1 (2008), p. 47.
[16] Sven Grimm, Yejoo Kim, and Ross Anthony, 'South African Relations with China and Taiwan Economic Realism and the "One-China" Doctrine', *Centre for Chinese Studies* (2014), p. 33.
[17] Yoon J. Park and Pragna Rugunanan, 'Visible and Vulnerable: Asian Migrant Communities in South Africa', in *South African Civil Society and Xenophobia* (Atlantic Philanthropies Research Report: 2010), pp. 5-6, http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/13_Visible_and_Vulnerable_c.pdf accessed on 18 August 2019.
[18] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 294.

citizenship does not necessarily symbolise belonging and is often just a practicality.[19] Nonetheless, some of the older Taiwanese migrants who have been in the country for 20 years or more tend to see themselves as South African and are integrated into middle-class society.[20] This is also true of the younger generation – their descendants – who were born here. Despite a fall in numbers, the Taiwanese remain a distinct minority group within broader South African society.

SABC Associations and Associational lives

SABC associations are the oldest existing Chinese organisations in South Africa, of which many were analysed in the first chapter. Some associations from the 1900s, for example, the Cantonese Club and the CCASA, have disbanded and fallen away. However, associations such as TCAG, CASA, SACSA, PCA, and SFA all have their roots in earlier associations and remain active in Gauteng. However, these contemporary associations have changed significantly after the end of apartheid in terms of their aims, functions and membership numbers.

The Chinese Association of Gauteng

The origins and early history of this association have been discussed in detail in Chapter One under its former name – the Transvaal Chinese Association (TCA). At its formation in 1903, the TCA was established to support Chinese immigrants who were experiencing discrimination by the British colonial authorities.[21] The Association initially partook in passive resistance campaigns along with the Indian community. This militancy was eventually replaced by a non-confrontational approach, such as petitioning the government for rights and concessions to the Chinese, during the segregation and apartheid eras.

[19] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 325.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 328.
[21] Interview with Erwin Pon.

Erwin Pon believes that the Association's purpose has not changed much since its former incarnation as the TCA.[22] Despite the name change after 1994[23], the Association still exists to help support the Chinese in South Africa, as seen in its current objectives to 'promote and protect the physical, economic, social, intellectual and educational welfare of the Chinese community'.[24] And while the purpose remains the same, the demographics of their membership has changed drastically. Currently, most of their members are SABCs who are South African citizens; fully integrated into South African society; some have intermarried and have children of mixed heritage. Their status in South Africa is that of equal citizens, unlike what Chinese migrants experienced in the early 1900s. They speak English as their first language and often are unable to speak or understand either Cantonese or Mandarin. Furthermore, they have access to email, the internet, social media and other means of communication in contrast to the limited forms of communication in the early twentieth century. Erwin states that currently, TCAG has around 2000 paying members who can vote in internal elections, and another 2000 non-paying members who cannot vote. Thus, the Association's membership has changed to reflect the group's assimilation into South African and modern technological society.

The new democratic dispensation has also played a role in transforming the TCAG's cultural and religious endeavours, specifically in regards to its celebration of the Chinese New Year (see figure 2). The Association has a long history of hosting of this celebration at the First Chinatown of Johannesburg and thus, it is an integral part of TCAG's activities as an association.[25] During apartheid, this cultural celebration, and other ones like the Double Ten festival[26], was a means of strengthening community bonds. Racial segregation enforced by this regime ensured that it was an exclusively Chinese event. Scholars such as Yoon Park go as far as to say that without apartheid, the Chinese cultural identity would not have developed as significantly.[27] However, since 1994 the event has taken on a multi-cultural character and audience. With the emergence of the idea of the 'rainbow nation', the

[22] *Ibid.*
[23] The new democratic dispensation established nine new provinces out of the previous four with Gauteng best representing the region the Association was based in.
[24] 'About Us', *The Chinese Association of Gauteng*, http://www.tcagp.co.za/about-us/, accessed on 14 March 2019.
[25] See Figure 2.
[26] Briefly discussed in Chapter One.
[27] Park, *Shifting Chinese South African Identities*, p. 249.

Chinese New Year has become one of South Africa's most popular public cultural events and is attended by people of all backgrounds.[28] Evidently, the freedom and equality guaranteed by democracy has transformed the TCAG's hosting of the Chinese New Year from an exclusive celebration to an inclusive event for all South Africans.



Figure 2

An advertisement for a celebration of the 2019 Chinese New Year.[29]

[28] Ufrieda Ho, 'Joburg's Chinese Community: New Year, Old Traditions', *BusinessLive* (15 February 2018), https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/life/food/2018-02-15-joburgs-chinese-community-new-year-old-traditions/, accessed on 14 March 2019.

[29] The Chinese Association of Gauteng Newsletter, (4 February 2019).

The case of the TCAG provides interesting insights into the relationship between SABCs and some of the recent Chinese migrants. While the Association is mostly geared towards SABCs, Pon himself being a fourth-generation Chinese South African states that the Association is open to anyone of Chinese origin.[30] This inclusivity is reflected in their objectives which aim to 'promote unity, harmony and goodwill amongst those of Chinese descent in Gauteng and throughout Southern Africa'.[31] Despite these stated aims, the Association remains predominantly made up of SABCs members. Pon argues that this is because of the linguistic and cultural differences between them and the recent Chinese migrants, and not because of any animosity between the groups.[32] However, some of the people interviewed for this project point towards some hostility between the groups, and this will be further analysed in Chapter Five.

As mentioned before, SABCs are South Africans of Chinese descent, which inherently makes their life experiences and identity significantly different from those of recent Chinese migrants. Furthermore, most of the recent Chinese migrants are Mandarin speakers and are not always proficient in English, whereas many of the SABCs only speak English with a few still speaking Cantonese. There are also SABCs who have a long family history in South Africa, dating back to as far as the 1800s. Seeing as their ancestors came from Guangdong, their cultural and linguistic background is different from that of recent migrants, who come from all over China, especially the Fujian province.[33] The passing of time has furthered this cultural gap, and many SABCs, especially the younger generation, do not retain any Chinese traditions but rather have become fully 'western' and South African.

Class and citizenship differences have also created a clear distinction between the two groups. SABCs are considerably wealthier than many of the recent Chinese migrants.[34] The migrants from the Fujian province, who make up the bulk of the group, were predominantly

[30] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[31] 'About Us', *The Chinese Association of Gauteng*, http://www.tcagp.co.za/about-us/, accessed on 14 March 2019.
[32] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[33] The diverse origins of recent Chinese migrants are initially discussed in the introduction and will be further detailed in Chapter Three and Chapter Five.
[34] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 269.

small traders and peasants in China. As a result, many lack social and economic capital; as well as having low levels of education and limited knowledge of English.[35] These class differences mean that the two groups inhabit different spaces[36] and that they have divergent interests and activities – which also shape their associational life. In regards to citizenship, SABCs are South African whereas the large majority of recent migrants are Chinese citizens who are in South Africa on temporary visa permits – or, in some cases, illegally.[37] This indicates significant cleavages between the two groups both in terms of class and ethnic identity and belonging. Additionally, many Chinese migrants have entered the country illegally and some of them engage in other illegal activities once here.[38] Consequently, many SABCs push back against being associated with Chinese migrants because of the stigma of illegality and criminality attached to this group.

Despite the distinctions, there are various instances in which the TCAG interacts and collaborates with the new associations established by recent Chinese migrants after 1994. As per its constitution, the Association strives to 'promote and preserve all ties with similar associations within and beyond the borders of the Republic of South Africa'.[39] Consequently, Pon is in contact with many of the different chairs of the recent migrant associations.[40] They discuss community issues, such as racism and crime; and the Chinese New Year and other cultural celebrations are also held in conjunction with the new associations.[41] Hence, the influx of recent Chinese migrants has also affected the SABCs and their traditional associations such as the TCAG in various ways.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 295.
[36] For example, wealthy suburbs versus low-cost housing in Cyrildene and Bruma.
[37] Some Chinese migrants are in South Africa on temporary permits or permanent residence permits. However, there is also a large number who are in the country illegally and undocumented.
[38] Yoon J. Park, 'Chinese Migration in Africa', *South African Institute of International Affairs*, occasional paper no. 24 (2009), p. 14.
[39] 'About Us', *The Chinese Association of Gauteng*, http://www.tcagp.co.za/about-us/, accessed on 14 March 2019.
[40] Although the project's research is not extensive enough to make claims on the gender dynamics of either SABC, Taiwanese or recent Chinese migrant associations, it is important to note that the research identified some associations with female chairpersons: TCA's Women's Federation and SACSA for SABCs; Taiwanese Woman Association for the Taiwanese; and the Chinese Scholars and Students of South Africa, and Africa Chinese Woman Association for recent Chinese migrants.
[41] Interview with Erwin Pon.

Southern Africa Chinese Sports Association (SACSA)

SACSA is another longstanding Chinese association that is mostly known for organising the popular Easter Tournament and is hosting its 60th annual tournament in 2019. This Association acts as an overarching body that incorporates all the provincial Chinese sports associations, such as the Southern Gauteng Chinese Sports Association, the Western Province Chinese Sports Association, and others.[42] Once a year, all these provincial associations get together in that year's hosting city to compete in the Easter Tournament. Initially, this tournament was held because under apartheid the Chinese were not allowed to play sports or mix with other 'racial groups', but it has continued after apartheid as an annual Chinese community event.[43] Participants of all ages compete in sports such as basketball, badminton, golf, squash and volleyball. The event is not limited to sports only but also includes social events. There is usually a presentation dinner where all the contestants and attendees come together for a large gathering and youth socials/dances form part of the festivities.[44] Evidently, the ultimate purpose of this event is to unite SABCs across South Africa. The event has helped establish networks and relationships between different SABC groups who would not normally interact with each other because they live in different parts of the country. The 2017 brochure for the Easter Tournament includes announcements of couples getting married after meeting through the tournament. It has great popularity amongst the SABCs, with around 500 participants annually.[45]

The end of apartheid and the emergence of a new democratic government has transformed the SACSA in two significant ways. Firstly, as mentioned previously, the Easter Tournament was an exclusively Chinese event under apartheid because of racial segregation. However, since 1994, the tournament has been open to non-Chinese participants. This more inclusive policy has been made possible by the freedoms guaranteed by democracy and the constitution. Secondly, as noted earlier, the ANC government changed its recognition of the legitimate representative of China from the ROC (Taiwan) to the PRC in 1998. This political shift post-apartheid is reflected in the brochures of the Easter Tournaments. The 1997

[42] SACSA Easter Tournament brochure (2017).
[43] Interview with Shirleen Man in Kensington, Johannesburg (18 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[44] SACSA Easter Tournament brochure (2017).
[45] Interview with Shirleen Man.

brochure for the event, when the political influence of Taiwan was still strong, only had a message from the Consulate-General of the ROC, whereas the 2017 brochure has a message from both the ambassador of the PRC and the Taipei Liaison Office.[46] This suggests that there have been improvements in the formal relations between the organisers and PRC diplomats in South Africa; and that the tournament evolved to better reflect the political status of the new South Africa with regards to China.

Shirleen Man is the current honorary president of SACSA, having been its chairperson for the previous 35 years, and is very involved in the organising of the Easter Tournament. She is an SABC, who was born in Sophiatown, Johannesburg, before the forced removals of the 1950s and has lived through apartheid. Besides her involvement in SACSA, she works in the accounting and Human Resources sector. While the Association and the tournament are largely made up of SABCs, she states that they have tried to incorporate recent Chinese migrants into their membership by reaching out to potential participants.[47] To some degree, there has been a success, as they have had teams from Taiwan and Hong Kong competing in the tournament. However, a big barrier to incorporation has been language. Most of SACSA members speak English (the brochures are almost entirely written in English), whereas recent migrants – and the Taiwanese – speak Mandarin. If teams have members that cannot understand one another, it causes communication problems on the field as well as creating a barrier against the development of social relationships. Man further states that many of the recent Chinese migrants are transient, having little long-term connections to South Africa, which makes it even more troublesome to integrate into the tournament.[48] Therefore, it is evident that while the influx of recent Chinese migrants to South Africa has allowed for the participation of more diverse teams, their integration has remained limited with the SACSA.

Despite SACSA and the Easter Tournament largely targeting SABC's, in my research I came across an individual who is a recent Chinese migrant that has been actively involved in these

[46] Since South Africa does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, the Taipei Liaison Office functions as the de facto embassy.
[47] Interview with Shirleen Man.
[48] *Ibid*.

sports events. Ross Li came to South Africa from Hong Kong in 1996 at the age of six. [49] His father was a banker who did some work in South Africa and enjoyed it so much that the whole family immigrated here. Li grew up in Pretoria, went to Pretoria Boys High School and later studied at the University of Pretoria. He currently works at the China Development Bank as a risk analyst. As a result of his move to South Africa at an early stage of his life, he feels settled and comfortable here, and he considers South Africa his home. His status is similar to that of an SABC. Furthermore, he is completely fluent in English and has attained a great level of integration in South African society. Growing up he was a very sporty person and was told by his uncle of the Easter Tournament which sparked his interest. Since then, he has actively participated in many of the Easter Tournament sports events, playing basketball and squash. His participation has not been limited to sports as he is also on the organising committee for the Easter Tournament. [50]

Another indication of Li's connection to the SABC community has been his involvement in the SABC Chinese New Year celebrations on Commissioner Street (or First Chinatown) in downtown Johannesburg, as part of which he has also acted as Master of Ceremony. Li argues that his involvement in largely SABC events comes down to two reasons: his love for sports and his social personality that has driven him to participate in and help organise events.[51] However, it also seems that growing up in South Africa and having lived here for most of his life has played a role in his association with more SABC inclined groups. Crucial to this is his education at an English school, that not only cultivated a proficiency in the language SABCs use most, but also provided him with a similar schooling experience. Furthermore, his economic status as a professional who works in Sandton has also allowed him to relate more to SABCs than recent Chinese migrants, many of whom are poor or earn a low income. Evidently, his personal history of migration and class status have made it easier and more likely for him to associate with SABCs, as opposed to low-income economic migrants from China that might struggle with the English language and South African culture, amongst other issues.

[49] Interview with Ross Li (pseudonym) in Sandton, Johannesburg (27 September 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Ibid*.

A further important aspect of this discussion is the difference in how and why some SABCs associate compared to how recent Chinese migrants associate. SACSA and all its affiliated associations have a presence on the ground in all the provinces. Each province has a team that competes against the other provinces' teams. This territorial nature of Chinese associations such as the PCA, TCAG and SACSA reflect the long history of SABCs in South Africa as it shows that these organisations are rooted in the country and that their identity is South African. In contrast, many of the associations of recent Chinese migrants are linked to a province, city, town or region back in China, as Chapter Three will show.[52] Their status as economic migrants means that many do not stay in South Africa indefinitely – not least because of their visa status and that they retain strong social and economic ties with China.[53] These differences between how the two groups associate is also connected to the changing political system of South Africa, as mentioned in Chapter One. The SABC associations were established during apartheid when the rights to residence and movement, amongst others, for those that were not classified as 'white' were severely constrained, and continued migration from China was restricted by the Immigration Restriction Act of 1902 and the Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act of 1953 later. Hence, the Chinese in South Africa tended to mobilise around issues affecting particular communities in the local South African context. The freedoms that Chinese associations historically fought for have now been won and since the country has enacted a rights-based constitution that applies to all South Africans, the focus of these organisations has shifted to issues of culture, community and sports.

Pretoria Chinese Association (PCA)

The PCA, in many respects, is similar to TCAG. They were both formed in the early to mid-1900s largely in response to racial discrimination and have, since their inception petitioned for equal rights and concessions for the Chinese.[54] Today, they are open to any person of Chinese descent. However, the PCA's primary function has changed post-apartheid. The chairman of the PCA, Eugene Kamson, explains that after 1994, the Association began

[52] The Fujian Association and the Beijing Association are examples of this trend.
[53] Dittgen, 'Features of Modernity', p. 985.
[54] Interview with Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue.

participating more in activities of a social and cultural nature as many of the discriminatory issues South African Chinese faced were removed by the democratic constitution of South Africa. These activities include the Chinese New Year celebrations in Johannesburg's First Chinatown, the Dragon Boat Race Festival at the Florida Dam in Roodepoort, the Mid-Autumn Harvest Festival (commonly known as the Moon Festival), B-BEE Commemoration every five years, select CASA quarterly conferences and monthly PCA committee meetings.[55] The PCA functions as a Non-Profit Organisation that is funded through donations from their members and is run by volunteers. It has 132 member-families of which less than half are paid-up members.

However, the Association is facing certain challenges. Kamson has expressed concern over the dwindling SABC population in Pretoria.[56] While no official figures exist, and sources vary in their estimates, there is a general consensus that numbers have reduced since 1994. This has led to a smaller membership base for the PCA, which has dropped from what was around 300 members (excluding their families) to 132.[57] The decrease is partly a reflection of outward migration, especially by younger SABCs. Furthermore, Chinese youth participation in cultural and community events has been in decline and often limited to sports events – which indicates high levels of integration in South Africa's middle class.[58] As a result, the PCA has been struggling to look into the future as there are very few young Chinese leaders emerging from its ranks. Evidently, the new democratic dispensation has both affected the primary functions of the PCA and its membership base.

While the PCA's membership has been waning post-apartheid, they remain quite active in terms of the strong relationship with the Pretoria Chinese School (PCS). This relationship dates back to the formation of the Association in the 1930s when it used the school's old premises on Boom Street as their base.[59] Interestingly, at the time, the street and the surrounding area of Marabastad/Asiatic Bazaar was a diverse community of African, Coloured, Indian and Chinese people. However, many of the residents were subsequently forcefully and traumatically relocated through the 1950 Group Areas Act, which enforced

[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 37.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

urban segregation.[60] Currently, the PCA supports the school through fundraising and donations, as well as many of its leaders being board members of the PCS.

This intimate relationship is reflected in Kamson's life history as well. He was born in Johannesburg in 1936 but was a sickly child and initially could not go to school. When he was ten, his father found a job in Eastwood, Pretoria. Fortunately, when they moved he was able to attend the PCS, and received much individual help and support from the teachers at the school.[61] It was his admiration and gratitude towards the school that has led him to being involved with the PCA and PCS later in his life. On Kamson's 80th birthday, he asked for all presents to be donations to the school and this initiative managed to raise R141700.[62] Evidently, the PCA's relationship with the PCS reflects a long history of partnership rooted in local social and political realities. This sets them apart from many of the newer associations whose connections with China are very strong and that are part of transnational Chinese migration networks, rather than local ones.

The PCS was initially created in 1934 to offer a good education, and a means of maintaining Cantonese, to Chinese students who were restricted from accessing schools because of segregation. The school's purpose and student membership has significantly changed post-apartheid for various reasons. In the 1990s, the school expanded to include a high school; and they were able to move to new premises in Wingate Park after the restrictions on Chinese ownership of property had been relaxed.[63] Along with these changes, the end of apartheid meant that the school began accepting non-Chinese students. Both the influx of students from diverse backgrounds and the freedom of Chinese parents to send their children to any schools meant that the demographics of the PCS changed drastically. Today students of Chinese origin only amount to 10-15 per cent of the student body.[64] The school also transitioned from offering Cantonese classes to Mandarin ones in 1992. The economic rise of China in the 1990s, and with it, the increasing significance of Mandarin, played a key role in this language policy change. Additionally, South Africa's decision to recognise the PRC

[60] Darryl Accone's memoir, *All Under Heaven: The Story of a Chinese Family in South Africa* (New Africa Books, 2004), provides a personal account of this event.
[61] Interview with Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] 'About Pretoria Chinese School', *Pretoria Chinese School*, http://pretoriachineseschool.co.za/about-us/, accessed on 14 March 2019.
[64] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 42.

in 1998 reaffirmed the transition to Mandarin. Currently, Mandarin is taught as a compulsory Second Additional Language in the school, while English is the medium of instruction. These changes show that the PCS adapted to the shifting demographics of the Chinese population in South Africa, the new political situation in South Africa, and China's growing importance internationally.

