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Decentralisation in Cameroon and the Anglophones’ Struggle for Autonomy

Emmanuel Makia Epongo

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the

Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Supervisor: Professor Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk

Co-supervisor: Dr. John Khumalo

May 18, 2023



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Abstract

In Cameroon, decentralisation was introduced in 1996 to promote development, democracy and

good governance at the local level. However, decentralisation exacerbated conflicts between the

Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government, resulting in a civil war in

2017. Therefore, this research explores how the implementation of decentralisation in the two

Anglophone regions exacerbated conflicts between the Anglophone minority and the

Francophone-majority government. Despite the growing literature on decentralisation and

conflicts, very little research has been conducted on conflicts arising from former independent

colonial territories that reunited under a federal system and later evolved to a decentralised

unitary system, a shortcoming addressed by this research. This study used qualitative

methodology and a case study design. The research was conducted at the Kumba and Bamenda

city councils in the Southwest and Northwest regions, respectively. Participants were selected

through purposive and snowball sampling techniques for semi-structured interviews. Data from

interviews, observation and archival documents were merged and analysed through thematic

analysis. The findings suggest that decentralisation in the Anglophone regions is more of

deconcentration than devolution. Understanding how decentralisation increased intrastate

conflict between the Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government could have

a broader significance for researchers, governments and policymakers seeking to mitigate

conflicts, particularly in Africa, with diverse societies prone to intrastate conflicts.

Keywords: decentralisation, intrastate conflicts, mitigate conflicts, eroded autonomy,

divided societies.



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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the

requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand,

Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other

University.

-----------------------------------------

Emmanuel Makia Epongo

May 18, 2023



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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents of blessed memory, Papa Epongo Paul Eyambe

and Mama Esther Tua Epongo, who encouraged me to get a good education.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to God for helping me to complete this thesis. Twenty-eight years ago, I left

Cameroon by road to study law at the University of Witwatersrand, but I got stranded in the

Democratic Republic of Congo. That experience changed my life and purpose. I thought I had

failed, but God had a different plan. In 2013, my wife was transferred to the U.S. Consulate in

Johannesburg, South Africa. While in Johannesburg, I applied to the Law School at Wits, but the

Director sent my application to the Wits School of Governance, where I was accepted.

I thank my first supervisor, Dr. Manamela Matshabaphala, for his guidance before transferring to

Wits Business School. I am grateful to the Director of the WSG for assigning me new

supervisors. I sincerely thank Professor Anthoni Van Nieukerk for agreeing to supervise my

thesis and the Co-supervisor Dr. John Khumalo. Without their assistance, this research would not

have been possible.

I am eternally grateful to my wife for accepting the transfer to South Africa and for her moral

and financial support. I am also grateful to my son, who did not take offence whenever I could

not attend some of his social activities and basketball games because I had to work on my paper.

I am grateful to the staff at the WSG secretariat and the faculty for their assistance throughout

my study. I am also thankful to my late parents, Pa Epongo and Mama Esther, for encouraging

me to continue my education.

Finally, I am grateful to all the participants who participated in my research, whose names cannot

be mentioned here because of ethical considerations. Without you all, I would not have

completed this research.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC1 All Anglophone Conference 1

AAC2 All Anglophone Conference 2

AD Administrative Decentralisation

CFA African financial community

CDF Common Decentralisation Fund

CPDM Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement

DO Divisional officer

ECG East Cameroon Government

ELECAM Elections Cameroon

FC French Cameroun

FEICOM Special council support fund

FD Fiscal Decentralisation

GD Government Delegate

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

NA Native Authority

NDF National Decentralisation Fund

PD Political Decentralisation



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PIB Public Investment Budget

SDF Social Democratic Front

SDO Senior Divisional Officer

SC Southern Cameroons

SCNC Southern Cameroons National Council

TB Tender Board

UN United Nations

WCG West Cameroon Government



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 2
DECLARATION 3
DEDICATION 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS 8
CHAPTER ONE 12
1.1 Introduction 12
1.2 Background to the Study 16
1.3 Statement of the Problem 20
1.4 Purpose Statement 22
1.5 Research Questions. 24
1.6 Scope of the Study 25
1.7 Significance of the Study 26
1.8 Definition of terms 31

1.8.1 Types of Decentralisation 32
1.8.1.2 Political Decentralisation 32
1.8.1.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 33
1.8.1.4 Administrative Decentralisation 34
1.8.1.5 Economic or Market Decentralisation 35

1.8.2 Forms of Decentralisation 36
1.8.2.1 Deconcentration 36
1.8.2.2 Delegation 37
1.8.2.3 Devolution 38

1.8.3 Autonomy 39
1.8.4 Conclusion 40

CHAPTER TWO 41
2.1. Introduction 41
2.2 Decentralisation can either reduce or increase conflicts. 42
2.3. Decentralisation has the potential to reduce conflicts. 47
2.4. Decentralisation can exacerbate conflicts 54
2.5. Conclusion 59

2.6. The Theoretical Framework 60
2.6.1 Decentralisation and Conflict Mitigation: Theoretical Considerations 63
2.6.2 The erosion of Anglophones’ autonomy exacerbated conflicts 71



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2.6.2.1 Historical Context 71
2.6.2.2 Decentralisation further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones 79
2.6.2.3 Conclusion 87

CHAPTER THREE 88
3.1 Introduction 88
3.2 Qualitative Research Methodology 88
3.3 Case Study Design 96
3.4 Method of Data Collection 103

3.4.1 Interviews 104
3.4.1.1 Sequencing of the Interviews 108
3.4.1.2 Data 108
3.4.1.3 Sampling Strategy 109
3.4.1.4 Author positionality 110
3.4.1.5 Participants 112
3.4.1.6 Procedure 114
3.4.1.7 Time Horizon 116

3.5.1 Documentation 117
3.5.2 Participant Observation 119

3.5 Ethical Considerations 121
3.6 Method of Data Analysis 126

3.6.1 Thematic Analysis 126
3.6.2 Applying the Six-step Process by Braun and Clarke 135

3.6.2.1 Step 1: Familiarising with the data set 135
3.6.2.2 Step 2: Generating initial codes from all the data. 135
3.6.2.3 Step 3: Searching for themes. 177
3.6.2.4 Step 4: Reviewing themes. 180
3.6.2.5 Step 5: Defining and naming themes: 183

3.7.3 Conclusion 184
CHAPTER FOUR 185
4.1 Introduction 185
4. 2 Methodology 185
4. 3 Producing the report 188

4.3.1 Political Decentralisation 189
4.3.1.1 Democratic Elections 189
4.3.1.2 Citizen Representation 192
4.3.1.3 Citizen Participation 194

4.3.2 Fiscal Decentralisation 198
4.3.2.1 Revenue Autonomy 198



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4.3.2.2 Expenditure Autonomy 202
4.3.3 Administrative Decentralisation 205

4.3.3.1 Accountability 206
4.3.3.2 Decision-making Authority 211
4.3.3.3 Local Autonomy 213

4.3.4 Conflict 221
4.3.5 Local Conflicts 221

4.3.5.1 Ambiguous Laws 222
4.3.5.2 Resource Allocation 223
4.3.5.3 Power Struggle 225

4.3.6 National Conflict 228
4.3.6.1 Eroded Autonomy 228
4.3.6.2 Lack of Political Will 234
4.3.6.3 Perception of Decentralisation 239
4.3.6.4 Conclusion 245

CHAPTER FIVE 246
5.1 Introduction 246

5.1.1 Decentralisation is more of deconcentration than devolution. 247
5.1.2 Decentralisation further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones 258
5.1.3 Decentralisation marginalised, discriminated and assimilated Anglophones. 263
5.1.4 Decentralisation increased conflicts. 267
5.1.5 Conclusion 272

CHAPTER SIX 273
6.1 Introduction 273
6.2 Discussion 273

6.2.1 Summary of the four key findings 274
6.2.2 Interpretation and implications of the results 276

6.2.2.1 Decentralisation is more of deconcentration than devolution 276
6.2.2.2 Decentralisation further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones 284
6.2.2.3 Decentralisation marginalised, discriminated and assimilated Anglophones 293
6.2.2.4 Decentralisation increased conflicts 300
6.2.2.5 Limitations of the study 309
6.2.2.6 Suggestions for future research in the field 311
6.2.2.7 Recommendations for policy intervention 313
6.2.2.8 Conclusion 321

CHAPTER SEVEN 323
7.1 Introduction 323
7.2 Summary of the key findings 323



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7.3 How the research aims and objectives were fulfilled 325
7.4 Contribution of this study to theory and practice 333
7.5 Conclusion 341
REFERENCES 342

Appendix A: Informed Consent Form 364
Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 367
Appendix C: Interview questions 369
Appendix D: Proposed 1960 Federal Constitution 373
Appendix E: Ethics Clearance Certificate & Wits Permission Letter 374
Appendix F: Authorisation Letter to do research in Bamenda. 375
Appendix G: Authorisation Letter to do research in Kumba 377



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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

With the rise of intrastate conflicts worldwide, governments have adopted

decentralisation as a popular strategy for mitigating conflicts in divided societies

(Brancati, 2006; Fujikawa, 2021). This research is about the implementation of

decentralisation in the two Anglophone regions of the Southwest and Northwest and their

struggle for autonomy from the central government. The modern state of Cameroon was

founded when British Southern Cameroons (hereinafter called Anglophones) joined

French Cameroun (hereinafter called Francophones) as an autonomous territory in 1961

under a federal system. In 1996, Cameroon became a decentralised unitary state to

promote development, democracy, and good governance at the local level. However, the

implementation of decentralisation in the two Anglophone regions intensified intrastate

conflicts, leading to the ongoing civil war in the Anglophone regions between

Anglophone armed groups and the central government (Nwati, 2021; Nkongho, 2018).

