

**SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO PEACE MISSIONS IN  
AFRICA**

by

**Precious Pakamile Hlungwani**

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**Abstract**

In 2013, the South African delegation to the African Union (AU) vigorously lobbied other AU Member States to urgently establish the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict (ACIRC) Brigade. South Africa argued that the continent needed a rapid deployment force to respond quickly to conflicts. Amongst others, the ACIRC will intervene in stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention missions, the neutralisation of terrorist groups, and attacks on legitimate governments. The decision to establish the ACIRC was a response to the M23 occupation of Goma and French intervention to assist the Malian government, which was under attack from Tuareg separatists and other Islamic fundamentalist groups.

Critics of the ACIRC mechanism argue that it goes against the principles of peacekeeping and is an indication that South Africa is advocating for a departure from pacifist to robust military intervention. From South Africa's perspective, the ACIRC Brigade is intended to fill the security gap left by the African Standby Force. This research study argues that the ACIRC is not an indicator that South Africa is advocating for a departure from pacifist to robust military intervention when resolving conflict in Africa. Instead, the ACIRC mechanism, like the Force Intervention Brigade and the French army intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali respectively, will provide the AU with a quick response mechanism for conflict. The robustness of response will be determined by the threat at the tactical level of military operation. As such, the deployment of the ACIRC Brigade will still be guided by the principles of peacekeeping as laid out in the UN Charter and Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act.

In this respect, post-apartheid South Africa has played a leading role in resolving conflicts in Africa. Those who subscribe to realism argue that South Africa participates in peace missions for its own self-benefit. They argue that its participation in peace missions will increase its global stature and improve its credibility in its quest to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. On the other hand, idealists argue that South Africa's participation in peace missions is inspired by the principles of *ubuntu* and altruism. This research study argues that both the realist and the idealist arguments are credible when assessing South Africa's participation in peace missions in Africa. However,

notwithstanding the credibility of both arguments, there is more evidence to support the realist view on South Africa's participation in peace missions.

**Declaration**

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial (50%) fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Security) at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

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30 June 2017

Precious Pakamile Hlungwani

(Assume to be signed if submitted electronically)

**Dedication**

Ya nkatanga, Nombulelo Dlomo-Hlungwani na vana ava hina, mhani wa mina  
Tintswalo Nkuna, va tshika msava hima lwandle na va tukulu va Khazamula wa  
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**Abbreviations**

ACIRC:	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict
AFISMA:	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
ANC:	African National Congress
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF:	African Standby Force
AUL:	African Union
BRICS:	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAR:	Central African Republic
CNDP:	National Congress for the Defence of the People
CNRDR:	National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (French antonym)
DoD:	Department of Defence
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
DIRCO:	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
FARDC:	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (French antonym)
FIB:	Force Intervention Brigade
FPA:	Foreign Policy Analysis
GNU:	Government of National Unity
ICC:	International Criminal Court
ICGLR:	International Convention of the Great Lakes Region
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IR:	International Relations
ISS:	Institute of Security Studies
M23:	March 23 Movement
MINUSMA:	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MNC's:	Multinational Companies
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MONUSCO:	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission
MUJAO:	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO:	Non-governmental Organisation
NIF:	Neutral Intervention Force
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSO:	Peace Support Operations
R2P:	Responsibility to Protect

RDC:	Rapid Deployment Capability
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
SAPSD:	South African Protection Support Detachment
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
USA:	United States of America
WW I:	World War 1
WW II:	World War 2

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## **Chapter 1. Introduction and Background**

### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

South Africa achieved inclusive democracy in 1994 after many years of struggle against colonialism and apartheid. However, despite many years of the armed struggle against the apartheid regime, the struggle did not end through a decisive military victory but through a negotiated settlement. This negotiated settlement culminated in an inclusive democracy with ‘relative peace’ (Barber, 2005). Consequently expectations were raised among the domestic and international community that the new democratic South Africa would transfer its conflict resolution skills to other parts of the world (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). In addition, it was expected that South Africa would transform from being a ‘pariah state’ into a responsible and respected member of the global community (Schraeder, 2001). South Africa has indeed lived up to this expectation. The domestic and international expectations, coupled with its colonial and apartheid legacies, would later become some of the key references that formed the basis of South Africa’s future foreign policy (Moore, 2014).

As widely expected, the new exponents of foreign policy in South Africa were preoccupied with transforming its foreign policy from that of a ‘pariah’ state to one that would be globally accepted (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). As such, the new democratic regime made it clear that South Africa was going to be a responsible global ‘citizen’. It was then not surprising when Nelson Mandela announced that South Africa’s foreign policy would be anchored in the promotion of human rights and democracy, conflict resolution and global cooperation (Alden & Le Pere, 2004; Mandela, 1993). In fact, Pretoria was prepared to meet the expectation of transferring its successful conflict resolution experience to the African continent.

South Africa has the most developed and is one of the biggest economies on the African continent. In addition, it has one of the most advanced military apparatus in Africa to back-up its upper middle income status (Global Fire Power, 2016). As a result South Africa has used its middle power status and regional hegemon to play a key role in championing the African renaissance agenda which aimed at rebuilding

the continent and bringing peace and stability to the continent (Gbaya, 2015; Jumat, Bezuidenhout, & Neethling, 2014).

In South Africa's Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, entitled *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu*, (hereafter draft white paper on foreign policy) the government acknowledges that it is not possible for South Africa to be an "island of prosperity in an ocean of poverty" (DIRCO, 2011, p. 20). The draft white paper on foreign policy further emphasises that South Africa's struggle for a better life is inherently linked with that of the continent and hence Africa is at the centre of South Africa's national interests. In order to achieve South Africa's ambitions of a prosperous and competitive African continent, it is vital that certain preconditions, such as security, peace and stability, are normalised. There will not be any upward mobility in Africa's development if security concerns are not addressed. As an advocate for Africa's renewal, South Africa has taken a lead in contributing towards security, peace and stability on the continent (Moore, 2014).

South Africa has become one of the leading role players in issues concerning conflict resolution in Africa. Its peace diplomatic efforts range from of all forms of conflict resolution mechanisms, including, but not limited to, mediation, negotiations, peace-making, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, post conflict building and recovery (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Since 1994 South Africa has participated in various conflict resolutions efforts such as the mediation in Nigeria, leading negotiations between governments and rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, bilateral missions in Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR), UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, AU led Peace Mission in Darfur, Observer Mission in Ethiopia/Eretria, military intervention in Lesotho (peace enforcement) under the banner of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and chief envoy leading to the establishment of the state of South Sudan, to mention but few examples where it participated in conflict resolutions (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012; Neethling, 2003a)

One of the key instruments of South Africa's foreign policy in respect of achieving its conflict resolution objectives is the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The SANDF plays a key role in conflict resolution on the continent, particularly in peace missions. The SANDF has been deployed in several United

Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and SADC peace missions since 1998 in pursuit of peace and stability on the continent (Neethling, 2003a). However, for South Africa, despite the fact that the SANDF is deployed in some of the conflict areas, its preference is that conflict and disputes should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. This approach is informed by the guiding principle outlined in South Africa's constitution and other government policy documents (South African Defence Review, 2015). The main aim of the military instrument (SANDF) is to assist in the monitoring and implementation of the agreements that follow upon the political and diplomatic process.

Between 2000 and 2016, South Africa has participated in no fewer than 15 peace missions. At the time of the study it was preparing for a peace mission force to enter the new hotspot in South Sudan (Conwell, 2016). At 31 December 2016 South Africa was ranked as the 13th troop contributing country in Africa and 19th in the world (United Nations, 2017). Even if its participation is not the biggest in terms of troop contribution, South Africa remains an important player. Given its status as one of the key role players in African conflict resolutions, particularly peace missions as this is the focus of this research study, it was deemed appropriate to conduct a scholarly enquiry, at least from a foreign policy perspective, into how South Africa approaches these peace missions and what its motivations are for participating in such peace missions.

Except for Lesotho in 1998, where South Africa opted to use military force to resolve conflict and restore peace, South Africa has tended to steer away from using robust military intervention in conflict resolutions. However, most recently, starting from 2012, South Africa has demonstrated that, when necessary, it is prepared to resort to robust military intervention. This was in fact demonstrated by its participation in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the eastern DRC (McKaughan, 2015). Furthermore, South Africa was also at the forefront of the establishment of the interim continental rapid intervention force known as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015; Warner, 2015). Although South Africa's participation in the FIB and ACIRC is through multilateral forums such as the AU and the UN, it is worth noting that, in most cases, it is at the forefront of championing these initiatives and that it

volunteers first in respect of providing resources and personnel (Nathan & others, 2013).

It is thus clear that South Africa has dedicated itself to playing a significant role in the achievement of peace and stability on the African continent. However, the question then arises as to why it is prepared to dedicate itself to play such a significant role across of its borders despite the numerous challenges such as poverty, unemployment and inequality on the domestic front. From the realist perspective, one may argue that South Africa would not use its limited resources beyond its borders if it had nothing to gain and, hence, the country must be benefiting in some way from its participation in peace missions. On the other hand, idealists would argue that South Africa does not have to benefit per se, but that it may be unselfishly participating in peace missions for altruistic reasons in alignment with the '*ubuntu*' principles as expressed on its draft white paper on foreign policy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

This research paper has two main objectives. Firstly, the paper aims to determine whether there has been a shift from the traditional pacifist approach to peace missions to a more robust military approach. This question has arisen from South Africa's participation in the FIB and its stance on the establishment of ACIRC. Secondly, the paper aims to establish South Africa's motives for participating in peace missions. In other words, from the International Relations (IR) theory point of view, is South Africa's participation in peace missions driven by realism or idealism? In an attempt to realise these research objectives, this exploratory study analysed South Africa's participation in peace missions, particularly its role in the FIB and ACIRC.

## **1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM**

Since 2003, South Africa has been at the forefront of ensuring that the African Standby Force (ASF), as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), comes to fruition. The ASF was envisaged to be fully operational by 2010 but, thus far, this has not happened (Warner, 2015). The delay in establishing the ASF has had a detrimental effect on the AU's aspiration of taking ownership in addressing armed conflicts on the continent. In fact, the continued delay in the establishment of the ASF has left those countries with weaker security apparatus

vulnerable to a resurgence of internal conflicts, insurgency and other forms of insecurities (Warner, 2015).

For example, during 2012, the March 23 Movement (M23) launched a military offensive and occupied Goma, the capital of north Kivu province in the eastern DRC. The M23 was met with little resistance from that country's armed forces. To make matters worse, when Goma fell to the M23, there was an estimated 17 000 strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in the country but the mission did nothing to halt M23 advances (Roux, 2013). At about the same time in 2012, the Tuareg separatists, known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (French Acronym MNLA), caused mayhem in northern Mali. This culminated to the destruction of various cities and towns, including Gao and Timbuktu, which threatened fall of the government in Bamako and with little resistance from the Malian army (Lounnas, 2013). To the embarrassment of the AU, the Malian government was forced to request assistance from its former colonial master, France, to halt the MNLA and the advances of other rebel Islamic movements to the south. This was after both ECOWAS and the AU had failed to raise a force in defence of the Malian government (Arieff, 2013).

These two incidents played a significant role in convincing some of the AU member states, notably South Africa, that, if the continent is to realise its dream of 'African Solutions to African problems' in respect of peace and stability, the moment was ripe to take matters into their own hands (Nathan & others, 2013). In other words, these two events presented a 'now or never' opportunity to realise the ideals of 'African solution to African problems', as envisaged by the AU and South Africa's African Agenda (Møller, 2009).

In response to the fall of Goma during 2012 to the M23, South Africa played a key role in mobilising SADC member states to establish a Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) in the eastern DRC (Cammaert, 2013). The SADC NIF was later adopted by the UN after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had unanimously passed Resolution 2098 to respond militarily to the crisis in the eastern DRC (Karlsrud, 2015; Sheeran & Case, 2014). This intervention force was named the UN FIB and consisted mainly of troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania (Mutton, 2013). The UNSC Resolution 2098 authorised the FIB to use all means necessary to

neutralise and disarm rebels operating in the eastern DRC (Janik, 2014). The FIB added a new dimension to UN peacekeeping as, for the “first time in its history, the UN had authorised an offensive combat force intended to neutralise and disarm an armed rebel group” (Cammaert, 2013, p. 2).

Apart from Operation Boleas in 1998, this was the first-time South Africa had participated in a peace mission involving offensive military combat on foreign soil. Furthermore, South Africa was one of the countries which had loudly campaigned for the urgent establishment of ACIRC (Warner, 2015). One may be justified to interpreting South Africa’s role in the both FIB and ACIRC as a change in approach or, at least, a realisation of the need to change its approach from the traditional pacifist approach to a more robust military intervention in the quest to bring about stability and the protection of civilians. In fact, the military interventions by the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French armed forces in Mali succeeded in stopping the armed charge by the insurgents and forced them back to the negotiating table (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; Cammaert, 2013). One may also be justified in assuming that the aforementioned interventions have saved innocent lives in line with the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles (MacFarlane, Thielking, & Weiss, 2004).

Taking into consideration the occupation of Goma, the capture of northern cities in Mali during 2012 and the continued instability in South Sudan, CAR, Darfur, Somalia, and Burundi, to mention just a few examples, it may perhaps be advisable for South Africa and the AU to reconsider their approach to conflict resolutions and to change from the pacifist to the robust military approach to prevent violent armed hostilities and loss of innocent civilian lives.

South Africa is a significant role player in conflict resolutions on the continent and, therefore, it is important to understand its preferred approach to peace missions because the country has the potential to influence the AU’s policy approach to conflict resolution (Neethling, 2015). In addition, it is equally important to understand its motivations in order to understand why South Africa chose to participate in some peace missions and why it did not prioritise others.

### **1.3. RESEARCH PURPOSE**

South Africa's role and participation in peace missions has been widely studied. However, the issue of whether South Africa is considering a departure from pacifist to robust military intervention in its approach to peace missions has not yet been explored. The purpose of this research study is therefore twofold:

- Firstly, the purpose of the research study was to ascertain where there has been a departure from a pacifist to a robust military approach when South Africa has participated in/conducted peace missions on the continent. This question stemmed from South Africa's role in the establishment of ACIRC and its participation in the FIB.
- Secondly, the purpose of the study was to critically analyse South Africa's motivation behind its participation in peace missions. In other words, at least from a foreign policy perspective, the research study examined whether South Africa's participation in peace missions is guided by a realist or idealist understanding of IR.

It was hoped that the study would be able to paint a comprehensive picture of an aspect of South Africa's foreign policy in conflict resolutions, thus contributing to the academic debates on and understanding of South Africa's foreign policy on the African continent, particularly in relation to peace missions.

### **1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION**

If Operation Boleas is deemed to be a peace mission conducted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, then South Africa may be said to have participated in various peace missions since 1998 (Monyae, 2014). At any given time before the recent withdrawal of the peacekeeping force from Sudan (Darfur) during April 2015, South Africa was contributing an average of 3 000 uniformed personnel to peace missions annually between 2003 and 2015 (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014; United Nations, 2017). At the time of writing this report, South Africa had deployed over 1,433 troops to the FBI alone and had deployed one of its top generals of the post-apartheid era, Lieutenant General Lawrence Mgwebi, to head MONUSCO in the DRC (United Nations, 2016; Conwell, 2016).

Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would argue that, among other reasons, South Africa's participation in peace missions is motivated by the opportunities offered to grow its international stature, economic opportunities and global influence (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Idealists, on the other hand, would argue that South Africa's participation is rooted in its firm believe in the guiding principles of '*ubuntu*' and altruism (DIRCO, 2011). For idealists, South Africa has a moral obligation to participate in peace missions due to its economic and military might and may not stand aside while its neighbours are plunged into security instability (Nathan, 2011).

Based on the observations above, there are two overarching questions that formed the basis of this research study. Firstly, has there been a shift from a pacifist to a more robust approach to peace missions? Secondly, what is the motivation behind South Africa's participation in peace missions?

In order to answer the overarching questions, the research paper focused on answering the following supplementary question:

- Firstly, in relation to the first overarching question, namely, "Has there been a shift from pacifist to a more robust approach when conducting peace missions?", the following sub questions were formulated
  - Is South Africa considering military intervention as the most effective form of conflict resolution? Stated differently, is there a likelihood that robust military intervention will feature more prominently in future peace missions than it does at present?
  - Does South Africa's participation in FIB and its envisaged ACIRC represent merely a response to the military situation on the ground as they present themselves?
- Secondly, from the IR theory perspective, what is the motivation or rationale behind South Africa's participation in peace missions in Africa:

- Is South Africa's participation influenced by a realist understanding of international relations?
- Is South Africa's participation influenced by idealism in relation to its international relations?