Shunde Friendship Association

The Shunde Friendship Association (SFA) was established by King Pon in 1997, thus being one of the youngest SABC associations.[65] Pon, a first generation SABC, was born in 1950 in the First Chinatown of Johannesburg (he is the older brother of Erwin Pon). He is also currently involved in the running of a fireworks store in Johannesburg's First Chinatown. There are unique characteristics about the SFA that sets it apart from other associations discussed earlier. The SFA is one of the few SABC associations established after apartheid. As a result, the Association has been able to differentiate itself from other SABC groups. For a start, the Association takes its name from the Shunde district of Foshan, which is situated in the Guangdong province of China, while historical SABC associations tend to identify locally in South African terms. The Association's purpose is also linked to Shunde identity. Its objectives are to preserve and promote the ancestral, cultural and traditional roots to Shunde for SABCs. Examples of this include trips (often for the youth) to ancestral villages in China; and at their 20th anniversary celebration last year, a famous chef from Shunde was invited to come share the cuisine unique to the area.[66] To become a member there is a once-off R50 joining fee. While they have around 1000 members on their record, Pon estimates the actual number to be closer to 800 if factoring in deaths and emigration.[67]

This type of association would not have been able to exist during apartheid, as both movement was restricted and connections with China were severed by South Africa's immigration laws and its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, rather than the PRC. Furthermore, China itself restricted emigration until the 1980s, when President Deng

[65] Interview with King Pon in Ferreirasdorp, Johannesburg (31 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[66] *Ibid.*
[67] *Ibid.*

Xiaoping began the process of opening up China to the rest of the world.[68] However, now that a democratic government is in place in South Africa (one which diplomatically recognised the PRC in 1998), there are less restrictions between movement and networks between South Africa and China. Thus, the political shift in 1994 has not only transformed historical SABC associations in numerous ways, but it has also allowed for new types of associations to form among SABCs.

The influx of recent Chinese migrants, as described in the introduction, has similarly affected the functions of the SFA. The Association is strongly linked to the Chinese community in the 'old' Chinatown on Commissioner Street, and one of its purposes is to foster social and cultural interactions amongst its members. Despite being a predominantly SABC association, it has many connections to recent Chinese migrants, potentially more so than some of the older SABC associations. Pon states that his association attempts to collaborate with new Chinese associations on various fronts including by connecting family links between the two countries and in the joint celebration of Chinese New Year.[69] Additionally, the SFA has formed a voluntary medical assistance group directed towards helping recent Chinese migrants access healthcare and receive support under emergencies. This group uses its expertise, contacts in and knowledge of the healthcare system in South Africa to ensure that in the case of an emergency, no Chinese person is left without medical care. Pon states that they are well known for their work amongst the recent Chinese migrant communities in Gauteng and are even contacted by the Chinese Embassy and Consulate to help in certain situations.[70]

In 2017, there was a case of a Chinese tourist who was shot in Gauteng and needed financial and medical assistance. The SFA, together with a number of recent Chinese migrant associations, managed to fundraise enough money that paid for the man's four-month stint in the ICU of a private hospital. At the moment, Pon is helping fundraise for a recent Chinese migrant, from the Fujian province in China, to be treated at Johannesburg's Milpark hospital as he was shot too. He says that despite their different origins, he and the Association are

[68] Xiao, *Free Chinese Immigration*, p. 60.
[69] Interview with King Pon.
[70] *Ibid.*

trying to unite with Chinese newcomers.[71] While the influx of recent Chinese migrants has not significantly affected the membership of the SFA, it has added to its roles in the form of voluntary and charitable work. Nonetheless, this situation reflects a key distinction of economic class between SABCs and recent Chinese migrants. Despite the links between the SFA and recent Chinese migrants, there exists an inherent separation and power disparity between the group helping and the group in need of help.

Chinese Association of South Africa

The existence of a collective, national association for the Chinese in South Africa dates back the 1950s and 1960s when the Central Chinese Association of South Africa (CCASA), discussed in Chapter One, represented the umbrella body of Chinese associations across South Africa. The CCASA was disbanded in 1967, but in 1981 its legacy was picked up when eighteen associations decided to establish CASA as a means of addressing the Chinese community's mixed reaction to the proposed President's Council under PW Botha, and to this day it continues to function as the national Chinese association for SABCs.[72] Some of these member associations include TCAG and PCA. During apartheid, CASA strove to attain full citizenship rights for the Chinese; to promote Chinese culture and interests, and to maintain amicable relations with other communities.[73] Many of these objectives have since been achieved with the new democratic era ushering in full and equal rights for all, thereby leading to a decline in CASA's relevance. While CASA remained an active association up until the 2000s, it has recently become dormant because of the freedoms guaranteed by the South African constitution.

Despite South Africans of Chinese origins earning full equality in 1994, the subsequent Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act 35 of 2003 indirectly discriminated against the Chinese in South Africa. These acts were instituted to address the economic inequalities created by the legacy of apartheid

[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 38.
[73] *Ibid.*

through affirmative action.[74] Black people, defined to include Africans, Coloureds and Indians, were set to benefit from these policies. The position of the Chinese in apartheid was ambiguous - being classified as 'Coloured' under the apartheid's Population Registration Act of 1950, but later receiving concessions indirectly from the unofficial classification of the Taiwanese as 'Honorary Whites'. In light of this confusion, the Chinese were excluded from the post-apartheid definition of black and were thus unable to benefit from these policies of redress.[75] Eugene Kamson was the chairman of CASA for four years during the B-BBEE dispute and he concisely sums up the conundrum they were in at the time: 'We were previously disadvantaged and now we are disadvantaged again'.[76] Thus while democracy did bring about more freedoms and universal suffrage, it also contradictingly produced new instances of discrimination towards the Chinese in South Africa.

CASA accordingly took up the case in 2007 to have SABCs included as beneficiaries of BEE and begun appealing to the South African government. For some South African Chinese, this was about setting the record straight and ensuring that they were not disadvantaged by being at the opposite end of these legislations. For others, access to education and jobs were a concern. Kamson says he found that one of the main reasons why the Chinese were excluded in the first place was out of ignorance of their history in South Africa by government officials.[77] He states that many were sympathetic to their cause after being informed of the historical context, but none were willing to take on the political risk that addressing this issue could cause. As a result, CASA decided to take the government to court in 2007 in order to speed up the process. In 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Chinese were to be included in the definition of 'black people' in terms of the Constitution.[78]

While this issue only really affected SABCs[79], there was some involvement from both the Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrant groups. CASA approached various associations representing these groups to help fundraise for the costly court battle. Kamson stresses that

[74] Harris, 'BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa', p. 3.
[75] 'Chinese South Africans Qualify for BEE, Court Rules', *Mail and Guardian* (18 June 2008), https://mg.co.za/article/2008-06-18-chinese-south-africans-qualify-for-bee-court-rules, accessed on 14 March 2019.
[76] Interview with Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue.
[77] *Ibid.*
[78] Harris, 'BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa', p. 14.
[79] The legislation was only broadened to include Chinese people who had lived in SA prior to 1994.

the moral and vocal support from these different Chinese groups was unwavering and that there were no tensions regarding the issue.[80] Although they received many pledges of financial support, unfortunately, the large majority of these were not fulfilled. This points to a level of disconnect between the various Chinese groups concerning the issues that are deemed important and urgent. Whereas the court case was a prominent matter for SABCs, it clearly did not affect the Taiwanese and recent migrants to the point of urging them to donate to the cause. This episode suggests that recent Chinese migrant associations do not relate to the long history of SABC associations in South Africa and that self-interest plays a part in the divisions between groups.

The court case victory for South African Chinese and CASA has had some unintended consequences. During apartheid, the Chinese in South Africa faced discrimination and this not only united SABCs under a common cause, but it also increased their associational activity. In the 2000s, the Chinese were excluded from economic redress by the democratic government and this was another political struggle. However, the court case to include the Chinese in economic empowerment policies was the last instance of broad-scale legal discrimination faced by SABCs. Since that victory, CASA has not engaged in any major political activity. Currently, CASA itself is not active and its member associations are mainly focused on Chinese cultural and community activities. An exception to this is the ongoing hate speech case spearheaded by the TCAG.[81] Although this case is not directed towards legal discrimination, it nonetheless suggests that the Chinese have not yet been fully accepted and integrated into South African society.

Kamson states that they have no more common enemies and that this has affected the engagement of SABCs in both the national organisation and its regional organisations.[82] This is confirmed by some SABCs who have questioned the continued existence and legitimacy of CASA considering that South African Chinese now have full rights.[83] And while the democratic dispensation initially introduced discriminatory policies towards the Chinese, its democratic institutions allowed CASA to engage in an unprecedented successful civil lawsuit

[80] Interview with Eugene Kamson and Hilton Bue.
[81] Discussed further in Chapter Five.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 11.

which has consequently further decreased the significance and activity of the Association. Hence, CASA's decline is a reflection of SABCs' gradual integration into the free and democratic society of South Africa post-1994.

Taiwanese Associations and Associational lives

The influx of Taiwanese immigrants to South Africa in the 1980s led to the establishment of their own associations. However, post-1994 many of the Taiwanese returned to Taiwan, greatly diminishing their numbers from around 30000 to 6000.[84] The project only examines two Taiwanese associations briefly as their significance is dwarfed by the large number of recent Chinese migrants and their associations.

Nan Hua Temple

The Nan Hua Temple, the largest of its kind in Africa, was built in 1992 when Bronkhorstspruit municipality (in Gauteng) donated over 18 hectares of land for the monastery.[85] It functions as the religious and cultural centre of Buddhism in South Africa. Estimates from 2012 put the temple at 2000 followers across South Africa, with about 1000 Taiwanese, 1000 people from Mainland China and 50 South Africans.[86] Its aims are to teach the methods of the Buddha, raise awareness of their religion, translate the scriptures into local languages, and to build additional temples.[87] Moreover, the temple is involved in numerous other activities including fundraising; charity work; Chinese New Year (which has a multicultural attendance) and other cultural celebrations: youth camps, meditation, retreats, and educational programmes. While this chapter has discussed the various influences that the democratic dispensation had on SABC associations, the temple is an interesting case study as its establishment was the outcome of an earlier political shift in South Africa. The strengthening ties between the country and Taiwan during the 1980s

[84] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 294.
[85] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 34.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] 'History', *Nan Hua Temple*, http://en.nanhuatemple.org/history.html, accessed on 14 March 2019.

meant that Taiwanese people were granted numerous concessions. This privileged position allowed for them to build a Buddhist temple, on donated land, before the end of apartheid.

The diversity of the temple's functions and purposes appeals to SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants. While the temple was established by the Fo Guang Shan Buddhist Order, which originates in Taiwan, it is open to anyone. Many Taiwanese go to the temple for religious, social and cultural reasons. Dale Huang, for example, has been involved with the Nan Hua Temple for the Chinese New Year Celebrations.[88] His parents came to South Africa in 1986 to start a school business, and he was born in 1998 in Kimberley. He is a South African of Taiwanese descent and has attained dual citizenship. While Huang received schooling in English, he is fluent in Mandarin, which he learnt through a Saturday School in Cyrildene. Currently, he works for the Bank of Taiwan and lives in Rosebank, a formerly white suburb of Johannesburg. As Huang's family is Buddhist, and although he is not religious himself, he has participated in cultural ceremonies to bring luck and favour, such as the traditional dragon dance. While others have religious reasons for visiting the temple, many of the practising Buddhist Chinese have stated that the temple is too far to regularly attend.[89] On the other hand, most SABCs attend the temple solely for cultural celebrations and social events.

Some recent Chinese migrants have also been involved in the temple. Li has been active in the Buddhist youth division and participates in its organised camps (both as an attendee and as a leader).[90] These camps are intended to be both a social activity and a space to learn about Buddhism. His engagement does not have a religious significance but instead holds social and cultural meaning for him. A similar example is that of Janet Chen. She emigrated from the Fujian province of China to South Africa in 1994 at age four along with her parents, who came in search of economic opportunities. While her family was poor when they migrated, through hard work they were able to improve their economic standing, enrol her in private schools and she currently works as a civil engineer. Like Huang, Chen attends the

[88] Interview with Dale Huang (pseudonym) in Rivonia, Johannesburg (9 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[89] Houston, Wentzel, Yu and Vivier, 'Bodies that Divide and Bind', p. 41.
[90] Interview with Ross Li.

temple for cultural reasons. She has also volunteered at festivals, such as the Chinese New Year.[91]

Both Li and Chen's backgrounds are similar to that of an SABC or first-generation Taiwanese South African. Additionally, Chen's professional qualification as an engineer also sets her apart from the majority of recent migrants who are often small traders.[92] While they are clearly not a typical representative of the recent Chinese migrant group, it is nonetheless important that the temple draws people from across the SABC, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrant categories. Whereas the political ties between apartheid South Africa and Taiwan made the building of the temple possible – it is, in part, the new democratic dispensation in the post-apartheid era that has allowed for the temple to act as a free space for Chinese people of all origins and for the broader South African public to associate.

South Africa Hakka Association (SAHA)

SAHA is a Taiwanese association established in 1995, for the purposes of connecting and fostering social networks between Hakka people in Johannesburg. It generally operates from a property in Benoni and organises and hosts social events such as the Dragon Boat Race in Roodepoort; Dragon Dancing for the Chinese New Year celebrations of both the Nan Hua Temple and Second Chinatown in Cyrildene; and gatherings for the Moon Cake Season and Bamboo Bun Season.[93] Like SABC associations, SAHA has experienced a significant decrease in membership numbers. Whereas, it had over 500 members at their highest point in the 1990s, it currently only has around 200 members.[94] As discussed earlier in this chapter, many Taiwanese started remigration soon after 1994, as a result of South Africa's shift to the PRC. Huang, introduced earlier in the chapter, is a member of this organisation. He states that many of their members left the country for Taiwan or other destinations because they believed the quality of life in South Africa was deteriorating.

[91] Interview with Janet Chen (pseudonym) in Edenvale, Johannesburg (18 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[92] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 295.
[93] Interview with Dale Huang.
[94] *Ibid.*

Despite this decrease, the Association is still active in the various social and cultural events listed above. Through participant observation at the 2019 Chinese New Year held in the Cyrildene Chinatown, it became clear that SAHA has a multicultural membership. The participants of the Dragon Dance, which the Association organised, were from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Huang affirms this characteristic by stating that although SAHA is aimed towards the Taiwanese, they are open to anyone.[95] Through this example, and the Nan Hua temple, it is evident that the democratic transition of South Africa has had similar impacts on SABC and Taiwanese associations – since both have seen a decline in membership but have attained a multicultural characteristic.

Conclusion

SABC associations have changed significantly in the post-apartheid era. Whereas many of these groups were concerned with gaining equal rights and concessions for the Chinese during the segregation and apartheid eras, the new democratic dispensation decreased the need for these objectives by extending freedom to all in South Africa. Although this dispensation did initially discriminate against the Chinese by side-lining the group in affirmative action policies, CASA managed to successfully challenge their exclusion through the constitutional court. Consequently, many associations have instead turned towards communal and cultural events and activities, as they struggle to maintain their relevance in the twenty-first century.

Moreover, the declining population of the SABC community since 1994 has, in turn, reduced participation in associations and affected their membership numbers. Evidently, the Chinese New Year has emerged as one of the main socio-cultural activities of SABC associations that continues to give purpose to their existence. As this event attracts a multicultural audience, it also shows how the South African Chinese experience has been incorporated into the ideal of the rainbow nation post-apartheid. However, it is important to note that this incorporation has not been without its challenges. The ongoing hate speech case led by the

[95] *Ibid.*

TCAG suggests that there are still lingering issues of racism and prejuidice directed towards the Chinese despite the ideals of the rainbow nation.

SABC associations have also been affected by the influx of recent Chinese migrants to South Africa in the democratic era. Not many migrants have been incorporated into these associations, and those migrants that have are likely to have grown up in this country and are of a similar economic class. Differences in language, citizenship and visa status, class, religion, origin and culture have created divisions between the two groups and often act as barriers to integration. However, different Chinese groups do collaborate around certain issues, notably cultural events such as the Chinese New Year. While associations such as the TCAG, PCA, SACSA, and SFA remain the leading representatives of SABCs, they also cooperate with recent Chinese migrant associations on cultural events and charitable work pertaining to the whole Chinese population of South Africa. Thus, the development and transformation of SABC associations need to be understood in the context of SA's transition to democracy and the rise of Chinese migration globally and to South Africa.

Alternatively, the ties between apartheid South Africa and Taiwan in the 1980s not only fostered the creation of business associations,[96] but also permitted the building of the Nan Hua Temple in 1992. This temple has become a space in which not only Taiwanese people associate but also SABCs, recent Chinese migrants and the broader South African public gather. Furthermore, SAHA has attained a multicultural character in some of their activities, thereby reflecting the diversity of the democratic rainbow nation of South Africa. Lastly, the declining membership of SAHA shows that the democratic transition of 1994 has had a similar impact on both SABC and Taiwanese associations. Chapter Three will build onto this discussion by examining the new associations established by recent Chinese migrants.

[96] See Chapter One.

Chapter Three

Recent Chinese Migrant Associations: Social, Cultural, Religious, Support and Business Networks

The social, cultural, economic and political context in which recent Chinese migrants have settled in South Africa has made their situation unique. As mentioned before, the increasing economic and political freedoms in China from the 1980s lifted travel restrictions and escalated Chinese migration to numerous parts of the world. South Africa was seen as a promising destination to many of these migrants, especially after the ANC was democratically elected to government in 1994 and later in 1997 when the country diplomatically recognised the PRC.[1] These migrants have come in two separate influxes – the first in the 1990s comprising mainly business people, often from Shanghai or Beijing, and the second, much larger influx, being small-traders and peasants from the Fujian province in the early 2000s.[2] By 2008, there were at least 300 000 Chinese migrants estimated to be in South Africa.[3]

Since arriving in larger numbers from the 1990s onwards, migrants from Mainland China and Hong Kong have established their own new associations in South Africa, with unofficial estimates putting the number at around 100 groups.[4] This chapter examines some of the new associations formed by recent Chinese migrants and their character and role, which is of a different nature to the original Chinese associations of the early twentieth century. These groups include the Young and Beauty Bible Study and the South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre (SACCPCC). It then analyses the proliferation of

[1] Accone, '"Ghost People"', p. 265.
[2] Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 289.
[3] Park and Rugunanan, 'Visible and Vulnerable', p. 8.
[4] Interview with Erwin Pon.

business-orientated associations and networks to argue that their existence has been made possible by the shifting political context of South Africa with the democratic dispensation of 1994, and the ensuing rise of the Chinese economy, specifically relating to Chinese investment in South Africa. Examples include the China Mall Johannesburg, China Mall West, the Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce (SSACC), and the Chinese economic hub of the Cyrildene Chinatown.

Furthermore, the chapter contends that these new business associations reflect the cultural background of their recent Chinese migrant membership base by being concerned with the practice of *guanxi*. Guanxi translates roughly to 'networks' or 'connections' but predominantly in the business sense. Its practice will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. Lastly, the chapter looks at the existence of recent Chinese migrants who do not associate and similarly contend that this relates to educational, class and economic status, and as a result of the ways in which these migrants have integrated into South African society. It is necessary to note here that with the large influx of Chinese migrants to South Africa in the twenty-first century, this group now makes up the majority of the Chinese population and their new associations now outnumber the older organisations.