Therefore, this research explored how decentralisation exacerbated intrastate conflicts in

Cameroon. This paper examined the design of decentralisation and the degree of

autonomy devolved to the Anglophone regions by studying the Kumba and Bamenda city

councils in the Southwest and Northwest regions, respectively. The findings suggest that

the form of decentralisation implemented in the Anglophone regions is more of

deconcentration than devolution because decentralisation has failed to transfer sufficient

powers and resources to the Anglophones to manage their local affairs with limited



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interference from the central government. Instead of decentralisation restoring the lost

autonomy of Anglophones, it further eroded their autonomy, thus exacerbating intrastate

conflicts. Autonomy is essential in conflict mitigation, especially for minority groups like

the Anglophones with different preferences and spatially concentrated in a specific area

and have different preferences (Fujikawa, 2021; Aime, 2020; Tranchant, 2007).

Decentralisation has the potential to reduce conflicts by empowering minority

groups with independent decision-making powers to design and implement policies

according to their preferences (Seabright, 1996; Hechter, 2000, Gurr, 2000, Brancati,

2006; Tranchant, 2007; 2016; Grasa & Camps, 2009; Burgess, 2011; Durante, 2017,

Fukijawa, 2021). However, decentralisation could also intensify conflicts by eroding the

autonomy of minority groups (Merera, 2007; Woodward, 2007; Sambanis & Milanovic,

2009; Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011; Goodfellow & Lindermann, 2013; Marinzel, 2014) and by

reinforcing ethnic and regional identities (Brancati, 2006; Eaton, 2006; Beland &

Lecours, 2005; 2007; Colomb, Bakke & Tomaney, 2014). Therefore, it is contended that

decentralisation increases conflicts when the central government erodes the autonomy of

a minority group within a unitary state that previously enjoyed some form of autonomy

before joining the host state. Adopting a theoretical framework which explains how

decentralisation exacerbates intrastate conflicts in a decentralised unitary state could have

a broader significance for governments and policymakers seeking to mitigate conflicts,

particularly in Africa, with diverse societies prone to internal conflicts (Keller, 2007;

Burgess, 2011).

This study is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one begins with the

introduction and is followed by the background to the study, problem statement, purpose



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of the study, research questions, scope of the study, significance of the research and

definition of the terms. This chapter provides a general understanding of the concept of

decentralisation and how governments are increasingly using decentralisation as an

effective mechanism for managing intrastate conflicts. In this chapter, the researcher

argues that decentralisation increases conflicts when the central government continues to

erode the autonomy of a minority group that previously enjoyed some form of autonomy

before joining the host state (Merera, 2007; Marinzel, 2014). Chapter two focuses on the

literature review, assessing the ongoing debate and the conflicting themes, and the theory

of decentralisation that guided this study. Decentralisation has the potential to either

increase or reduce conflicts depending on the circumstance (Brancati, 2006). The

researcher argues that the decentralisation laws and their implementation failed to ease

conflicts owing to their weak design and poor implementation.

Chapter three outlines the methods section, including qualitative methodology,

case study design, data collection method and data analysis and the justification for their

selection. The researcher chose the qualitative methodology because this research is

grounded in the interpretive paradigm, and researchers in the interpretive tradition seek to

understand a phenomenon from the perspectives and experiences of participants. Chapter

four is the write-up report of the thematic analysis. The chapter describes the process that

was followed to analyse the data and produce the report. In producing the report, the

researcher used the six-step process developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). Chapter five

presents the findings/results of the study. The key finding of this study is that the form of

decentralisation implemented in the two Anglophone regions is more of deconcentration

than devolution because the weak design and poor implementation of decentralisation



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failed to transfer real power to the Anglophone regions. Chapter six deals with the

discussion and recommendations. In the discussions, the findings are presented in the

form of themes directly related to the research questions. The pattern of results is

consistent with past studies on decentralisation in the literature. The chapter also

discusses the study’s limitations, provides suggestions for future research in the field and

offers recommendations for policy intervention to mitigate the ongoing conflict. Chapter

seven is the conclusion of the study. The chapter summarises the key research findings

related to the research aim and questions and how the research helps address the gap in

the study. This chapter also discusses the value and contribution of this research to the

field of knowledge both in terms of theory and practice, The study ends with references

and appendices sections.



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1.2 Background to the Study

Since the end of the Second World War, intrastate conflicts have become the most

common type of conflict rather than wars between nations (Bakke, 2008; Sambanis &

Milanovic, 2009). To prevent these types of conflicts, governments have turned to

decentralisation as one of the tools for managing intrastate conflicts while preserving the

territorial integrity of the actual state (Schrottshammer, 2006; Bakke, 2008; Keil &

Anderson, 2018). Decentralisation is defined as

the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation
of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public
authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or
non-governmental private or voluntary organisations (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema,
1983:13).

This definition is relevant to this study because it shows intergovernmental fiscal

relations and the relationships between the government and outside organisations,

working together to make the government more efficient in providing public goods and

services (Tiebouts, 1956; Oates, 1972). This concept of governance does not view

decision-making as the exclusive domain of the central government but also as the right

of citizens and the private sector to shape public policy (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

The assumption is that decentralisation would reduce intrastate conflict by empowering

regional and local governments or minority groups to design and implement public

policies according to their preferences (Tranchant, 2007; Brancati, 2006; Hechter, 2000;

Gurr, 2000).

Decentralisation has been used in developed and developing nations to mitigate

intrastate conflicts. Several scholars (Brancati, 2006; Tranchant, 2007; Bakke, 2008)



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suggest that political decentralisation has been successful in reducing ethnic conflicts and

secession in developed countries like Belgium, Spain, Canada, Switzerland, United

Kingdom, as well as in developing countries like Brazil, Nigeria, India, and

Bosnia-Herzegovina. African countries have also implemented decentralisation to

promote stability, democracy, and development (USAID, 2010). However, Burges (2011)

suggests that decentralisation has had a limited impact on containing intrastate conflicts,

especially in Central Africa, the most undemocratic and unstable region, comprising

mostly French countries, including Cameroon. Ndegwa (2002:16) describes the overall

pace of decentralisation in Africa as “moderate”, with the least decentralisation occurring

in Francophone countries. In 1996, Cameroon adopted decentralisation, but it

exacerbated conflicts, leading to a civil war in 2017 between Anglophone armed groups

and the central government.

Numerous studies have been conducted on decentralisation and ethnic or regional

conflicts (Brancati, 2006; Bakke, 2008; Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009). These studies

have found that decentralisation reduces conflicts by granting ethnic or regional groups

autonomy (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Tranchant, 2007, 2016; Durante, 2017; Fujikawa,

2021), sharing political power (Burgess, 2011; Grasa & Camps, 2009; Noris, 2008) and

accommodating ethnic diversity (Miodownik & Cartrite, 2009; Yusoff, Sarjoon &

Hassan, 2016). However, decentralisation increases conflicts by undermining the

autonomy of local governments and ethnic or regional groups (Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011;

Tambulasi, 2009; Merera, 2007; Goodfellow & Lindemann, 2013) and by empowering

regional groups with resources to demand greater autonomy or secession (Brancati, 2006;

Eaton, 2006; Beland & Lecours, 2005, 2007; Colomb et al., 2014). These studies have



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focused on conflicts between governments and ethnic or regional groups seeking greater

autonomy or independence.

However, very little research has been conducted to understand the relationship

between decentralisation and conflicts between former independent United Nations Trust

Territories that reunited under a federal system but later evolved into a unitary state,

especially when their colonial histories, socio-cultural and political characteristics were

different. The sparse research has created room for further research. Therefore, this study

explored how decentralisation intensified conflicts between the Anglophone minority and

the Francophone-majority government. If the ongoing conflict is unchecked, as

Dahrendorf (1958) claims, it could intensify and lead to more deaths. Several studies

(Tiryakian, 1998; Premdas, 2000; Marinzel; 2014) suggest that groups try to secede

when governments fail to rectify conditions of discontent.

Hence, this research aimed to understand how decentralisation exacerbated

intrastate conflicts in Cameroon. Before joining French Cameroon in 1961, the

Anglophone territory was an autonomous region and under the federal system,

Anglophones continued to enjoy some degree of autonomy. However, under

decentralisation, Anglophone regions do not have any exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore,

this research argues that decentralisation intensified intrastate conflicts by failing to

restore the lost autonomy of Anglophones and further eroding their autonomy due to its

poor design and implementation. For example, Eyoh (1998) and Anyefru (2011) claim

that the Francophone-dominated government has used state laws to dismantle the

autonomy and cultural heritage of the Anglophones. Research by Aime (2020) suggests

that the Constitutional and legal framework of decentralisation under the 1996



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Constitution, among other things, failed to address the perception of Anglophone

marginalisation adequately. Mbuagbo and Fru (2011), based on the study of the 2004

Law implementing decentralisation in Cameroon, found that the appointment of

government officials over regional and local authorities undermined the authority of

elected mayors and councillors, thus resulting in conflicts. Similarly, Cheka (2007)

claims that the appointment of government delegates in Cameroon to supervise regional

and local authorities subverted the democratic principles of electoral accountability.