### **1.5. CONCLUSION**

Foreign policy normally emanates from domestic realities. During the first administration of the post-apartheid era, South Africa focused primarily on nation building and reconciliation. These domestic realities for South Africa were also reflected on its foreign policy which placed the promotion of democracy, human rights and conflict resolution at the top of its agenda (G. Evans, 1999) . From Nelson Mandela's administration in 1994 to that of Jacob Zuma at the time of this study, South Africa has played and continues to play a key role in conflict resolutions in Africa. South Africa has embraced its international obligation of contributing to peace and stability on the African continent (Jumat et al., 2014). Pretoria has always argued that peaceful resolutions to conflict will result in long term stability as opposed to the resolution of conflict using force and it has taken pride in its being an example of the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The SANDF has been deployed in various peace missions, mainly as a 'pacifist' peacekeeping force with the main task of providing protection to civilians, protection services to political figures involved in negotiations and the monitoring and support of elections. However, in 2008, the SANDF was deployed in a peace enforcement mission in Lesotho (Mmutle, 2007). Since 2013 the SANDF has been deployed at the FIB in eastern DRC on another peace enforcement mission with a Chapter VII mandate (Nathan & others, 2013). Clearly, the 'robust' military approach is a possible option when necessary despite Pretoria's insistence that conflicts must be settled through peaceful dialogue and negotiations.

The next chapter explores existing literature on what informs foreign policy actions in the hope that this will lead to an understanding of South Africa's approach to peace missions and what motivates its participation in such peace missions. The chapter also clarifies the conceptual framework used in the study and explains some of the important concepts used.

## Chapter 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

South Africa is arguably one of the most respected countries in matters of international relations in Africa. The country has succeeded in transforming itself from a ‘pariah state’ to one that contributes meaningfully towards peace and stability on the African continent (Schraeder, 2001). Its ‘miraculous’ achievement of an inclusive democracy through a negotiated settlement has persuaded many interested observers to admire and envy the way in which the country conducts its affairs. Thus, the international community waited in anticipation to see whether its peaceful transition from the apartheid regime to a multiparty democracy would also characterise its conduct of international relations (Nathan, 2011).

With Nelson Mandela South Africa was blessed with a ‘messiah’ who preached peace and reconciliation not only to the country, but also to the entire African continent and beyond. The international community looked up to Mandela for moral and ethical leadership (Borer & Mills, 2011). His successor, Thabo Mbeki, was an intellectual giant who assisted in crafting strategies for Africa’s rebirth through his New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiatives and the transition from Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU. Mbeki hoped to provide a strategic vision that would emancipate the African continent from the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality, and bring peace and security on the continent (Vale & Maseko, 1998). It was envisioned that the NEPAD initiatives would elevate the continent to the status of an equal partner with the other regions of the world and that it would no longer be perceived as a mere recipient of aid (Evans, 1999). It was under Mbeki’s tenure that South Africa first deployed a peacekeeping force, building on Mandela’s negotiations efforts in Burundi and the DRC. Since then, South Africa has continued to participate in peace missions on the continent (Heleta, 2016).

Under Jacob Zuma’s administration, South Africa is continuing to make inroads in global politics through its participation in alliances such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). In addition, South Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was Chair of the AU until January 2017 (Saunders, 2014). Moreover, South

Africa continues to be at the forefront of Africa's conflict resolution endeavours, either as facilitators for peace-making through negotiations, such as in Lesotho and South Sudan; peacekeeping in Sudan or peace-enforcement in the eastern DRC, to mention but a few (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). In terms of its foreign policy focus, South Africa remains committed to conflict resolution, peace and stability on the continent (DIRCO, 2011).

South Africa's draft white paper on foreign policy made it known that the country is aiming to be one of the most influential role players in international affairs by 2025 (DIRCO, 2011). In order to achieve this foreign policy objective, South Africa has outlined strategies which, among others, include its focus on the continent in line with the 'African Agenda' (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). In relation to its strategy in Africa, South Africa identifies regional integration and conflict resolution as crucial in achieving its national interests (Landsberg, 2009; South African Defence Review, 2015). As such, the draft white paper on foreign policy underlines that South Africa will continue to be a significant actor in Africa's conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts (DIRCO, 2011).

As at 31 December 2016 there were 16 UN peace missions globally with nine of those peace missions taking place on the African continent. In this regard, South Africa is ranked the number 19 troop contributor globally and as number 11 in Africa. Since 1999, South Africa has participated in no less than 14 UN and AU peace missions (United Nations, 2017). It is also important to note that the UN Force Commander of the largest peace mission MONUSCO at the time of this study was a South African, Lieutenant General Derrick Mgwebi (Conwell, 2016).

Based on South Africa's commitment to peace missions on the continent, it is therefore deemed appropriate to conduct a scholarly study of South Africa's approach to peace missions and the motivation behind its participation. It was anticipated that a study of this nature would contribute to the existing body of scholarly literature on an aspect of South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in relation to peace missions. It was not the intention that the study would analyse peace missions as a subject of scholarly enquiry but, instead, as an outcome of foreign policy and practice. It was thus necessary to start the literature review with an investigation into background of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa.

## **2.2. SOURCES OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA**

South Africa became a democracy in 1994 after many years of colonisation and apartheid. Between 1948 and 1994 South Africa's foreign policy was centred on justifying and defending the apartheid regime which had segregated the white's minority groups from the black majority population (Schraeder, 2001). Consequently, the apartheid regime was ostracised by the international community due to its domestic policy of apartheid and its confrontational attitude towards the African populations and its neighbouring countries respectively (Borer & Mills, 2011). It was only after the election of the democratic government in 1994 that the new South Africa embarked on a mission of transforming its foreign policy from an isolationist stance to that of a responsible global citizen (Khadiagala & Nganje, 2015; Nathan, 2005).

It is against the background of its colonial and apartheid heritage that South Africa's foreign policy has since been premised on the promotion of human rights, democracy, conflict resolution and African renaissance through multilateral forums (Alden & Le Pere, 2004; Schraeder, 2001). Central to the realisation of its African renaissance agenda goals is the achievement of political stability, peace and security as a prerequisite for Africa's socio-economic development (Landsberg, 2009). Consequently, South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven primarily by its national interest of seeing the African continent becoming competitive in the issues relevant to global affairs (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Venter, 2001). Thus, peace missions became a foreign policy activity aimed at realising South Africa's national interests of contributing to the peace and stability of the African continent (Williams, 2000). This is based on the understanding that a peaceful and stable Africa will create the environment required for Africa's economic development which, in turn, is a precondition to Africa's becoming a competitive global player (DIRCO, 2011).

## **2.3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A CONCEPT OF SCHOLARLY ENQUIRY**

There is still no consensus among scholars on how best to define the concept International Relations (IR). However, as a concept of scholarly enquiry, IR may be explained as the study of the web of relations made up of cross border interaction between both state and non-state actors (Schieder & Spindler, 2014). As such, it

involves an analysis of “who gets what, when, and how” in the globalised world (Henderson, 1998, p. 20). At the state level it is usually the state that is responsible for deciding on who gets ‘what, when and how’. However, at the international level there is no central authority, thus leaving each state to fend for itself (Von Beyme, 2011). This lack of central authority is referred to as the “anarchic nature of the international system” and resulting in the notion of the “survival of the fittest” on the part of states in their conduct of their international affairs (Milner, 1991, p. 69).

The practice of international relations is as old as humanity itself. The roots of its practice may be traced back several centuries, starting from the biblical stories of relations between the Israelites and the Egyptians to the era of the Greek city-states, Roman and Chinese empires and the writings of Sun Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli (Henderson, 1998). However, as a subject of academic enquiry, the study of IR became in the twentieth century which saw the two World Wars and the Cold War era (Smith, 2013). IR is an academic discipline that is used mainly to explain the nature of cross border relations between states and how such relations are conducted.

A careful analysis of the ‘Melian dialogue’ during the Peloponnesian War, as articulated by Thucydides, reveals that initially the study of IR was focused on the “analysis of the causes of war and the conditions for peace” (Smith, 2013, p. 1). However, IR later evolved into the study of the way in which authority and/or power are used to organise and manage trans-border relations between actors and how this, in turn, contributes to the establishment, maintenance and transformation of order in the world systems.

The Melian Dialogue further reveals that, in its classical form; the study of IR involved the analysis of the state and its representatives/institutions as the main, important actors in international relations. Most contemporary scholars still agree with a view that states continue to be important actors in IR although they add that non-state actors are equally as important and have gained prominence in cross-border relations (McGowan, Cornelissen, & Nel, 2006).

It is necessary to take note that there is a distinction between ‘international relations’ written with small letters and ‘International Relations’ written with capital letters

(Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). This distinction is also emphasised by McGowan et al. (2006) who point out that IR with capital letters refers to the academic subject while international relations with small letters refers to events in IR. Thus, International Relations involves scholars of IR observing and analysing the relations between states or international actors. IR is therefore the “theory and methods which researchers [use in their] analysis of the discipline of IR” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 23).

The understanding of IR theory was imperative in this study because it influences how IR scholars use “concepts, models and paradigms to interpret and explain their understanding of the world and its social dynamics” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006, p. 24). There are several theories of IR including, but not limited to, critical theory, realism, idealism, constructivism, post-colonialism, globalism and structuralism (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013). There is no superior theoretical approach in IR and any one of these theories is as important as the others. Thus, the choice of theory depends on the subject of enquiry (Schieder & Spindler, 2014). For the purposes of this study classical realism and idealism were chosen as appropriate theories in terms of which to analyse South Africa’s motivation for its participation in peace missions. These theories were deemed to be the most suitable theories for explaining foreign policy behaviour and the motives for foreign policy actions.

A realist and an idealist may analyse the same facts in the Melian dialogue but will arrive at a different conclusion on what caused the war and what the conditions for peace were. The same applies when analysing state motivation for participating in peace missions. It is for this reason, among others, that it is essential that IR students understand IR theories in order to be able to assess the school of thought the IR scholar is using to interpret world events and also to understand the theories that underpin their own world view of international affairs (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006). In short, in order to understand states’ cross-border interactions and their foreign policy activities, one needs to understand the basic assumptions of the theories used in IR (McGowan et al., 2006).

There are three main, basic levels of analysis in the study of IR, namely, the state level, the institutional level and the individual level of analysis (Henderson, 1998). All these levels are present in the international domain. However; the difference is

the focus of the main actors in IR at the level of analysis in question (Mingst, 2008). For example, an analysis of South Africa's participation in peace missions may be conducted at any of the three levels mentioned above. At an individual level, IR scholars may focus on the role of former President Mbeki in his spearheading South Africa's participation in peace missions and starting with his belief in the African Renaissance Agenda that led to the NEPAD framework and the evolution of the OAU into the AU and, later, the adoption of the ASF concept as a mechanism for peace and stability on the continent (Venter, 2001; Von Beyme, 2011).

At the state level of analysis, the focus is on South Africa as a state using its state machinery (SANDF) to contribute to conflict resolutions on the continent. In this research study the state machinery concerned was the deployment of the SANDF in peace missions. Finally, the system level of analysis may be either global or sub regional. In this case one could focus on South Africa's participation in peace mission through multilateral organisations such as the UN or the AU (Hague & Harrop, 2001). The focus in this research study was on the state level of analysis because the study concentrated on South Africa's approach to peace missions and its motivation for participating in these peace missions.

#### **2.4. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES (IDEALISM VS REALISM)**

The extent and the devastation that followed World War I (WWI) (1914–18) sparked a paradigmatic revolution in the study of IR with several schools of thoughts competing for attention. Idealism emerged as the dominant view. This school of thought advocates that people are, by nature, good. The proponents of idealism argued that the wicked behaviour that led to the catastrophic events of WW I had been the result of structural arrangements that motivated people to act in their own self-interest (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995). After WW I, IR became concerned primarily with diplomatic issues, thus attempting to prevent a similar war and hence the formation of the League of Nations in 1920.

The idealist scholars are more optimistic about change than their realist counterparts are willing to accept. Acknowledging that the international system is, by nature, anarchic, idealists argued that humans are, by nature, good and, with the appropriate international institutions, such as the League of Nations (later the UN), that should

aim to create a conducive environment for peaceful and independent global systems, there were prospects for change for the change (Coulombis & Wolfe, 1982). This argument drew much criticism and it was based on this reaction, especially after the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II (WWII), that realism emerged as a dominant theory in IR.

Unlike idealists, realists argue that change is not possible but that the continuity of history and wars will always remain a feature in international relations due to the anarchic nature of the international system (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993). Realists further argue that states strive to maximise their power and wealth and that, unless a balance of power is established, war will remain an ongoing feature of the international system as states resort to their military apparatus either to defend themselves or to acquire wealth and power (McGowan et al., 2006). As already indicated, the theoretical bases that was used analyse South Africa's motivation behind its participation in peace mission is both realism and idealism. As a result, it was imperative to discuss the basic assumptions of idealism and realism in detail.

#### **2.4.1. Idealism vs Realism**

The review of the literature revealed that there are various theories in IR. For the purpose of this research study; the focus was on realism and idealism only as the theories used for analysing South Africa's foreign policy in respect of its participation in peace missions. Like other theories in the study of IR both realism and idealism are founded on certain basic assumptions. The following basic assumptions are made by realists and idealists alike and have been applied in the effort to understand South Africa's participation in peace missions as an outcome of South Africa's foreign policy decision making process that culminates into policy action.

#### **The Basic Features of Human Nature and Characteristics of the International System**

The first assumption of realism is that states, just like the human beings who rule them, "are selfish actors who always seek to maximise their own interest" (McGowan et al., 2006, pp.28). This individualist behaviour of states is perpetuated by the lack of central authority in the global system. Due to this anarchic nature of

the international system “statesmen [within the international arena] think and act in terms of interests [of their own respective states] defined in terms of power” even if this is achieved at the expense of other states (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 4–5).

In principle, idealists tend to agree with realists on the basic anarchic nature of the international system. However, they disagree that the absence of a global authority, as realists suggest, condemns actors to perpetual competition for their individual (state) interests. Idealists argue that, even in the absence of a global central authority, nations or states have found ways in which to cooperate on issues that affect all states and also humanity at large (Heywood, 2011). For example, idealists would argue that the abolishment of slavery, adoption of the UN Charter, cooperation on climate change and other international laws prove that states cooperate in more ways than realists are willing to admit (Nel, 2006).

### **Distribution of Power**

Realists believe that the distribution of power is extremely important in international relations. They agree that, in principle, states have sovereign equality in terms of international law although they are also quick to point out that states are not always equal in terms of power (military strength, size of the economy, geographical and population size) and dominance (Daddow, 2009). Realists argue that states which, in their view, are the most important actors in international relations, spend most of their time and effort in trying to maximise their power, dominance and influence (Russell, 1994). They are of the opinion that those states with economic and military supremacy are able to impose their will on the less powerful states. In other words, it is incumbent on any state that wishes to have influence in global affairs to maximise its economic and military strength. As a result, weaker states attempt to strengthen their economic and military dominance in order to become more powerful and so, in turn, to acquire global influence and gain respect. Another strategy is to align themselves with powerful states so that they have some form of protection from a powerful counterpart (Daddow, 2009).

However, idealists challenge the notion that power distribution is the most prominent factor that determines the outcome of a phenomenon. For those who subscribe to this school of thought, power is only one of the factors that contribute to the way in

which states influence each other. Thus, in analysing the conflict between India and Pakistani, for example, idealists go beyond looking for answers within the context of either the balance of power or the lack thereof and, instead, they seek explanations in terms of factors such as misperceptions and misunderstandings of each other's intentions in the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan (Nel, 2006, p. 33).

### **The Role of Moral Beliefs in the Practice of International Relations**

Realists are not convinced that there is a role for moral considerations in the conduct of international relations as liberals would argue. It is not that realists do not "necessarily believe in moral principles themselves" but they do believe that the basic anarchic nature of the international system does not permit actors to act in moral ways (Nel, 2006, p. 30). This view is further reinforced by Kegley and Wittkopf (1995) who argue that the most important principle in international relations is that of 'self-help'. To this end, states are ultimately dependent on their own resources to pursue national interest and power and, hence, there is no place for moral considerations (Morgenthau, 1978).

On the other hand, idealists value the role of morality in international relations than realists are willing to accept. Idealist look back to historical international events which were characterised by mutual cooperation to support their claim of morality in international relations. They argue that it was the result of humanity and the ability of humans to make morally conscious decisions that slavery was abolished and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948. Idealists also view international donor aid as an act of altruism and cite acts of morality in international relations. They further argue that states participate in peacekeeping due to moral considerations and are incapable of letting others suffer the scourge of conflict if they are able to offer help (Nel, 2006).

### **Actors in International Relations**

It is clear from the three main assumptions discussed in the preceding sections that realists identify the state as the main actor in international relations (Neack, 2008). However, this is not to say that realists disregard the importance of non-state actors such as prominent individuals, multinational cooperation, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but they do single out states as the

most important actors in international politics (Morgenthau, 1978). Realists advance reasons for their views such as the state is the only legitimate entity that controls and has the power to wage wars on behalf of its citizens (Nel, 2006). On the other hand, realists agree that, in the contemporary era, the non-traditional actors have growing influence in international relations but nevertheless still maintaining that “on the balance, states remain the major coercive and regulatory institution in the world” (Nel, 2006, p. 31).

Advocates of idealism also concur with their realist counterparts that the state is undeniably an extremely important actor in the international system but they argue that it should not be regarded as the most important one (Heywood, 2007). Idealists suggest that there are numerous international actors that interact together to produce the very anarchic nature of the international system (Neack, 2008). This argument reveals that it is impossible to predict which actor will be the most important actor before the actual occurrence of a particular event and, thus, which actor will be the most important will depend on the issue at hand. For example, in international economic affairs the state is no longer the sole or most important actor and, in fact, multinational companies (MNCs) and financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have become the more dominant, if not the most important, actors (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001).