Recent Chinese Migrant Associations

Recent Chinese migrants have established numerous religious, cultural, social and community associations in South Africa. As the context in which they have emerged is significantly different from the context in which SABC and Taiwanese associations were created historically, it is important to look at how and why these new groups have developed to better understand the driving factors behind the formation of associations. The two associations examined in this section are the Young and Beauty Bible study group, and the SACCPCC, covering religious, social, cultural and communal roles. The Bible study is a small informal association and the SACCPCC is a formal national organisation with a governing body. While they might not be representative of the entire range of associations set up by Chinese migrants, this small sample nonetheless provides insight into their diverse disposition and membership. As part of my research, I attended several of the Bible study meetings and some of their social events. Through participant observation, it was possible

for me to better understand the inner workings of this association. The discussion of this association will thus differ from the others as a result of the research methodology used.

The Young and Beauty Bible Study Group

The Young and Beauty is a Bible study group formed in 2016 by Jared Shen under the auspices of the Johannesburg Gospel Church, of which he is an active member. Shen came to South Africa in 1998 from Taiwan, when he was 13 years old, with his mother and younger brother. His father did not join them because his parents were divorced. Shen states that one of the reasons for coming to this country was that his mother sought good educational opportunities for him and his brother. Furthermore, he was playing golf professionally and South Africa was known for its excellent golf courses and coaches. In Johannesburg, he attended Northcliff High School and then studied for a BA in Sports Psychology at the University of Johannesburg. Currently, he is the owner of a growing plastic manufacturing business which he started in 2011. [5]

The Johannesburg Gospel Church is a Chinese fellowship established in 2011, headed by Pastor William Tam, originally from Hong Kong. It is currently using the premises of the Rosebank Union Church (RUC), located in Hurlingham, for its services and meetings.[6] The services are open to anyone, however, they are conducted in Mandarin and consequently, they have a congregation of mainly mainland Chinese migrants and some Taiwanese. Shen himself is from Taiwan and his Bible study group, while being made up of mainly recent Chinese migrants that have arrived in South Africa over the course of the last two decades, reflects the mixed nature of the church.[7] Evidently, the membership of this group differs greatly from the formal SABC associations analysed in Chapters One and Two.

As the 'Beauty' part of the name is meant to imply youth, the group is directed towards young Chinese, in their 20s and 30s, especially those living or working in the Sandton, Rosebank and Rivonia areas of Johannesburg. There is an implication in their name that the

[5] Interview with Jared Shen (pseudonym) in Hurlingham, Johannesburg (2 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[6] 'Johannesburg Gospel Church', *Rosebank Union Church* (7 October 2013), https://ruc.org.za/news/johannesburg-gospel-church/, accessed 15 March 2019.
[7] Interview with Jared Shen.

patrons of most other Bible studies in the church are older members. Shen states that he started the group because he felt a calling from God to serve Chinese young professionals working in Sandton for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), banks and local corporates.[8] It is important to mention that not all who participate in the Bible study group are necessarily part of the church. Rather the group functions as an extension of the church that has its own small community.

The typical Bible study group I observed during my three visits unfolds as follows: on a Thursday evening[9], members and guests (who numbered between 10-15 during the meetings I attended) begin arriving around 7 pm in the Alpha Room of RUC, which is roughly the size of a classroom. They congregate around the tea and coffee table, where general chatting and socialising occurs (mostly in Mandarin). When most people have arrived, Shen calls everyone to take a seat and form a circle. Once everyone settles down, he starts the night off by singing a worship song. There are usually sheets passed around with the lyrics on (in Mandarin).

Shen notes how local churches worship is culturally different from the Chinese way and that there is something special about worshipping in one's mother tongue. He sees this as a major reason why many Christian Chinese are drawn to the church and the group. If there are any guests or newcomers, usually friends of regular attendees, they play ice-breaker games after the song. These vary but all intend to make people feel welcome and included. Often the penalty for losing at the ice-breaker is that the person would have to share about their week with the group. This part of the evening feels very social and is a great time to meet and get to know each other. Dale Huang, first introduced in Chapter Two, is a Taiwanese member who has been coming to the study group for a few months. He is not Christian and instead describes himself as an atheist.[10] Nonetheless, he was drawn to this group because of the social aspect and has made friends through it. Others, such as Jeff Tai, are committed Christians who see the Bible study as part of their spiritual walk.[11]

[8] *Ibid.*
[9] The Bible study was recently moved to Sundays.
[10] Interview with Dale Huang.
[11] Interview with Jeff Tai (pseudonym) in Sandton, Johannesburg (6 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.

Once the ice-breaker session concludes, the Bible study takes place. Usually, the discussion is in Mandarin but, on my behalf, Shen repeated himself in English. There are two regular attendees who do not understand Mandarin - an SABC and the South African Afrikaans-speaking husband of one of the members - but the Bible study seeks to include them through English translation. Shen then leads the group through an analysis and understanding of that week's Bible scripture in Mandarin. Again, language plays a significant role in this Association. Shen states that he finds it easier to get his point across in his mother tongue and that most members understand the Bible much easier in Mandarin.[12] From his experience, people are more receptive to hearing about the Gospel of Christ when it is spoken in their mother tongue. Hence, the use of Mandarin is a major factor that separates this recent Chinese migrant association, and others, from SABC groups who instead use English or Cantonese sometimes.

One of the occasions when I attended the Bible study meeting, the group was discussing the story of Isaac and Jacob in the Book of Genesis. While Shen does most of the talking, people are free to share their thoughts and ask questions. Furthermore, he often refers questions to the group, which is an interactive time. This takes up much of the evening and when the time is up around 9 pm, they end with a prayer. Despite claiming to be an atheist, Huang says he enjoys learning principles and morals from the Bible.[13] There is some chatting and socialising after it ends but not for too long. The venue itself does not stay open much longer and people soon leave for home.

The Young and Beauty group does not only get together for Bible study but Shen also often organises social events. These vary from going to the cinema, to hiking, to eating out. I was invited to one such event in which about 20 people or so went to a Chinese restaurant in Rivonia for an 'authentic' traditional Chinese hotpot. The restaurant only has a Chinese name which roughly translates to 'Old Yang', Yang being a common surname in China. Many of the other patrons were also Chinese, and while there were many familiar faces from the Bible study, Shen also brought along some members of his family. Hotpot itself is a uniquely Chinese, communal and social way of eating out. The idea behind it is to cook and eat your food while socialising.

[12] Interview with Jared Shen.
[13] Interview with Dale Huang.

At the restaurant, everyone had an individual stove plate upon which a soup/broth (of your choice) is kept boiling. There are many options to flavour this soup as well. Then a variety of thinly sliced meat, leafy greens, mushrooms, wontons, dumplings, tofu, and seafood are ordered. These are shared amongst everyone at the table and then each person starts cooking these ingredients in their broth. There is constant chatting and discussion occur over the cooking and it is a very interactive way of eating out. The menu options are traditional Chinese cuisine, and they include delicacies such as cow stomach and goose intestines. Thus, the Bible study takes on an important cultural characteristic, by enabling social networks that rely on the shared interest in traditional Chinese food and custom of recent Chinese migrants. However, not all the social activities of the Young and Beauty group take on such cultural features. I have also joined the group on a quad biking trip to a farm north of Johannesburg, in which the only discernible motivations were to socialise, be adventurous, and have fun.

The reasons for the establishment of the Young and Beauty Bible study group and why members join the group are wide-ranging. These include communicating and worshipping in a shared language; the desire to socialise with people of the same age, class and cultural background; and, most importantly, the wish to learn more about the Bible, whether for moral or religious intentions. However, the group also plays a key role in creating and establishing migrant networks that provide a sense of cultural and spiritual belonging. While Chinese migrants generally have an outsider status to the broader South African public, the Bible study offers young Chinese migrants, in and around the unfamiliar Sandton area, an insider status by providing a familiar social, religious and cultural space in which they can associate.

The research for this study identified a larger religious network of around 20 Chinese Christian fellowships across Southern Africa.[14] These churches are connected by the South Africa Chinese Outreach Network (SACON), established in 2011, which aims to grow and support these fellowships. They are generally led by pastors from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.[15] While the Johannesburg Gospel Church is not part of the Association, it

[14] SACON Congregation Database.
[15] Interview with Karl Teichert, in Randpark Ridge, Johannesburg (20 December 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.

is important to note that the religious networks amongst recent Chinese migrants are significant and widespread in Southern Africa.

South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre (SACCPCC)

In 2004, the national South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre was founded in Cyrildene. At this time, migrants from the Fujian province were increasingly moving to other parts of the world including to South Africa. Furthermore, increasing criminal activities became a crucial concern for Chinese Cyrildene residents. This issue gained serious traction in international media as newspapers reported on the high rate of crime in South Africa and how the Chinese community were particularly vulnerable. *China Daily* reported that:

> There were 24 Chinese people murdered in Johannesburg [in 2003]. Nobody dared walk at night in Chinatown because of fear of robbery and blackmail. In one row of 14 warehouses, all eight Chinese warehouses were robbed while the rest were untouched. When the gang was arrested, many products from China such as bedclothes and ceramics were found.[16]

In response to this, and growing anxieties that the Chinese community were being specifically targeted by criminals, Li Xinzhu and Wu Shaokang established the Association and have been alternating in leading it since. Both men came to South Africa from the Fujian province in the 1990s for business reasons and have since become successful entrepreneurs as well as being leaders among the Chinese community around Cyrildene.[17] Xinzhu initially opened a clothing shop in Pretoria before moving into the manufacturing and mining sector, whereas Shaokang originally opened an electronics store in Cyrildene before starting his own manufacturing business with the Feilitong Science and Technology Group.[18]

[16] Zhao Yanrong, 'Center Brings Security to Chinese in Johannesburg', *China Daily* (25 March 2013), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-03/25/content_16344315.htm, accessed 15 March 2019.
[17] They have both held leadership positions on other Chinese associations and were the founding members of the Chinese community newspaper *African Times*. The newspaper was founded in 2005 as an autonomous South African Chinese news agency based in Cyrildene and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
[18] Barry Van Wyk, 'Networking a Quiet Community: South African Chinese News Reporting and Networking', *Africa-China Reporting Project* (2018), p. 19.

The Association's main purpose is to be a bridge between the Chinese communities and local law enforcement agencies across South Africa.[19] It cooperates with the South African Police Service (SAPS) in dealing with various types of crimes involving Chinese migrants and works to safeguard the legal rights and interests of recent migrants. As a result of the language barriers between recent migrants and the local law enforcing agents, the Centre helps Chinese migrants with communicating with South African police officers; reporting fraudulent policemen and police harassment; responding to incidents of crime and domestic violence; mediating business disputes, and giving legal assistance.[20] It sends out WeChat notices and news reports notifying people of criminal activities, hot spots and safety tips.[21] The Centre also supports the SAPS by offering interpretation and assisting investigations.[22] Furthermore, it collaborates with the Department of Home Affairs in handling Chinese immigration and helps the Consulate General in Johannesburg with consular protection work.[23]

The Centre consists of an administration section, with a governing council and director, currently Li Xinzhu; and an operational section with paid staff based in all the 13 regional offices. The head office is located in Cyrildene, Johannesburg, with other branches in cities such as Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth.[24] There are only a few full-time staff members, but many volunteers assist as well. The Association is well-known amongst recent Chinese migrants, as well as some SABCs and Taiwanese, and representatives from numerous Chinese migrant associations are present on the board of directors.[25] Many of the interviewees for this research mentioned that they were aware of the Centre and its work – thereby reflecting their prominence as an association.

From the above, it is clear that the Centre provides a wide range of community services that are meant to protect and advance the legal and security interests of the Chinese in South Africa. While this is similar to the functions of the original Chinese associations – the way in

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[20] Interview with Brendan Ma (pseudonym) in Cyrildene, Johannesburg (20 July 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[21] This will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
[22] Cavojska, "'United we stand"', p. 90.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] Van Wyk, 'Networking a Quiet Community', p. 18.
[25] Cavojska, "'United we stand"', p. 89.

which this support manifests is significantly different and more relevant to the specific context of recent Chinese migrants. Unlike some of the other recent Chinese migrant associations that have purely social, religious and/or cultural characteristics, the Centre emerges as an organisation that is a response to the socio-economic issues of crime, racism, immigration restrictions, xenophobia, discrimination, harassment and exploitation experienced by this migrant group. In many ways, it mirrors the old associations that were established to fight against racial discrimination in the twentieth century as it acts as a community support system.

Bianca Lin is a secretary for the Cyrildene branch of the Centre. She came to South Africa from Taiwan in 1993 at the age of 16, and having lived here for over 25 years, she views South Africa as her home. She states that while the Centre takes on all cases presented to them; many of the recent Chinese migrants 'do not know how to protect themselves' and are therefore often in need of support.[26] Furthermore, many migrants are of a lower-income class and the illegal status of some have made them even more vulnerable. Brendan Ma is a senior employee at the Cyrildene branch. He came to South Africa in 2006 looking for business opportunities and has worked at the Centre for a number of years. He states that while the job is dangerous, he feels there is a need to protect the Chinese community as it is vulnerable.[27]

Clearly, Ma's willingness to support Chinese migrants indicates a strong sense of community, belonging and safeguarding his Chinese identity. This is also reflected by the many volunteers who assist the Association. Therefore, while the Centre is concerned with legal and security issues, it heavily relies on social networks and community bonds in order to achieve these functions. Furthermore, this example shows how troubles and issues facing a community can drive people to associate in order to combat these problems. Similar concerns instigated the first Chinese associations in the twentieth century and contrastingly, the absence of these concerns amongst SABCs, due to their relative integration into South African society and largely middle-class status, now plays a role in the declining activity of SABC associations.

[26] Interview with Bianca Lin (pseudonym) in Cyrildene, Johannesburg (20 July 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[27] Interview with Brendan Ma.

Business Associations and the Practice of *Guanxi*:

As discussed in the introduction, the third wave of Chinese migration to South Africa has occurred in two distinct impulses. The first consists of businessmen and professionals from the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang and cities like Beijing and Shanghai who arrived in the 1990s – drawn by strengthening political and economic ties between South Africa and the PRC. The second impulse consists of small-traders and peasants from the Fujian province, who came to South Africa in the early 2000s and make up the bulk of recent Chinese migrants globally and in the country. The similarity between these two groups of migrants is that they both came looking for economic opportunities in South Africa.

South Africa's diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1997 and eventual inclusion in the BRICS alliance in 2011 is a testament to its growing political and economic ties with China. Simultaneously, China has been rapidly increasing its trade with and foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa. China's exports to Africa grew from USD 2.4 billion in 1995 to USD 36.7 billion in 2007, and Chinese FDI stocks in Africa rose by an estimated 6000% from 1990 to 2006.[28] Specifically, in South Africa, Chinese FDI reached USD 15.2 billion in 2017.[29] Additionally, there have been initiatives which sought to foster Chinese business in South Africa. One relevant example is the creation of the Sandton-based China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) in 2007. It acts as an equity capital instrument to support Chinese business expansion in Africa.

In light of this context, this section looks at the different types of business associations established by recent Chinese migrants to show that their practice of *guanxi* reflects the distinct cultural backgrounds of their members. It also argues that democracy and the ANC government has attracted foreign investment from mainland China, which has, in turn, allowed Chinese business associations to flourish, contrary to the restrictive economic environment of apartheid and its economic ties to Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s.

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[28] Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, 'Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa', *Journal of African Business*, 12, no. 1 (2011), p. 31.
[29] Chris Torrens, 'Chinese Investment in South Africa: Set For Success, If Common Mistakes Are Avoided', *Control Risks* (25 July 2018), https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/chinese-investment-in-south-africa, accessed 15 March 2018.

China Malls and Commercial Associations

China Malls have been a growing phenomenon in South Africa since the mid-1990s, mirroring the aforementioned increasing commercial networks between China and Africa. By 2011, there were at least 18 China Malls in Johannesburg alone[30], while more recent data puts the number at 20.[31] Romain Dittgen states that they are often planted in industrialised and poor areas by Chinese entrepreneurs, the large majority are found south of the CBD in the industrial Crown Mines area, where property prices are low and there is a demand for cheap goods and services.[32] These malls are connected to large transnational import and export networks with China and Hong Kong in order to source low-cost goods. China Malls are also known to often accept and make use of the 'China' brand – which is not only a cultural brand but also implies and infers that goods are cheap, low quality and available in high quantity.[33] Many of the tenants are Chinese, specifically from the Fujian province, with some other Asian and African migrants, and even local South African entrepreneurs.[34] However, the mall owners are generally people that come from cities along the east coast of China, as large amounts of capital are needed for the start-up of a mall.[35]

Robert Xu is the owner and manager of two China Malls in central Johannesburg called China Mall Johannesburg and China Mall West. Born in the Jilin province of China in 1956, he came to South Africa in 1994 as a representative for a Chinese company.[36] The company pulled out of the country in 1996 but Xu decided to stay and try to make a living here. After pursuing some potential opportunities, he managed to build China Mall Johannesburg in 2006, in the industrial Amalgam suburb of the CBD. Since then he has expanded to build another shopping centre called China Mall West in Fordsburg.[37] His malls provide informal areas of association for the Chinese tenants who run their shops there. The concentrated nature of these shops into one space results in daily interactions between tenants. However, Xu has also recently instituted a formal association for all his tenants.

[30] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 919.
[31] Dittgen, 'Features of Modernity', p. 979.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 979.
[33] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 919.
[34] *Ibid*, p. 920.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] Interview with Robert Xu in Amalgam, Johannesburg (20 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[37] *Ibid.*

In 2013, Xu created the Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce (SSACC) of which he has been the chairman.[38] This Association incorporates all the tenants from both his China Malls and numbers approximately 150 members. It has provided a platform for the tenants to share information and to cooperate with one another all in the name of fostering business. Furthermore, the Association also invites Chinese businessmen to South Africa and it receives Chinese business delegations with the intention of establishing international connections and attracting investment for local businesses. Considering that many migrants send money back to China and bank through Chinese institutions based in South Africa, such as the Bank of China and China Construction Bank, Mr Xu asserts that the aim is to bring money into South Africa, and not for it to be taken out. These type of business events are also held by other malls such as Oriental City in Rivonia.[39] However, the SSACC is not only business-focused as Xu mentions as it also organises 'social events'. The SSACC is also very involved in humanitarian and philanthropic initiatives. It collects donations and distributes items, such as sanitary items, school bags, uniforms and study materials, to local communities in need.[40]

Xu states that he is well aware of his success in South Africa and he wants others to replicate it. Personally, and for the Association, he earnestly wants to see South Africa prosper and live up to its potential.[41] Despite being a relatively young association meant for Chinese entrepreneurs and small traders, the SSACC has set up strong roots in South Africa and has long-term goals. This is reflected in Xu's own life as he would like to apply for South African citizenship and to forsake his Chinese one, as China does not allow dual citizenship.