According to the World Bank (2011:4), “Cameroon lacks an effective and an operational

plan for decentralisation. Indeed, line ministries appear to regard decentralisation as a

threat to the control over resources and their influence”. Ndiva (2011:524) suggests that

Cameroon’s form of decentralisation “resembles more a false version of devolution than

the real one”. According to Fombad and Steytler (2019), the design of decentralisation in

the form of deconcentration in Cameroon is a disguise for the central government to

maintain power and control over regional and local authorities. Similar studies outside

Cameroon (Tambulasi, 2009; Marinzel, 2014; Goodfellow & Lindermanne, 2013;

Merera, 2007; Woodward, 2007; Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009) also suggest that

decentralisation exacerbates conflicts by eroding the autonomy of minority groups,

especially those which have previously enjoyed some degree of independence before

joining the host state.

Given the above discussion, this study suggests that the failure of decentralisation

to restore the autonomy of Anglophones, coupled with a weak design and poor

implementation, intensified intrastate conflicts, resulting in a civil war in 2017.

Therefore, this research explored how decentralisation exacerbated conflicts between the



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Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government and proposed

recommendations that could help mitigate the ongoing conflict.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The key problem addressed in this research is that the implementation of

decentralisation in Cameroon in 1996 has exacerbated intrastate conflicts between the

Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government, which led to a civil war

in 2017. According to Ngoh (2011), Anglophones have been complaining about the

erosion of their autonomy since independence. Therefore, during the constitutional

debates leading up to the 1996 decentralised unitary Constitution, Anglophone leaders

called for the government to return to federalism so that each territory would regain its

autonomy (Munzu, 2016). Also, in 2015, Anglophone Common Law lawyers called for

the government to return to a federal system. After the government rejected their

requests, the lawyers organised a peaceful protest, but some of their leaders were arrested

and tried in court for treason (Nkongho, 2018). That led some Anglophones to create

self-defence groups to continue their struggle. On December 30, 2017, President Paul

Biya declared war on the Anglophone armed groups (Nwati, 2021).

While most conflicts in the literature have been between central governments and

ethnic or regional groups seeking greater autonomy or independence (Bakke, 2008;

Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009), very few studies have examined decentralisation and

conflicts between former independent United Nations trust territories that reunited under

a federal system but later evolved to a unitary state. Therefore, this study explored how



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decentralisation exacerbated conflicts between the Anglophone minority and the

Francophone-majority government. Previous studies on decentralisation intensifying

conflicts have focused on minority’s grievances against their central governments

(Durante, 2017; Hechter, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Goodfellow & Lindemann, 2013; Merera,

2007; Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011) and decentralisation reinforcing ethnic and regional

identities (Roeder 1991; Bunce, 1999; Brancati, 2006; Eaton 2006; Beland & Lecours,

2005; 2007; Colomb et al., 2014). However, these studies have not examined how the

historical context influences the design of decentralisation to erode the autonomy of

minorities with different colonial histories within a unitary state, thus leading to conflicts.

Insufficient research has created the opportunity for further study.

The motivation for this research came from the desire to understand why

decentralisation would mitigate intrastate conflicts in other countries but not in

Cameroon. Therefore, this study explored how decentralisation intensified intrastate

conflicts in Cameroon. The ongoing conflict is not only destroying human lives and

property, forcing thousands of Anglophones to flee to Nigeria as refugees and displacing

thousands of Anglophones from their homes, slowing down the economy and preventing

children from attending schools regularly, but it is also encouraging kidnappings, rapping,

looting, burning of villages, arms trafficking, and threatening the territorial integrity of

the nation and regional peace (Nkongho, 2018; Nwati, 2021). After six years of fighting,

over 6,000 people have died in the Anglophone regions, thousand displaced, about

600,000 children deprived of education and over 2.2 million people need humanitarian

support (International Crisis Group, 2023, March 31). Therefore, understanding how

decentralisation increased conflict between the Anglophone minority and the



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Francophone-majority government could contribute new knowledge to conflict resolution

and offer new insights to policymakers in Cameroon on how to contain the ongoing

conflict and restore peace in the nation. To do this, the researcher conducted qualitative

research with a case study design. Data collected was analysed through thematic analysis

to propose policy interventions.

1.4 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore how the implementation

of decentralisation in the Kumba city council in the Southwest and Bamenda city council

in the Northwest regions of the two Anglophone regions exacerbated conflicts between

the Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government of Cameroon since

it was instituted in 1996. The following five objectives aim to fulfil the purpose of this

study:

1. To explore how the implementation of decentralisation exacerbated

conflicts between the Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government.

Before reunification, Anglophones had a government, legislature, constitution, and

judiciary and exercised control over their legal system, economy, education, politics and

language. However, Anglophones have no exclusive jurisdiction on any subject matter

under decentralisation.

2. To understand the meaning of decentralisation and how it is implemented

in the Anglophone regions. According to section 2 (1) of the 2004 law, decentralisation



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shall consist of devolution by the state of special powers and resources to regional and

local authorities.

3. To understand the lived experiences of Anglophones under the

decentralisation program. Several scholars claim that Anglophones have been

marginalised, discriminated and even annexed by Francophones (Konings & Nyamnjoh,

1997; Eyoh, 1998; Anyangwe, 2009; Gorji-Dinka, 1985; Fanso, 2009; Kah, 2010; Ngoh,

2011), while others think that Anglophones have been treated as second class citizens and

slaves (Anyangwe, 2009; Ambe,2021). Some Francophone elites have described

Anglophones as “enemies in the house” and have called them “Biafrans”, meaning

foreigners from the Igbo region of Nigeria. They have also described Anglophones as

“dogs”, “roaches which need to be exterminated”, “terrorists” about the armed groups

and “two cubes of sugar in a basin” (Mukong, 1998:22; Ngamfon, 2020:1484)

4. To understand how Anglophones perceived the decentralisation program.

Anglophones perceived the program as a sham because the poor design and

implementation further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones. According to Eyoh (1998)

and Anyefru (2011), the Francophone-dominated government uses state laws to dismantle

the autonomy and cultural heritage of the Anglophones. Anglophones also viewed the

concentration of power with the central government as a political ploy by the

Francophones to maintain control over Anglophones (Anyangwe, 2009; Gorji-Dinka,

1985; Fanso, 2013).

5. To identify the reasons motivating Anglophones to continue their struggle

for autonomy. Anglophones were motivated to continue their struggle because of a poorly



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designed decentralisation that resulted in the marginalisation, discrimination and

assimilation of Anglophones (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997; Eyoh, 1998; Mukong, 1998,

Anyangwe, 2009; Gorji-Dinka, 1985; Fanso, 2009, Ngamfon, 2020; Ambe, 2012)

1.5 Research Questions.

The research questions are derived from the five objectives in the purpose

statement. Therefore, the following questions are set as guidelines to fulfil the purpose of

this research. The main research question is

1. How did decentralisation exacerbate conflict between the Anglophone

minority and the Francophone-majority government?

The sub-questions are

2. What is the meaning of decentralisation, and how is it implemented in the

Anglophone regions?

3. What are the experiences of Anglophones under the decentralisation

program?

4. How do Anglophones perceive the decentralisation program?

5. What reasons motivate Anglophones to continue their struggle for

autonomy?



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1.6 Scope of the Study

The purpose of this research was to explore how the implementation of

decentralisation in the two Anglophone regions of the Southwest and Northwest

exacerbated conflict between the Anglophone minority and the majority Francophone-led

government. The specific subject investigated was the devolution of power by the state to

the local government in the two Anglophone regions. The goal was to understand how

the implementation of decentralisation further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones, thus

leading to intrastate conflicts. The study was conducted only in the two Anglophone

regions, namely, at the Kumba city council in the Southwest region and the Bamenda city

council in the Northwest region. Each city council has three sub-divisional councils

within the city council area. The research was conducted in all six sub-divisional

councils, including the two city councils. This research began in 2014 and will end in

2023. The researcher travelled to Cameroon in 2016 to conduct interviews in Kumba and

Bamenda from January to March 2016. The study participants were all Anglophones

who lived and worked in the two Anglophone regions. While some were selected for

their knowledge and experience of the decentralisation program, others were chosen for

their political activism. Using purposive and snowball sampling strategies, 49 key

informants participated in the study (Merriam, 2002; Neuman, 2011; Wahyuni, 2012).

The participants included representatives of the senior divisional officers (SDO) and

government delegates (GD), mayors or their representatives, municipal treasurers,

council secretary generals, councillors, activists, community leaders and academics. This

study used qualitative methodology with a case study design. Data were obtained from



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interviews, observation, and archival documents. The data were merged and analysed

through thematic analysis (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Braun & Clarke, 2006).

This study was not about the failures and successes of decentralisation in

Cameroon; instead, it was about the implementation of decentralisation and the

Anglophones’ struggle for autonomy. Second, this research focused only on

decentralisation even though there are other institutional designs for mitigating intrastate

conflicts, such as federalism (Wolff, 2011), veto rights for minorities, proportional

representation (Keil & Anderson, 2018) and consociational or other power-sharing

arrangements (Lijphart, 2004; Norris, 2008; Burgess, 2011).

1.7 Significance of the Study

The findings of this research could add new knowledge to the field of

decentralisation and conflict mitigation while also benefiting specific groups like the

Anglophones, the government of Cameroon, policymakers, researchers, international

organisations and countries interested in conflict mitigation in Africa. In the literature,

decentralisation is perceived as an effective mechanism for conflict mitigation in divided

societies, but in practice, decentralisation is more successful in reducing conflicts in some

countries than in others (Brancati, 2006). Several scholars suggest that decentralisation

reduces conflict when minority groups are empowered to meet their needs (Gurr, 2000;

Grasa & Camps, 2009; Tranchant, 2007; Keil & Anderson, 2018). On the other hand,

others are convinced that decentralisation intensifies conflicts when the central

government erodes the autonomy of minority groups (Goodfellow & Lindemann, 2013;



27

Merera, 2007; Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011) and reinforces ethnic and regional identities

(Brancati, 2006; Eaton, 2006; Beland & Lecours, 2005, 2007; Colomb et al., 2014).