### **The Degree and Direction of Change in International Relations**

The final basic assumption of realists is that there is a continuity (of history) in the international system and thus any hope of change is unrealistic (Nel, 2006). Thus, realists believe that fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if desirable. For realists, “the international system is [and will continue to be] characterised by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-states” (Burchill, 2005, p. 32). It is further pointed out that inter-state affairs are still much in line with inter-state affairs as conducted during the period of antiquity. For realists, as long as there is no balance of power, wars and conflict will remain a feature of the international system.

Idealists dispute the realist view on the basic continuity of events and the conduct of states in international relations, arguing that the world is no longer the way it was

during the Peloponnesian Wars, slavery and colonisation. Due to the continuing interdependence of states within the international system as a result of globalisation, things have changed for better and will continue to improve as international actors seek better ways in which to coexist within the international system (Nel, 2006).

## **2.5. FOREIGN POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

The preceding sections have discussed IR as a subject of scholarly enquiry. In addition, it was explained that the approach to studying IR is based on certain theories of which the most dominant theories are realism and idealism. These theories are founded on certain basic assumptions as discussed above. The next section critically analyses what foreign policy is and what informs it.

Unfortunately, like many concepts in social sciences, there is little consensus of what foreign policy is, thus leaving its meaning open to several interpretations. The concept of foreign policy may, for example, include ECOWAS negotiating with former Gambian dictator, Yahya Jammeh, to persuade him to leave office peacefully after his electoral defeat, South Africa's inclusion in BRICS, Kenya's withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) or Donald Trump threatening to build a wall between the USA and Mexico (Hill, 2003).

Foreign policy may be defined as "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations" (Hill, 2003, p. 3). Thus, foreign policy is the "discrete purposeful action that results from the political level discussion of an individual or group of individuals ... [it is] the observable artefact of political level decision. It is not the decision, but a product of decision" (Neack, 2008, p. 9). In other words, foreign policy includes those intentions, statements and actions of an actor (often a state) directed towards the external world and the responses of the other actors to these intentions, statements and actions (Neack, 2008).

Habib (2009), citing Morgenthau, proposes a neo-realist and idealist definition of foreign policy. Neo-realists adopt a state centric view by defining foreign policy as the "product of national interests and nations 'structural location' in the international system" (Habib, 2009, p. 145). The neo-realist's nemesis, the idealists, agree with this definition but argue further that other variables, including business, political

actors and NGOs also need to be seen as playing a crucial role in shaping foreign policy. From the idealist' point of view, even though the state plays an important role in foreign policy, it is not the sole actor (Habib, 2009).

Policy is the sum of these 'official relations' in order to avoid the creation of separate foreign policy by the individual actions of the actors. Such policy is 'foreign' as the world is not a single homogenised entity and is separated into unique communities. In short, a community (in this case both state and non-state actors) formulates strategies to deal with foreign communities (Hill, 2003). Policy is further understood by Venter and Landsberg (2006, p. 251) to mean a "purposive or oriented course of action, pursued by decision makers of a state, based on a set of social values, to solve matters of public concern, on the basis of clear goals to be achieved".

Thus, foreign policy comprises a carefully planned course of action and strategies designed by the policy makers of a state and laying out how they will relate with other states or multilateral agencies in international relations. In other words, foreign policy is a policy action directed towards foreign parties, be they state or non-state actors, and intended to secure economic, political and social interests (Venter & Landsberg, 2006). However, foreign policy is not unilateral because it focuses on the intentions, actions and statements of actor(s) in relation to another and the latter's response. When a state acts in relation to other foreign entities the state expects some form of feedback (Neack, 2008). Thus, foreign policy refers to the process of setting the goals and objectives which a state perceives as paramount on behalf of its society, whether internal and/or external security; wealth creation, the search for prestige or status in the global order, establishing and protecting its ethnic identity or religiosity; or an attempt to achieve the universality of certain values to transform the international political order (Venter & Landsberg, 2006).

It is clear from these definitions that it suffices to agree with Van Nieuwkerk (2006, p. 28) who argued that foreign policy analysis (FPA) is dominated by realists' connotations because it mainly "focuses on the analysis of state behaviour in the international context". This is because initially, or at least, when scholars began theorising about foreign policy, the main actors or initiators of foreign policy were the heads of states and state institutions. However, there is an admission in the

contemporary era that non-state actors are equally important in matters of foreign policy (McGowan et al., 2006). However, in the final analysis, despite the fact that other non-traditional actors have been given space in matters of foreign relations, it is the state, through its government institutions, that remains the chief architect of international relations.

For example, in South Africa, the formulation of foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of DIRCO in conjunction with the Presidency (Landsberg & Monyae, 2006). Nevertheless, there are several other actors involved in both foreign policy formulation and implementation. For instance, other key role players in foreign policy include, among others, the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Tourism and Trade and Industry as well as civil society, business and eminent persons such as Emeritus Bishop Desmond Tutu (Landsberg & Van Wyk, 2012).

In most instances, foreign policy is informed by domestic policy. What states attempt to achieve abroad by establishing relations with the outside world is also aimed at achieving government objectives within the state (Neack, 2008). During the apartheid era, the 'policy of isolation' was informed by the state obsession to protect the regime from collapsing. Accordingly, it was necessary for the apartheid regime to embark on the bombardment of neighbouring countries in order to destabilise the liberation movements and weaken their support (Schraeder, 2001). Equally so, during Nelson Mandela's era, the policy of reconciliation was informed by the need to rebuild South Africa and reconstruct social cohesion within the country. Thus, South Africa's foreign policy has been transformed from its isolationist orientation to an inclusive and global orientation; driven by the promotion of democracy, advocating for human rights and pursuit of peace and stability (Nathan, 2005).

It is clear from the literature reviewed that, as much as states and other non-traditional foreign policy actors have a prominent role in matters of foreign relations, it is equally important to understand the role of individuals in international relations. These individual actors may be acting on behalf of the state or not. In the introductory section of chapter 1, the paper highlighted the key roles of Mandela and Mbeki in steering South African foreign policy in a particular direction. The third generation scholars of FPA argue that the findings of any analysis of international

relations that does not recognise or study the role and influence of individuals in foreign policy are likely to be flawed (Hudson & Vore, 1995).

Any attempt to analyse South's African foreign policy during Mandela's presidency without studying the role of Mandela himself would not reach a true understanding and reflection of what informed South Africa's foreign policy at that time. The same applies to Mbeki and his African renaissance agenda which was at the forefront of South African foreign policy during his tenure but which withered when President Jacob Zuma came to power (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). The analysis of dominant individuals or 'strong men' is important, especially on the African continent where it has been observed that those at the helm of the state tend to exclusively dominate the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in their respective countries. It is, indeed, for this reason that the decision-making approach of FPA breaks apart the monolithic view of states as the sole and unitary actors in international relations (Hudson & Vore, 1995).

## **2.6. THE CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING**

In order to understand the rationale for South Africa's participation in African, it is perhaps helpful to establish what peacekeeping is and why should there be peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is one of the conflict resolution mechanisms employed to keep peace between warring parties. It is usually a primary tool reserved for the UN to use to settle disputes as prescribed in the UN Charter although it may also be delegated to regional and sub-regional bodies such as the AU and SADC (Hoffmann, 2001; United Nations, 1945).

In order to understand conflict resolution and some of its mechanisms, one needs to understand the concepts and tools required for the analysis of the conflict and the mechanisms available through which to resolve conflict (Wallensteen, 2012). Thus, conflict theory and peace studies, under which the study of peacekeeping also falls, clarify the concepts and tools required for the analysis of the causes of conflict and how to resolve conflict (ACCORD, 2015). It is not the purpose of this research project to study conflict theory and, hence, it will not be discussed in detail at this point. This paper focuses mainly on peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy decision and action and, hence, the next section attempts to unpack the concept of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping is one of the most misused terms in peace studies. The fact that peacekeeping has been left to the military and foreign policy practitioners has culminated in the lack of an in-depth, theoretical analysis of what peacekeeping is (Bellamy, 2004; Orth, 1996). This, in turn, has led to analytical confusion because it would seem that what peacekeeping is left to the interpretation of those who are talking about it at a particular point in time. This confusion has rendered peacekeeping a concept which is difficult to carry out a proper analysis in scholarly terms. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, at the end of the cold war era, “a seemingly confusing array of concepts and terms were used regarding the scope and meaning of peacekeeping” (Neethling, 2003b, p. 96). In most cases, peacekeeping, peace missions, peace support operations and peace-making are sometimes used erroneously used interchangeably (Neethling, 2012).

For example, the UN use the term ‘peacekeeping’ and defines it as “the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with consent of parties to the conflict and/or national authorities, in order to contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement” (Dorn, 2011, p. 8). On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) prefers to use the term ‘Peace Support Operations (PSO)’ and defines it as “an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil or military means, usually in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles to restore or maintain peace (Dorn, 2011, p. 5). Diehl (1994, p. 4) refers to peacekeeping as any “effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolutions of long standing dispute”.

However, the definitions mentioned above all have serious shortcomings. Understandably so and recognising the context of the time, Diehl’s (1994) definition concentrates on ending armed hostilities only. However, peacekeeping or peace missions, as referred in this paper, have since evolved to include preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peace building. The UN definition emphasises the consent of the belligerents and/or host governments. Nevertheless, the Rwandan genocide has forced the international community to reconsider its stance on the principle of consent. Consequently, in exceptional circumstances, such as instances of genocide, gross violation of human rights, ethnic cleansing and other related war

crimes, the UN no longer requires the consent of the belligerent parties to become involved (Hoffmann, 2001).

The main reason for this change is the recognition and global consensus that the international community, through the UN, has a responsibility to protect civilians in conflict affected areas (Johnstone, 2011). The shortcomings in the NATO definition and the way they are put into practice are the emphasis on the use of the armed forces as a tool to achieve peaceful ends. However; experiences in Libya and Afghanistan have once again proved to the international community, policy makers and scholars of conflict resolutions and peace studies that prioritising robust military intervention without meaningful dialogue between the aggrieved parties and improving governance is unlikely to bring about long-term peace and stability.

The confusion regarding a proper definition of peacekeeping has led to some misuse of the concept. Some have also used this weakness to disguised themselves as peacekeepers in order to achieve their own narrow political ends while pretending that their main objective is the restoration and maintenance of international peace (Diehl, 1994). This claim is supported by the example of the United States of America's (USA) invasion of Grenada. The USA troops invaded Grenada under the guise of a PSO and they were referred to as the 'Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces' even although they had not been mandated by the UN or any other authorised body (Diehl, 1994). Furthermore, Ronald Reagan labelled the MX Missile the 'Peacekeeper', thus adding to the confusion of exactly what peacekeeping is.

In an attempt to clarify the conceptual confusion on what peacekeeping is, Bellamy (2004) has identified three roles which peacekeeping is supposed to fulfil. Firstly, peacekeeping is a mechanism to resolve conflict without the involvement of the cold war super powers, thus limiting the potential for escalation as experienced during the cold war era. For instance, during the cold war era it was easy for a conflict to escalate through the involvement of the USA and the Soviet Union as when the global community witnessed the escalation and prolonged conflict in Angola where the super powers took sides in supporting UNITA and the MPLA.

Secondly, peacekeeping mobilises the international community in a united effort to end hostilities and maintain peace between warring parties through multilateral

forums. It is conducted on the multilateral platforms such as the UN and AU and in terms of which countries are able to hold each other accountable and demand from their counterparts adherence to international laws without being accused of meddling in each other's internal affairs (Pevehouse, 2002). Finally, peacekeeping opens up a diplomatic window for further negotiations aimed at achieving long term peace. It must, however, be noted that peacekeeping is but one of the mechanisms available to resolve armed dispute but that its aim is to open up space for peaceful negotiations that will lead to long term, sustainable peace and stability (Bellamy, 2004).

Bellamy's (2004) conceptual clarification helps to highlight that peacekeeping is a broad concept involving several activities but that all are aimed at ending hostilities and establishing and maintaining peace. This implies that all conflict resolution mechanisms such as PSO; peace enforcement; peace making and peacebuilding are often used interchangeably but that all describe UN activities aimed at restoring or maintaining peace and stability as determined by the UN Charter. Diehl (2008) noted the same confusion and interchangeability of terms, arguing that it is common for the concepts mentioned by Neethling (2003b) to be used interchangeably. However, the most preferred term used by most scholars and analysts alike is 'peacekeeping missions' as this term encompasses everything from preventative diplomacy, peace enforcement to post-conflict recovery (Neethling, 2003a).

The South African government and the Department of Defence (DoD) in particular prefer to use the term 'Peace Support Operations' which is also used by NATO. This preference is reflected in most government policy documents including the *White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa: Defence in Democracy* (1996), *White Paper on Peace Support Operations* (1999) and the *South African Defence Review* (2015). South Africa's adoption of the NATO definition was influenced by the attempt to make a conceptual distinction between military operations and other diplomatic engagements – a distinction which is extremely difficult in practice (Cilliers, Shaw, & Mills, 1995). There is a consensus that all measures aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolutions are, in essence, political and/or diplomatic (with the military playing a supporting role only) and that the word 'operations' inevitably created an impression of a military activity, hence the preferred use of the term 'peacekeeping' (Neethling, 2003a).

It is worth noting that most of the literature consulted uses both ‘peace support missions’ and/or ‘peacekeeping missions’ as these terms encompass all the role players attempting to settle international disputes in whatever capacity, whether they are part of a military or civilian component (Neethling, 1997). According to the UN operational definition, peace missions/peacekeeping include everything from preventative diplomacy, peace-making, peace-building, peace enforcements and all activities sanctioned under the UN Charter in the effort to maintain, restore and/or enforce international peace and stability (United Nations, 2008). For the purpose of this research report, the term peace missions and peacekeeping are used interchangeably.

## **2.7. PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING**

Peacekeeping in practice is equally contested with peacekeeping as a theoretical concept of scholarly enquiry. In the interests of effective peacekeeping in the field of operations, the UN, as the chief custodian of peace and security, has laid down three fundamental principles to guide both the policy makers and peacekeepers in the theatre of operations.

The principle of the consent of the parties to the conflict is the first fundamental principle of any UN sanctioned peace mission and also applies to the regional and sub-regional bodies participating in peace missions (Langholtz, 2010). This principle of consent implies that the UN must seek the consent of the belligerent parties involved in the conflict before embarking on any peace missions. In the African context, the parties concerned are usually the incumbent government and some armed ‘rebel’ groups involved in violent hostilities. Consent ensures that the UN peacekeeping force is given the freedom to carry out its mission and that it is protected while carrying out its mandate. The principle of consent is based on the premise that the UN peacekeeping force risks becoming a party to the conflict if one or both parties to the conflict resist the involvement of the peacekeeping force (Nationen, 2012).

It is worth noting that the genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans in the early 1990s taught both the UN and the international community a valuable lesson regarding the shortcomings of the principle of consent. As a response to the said genocide and gross violation of human rights the UN adopted the Right2Protect (R2P) and has

since made provisions to allow interventions in certain circumstances without the consent of the parties to the conflict (Evans, 2001). Accordingly, the UN now reserves the right to intervene in any conflict situation with or without the consent of the belligerents in cases where there is a gross violation of human rights, genocide and/or ethnic cleansing (Evans, 2001). The AU also made amendments to Article 4(h) in line with the UN but added that it will intervene in a member state where there is a serious threat to legitimate order (i.e. military coupe) for the purpose of restoring peace and stability and intervening to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity (Baimu & Sturman, 2003).

The second principle of peacekeeping is that peacekeepers must carry out their mandate in an impartial manner and without favouring one party over the other. Impartiality does not necessarily mean that peacekeepers are 'neutral' but that it is expected of them to apply the same principles to all parties to the conflict while implementing their mandate. Impartiality ensures that the peacekeeping force protect its legitimacy in the mission area (Nationen, 2012).

Lastly, the peacekeepers must "refrain from the use of force except in defence of their mandate and self-protection" (Nationen, 2012, p. 14). Thus, peacekeepers are allowed to use limited force only against 'spoilers of peace' and only with authorisation from the UNSC. Such limited force shall be used as a last resort when defending UN property, personnel and the mandate and only after exhausting all possible peaceful means to achieve the same end without the use of force. At the same time, when the peacekeepers resort to the use of force in defence of the mandate, the force must be proportional to that of the belligerents.

The three principles discussed still are still in place and are adhered to by the UN when it carries out peace missions. However, the UN has recently been willing to use robust military force to enforce peace and restore political stability. A case in point was the authorisation to deploy the FIB in the eastern DRC, the no fly-zone in Libya after resolution 1973 and, recently, the authorisation of ECOWAS to use military force to remove Yahya Jammeh after he had refused to hand over power in the Gambia. South Africa, under the auspices of SADC, also used military force to restore peace in Lesotho in 1998. The robust military dimension of peace missions is an indication that peace missions have evolved from the traditional pacifist

approach to a multidimensional approach which makes provision for ‘robust military’ intervention as a mechanism to restore peace and stability.