These examples of China Malls and the associations surrounding them reveal much about recent Chinese migrant associations and Chinese investment in Africa. One observation is that they are largely focused on business, contrary to the SABC associations that are more inclined towards community, cultural and social activities.[42] Some SABCs involved in associations have mentioned that they struggle to connect to the new associations because

[38] *Ibid.*
[39] 'Oriental City Part of a Bigger Community', *Oriental City* (6 June 2017), http://www.ocity.co.za/2017/06/06/oriental-city-part-of-a-bigger-community/, accessed 16 March 2019.
[40] Interview with Robert Xu.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Interestingly, the ancestors of these SABCs were mostly small traders when they migrated to South Africa in the late nineteenth century and their associations fought for trading licenses.

of their commercial focus. As most Chinese migrants have come to South Africa in pursuit of economic opportunities, the result is that their associations are predominantly business-oriented. However, contrary to their status as economic migrants, Mr Xu's China Malls and association are not temporary but have long-term plans in South Africa. This may not be so for most recent Chinese migrants, including some of his tenants. These migrants have maintained citizenship to China – both because of the legal difficulties in receiving South African citizenship and preferring the diplomatic reach of citizenship to China that is linked to transnational Chinese economic networks.[43]

Moreover, the strong commercial connections and networks that exist between South Africa and China have been fostered by their growing political and economic relationship post-apartheid. While the original Chinese associations represented migrant small traders in the early twentieth century, these groups were not able to function freely, and instead had to take up civil action in an attempt to receive economic rights. Additionally, as apartheid regulated and restricted the economic activity of Chinese people, and other racial groups, through the Group Areas Act of 1950[44]; and preferred establishing economic relations with Taiwan over the 1970s and 1980, the emergence of significant mainland Chinese business associations and transnational networks were restricted. Without these limitations and increased Chinese investment in Africa, Chinese business associations and networks have been allowed to proliferate post-apartheid.

Guanxi: Business Networks

Kyle Sun has a complicated migratory history. He was born on the mainland of China in 1986 but moved to Hong Kong at the age of six.[45] In 1996 he moved to South Africa with his parents but went back to Hong Kong on his own after three years to attend school there. He stayed in the city until 2006 when he moved to the United States of America to complete his tertiary studies at a college. In 2014, he went back to Hong Kong and then in 2017 returned to South Africa again, and has been here since. During this time, his parents remained in

[43] The PRC does not allow for dual citizenship.
[44] This is discussed in detail in the first chapter.
[45] Interview with Kyle Sun (pseudonym) in Rivonia, Johannesburg (17 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.

South Africa and started the Oriental City Investments Group which runs a number of Chinese Malls in Gauteng. Since his return to South Africa, Sun has been involved in the family business through the management and development of, and investment in China Malls. He is part of two recent Chinese associations that are business-oriented: the Minnan Chamber of Commerce and the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Commercial Liaison Association.[46] Both these groups host business events, receive delegations from China and organise social gatherings such as banquets. Sun states that he attends these types of events both to expand his business contacts and for social reasons as well.[47]

From this example, the practice and need for *guanxi* amongst recent Chinese migrants become visible. Erwin Pon, the chairman of the Chinese Association of Gauteng, describes it as 'culture of doing business'.[48] Seung Park and Yadong Luo define it as a 'web of connections to secure favours in personal and organizational relations'.[49] It is the transfer and reciprocation of personal favours, through an intangible, utilitarian network.[50] Evidently, the term social capital and *guanxi* are similar, whereas the latter has a distinct Chinese cultural identity.[51] Essentially, for many of these new associations, business and socialising are intricately linked. Social events have utilitarian purposes and are held to foster business relationships and business events incorporate social activities.[52]

Guanxi has become so important to recent Chinese migrants that Sun states that receiving delegations provides legitimacy to associations and serves as proof that they are active and successful.[53] Consequently, new associations receive delegations regularly in order to maintain *guanxi*. A recent example saw the Foshan Overseas Friendship Association visit South Africa which was hosted by local business associations including the South African

[46] *Ibid.*
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[49] Seung H. Park and Yadong Luo, 'Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms', *Strategic Management Journal* 22, no. 5 (2001), p. 455.
[50] Yadong Luo, 'Guanxi: Principles, Philosophies, and Implications', *Human Systems Management*, 16 (1997), p. 44.
[51] Nan Lin, 'Building a Network Theory of Social Capital', in *Social Capital* (2017), p. 30.
[52] Park and Luo, 'Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics', p. 457.
[53] Interview with Kyle Sun.

Shunde Association, the Southern Guangdong Hong Kong and Macau Chamber of Commerce, and the Hong Kong Bauhinia Club.[54]

As previously mentioned, many SABC associations have staked their identity in local and provincial areas of South Africa where their members reside. One provincial SABC association, therefore, covers all the Chinese under their region of jurisdiction. In contrast, recent migrant associations have instead staked their identity in their members' geographical origins in China as a reflection of the cross-national *guanxi* networks. Here lies the potential for numerous associations to emerge in one area of South Africa because they cater to groups of migrants coming from specific geographical areas in China. And these groups have grown in number. In an interview with the chairperson of TCAG, its chairman, Erwin Pon, states that there has been an explosion of new associations in the last ten to 15 years and these could be numbering over 100.[55] This explosion is further seen as the geographical identity of these new associations can range from a province to a city to a district within a city and even to a village. The transnational nature of some of these new groups has, in turn, limited the number of Chinese migrants in South Africa who could potentially associate with them.

It is clear from these examples that the *guanxi* focus of many recent Chinese migrant associations are both the product of the class and cultural interests of their membership. These social capital networks are key examples of how these migrants use their associational lives to access resources, as well as foster belonging with one another. Furthermore, the Chinese geographical names of these groups and their proliferation reflect the strong connections that still exist between these migrant groups and their regions of origin. As their belonging is still rooted in China, their associations maintain strong economic ties to China.

[54] As seen by this article (in Mandarin) on a Chinese news website: http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/shetuanhuodong/2018-11-13/61858.html
[55] Interview with Erwin Pon.

Chinese Spaces and the Second Chinatown

The settlement of recent Chinese migrants in Johannesburg is distinct to earlier patterns of Chinese migration in various ways. It is hard to map exactly where these migrants live, as South Africa's 2017 census does not have a specific Chinese category and instead, they are grouped under Asians and Indians, reminiscent of apartheid classifications; and the illegal status of many migrants means that they stay off the 'radar'.[56] Nonetheless, researchers have used numerous indicators, most importantly the location of Chinese businesses, to determine specific clusters of Chinese migrants in the city. The data suggests that there are large numbers of Chinese living in Johannesburg East – specifically the suburbs of Edenvale, Bedfordview, Bruma, Kensington and Cyrildene, as indicated in Figure 3 below.[57] Areas of lesser clustering include the CBD, Fordsburg, Fourways, Rivonia and Sandton.

Many of these areas in Johannesburg East have a history of Chinese settlement that dates back to the 1970s. At the time, certain concessions had allowed Chinese people to move to 'white' areas and gradually, places such as Edenvale and Bedfordview experienced an upsurge in Chinese residents.[58] When the third wave of Chinese migration began, many migrants were attracted to these areas because of the already existing Chinese presence. Furthermore, the proximity of OR Tambo International Airport has added to the attractiveness of Johannesburg East. The increased Chinese population has led to the emergence of an 'ethnoburb'[59] in this area post-apartheid. Simultaneously after 1994, the First Chinatown on Commissioner Street, saw a drop in population and relevancy

[56] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 912
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 913.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 916.
[59] An ethnoburb is a settlement term for suburban or residential areas that have a notable cluster of a particular ethnic minority. First coined by Wei Li in the article 'Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: The Chinese Ethnoburb in Los Angeles', *Urban Studies*, 35, 3 (1998), pp. 479–501.



Figure 3

Distribution of Businesses with 'China' and 'Chinese' in their names.

(Source: Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immigrants and Diasporic Spaces in Johannesburg, South Africa', p. 913.)

It is in this context that Johannesburg's Second Chinatown developed in Cyrildene from the mid-1990s. While it was initially run by mostly Taiwanese entrepreneurs, it has since the 2000s been predominantly occupied by Chinese migrants from the Fujian province of China.[60] Centred on Derick Avenue, the Chinatown is a strip of 'grocery shops, restaurants, electronic outlets, teashops, cultural centres and massage parlours'.[61] The second Chinatown is different from the original Chinatown on Commissioner Street in numerous ways. While the first one developed largely as a result of the urban segregation initially

[60] Dittgen, 'Features of Modernity', p. 990.
[61] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 918.

enforced by colonial authorities in the early 1900s and later the segregationist and apartheid states; the second one has been a deliberate choice on the side of the occupants as there are no regulations on where people can live in democratic South Africa.[62] Democratic freedoms have also allowed the second Chinatown to go through a process of hybridisation.[63] The Chinese shopkeepers mostly employ African migrant workers at low cost, often from Zimbabwe, and attract customers from all parts of the South African public.[64] However, both the Chinese New Year celebration in the First Chinatown and the Cyrildene Chinatown have taken on a completely multi-cultural characteristic. I attended the celebrations in 2019 and noticed that a large number of attendees were not Chinese. Even some of the street stalls and participants in the dragon dances and the parade were of different ethnic background groups. Hence, like the celebrations by SABC associations, the second Chinatown's New Year festival is a part of South Africa's rainbow nation ideal and this hybridisation is in part a result of the new democratic dispensation post-1994.

'Hollow' Associations

Throughout the research and many of the interviews, it became clear that there exists a subset of Chinese associations that could be called 'hollow'. I use this term to describe associations that purport to be business organisations and have all the formal structures in place – including having a chairperson and executive committee or board of trustees – yet they do not seem to have a significant or active following or membership. While outwardly these associations may seem active, by receiving delegations and participating in business conferences, it is only those in leadership positions who are truly involved. The research did not identify any specific association as 'hollow'[65] but has rather drawn from a consensus amongst many of the interviewees that such groups exist. Unfortunately, no mention of hollow associations has emerged in the literature on Chinese migrants to South Africa.

[62] Xu, 'Cyrildene Chinatown', p. 91.
[63] Dittgen, 'Of other spaces?', p. 44.
[64] Xu, 'Cyrildene Chinatown', p. 93.
[65] In order to do that one would need to access membership details and leadership structures of the suspected hollow association. Furthermore, exposing such associations may put the researcher's safety at risk.

To understand how 'hollow' associations have come about, it is necessary to examine the self-interest of some Chinese businessmen. Being the chairperson of an association brings certain benefits, opportunities and status, particularly in China. Various interviewees state that having a chairperson title when travelling to China for business opens many doors for business contracts, meeting relevant people and just generally being treated with a certain status. The membership size or activities of an association are not as relevant in this context. Keeping in mind how important *guanxi* is in Chinese business dealings, it is very beneficial to have chairperson/director titles attached to one's name for business and tax purposes. As there is a limited amount of chairperson roles, many of the interviewees feel that some of these new organisations are only established to give the corresponding chairperson not only status in South Africa but more importantly in China. This has also led to intense competition between different groups for favour in China and Janet Chen states that there is often money involved in the bidding of positions.[66] Furthermore, some of my interviewees hinted at the possibility that some of these hollow groups are fronts for illegal activity. The Chinese Embassy is seemingly aware of this issue as they have capped the number of associations that they recognise – highlighting the fact that this trend has attracted the attention of an official body warranting the need to curb these activities.[67]

While there is a degree of suspicion around new Chinese associations by the established SABC associations, it is important to note that many are properly recognised and deemed legitimate by both recent Chinese migrants and under the law.[68] Erwin Pon states that many of the larger and more prominent recent Chinese migrant associations, such as the Fujian Association, are transparent in their dealings and have checks and balances in place.[69] He believes they do a lot of good work in both the Chinese community and local South African communities. Chen also admitted that she might be ignorant of legitimate associations. Therefore, while there is some speculation that 'hollow' associations may exist, it should not be generalised to all associations. Instead, more research needs to be undertaken about these groups in South Africa.

[66] Interview with Janet Chen.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] Interview with Erwin Pon.
[69] Ibid.

Non-Associational Life

During the research into the associational life of the Chinese in Gauteng for this project, I came across various people who either intentionally dissociate or distance themselves from Chinese groups or are unintentionally not involved. I describe this phenomenon as 'non-associational' life. This section argues that the transition to democracy in South Africa and the unique backgrounds of some recent Chinese migrants has lessened the need for associating as Chinese for some people. It needs to be clarified that the interviewees mentioned in the following discussion are not necessarily non-associational in all spheres of their lives but rather non-associational in regards to specifically Chinese groups.

Janet Chen is a recent migrant from the Fujian province, first introduced in Chapter Two. Growing up her family was very poor and she often had to help her father, who was a street vendor in Kempton Park, during the week and over weekends. Through hard work, her father eventually managed to open a small-trading shop but despite this, Chen had to earn a scholarship to be able to go to St Andrews School for Girls, a private high school in Bedfordview. Although both her parents were little educated, they put an emphasis on her schooling. This paid off as she managed to study civil engineering at the University of Witwatersrand and is currently working as an engineer.

At university, Chen was part of the Chinese student associations –Chinese@tuks (it has since been renamed to Tuks Asian Group) and the Taiwanese RocSA based at the University of Pretoria and University of Witwatersrand respectively – but she has struggled to find commonality with Chinese groups since then. Both social groups have quite diverse memberships ranging from SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants. She currently feels that she is either too Chinese for some of the SABC groups or not Chinese enough for more recent migrant groups. From her story, it is clear that there is a distinction between the Chinese migrants who have been in South Africa for some time, especially those who spent their childhood and went to school here, and those migrants that are 'fresh off the boat', so to speak.[70] Interestingly, Chen says that many of her Chinese friends are in a similar in-between place and therefore, they have essentially formed their own friendship group.[71]

[70] The term was used in a humorous way by the interviewee but some people may find this derogatory.
[71] Interview with Janet Chen.

In addition to her conflicted identity, she feels that there is a negative perception of Fujianese people, especially when it comes to crime, in South Africa. This has led her to both avoid disclosing information about her origins and to keep away from associating with Fujianese groups.

Nathan Yang arrived in Pretoria from Hong Kong in 2006, at eleven years of age, with his parents who are Christian missionaries. He spent three years in Rietondale Primary School before going to Pretoria Boys High School. Yang has just completed his Fine Arts degree at the University of Pretoria. He states that his interests just do not align with most other recent Chinese migrants or SABCs.[72] Art plays a big part in his life and he feels he is unable to share that with most Chinese people. He has also fully embraced Western culture, is integrated into white South African society with most of his good friends being South African Afrikaans-speakers he met in primary and high school. Thus, he does not feel any need to join a specifically Chinese association and Yang says he prefers diversity over exclusivity.[73]

Lester Wang's case provides another example of non-associational life. He was born in 1989 the city of Chongqing, South-West China. When he was nine years old, he moved to the United Kingdom with his family as his father had the opportunity to do his PhD there. They lived there for five years but then moved to Beijing because of his mother's ill-health. Here he managed to relearn Mandarin. They moved once again in 2005, this time to South Africa, in order to pursue an import-export business his mother started in the country. He attended the University of Witwatersrand and currently works for Standard Bank in Sandton under the global markets division. Wang states that he has many Chinese friends from his university days and works with many Chinese people.[74] This has in part allowed him to not feel compelled to associate with any Chinese groups as his daily interactions already allow socialising with other Chinese. Additionally, the case of Harry Zhao, a shop owner in Randburg, originally from Hong Kong, shows how individual choice also plays a role in why

[72] Interview with Nathan Yang (pseudonym) in Faerie Glen, Pretoria (22 July 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] Interview with Lester Wang (pseudonym) in Sandton, Johannesburg (21 September 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.

people do not associate.[75] He and his wife wanted to 'experience something different' by coming to South Africa and seek to be self-reliant. Consequently, they have intentionally not connected themselves to a Chinese community.[76]

These examples are a reflection of South Africa's democratic shift for two reasons. Firstly, as we now live in an equal society, recent Chinese migrants feel they have the 'freedom' to disassociate themselves from the larger community. And secondly, the repeal of racial laws by democracy has enabled upward mobility of people like Chen, who have gradually improved their economic status, and thus also improved their ability to integrate into middle-class society. Furthermore, it is the social and economic background of these migrants, who do not represent the whole group, which has inclined them towards being non-associational. People like Chen and Yang have spent much of their childhood/lives in South Africa, and Wang lived in the United Kingdom before coming to South Africa and thus has been able to both learn English and assimilate to western culture, as well as being able to build a diverse circle of friends. Wang mentions that because of his fluency in English, he is able to more easily navigate middle-class South African society compared to more recent migrants. Furthermore, receiving an education in English also seem significant to this trend of not associating as people are exposed to different cultures and diverse friends thus aiding their integration into middle-class society. Many of these recent Chinese migrants mentioned are of a higher economic class than the majority of Chinese migrants and they live and work in middle-class areas. This has also separated them from the Chinese migrant community that predominantly lives in Johannesburg East.

Conclusion

The influx of recent Chinese migrants since the 1990s has resulted in the emergence of various new associations in the Gauteng province. These new associations range from business, religious, cultural, and sport groups, with business being the majority. They differ from SABC associations in two important ways. Firstly, these new groups are reflective of

[75] Interview with Harry Zhao (pseudonym) in Randburg, Johannesburg (6 September 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[76] *Ibid.*

their significantly diverse membership base. For example, as these associations are largely made up of economic migrants, their focus is predominantly on fostering business and commercial networks. The transnational financial connections to China also highlight the liminal status of many of these migrants. Furthermore, the practice of *guanxi* has, in part, led to the proliferation of business groups and shows how culture is intricately linked to the development of Chinese business networks. Additionally, non-economic associations, such as support organisations and religious groups, have also developed to address the various legal and socio-economic issues facing Chinese migrants; as well as their distinct social, cultural, linguistic and religious interests.

The second important difference between historic Chinese associations and those created by recent migrants relates to the new democratic dispensation after 1994 and increasing Chinese investment in Africa. Contrary to the regulation of Chinese economic activity under apartheid, the proliferation of business associations has been made possible by the equal rights guaranteed through the constitution, as well as by the growing economic networks between South Africa and China.

The chapter also examined the instances of recent Chinese migrants adopting non-associational lives. Similar to associations, the phenomenon of not associating both reflects individual backgrounds as well as the democratic shift in South Africa. Those migrants who prefer to live non-associational lives tended to be middle class; and spent much of their childhood in South Africa and/or received predominantly English schooling. Furthermore, democracy has allowed for the freedom of choice in regards to the ways in which people can associate. Thus, some recent Chinese migrants have deliberately chosen to dissociate themselves from groups that identify as Chinese. Chapter Four will extend this discussion by analysing the effect of radio and social media on these recent Chinese migrant associations.

Chapter Four

New Forms of Social Networks: The Impact of Radio and Social Media on Chinese Associational Life

Associational life generally refers to the phenomenon in which individuals rely on social networks and kinship relations to survive, produce social capital and access resources.[1] This is done through associations which are typically organised bodies or institutions that have a hierarchy and have a central meeting place. However, this research has unveiled new forms of social networks and community that do not necessarily conform to traditional associational structures among the Chinese in South Africa. This chapter looks at the traditional media of radio and new social media to analyse how they have created new imagined communities, and analyse what their impact has been on traditional forms of associations. It firstly examines *ArrowLine Chinese Radio,* a Chinese community radio station broadcasting from Johannesburg, to show how its social network of listeners have developed beyond traditional forms of associating. The chapter then looks at how recent Chinese migrants living in South Africa use new social media, in particular, the digital application or app called WeChat. It argues that the existence of chat groups and the Moments page on this platform, which perform many of the functions of conventional associations but have new additional capabilities, have created new types of virtual social networks that do not conform to the conventional structure of associations. Moreover, they have also transformed some of the traditional associations. Lastly, the chapter analyses the role of other social media platforms, such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Line[2], as the preferred social media platforms for SABCs and Taiwanese people.

[1] Marcus Foth, *Handbook of Research on Urban Informatics: the Practice and Promise of the Real-Time city* (IGI Global, 2008), p. 52.

[2] Line is new communication app which provides free call and text messages – similar to WhatsApp.