However, others maintain that decentralisation has the potential to either decrease or

intensify conflicts depending on the particular circumstance (Brancati, 2006; Bakke,

2008; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006).

While most of the research has focused on the relationship between

decentralisation and ethnic or regional conflicts (Brancati, 2006; Bakke, 2008; Sambanis

& Milanovic, 2009), there has been little research on decentralisation and intrastate

conflicts between former independent United Nations Trust Territories that reunited under

a federal system but later evolved to a unitary state, a shortcoming addressed by this

research. According to Schou and Haug (2005), studies on how decentralisation is used to

manage conflicts and diversity in multiethnic states that have evolved into unitary states

are lacking in the literature. In 1996, Cameroon adopted decentralisation to promote

development, democracy and good governance at the local level. However,

decentralisation exacerbated intrastate conflicts, resulting in a civil war in 2017.

Therefore, this research explored how decentralisation exacerbated conflicts between the

Anglophone minority and the Francophone-majority government. Before joining French

Cameroon in 1961, the Anglophone territory was an autonomous region and under the

federal system, Anglophones continued to enjoy some degree of autonomy. This research

argued that decentralisation increased intrastate conflicts between the Anglophone

minority and the Francophone-majority government because it failed to restore the

autonomy rights of Anglophones. Second, the weak design and poor implementation

further eroded the autonomy of Anglophones, thus leading to a civil war in 2017.



28

Therefore, the findings of this study could add new knowledge to the field of conflict

mitigation, which previous studies had not adequately addressed, thus narrowing the gap

in the literature.

The findings of this study could also benefit researchers and academics. In a

world where intrastate conflicts are on the rise, the responsibility of researchers and

scholars, who are trying to resolve intrastate conflicts, has become more relevant (Bakke,

2008; Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009). Scholars and practitioners of decentralisation hope

to find new ways or insights to mitigate conflicts or prevent wars resulting from intrastate

conflicts that threaten international peace. Therefore, the findings of this study could

inspire other scholars to build on this study and improve on the findings by overcoming

some of the limitations in the study. There is also a lack of consensus among scholars and

practitioners regarding the effectiveness of decentralisation in mitigating conflicts in

divided societies. Therefore, this research findings highlighting the importance of the

historical context in designing and implementing decentralisation could advance the

debate.

The ongoing conflict threatens the territorial integrity of the state of Cameroon as

many activists and separatist groups are now demanding the independence of their

territory, which they now call “Ambazonia” (Anyangew; 2017; Ngamfon, 2020; Nwati,

2021). Therefore, the findings of this study could help Cameroon's government

understand why Anglophones continue their struggle for autonomy and respond

positively. According to Lustick et al. (2004), when governments respond positively to

the demands of disgruntled minorities, decentralisation can prevent secession while

preserving the state’s territorial integrity. On the other hand, groups try to secede when



29

governments fail to rectify conditions of discontent and disregard mechanisms for

regulating social conflicts (Dahrendorf, 1958; Tiryakian, 1998; Marinzel, 2014 ).

Therefore, understanding Anglophones' grievances and empowering them to define their

local affairs could encourage them to abandon their quest for independence, thus

preserving the state’s territorial integrity.

Mitigating the ongoing conflict could also help deepen democracy and good

governance in the Anglophone regions where the conflict continues. According to Schou

and Haug (2005), conflicts weaken local governance institutions and civil society because

resources are diverted from these institutions to war efforts and areas of heavy fighting.

Additionally, the ongoing conflict is affecting the economy of Cameroon; therefore,

resolving this conflict is critical. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2019,

September 26), the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and PAMOL, two of the

country's biggest agricultural companies, have lost up to 80 per cent of their capacity.

Also, pressure is being put on the Cameroon military as they are fighting incursions and

cross-border raids and attacks in the Far North Region from Boko Haram, a radical

jihadist group from Northern Nigeria. Furthermore, there are thousands of refugees in

Cameroon from the Central African Republic (CAR) due to the conflict in CAR in 2012.

Cameroon also shares a common border with Nigeria, which also has domestic conflicts,

including the widespread activities of Boko Haram. The terrorist group has carried out

attacks in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Due to the conflicts,

refugees flee from Nigeria to Cameroon (Nwati, 2021). The Democratic Republic of

Congo also experiences conflicts, forcing refugees to move to neighbouring countries,



30

including Cameroon (Kuku, 2019; Institute for Peace & Security Studies, 2020).

Therefore, the findings of this study could also help promote regional peace and stability.

Anglophones could also benefit from this study if the government of Cameroon

redesigns the decentralisation program to grant them their autonomy. First, ending the

conflict would stop the killing of innocent civilians, restore peace in the regions and

encourage IDPs and refugees to return to their homes. It will also enable all schools to

reopen so students can continue their education and allow businesses and companies that

closed down to return to the regions. Second, Anglophones and Francophones have

different preferences in terms of language, law, education, political values, culture and

social norms because of their colonial history (Brain & Eyongetah, 1974). Therefore,

granting them autonomy will enable Anglophones to design and implement policies to

produce group-specific public goods and services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Sambanis

& Milanovic, 2009).

Finally, more wars are fought worldwide from intrastate conflicts than interstate

conflicts (Brancati, 2006; Bakke, 2008; Keil & Anderson, 2018). Therefore, the findings

of this research could help international organisations and donor countries prevent or

resolve conflicts, thus promoting international peace and stability in conflict-prone

nations. Several studies (Bardhan, 2002, Shar & Thompson, 2004; Grasa & Camps,

2009) suggest that the World Bank has embraced decentralisation as a major governance

reform program. According to Van de Walle (2003:6), the World Bank promotes national

decentralisation policies, arguing that low-income countries should focus on “core public

goods and services” and transfer other responsibilities to local governments, the private

sector and voluntary organisations to meet the needs of their people. Cheema and



31

Rondinelli (2007) claim that the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other

international development organisations support decentralisation to strengthen democracy

and promote good governance worldwide. Jan (2014) claims that the World Bank and

IMF have also given financial and institutional support to decentralisation reforms

throughout Africa. Researchers Keil and Anderson (2018) also claim that the UN

Department for Political Affairs has a unit that supports decentralisation programs.

Therefore, the findings of this study could provide new insights to local, regional and

international organisations involved in conflict mitigation in divided societies.

1.8 Definition of terms

Decentralisation is defined as the

transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of
resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public
authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or
non-governmental private or voluntary organisations (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema,
1983:13).

This definition is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First, it establishes

an intergovernmental relationship within the government and a relationship between the

government and private organisations. This definition does not only view

decision-making as the exclusive domain of the central government but also as the right

of citizens and the private sector to shape public policy (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

Second, this definition provides an institutional framework for citizen participation in

local government through free and fair elections (Besley & Smart, 2007; Crook & Manor,

2000). Third, this definition promotes market-based ideas of decentralisation. Through

these ideas, the central government strengthens the private sector, deregulates, and



32

privatises those activities that the private sector and civil society organisations could

carry out more efficiently than public enterprises. This definition categorises

decentralisation into four types or dimensions: political, fiscal, administrative, and

economic decentralisation (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Each type of decentralisation

depends on the scope of authority transferred by the central government to local

governments and the character and nature of the local governments receiving the

authority. A key question in understanding a particular type of decentralisation is

assessing the extent of central government control and local autonomy (Braathen &

Hellevik, 2008). Therefore, distinguishing the different types and forms will clarify the

definition of decentralisation (White, 2011).

1.8.1 Types of Decentralisation

There are four types: political, fiscal, administrative and economic or market

decentralisation.

1.8.1.2 Political Decentralisation

It is a system of government that

aims to give more authority to citizens and their elected representatives in decision
making and public administration. This concept is usually associated with pluralistic
democracy and representative governance. Political decentralisation has also tended to
support democratisation by providing more opportunities for citizens and their elected
representatives to affect the creation and implementation of policies. Political
decentralisation, in this sense, implies that the selection of representatives from local
electoral jurisdiction allows citizens to better know their political representatives and
allows elected officials to better know the needs and desires of their constituents.
However, political decentralisation also requires constitutional or statutory reforms,
development of pluralistic political parties, strengthening of legislatures, creation of
local political units, and encouragement of effective public interest groups (Rondinelli,
1999: 2).



33

According to Brancati (2006), political decentralisation is associated with

power-sharing arrangements among different levels of government, with each level

having the power to legislate on at least one subject matter. Manor (2011) defines

political or democratic decentralisation as the devolution of powers and resources from

higher levels in political systems to elected bodies at lower levels. According to the

author, if political decentralisation is to work well, three essential things must be present,

namely, (1) substantial powers must be devolved unto elected bodies at lower levels; (2)

substantial resources must be devolved unto elected bodies; (3) two types of

accountability must be established: first, horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to

elected representatives and downward accountability of elected representatives to their

constituents. To the author, “If any of these three essentials is absent, the system will fail,

if any is present but weak, the system will work less than well. We know of no exception

to this set of principles” (Manor, 2011: 3).