## **2.8. EVOLUTION OF PEACE MISSIONS**

Traditionally, peace missions were envisaged as managing inter-state war which had the potential to disturb global peace (Woodhouse, 2010). Peace missions were carried out by lightly armed soldiers from neutral countries who formed a buffer between two opposing countries armies to create space for negotiations to restore peace. The aim of these types of peace missions, known as first generation peace missions, was to conduct operations without enforcement powers, to help maintain and to restore peace in conflict affected areas. In these first-generation peace missions, military personnel doubled as diplomats in conflict areas with the responsibility to monitor, supervise, and verify the implementation of peace agreements. These peace missions were authorised by the UNSC as per Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) of the UN Charter (Sloan, 2014).

The end of the Cold War brought a new dimension to the conflicts taking place around the world with inter-state conflict declining drastically while intra-state conflicts were on the increase. Not only did the main belligerents change from those of state armies against other state armies but the intra-state conflict belligerents often comprised a state army against a section of the population. The character of the victims of war also changed as it was not the armed soldiers who were dying in numbers but unarmed civilians, especially the vulnerable groups such as women, children and the elderly.

These new developments in the character of the intra-state conflict forced the UN to adopt a different approach to peace missions. The intra-state conflict required an innovative approach to peace missions to deal not only with the restoration of peace and stability but also to address the challenges of internally displaced persons, famine and civilian casualties. Accordingly, the UNSC started to pass several resolutions to deal with the new, complex operation that required a multi-dimensional approach to addressing the new challenges. These multi-dimensional peace missions, also known as second-generation peace missions, required not only the deployment of military personnel but also authorised the deployment of police and civilian personnel in order to address the complex security situation.

It must, however, be added that the second-generation, multidimensional peace missions did not necessarily authorise the use of force by peacekeepers to address the fighting between the belligerents but, instead, that the aim of the new additions was to address the needs of the vulnerable civilians affected by the conflict while, at the same time, trying to protect these vulnerable groups. The Rwandan Genocide proved to the international community that there is, indeed, a need to authorise armed response to conflict in order to protect the vulnerable groups and, for the AU, also to protect the legitimate, democratically elected regimes from insurgents (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002).

The AU's intention to establish the ASF is a clear intention that the African continent is willing to embrace the organisational culture change from the non-intervention cherished by its predecessor, the OAU, to intervention when necessary. The ASF was designed with six scenarios in mind: from scenario 1 (deals with military advice to a political mission) to scenario 6 (AU interventions) (P. D. Williams, 2006).

## **2.9. THE RATIONALE FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MISSIONS**

A quick perusal of the main elements and underlying principles of South Africa's foreign policy as outlined in the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy and, in particular, the section that elaborates on South Africa's position towards Africa, may prematurely mislead one to conclude that South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven primarily by the altruistic and humanist approach advocated by classical liberals (Conwell, 2016). However, if interrogated critically, the same variables may be explained in reference to both South Africa's own national interests and to the growing of its international profile (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). As the realists argue, foreign policy is driven by the state's desire to pursue its national interests. This characteristic is evident in both South African foreign policy documents and in its actions (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). South Africa's participation in peace missions may also be explained in terms of both the realist and idealist connotations of IR.

As a result of its miraculous and relatively peaceful negotiated settlement and the subsequent birth of a democratic dispensation, the international community was

hoping that South Africa will transfer this miracle to other parts of the continent (R. Williams, 2000). The new democratic government felt compelled to participate in African peace missions because it felt it must attempt repay the solidarity showed to the new ruling party during the liberation struggle (R. Williams, 2000). It was not only the oppressed people of South Africa who had felt the brunt of apartheid but almost all the neighbouring countries had suffered direct onslaughts and subsequent devastation at the hands of the apartheid regime's military forces. The bombardment of these neighbouring countries had also contributed to their underdevelopment and thus South Africa felt it had a moral responsibility to contribute towards the development of the continent. One of the preconditions necessary for development is peace and security and, hence, South Africa's participation in peace missions (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007).

In addition to South Africa's obligation to the rest of the continent due to the role it played in ending apartheid, South Africa also possesses the financial and military capacity to assist countries in distress. Therefore, it is both morally and ethically expected of the country to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace and stability on the continent (R. Williams, 2000). Senior government officials, such as the former Chief of the SANDF, General Nyanda, have argued that, in Africa and, in particular, in the SADC region, South Africa, with its all-encompassing economic, political and a military hegemony, is in a "position that enables it not only to largely participate in peace missions across the spectrum, but to also take a leading role in the whole domain of Africa's renewal" (Nyanda, 2003:1). In other words, South Africa may not ignore the misfortunes happening on the continent, especially after the international community had done so little to prevent the genocide in Rwanda (Neethling, 2003a).

In view of the above observations and, in part, the rhetoric contained in the speeches of government leaders and that echoes the altruistic values enshrined in South Africa's approach to foreign relations and peace missions, in particular, those who subscribe to the idealist school of thought are able to present a compelling case that, indeed, South Africa is participating in peace missions for the common good and it is not expecting any benefits in return. However, based on a further critical analysis of the draft White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, realists may argue that

participation in peace missions not only serves the cause of Africa's peace and security but, without a doubt, it also serves the advancement of South Africa's national interests of exploring business opportunities, growing its economy and managing migration to its shores.

The African renaissance agenda, which has been vigorously preached since Mbeki's tenure, has now find expression in Zuma's foreign policy as one of the key pillars of the "African Agenda" (DIRCO, 2011). As such, effective and responsible participation has become a matter of national interest for South Africa. National interests, as an instrument of political action, "serve[s] as a means of justifying, denouncing, and proposing policies" (Rosenau, 2006, p. 246). South Africa's participation in peace missions may thus be regarded as a way of pursuing its socio-economic goals because Africa is its biggest export market and, hence, its zeal to stabilise the continent (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004).

South Africa has also been accused of being a proxy of western interest and its involvement in peace missions has been translated by some of its critiques as a way of the stabilising regions where its western counterparts have economic interests (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). There are, indeed, some notable contradictions in South Africa's participation in peace missions if one considers that, in some cases, it participates for humanistic reasons, as idealist would like to argue, but also because it expects to be paid back in the form of investment opportunities – a realist inclination. It is worth noting that South African businesses are flourishing in countries where South Africa has played a role in the restoration of socio-political stability such as in Burundi and the DRC (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012).

The main aim of the research paper was to explore whether there has been a shift from a pacifist to a more robust military approach in South Africa's peace missions in Africa. Moreover, the paper also sought to determine whether South Africa's participation in peace mission is driven by either realist or idealist approach to foreign relations. Before attempting is made to answer these two overarching research questions, the next chapter will elaborate on the research methodology employed in the study.

## **Chapter 3. Research Methodology**

### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

This research study explored an area of South Africa's foreign policy which has already been widely studied. Nevertheless, the approach adopted in this study was aimed at determining whether South Africa is attempting to shift its approach to peace missions from a pacifist to a more robust military approach. This question arose from South Africa's participation in the FIB in the eastern DRC and its insistence that the AU establish a continental, rapid intervention force in the form of ACIRC while waiting for the full commissioning of the ASF.

Moreover, the paper also sought to understand the motivation for South Africa's participation in peace missions. Is this participation motivated by the principles of '*ubuntu*', as an idealist would claim, or is motivated by the national interest of exploiting economic opportunities and improving its stature on the global platform, as a realist would reason? This question arose from an observation that South Africa has been willing to risk the lives of its citizens (SANDF troops) in some extremely risky military interventions such as those in the DRC, Burundi and Lesotho. On the other hand, on some missions where the stakes are not so high it would appear that South Africa is prepared to deploy only few personnel, such as military observers, for example, in the Ivory Coast and the Ethiopia/Eretria conflict. In addition, it took no part in peace missions such as those in Somalia and Mali.

This chapter explains the method that was adopted to conduct this research study, the data gathering process and the analysis of the said data. In addition, the chapter also discusses both the successes and the challenges faced by the researcher from the initial stages of the research to the end.

### **3.2. RESEARCH PARADIGM**

Before a researcher commences with any research, it is imperative to establish the paradigm which the researcher intends to use to observe and/interpret the phenomenon he/she is going to study (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). The researcher based this research study on the constructivist/interpretative paradigm. Constructivists believe that "knowledge is subjective because it is socially

constructed and mind dependent” and, hence, it is possible that those who subscribe to the realist and idealist schools of thought are able to observe the same foreign policy events but arrive at different interpretations (Chilisa & Kawulich, 2012, p. 56).

### **3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The research design which was deemed appropriate and which was chosen for the purposes of this study was the qualitative research design. Since it is not really possible to analyse policy decisions through experiments in terms of quantity and measurements, the researcher was forced to rely on interpreting the meaning and motivation of policy decision using various theoretical approaches – in this case is idealism and realism (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). Thus, the qualitative design was deemed to be the most appropriate for critically examining South Africa’s approach to peace missions and what motivates such decisions. This examination of the qualities and interpretations of the South Africa’s participation in peace missions was conducted by engaging experts in South African foreign policy, especially those with interests in South Africa’s involvement in peace missions.

The research study adopted an exploratory approach in an attempt to examine whether South Africa was, indeed, departing from its pacifist approach to peace mission to a robust military approach as was observed through its response to the fall of Goma at the hands of the M23 and its insistence on the establishment of ACIRC. Since South Africa’s participation in peace missions is conducted through multilateral platforms, the research study also explored whether it would be possible to use the French intervention in Mali during 2013 to determine a trend from pacifist to robust military interventions. It is important to clarify that exploratory studies are not conducted only when the area of academic enquiry is new but may also be carried out if the researcher is new to the subject itself or is motivated by a desire to satisfy personal curiosity. The researcher in this study was motivated by the latter (Babbie, 2010).

The nature of exploratory studies means that they may also be carried out to provide possible grounded insight into a seemingly developing situation being developed – in this study the advocacy of a more robust military response to conflict resolution when necessary (Babbie, 2010). Moreover, the exploratory approach allows

researchers to generate new ideas and makes possible assumptions of causalities (De Vaus, 2011). Since the cases used in this study to determine whether South Africa was, indeed, learning towards a robust military approach to resolving armed hostilities in conflict areas included its involvement in the FIB and ACIRC, it was possible to formulate a hypothesis on South Africa's future approach to peace missions. It was anticipated that this hypothesis would generate possible, future research questions. For example, should the research findings of this study reveal that there is a need to shift from a pacifist to a more robust military approach this would, in turn, imply that a study of how a future peacekeeping force should be capacitated must follow?

### **3.4. DATA**

Qualitative research studies usually rely on three basic methods of gathering data, namely, observation; interviews and a document analysis (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). The data required for this research study gathered my means of a document analysis and interviews. The data was collected from online sources (journals, reports, e-books, etc.), using the University of Witwatersrand online library platform. In addition, books, printed journals and reports were obtained from the University of Pretoria and later from the University of Duisburg-Essen as the researcher was based in Germany for the latter part of the study.

A total of 15 potential interviewees were identified although 7 face to face interviews only were conducted. This was mainly because the researcher had had to relocate to Germany during October 2016. However, the fact that the researcher did not manage to conduct the other 8 interviews did not cause any major challenges because the interviews which were conducted were supplemented by the richly available secondary data on the topic under study. All the interviews were recorded using a recording device and notes were also recorded in a notebook. All the interviews were later transcribed into Word format for the purposes of analysis and interpretation.

### **3.5. SAMPLING**

There are two types of sampling methods generally used in social research, namely, probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Babbie, 2010). In probability

sampling, “everyone in the population has an equal and independent chance of being included on a sample” (Babbie, 2010, p.192). On the other hand, in non-probability sampling, participants are included in a sample because they have been chosen, are available and have agreed to be involved in the study (Laher & Botha, 2012).

This research study used the non-probability sampling method. The non-probability sampling techniques used comprised purposive sampling because all the interviewees were carefully selected based on their knowledge of the subject under study. Moreover, the participants agreed to participate in the study (Laher & Botha, 2012). Some of the interviewees further suggested other experts to the researcher and these experts also participated in the study. In other words, the snowballing sampling technique was used. The interviewees were all respected academics and experts with a vast knowledge of South African foreign policy and were also very familiar with South Africa’s participation in peace missions. Military practitioners who were still active in the SANDF at the time of the study also participated in the study.

### **3.6. INTERVIEWS**

The interviewees who had been identified and contacted and who participated in this research study ranged from researchers to reputable research institutions, DIRCO, DoD, academics and military personnel with an extensive knowledge of South Africa’s foreign policy as well as the country’s participation in conflict resolutions, particularly peace missions. A total of 7 interviewees participated in the study research. Of the 7 interviewees 5 only agreed that their names could be included in the final paper. Two SANDF members chose to remain anonymous because they had not been able to obtain the permission of their superiors to be interviewed on record at the time when the interviews were conducted.

Semi-structured, open ended interviews were used to obtain the requisite data. An interview guide was prepared well in advance and adjusted according to the person who was to be interviewed. For example, the questions posed was differed when military practitioners were being interviewed or the research expert from the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) was being interviewed. The semi-structured questions were carefully designed to arrive at the interviewee’s understanding of South Africa’s approach to peace missions?

Furthermore, the questions were aimed at helping the researcher to understand whether the motivation for South Africa's participation in peace was influenced by either realism or idealism. However, these questions were designed in such a way that answers would be obtained without any reference to either idealism or realism. For instance, the researcher asked a question such as "In your opinion, why do you think South Africa participated in peace missions or intervened in Lesotho"? The participants' answers included 'Because South Africa did not want the conflict in Lesotho to spill over its borders and it wanted to secure its water interest in the Katse Dam'. Some argued that such peace missions/interventions were part of South Africa's international obligation as the authorities were responding to a request of the then president of Lesotho. In order to analyse whether the given answer supported either the realist or the idealist argument, a qualitative coding method was developed based on the fundamentals assumptions of idealism and idealism (Babbie, 2010).

All the participants were informed prior to the interviews about the nature and purpose of the study. They were also requested to give their consent to participate in the interviews and also asked for their permission to use their names on the final research report. Their consent was recorded using the voice recorder before the interviews commenced. They were also informed that they were free to withdraw from the interview for whatever reason should they feel so inclined.

The following people and institutions were approached and agreed to participate in the study by granting the researcher permission to conduct the interviews:

- **Institute for Security Studies (ISS):** Annette Leijenaar (Division Head Peace Operations and Peace Building) and Gustavo de Carvalho (Senior Researcher Peace Operations) were interviewed at the ISS offices in Pretoria on 28 September 2016.
- **Africa Institute of Southern Africa (AISA),** a research arm of conflict resolutions, among other things, at the Human Science Research Council (HSRC). DR Nicasius Check, a research specialist in the Governance and Security Programme, was requested to participate in the study and agreed to do so. Unfortunately, the interview was interrupted half-way due to an emergency meeting he

was called to attend. Nevertheless, sufficient data had already been collected. This interview also took place on 28 September 2016.

- **Defence Decision Support Institute**, a Research and Development section at ARMSCOR: Mr L.M Mathoho is a Senior Military Analyst and a former senior infantry officer in the SANDF. He was deployed in the Eastern DRC during the fall of Goma in 2012 as a UN military observer. The interview was conducted on 27 September 2016.
- **DIRCO**: Dr J.T. Pitswane, a Director at the National Office of the Coordination of Peace Missions at DIRCO, had agreed to an interview but postponed twice. This interview did not take place.
- **Lt Col P.T Roos**: A senior military officer with extensive deployment experience. He is a former senior directing staff at the South African War College, South African Peace Mission Training Centre. He is also a Master of Management (Security) graduate from the University of Witwatersrand. The interview was conducted on 28 September 2016.
- **Richard Cornwell**: A research advisor in the British Peace Support Team South Africa and a consulted for the South African Peace Mission Training Centre. He is a historian and senior researcher with an interest in conflict resolutions in Africa. The interview was conducted on 21 September 2016 at the South African Peace Mission Training Centre.
- Two senior SANDF members were also interviewed but chose to remain anonymous because permission to use their names at the time the interviews were conducted and the research report written had not been obtained. Both interviews were conducted on 28 September 2016.

In total, seven face to face interviews were conducted and one email response received. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed. All the information published for the purposes of the research report was obtained legally and ethically and the information was disclosed with the knowledge and consent of the participants. Two of the participants did not give consent for their names to be used in the study, although they agreed that their input be used in the research study as

long as their anonymity was respected. All the interviews were conducted in English.

### **3.7. CREDIBILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS OF DATA**

This research project was declared worthy of scholarly enquiry after the researcher had successfully defended the research proposal at a Research Proposal Board convened by the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management of the University of Witwatersrand on 23 September 2016.

Qualitative researchers refer to what quantitative researchers call validity and reliability as the credibility and trustworthiness of the data collected. The trustworthiness and credibility of this data was ensured by the use of multiple methods of data gathering (interviews and document analysis) (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). In addition, the data had been gathered through the interviews was reconciled with the findings of a document analysis. This research technique of validating data is known as the crystallisation of data. The crystallisation of data implied that the researcher had compared the data gathered from the interviews and document analysis to ascertain whether the information was the same. This was ensured by using coding methods to verify trends in the narratives of the interviews and the arguments put forward in the scholarly journals, books and government official documents consulted (Kawulich & Holland, 2012).

### **3.8. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH**

This study was bounded by a few limitations. It is important that researchers recognise a study's limitations because these limitations may impact on the research findings. This study did not focus on South Africa's comprehensive approach to conflict resolutions and that includes soft diplomacy techniques such as mediations, negotiations and good offices. Instead, the study was limited to analysing the peace missions in which the SANDF had been deployed as an instrument of foreign policy.