Both radio and social media have contributed to the emergence of new types of social networks that can be viewed as imagined communities. Benedict Anderson first conceptualised and developed the notion of imagined communities by looking at the role of daily newspapers in nation-building processes in Europe during the 1800s. At the time, the development of print technologies made daily newspapers more viable to produce and easier to access in industrialised countries. He argues that these newspapers 'made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and relate themselves to others in, profoundly new ways'.[3] Essentially, as people across the country were engaging with the same information, news and content – a concurrent national experience and consciousness arose around which people united. This phenomenon did not represent a traditional community - as citizens of a nation would not know, meet, or speak with most other fellow citizens despite being symbolically connected by a national identity.[4] Nonetheless, the shared national experience created an imagined community, where members imagined that they all had common beliefs, attitudes, opinions and morals.[5] While Anderson's discussion on imagined communities focuses on nationalism, this concept can be extended to understand the communities which have emerge around other media as well as new social media. This chapter extends the discussion by examining how the imagined communities created by radio and social media platforms have impacted the associational lives of some recent Chinese migrants in South Africa.

Africa's First Chinese Community Radio Station

The first-ever radio transmission was sent in 1895 by Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi and by the early twentieth century, the first radio stations had begun to emerge. Since then, radio has become a popular media, particularly in the African continent. Africanist scholars have shown how the medium of radio, similarly to newspapers, has played a role in establishing a sense of belonging to nations and creating imagined communities around

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso Books, 2006), p. 36.
[4] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
[5] *Ibid.*

radio stations in the African context.[6] This phenomenon can be illustrated through the example of post-colonial Cameroon. After the country became independent in 1960 from its colonial ruler, France, the new president Ahmadou Ahidjo put nation-building first on the agenda.[7] He used radio to reach both the urban and rural population, and consolidated the national personality and social cohesion of Cameroon through broadcasting educational programmes and news bulletins.[8] Evidently, radio has the capacity to unite people by providing equal access to information. This will be further analysed in the case of a Chinese radio station in the Gauteng province of South Africa.

ArrowLine Chinese Radio Station of South Africa

The first Chinese community radio in Johannesburg – *ArrowLine Chinese Radio Station of South Africa* – was initially named *Mandarin Chinese Radio* at its establishment in 1995.[9] At the time, it catered to Taiwanese listeners and was strongly linked to Taiwan, even receiving funding and investment from the country. As described in Chapter One, the influx of Taiwanese migrants and business people in the 1980s led to a sizable community forming in the 1990s and this community radio emerged as a voice for this group at the time of South Africa's democratic transition. The radio operated by reporting on a mixture of South African and Taiwanese news, holding discussion shows and playing Chinese music for some time – all in Mandarin. However, when a new management took over the radio station in the late 1990s, the station soon faced legal issues. The new owner Polly Liao had very little knowledge of the broadcasting regulatory laws of South Africa.[10] He failed to register with the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) and did not have a valid broadcasting licence for two years. Upon their demands of registration not being met, ICASA shut down the radio station around 2005. The site and infrastructure from where the radio station broadcasted in the Midrand were abandoned and ransacked over time, leaving little

[6] Maria Frahm-Arp, 'Radio and Religion: A Case of Difference and Diversity' in Liz Gunner et al., eds, *Radio in Africa: Publics, Cultures, Communities*, p. 213.
[7] Nyamnjoh, *Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging*, p. 129.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] 'About Us', *ArrowLine Chinese Radio of South Africa*, http://www.arrowline.co.za/, accessed on 11 March 2019.
[10] Interview with Isaac Hsu (pseudonym) in Edenvale, 11 September 2018. Transcript in the possession of the author.

material evidence of the community radio station ever existing. However, this was not the end of the station as it would be revived by Isaac Hsu and his mother.

Hsu was born in Taiwan in 1987 and came to South Africa in 1995. His father had disliked the smog and busyness of Taiwan (Hsu himself was a sickly child because of the pollution) and was looking to migrate elsewhere. Having been to South Africa a few times visiting a family friend, his father decided to move his family here. His mother initially moved here with him and his brother, while his father joined them later. At first, he struggled with the language change but as he attended English schools, having gone to the private Harvest Christian School in Mulbarton, Johannesburg South, for his secondary education, this soon improved. During these early years of their stay in South Africa, Issacs's mother began working at *Mandarin Chinese Radio* as a presenter and soon made a name for herself amongst the listeners. However, this ended when the radio station closed down in 2005.

Between 2007 and 2008, Hsu and his mother decided to revive the radio station under a new name: *ArrowLine Chinese Radio Station of South Africa*.[11] The new name refers to their objective of piercing through communication barriers like an 'arrow'. They reapplied to ICASA for the license to broadcast and received it in 2008, on the same frequency of AM 1269 as the old station. Upon receiving the license, they had to start from scratch, buying and setting up equipment in their new site in Edenvale. The reincarnated *ArrowLine* now mainly broadcasts local South African news while also bringing some international news, particularly relating to China, into the spotlight. The language of the station is Mandarin. Additionally, it hosts regular talk shows on current issues, such as E-tolls, which often feature experts, academics or other relevant guests. The radio also features music shows, however, the poor quality of AM frequency has kept this to a minimum. Despite this drawback, AM is used because it has a much further reach per transmitter. Through these popular programmes and a 250km broadcasting radius in the greater Gauteng region, *ArrowLine* has built up a strong following with around 60,000 listeners.[12] Hsu states that the majority of their listeners are now Chinese migrants from mainland China, unlike the Taiwanese following of the earlier rendition of the radio, and that the radio has adjusted to

[11] Interview with Isaac Hsu.
[12] Based on a 2015/16 survey done by ArrowLine Chinese Radio Station

suit this new base. Despite a rocky start, the *ArrowLine* Chinese Radio Station has become a significant community radio in its own right.

Radio's Role in Fostering New Types of Chinese Associations

The *ArrowLine* radio station functions, in some ways, as a conventional association. It has a physical presence at its site in Edenvale – similar to traditional associations that generally have central meeting places. Additionally, the station often holds community events at which its listeners come together to socialise.[13] Hsu states that some of the activities they host include charity fundraising events, and an annual celebration dinner held for outstanding police officers in Gauteng. Consequently, many of its listeners have fostered relational bonds through physical interaction with each other. Interestingly, *ArrowLine* has also played a role in strengthening Chinese migrant associations in the Johannesburg and Gauteng area. The radio station has good working relations with various associations, such as the SACCPCC and the Zhe Jiang General Business Chamber of Commerce; and often covers news regarding these groups as well as inviting some of these associations' leaders onto talk shows. It also sends reporters to events hosted by Chinese associations as representatives for the station and this, in turn, gives Chinese associations a degree of legitimacy since they have been covered by a trusted news source. These events are often election or yearly report meetings, as well as social and cultural celebrations such as Chinese New Year. If the radio station gives an association publicity, then the work of that association is taken more seriously by the listeners.

Additionally, *ArrowLine* has links with the local *African Times* Chinese newspaper.[14] This newspaper was founded in 2005 as an autonomous South African Chinese news agency based in Cyrildene.[15] Its reporting includes wide-ranging coverage on events, association meetings, Mainland delegation visits, and crime incidents. It employs a small number of full-time journalists, and has a small circulation. *ArrowLine* and *African Times* often share reporters, resources, photos, stories, and advertising clients, thereby assuring mutual growth and access to resources. These interactions show how the radio station has a

[13] Interview with Isaac Hsu.
[14] *Ibid*.
[15] Van Wyk, 'Networking a Quiet Community', p. 4.

grassroots presence; is involved in the production of social capital; and is connected to the conventional associations of its local community listeners. While the station is not an association itself, it nonetheless has attributes that have promoted conventional associating amongst its recent Chinese migrant listenership.

ArrowLine radio station has also developed an imagined community around itself. Hsu states that the radio listeners' key demographic are Chinese migrants aged between 40 and 65, as typical of a community radio, many of whom have recently migrated and are unaccustomed to the country.[16] Most of them are from the PRC and have little or no formal education. These listeners also speak little to no English, are less likely to use social media and thus rely heavily on the radio station's broadcast for domestic and international news; information on upcoming events and to address community issues. The radio is strongly aligned with China's state propaganda media organisation China Radio International (CRI) and is therefore an extension of Chinese nationalism.[17] This offers the Chinese diaspora in Gauteng a means to maintain a traditional Chinese world view outside of China. Therefore, as their core community of listeners share a similar identity, nationality, culture and language; and also converse and engage with the same information and news – they effectively constitute an imagined community. Evidently, *ArrowLine* has contributed towards a new type of associational life amongst recent Chinese migrants, one that does not rely on physical interaction, but rather sees individuals establishing imagined bonds over shared reliance on a radio broadcast.

Additionally, the station does not only limit itself to this demographic but attempts to appeal to Chinese migrants in Johannesburg more broadly. The station's webpage states that:

> *ArrowLine* aims to be the leading media source for the Chinese community by providing up-to-date international, local, and Chinese news through quality radio broadcast. At the same time, we will strive to be a support centre for the Chinese community and make our listeners feel more at

[16] *Ibid*.
[17] Wanning Sun, 'The Conundrum of the "Honorary Whites": Media and Being Chinese in South Africa', in *Media and Communication in the Chinese Diaspora* (Routledge, 2015), p. 37.

> home in South Africa. If you want to better understand, reach out or expand into the Chinese market, we can help.[18]

While this statement is broad, the station evidently tries to be more than just a media platform, as it provides a support network to its listeners. It also seeks to maintain social cohesion and foster solidarity within the Chinese community at large. This is further seen as the radio's website has a business directory of the contact numbers of numerous Cyrildene Chinatown shops, enterprises, and services – which brings an online publicity to these local Chinese businesses. These actions serve to strengthen the radio's imagined community by creating a new social network that exists through analog audio and digital space.

The next section of this chapter discusses how social media has created new types of associating and, simultaneously, transformed conventional associations.

WeChat: The Dominant Social Media App

WeChat is a multipurpose mobile phone app developed by Tencent, a Chinese internet-based technology company in Hong Kong. Released in 2011 for the Chinese market, it has since become a leading social media app with over 900 million daily active users worldwide as recorded in 2018.[19] It is especially popular in China, where WeChat is used by 79,1 per cent of smartphone users.[20] As social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp (which is similar to WeChat), are blocked in China, this has made it possible for WeChat to dominate the Chinese cyberspace market. WeChat has struggled to make a significant impact in South Africa, with WhatsApp maintaining a hold on the market.[21] Nevertheless, Chinese migrants to South Africa use WeChat regularly and prefer it over other forms of social media – as they can communicate with relatives, friends, and other

[18] 'About Us', *ArrowLine Chinese Radio of South Africa*, http://www.arrowline.co.za/, accessed on 11 March 2019.
[19] Nicole Jao, 'WeChat Now Has Over 1 Billion Active Monthly Users Worldwide', *Technode*, (5 March 2018), https://technode.com/2018/03/05/wechat-1-billion-users/, accessed on 11 March 2019.
[20] Danielle Long, 'WeChat users in China to Reach nearly 500 Million in 2017', *The Drum*, (12 July 2017), https://www.thedrum.com/news/2017/07/12/wechat-users-china-reach-nearly-500-million-2017, accessed on 11 March 2019.
[21] 'China's WeChat takes on WhatsApp in Africa'. (24 July 2016). *Fin24*, https://www.fin24.com/Tech/Mobile/chinas-wechat-takes-on-whatsapp-in-africa-20160724, accessed on 11 March 2019.

people in China through the app.[22] Therefore, WeChat plays an important role in the way Chinese migrants communicate, interact, socialise and associate on an everyday basis.

WeChat caters for text and voice messaging; is free to download and install; free to use, and is supported on all smartphone platforms including iPhone and Android.[23] However, WeChat extends its functionality beyond communication into financial transactions as well. It is often called 'China's app for everything', showing the versatility of the app to go beyond just communication.[24] Other than text messaging, WeChat provides hold-to-talk voice messaging; broadcast messaging; video calls; conference calls; mobile video games; sending of photographs, videos, emojis and stickers; as well as the ability to share your location and contacts. Furthermore, and unlike Whatsapp, users can link WeChat to their bank accounts, Visa, MasterCard, and other financial services. In China, users who have registered their bank account information can use the app to pay their bills, order goods and services, and pay for purchases in certain stores. Additionally, there is also the WeChat Pay function, which is a digital wallet service that allows users to perform financial transactions and send money between contacts anywhere in the world.

A distinct function of WeChat is the ability to create Official Accounts. These work as the WeChat equivalent of Facebook pages. They enable the user to push feeds, interact and provide subscribers with services. Official accounts can be either a service account, a subscription account or enterprise account. The service account has advanced features for businesses or organisations and it supports WeChat payment services. The subscription account is far more basic, only allowing push content and notification updates for subscribed followers without the option for any payment service. The enterprise accounts are exclusively meant for the internal management of a company with functions that facilitate high visibility and high security.[25] Another distinct function is WeChat Moments. Users can post images, texts, comments, advertisements; and share music and articles with

[22] A general consensus from all the interviews conducted.
[23] Che H. Lien and Yang Cao, 'Examining WeChat Users' Motivations, Trust, Attitudes, and Positive Word-of-Mouth: Evidence from China', *Computers in Human Behavior*, 41 (2014), pp. 104-111.
[24] Eveline Chao, 'How WeChat Became China's App For Everything', *Fast Company*, (1 February 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3065255/china-wechat-tencent-red-envelopes-and-social-money, accessed on 11 March 2019.
[25] Thomas Graziani. 'WeChat Releases "Enterprise Accounts" to Manage Companies' Internal Processes', *WalkTheChat,* (3 October 2014), https://walkthechat.com/wechat-releases-enterprise-accounts-manage-companies-internal-processes/, accessed on 11 March 2019.

all their friends which then appears on the Moments page. It functions much like Facebook's or Instagram's newsfeed. WeChat also has the ability to search for other users near your location thereby allowing more chat options. Evidently, WeChat is a multi-purpose app distinct from many of its competitors.

There are many reasons why WeChat is preferred by Chinese migrants in South Africa over alternatives such as WhatsApp. Firstly, judging by how popular the app is in China, many of the recent Chinese migrants would have been using WeChat before arriving in South Africa and just continued using it here.[26] Evidently, the influx of Chinese migrants over the past three decades has created a pool of Chinese WeChat users in South Africa. Ross Li is a recent Chinese migrant from Hong Kong, who came to South Africa in 1996 at the age of six and currently works for the China Development Bank in Sandton.[27] As he has been in South Africa from a young age and is quite integrated into middle-class society, Li mainly uses WhatsApp. However, his usage of WeChat has increased over the last five years because work colleagues, clients, and friends, who are recent Chinese migrants, use it almost exclusively.[28] Cate Lu has a similar experience with WeChat. She is a Taiwanese migrant who moved to South Africa in 1982. She currently works as an insurance broker in the Edenvale area and states that she uses the app to contact and discuss with clients both because of its usability and because most of her clients are recent Chinese migrants, who use WeChat exclusively.[29]

Janet Chen, a migrant from the Fujian province, has also lived in South Africa for most of her life and says that she only started using WeChat to enable communication with her family in China and with her parents in South Africa.[30] While she is quite integrated into middle-class South African society and therefore uses WhatsApp, her family members both in South Africa and in China are not, which has prompted her to use WeChat selectively. This is corroborated by Kyle Sun, who lived in Beijing until moving to South Africa in 2017. He likewise uses WeChat to communicate with friends from mainland China.[31]

[26] Interview with Ross Li.
[27] His life story is first outlined in Chapter Two.
[28] *Ibid*.
[29] Interview with Cate Lu (pseudonym) in Edenvale, Ekurhuleni (14 September 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[30] Interview with Janet Chen.
[31] Interview with Kyle Sun.

Therefore, it is clear that the popularity and success of WeChat in China has extended to South Africa through Chinese migrant networks. Other reasons given by interviewees for using WeChat ranged from its advanced functionality to the fact that it 'feels more Chinese' – there is a distinct Chinese identity of the app specifically because it uses Mandarin as its preferred language and it is owned by Tencent, which is one of China's flagship companies.[32] More personal reasons, such as one's partner or spouse using it, were also given by some interviewees.[33]

The Creation of New Forms of Associating and Communities Around WeChat

Advancements in technology, and specifically the invention of the smartphone, have revolutionised the way in which people connect to one another around the globe. Communication has become practically unhindered by time or distance constraints. Social media apps, such as WeChat, have further facilitated communication through their platforms. These new and enhanced media platforms are different from traditional media like newspapers and radio as they have developed a new type of imagined community: virtual communities. It is therefore of no surprise that these advancements have had a significant impact on the ways people associate and on how communities form. This section considers how new forms of Chinese associations and virtual communities have evolved in South Africa through the use of WeChat.

One such new virtual community surrounds a classifieds advertising company on WeChat called 'South African Market' (南非赶集). It operates as a platform for the broadcast of: daily announcements for job placements; jobseekers' CVs; the selling of various products and services including real estate; lost and found notices; security warnings; and people looking for love and relationships. It does not use the conventional social media 'group' function, in which many people join the same closed platform, but rather uses a personal account to advertise. Announcements are put up on the WeChat Moments of said accounts enabling anyone who has added their account as a contact to see the posts. The language used is Mandarin and the account specifically targets recent Chinese migrants in South

[32] Interview with Lester Wang.
[33] Interview with Jared Shen; interview with Brendan Ma.

Africa. Many of these accounts exist (under similar names) as they are limited to 5000 friends and once that fills up, another account is created.[34] This online interactivity suggests the creation of a virtual marketplace around which members connect with each other.

Caroline Peng's story is a good example of how the South African Market WeChat account has established a virtual community. Before she moved to South Africa with her Afrikaans husband in 2017, she decided to look for WeChat groups that targeted Chinese migrants in the country and soon found and befriended this account. When they arrived in South Africa, she immediately started searching for a job. She saw a job post under Human Resources on the WeChat account for a Taiwanese factory in Johannesburg and submitted her CV. She was called for an interview and within two weeks of her being in South Africa, she was offered a job and started working at the factory.[35] Peng still consults the account regularly, not looking for something specific, but just browsing.[36] This shows that there is a level of personal or emotional attachment towards the account and an interest to stay connected and updated with its activity. Clearly, the ability of social media to seamlessly connect people and their common interests far surpasses that of more traditional community platforms, such as coffee/clubhouses, community associations, sport clubs or other central meeting places; local newspapers; and radio.

Peng has not only used the South African Market account for browsing but has also advertised on it herself. Both she and her husband tutor English and are hoping to start a tutoring business that in part targets Chinese migrants. In May 2018, they contacted the owner of the account and asked if they could advertise their tutoring services through the account's Moments page.[37] They had to pay a small fee and an announcement was sent out. Within a week, they had received around 90 responses to their advert from Chinese people across South Africa enquiring for further details. Once again this shows how quick social media is in communicating information and in connecting people wherever they are in the world.

[34] Interview with Caroline Peng (pseudonym) in Cresta, Johannesburg (14 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] *Ibid*.
[37] *Ibid*.

In many ways, this account functions in a way similar to normal associations. The 'friends' of this account have commonality around shared economic, cultural and social interests. Many are looking for workplaces that use Mandarin as their preferred language and/or operate in areas that have significant Chinese numbers. Similarly, the buying/selling/renting of houses, flats or shops also rely on the common geographical preference of areas such as Cyrildene and Edenvale. Furthermore, these economic networks on WeChat encourage the development of social capital, or in this case *guanxi*[38] – which is an integral part of associational life. This statement is supported by literature on WeChat, stating that the app reinforces *guanxi* amongst its Chinese users.[39] Additionally, through this account there is a genuine desire to help one another; foster solidarity among the Chinese community; and to ensure survival, as seen in the love-seeking posts; and security alerts – which warn of known criminals targeting Chinese businesses and which provide safety tips.[40] Evidently, the South African Market WeChat account reflects a new form of associational life, based on a virtual space.