1.8.1.3 Fiscal Decentralisation

It is commonly defined as the “transfer of fiscal power and resources from the

central government to subordinate or quasi-independent (subnational) government units”

(Boex, 2009: 2). According to Bahl (2008: 3), fiscal decentralisation is “the process of

transferring budgetary authority from the central government to elected subnational

governments to grant them the power to make decisions regarding taxes and expenses''.

Siegle and O’Mahony (2006) define fiscal decentralisation as the transfer of financial

authority to the local level. It involves reducing conditions on the intergovernmental

transfer of resources and giving local jurisdictions greater authority to generate revenue.



34

According to (Rondinelli, 1999), if local governments and private organisations are to

carry out decentralised functions effectively, they must have adequate revenues

transferred from the central government to local governments and the authority to make

expenditure decisions. Therefore, under fiscal decentralisation, local government taxing

and expenditure autonomy are critical in meeting the needs of the people.

1.8.1.4 Administrative Decentralisation

It refers to the

transfer of responsibility for planning, financing, and managing certain public
functions from the central government to subordinate units or levels of government,
semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional, or
functional authorities. It seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial
resources for providing public services between levels of government (Rondinelli,
1999: 2).

Administrative decentralisation focuses on the degree of autonomy local

governments enjoy and the extent of central government control over local government.

The following issues can measure this level of authority: first, the degree of

decision-making authority enjoyed by the local governments; second, the authority to hire

and fire their staff and third, the power to make taxing and spending decisions or the

authority to control public finances (Schneider, 2003). The literature classifies

administrative decentralisation using deconcentration, delegation and devolution. The

degree of autonomy each category enjoys differs. According to Schneider (2003),

deconcentration involves the least degree of autonomy, delegation slightly more, and

devolution the most autonomy. Another difference between these forms of administrative

decentralisation is the relationship between the central and local governments.



35

Deconcentration involves a bureaucratic or hierarchical relationship; delegation involves

a contractual relationship, and devolution involves an arm’s length relationship

(Schneider, 2003).

1.8.1.5 Economic or Market Decentralisation

Economic or Market Decentralisation shifts responsibility for functions from the

public to the private sector. Market decentralisation allows functions that used to be done

exclusively by the government to be performed by businesses, community groups,

cooperatives, private voluntary associations, and other nongovernmental organisations.

Privatisation and deregulation are the two forms of market decentralisation. Rondinelli,

McCullough and Johnson (1989:72) claim that through privatisation and deregulation,

some governments have divested themselves of responsibilities for functions either by
transferring them to voluntary organisations or by allowing them to be performed by
private businesses. In some cases, governments have transferred responsibilities to
parallel organisations such as national industrial and trade associations, professional
groups, religious organisations, political parties, or cooperatives. These parallel
organisations have been given the responsibility to licence, regulate or supervise their
members in performing functions that were previously performed or regulated by the
government.

Under market decentralisation, voluntary organisations can be crucial in

expanding access to services. They can be essential in delivering services to meet basic

human needs. For example, private organisations can run daycare centres, nursery

schools, health clinics, and homes for destitute children and provide vocational training,

non-formal education, sports, and recreation programs (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema,

1983).



36

Local governments can also privatise by contracting out some government

administrative functions. For example, local governments can use private contractors to

collect local taxes. Also, local governments can use private consulting firms to fill

technical positions such as engineers and accountants since local government pay levels

are often too low. These authors also claim that voluntary and religious organisations

have been heavily involved in providing primary health care services in rural areas,

where government health care programs are inadequate and private health care services

are unavailable.

1.8.2 Forms of Decentralisation

In addition to the four types of decentralisation, there are also three forms of

administrative decentralisation. With all the complexity and mixtures, it is essential to

define these three forms of administrative decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation

and devolution.

1.8.2.1 Deconcentration

Deconcentration is defined as

handing over some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels
within central government ministries and agencies. It is a shifting of the workload
from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside of the national capital.
Deconcentration, when it is more than reorganisation, gives some discretion to field
agents to plan and implement programs and projects or to adjust central directives to
local conditions, within guidelines set by the central ministry or agency headquarters
(Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema, 1983:15).



37

According to the authors, deconcentration has been the most frequently used

form of decentralisation in developing countries since the early 1970s. The distinguishing

characteristic of deconcentration has been that the authority for transferring specific

functions from the central government to local governments remains within the central

government structure. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007:3) define deconcentration as the

“shifting of administrative responsibilities from central ministries and departments to

regional and local administrative levels by establishing field offices of national

departments and transferring some authority for decision-making to regional field staff”.

Schneider (2003) states that under deconcentration, the central government retains

authority over the field office and exercises that authority through the hierarchical

channel of the central government bureaucracy. Secondly, the transfer of responsibilities

changes the spatial and geographical distribution of authority but does not significantly

change the autonomy of the entity that receives the authority. Finally, deconcentration

allows only moderately more authority than centralised systems. According to Ozmen

(2014), deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralisation used in unitary states.

1.8.2.2 Delegation

Delegation refers to

the transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to
organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only
indirectly controlled by the central government. Delegation has long been used in
administrative law. It implies that a sovereign authority creates or transfers to an agent
specified functions and duties, which the agent has broad discretion to carry out.
However, ultimate responsibility remains with the sovereign authority. In developing
countries, responsibilities have been delegated to public corporations, regional
development agencies, special function authorities, semi-autonomous implementation
units, and a variety of parastatal organisations (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema,
1983:19).



38

In delegation, “national governments shift management authority for specific

functions to semiautonomous or parastatal organisations and state enterprises, regional

planning and area development agencies, and multi-and single purpose public

authorities” (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007: 3). According to Schneider (2003), delegation

transfers policy responsibility to local governments or semi-autonomous organisations

that are not controlled by the central government but remain accountable to it. The main

difference between deconcentration and delegation is that the central government

exercises its control through a contractual relationship that enforces the accountability of

local governments. Therefore, delegation represents a slightly higher level of

administrative autonomy for local entities than deconcentration. That is, delegation is a

more extensive form of decentralisation.

1.8.2.3 Devolution

Devolution is defined as

the creation or strengthening-financially or legally-of subnational national units of
government, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the
central government. Under devolution, local units of government are autonomous or
independent and their legal status makes them separate or distinct from the central
government. Central authorities frequently exercise only indirect, supervisory control
over such units. Normally, local governments have clear and legally recognised
geographical boundaries within which they exercise an exclusive authority to perform
explicitly granted or reserved functions. They have corporate or statutory authority to
raise revenue and make expenditures. They should be perceived by local citizens as
organisations providing services that satisfy their needs, and as governmental units
over which they have some influence. Devolution establishes reciprocal and mutually
benefitting relationships between central and local governments. That is, the local
governments are not merely subordinate administrative units, but they have the ability
to interact reciprocally with other units of government in the political system of which
they are a part (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema, 1983: 25).



39

Under devolution, the central government allows local government units to

exercise power and control over the transferred policy. Devolution grants local units the

greatest degree of autonomy than deconcentration and delegation. Local governments are

only accountable to the central government as much as the central government can

impose its will by threatening to withhold resources (Schneider, 2003). According to

Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), devolution strengthens local governments by granting

them the authority, responsibility, and resources to provide services and formulate and

implement local policies. Devolution requires that local governments be given autonomy

and be perceived as a different level of government over which the central authorities

exercise little or no direct control (Rondinelli, McCullough & Johnson, 1989).

1.8.3 Autonomy

Another important concept in the decentralisation literature that warrants our

understanding is autonomy. According to Zaharia and Bilouseac (2009), autonomy is the

ability of local governments to make independent decisions within the law to solve the

problems of their people with limited intervention from the central government. Local

autonomy does not mean complete independence or separation from the central

government. Instead, the principle of local autonomy provides local authorities with

sufficient authority and freedom to manage local public affairs to meet their constituent’s

needs. Libonati (2001) holds the view that autonomy refers to the degree of discretionary

authority delegated to local governments to determine their form of government and

internal organisation: the functions they perform, the power to raise money, borrow and

spend, and the power to fix employment conditions of their staff. In addition, autonomy



40

may refer to the local government’s authority to initiate policy and enjoy immunity from

the central government. According to Selee (2006), autonomy refers to the degree of

powers: administrative, legislative, and judicial powers transferred to local authorities to

provide certain essential functions such as building and maintaining roads and streets,

providing drinking water and electricity, and obtaining resources to carry out their tasks.

Lijphart (2004) suggests that autonomy means that minority groups have the authority to

manage their internal affairs, especially in education and culture. To sum up, autonomy is

the ability of local governments to manage and control their internal affairs with limited

interference from the central government.

1.8.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the study's introduction, background, and problem

statement. The chapter also discussed the purpose statement, the research questions, and

the study’s scope and significance. The chapter concluded by defining the key terms used

in the study. The next chapter deals with the literature review and the theoretical

frameworks.



41

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Assessing decentralisation as an effective strategy for conflict mitigation.

2.1. Introduction

Decentralisation is increasingly being used as an effective strategy to mitigate

ethnic conflicts and secessionism. However, decentralisation has been more successful in

some countries than others (Brancati, 2006; Bakke, 2008). Therefore, assessing the

effectiveness of decentralisation in mitigating conflicts in diverse societies has become

increasingly relevant (Tranchant, 2007; Keller, 2007; Burgess, 2011). Decentralisation is

defined as the

transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of
resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public
authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or
non-governmental private or voluntary organisations (Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema,
1983:13).