It was unfortunate that DIRCO, particularly the National Office Coordination of Peace Missions, was unable to participate in the interviews. Dr Pitswane, who is a director at NOCPM, had agreed to be interviewed but unfortunately it was not possible to set a time that would have accommodated both parties. This limitation was serious because DIRCO is the custodian of South Africa's participation in peace

missions and its input would have been valuable. Nevertheless, this limitation was mitigated by the availability of the several documentary sources available as well as the other interviews which were conducted with experts on the topic.

Finally, the researcher had relocated to Germany during the data gathering stage (interviews) and thus was not able to everyone potential interviewee who had been identified. Nevertheless, the researcher believes that the interviews that were conducted provided sufficient data to enable her to proceed with the study. In addition, the documentary data also compensated for the limited number of interviews conducted.

### **3.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The researcher has ensured that all the ethical considerations required when one is conducting social research, as prescribed by the University of Witwatersrand's code of ethics, were adhered to. Accordingly, the researcher made sure that the neither the research process nor the research outcomes caused any harm to either the participants or those would read the final research report. The research also requested the participants consent to participate in the interviews and informed them of the nature and purpose of the research prior to the interviews being conducted. Two of the participants had requested that they were not directly quoted in the research report because they have not obtained authorisation to participate from their superiors. In addition, a declaration of honesty is also attached to this report as confirmation that the study is entirely the researcher's own work and that the researcher has acknowledged all sources.

### **3.10. TIME MANAGEMENT**

Time management is of the essence when a researcher embarks on a scholarly research project. It is thus incumbent on the researcher to carefully plan for and allocate time for the data gathering, data analysis, and the writing of the thesis (Roos, 2016b). The researcher took leave from work during the period allocated to conducting interviews and, when necessary, to conduct research at the library. The online data gathering was done after hours and over the weekends as the researcher was a full-time employee. However, the analysis of the data and the writing of the final research report were done when the researcher was in Germany on a

scholarship. This, in turn, implies that the researcher had had to juggle the writing the thesis while busy with the academic demands of the University of Duisburg-Essen.

### 3.11. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT

The research report was organised into six chapters as outlined below.

- **Chapter 1: Introduction and Background.** This chapter included a discussion of the background of the study, research problem, research purpose, research questions as well as the research methodology and data collection techniques used. Thus, this introductory chapter explained the background to what informed the research and the relevance of the study. A brief analysis of South Africa's foreign policy and its record of participation in peace missions are briefly explained in this chapter.
- **Chapter 2: Literature Review.** The literature review chapter attempted to link the arguments found in the literature consulted for the purposes of the study with the researcher's views on the research topic under study. The literature review section also clarified the need to undertake this study. It further explained important concepts and definitions which were of importance to the research. The theoretical framework of analysis (realism and idealism) was also discussed at length in this chapter because this framework outlined the theoretical tools which were used to explore South Africa's motivation for its participation in peace missions.
- **Chapter 3: Research Methodology.** The chapter on research methodology explained the logic that was followed in conducting the research and outlined how the research was conducted. The chapter explained the methods of data gathering and data analysis that were used and highlighted the challenges that were encountered during the research process and the compilation of the research report.
- **Chapter 4: Presentation of Research Results and Data Analysis:** In view of the two overarching research questions, the first part of the research aim that addressed South Africa's approach to peace

missions was addressed on this chapter. In short, has there been a shift from the traditional pacifist approach to a more robust military approach in South Africa's peace keeping strategy? This question was based on South Africa's participation in the FIB and its stance in relation to ACIRC. The 'Fall of Goma' during 2012 and French military intervention in Mali during 2013 were used as examples. In addition, the chapter also contained a section that discusses the possible challenges of future peace keeping. This chapter was entitled 'Departure from a Pacifist to a Robust Military Approach to Peace Keeping'.

- **Chapter 5: Presentation of Research Results and Data Analysis.** The second part of the research question aimed at establishing South Africa's motivations for its participation in peace missions. Could South Africa's participation in peace missions be explained from a realist or an idealist perspective? This chapter was entitled 'South Africa's Motivation behind Participating in Peace Missions'.
- **Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations.** The last chapter contained the overall conclusions to the study and made certain recommendations regarding South Africa's future approach to peace missions.

## **Chapter 4. ACIRC: A Departure from a Pacifist to a Robust Military Approach to Peace Missions?**

### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

The motivation to embark on this study was influenced by two related, but separate, events that marked what appeared to signify a departure from the UN pacifist approach to peace missions to more robust military interventions. The first event was led by South Africa but was, in fact, the SADC's response to the M23 occupation of Goma during November 2012. After an 8 months long military offensive in North Kivu, the M23 finally defeated the FARDC and occupied Goma in November 2012. This occupation of Goma took place in the presence of an estimated 17 000 large MONUSCO peacekeeping force in the DRC with some of the force based in Goma. The occupation of Goma was preceded by the mass killing of unarmed non-combatants, the mass rape of women and children, and other related war crimes committed by both the M23 rebels and the Congolese army (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Disappointed by MONUSCO's lack of an appropriate response to prevent a further decline of security in the North Kivu, the SADC decided to take over resolving the insecurity situation itself. As a result, the SADC decided to establish an intervention force known as the Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) to confront the rebels and to assist the Congolese army to restore stability in the eastern DRC (Cammaert, 2013). The aim behind the SADC's rationale for establishing the NIF was primarily to restore peace and stability, protect unarmed civilians from the scourges of war and protect a democratically elected government which was under attack from the rebel groups (Cammaert, 2013; Karlsrud, 2015).

The second event occurred at approximately the same time as the occupation of Goma by the M23. In northern Mali, secessionist groups, Islamic fundamentalists and terrorist groups launched a military offensive against the government of Mali. The rebels in Mali were prevented from overthrowing the government only when the French army intervened in the conflict at the request of the Malian government (Wing, 2016). During the conflict an estimated 475 000 people were displaced. It is

unclear how many were killed but it was reported that war crimes related abuses had been committed by both sides (CBCnews, 2013).

These two events sparked debates among the policy makers responsible for the security architecture within the AU, AU regional blocs and the UN on whether it was time to consider 'robust' military interventions as a preferred method to restore peace and stability in war torn countries. In 2013 alone the UN had authorised robust military intervention in the CAR, DRC and Mali and giving the peacekeepers a mandate to "use all necessary means to neutralise and disarm identified groups" and stabilise the areas to which they had been deployed (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 39).

It was against this backdrop that South Africa proposed to the AU that there was an urgent need to establish ACIRC as an interim measure to intervene militarily in conflict ridden areas in order to prevent further security instability and, especially, to protect unarmed civilians and prevent the unconstitutional takeover of democratically elected governments (Esmenjaud, 2014).

Empirical evidence on the way in which the UN and AU have approached peace missions in the CAR, DRC, Mali, South Sudan and Somalia over the four years prior to this study indicated a trend which suggested a departure from the pacifist to a more robust approach in the AU and UN peace missions and in line with the approach suggested by ACIRC advocates. This chapter is therefore aimed at determining whether there has, indeed, been a shift from pacifist to a robust military approach to peace mission in Africa. In other words, the chapter aimed to investigate whether the proposal to establish the ACIRC Brigade was an indication of a policy shift from pacifist to robust military interventions as the preferred mechanism to restore peace and stability in conflict areas. The research report used the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French military intervention in Mali as case studies to answer the research question.

In order to determine whether there has been a shift in policy from a pacifist approach to peace missions to robust military intervention the researcher deemed it necessary to commence by explaining the existing mechanisms for conflict resolutions available to the AU and the establishment of the ACIRC. In view of the case study approach adopted the chapter commenced with a brief background to both

the occupation of Goma by the M23 in November 2012 and the events that led to the French army intervention in Mali during January 2013. The second part of the chapter analysed the APSA and explained how the AU uses this security mechanism for conflict resolution on the continent. The emphasis was on the ASF which was supposed to have been commissioned in 2010 although, up to the time of writing this report, it had not yet been commissioned. Since the ASF has failed to materialise thus far, the ACIRC concept has been proposed as an interim measure to fill the security gap left by the ASF. In the third section, the chapter focuses on the core of the research question, namely, robust military intervention in Africa. The FIB deployment in the DRC and the French army's robust military intervention in Mali were used as case studies. Thereafter, the research report evaluates the success and challenges of robust military interventions using the same case studies of the DRC and Mali. The researcher argues that these cases could be used as valuable lessons for the ACIRC mechanism and later the ASF. Before discussing the study's findings, the chapter also discuss the future of robust military interventions before concluding.

## **4.2. THE FALL OF GOMA AND THE FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MALI**

### **4.2.1. The Fall of Goma during November 2012**

The M23 Movement was formed in April 2012 by former members of National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and led by Bosco Ntaganda (Piiparinen, 2016). The CNDP had signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government in 2009 that had led to its integration into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (known mainly by their French antonym, FARDC) (Murphy, 2016). In March 2012 members of the dissolved CNDP staged a mutiny accusing the government of its slow pace in implementing some of the peace agreements of 2009 and complaining about both the unfair treatment of former CNDP soldiers who had been integrated into the FARDC and poor conditions in the army (Müller, 2015).

The M23 started its military offensive against the Congolese army in April 2012 in North Kivu, in the eastern DRC and thus increasing insecurity in the region (Müller, 2015). Due to the brutality and indiscriminate attacks against both military and

civilian targets, many innocent people, particularly the vulnerable non-combatants, women, children and the elderly, lost their lives or were displaced from their homes (Duncan, 2013; Mathoho, 2016). After seven months of intense fighting between the M23 and the FARDC, the Congolese army deployed in North Kivu finally succumbed to the M23 military offensive. In November 2012 the M23 launched a final offensive on the outskirts of the provincial capital city of North Kivu, Goma. The FARDC was defeated. Many of its soldiers deserted their posts while some either surrendered or simply switched ranks to the M23 (Conwell, 2016). When the M23 finally reached Goma, there was almost no resistance from the FARDC (Mathoho, 2016).

It must be noted that that the M23 military offensive and the subsequent occupation of Goma happened in full view of the UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO. At the time of the M23 military offensive, MONUSCO's military strength was estimated to be approximately 17 000 but, nevertheless, it made no effort to stop the M23 occupation of Goma (Cammaert, 2013). In addition, the M23 military offensive and the occupation of the several towns in North Kivu and the capital of Goma were accompanied by atrocities such as the summary execution of opponents, mass rape of women and children, forced recruitments and other related war crimes (Duncan, 2013). Thus, the painful reality was that MONUSCO's presence in North Kivu had not been a sufficient deterrent for the M23 despite it being empowered with a Chapter VII UN Mandate (Cammaert, 2013).

The fall of Goma to the M23 and the inaction on the part of MONUSCO prompted some of the stakeholders in the peace-making process in the DRC, most notably South Africa, to argue that it was perhaps time to consider a different approach that would be appropriate to the M23 threat and restoring stability in the eastern DRC. As a result South Africa played a key role in lobbying SADC Member States to establish the NIF that would, in turn, confront the M23 in a robust military intervention with the aim of restoring peace and stability in North Kivu (Cammaert, 2013). Simultaneously with the proposal by SADC to establish the NIF, the International Convention of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) proposed assembling a robust military force to monitor the border between the eastern DRC and Rwanda to

prevent foreign, armed groups from participating in rebel activities in north Kivu (Cammaert, 2013; Karlsrud, 2015)

The UN was embarrassed by the fact that regional bodies were taking security initiatives upon themselves to resolve the growing insecurity in the eastern DRC due to the failure of MONUSCO. Accordingly, before the SADC NIF and ICGLR border monitoring forces could be deployed to the eastern DRC, the UNSC passed Resolution 2098 that formally adopted and consolidated the two regional initiatives in their confronting of the M23 through robust military intervention (Sheeran & Case, 2014). As a result, the FIB was established as a robust military intervention force operating under the command of MONUSCO. The FIB consists of troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania (Mutton, 2013). In terms of UNSC Resolution 2098, which was passed on 28 March 2013, the FIB was authorised to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and UN personnel and to neutralise and disarm armed groups operating in the eastern DRC (Janik, 2014). The deployment of the FIB brought a new dimension to UN peacekeeping as, “for the first time in its history, the UN had authorised an offensive combat force intended to neutralise and disarm an armed rebel group” (Cammaert, 2013, p. 2).

The researcher is of the view that the deployment of the FIB as an offensive combat force with an offensive mandate marked a move from the usual passive, pacifist approach to peace missions to a more robust approach when addressing conflicts on the African continent (Piiparinen, 2016). The following question then arose from this novel deployment of an offensive combat force, namely, Has there been a shift in policy approach from a pacifist to a more robust approach when resolving conflicts?

The legitimacy of this question was underlined then, a few months after passing Resolution 2098, the UNSC authorised a similar mission in Mali, namely, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which had a similar mandate to that of the FIB (Karlsrud, 2015). Prior to the authorisation of MINUSMA, the French Army had been requested to and had agreed to intervene militarily in Mali in a robust military intervention against the Tuareg separatists and other armed groups that wanted to secede from Mali and establish an Islamic caliphate (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014).

#### **4.2.2. French Military Intervention in Mali**

At about the same time as the occupation of Goma by the M23, the MNLA separatist group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and other al-Qaeda linked jihadist in the Maghreb region, launched a military offensive in Mali (Karlsrud, 2015). The MNLA were fighting for autonomy in northern Mali while the Islamic fundamentalist intention was to establish a caliphate. Had it not been the robust military intervention by the French army, the Malian government would not have survived the military onslaught by the rebels and would have been overthrown (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).

The attempt by the MNLA separatists and the Islamic fundamentalists to overthrow the Mali government had been preceded by a military coup in March 2012 when a group of junior military officers had launched a successful coup against President Amadou Toumani Traore (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). The military junta, which called itself the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (French antonym, CNRDR), argued that it was taking over the government on the basis of President Traore's failure to deal with the Tuareg separatists in northern Mali and the growing threat of the jihadists (Wing, 2016).

With the military junta of the CNRDR at the helm of a fractured government, many soldiers deserted their posts while others joined the Tuareg separatists and Islamists operating from northern Mali. The collapse of the state, which was exacerbated by the weakness of the military junta, made it become easy for the MNLA and the jihadists to align with al-Qaeda to seize several towns in northern Mali, including Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (Wing, 2016). With the rebel groups seizing the towns and what was left of the Malian army trying to stop the military offensive, almost 500 000 thousand people were displaced, civilians whose loyalty could not be established by either side were executed, women raped and children forcefully recruited to the ranks of the fighters from both sides (CBCnews, 2013).

By the time ECOWAS had forced the military junta to step down and the subsequent inauguration of an interim president, the Tuareg separatists had almost reached Bamako, the capital of Mali. Had the armed rebel groups managed to seize the air force base in Kidal, the government in Bamako would have been overthrown in a matter of days (Wing, 2016). In fact, Bamako and, by implication, the Malian

government were saved only when the French army and special forces intervened in January 2013 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). The UN led mission, MINUSMA, which had replaced the ineffective AU mission, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), only joined the French army in July 2013 (Karlsrud, 2015). By this time the French army had successfully defeated the Tuareg separatists and the jihadists rebels and had forced them to retreat, thus preventing the overthrow of the Malian government (Wing, 2016).

The most crucial factor to consider in the case of the Malian conflict, at least for the purpose of this paper, is that both the AU and ECOWAS had failed to raise the an adequate military force required for intervention, in particular, when there had been an unconstitutional removal of a democratically elected government. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, as amended in 2010, commits the AU to militarily intervene in AU Member States if there is “serious threat to legitimate order” such as military coups and the replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements (Baimu & Sturman, 2003, p. 41).

The failure by the AU to assist the Malian government signified a failure to meet its own regional mandate in terms of maintaining security and order. In addition, this failure of the AU to intervene in Mali was a clear indication of the security gap left by the absence of the ASF and, hence, the need to establish the ACIRC Brigade as an interim measure. It is true that ECOWAS had been instrumental in persuading the military junta to hand over power to a civilian led, interim government but it had, however, failed to provide support to the Malian government against the military offensive by the Tuareg separatist and jihadists terrorist groups who were attempting to overthrow the government. The most embarrassing factor for the AU was that Mali had had to request its former colonial master to intervene (Karlsrud, 2015).

It was against the backdrop of the M23 occupation of Goma and the French military intervention in Mali that South Africa and other AU Member States lobbied for the urgent establishment of ACIRC to fill the security gap that had been left by the ASF. The ACIRC mechanism is intended to be a rapid reaction force that will intervene militarily to deal with conflict and crises, particularly where there has been an unconstitutional change of power and the lives of unarmed civilians are endangered.

Thus, it is in line with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act (Baimu & Sturman, 2003; Warner, 2015).

Based on the deployment of the FIB and French army in the eastern DRC and Mali respectively, the following fundamental question again arose, namely, ‘Has there been a shift from pacifist to robust military intervention’ in peace missions in Africa?’. However, before addressing this question, it was important to explain the security mechanism available to the AU to resolve violent conflicts Africa at the time of the study. To this end, the next section discusses the establishment of the APSA.