While the South African Market account could be viewed as a new form of associating and community making, it is also fundamentally different from traditional definitions of community. A traditional community can be broadly described as a social unit that associates around common beliefs, norms, identities and other factors, and is usually rooted in a geographical location.[41] The South African Market account has emerged as a virtual community that differs greatly from this traditional definition. Significantly, the account is not based on interpersonal relationships, while communities usually revolve around face-to-face meetings, gatherings, and events. There is no general chatting or socialising but rather the focus of the account is to connect Chinese people from a largely economic perspective. When someone adds the account, their details only become known to some of the wider community if they post something or respond to a post. It is entirely possible to remain completely unnoticed and anonymous in this virtual community. Furthermore, much of the information put forth, such as names or profile pictures, are not completely verifiable and

[38] The term has been explained in full in Chapter Three.
[39] Yang Wang, Yao Li, Bryan Semaan, and Jian Tang, 'Space Collapse: Reinforcing, Reconfiguring and Enhancing Chinese Social Practices through WeChat', *Tenth International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media* (2016), p. 434.
[40] Interview with Lester Wang.
[41] Graham Crow, 'Community', in George Ritzer, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology* (2007), p. 617.

people can use pseudonyms. As all information posted goes through the moderator/s of the account first – there are no free flow discussions either. Nonetheless, the account provides a space for users to find something to belong to – whether it is common identity, struggles, language or economic interests – and thus remains a form of community despite the aforementioned differences.

Another factor that sets this virtual community apart from traditional communities is that despite it being aimed at people living in a specific area, the account is accessible from anywhere. There are no headquarters, central meeting place or any other visible space around which this virtual community functions. Peng's advert for English tutoring mentioned earlier received responses from Chinese people all across South Africa and many of the adverts posted are about jobs in different cities in South Africa.[42] While the account is aimed towards the Chinese in South Africa, there is no physical manifestation of this community in the country. Rather, there exists a virtual space in which the community functions. Even though this virtual community differs greatly from the traditional forms of community, its activeness, interconnectedness, and ability to foster belonging show how social media has revolutionised the way in which Chinese people associate and network in South Africa - and more broadly in the rest of the world.

WeChat as a tool for Chinese Associations

As argued previously, WeChat has become the primary social media app used by the recent Chinese migrants in South Africa. This has also filtered down to Chinese associations as many, if not all, now have WeChat groups or Official Accounts for their members. However, different associations use such groups in different ways and for different reasons. This section examines how WeChat groups are used by some of the recent Chinese migrant associations and it shows how WeChat has improved and expanded the capabilities of associations in the technological age.

One of the reasons why WeChat groups and Official Accounts are used by recent Chinese migrant associations is that they are able to extend their reach and communication ability. Before social media, associations often had to rely on word of mouth, general meetings,

[42] Based on an analysis of adverts put out by South African Market between 10-15 October 2018.

newsletters and later, on emails to disseminate information. Associations are now able to contact their members anywhere and at any time. Messages are delivered instantaneously and are sent to all members of a group simultaneously, which allows associations to spread information and communicate with ease. An example of how WeChat has extended the reach of a formal association is seen with the South African Chinese Community and Police Co-operation Centre (SACCPCC).[43] This association's purpose, as analysed in Chapter Three, is to play a mediating role between the Chinese migrant population in South Africa and the South African police through its 13 regional offices. Furthermore, they act as a first response unit to any disputes or crimes reported to them. Having an official account on WeChat has considerably improved their ability to serve their community.

Through this account, the SACCPCC sends out information on relevant crimes and cases that are affecting the Chinese population; warnings of unsafe areas/places to avoid; and safety tips on how to protect oneself from and in dangerous situations such as robberies and hijackings.[44] Furthermore, it is essential for the association to be able to broadcast updates on developing situations and to get out emergency information quickly. An analysis of the account during the period between 28 September and 4 October 2018 reveals that information was shared on topics that included a cash-in-transit robbery outside Mahikeng; a symposium that was held by the Chinese Embassy on Sino-South Police Cooperation; the killing of a police officer in Hillbrow; and a large drug seizure in Port Elizabeth. These topics are wide-ranging and are not of exclusive interest to recent Chinese migrants in South Africa. Whereas before 2011, the SACCPCC 's reach was limited to its physical presence in Johannesburg and other localities, and its influence only extended to areas within their physical reach[45]; now the association can help and inform recent Chinese migrants living all over the country and it can easily coordinate with volunteers working in the different areas thereby increasing their effectiveness and response time immensely. It is evident that the use of WeChat has not changed the objectives of this association, but rather it has increased the association's capacity to achieve and fulfil its objectives; and has added on new objectives that were not previously achievable.

[43] This association is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
[44] *Ibid*.
[45] While the SACCPCC remains unable to directly assist Chinese people outside of the reach of their centres and volunteers, they can nonetheless help inform and raise awareness amongst Chinese all over South Africa.

Other examples of how social media has transformed conventional associations can be seen with the WeChat activities of the Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce (SSACC) and Oriental City Investments Group (OCIG).[46] The SSACC was established by its current chairperson Robin Xu as an association that would connect all the tenants of his two China Malls in Johannesburg.[47] The main purposes of the association are to foster business prospects and networks while simultaneously encouraging charitable endeavours between the two countries. Xu states that there is a real desire to see economic growth in the China Malls as well for that growth to benefit poor South Africans.[48] WeChat has enabled this association to achieve these goals much more significantly. There is a WeChat group with most of the tenants and Xu uses this platform to send out information regarding visiting delegations from China; business conferences; charity work; and donation drives. Thus, he is able to organise and coordinate business and philanthropic ventures through a virtual platform with his tenants. The OCIG has a similar WeChat group with their tenants. It is their primary way of communicating with tenants and they often use it to broadcast updates and information on promotions or competitions that the company is running. WeChat has evidently helped these Chinese business associations fulfil their primary motives through its platform.

WeChat has also significantly changed or added to the existing aims of Chinese associations in some instances. For example, the Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau Commercial Liaison Association is a collection of merchants, investors and businessmen, originally from those three areas, who speak Cantonese.[49] The association was initially established to foster business relationships between South Africa and these areas in China and organise social events. Subsequently, WeChat has become a platform for the members of the association to do that. However, it has also added to the typical activities and motives of this organisation. On the WeChat group members share funny, interesting, informational, patriotic, music and promotional videos, pictures, articles and links daily; they congratulate each other on job promotions, birthdays and cultural celebrations; and they regularly warn each other on crime incidents, police roadblocks, and speed trapping cameras.[50] Evidently, the use of

[46] Both these associations are discussed in Chapter Three.
[47] Interview with Robin Xu.
[48] Discussed in Chapter Three
[49] Interview with Kyle Sun.
[50] Interview with Bianca Lin.

WeChat has transformed the association from a group that occasionally interacts to a cohesive group that is concerned with everyday issues.

Other forms of social media: Line and WhatsApp

While WeChat remains the most popular social media amongst the recent Chinese migrants in South Africa, alternatives such as Line, Facebook and WhatsApp tend to be the preferred apps used by SABCs and the Taiwanese migrants. Line is a Japanese social media app that has many of the same features and purposes of WeChat and WhatsApp. While it may not have a strong following in South Africa in general, it has received strong support among the Taiwanese migrant population of South Africa. Bianca Lin came to South Africa from Taiwan in 1992, when she was 16 years old.[51] She came with her parents who wanted her to be schooled in English. She views South Africa as her home, especially as her children were born here, and she has dual South African-Taiwanese citizenship. Currently, Lin works as a secretary for the SACCPCC at their Cyrildene office and lives in Edenvale. Despite working for an association focusing on recent Chinese migrants and living in an area popular amongst this group, she tries not to use WeChat. She states that she is wary and concerned of the Chinese government potentially spying through WeChat and collecting data on her if she were to use it.[52] Lin prefers Line because she feels it is more 'neutral' and freer from government interference.

Dale Huang was born in South Africa in 1998 but is of Taiwanese descent. His parents moved to the country in 1986 to pursue business opportunities. He also prefers to use Line and expresses that while not being a big social media person, he uses this app because of family and friend groups on it.[53] He also states that the Hakka Association (SAHA)[54] he is part of, which is a Taiwanese organisation, has a Line group - contrary to most of the Chinese associations that have groups on WeChat. From this, it appears that these social media platforms have acquired nationalist characteristics in South Africa and that Line and WeChat

[51] Her full background is discussed in Chapter Three
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] Interview with Dale Huang.
[54] SAHA is discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

reflect the divide between people that identify with Taiwan versus those that are linked to the PRC.

WhatsApp seemingly has its own place amongst the Chinese social media users of South Africa. Most SABC's use WhatsApp, it being the dominant social media app in the country, instead of WeChat as they are more Westernised and Anglicised than the recent Chinese migrants. This is also true of those Chinese professionals who have been in South Africa for a long period of time and are thus more integrated into South Africa's middle class. Recent Chinese and Taiwanese migrants who also sometimes use WhatsApp have stated that they do so in order to chat with their South African friends.[55] Therefore, WhatsApp is important to some of the Chinese in South Africa and it has users amongst this population but for different reasons from WeChat. WhatsApp is used by those that primarily identify in South African terms, while WeChat is used by those who are connected to Chinese circles. It is important to note that the usage of these social media platforms can coexist and they are not mutually exclusive. Collectively, these intangible virtual structures have become gateways into different social and economic networks of the Chinese in South Africa; and therefore, are essential components of Chinese associational life.

Conclusion

Traditional media has historically played an important role in the creation of new 'imagined communities'. *ArrowLine* radio station has both cultivated traditional forms of associating around its physical presence, as well as new forms of associating around its broadcasting, among the Chinese migrant community of Gauteng. While some listeners may attend the events held by the station and engage in its tangible endeavours, others only listen in on the radio and maintain a level of separation. Either way, the station has fostered a sense of shared identity and belonging and therefore, created an imagined community based on abstract forms of associational life.

The rise of new social media has also enabled the emergence of virtual communities, which have similarly transformed traditional associational life. In the case of the WeChat account,

[55] Interview with Jared Shen; interview with Janet Chen; and interview with Lester Wang.

South African Market, Chinese people are able to connect in fundamentally different ways than in conventional associations. The unique characteristics of this virtual community include the reach of the group; its relatively impersonal and asocial nature; the potential to remain anonymous in it; and the extreme responsiveness of members. This all shows how social media has allowed for new types of associating to exist.

Furthermore, WeChat has transformed some already existing recent Chinese migrant associations. Through the use of WeChat groups, formal associations are now able to communicate with members instantly with no time or distance limitations. By providing instant and daily connections, these associations are also able to better carry out their primary functions whether it be promoting business, organising events, improving security or fostering a sense of community. These examples demonstrate that associational life and associations are dependent on technological advances in media production and have changed accordingly. Furthermore, the contrasting usage of social media apps by different Chinese groups show how cultural identity has been intertwined with these new media platforms. The next chapter will look at another aspect of this media theme by examining the various stereotypes and prejudices which negatively impact the Chinese in South Africa. It will also problematise the broad fixed categories used to describe this diverse group.

Chapter 5

Chinese Generalisations and Stereotypes in South Africa

Various academic studies have estimated that the number of recent Chinese migrants living in South Africa approximates to 300 000, with the majority based in Gauteng.[1] As the Chinese in general have gained more prominence in South African society and with the increased presence of China on the African continent, various generalisations, stereotypes and prejudices have been directed towards this group.[2] The literature on the Chinese in South Africa has identified three broad categories of Chinese and the project itself has used these groupings as a means for framing its discussion. However, this chapter investigates the numerous differences and divisions, specifically amongst recent Chinese migrants to argue that these categories are inadequate in representing the complexity of the Chinese in South Africa. It specifically looks at the two different influxes of the third wave of Chinese migration and analyses the diverse experiences of Chinese migrants in order to challenge the category of 'recent Chinese migrant'. Furthermore, this chapter examines the development and history of racist and prejudicial stereotypes towards Chinese people in the South African media, the public and even their own compatriots. Consequently, it uses a sample group of recent Chinese migrant interviewees whose associational lives reject these stereotypes, to show that those racist labels are inaccurate, disparaging and damaging. It also examines how The Chinese Association of Gauteng (TCAG) has had to be active and forceful in challenging these stereotypes and defending themselves through legal action despite democracy's promise of equality.

[1] Park and Rugunanan, 'Visible and Vulnerable', p. 11.
[2] Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 2008).

Inadequate Categories

The literature on the Chinese in South Africa has designated one specific category – recent Chinese migrants – to represent the third wave of migration from the 1990s to the present day. It has also largely been adopted by popular discourse and by SABCs, Taiwanese and Chinese migrants. While this helps distinguish the different groups of Chinese people in the country through their migratory history, the description is nonetheless extremely broad, especially considering the large time-span that it covers. Furthermore, the category essential lumps together all Chinese migrants under a single homogenous classification. This section evaluates the usage of the term 'recent Chinese migrants' by analysing the two influxes of the third wave of Chinese migration; and examples of associations and associational lives that problematise the category.

The Two influxes of Recent Chinese Migration

After the Taiwanese wave of migration in the 1980s, the next significant influx of Chinese migrants to South Africa came in the 1990s. These migrants were largely drawn by the new economic opportunities created by the democratic shift of 1994 and the country's recognition of the PRC in 1998. They were middle-managers, entrepreneurs, professionals, investors and well-connected businessmen with access to capital, mainly from the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and cities of Beijing and Shanghai.[3] Many anticipated the manufacturing potential in Africa and ventured into the import-export business; as well as into retail, wholesale trading or manufacturing.[4] Furthermore, another sub-group of migrants during this early period were educated professionals who initially arrived in South Africa as employees of the various Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or businesses that entered the country after 1998. They decided to stay after their 2-3 year contracts ended because they had either already established significant business networks or saw potential in the South African market.[5] Most of these migrants of this first influx have since

[3] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 289.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 293.

become financially successful and have established extensive commercial networks between Southern Africa and China.

The second influx of the third wave of Chinese migration occurred in the 2000s, with many of these migrants hailing from the Fujian Province. The Fujianese have a long tradition of migration and increasing levels of economic competition have played a part in their mass exodus from China to Europe, Japan, and most notably the United States in the twenty-first century.[6] They, by far have constituted the largest group of Chinese migrants to South Africa and now comprise an estimated two-thirds of the 300 000 Chinese in South Africa.[7] These migrants come from poor, lower economic -class and rural peasant backgrounds.[8] Many have entered South Africa illegally, often through the Lesotho border, and some are involved in criminal networks, specifically around poaching and the black market. The majority of the Fujianese migrants have settled in small towns around the country, having found no job opportunities in the main urban areas, living on the margins of society. However, some also live in the main cities of South Africa, including Johannesburg and Pretoria.[9]

Despite being part of the same wave of migration, migrants from these two influxes have radically different origins in China. As a result, they also differ in culture and traditions that are specific to their region of origin. The first group clearly occupies a higher economic class and are better educated than the Fujian counterparts; and since they have been in the country longer, are more likely to be well-versed in English and to be integrated. Whereas they benefitted from the economic optimism of the 1990s, the newer migrants arrived at a time when South Africa was struggling with unemployment, political instability, limited service delivery, xenophobic violence, and a global economic depression.[10] This created an even larger disparity between the two groups, as seen by the documented discords in the Chinatown of Cyrildene between poor migrants from the Fujian province and Northern provinces of China, and the wealthier migrants from East China who compete for favour from the Chinese Embassy and for economic resources from China.[11] Furthermore, the

[6] Liang and Ye, 'From Fujian to New York', p. 198.
[7] Harrison, Moyo and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 904.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Huynh, Park, and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 296.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Xu, 'Cyrildene Chinatown, Suburban Settlement, and Ethnic Economy', p. 98.

settlement patterns of these two influxes vary, especially regarding the illegal entry of some Fujianese migrants. Lastly, the second influx does not account for the migrants who have been arriving after 2008 – as most literature continues to reference Yoon Park's estimate of the Chinese population in that year – and it is likely that this group would also have distinct characteristics. Hence, the broad term of recent Chinese migrants does not satisfactorily capture all these significant differences and experiences; and has become inadequate in representing the complexities of the third wave of Chinese migration.

Chinese Associations: Divisions and Fluidity

The two influxes of the third wave of Chinese migration to South Africa spurred the establishment of many new Chinese associations. However, there are various divisions between these organisations that have become apparent since the 2000s. The proliferation of Chinese associations represents the multiplicity of interests and needs within the broad category of recent Chinese migrants, as well as the increasing competition for economic resources both in South Africa and China.[12] This competition has created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion between Chinese businessmen which indicates growing/deepening factionalism.[13] Furthermore, the naming of associations after various regions and areas in China shows that the identities and origins of recent Chinese migrants are particularly diverse. As argued in Chapter Three, many of these associations reflect the backgrounds of their members and therefore, the divisions amongst Chinese associations is a reflection of the class and other disparities that exist within the migrant group.

Certain Chinese establishments have also further blurred the boundaries between the categories of SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants. One such example is the Hong Ning Old Age Home, a retirement village in Belgravia for Chinese seniors living in Johannesburg. The home was established in 1977, with the intention of providing care to retired SABCs, and continues to operate today. The food served, events held and activities offered are all geared to cater to this group of the Chinese population. While the residents comprise mainly SABCs, the home is also open to recent Chinese migrants. Shirleen Man, a

[12] As discussed in Chapter 3.
[13] Harrison, Moyo, and Yang, 'Strategy and Tactics', p. 910.

committee member of the old age home, explains that the lack of recent Chinese migrants is because many of the new migrants have not reached retirement age or have returned to China after reaching the age of seniority.[14] Presumably, the poor economic status of many Chinese migrants, not being able to afford the fees of the home, and visa issues have also added to their current absence.

Despite this, the home receives substantial investment and support from different sections of the Chinese population. SABC associations, such as the TCAG and PCA, have strong historical ties to the home; while various Christian and Buddhist Chinese, as well as Taiwanese organisations/charities, also provide donations and funding. Furthermore, the home is fervently financially supported by many of the new wealthier Chinese business associations.[15] Evidently, the Hong Ning Home receives widespread support and is considered an important community facility by the different groups of Chinese.

Another example of Chinese establishments that blur the boundaries between the categories of SABC, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants would be the Nan Hua Temple in Bronkhorstspruit, which similarly to the old-age home, draws Chinese people from all three categories, and from the general South African public, for religious, cultural and social reasons.[16] This diversity is particularly seen through the temple's celebration of the Chinese New Year. The labels of SABC, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrant are meant to separate these groups. However, these examples show how there is a degree of overlap between these categories. They do not take into account the possibility that the associational life of some Chinese people is fluid and not represented by this rigid framework.

Migrant Lives: Breaking the Mould

The category of recent Chinese migrants largely refers to economic migrants. They have migrated and settled in South Africa particularly for monetary gains.[17] Consequently, these migrants still harbour a strong belonging to China and see South Africa as a temporary

[14] Interview with Shirleen Man.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] Detailed in Chapter 2.
[17] Dittgen, 'Features of modernity', p. 985.

destination. However, not all migrants in the category fit this mould.[18] For many, staying in South Africa is not purely about making money but also about enjoying the country's environment and lifestyle. Ross Li, first introduced in Chapter Two, is a migrant from Hong Kong, which he left in 1996 to come to South Africa with his family. He really enjoys South Africa's landscape and climate, which he believes is the best in the world.[19] Similarly, while Robert Xu, who moved here from China in 1994, is currently concerned with the running of two China Malls, he also agrees that South Africa is a beautiful country and says that this played a pivotal role in his decicion to stay here long-term.[20] Although many migrants are exclusively concerned with the financial aspects that the country has to offer, there are evidently some who have more diverse reasons for living here. It is these different social and economic interests that are lost in the inadequate category of recent Chinese migrants.