This definition is appropriate for this study because it emphasises

intergovernmental relations and an external relationship between the central government

and outside organisations. This definition is significant because governance is no longer

viewed as the exclusive domain of the central government. Through decentralisation,

citizens, civil society organisations and the private sector can also shape public policy

(Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The objective is that the government, working with



42

citizens and outside organisations, will become more efficient in meeting the needs of the

people, thus preventing intrastate conflicts (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Rondinelli,

Nellis & Cheema, 1983).

However, there is a lack of consensus among scholars regarding the effectiveness

of decentralisation in mitigating intrastate conflict. On the one hand, some scholars

(Brancati, 2006; Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008; Bakke, 2008; Braathen & Hellevik, 2008;

Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006) argue that decentralisation has the potential to either reduce

or exacerbate conflicts depending on certain circumstances. On the other hand, other

academics (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009; Beland & Lecours, 2005; 2007; Goodfellow &

Lindemann, 2013; Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011; Tambulasi, 2009) contend that decentralisation

increases conflicts. However, other scholars (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Bardhan, 2002;

Tranchant, 2007; Burgess, 2011; Grasa & Camps, 2009) even maintain that

decentralisation reduces conflicts. The following review of the literature on

decentralisation and conflicts confirms the ongoing debate, discusses the conflicting

themes and concludes that despite the increasing use of decentralisation to resolve

intrastate conflict, the debate remains inconclusive, thus giving room for further research.

2.2 Decentralisation can either reduce or increase conflicts.

Although decentralisation is praised as an effective mechanism for conflict

mitigation, decentralisation is more successful in reducing conflicts in some countries

than in others due to particular circumstances. For example, Brancati (2006), based on a

large-N statistical analysis of election results of regional parties in thirty democracies

from 1985 to 2000, found that decentralisation has the potential “to decrease ethnic



43

conflicts and secessionism in democracies by bringing the governments closer to the

people, increasing their opportunities to participate in government, and giving groups

control over their political, social and economic affairs.” Brancati's logic is that by

empowering groups to pass legislation to protect their interests and concerns,

decentralisation will prevent ethnic groups from fighting each other and reduce the

incentive for regions to secede. However, decentralisation may indirectly increase ethnic

conflicts and secessionism by encouraging the growth of regional parties, which can

increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities,

passing legislation favouring particular groups over others, and mobilising groups to

engage in ethnic conflicts and secessionism. In the article, Brancati explains that the

strength of regional parties is the key to understanding why political decentralisation is

more successful in reducing ethnic conflict and secessionism in some democracies than in

others.

Lublin (2012) in analysing the impact of decentralisation on ethno-regional party

success using a multipronged approach, namely, a historical analysis, quantitative case

studies of Italy and Spain, and a multivariate model of ethno-regional party success in 71

democracies from 1990 through 2011 argues that decentralisation does not consistently

strengthen ethno-regional parties. In the article, Lublin demonstrates that ethno-regional

parties derive no benefit from decentralisation in non-ethnically decentralised countries

but notes that certain types of decentralised institutions may promote ethno-regional party

success in ethnically decentralised countries. The author concludes that the impact of

decentralisation on ethno-regional parties could be minimised or regulated by granting

ethnic and regional minorities autonomy but not statewide influence. Miodownick and



44

Cartrite (2009), using an agent-based model to understand the effectiveness of political

decentralisation on ethnopolitical mobilisation, found that weak and medium levels of

decentralisation increase the potential for ethnopolitical mobilisation while a strong level

of decentralisation dampens regional conflicts. In the article, the authors explain that

entrusting regional elites with more responsibilities, under most circumstances, seems to

be the most reasonable way to mitigate regional demands for autonomy. According to

Schou and Haug (2005), studies on how decentralisation is used to manage conflicts in

unitary states are lacking in the literature; therefore, empowering minority groups and

ethnic or regional groups with the power and resources to protect their interest could help

close the gap in the literature.

However, other scholars, who have studied the effects of decentralisation and

regional parties on ethnic conflicts and secessionism, suggest that political

decentralisation does not reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism; rather, it exacerbates it

by reinforcing and strengthening ethnic and regional identities, and by recognising certain

ethnic groups and legitimating them over others (Hardgrave, 1994; Kymlicka, 1998) or

by empowering groups to make laws that discriminate against other ethnic or religious

groups (Harowitz, 1991; Suberu, 1994), and by providing ethnic or regional groups with

the resources such as a regional police force, legislature or media to engage in ethnic

conflicts and secessionism (Roeder, 1991; Kymlicka, 1998; Bunce, 1999; Snyder, 2000;

Cornell, 2002; Eaton, 2006). When the central government is weak, empowered regional

governments can escalate their demands for secession. Several authors (Treisman, 1997;

Hale, 2000; Bunce, 1999) suggest that a high degree of regional autonomy led to

separatist movements in Russia in the 1990s. Bunce (1999) argues that the federal



45

structures of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia contributed to their

collapse because they encouraged a shift in power from the centre to the regions,

providing resources to regional actors for mobilisation.

The creation of new districts and the unequal distribution of power can dampen or

intensify intrastate conflicts. In Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni implemented

decentralisation in 1986, Green (2008) found that decentralisation reduced national-level

conflicts but increased local-level conflicts. In the article, Green explains that the

decentralisation program was designed to transfer equal power to all five levels of local

governments. However, in practice, power was concentrated only at the district level. The

concentration of power and resources at the district level led to conflicts over

district-level leadership positions. Likewise, Siegle and O’Mahony (2006) found that

decentralisation has a differentiated effect on ethnic conflict. From their statistical

analysis, the authors demonstrate that decentralisation programs that support elected

leaders, higher local government expenditures, and employment opportunities are less

likely to have ethnic conflicts. However, decentralisation measures in countries with

higher local government taxes were more likely to experience ethnic conflicts.

Implementing decentralisation in countries with historical grievances and income

inequalities among minority groups has produced mixed results. In a comparative case

study in some towns in Nigeria and Indonesia where inter-group relations resulted in

violent conflicts, Diprose and Ukiwo (2008) found that decentralisation mitigated

conflicts by accommodating ethnic diversity and managing historical grievances by

meeting the needs of the people. However, decentralisation resulted in violent conflicts

with strong perceptions of unequal access to power and resources between ethnic and



46

religious groups. In explaining how economic factors shape demands for greater

autonomy, Sambanis and Milanovic (2009) claim that more prominent, prosperous and

resource-rich regions are more likely to demand sovereignty or policy autonomy than

poorer regions. The authors also stated that ethnically distinct regions with low levels of

autonomy would be more likely to engage in conflicts with their governments.

Decentralisation plays an ambiguous role in peacemaking and conflict

management. Braathen and Hellevik's (2008) research on the role of decentralisation in

peacemaking and conflict management processes claims that in some cases,

decentralisation as a power-sharing arrangement could provide opportunities for peace

and conflict management, while in other cases, power-sharing could trigger further

conflict. From their review of several armed conflicts in Africa, the authors conclude that

decentralisation leads to lasting peace when there is an interdependent relationship

between the central and local governments. As the authors explain, such a relationship

requires the central government to devolve powers and resources to local governments,

maintain fiscal equity between local governments and ensure local governments are

accountable.

Similarly, Bakke (2008), based on a study on how decentralisation can be

peace-preserving, claims that decentralisation can be peace-preserving or exacerbate

conflicts depending on the ethnic composition and wealth of a region. In exploring the

conditions under which decentralisation could be peace-preserving, the author examined

three case studies in which central governments had conflicts with subnational

governments. These three conflictual centre-region relations included Moscow’s

relationship with Chechnya, India's relationship with Punjab and Quebec’s relationship



47

with Canada. Using a combination of secondary and primary sources and interviews, the

author found that decentralisation can reduce or increase ethnic conflicts depending on

the ethnic composition and levels of wealth in a region. For example, decentralisation

could mitigate conflicts if regions were granted fiscal and policy autonomy over issues

such as language and religion important to minority groups’ recognition, protection, and

safety. However, resource-rich regions with low levels of fiscal decentralisation will fight

for more financial autonomy. Bakke also found that ethnic groups that perceive the state

as a threat to their survival or autonomy will also intensify ethnic mobilisation for

autonomy. Marinzel (2014) suggests that wealthy regions or groups in an unequal society

may want to succeed because they find it burdensome to subsidise the rest of the nation.

For example, Catalonia, one of Spain's richest and most highly industrialised regions,

wants to secede because they claim they are paying more taxes to the central government

than they are spending on social programs or infrastructure.

2.3. Decentralisation has the potential to reduce conflicts.

In the past decades, decentralisation has become one of the most prominent tools

for mitigating intrastate conflicts around the world (Bakke, 2008; Sambanis & Milanovic,

2009; Keil & Anderson, 2018). In response to the rise of these types of conflicts, scholars

and policymakers have developed institutional strategies such as regional autonomy or

regional self-government, accommodation of ethnic diversity and power-sharing

arrangements to resolve ethnic conflicts and secessionism. Decentralisation has been

viewed as an effective conflict mitigation strategy granting ethnic or regional groups

autonomy to control their local affairs. For example, Bakke (2008) claims that



48

decentralisation granted Northern Ireland a legislative assembly within the United

Kingdom during the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, ending 30 years old religious

conflict between the Protestants and the Catholics. Bakke added that in 2005,

decentralisation also mitigated another 30-year-old conflict between the Indonesian

government and the separatist Islamist Free Aceh rebels. The rebels agreed to give up

their armed struggle in exchange for the right to establish regional self-government.

According to Tranchant (2016), the relative success of decentralisation in countries like

Switzerland, Canada and Belgium has given credence to autonomy as a conflict

resolution strategy.