#### **4.3. AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)**

The OAU was decommissioned in 2002 and replaced by the AU after a careful assessment of the former’s role in the post-colonial and post-cold war era. The OAU Heads of States and Governments agreed that the organisation had become redundant and irrelevant in the light of the contemporary political, economic and social challenges facing the African continent. It was then decided that a new organisation, which would be geared to confront the challenges facing Africa at that time and in the future, should succeed the OAU. The AU was thus formally inaugurated in 2002 as Africa’s continental body (Warner, 2015). Among the organs of the AU is the Peace and the Security Council (PSC) which is the organ which is mainly responsible for the “prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” in Africa (African Union, 2016, p. 50).

Within the PSC the AU also has a collective umbrella body with five institutions which are collectively known as the APSA. The APSA mechanism is responsible for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa and its responsibilities and core objectives are outlined in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act (African Union, 2016). The five institutions that comprise the APSA is the PSC, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and the Peace Fund (African Union, 2016). These bodies have distinct functions and objectives although, in the main, their combined objective is to promote peace, stability and stability on the African continent.

Since the main objective of this chapter was to establish whether there had been shift in policy from a pacifist to a more robust military approach to peace missions in Africa, the paper focused mainly on the ASF as a body which is envisaged to meet the collective security needs of the African continent, including to the right to intervene in a Member State facing in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Warner, 2015).

#### **4.3.1. African Standby Force**

Although the ASF was conceptualised in 2003 under the auspices of the APSC, its historical roots may be traced back to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Engel & Porto, 2014). The founding fathers of the OAU had hoped to establish a Pan-African army with the main objectives of guarding Africa's territorial integrity and countering the recolonisation of the continent by pooling resources (Warner, 2015). The collective security mechanism of the Pan-African army under the OAU was intended to be a deterrent against external aggression, presumably from the former colonial masters and imperialists. In common with the OAU, which placed great value on the principle of sovereignty, the Pan-African army was not supposed to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states and to hold the principles of "non-intervention and nonaggression" in respect of member states (Warner, 2015, p. 57).

The end of the cold war brought about different and dynamic changes in the political and security environment in Africa. The OAU Heads of states and Governments realised that the continental body had become obsolete and, therefore, the AU needed to be reformed and reorganised to deal with the political, social and economic challenges of the post-cold war era. Accordingly, after a series of meetings and summits discussing the future of the OAU, the AU was finally dissolved in 2002 and replaced by the AU. The transition from the OAU to the AU was also accompanied by changes to the security framework.

It was thus agreed in 2003 that the AU should establish a continental standby force which would be based in the five regional blocks of the AU. The ASF comprises five regional brigades in alignment with the AU five regional blocks and, therefore, there is the Southern Africa Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, East Africa Standby Force, Central Africa Standby Force and North African Region Standby Force (African Union, 2016).

The ASF is envisaged to provide the AU with a continental Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) which could be deployed to conflict areas within fourteen days when requested to do so (Warner, 2015). The other tasks of the ASF are to “conduct, observe, and monitor” peace missions and support functions (Warner, 2015, p. 59). In addition, the ASF is also responsible for the prevention of disputes and conflicts and for providing humanitarian assistance. The ASF has the right to intervene militarily in grave circumstance at the request of the AU Member States. However, as a departure from its predecessor, the PSC reserves the right to intervene even if there has been no request from the AU Member State if there are special circumstances such as crimes against humanity and war crimes (African Union, 2016).

The ASF was supposed to have been fully operational by 2010 but, thus far, this has not materialised. The 2010 deadline was then moved to 2013 and then to 2015. However, up until the time of writing this report it was yet to be commissioned (African Union, 2016). The reasons attributed to the delay range from the lack of adequate resources to funding issues. In addition, other regions such as the Central and North African regions have shown little interest in playing their part to ensure the commissioning of the ASF. The Southern, Western and Eastern Africa are the only regions which have, thus far, demonstrated their willingness to commission the ASF and have participated in the ASF exercises, namely, AMANI AFRICA I and II (Institute for Security Studies, 2015; Warner, 2015).

The failure by the AU and its regional blocks to commission the ASF by the targeted dates has left a security vacuum on the continent. Both the number of civil wars and the character of conflict in Africa, which targets mainly non-combatants, are proof that the AU must accelerate the process of commissioning the ASF. The M23 occupation of Goma, the French army intervention in Mali and the ongoing crises in Burundi, DRC, CAR and South Sudan all indicate that it is vital that the AU do all it can to avoid another genocide such as the one seen in Rwanda and the complete collapse of the state as witnessed in Somalia. Moreover, the M23 occupation of Goma and the Mali conflict in 2013 are clear signs that the AU cannot afford to continue to rely on international partners to resolve internal conflict on the African continent.

It is the view of this researcher that, had the ASF been fully functional as had been envisaged, the Mali and Goma incidences may have been avoided. Moreover, a fully functional and unbiased ASF, under the auspices of the PSC, would serve as a deterrent not only to armed groups on the continent, but also to incumbent governments that suppress democratic progress in their countries such as in Burundi and the DRC. It is as a result of the security gap left by the ASF that the AU Commission proposed the ACIRC concept in 2013 and operationalised it in January 2014 as an interim measure to address security issues on the continent (Esmenjaud, 2014).

#### **4.3.2. The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict Rationale for the ACIRC Mechanism**

It was not the intention of this research report to assess the suitability of ACIRC nor to compare it with the ASF regional brigades but, instead, to establish whether, indeed, there has been a policy shift from pacifist to robust military interventions when resolving violent conflicts in Africa. The paper, therefore, investigated whether South Africa, as the main advocate of the ACIRC concept, was indicating that there should be a shift in approach to peace mission from a pacifist to a robust military approach (Cocodia, 2016).

As mentioned in the introductory chapter of the research report, the notion of the urgent establishment of ACIRC was sparked by the AU and UN failure to adequately resolve the declining security situation and the increasing political instability in the eastern DRC and Mali during 2012 (Cammaert, 2013; Esmenjaud, 2014). After some intensive lobbying by the South African delegation to the AU, the ACIRC concept was formally proposed to the AU Commission by the then AU Chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, during April 2013 (De Carvalho, 2016; Warner, 2015).

Apart from the M23 occupation of Goma in November 2012, the AU also had to come to terms with the reality that it was not capable of resolving the political and security developments in Mali. While the AU was still trying to decide what to do to restore peace in the eastern DRC, the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists were intensifying their efforts to topple the Malian government. The Tuareg

separatists and the Islamic fundamentalists were prevented from doing so only by the intervention of the French army in January 2013 (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; Cristiani & Fabiani, 2013). Had it not been for the intervention of the French army, the AU would have had to stand by and witness the collapse of the Malian state and, perhaps worse, the succession of northern Mali and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in one of its Member States.

What made matters worse for the AU was that both the M23 occupation of Goma and the Malian crises had demonstrated to the AU that, as a regional body, it was incapable of maintaining peace and stability in the region; and that the notion of the 'African solutions to African problems' was just a delusion (Esmenjaud, 2014). In addition, it was also a demonstration that it is not possible for the AU to continue to rely on external actors for rapid intervention within its member states as had happened when the French army had come to the AU's rescue in both Mali and the CAR in 2013 (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015).

These two events indicated to some in the AU and, especially, to the SADC, ECOWAS and the ICGLR regional communities, that, if the AU was serious about realising the ideal of 'African solutions to African problems', then the AU could not continue to rely on its international partners to continue to come to its rescue it during security crises (Nathan & others, 2013). Another painful reality was the reaffirmation that, if the AU were to make progress, it could not continue to go back to the former colonial masters to resolve Africa's political and security problems as had happened in Mali (Warner, 2015). The moment was, therefore, ripe for the AU to take decisive actions to resolve the issues of security and instability and confront any group that threatened peace, militarily if necessary.

The fall of Goma and the French intervention in Mali both clearly indicated the existence of the security gap left by the failure to fully operationalise the ASF. After the AU Commission's proposal to establish ACIRC, other similar events that justified the decision to urgently establish the ACIRC took place. For example, at the time of the study there was ongoing insecurity and political instability in the CAR, reports of ethnic cleansing in South Sudan while President Nkurunziza was unleashing violence against those protesting against his decision to run for a third term of office as president of Burundi. In addition, in December 2016, Yahya

Jammeh had refused to hand over presidential power after he had lost democratic election in the Gambia and was forced out only when he was threatened with military intervention by ECOMOG. These are just some of the few examples that justify the urgent need to fully capacitate the ASF and, in the interim, the ACIRC mechanism.

It is important to keep in mind that the AU and its Member States have made a commitment to promote and consolidate democracy on the continent. Moreover, one of the main objectives of the AU is the maintenance of peace and stability in Africa. The AU's commitment and objectives will be realised by the protection of democratically elected governments against unconstitutional takeovers of power and the protection of unarmed civilians against the tyranny of armed groups (state or non-state). In addition to the diplomatic measures as instruments with which to achieve the aforementioned commitment and objectives, the AU has agreed that military interventions will be utilised when necessary, especially in grave circumstances (African Union, 2016).

### **The ACIRC Mechanism**

One of the instruments available to the AU to maintain and consolidate security and political stability on the continent is the APSA, of which the envisaged ASF and its subsidiary, the RDC unit, are intended to intervene militarily should there be a threat to political security and instability in the region. As the time of writing this report, the commissioning of the ASF had been postponed four times – in 2008, 2010, 2013 and 2015 (Cocodia, 2016). Although it is not clear when the ASF will finally come to fruition as was intended, its absence has, however, left a security gap within the APSA. The delay in commissioning the ASF is denying the APSC the ability to deploy a peacekeeping force in grave circumstances as defined in Article 13 of the PSC Protocol (African Union, 2016, p. 58).

It is against this backdrop that the ACIRC concept was proposed as an interim solution to fill the gap left by the ASF (Warner, 2015). The ACIRC was, therefore, an interim measure as a result of the delay in fully commissioning the ASF. The main purpose of the ACIRC is to provide the AU with a “flexible and robust force,

voluntarily provided by Member States, to effectively respond to emergency situations” within the APSA framework (African Union, 2016, p. 60)

The ACIRC force will be deployed in the following circumstances: “ (i) stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention missions, (ii) neutralisation of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and (iii) emergency assistance to Member States within the framework of the principles of non-indifference to the protection of civilians” (de Albuquerque, 2016, p. 20)

It is planned that the ACIRC Brigade will comprise 5000 troops deployed voluntarily by the AU Member States. Of the 5000 troops, it should be possible to deploy 1500 to the theatre of conflict within 10 days and that they should be able to sustain themselves for 30 days on the front before the rest of the force arrives to reinforce them (Esmenjaud, 2014). Thus, the composition of ACIRC is that of an offensive force prepared to engage directly with the spoilers of peace in a military combat. The ACIRC force will be both small, flexible and quickly mobilised for the purposes of deployment (Cocodia, 2016). It consists of the following elements:

Three tactical battle groups, comprised of three infantry battalions of 850 troops each, an artillery support group and light armour elements, as well as the air wing of 400 troops, which will include strike aircraft and helicopters and logistical support, including strategic airlift capabilities. The unit would have a 10-day notice of movement (Warner, 2015, p. 60).

Whether this composition is too ambitious or not, the envisaged ACIRC Brigade has all the characteristics of an offensive force. The ACIRC concept provides the AU with a conflict resolution mechanism to enable it to confront armed groups head-on and achieve what the FIB achieved in the eastern DRC in suppressing the M23 armed rebellion and what the French army achieved in routing the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists in Mali. In other words, the ACIRC mechanism provides the AU with the capability to robustly confront armed elements with the aim of ending hostilities and returning to the negotiating table (Esmenjaud, 2014). However, most importantly, it is aimed at protecting the innocent civilians who often suffer the most during violent conflicts; and promoting democracy by preventing the

unconstitutional change of governments through undemocratic means (African Union, 2016).

Contrary to the ASF which implies the deployment to conflict areas of organised and staffed regional brigades, the ACIRC concept proposes that the ACIRC Brigades could be pledged by a group of AU Member States or even be from one country (Esmenjaud, 2014). In other words, ACIRC deployment will be composed of a “coalition of the willing” who will decide on the number of troops, equipment and funding to assist in conflict areas (Conwell, 2016; Warner, 2015). This ACIRC brigade must also be willing and able to sustain itself while deployed in relation to both logistics and funding (Brosig & Sempijja, 2015).

At the time of writing this report 13 of the 54 AU Member States only had pledged forces to the ACIRC, namely, “Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda” (African Union, 2016, p. 60). It must be noted that some countries, most notably, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia, have vigorously opposed the ACIRC concept, arguing that the AU should, instead, focus on resourcing the ASF because this new initiative will only lead to the redirection of resources which were intended for the ASF, thus leading to a further delay in commissioning the ASF (Cocodia, 2016; Warner, 2015)

It is worth to noting that, despite the fact that the ACIRC concept appears to be similar to that of the ASF, their main objectives are fundamentally different and, hence, the scepticism from some AU Member States. For example, the ASF’s six deployment scenarios are in line with the UN peace mission spectrum which ranges from conflict prevention to peacebuilding. For the ASF, Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement) will be invoked only in grave circumstances such as “war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide” (Esmenjaud, 2014, p. 174).

On the other hand, in addition to the deployments under grave circumstances in line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the ACIRC concept makes further provision for the deployment of the ACIRC Brigade in cases of non-indifference towards the protection of civilians, neutralisation of terrorist groups, cross-border criminal entities and armed rebellions (Esmenjaud, 2014; Warner, 2015). In short, the

ACIRC concept is envisaged to robustly engage the ‘enemies of peace’ by confronting them militarily and is beyond the scope of the ASF.

The advocates of the ACIRC concepts argue that the departure from a pacifist to a more robust approach to peace mission is justified based on the failure of the existing mechanisms, for example, the failure to prevent the occupation of Goma and the near capture of Bamako in 2012 and 2013 respectively (Esmenjaud, 2014). As demonstrated in the next sections, it was due to their willingness to confront the rebels, separatists and jihadists groups in armed combat that the FIB and the French army were successful in routing these groups which were threatening peace in the DRC and Mali respectively.

Although the ACIRC mechanism appeared to be the most viable option in respect of intervention in conflict areas, it has certain serious weaknesses that are impossible to ignore. The most notable weakness in the ACIRC framework is that it may only be deployed when requested to do so by a Member State and as authorised by the PSC. This is problematic because it seems to be in line with the outdated principle of non-intervention in Member States. No Member State that would request the intervention of ACIRC’s rapid deployment force against itself but only if the regime were under attack.

Such an instance was the refusal of the Burundian government in January 2016 to accept the AU deployment of a peacekeeping force during the protests against President Nkurunziza’s intention to run for office despite the fact that his constitutional term of office had expired. Nkurunziza’s regime responded to these protests by intimidating and killing the protesters. In this situation, the AU should have deployed a peacekeeping force to protect the innocent and unarmed protesters against the Burundian security forces. However, when the AU resolved to send a peacekeeping force to Burundi the government threatened the AU that it would treat the deployment as an infringement of its sovereignty and that it would respond by treating the AU peacekeeping force as an enemy of Burundi, thus reserving the right to defend itself (De Carvalho, 2016; Leijenaar, 2016) .

#### **4.4. ROBUST MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE EASTERN DRC AND MALI**

##### **4.4.1. The FIB Robust Military Intervention in the DRC**

The M23 reached Goma in November 2012 despite the presence of a 17 000 strong force of MONUSCO. SADC, led by South Africa and Tanzania, proposed the formation of a NIF to intervene in Goma on humanitarian grounds and to oppose the attack on a legitimate and democratically elected government (Karlsruud, 2015; Müller, 2015). In line with the SADC's NIF initiative, the ICGLR also proposed the establishment of another regional mission to control the border between the DRC and Rwanda (Müller, 2015). Both SADC and the ICGLR intended to address the security situation in the DRC themselves as MONUSCO was doing very little to save the situation. Thus, the regional bodies argued that they would not stand and watch while the security situation continued to deteriorate (Cammaert, 2013). One may argue that the initiative on the part of SADC and the ICGLR to restore peace and stability in the eastern DRC was informed by the intention to prevent another Rwanda where innocent civilians were massacred in the presence of the UN peacekeeping force (Mathoho, 2016).

MONUSCO was heavily criticised by the international community and, particularly by AU Member States, for allowing the M23 to occupy Goma and for the resultant humanitarian disaster in the aftermath of the M23's onslaught on unarmed non-combatants (de Carvallo, 2016). As a result of its embarrassment and the wish to prevent the regional blocs from establishing missions parallel with MONUSCO, the UNSC passed Resolution 2076 on 20 November 2012, expressing its concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in the eastern DRC and the deepening humanitarian situation due to the activities of the M23 (Müller, 2015). Resolution 2076 gave the UN Secretary General the mandate to explore options to improve the mandate of MONUSCO regarding resolving the deteriorating insecurity situation.

The UN Secretary General decided to the intentions of SADC and ICGLR into line in order to strengthen MONUSCO and give it a fresh mandate with the power to confront the M23 militarily. It was then agreed that the military forces that were to be deployed by SADC and ICGLR to the DRC must be integrated into MONUSCO and their actions aligned through the unity of command provided by the UN

peacekeeping force already active in the DRC. As such, on 28 March 2013 the UNSC passed Resolution 2098 authorising the deployment of the FIB (Müller, 2015). Resolution 2098 authorised the FIB to “neutralise armed groups and to reduce the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security through targeted offensive operations in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2014, p. 1).