Additionally, since Xu has been in South Africa for more than 20 years – raised a family here; and has built friendships and businesses over the years – he calls this country 'home' and has a permanent residence permit.[21] Because of this sense of belonging and his business interests, Xu is very concerned with the state of the country and its future. He and his association, the Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce based at the China Mall Johannesburg and China Mall West, are also looking to the long-term success of South Africa by being heavily involved in developing local businesses and in outreach programmes to local communities.[22] Kyle Sun, first introduced in Chapter Three is a migrant from Hong Kong who spent part of his childhood in South Africa, before returning here recently.[23] While Hong Kong was his first hometown, he now considers Johannesburg his home. Likewise, Nathan Yang, first introduced in Chapter Three, is a migrant from Hong Kong who came here at age 11, and has a fluid sense of belonging common amongst first-generation diasporic communities.[24] He states that he feels like a drifter and is currently content with being in South Africa. These examples reject the argument, put forward by Romain Dittgen, that recent Chinese migrants having strong belonging to China; and shows that there are

[18] Huynh, Park and Chen, 'Faces of China', p. 286.
[19] Interview with Ross Li.
[20] Interview with Robert Xu.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Discussed in Chapter 3.
[23] Interview with Kyle Sun.
[24] Interview with Nathan Yang.

migrants who associate with a South African identity or alternatively, have ambiguous national identities. It is important to note that while these interviewees are not representative of the majority of recent Chinese migrants but rather exceptions, these examples show how the category of recent Chinese migrants fails to capture these diverse experiences.

This chapter, however, is not suggesting abandoning the application of these three categories. They do serve a purpose in providing a broad framework to analyse the Chinese in South Africa and in some respects, they reflect the nature and backgrounds of their constituency. It is necessary to acknowledge that there are many outliers to these three groups. No sweeping statements or generalisations can be made as recent Chinese migrants are not a uniform group. Instead, when making use of these categories, it is important to highlight the individual experiences and personal details of people who fall under it.

Racist Stereotypes: Paranoia, Illegality and Xenophobia

Recent Chinese migrants have received increasing media attention over the last two decades due to an influx in their numbers; growing Chinese investment in Africa; and the strengthening relationship between South Africa and China. Economic ties are especially prevalent, as a recent newspaper article outlines:

> China has been South Africa's largest trading partner for nine years in a row, and South Africa has become China's largest trading partner in Africa for eight consecutive years. Two-way trade totalled $39.17-billion in 2017, more than 20 times the figure at the start of our diplomatic engagement.[25]

Much of the English media coverage on South Africa-China relations has been critical of their political and economic ties, and subsequently, has directed negativity towards the recent Chinese migrants by association.[26] Additionally, public opinion on Chinese migrants has formed part of the larger xenophobic discourses on migrant labour in South Africa. Specifically, through perceptions that Chinese migrant businesses prefer to hire non-South

[25] Chen Wenjun, 'Twenty Years on, China-SA Relations Embrace a New Chapter', *Business Day* (25 September 2018), https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/asia/2018-09-25-twenty-years-on-china-sa-relations-embrace-a-new-chapter/, accessed on 16 March 2019.
[26] Examples are the newspapers: *Mail & Guardian, Times Live, The Sowetan, The Star, City Press, and The Citizen*.

African blacks and that they flood the local manufacturing market with cheap, low-quality goods

This section examines a few examples of how stereotypes, generalisation, and racism, which have their roots in historical 'yellow peril' discourses that go back to the colonial period, have helped create a negative perception of the Chinese in South Africa. Furthermore, by examining the experiences of a group of recent Chinese migrants who are educated professionals and well-integrated into South Africa society, I argue that these prejudicial labels should be rejected outright. The analysis is mainly based on newspaper articles and cartoons but will highlight the reporting trends about the Chinese that emerge through different mediums.

Portrayals of Chinese people in the South African Media

Racism towards the Chinese in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. Chapter One briefly dealt with 'yellow peril' discourses that existed in the 1900s that in many ways have persisted into the present, albeit in different forms. These included the moral panics around the perceived criminality and homosexuality of Chinese labourers on the Witwatersrand in the early twentieth century; oriental discourses on supposed 'Chinese inferiority', which were reinforced by the discrimination Chinese people faced in both colonial and apartheid South Africa; and alternatively, around the stereotype that the Chinese are hard-working and diligent, and therefore threatened white jobs.[27] Furthermore, during the apartheid era, these discourses existed alongside 'Rooi Gevaar' fears that communistic political actors, such as Russia, China and the ANC, were intent on overrunning South Africa through force.[28]

In the 1990s, the influx of Chinese migrants, many of whom set up wholesale stores, substantially increased the flow of cheap imports from China to South Africa and this led to a growing fear that the country's manufacturing sector would not be able to compete with such low prices.[29] During this time, the media began converging the stereotype that the Chinese have an unparallel work ethic, which in turn stoked yellow peril fears that they

[27] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 2; and Harris, 'Chinese Merchants on the Rand', p. 163.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] Harrison, Yang and Moyo, 'Visual representations', pp. 38-39.

would take away jobs from local South Africans and undermine the manufacturing market. The Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Beeld*, also maintained anti-communist views post-Cold War and pushed the idea of secret Chinese mafias infiltrating South Africa.[30] Essentially, many English and Afrikaans media outlets in the 1990s perpetuated negative and racist stereotypes and widespread misconceptions about Chinese migration.[31]

These anti-China and anti-Chinese discourses were strengthened in the 2000s and 2010s. As South Africa and China's bilateral ties developed, their relationship became a significant and controversial topic in public debate. Philip Harrison, Yan Yang and Khangelani Moyo conducted an analysis of numerous mainstream news articles on China from this period and highlighted the prevalence of many racist tropes.[32] The most common tropes were that Chinese investment signalled some form of economic 'invasion'; and that Chinese people are criminal and immoral. Many cartoons published in daily newspapers have also hinted at these discourses. A cartoon by well-known South African cartoonist, Zapiro (Figure 4), published shortly after the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that was held in Johannesburg between 3-5 December 2015, depicts the president of China, Xi Jinping, pushing the continent of Africa, which has a price tag on, in a shopping cart.[33] The imagery once again invokes the idea of Chinese invasion and neo-colonialism in Africa by implying that President Jinping has essentially 'bought' the continent, and various African political leaders and politicians. Moreover, the cartoon suggests that there is an imbalance of power on China's side, thereby undermining the forum's 'cooperative' objective.

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 39.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] FOCAC is a platform in which China and African countries foster political and business relations.



Figure 4

Source: Zapiro, 'Chinese Take-away in Africa', *The Times*, 8 December 2015.

Other instances of 'yellow peril' and 'yellow scourge' reporting are exemplified by the 2007 op-ed 'Hoe's my China nou?' published in the *Mail & Guardian* by journalist John Matshikiza and the 2012 cover story 'Howzit China?' published in *Noseweek* by the editor Martin Welz.[34] In the first piece, Matshikiza quotes the American composer Duke Ellington's belief that 'the whole world is turning rapidly Oriental' in order to evoke an imagery of South Africa being overrun and overwhelmed by an influx of Chinese migrants. He also makes mention of the new Chinatown in Cyrildene which he argues 'represents the new-wave [from] China that we all have to be very aware of, if not directly terrified and scared'.[35] The second piece laments how many Chinese traders and shopkeepers have immigrated to

[34] John Matshikiza. 'Hoe's my China Nou?', *Mail & Guardian* (22 January 2007), https://mg.co.za/article/2007-01-22-hoes-my-china-nou, accessed on 16 March 2019; and Martin Welz, 'Howzit China?', *Noseweek* (1 November 2012), https://www.noseweek.co.za/article/2836/Howzit-China, accessed 16 March 2019.
[35] *Ibid.*

South Africa, specifically to small towns across the country. It accuses these migrants of flooding the retail market thereby undercutting local businesses, entering the country illegally, and being involved in general illicit trading.

However, the most egregious claim in the article is that all these traders are part of a sinister plot by China to take over the South African retail arena. He asks, 'why has the South African government gone soft on Chinese immigration – or, rather, turned a blind eye to the mass of illegal immigrants from China who have quietly settled in as if nothing was the matter?', thereby insinuating there is a larger conspiracy at hand. These examples show how paranoia and fear continue to drive negative reportage on the Chinese. While no easy generalisations can be made on the reporting of China and the Chinese in South Africa by the media, it is nonetheless clear that there are numerous stereotypes, xenophobic tropes and misconceptions that have been perpetuated through these platforms.

The negative discourses on recent Chinese migrants in the media have also contributed to the proliferation of racist and xenophobic attitudes towards the Chinese amongst some South Africans. One example that highlights the pervasive fears and distrust directed to recent Chinese migrants by members of the general public is the recent misunderstanding around the establishment of the thirteenth branch of the South African Chinese Community and Police Co-operation Centre (SACCPCC) in Port Elizabeth during October 2018.[36] While the association is not a new development, with 12 others existing across South Africa already, this specific branch became the centre of controversy when misinformation about the branch went viral. Country-wide rumours spread across social media stating that 'the Chinese' had opened their own police station in the city, when in fact it was just the community association that had commenced operations.[37]

As analysed in Chapter Three, this organisation is focused on facilitating and mediating interactions between the police and recent Chinese migrants, as well as offering support to any person affected by crime. Nonetheless, these rumours gained traction and led to many people evoking images of a 'Chinese invasion', 'Chinese neo-colonialism' and other forms of

[36] This association is detailed in Chapter 3.
[37] 'No, Chinese People Aren't Opening their Own Police Stations in South Africa', *Africa Check* (13 November 2018), https://africacheck.org/spot-check/no-chinese-people-arent-opening-their-own-police-stations-in-south-africa/, accessed on 16 March 2018.

'yellow peril' discourses via online platforms.[38] It is in the atmosphere of racism and prejudice that such allegations spread despite there being no truth attached to them. Despite the Port Elizabeth Chinese community's long history in the region, it has attempted to respond and combat the rumours – thereby indicating that their reputation has been affected by these racist media discourses.[39]

Another example is the racist comments on the Facebook profiles of *Carte Blanche*, the Karoo Donkey Sanctuary and TCAG, directed towards the Chinese regarding the illegal trade in donkey skins. However, to understand why these comments were posted, it is necessary to first examine the context in which they were made. The media has a history of linking illegality and criminality to the Chinese, harking back to the 1906 Bucknill Commission which demonised Chinese labourers on the Witwatersrand mines[40]; and later by linking Taiwanese migrants to the rising shark fin and abalone black market trade in the late twentieth century.[41] It has continued to do so in regards to the contemporary rhino poaching and illicit ivory trade.

A 2013 article in the *Mail & Guardian* titled 'Rhino horn trade thrives in Joburg' exemplifies this pattern to broadly link Chinese migrants to these particular criminal activities.[42] When discussing the ivory trade, the article states: 'The recent influx of Chinese immigrants to Southern Africa has seen the market grow', thereby immediately suggesting a connection between the Chinese coming to South Africa and the trade in rhino horns and ivory.[43] The issue here is not that there is a correlation between the increase of Chinese migrants and these illegal trading networks but rather that the article does not clarify that many Chinese people moving to the country are not involved in these criminal networks. The article also goes on to state that the Bruma flea market and the New Chinatown in Cyrildene are both places with a high concentration of Chinese migrants and illicit ivory trade hubs.[44] While

[38] A discussion thread on a twitter post by popular comedic social media account 'Man's Not Barry Roux' (@AdvBarryRoux) enlisted over 4000 responses.
[39] Bongani Nkosi, 'China "Not Opening Police Stations" in SA', *IOL* (16 November 2018), https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/china-not-opening-police-stations-in-sa-18142156, accessed 16 March 2019.
[40] Pauw, 'Media Portrayals and Discourses', p. 2.
[41] Gastrow, 'Triad Societies and Chinese Organised Crime', p. 1.
[42] Hongxiang Huang, 'Rhino Horn Trade Thrives in Jo'burg', *Mail & Guardian* (4 October 2013), https://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-04-00-rhino-horn-trade-thrives-in-joburg, accessed 16 March 2019.
[43] *Ibid*.
[44] *Ibid.*

illegal trades do occur in those areas, the article makes no distinction between the legitimate Chinese traders and residents, and criminal elements.

Similar issues emerged with the exposure of the black-market donkey hide trade on 20 January 2017. The first reporting on this subject was in a *Mail & Guardian* article titled 'Why are gangs killing our donkeys?'[45] The article revealed that a Chinese syndicate operating in Benoni was to blame and that the hides were sought after for traditional Chinese practices and medicine. While it clearly identified a specific criminal network to be the perpetrators – Chinese people, in general, were inevitably linked to this issue as was evident by the racist and derogatory Facebook comments. On 29 of January 2017, *Carte Blanche*, an investigative journalism TV show, further discussed the issue. After the broadcast, many people began commenting with racist and anti-Chinese opinions on social media in regards to this expose. It became clear that the negative and generalising media portrayals of Chinese people influenced public opinion and perceptions accordingly.

Most of the racist comments were posted on the Facebook profiles of *Carte Blanche*, the Karoo Donkey Sanctuary and TCAG. Some of the vile statements made included racist slurs, death threats, and accusations.[46] They made no distinction between the different groups of Chinese but rather targeted the Chinese as a whole. Furthermore, the comments show how the Chinese population, in general, has become a scapegoat for a number of issues regarding poaching and the illegal trade of various items such as ivory, rhino horns, donkey hides and others.[47] One interviewee attests that the Chinese are being scapegoated. Vince Wu was born in 1990 and is a second generation Taiwanese South African.[48] He states that he has also received racist remarks accusing him of rhino poaching, largely from black South Africans.

The Chinese in South Africa have responded to the various attacks against their name. The Chinese Embassy wrote a letter to the editor in the *Mail & Guardian* stating that the newspaper's reporting on the rhino horn issue was misleading and confirmed China's

[45] Goven Whittles and Given Sigauqwe, ''Why are Gangs Killing our Donkeys?', *Mail & Guardian* (20 January 2017), https://mg.co.za/article/2017-01-20-00-donkey-hide-bust-points-to-gang, accessed 16 March 2019.
[46] Racial slurs such as 'chings' and 'slant-eyed freaks' were used.
[47] Karen H. Harris, 'Entangled South African Chinese Diasporas: Molluscs, Ungulates and Equidae', Paper presented at the 26th Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Society, 21-23 June 2017.
[48] Interview with Vince Wu (pseudonym) in Sandton, Johannesburg (27 October 2018). Transcript in the possession the of author

commitment to protecting endangered species.[49] Furthermore, in response to the racism expressed on Facebook, TCAG released a media statement decrying the hate speech targeting the Chinese community, while reaffirming that they are against both poaching and animal cruelty.[50] The association has subsequently also laid criminal charges against those who took part in the xenophobic comments as well as submitting a hate speech complaint to the South Africa Human Rights Council (all of which are ongoing cases). An account has been opened to help pay for legal expenses and the association regularly hosts fundraising events.[51]

Erwin Pon, the chairperson of TCAG, recently wrote an opinion piece for *News24* on 10 March 2019. Therein he seeks to raise awareness of the hurtful stereotypes towards the Chinese in South Africa and states that the Chinese community, referring to SABCs, stands against this 'assault on the cultural and identity differences that are part of the lifeblood of our diverse democracy'.[52] It is clear that while democracy has diminished the need for civil action by Chinese associations through extending freedom to all citizens, the TCAG has had to defend the Chinese in the very context of democracy itself. Interestingly, both in the article and in his interview, Pon reveals that TCAG held a 'special general meeting with all the main Chinese community leaders and representatives nationally', including recent Chinese migrant associations.[53] However, from the onset, it seems that TCAG has taken the mantle of challenging hate speech, through legal processes, by itself.

Other stereotypes held by members of the South Africa public and media relate to recent Chinese migrants' supposed lack of integration and inclination to isolate themselves. An interview with Kopano Wilson – a South African cab driver – by journalist Arison Tamfu, highlights the negative sentiments held by some. On the Chinese, he states that 'they are everywhere. We are tired of them. They have taken all our jobs and are very secretive and

[49] Pan Peng, 'Letter to the Editor: M&G Rhino Article Misleading', *Mail & Guardian* (16 October 2013), https://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-16-letter-to-the-editor-mg-rhino-article-misleading, accessed 16 March 2019.
[50] 'Media Statements', *The Chinese Association of Gauteng* (7 February 2017), http://www.tcagp.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Chinese-Association-Press-Release.pdf, accessed 16 March 2019.
[51] The Chinese Association of Gauteng Newsletter, (22 July 2019).
[52] Erwin Pon, 'Racist and Violent Speech Aimed at Chinese South Africans a Threat to Democracy', *News24* (10 March 2019), https://m.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/racist-and-violent-speech-aimed-at-chinese-south-africans-a-threat-to-democracy-20190310, accessed 17 March 2018.
[53] *Ibid.*

racial type of people'.[54] His statement on job security shows how these Chinese discourses are linked to broader xenophobic sentiments towards mainly immigrant African labourers.

The aforementioned article 'Hoe's my China nou?' by Matshikiza, also affirms this belief that Chinese people do not intend to acculturate into South African society by lamenting the predominant usage of mandarin in the Cyrildene Chinatown. He reinforces this criticism in another column 'Sleaze: strictly for "Chinese"' published by the *Mail & Guardian* in 2007 – where he mocks the broken English spoken by some recent Chinese migrants.[55] In this article, he also portrays Cyrildene Chinatown as a dirty, corrupt and a run-down place. These instances are indicative of underlying racism towards Chinese migrants based on generalisations and show the wide variety of stereotypes directed towards this group.

It is important to note that while prejudices and generalisations on recent Chinese migrants exist within the South African media, not all portrayals are necessarily negative or racist. Articles such as 'Columns incite a new "yellow peril" in SA' by Yoon Jung Park and Tu Huynh, published in the *Mail & Guardian*; and 'Nosedive: Chinese shopkeeper cover story a new low for South African journalism' by Kevin Bloom & Richard Poplak, published in the *Daily Maverick* – push back and actively criticise the persistence of Chinese stereotypes in the media and advocate for more nuanced and unbiased journalism.[56] Despite such articles, there remains a trend to portray recent Chinese migrants in the media through the aforementioned stereotypes and thus, it is important to expose these as such.

Rebuffing Stereotypes

As shown previously, the South African media has perpetuated 'yellow peril' discourses, specifically in the form of supposed 'neo-colonialism' by China; and has furthered the

[54] Arison Tamfu, 'Chinese Migrants Have Come to South Africa to Stay But Are Finding Some Locals Unfriendly', *Daily Reporter* (26 November 2017), http://www.reporter.co.ke/2017/11/26/chinese-migrants-have-come-to-south-africa-to-stay-but-are-finding-some-locals-unfriendly/, accessed 16 March 2019.
[55] John Matshikiza, 'Sleaze: Strictly for "Chinese"', *Mail & Guardian* (23 February 2007), https://www.pressreader.com/, accessed 16 March 2019.
[56] Yoon. J. Park and Tu Huynh, 'Columns Incite a New "Yellow Peril"', *Mail & Guardian* (9 March 2007), https://mg.co.za/article/2007-03-09-columns-incite-a-new-yellow-peril-in-sa, accessed 16 March 2019; and Kevin Bloom and Richard Poplak, 'Nosedive: Chinese Shopkeeper Cover Story a New Low for South African Journalism', *Daily Maverick* (31 October 2012), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-10-31-nosedive-chinese-shopkeeper-cover-story-a-new-low-for-south-african-journalism/, accessed 16 March 2019.

stereotype that Chinese migrants are reclusive; living the country illegally; involved in criminal networks and black market trades. However, this section argues that these portrayals are inadequate and damaging representations of the Chinese. It does so by examining a specific sub-group of recent Chinese migrants, largely working professionals in and around the Sandton CBD and Rivonia, whose experiences and associational life challenge the said assumptions. While these migrants are themselves not demonstrative of the whole group (and this project will avoid reinforcing another stereotype that immigrant Asian families are studious diligent and successful), their situation nonetheless highlights how general stereotypes misrepresent the diversity of individuals within the recent Chinese migrant category.