The institutional design of autonomy has been used to mitigate conflicts by

protecting the identity and interest of marginalised minorities from central government

intrusion and domination (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Rothchild & Hartzell, 1999). Lake

and Rothchild (1996) found that decentralisation plays a role in mitigating political

conflicts by enabling local and regional authorities to have some degree of autonomous

power within a larger state. In discussing the origins and management of ethnic conflicts,

the authors claim that ethnic conflicts are not caused directly by inter-group differences,

ancient hatreds or centuries-old feuds. Instead, ethnic conflicts are often caused when

minority groups fear for their security and safety. In the paper, Lake and Rothchild

highlight that politically marginalised groups who continue to fear majority domination

and have experienced excessive state intrusion into their local affairs prefer autonomy

because it places institutional limitations on the central government’s authority. The

authors conclude that marginalised groups view autonomy as a check and balance



49

mechanism to insulate their interests from the overreaching power of the central

government.

Likewise, Rothchild & Hartzell (1999) claim that autonomy or self-government

could also reassure minorities, who would otherwise worry that central governments can

interfere with their local affairs. According to the authors, decentralisation enables groups

to have control of their local affairs and provides important checks on the central

government. By having a regional legislature with policy-making powers, minority

groups can limit the central government's excessive intervention in their local affairs.

Bakke and Wibbles (2006) suggest that “minority groups, fearful of being assimilated,

integrated or worse still eliminated, having decentralised institutions helps improve their

sense of stability, security and confidence in the state.” Lublin (2012) suggests that

decentration safeguards regions from central government power, protects their language

and culture, and shapes regional economic development. According to Bardhan (2002),

decentralisation is a strategy for diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local

cultural and political autonomy.

Autonomy enables ethnic or regional groups to legislate in some areas important

to them, thus dampening their secessionist ambitions. For instance, Brancati (2006)

claims that decentralisation reduces intrastate conflicts by granting autonomy to regions

through regional legislatures. In the paper, Brancati explains that political

decentralisation is a system of government in which there is a vertical division of power

among multiple tiers of government that have independent decision-making power at

least over one subject matter. The author concludes that decentralisation “reduces ethnic

conflict and secession in democracies by bringing the government closer to the people,



50

increasing opportunities to participate in government, and giving groups control of their

political, social and economic affairs.” By enabling regions or ethnic groups to make laws

to protect their interest and concerns, decentralisation prevents ethnic groups from

fighting each other or trying to secede.

McGarry and O’Leary (1993) also note that in a truly decentralised system,

minorities are given constitutional powers to “legislate on important areas, such as

language, religion and education, while leaving other policy briefs-defence and fiscal

policies-to the central government.” In this sense, decentralisation is a conflict mitigation

strategy because it provides embattled minority groups with legitimate channels to

articulate their grievances, regulate important policy issues and protect their status.

Likewise, Tranchant (2007), using decentralisation as an empowerment model, found that

decentralisation can reduce ethnic conflict by empowering minority groups to control

their local affairs. In the article, the author demonstrates that the empowerment of

minority groups is easily reached if they are geographically concentrated in one region

representing the majority or a significant minority of the population. The author explains

that decentralisation will reduce ethnic conflicts by devolving power to minority groups

to design and implement public policies according to their preferences. In another study,

Tranchant (2016) found that regional autonomy is an effective tool for curbing conflict

between local majority groups within a given population.

Autonomy arrangements have also been used as a compromise solution to

mitigate violent self-determination struggles between ethnic minority rebels and national

governments. Fujikawa (2021), based on the case study of Aceh in Indonesia, found that

autonomy was used as a compromise solution between Aceh rebels who were fighting for



51

independence and the government of Indonesia that was unwilling to relinquish their

sovereignty. In the article, Fujikawa pointed out that warring parties in ethnonational

conflicts tend to be reluctant to resolve their conflicts for two reasons. First, national

governments have no incentive to offer substantial concessions to ethnic minority rebels

because rebels in ethnonational conflicts tend to be poorly armed and incapable of

inflicting severe damage on the government. Second, rebels have difficulty believing

national governments will be committed to any signed agreement in the long run.

However, the national government of Indonesia accepted an autonomy arrangement with

the Free Aceh Movement rebels because of the cumulative cost of the protracted conflict,

and the rebels signed the agreement because of the backing of the international

community. The agreement stated that Indonesia would remain a unitary state but would

guarantee a certain degree of self-rule to the Aceh region. In this sense, autonomy is a

compromise strategy between ethnic groups seeking self-determination and national

governments protecting their sovereignty (Caspersen, 2017).

Likewise, research by Keil and Anderson (2018) highlights that autonomy

arrangements can act as a compromise between warring parties by granting minority

groups sufficient autonomy to control their economic, political and social affairs while

preserving the state. Additionally, autonomy arrangements have also been used to prevent

secessionist movements. According to Keil and Anderson (2018), separatist movements

are found worldwide, and states have used decentralisation to derail their plans for

independence. In the article, Keith and Anderson suggest that for some minorities, having

a devolved parliament with law-making powers over a limited subject matter will be

enough incentive to give up their ambition to secede. Similarly, Lustick et al. (2004)



52

suggest that granting autonomy to disgruntled minorities can prevent secession while

preserving the stability of the central state.

Using decentralisation to accommodate ethnic diversity has been praised as a

conflict mitigation strategy in diverse societies. Yusoff, Sarjoon and Hassan (2016),

through the review of literature on decentralisation as a tool for ethnic diversity

accommodation, found that decentralisation has been used to accommodate diverse

ethnic groups in a larger political system where socio-cultural, economic and political

differences exist. The findings indicate that granting minority groups greater control over

their local affairs assures them that the government recognises their interests and

concerns. The authors conclude that by giving minorities a voice in the government,

decentralisation is viewed as a flexible strategy for accommodating the concerns and

priorities of diverse ethnic groups within a larger population. Miodownick and Cartrite

(2009:14) suggest that “policymakers may find that accommodation, rather than

suppression or control, of the diverse interests of regions and groups” will mitigate

intrastate conflicts while also protecting the integrity of the state. Lustick et al. (2004)

suggest that although repression may work to suppress ethnopolitical movements in the

short term, it does not effectively reduce the threat of secession.

Decentralisation as a power-sharing arrangement is often cited as a solution for

mitigating ethnic conflicts and consolidating democracy in diverse societies. Lijphart

(2004) states that power-sharing involves the participation of representatives of all

significant communal groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive

level. Norris (2008), in his seminal work on power-sharing institutions, found that

power-sharing arrangements avoid winner-take-all elections and guarantee minorities a



53

voice in the government. With the assurance that they will not be dominated or excluded

from the government, ethnic minorities are less likely to take actions that will undermine

the territorial stability of the state. As explained by Norris, power-sharing arrangements

encourage diverse societies to be more inclusive and tolerant of other groups because it

deemphasises ethnic identities. Similarly, Burgess (2011), based on a study of

power-sharing institutions in 48 Sub-Saharan African countries, found that

decentralisation could help mitigate conflicts by including people from different minority

groups in decision-making. Burgess found a strong and significant correlation between

power-sharing institutions and democracy and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The author

explains that decentralisation is an essential strategy for defending the interest and

protecting the rights of spatially concentrated groups.

Similarly, Grasa and Camps (2009), in a study to understand the linkage between

decentralised governance and conflict prevention, found that decentralisation reduces

conflicts by including minorities in decision-making. Likewise, Siegle and O’Mahony

(2006) suggest that the conflict-mitigation rationale for decentralisation in ethnically

divided societies offers minority groups opportunities for participation and representation

in government. A study by Lustick et al. (2004) indicates that representative types of

power-sharing are more effective than repression of ethnopolitical movements in

reducing the threat of secession. The authors argue that if governments respond positively

to the demands of disgruntled minorities, secession could be prevented while preserving

the state’s territorial integrity. As the authors explain, power-sharing arrangements will

encourage secessionist groups to feel confident in representing and protecting their

interests and concerns, thus mitigating their demands for secession. However, Durante



54

(2017) suggests that regional autonomy alone might not reduce conflicts; instead,

regional autonomy for a territorially concentrated ethnic group and governmental

power-sharing with minority groups within the central executive is necessary for

decentralisation to reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism.

Studies using decentralisation as a conflict mitigation strategy in pluralistic

societies that have become unitary states are not common in the literature; therefore,

these studies taking as a whole, which have used different institutional strategies such as

autonomy to protect the identity and interest of marginalised minorities from central

government intrusion and domination (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Rothchild & Hartzell,

1999), accommodating ethnic diversities to include minorities in government (Yusoff,

Sarjoon and Hassan, 2016) and using power-sharing arrangements which encourage

diverse societies to be more inclusive and tolerant of other groups (Norris, 2008) could

help close the gap.

2.4. Decentralisation can exacerbate conflicts

Although decentralisation is perceived as an effective mechanism for resolving

intrastate conflicts, other scholars have adopted a more pessimistic view. For example,

Snyder (2000: 327), discussing the violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the early

1990s, stated that granting autonomy concessions has a “terrible track record” in

resolving intrastate conflicts. Decentralisation can lead to ever-growing demands for

greater autonomy or secession by empowering regional leaders who engage in ethnic

conflicts, empowering groups to legislate discriminatory laws against other minorities

and reinforcing ethnic or regional differences among groups. For example, research by



55

Colomb et al. (2014) suggests that decentralisation has led subnational movements with

strong regional identities in Scotland in the United Kingdom, Catalonia in Spain, and

Flanders in Belgium to intensify their demands for more autonomy or territorial

independence. In the same way, Beland and Lecours (2005, 2007) claim that the

implementation of social policies in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium have also

inspired regional leaders to demand greater autonomy for their regions.