By November 2013, seven months after the deployment of the FIB, the M23 was defeated as a military force (Müller, 2015). The FIB had proved itself to be a credible intervention force that had been able to neutralise the military threat posed by the M23 and other armed groups operating in North Kivu. After suffering heavy military defeats, the M23 agreed to return to the negotiating table in August 2013. By this time the M23 had lost its leverage as many of its fighters had been killed in combat, fled for neighbouring countries or simply integrated in the local communities (Murphy, 2016).

The deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC was similar to the intended achievements of ACIRC and the ASF under Scenario 6 (Cilliers, 2008). In light of the military success of the FIB against the M23, one may argue that the ACIRC concept and/or the ASF will be a valuable addition to the APSA as, not only had the FIB defeat the M23 militarily but it had also forced them to return to the negotiating table.

Moreover, the FIB success saved the lives of vulnerable people in the DRC, particularly women, children and elderly people (Duncan, 2013). Although, in the main, insecurity still prevail in the eastern DRC the FIB has, nevertheless, achieved the majority of its mandated objectives. The M23 as a credible fighting force has disappeared while, similar to the military successes of the FIB against the M23, the French army also managed to prevent the overthrow of the government of Mali in 2013.

#### **4.4.2. French Military Intervention in Mali**

In common with many conflicts on the African continent, the 2012 conflict in Mali may be traced back to 1960 when the country gained its independence from France. Throughout the post-colonial era in Mali, the main causes of the conflict may be

narrowed down to poor governance of the state, economic mismanagement and underdevelopment (Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). In addition, the nature of the Malian conflicts, in most cases, has taken on an ethnic and racial dimension between the Arabs, based mainly in the northern parts of the country, and the 'black Africans', based mainly in the southern part of Mali.

The 2012 conflict was not different to previous causes of conflicts as the government of President Amadou Toumani Traore was accused of mismanaging the economy, failed state institutions and endemic corruption (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). As a result, a newly formed political party, MNLA, formed by those returning from the Libyan conflict embarked on a mission to demand an autonomous state in northern Mali (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). As a result of the government's inability to deal with the MNLA separatists in northern Mali, a group of officers led by Captain Amadou Sonogo successfully deposed the government in a bloodless military coup in March 2012 (Wing, 2016). The military junta justified the military coup, claiming that, as compared to the government, they would be in a better position to address the insecurity situation caused by the military offensive in the north and restore order and political stability in Mali.

With the fractured military junta led by junior officers and a depleted army (some of the Malian troops defected to the ranks of the Tuareg separatists and other Islamic fundamentalists), the insurgents were able to seize many cities in northern Mali, including Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (Wing, 2016). By the time the military junta had been forced to step down by the AU and ECOWAS, the Tuareg separatists had almost reached Bamako, the capital of Mali. When the interim government led by President Dioncouda Traore was inaugurated, the rebels were on the verge of seizing the town of Konna on the boundary between northern and southern Mali. Writers such as Wing (2016) argue that, had the rebels succeeded in taking over the air force base in Konna, Bamako would have fallen in a matter of days.

The interim president was under pressure to quell the rebel advances to Bamako. With no adequate military assistance from ECOWAS and the AU, President Dioncouda Traore was left with no choice but to ask France, Mali's former colonial master, for military assistance. The French government acceded to the request of the government of Mali and, on 11 July 2013, the French army intervened in the Malian

conflict (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015; Wing, 2016). At the peak of its deployment in Mali, the military strength of the French army was approximately 5000 – the same number which both the ASF and ACIRC would deploy in the theatre of conflict (Cocodia, 2016; Esmenjoud, 2014). Within three weeks of the French army's robust military engagement against the Tuareg separatist and Islamic fundamentalist groups, the French army had succeeded in halting the rebel advances to Bamako (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015).

In line with the robust military intervention which had succeeded in defeating the M23 militarily, the French army also managed to defeat both the Tuareg separatist and Islamic fundamentalist groups in armed combat. The majority of the insurgents were killed, some fled to neighbouring Chad and Libya while some integrated themselves into the civilian population in Mali (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). By the time the AFSMA had been integrated into a UN led mission MINUSMA, on 1 July 2013, the French had already defeated the insurgents (Cocodia, 2016). MINUSMA was then left with the responsibility of ensuring the continued stability in northern Mali and which had been achieved by the French within a very short space of time.

The robust military interventions by both the FIB and the French army demonstrated that a 'robust military solution' could be successful in ending armed hostilities. At the same time, robust military interventions have also proved that they are not a desirable long term strategy because, despite the military defeat of the M23 in the DRC and the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists in Mali, at the time of the study political and security instability continued to prevail in both countries (Cocodia, 2016; Mathoho, 2016). Nevertheless, in the main, military interventions save the lives of the innocent non-combatants who are often caught up in the midst of the conflict. Although robust military intervention is a useful strategy to end armed hostilities quickly it is essential that the main aim of such intervention is to persuade the "spoilers of peace" to return/come to the negotiating table (Roos, 2016a).

Despite the successes of robust military intervention in terms of militarily defeating armed groups, as seen in the DRC and Mali, there are notable lessons to be learnt in relation to both the challenges and success factors. It is no longer a matter of debate whether the AU should accelerate the commissioning of the ASF and integrate some

of the elements of the ACIRC into its operating mechanism. However, does the success of robust military intervention in the cases cited above provide evidence that such robust military interventions are the future of peace missions in Africa?

#### **4.5. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF ROBUST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE DRC AND MALI**

It was necessary to interrogate the reasons why the robust military interventions were successful in the eastern DRC and Mali. Despite the acknowledgement at the end of this the research study that robust military interventions are not a sustainable option in the interests of long-term peace, they do, nevertheless, remain a key strategy that may be used as an interim measure while other diplomatic measures are being explored as intended by the ASF and ACIRC. The lessons learnt from the successful French army and FIB interventions may be important in terms of other robust military engagement in future peacekeeping in Africa.

##### **Success of the Robust Military Interventions in the eastern DRC and Mali**

The first success factor in relation to robust military intervention and, perhaps, the most important reason for such interventions, is the growing recognition on the part of the AU Member States that insecurity and political instability may impact adversely on political and economic progress. If the AU Member States are not willing to resolve political instability and violent conflicts then the developmental progress of the continent will continue to lag behind that of other regions in the world. It may thus be said that the success of the FIB was primarily because the AU Member States in the regional blocs demonstrated their willingness to take matters into their own hands to resolve conflict even if this meant going to war in order to restore peace (Karlsrud, 2015).

SADC and the ICGLR initiated the FIB and were prepared to take the risk to restore peace in the region. This same willingness was also shown by ECOWAS in Mali despite the delay in sending ECOMOG to restore peace in Mali. In other words, if the regional blocs are prepared not only to show solidarity but also to take active steps to resolve conflict this sends a clear message to the aspiring armed combatants that they will have to resolve their political disputes through peace means because violence will no longer be tolerated.

Regarding the willingness of the regional blocs to confront armed groups in armed combat, the FIB was used and the Malian conflict resolved by the coalition of states which were willing to risk their citizens to resolve the escalating humanitarian disasters in the DRC and Mali. Despite the fact that the motives of the ‘coalition of the willing’ have been criticised as the “willing” pursuing the narrow interests of their own countries in the DRC and Mali, it is clear that, in order to deploy a robust military army, the AU will have to rely on the willingness of its Member States to take risks by sending their countrymen on high risk peace missions (De Carvalho, 2016).

Military operations are expensive and, particularly, for the offensive combat forces. The offensive military operations in the eastern DRC and Mali were funded by the UN and the French government respectively. The advantage of the robust military offensive in Mali was the logistics support afforded to the French army. Unlike the rebel forces in Mali, the French army was provided with all the logistical support it needed on a daily basis (Wing, 2016). The FIB, which operates under the auspices of MONUSCO is also equally well resourced. The approved budget for the period June 2016 to June 2017 is \$1 235 723 100 (United Nations General Assembly, 2016, p. 3). Thus, both the French army and the FIB are well resourced in terms of troops, equipment and funding. Thus, the lesson to be learnt is that, if the ACIRC offensive military operations are to be a success, it is essential that the issues of funding, logistical support and other related military requirements are taken seriously. However, the proposed funding model in terms of which the member states must self-fund their military operations will, in all likelihood, deter poor countries from participating because they will not be able to afford to fund their military operations even if they are willing to send troops on the missions.

On the operational and tactical levels, several factors contributed to the success of the French military intervention in Mali and the FIB in the DRC. The air power of both the FIB and French army was superior to that of the armed groups against which they were fighting. The FIB air superiority was provided by the South African Air Force attack helicopter gunship, the Rooivalk (Roos, 2016a) while the French army ‘Operation Serval’ was backed by superior air power capable of both attack and surveillance (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). Thus, the lesson to be learnt for both ACIRC and the ASF is that air superiority plays an important role in the

success of offensive military combat. Since ACIRC is intended to be a ‘coalition of the willing’ this implies that countries that volunteer for a specific intervention must ensure that their military strengths complement each other and they must ensure that they have air superiority over the armed group with which they are engaging.

Another success factor at the tactical level was that, in Mali, the French army had sound tactical intelligence and combat experience and there was limited media coverage. The French government has always had strategic interests in Mali due to the uranium mines that supply the French energy generating sector and, therefore, France always takes a keen interest in political developments that may impact negatively on its national interests. Moreover, the French intelligence had always kept a close eye on Islamic fundamentalists whom, they believe, may attempt to launch terrorist attack in France and then retreat to their base in Mali. Accordingly, the French have always gathered intelligence on developments in Mali. The intelligence which the French army had at its disposal was instrumental in assisting them to identify the key instigators who had to be eliminated and/or isolated. The intelligence was also important in helping the French army to navigate the topography of the area with ease (Wing, 2016).

The lesson to be learnt in this instance is that intelligence gathering is crucial in winning combat engagement against any ‘enemy’. In the context of the ASF and ACIRC, the researcher acknowledges that intelligence gathering by one member state over the other is a very sensitive matter. However, if the AU and its regional blocs and member states are serious about continental and regional collective security, they must understand that they would have to let go of their sovereignty in intelligence gathering. In other words, the AU and its Member States must come up with a strategy for intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing, especially in areas identified by its Early Warning Systems (De Carvalho, 2016).

In addition, the French army also had combat experience as some of its soldiers had gained combat experience during their assignments in Afghanistan and Iraq. This combat experience, in turn, was invaluable in their fighting against seasoned fighters who had just fought in Libya (Wing, 2016). This paper is not suggesting that ACIRC troops must have combat experience but does suggest regular joint military exercises, such as the AMANI AFRICA I and II, to prepare themselves for armed

combat (African Union, 2016). The AU will then have to find the financial and other resources necessary to continue to fund the joint military exercises to prepare the ASF and ACIRC Brigade for armed combat.

### **Challenges for the ACIRC Concept**

The ACIRC concept appears to be a desirable, quick solution for resolving conflict in Africa. However, despite the laudable objectives of the ACIRC, like the ASF, there are, nevertheless, numerous challenges and, hence, the delay in its commissioning and the possibility that the ACIRC concept is destined for the same fate as the ASF. The ACIRC concept faces challenges including logistics, funding, capacity and numerous others. This paper, however, limited its discussion on these challenges to political issues regarding troop contribution and the legal principles of peacekeeping.

It is envisaged that the ACIRC Brigade will be composed of troops from a 'coalition of the willing' AU Member States. In addition, ACIRC aims to be able to mobilise 1500 troops for a rapid response in conflict areas within a period of 10 to 15 days while the remaining 3500 troops will reinforce the advance team within 30 days. It has already been mentioned in this paper that, at the time of this study, 13 of the 54 AU Member States only had pledged forces for the ACIRC.

Should the PSC authorise the deployment of ACIRC, it is highly improbable that the ACIRC will be able to mobilise the number of required troops within the stipulated time period. For example, the majority of the Member States which have pledged forces are already committed in other UN or AU missions and, therefore, it is extremely unlikely that they would be able to mobilise more troops for another mission elsewhere (Leijenaar, 2016). Moreover, the ACIRC concept is based on the troops of these countries bringing their own equipment and resources and being self-funding (Cocodia, 2016). However, many countries are already struggling to fund their own security and social programmes at home. Thus, even if the countries supplying these troops were willing to deploy them, issues relating to airlift capacity and the provisioning of the troops at the front may cause domestic problems at home due to competing social needs which these countries are already struggling to address. In other words, the AU will have to come up with a better funding and logistic mechanism if the ACIRC is to work.

The other challenge identified in this paper was the fact that peacekeeping is the primary responsibility of the UNSC. At first glance the ACIRC concept appeared to represent a solution to conflict resolutions, especially in instances in which innocent civilians are caught up in the fire between warring parties. However, the ACIRC concept is a clear departure from the fundamental UN principles of peacekeeping as they stand today. In essence, peacekeeping rests upon two defining features:

Firstly, from the organisational point of view, according to Article 29 of the UN Charter, all peace missions come under the auspices and command of the UNSC (Müller, 2015). The intention of the SADC NIF and the ICGLR fell outside of the ambit of the UN and thus did not qualify as peace missions. Even though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does allow regional bodies to embark on peace missions these must still be authorised by the UNSC. Moreover, the AU has to obtain authorisation from the UNSC to deploy an intervention force. Such authorisation is not always guaranteed as that some permanent members in the UNSC may veto such decisions by the AU. Thus, unless the AU is able to come to some sort of compromise with the UNSC regarding the deployment of ACIRC, it may, sometimes, find itself contravening both the international laws of peace missions and the UN Charter.

Secondly, peacekeeping is based on three fundamental principles, namely, consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in defence of the mandate (Müller, 2015). It is true that these fundamental principles of peacekeeping have been revised. For example, the consent of the parties is not required in grave circumstances such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Moreover, impartiality does not mean that the UN peacekeeping force must not act to prevent action on the part of the spoilers of peace. However, it is not clear what the AU would do if it did not receive authorisation from the UNSC. Would the AU proceed unilaterally as the USA did in Granada? (Diehl, 1994).

Moreover, how would the AU ensure that the coalition of the willing is not composed only of those with vested interests? Also, what if there is no consensus from the AU Member States themselves regarding deployment to the country in question? If this is not clearly defined it has a potential to further escalate conflict because other countries may intervene to defend their allies as happened in the Great

Lakes Region when some members of the SADC found themselves at war fighting alongside the DRC government troops against Rwanda and Uganda during 1998. It is thus clear that AU will have to do everything to prevent such a scenario in view of the potential of military solutions to cause an escalation in hostilities.

The challenge cited by humanitarians is that robust military interventions, for example, those carried out by the FIB, places the fundamental principles of peacekeeping at risk. It is argued that intervening in combat engagement means that the UN peacekeeping force will be party to conflict, thus negating some of the key principles of UN peacekeeping, for example, impartiality (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2014).

The FIB has achieved visible successes in the eastern DRC and French army in Mali. Nevertheless, on balance, it must be noted that robust military intervention comes with many potential challenges and, if these challenges are not anticipated and well managed, this could result in the further insecurity on the African continent. However, the challenges also do not mean there is no future for robust military interventions in relation to resolving violent conflict but simply that the AU will just have to be vigilant and not replace the peaceful settlement of conflicts with the barrel of a gun.

#### **4.6. THE FUTURE OF ROBUST MILITARY INTERVENTION**

The military success of the FIB and the French army in the DRC and Mali proved beyond doubt the power of robust military intervention to suppress armed rebellion and limit the suffering of innocent civilians. In addition, robust military intervention has also proved itself to be a useful instrument in the promotion and consolidation of democracy by protecting democratically elected governments from armed rebellion – as is intended with the ACIRC. However, the consensus from both the literature review and the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study is that robust military intervention is not desirable although it may be a necessary tool for short-term strategic gains in persuading the spoilers of peace to halt armed hostilities and return to the negotiating table.

After the success of the FIB in the eastern DRC, there were calls for the same model to be used to be used in other conflict affected areas such as South Sudan, CAR and

Somalia (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2014). However, unfortunately, even if the resources were available to deploy a force such as ACIRC in hostile conflict environments, there are very few countries willing to risk their troops in such dangerous missions. As indicated earlier in the paper, 13 AU Member States only have pledged their contribution to the ACIRC. In addition, it must be noted that a pledge and an actual contribution are two different things. Countries may pledge resources but, when the time for actual deployment comes, they are often not able to fulfil their pledges for several reasons. The lack of pledges in respect of the ACIRC Brigade is an indication that the AU must consider other mechanisms or, at least, prioritise the commissioning of the ASF because it will operate at a regional level and could always be supplemented by other regions if required (Cilliers, 2008).

The reason why the UN changed the principle of neutrality to one of impartiality was to allow the UN peacekeeping force a wider use of force in defence of the UN mandates (Muller, 2015, p. 360). Thus, the mechanisms and principles of peacekeeping in place at the time of the study were sufficient to enforce peace without complicating the issue by additional structures such as the ACIRC. Deploying a force such as the FIB goes against the principle of avoiding the UN to be part of the conflict. Relying on lead countries or a coalition of the willing may mean that the AU may run the risk of its Member States becoming involved in the conflict and, in the long term, this may have serious repercussions. The principle of impartiality implies that the UN or AU peacekeeping force may use the necessary amount of force in defence of the peacekeeping mandate and thus what is required is leadership willing to exercise its powers as per the mandate at both the operational and tactical levels of peacekeeping operations.