One way in which this sub-group rejects the negative discourses on recent Chinese migrants is through their economic class and lifestyle. Jeff Tai came to South Africa in 2004 at 16 years of age, 5 years after his parents, on the perception that the country was full of economic potential.[57] He initially enrolled at Allen Glen High School in 2004 before moving to the Maragon Ruimsig private high school. For tertiary education, Tai studied finance at the University of Witwatersrand. He is currently working as a Financial Manager for the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in Sandton and lives close to Rivonia. Evidently, his economic position in South Africa is radically different from the stereotypes that recent Chinese migrants are 'desperate delinquents' intent on acting unlawfully in order to achieve prosperity.

Further examples include Lester Wang and Ross Li, who both work in Sandton for Standard Bank and the China Development Bank respectively.[58] Wang works in their global markets divisions while Li is a Risk Analyst. These occupations are highly skilled and specialised. Additionally, Sun works in Rivonia as a manager of a Chinese mall and Janet Chen works as a civil engineer.[59] Hence, there is a sub-group of recent Chinese migrants, who largely work in the banking sector or for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, are in a higher economic class than the stereotypical migrant because of their vocations. These individuals also live in and around the middle and upper-class neighbourhoods of Sandton, Fourways, Rosebank and

[57] Interview with Jeff Tai.
[58] Interview with Lester Wang; and interview with Ross Li.
[59] She is currently working on site in Rustenburg during the week but returns to Johannesburg over weekends.

Rivonia and therefore, have very different lifestyles compared to how the South African media and the public have portrayed Chinese migrants as being deceitful, dubious and sleazy.

Other reasons why this sub-group of migrants reject the various stereotypes discussed is their proficiency in English; education background; the level of integration and their legal status. All the aforementioned interviewees were fluent in English, despite their mother tongue being Mandarin. Their accents mainly sounded South African, with Sun retaining an American accent due to the number of years he spent there before coming to Johannesburg. This is likely because most of them have lived in the country for a long time and spent large amounts of their childhood here. Furthermore, many went to private English schools and received tertiary education from English universities. Taryn Chang is an interesting example of a recent Chinese migrant in South Africa. While she was born in China, specifically in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous region, she was proficient in English before coming to South Africa in 2002.[60] She spent 16 years teaching English as an associate professor at Liaoning Technical University. After her arrival in the country, she initially studied at the University of Pretoria and now works in the Department of Linguistics and Modern Languages at the University of South Africa. Evidently, this is in stark contrast to the stereotypes that Chinese migrants are uneducated and unwilling to learn English.

Their length of stay in the country and private education has also increased their level of assimilation into middle-class South African society. Tai states that at university he made friends with people from diverse backgrounds, and similarly, Chen and Chang both have local friends whom they met through university and work.[61] And while Sun says that he has not made any real local acquaintances, he feels that this is mostly due to his busy life.[62] Once again, it is clear that the stereotypes which claim Chinese migrants to be reclusive and inaccessible are not fully accurate especially in regards to these interviewees. Lastly, whereas the media has portrayed most Chinese migrants to be illegal aliens, all these interviewees, except Jeff who has attained South African citizenship, are in the country on a Permanent Resident permit. Furthermore, most estimates gauge the amount of illegal

[60] Interview with Taryn Chang (pseudonym) in Mucklenuek, Pretoria (27 August 2018). Transcript in the possession of the author.
[61] Interview with Jeff; interview with Janet; and interview with Taryn Chang.
[62] Interview with Kyle Sun.

Chinese migrants in the country at one-third of the speculated 300 000 total Chinese migrants.[63] Therefore, the assumptions made by the South African media and members of the public that recent Chinese migrants enter and stay in the country illegally, is an oversimplification and a sweeping statement. Furthermore, the illegal status of some Chinese migrants do not justify the prevalence of racist stereotypes.

Fujianese Stereotypes

While the South African media and public hold certain inaccurate prejudices towards recent Chinese migrants, South African Chinese also often hold a bias against recent migrants and those from the Fujian district more specifically. In her field research around 2008-9, Yoon Park discovered that many SABCs, Taiwanese and established/well-integrated recent Chinese migrants, have negative perceptions of migrants from the Fujian province of China. They are seen as 'poor, uncouth peasants with limited education' and are associated with 'ongoing criminal activities'.[64] Fujianese migrants are also often in the country illegally (a trend also seen in the United States of America, with some involved in the illicit dealings of Chinese triads in South Africa; and consequently, many other Chinese people try to differentiate themselves from this identity.[65] Essentially, this sub-group of Chinese migrants is generally looked-down upon and seen as the reasons for the Chinese having a bad reputation amongst other South Africans.[66]

Janet is a recent migrant from the Fujian province who has lived in South Africa for most her life.[67] Despite currently being affluent and well-integrated, her family's journey in the country was initially tough, similarly to many other Fujianese migrants. She spent much of her childhood helping her father with his street trading business. Janet states that oftentimes in primary school when teachers would enquire what students did over the weekend, she would lie and say that she played with friends instead of telling the truth that she had to be on the street selling goods. Despite having an underprivileged upbringing, she

[63] Park and Rugunanan, 'Visible and Vulnerable', p. 8.
[64] Park, 'Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions', p. 446.
[65] Zai Liang, 'Demography of Illicit Emigration from China: A Sending Country's Perspective', in *Sociological Forum*, 16, 4 (2001), p. 681.
[66] Park and Rugunanan, 'Visible and Vulnerable', p. 13.
[67] Interview with Janet Chen.

managed to rise above the circumstances, receive bursaries for education and is now working as a civil engineer.

Despite being a successful and reputable professional in South Africa, Janet states that she prefers not to tell people about her Fujianese heritage.[68] She feels that people automatically make negative assumptions upon hearing that her family is originally from this province and that she has to explain at length that she and her family are not involved in criminal dealings. As a result, she often avoids the question or gives an obscure answer. Janet also stays away from participating in Fujianese associations, both because she is aware of the negative connotations that come with it and because she feels that they are most likely involved in illegal activities (thereby perpetuating the stereotype herself). Furthermore, she feels that some SABCs have cast blame and scapegoated Fujianese migrants, especially after the furore around the illegal donkey hide trade which led to those racist Facebook comments discussed previously.[69] However, Janet's example contradicts the general stereotypes about Fujianese migrants and shows how these prejudices are inaccurate and harmful. Her story is one of how hard work and determination has led to success and not how someone resorted to criminal activities. While her family started off as poor migrants, she is now comfortably integrated into South African society, speaks English fluently and is a working professional.

Conclusion

The literature on the Chinese in South Africa has recognised three categories of Chinese, namely SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants which correlates to different waves and patterns of Chinese migration to South Africa over the last 150 years. In many ways, these categories are useful to understand the general distinctions between these groups, and I have employed this framework in this study. However, the categories fall short in representing the complexities in the origins, migratory history, class, economic interests,

[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*

belonging, and identity of recent Chinese migrants; and therefore, are inadequate portrayals of a complex and divided migrant group.

Media shapes and influences popular thought and thus is a key contributor to the emergence of stereotypes. The South African media have historically perpetuated various racist stereotypes and generalisations about the Chinese in South Africa, which have consequently also taken hold in certain sectors of public opinion. These assumptions that Chinese migrants are undocumented/illegal, poor, prone to criminal enterprises, uneducated, unintegrated and reclusive have reemerged in the twenty-first century, partly due to China's increasing involvement in Africa, as part of the broader xenophobic discourses around migrant labour. Using interviews with working professionals in and around Sandton and Rivonia, this chapter has argued that this sub-group of Chinese migrants challenge these stereotypes by showing that recent Chinese migrants can also be fully legal, affluent, educated, and well-integrated in South African society. Furthermore, this chapter looked at the particular stereotypes directed towards Fujianese migrants and similarly argued that generalisations towards this sub-group are also misleading. Clearly, the Chinese population of South Africa is a diverse group – and the simplistic categories and stereotypes that have been used to describe the group as a whole, do not fully highlight the crucial intricacies of recent Chinese migrants. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasise the distinct backgrounds of Chinese individuals when using these categories, to ensure that no sweeping statements and generalisations are made based on assumptions.

Conclusion

Associational life has been defined as the process by which individuals rely on social networks and kinship relations to survive, produce social capital, access resources and build community. The framework of associational life has received increasing attention in the literature on contemporary international migration studies, as migrant communities have a tendency to form associations. However, in the existing historiography of the Chinese in South Africa this term has not been readily applied to Chinese migration to this region nor to the African continent as a whole. Applying this framework to Chinese migration has not only provided valuable insights about the history of the overseas Chinese in South Africa but has opened up opportunities for comparative studies to emerge on the numerous nationalities and cultural groupings in South Africa that also have a rich history of migration.

This migration has occurred in three distinct waves over the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with migrants from each wave establishing their own respective associations. The study has examined the changing nature of Chinese associational life with a particular focus on the contemporary period, by arguing that SABC and Taiwanese associations have in part shifted their previous focus on civil rights towards culture and community post-1994. It has also argued that the consequential transformation of the political, economic, demographic and social dynamics of the country, especially regarding the country's strengthening ties to China post-apartheid, has in part resulted in the proliferation of business associations amongst recent Chinese migrants.

Chapter One traced the historical roots of Chinese associations in South Africa from the early days of migration in the seventeenth century to the end of the apartheid era. It examined the early stages of Chinese immigration to South Africa and showed how associational life was an integral component of these immigrants' lives by examining how they rallied together to petition against the colonial government. Petitioning was one of the legal avenues through which they could challenge the unjust treatment and discrimination by British colonial authorities, and later the Union government and apartheid state. The chapter argued that the passing of discriminatory anti-Asiatic legislation against the Chinese

played a significant role in the development of the first formal Chinese associations in the early 1900s, such as the Transvaal Chinese Association (TCA). While the TCA was initially involved in the passive resistance movement, internal conflicts and increasing government oppression saw it take on a more accommodationist approach, by petitioning for rights and providing community support from the 1920s onwards. Furthermore, the increasing relevance of official Chinese representatives such as the Consul-General and Liaison Officer, provided alternative means of addressing political grievances which simultaneously ensured that the Chinese maintained a low profile and avoided confrontation.

The chapter also discussed the large importation of Chinese indentured labourers who were contracted to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand for the period from 1904 to 1910. Many of these miners would go on to establish certain secret societies or brotherhoods, once again showing the tendency of Chinese migrants to maintain connections and associate amongst themselves in a foreign environment. Despite the fact that most of these labourers returned to China at the end of their indenture, this period saw the rise of brutish racist and stereotypical discourses on the Chinese that have persisted to the current day. These yellow peril tropes continue to affect contemporary Chinese associations and associational life, which was further discussed in Chapter Five.

The enactment of apartheid racial laws from the late 1940s, many of which affected the Chinese, led to the centralisation of Chinese associations under the Central Chinese Association of South Africa (CCASA)[1], with the mandate to address increasing oppression and marginalisation. This national Chinese association took on an accommodationist approach, as opposed to the militant tactics used by earlier incarnations, in response to the political milieu of the time. Chinese associations did not completely relinquish their civil-rights purpose but their methods of achieving this goal changed in the mid-twentieth century. Lastly, Chapter One turned its focus to the 1970s and 1980s and examined the emergence of a new immigrant group, the Taiwanese, and how their introduction brought in numerous concessions from the government that indirectly eased up on the regulation of the local Chinese in South Africa. Thus, Chinese associations slowly progressed from being small and sporadic during the first phases of migration to becoming more formal and

[1] Later known as the Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA)

established in the early 1900s and more centralized, but less militant, under apartheid. Throughout this chapter, there was a deliberate attempt to break away from the common misnomers associated with Chinese history in South Africa, such as the belief that SABCs are mostly descendants of Chinese miners brought to South Africa between 1904-1910 who were instead repatriated at the end of their contracts.

Chapter Two dealt with the development of original SABC and Taiwanese associations into the post-apartheid period, examining how the new democratic environment and the growing diplomatic and economic ties between South Africa and China have transformed these associations. The first section deals with many of the older associations, such as the TCAG, the PCA and CASA that continue to function today. These associations were initially established as a means of responding to the oppression Chinese people suffered under the colonial and apartheid authorities in South Africa, but democracy ensured that they no longer faced such widespread legal discrimination. Discrimination towards the Chinese, both legal and racial, has to some extent continued into the democratic era, partly as a result of the Chinese's ambivalent status under apartheid, which has extended into the present. At the same time, the advent of democracy and the 1996 constitution guaranteed, for the first time in South Africa's history, full and equal voting and citizenship rights to all groups, including South African Chinese. Consequently, many of the established Chinese associations have turned towards community and socio-cultural functions to retain their relevance and popularity amongst SABCs, and their joint celebration of Chinese New Year in the First Chinatown has gained a multicultural attendance. Yet associations such as CASA and TCAG have gone on to tackle the areas of discrimination against Chinese people that have both persisted in and emerged in the context of the democratic era. Important examples of this are two high-profile court cases: the first relates to the side-lining of the Chinese in B-BBEE policies and the second concerns an anti-Chinese hate speech case currently on trial at the Equity Court. While democracy has not completely eradicated the need for civil action by Chinese associations, and has at times discriminated against the Chinese in much the same way that the apartheid government had, it has nonetheless provided the constitutional foundation and institutions through which ongoing discrimination can be challenged.

The second section of the chapter focusses on how the SACSA, PCA, and SFA attempt to remain relevant in the post-apartheid era. Associations, such as the PCA, have lost members partly because there is no longer a common enemy around which to mobilise. The membership of most of these groups remains dominated by SABCs, and many cite language differences as the significant contributor towards a lack of integration between SABCs and recent Chinese migrants. Additionally, the lack of any real support from recent Chinese migrants in the B-BBEE court case suggests a disjuncture between these two groups. Chapter Five problematises the argument that the language barrier is the reason for this separation by showing that some SABCs are themselves wary and prejudicial towards recent Chinese migrants.

Chapter Three examined the types of new associations established by recent Chinese migrants, which contrast the social nature of SABC groups. Many of these associations, such as the Sino South Africa Chamber of Commerce (SSACC), consist of economic migrants, and their focus is on developing business and financial networks. Furthermore, the production of social capital, *guanxi*, shows how culture plays a significant role in the development and proliferation of Chinese business networks. Additionally, other associations, such as the South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre (SACCPCC) and Young and Beauty bible study, have also developed to address the various legal and socio-economic concerns of Chinese migrants; as well as their diverse social, cultural, linguistic and religious needs.

Lastly, Chapter Three analysed Chinese individuals who have chosen to not associate. The issue of identity becomes apparent here, as many of the Chinese in South Africa feel they do not fit any of the Chinese groups and thus do not associate. Additionally, there is also a trend that Chinese migrants who are economically and socially integrated into South African society feel less of a need to associate on the basis of their Chinese identity. Participating in migrant networks become less urgent when one has the language, educational skills, and economic resources to be independent. This discussion seems to suggest class is an important factor in the way recent Chinese migrants identify and associate in South Africa.

Chapter Four looked at how modern technology has revolutionised the associational lives of recent Chinese migrants. Using Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities, it examined how the *ArrowLine Chinese Radio* has cultivated conventional forms of associating

around its physical presence but developed new forms of associating around its broadcasting. As its broadcasting fosters a shared belonging amongst the Chinese migrant community of Gauteng, the radio has therefore created an imagined community based on abstract forms of associational life.

Chapter Four also analysed the rise of new social media and the emergence of virtual communities, specifically by adding on to the research and literature of associational networks in the digital age. The example of the South African Market account on WeChat demonstrates that the interconnectivity of virtual groups far surpasses the communicative reach of conventional associations. Furthermore, it shows that virtual communities differ in their relatively impersonal and asocial nature; ability to remain anonymous in it; and responsiveness of members. However, social media has also transformed some conventional Chinese associations through the use of WeChat groups. By providing a constant connection to members, these associations are now more efficient in carrying out their primary functions. Evidently, these new technologies and platforms of radio and social media have been eagerly embraced by the Chinese in South Africa and both examples have demonstrated that in the twenty-first century, associational life and associations are dependent on technological advances and have adapted accordingly.

The scholarship on the Chinese in South Africa identifies three broad categories of Chinese: SABCs, Taiwanese and recent Chinese migrants. This categorisation, which I have also applied to this study, provides a helpful distinction between these groups. However, Chapter Five argued that these categories have become inadequate portrayals of the Chinese in South Africa because of the myriad of differences they encompass in terms of background, migratory history, class, business interests, belonging and identity. While they can still be used as a general framework, it is essential to highlight the diversity of individuals who fall under each category.

Additionally, Chapter Five examined the stereotypes about the Chinese held by the South African media and the public. These generalisations, which have deep historical roots, portray the Chinese as undocumented/illegal migrants, poor, prone to criminality, ignorant, illiterate and isolated. The chapter argues that even some SABCs are inclined to stigmatise and/or stereotype their own compatriots. This partly reflects the process of acculturation to host societies, but also importantly underlines the conflict between senses of belonging and

not belonging. The chapter challenged such stereotypes by analysing the experiences of recent Chinese migrant professionals who are legal residents, prosperous, educated, and well-integrated in South African society. Furthermore, it looked at how the specific stereotypes about Fujianese migrants are based on oversimplifications of a large and diverse group. Evidently, the Chinese population of South Africa is not a homogenous group and requires more complexity when represented in academic literature, media and public discourse.

In conclusion, this project analysed the transformation of Chinese associations in the post-apartheid era. Older associations partly shifted their focus to community and cultural activities in the democratic era, whereas recent Chinese migrants established new associations, many of which are business-orientated but also include support and religious groups. Modern technology, particularly social media, has enhanced Chinese associations' ability to connect and communicate with their members while simultaneously allowing for the development of new forms of associating through virtual communities. This thesis has raised important questions about old and new forms of "imagined communities", and the role of associational life in the South African Chinese communities that have collectively formed over the course of the past century and a half, with particular focus on the post-1994 period. Associations and associational life have been an important lens through which to analyse migrant communities and their histories. Its use in this project has shed valuable light on the ways in which culture is transmitted, how communities are shaped by changing socio-political circumstances (including the influx of new generations of migrants), and how communities use associations to share information, build social capital, access resources and foster kinship networks. These findings of this study are integral to our understanding of how and why Chinese migrants have historically settled in South Africa at different historical periods and the challenges that they have faced. More importantly, the findings add to the scarce literature on the different contemporary Chinese groups in South Africa and will be essential to the analysis of the numerous other migrant communities in the country and more broadly the continent. The transformation of Chinese associational life in South Africa over the last century into the democratic era has illustrated how these forms of social, economic, religious and cultural relations and interactions have been central to the way in which Chinese migrants have endeavoured to make South Africa home.

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Annexure 1

Sample Questions

1. Please tell me about yourself– where and when were you born, your family background, schooling, marital status, education, occupation?
2. Please tell me about your or your family's migration to South Africa.
3. How has your experience in South Africa been?
4. Where would you call 'home'?
5. Do you feel welcomed in South Africa?
6. What are some of your daily social activities and hobbies?
7. Are you connected and involved in a Chinese community?
8. Are you a member of any Chinese group/association in Gauteng? Follow up questions= What type of organization is it (formal and informal)? How does its membership work? (exclusive Chinese?). What language is used predominantly? How often do you participate? What are your reasons for being part of such a group? How important are these associations to you and to your community? What value do you find in them? What are the objectives of the association?
9. Did you belong to associations/social networks in China? And are you still connected to them?