Some scholars (Bunce, 1999; Synder, 2000; Riker, 1964) claim that

decentralisation encourages ethnic conflicts and secessionism by providing regions with

resources like regional legislatures and police that make it easier for groups to engage in

ethnic or regional conflicts. Eaton (2006) claims that decentralisation, instituted to

resolve the armed conflict that plagued Columbia for decades, allowed regional parties to

win elections and mobilise resources to engage in regional conflicts. According to Keith

and Anderson (2018), in trying to accommodate and protect ethnic and cultural identities,

decentralisation may reinforce the very identities and cultural traits which minority

groups claim make them different. Legislation which promotes the language and cultural

characteristics of minority groups could deepen ethnic identities and ensure the

continuation of ethnic differences. The authors explain that ethnic differences could erode

any unity between minority groups, cement diverse identities, and promote differences

among groups, thus contributing to political tension.

Decentralisation could increase conflicts when the central government

undermines the authority of elected officials. For instance, Mbuagbo and Fru (2011),

based on the study of the 2004 Law implementing decentralisation in Cameroon, found

that the overreaching influence of government officials over regional and local authorities



56

undermined the authority of elected mayors and councillors, thus resulting in conflicts.

The author also found that the decentralisation law needed to define the roles of

appointed and elected officials clearly. The powers devolved by the state to local

authorities were not exclusive. They were exercised concurrently by the central

government and the local authorities. Therefore, conflicts occurred because each side

interpreted the law in their favour. In another paper by Mbuagbo (2012) on urban

governance policies in Cameroon, the author found a similar result of decentralisation

intensifying conflicts between government representatives and elected mayors because of

competing interpretations of the law. Similarly, in a study on the relationship between

decentralisation and institutional conflicts at the local government level in Malawi from

2000 to 2005, Tambulasi (2009) found that poorly designed decentralisation increased

institutional conflicts at the local government level. By reviewing primary and secondary

data on decentralisation from government publications and newspapers and conducting

interviews with government and elected officials, the author found that decentralisation

did not transfer real power to local governments. Therefore, local government officials

felt powerless in the exercise of their duties. As a result, conflicts occurred when they

tried to assert their authority against central government intrusion. Tambulasi also pointed

out that because the roles and powers of the councillors and parliamentarians were not

clearly defined, power struggles occurred between the councillors and parliamentarians.

Decentralisation intensifies conflicts when the government refuses to share

political power and resources with ethnic or regional groups. In exploring and assessing

Ethiopia’s democratisation and decentralisation experiment, Merera (2007:82) found that

the “top-down approach of the ruling party” to maintain control over the Oromo people



57

instead of sharing political power and resources with the regional group exacerbates

conflicts. The author conducted a case study of the Oromo people, the country’s largest

ethnic group. In the article, the author explains that the Oromo and the Southern

Ethiopian People’s regions produced coffee which constituted more than 60% of the

country’s foreign exchange earnings but was allotted a disproportionate share from the

national treasury. Through interviews, focus group discussions, and official reports and

publications, the author found that the central government was reluctant to evenly

distribute national resources and share political power with the region, thus generating

intrastate conflicts between the Oromo people and the central government. The Oromo

people have been fighting for self-rule since the 1960s because of the marginalisation of

their region. Erk (2014) claims decentralisation in Africa, specifically in South Africa,

Ethiopia and Nigeria, has politicised local conflicts and increased competition and

disputes between ethnic groups over land, water and natural resources.

Schou and Haug (2005) suggest that inequalities in the distribution of state

resources for development projects can stir up envy between different regions, thus

leading to ethnic conflicts in already polarised societies. Gurr (2000) suggests that ethnic

minorities with no access to power tend to intensify their demand for independence from

the central government. Durante (2017) claims that the government's mistreatment of

minorities triggers ethnic conflicts. Premdas (2000) suggests that when ethno-regional

and ethnonational groups are frustrated in their quest for recognition and resources, they

usually fight against the central state. According to Woodward (2007), “economic

deprivation, political neglect, and forced cultural assimilation have in recent years

resulted in minority nations taking up arms to fight for the protection of their identity and



58

their independence from the host state.” Decentralisation increases conflicts when there is

a history of government discrimination and repression against ethnic minorities

(Sambanis & Milanovic, 2009).

Decentralisation will likely increase intrastate conflicts when the central

government erodes the autonomy of ethnic or regional groups that previously enjoyed

freedom. Research by Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) on the relationship between the

national government and traditional institutions in Uganda suggests that decentralisation

increased violence between the Buganda Kingdom and the central government because

the central government infringed on the autonomy of the Buganda Kingdom. The

introduction of decentralisation by President Museveni in the 1980s eroded the autonomy

of the Buganda kingdom, which had enjoyed autonomy before joining Uganda’s

independence in 1962, by transferring part of the management of Buganda’s land from

their king’s control to the central government. To the Buganda elites, the loss of their land

meant a weakening of their kingdom’s influence. While the Buganda kingdom wanted to

preserve their autonomy and control their entire land, the central government wanted to

weaken the kingdom’s autonomy and institute a national land management program.

Therefore, the clash of institutional interests between the Buganda Kingdom and the

central government resulted in violent conflicts in 2009. The authors concluded that the

refusal of the central government to allow the Buganda Kingdom to maintain their

autonomy and control its land motivated the Buganda elites to continue their fight for

self-rule. Manyak and Katono (2010) suggest that decentralisation increased conflicts in

local governments in Uganda because President Museveni wanted to maintain political

control over local governments. Similarly, Marinzel (2014) claims that the secessionist



59

desire within Catalonia stems from a history of the Spanish government eroding its

regional autonomy. In the article, the author suggests that after General Francisco Franco

came to power in Spain, his goal was to unite Spain and rid it of anything that encouraged

disunity. Therefore, Catalonia’s autonomy was revoked, its language was outlawed, and

Catalan intellectuals were persecuted. The author concludes that the long history of

persecution continues to inspire Catalonians to fight for independence. Seigle and

O’Mahony (2006) claim that studies using context in analysing conflicts are lacking in

the literature as two-thirds of intrastate conflicts have occurred in autocratic political

environments; therefore, these studies which have examined the history of political

persecution, oppression and discrimination against minority groups could help narrow the

gap in the literature.

2.5. Conclusion

Intrastate conflicts remain a major problem in international politics today. To

prevent this type of conflict worldwide, governments have turned to decentralisation as

one of the tools to mitigate intrastate conflicts ( Bakke, 2008; Sambanis & Milanovic,

2009). Despite the increased use of decentralisation to resolve intrastate conflicts, the

debate remains inconclusive (Smoke, 2003; White, 2011; Bakke, 2008). There is still no

clear answer to why decentralisation is more successful in reducing conflicts in some

countries than others. The literature review identified three conflicting themes held by

scholars and practitioners regarding the effectiveness of decentralisation in mitigating

conflicts.



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On the one hand, several scholars have suggested that decentralisation has the

potential to either reduce or increase conflicts depending on certain circumstances

(Brancati, 2006; Bakke, 2008; Bunce, 1999; Synder, 2000; Suberu, 1994; Siegle &

O’Mahony, 2006). On the other hand, some have argued that decentralisation has the

potential to mitigate intrastate conflicts (Fujikawa, 2021; Durante, 2017; Burgess, 2011;

Grasa & Camps, 2009; Tranchant, 2007, 2016; Yusoff et al., 2016). Others have

maintained that decentralisation exacerbates conflicts (Goodfellow & Lindemann, 2013;

Mbuagbo & Fru, 2011; Merera, 2007; Tambulasi, 2009; Eaton, 2006). Decentralisation is

not a panacea to cure all kinds of intrastate conflicts. The use of decentralisation to

mitigate conflicts in the developed and developing world has been widely documented.

However, a major limitation of this literature is that numerous studies have focused

mainly on the relationship between decentralisation and ethnic or regional conflicts.

Therefore, further research is needed to understand the relationship between

decentralisation and conflict arising from former independent colonial territories that

reunited under a federal system but later evolved into a unitary state, especially when

their preferences and interests differ.

2.6. The Theoretical Framework

This research is grounded in and supported by the theory of decentralisation.

According to Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema (1983:13), decentralisation is defined as

the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation
of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government
agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public



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authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or
non-governmental private or voluntary organisations.

This definition is relevant to this study, given its emphasis on intergovernmental

fiscal relations and the relationship between the government, the private sector, and civil

society organisations. This idea of intergovernmental fiscal relations refers to the

distribution of powers and resources among the different levels of government. The main

idea is to determine which public functions should be centralised and which should be

assigned to subnational governments. Fiscal transfers make the government more

efficient in providing public goods and services according to the people’s preferences

(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). This definition does not only view decision-making as the

exclusive domain of the government but also as the right of citizens and civil society to

shape public policy (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Besley & Smart, 2007; Crook &

Manor, 2000). The assumption is that by empowering local governments to design and

implement public policies according to the preferences of their people, decentralisation

will reduce conflicts (Brancati, 2006; Tranchant, 2007; Hechter, 2000).

Historically, the literature on decentralisation and conflict mitigation is derived

from the classical theory of fiscal federalism or the first-generation theory of fiscal

federalism (FGFF) and the second-generation theory of fiscal federalism (SGFF).

According to Porcelli (2009), the classical theory of fiscal federalism could be

understood from two main contributors. The first contributor is Tiebout (1956), who

developed Tiebout's model of local public good provision. According to Tiebout’s model,

local governments compete in offering a mi