Moreover, deploying a unilateral army such as the French army in Mali violates the principles of a multilateral approach to peacekeeping. The same may be said for the 'coalition of the willing' because the AU runs the risk of its member states trying to pursue their own interests in other countries militarily. For example, how would the AU ensure that South Africa was not pledging forces to deploy on an ACIRC mission in Burundi or DRC in order to safeguard its own business and mining interests (Roos, 2016a). Although such concerns may be mere supposition they are,

however, genuine concerns which both the AU and the UN must take into consideration if they intend to preserve the credibility of international peacekeeping.

Robust military intervention is not a sustainable solution because it is not possible for either the AU or the UN guarantee that their member states will be willing to participate in high risk missions such as the FIB and the mission undertaken by the French armed forces in Mali (Mathoho, 2016). Thus, although the political will to use robust force is vital for peace enforcement missions it may not be a strategy which the AU and the UN should adopt.

There is a danger should the AU and UN wish to continue with robust military intervention such as the FIB and the intervention by the French armed forces. France did not necessarily intervene in Mali in order to protect the Malian government and its populace and, instead, its intervention was driven primarily by its own strategic interests of denying the Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists groups aligned to al-Qaida a base from which to operate. In addition, Mali supplies over 30 per cent of France's uranium needs for its energy generating capacity and, hence, the French's wish to ensure continued political and security stability in Mali (Wing, 2016). Similarly, in respect of the FIB, South Africa is the largest contributor of both personnel and military equipment. In addition, South Africa has vast business interests in the retail, banking and mining sectors in the DRC (Roos, 2016b). With such vested interests on the part of the countries volunteering, it is difficult to argue that their participation is not driven by their own national interest but by altruistic motives.

This paper, therefore, argues that, despite empirical evidence from 2012 which suggests growing trend in the UN authorisation of 'robust military intervention', such a strategy is a short term solution only. In terms of the African continent level, the AU must ensure that the APSA structures works in harmony to ensure that conflict is managed before it escalates to violence. The researcher supports the continued efforts to commission the ASF and the ACIRC in the interim process. The ASF should be available to the AU to be deployed in all six of the scenarios identified so that the spoilers of peace are aware that, if they are not willing to achieve peace through dialogue, the AU will not stand aside and watch them punish innocent civilians in their quest to realise their political agendas.

#### **4.7. IS THERE A SHIFT FROM A PACIFIST TO A ROBUST MILITARY APPROACH?**

The first research question aimed at determining whether, from South Africa's point of view, there has been a shift from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peacekeeping. This question emanated from South Africa's insistence that the ACIRC be established in the interim while the ASF has not yet been commissioned. The study used the FIB and the French army intervention in Mali as case studies that could be generalised to answer the primary research question addressed in this chapter. Having evaluated the motivation for the establishment of the ACIRC, the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French army's intervention in Mali, the next section discusses the study's finding in relation to the research question posed.

The period between 2013 and 2016 has seen the UNSC authorise four robust military interventions in Africa. In 2013 the UNSC passed Resolution 2098 to authorise the deployment of the FIB in the DRC (Cammaert, 2013). In April 2013 the UNSC authorised the deployment of the MINUSMA in Mali with this replacing the AU led mission (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). The French army's robust intervention in Mali, which was a precursor to MINUSMA, had the sanction of the UN. In 2014 the UNSC also authorised robust military intervention in both the CAR and South Sudan. Thus, the empirical evidence from the previous three years suggests that the UNSC is more prepared to authorise peace missions which are 'robust' in approach than before. As already indicated, this research study attempted to answer the following research, namely, has there been in change in policy from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peacekeeping?

It was no easy task to answer this question because, despite the empirical evidence indicating that there has, indeed, been a shift in approach from a pacifist to robust military approach, both the UN and the AU are quick to point out that the preferred method of conflict resolutions is a peaceful approach which favours dialogue between the warring parties. Thus, robust military interventions are authorised as a last resort only.

Robust military interventions are authorised only in exceptional circumstances and are also used only at a tactical level to halt armed hostilities. In other words, robust

military interventions should be used in an effort to achieve long term peace by creating the necessary conditions for the warring parties to go to the negotiating table and resolve their differences without further escalation of violence (Leijenaar, 2016).

Legally there has been no change in approach because the existing UN conflict resolution mechanisms and principles of peacekeeping do allow for robust peacekeeping without the UN Charter having to be amended (Murphy, 2016). The UN Charter makes provision for the UNSC and the regional bodies to conduct 'robust' military intervention when they are so authorised through the UNSC. The 'robust' intervention simply refers to the operational term used by the UN to communicate the message that it is going to use the necessary proportional force to deter armed groups (Murphy, 2016). Robust military intervention is allowed under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. For example, a peacekeeping force is given a specific mandate only after the threat level has been determined. Thus, the threat level and the security instability in the theatre of operations will determine whether the UN peacekeeping force and, by extension, the AU will be deployed under Chapter VI or VII (Mathoho, 2016). It is important to note that, in all peace missions, be it under Chapter VI or VII, the principles of peace missions still apply and peacekeepers should be trained to understand how they must act within the confines of the principles of peace missions (Mathoho, 2016).

The data gathered from both the literature review and the interviews supports the view that there had been an increase in the authorisation of robust military intervention in the four years prior to the study. However, despite this increase, the data suggests that the robust military approach is mission specific and is in response to the security situation on the ground. This research study concluded that there had been no shift in approach from a pacifist to a robust military approach. The deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC was designed specifically to address the threat level posed by the M23 and it was incumbent on the peacekeepers to respond adequately. Likewise, the intervention in Mali by the French army and MINUSMA was aimed at sending a peacekeeping force that would be able to address the threat posed by the Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists. The UN Charter and the principles of peace missions have always made provision for the UN

peacekeeping force and, by extension, the regional peacekeeping forces to respond adequately to the threat level in the theatre of tactical operations.

#### **4.8. CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this chapter was to determine whether there had been a change in approach from a pacifist to robust military approach. The main research question was informed by the events between 2012 and 2014 when the UNSC had authorised robust military intervention in at least four cases. The cases selected for the purposes of this study included the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and the French army intervention in Mali – joined later by MINISMA.

The findings of the research study were that, although the period between 2012 and 2015 had seen the UN authorise at least four robust military interventions, this did not, in fact, indicate a shift from a pacifist to a robust military approach as the preferred peace mission strategy. The researcher argued that UN Charter and Principles of Peace Missions have always made provision for a robust approach if conditions warrant the need to do so. Both the FIB and the French army in the DRC and Mali were responding to the threat level posed by the armed groups with which they were confronted.

South Africa, the focus of this paper, is bound by the multilateral decisions of both the AU and the UN. Thus, it does not have the authority to unilaterally favour the robust approach if the international community is not in support of such an approach. Moreover, South Africa's official policy documents and statements by senior public officials always emphasise the need to achieve peace through dialogue. Both M23 and Mali during 2012 represented a unique situation that required a unique response. Accordingly, this study concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been a shift in conflict resolution policy from a pacifist to a robust military approach.

## **Chapter 5: South Africa's Motivation for Participating in Peace Missions**

### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

South Africa achieved inclusive democracy in 1994 after many years of colonialism and apartheid. This democracy was achieved through a negotiated settlement after the liberation movements and the apartheid regime had agreed that an all-out military confrontation was not desirable and would, in fact, be detrimental for all parties and for the country. The outcome of the negotiated settlement and the subsequent democratic election that saw a Government of National Unity (GNU) come into office took many observers by surprise and has thus been labelled the 'South African miracle'(McGurk, 2013). As a result, both the domestic and the international community expressed the expectation that post-apartheid South Africa would transfer its conflict resolutions strategies to other parts of the world, particularly on the African continent (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999)

South Africa has, indeed, lived up to the expectations that it would play a role in conflict resolution in Africa. The domestic and international expectations coupled with the country's colonial and apartheid legacy later become key references that formed the basis of South Africa's future foreign policy. The post-apartheid, democratic government made it clear that its goal was to transform the country from a 'pariah' into an accepted global citizen (Schraeder, 2001). It was, therefore, not surprising when Mandela announced that post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy would be anchored on the promotion of human rights, democracy, conflict resolution and global cooperation on multilateral platforms (Mandela, 1993; Qobo & Nyathi, 2016).

South Africa's painful history of colonialism and apartheid was key in shaping South Africa's foreign policy identity and engagements. South African liberation movements had received support from both neighbouring countries and abroad and thus the apartheid regime had ensured that the neighbouring countries which supported the liberation movements also felt the brunt of the regime through random military raids and by suffocating them economically. Realising the extent of the assistance received by the liberation movements at significant risk to those who had

supported these movements, the post-apartheid government declared that Africa would be at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy engagements (DIRCO, 2011). Mandela (1993, p. 87) argued that "South Africa cannot escape its African destiny", thus indicating that the country would not progress if the Africa, continent and, in particular, Southern Africa, were excluded from any plans for its economic and social progress. These sentiments are also captured in the draft white paper on foreign policy with DIRCO acknowledging that South Africa cannot be an "island of prosperity in the ocean of poverty" (DIRCO, 2011, p. 20). Recognising the shared humanity and the compassion shown to its own liberation struggle against apartheid by other African countries, South Africa's foreign policy identity is, therefore, grounded in the philosophy of '*ubuntu*' (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016).

The philosophy of *ubuntu* has become a guideline in South Africa's foreign policy engagement, particularly in Africa. *Ubuntu* is described as a "worldview that attempts to capture the essence of what it means to be human, accentuating connectedness and a sense of responsibility towards others" (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016, p. 423). In line with this philosophy, South Africa has placed the 'African Agenda' at the centre of its foreign policy engagements. South Africa's African Agenda is intrinsically linked with the ideals of the African renaissance which is aimed at championing Africa's renewal and placing the African continent on a trajectory of development, peace and stability (DIRCO, 2011).

At the centre of Africa's renaissance is the vision to craft new strategies for achieving economic growth, development and improved forms of governance on the continent (Vale & Maseko, 1998). South Africa has, therefore, placed itself at the centre of Africa's developmental agenda by playing a key role in the design of institution such as the AU, NEPAD, APRM and other relevant institutions on the continent (McGurk, 2013). One of the preconditions for achieving the vision of the African Agenda is peace and stability on the continent and South Africa has made it its duty to play a significant role in the realisation of this precondition.

It is against this backdrop that, since 1994, South Africa has played a significant role in conflict resolution in Africa. South Africa has participated, and continues to participate, in various conflict resolution mechanisms on the continent ranging from

preventative diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and humanitarian interventions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

When one studies South Africa's official policy documents in relation to its engagement with the international community, one may prematurely conclude that South Africa's participation in peace missions is based on the idealist understanding of international relations. It is thus easy to conclude South Africa is not driven by the benefits it may accrue from its participation in peace missions and that its participation is based on altruistic reasons just as other countries assisted it without expecting anything in return when it was fighting its own liberation struggle.

South Africa has participated in peace missions since 1998. At any given time between 2003 and the recent withdrawal of the South African contingent deployed in Sudan (Darfur) during April 2015, it has contributed an average of 3 000 uniformed personnel to peace missions annually (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014). At the time of writing this research report, South Africa was still deployed in the FIB and was considering sending troops to South Sudan (Leijenaar, 2016).

The noble reasons for pursuing the African Agenda are understandable. However, are these only reasons why South Africa would risk its citizens in peace missions? One of the many roles of academia is to critically analyse policy pronouncements and intent vis-à-vis policy action, implementation and outcome. This research paper was, therefore, aimed at critically analysing South Africa's participation in peace missions. From an IR theory perspective, what is the motivation behind South Africa's participation in peace missions on the African continent?

## **5.2. MOTIVATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MISSIONS**

The research study was limited to interpreting South Africa's participation in peace missions on the basis of the realist and idealist theories of IR only. As with all IR theories, both idealism and realism are founded on certain basic assumptions. These have already been explained in detail in the literature review and the discussion of the theoretical framework in chapter two of the research report. Accordingly, this section discusses the main themes or reasons that emerged from the data gathering (literature research and interviews) as to the motivation behind South Africa's

participation in peace missions. At the end of the research report the researcher will indicate the conclusions reached as to which of the two IR theories is more dominant when one analyses South Africa's participation in peace missions.

### **5.2.1. South Africa's National Interests**

#### **Defining National Interests**

Various scholars and policy analysts have contrasting views on the motivation for South Africa's participation in peace missions in Africa. The reason cited most often for South Africa's participation in peace missions is that South Africa is merely pursuing its national interests. However, at the same time, there seem to be contradictions in respect of the understanding of the concept of national interest because, in the main, the concept is interpreted from the perspective of a realist understanding of IR. Thus, in view of these contradictions in the understanding of the concept of national interest, the researcher deemed it necessary to clarify his understanding of what national interest is. It was envisaged that this clarification would add conceptual value when a stand was taken on whether the national interest motivation argument is credible in determining whether if South Africa's participation in peace missions is influenced by wither the realist or the idealist interpretation of IR.

In its most simple form, national interests are the "most vital needs of the country" and thus the state will do whatever it takes to secure these vital needs (Landsberg, 2010, p. 273). It is vital that these needs are met if the state to prosper and secure its survival in an anarchic global system. In the context of classical IR national interests are usually associated with realism with the advocates of realism viewing national interest as the maximisation of power and self-perseverance in the conduct of international relations (Morgenthau, 1978; Russell, 1994). National interest would, therefore, play a role in the state determining of the policy goals to be pursued and also clarify the extent to which the state willing to go to realise such goals. From the realist perspective, national interests may include extending state influence through military power and flexing economic muscle to achieve its own aims in the conduct of international relations. At the end, national interests are those things which the state decides are important and which the state is willing to pursue at all costs. They are usually clearly defined in the form of policy documents (Landsberg, 2010).

Contrary to the realist interpretation of national interest, contemporary scholars of IR have started to interpret national interest from the idealist perspective. DIRCO agrees that national interest includes most of the characteristics as pointed out by realist but adds that national interest may also include “common agenda and shared values for a better world” and thus may be mutually beneficial for all parties concerned (Landsberg, 2010, p. 277). Qobo and Nyathi (2016) have also argued that the philosophy of *Ubuntu*, which is new the field of IR, is gaining momentum in the conduct of foreign relations. It is therefore, important that, when one evaluates South Africa’s participation in peace mission, that one understand that national interest may also be interpreted within the context of both idealism and realism.

Idealists do concur with their rival advocates of realism counterparts that states always act in their national interests. However, for idealists, this does not have to be always about the maximisation of the state power and the survival of the regime. National interests emanate from the culture and values of domestic society. As pointed in the draft white paper on foreign policy, South Africa does not believe that the international system is characterised only by anarchy and that states have to pursue the narrow interest under cover of securing their sovereignty (DIRCO, 2011). As the minister of DIRCO, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, states that, in its pursuit of national interests, South Africa will recognise that “states can work together around common global agenda and shared values for a better world” (Landsberg, 2010, p. 278).

Thus, from DIRCO’s perspective, South Africa understands both the realist and the idealist pursuit of national interests. Thus, although South Africa would prefer its conduct of foreign policy to be dominated by the idealist understanding of national interest, the realities of the global order compel it to prioritise its national interests from the realist perspective when necessary. It is due to the dominance of realist foreign policy pragmatism that South Africa’s participation in peace missions is limited primarily to the countries in which strategic interest is the key driver of foreign policy (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

### **National Interests as a Motive for South Africa's Participation in Peace Missions**

Bothy the document analysis and the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study revealed that South Africa has not explained in detail exactly what its national interests are. Landsberg has criticised South Africa lack of clearly defined national interests because this makes the analysis of its foreign policy and foreign policy activities difficult in scholarly enquiry (Landsberg, 2010; Landsberg & Georghiou, 2015). The draft white paper on foreign policy attempts to clarify South Africa's national interests but lacks detail and provides definitions in broad terms only while there is no clear explanation of how these national interests will be pursued. Accordingly, this research report had to rely on various policy documents and statements although it did also rely mainly on the draft white paper on foreign policy to deduce what South Africa's national interests are.

Mindful of South Africa's apartheid past, those responsible for making and implementing South Africa's foreign policy of foreign policy have argued that the country's past will determine its future identity and its national interests (Moore, 2014). The many policy documents in place and the speeches of prominent government officials acknowledge that the country is thankful for the selfless sacrifices and solidarity it was shown during the apartheid era and thus their wish for South Africans is what the wish for other citizens of the world. South Africa's national interest may, therefore, be articulated as "people-centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of its people ... and ensuring prosperity of the country, its region and the continent" (DIRCO, 2011, p. 10).

Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would argue that, despite South Africa's noble articulation that its engagement with Africa is based on noble and altruistic intentions, its participation in the peace missions is driven by a realist understanding of national interests. Realists would point out that South Africa is an ambitious, middle power country and, therefore, it is driven by the desire to improve its global stature in the majority of its foreign policy conduct and activity. In fact, it is due to South Africa's desire to be perceived as a credible leader on the continent

and the global south that South Africa has prioritised its participation in peace missions and conflict resolutions at large (Heleta, 2016; Mathoho, 2016).

In addition, realists would be quick to point out South Africa's ambition to be Africa's permanent representative at the UNSC and its economic interest in countries in which it undertook major deployments, such as Burundi, Sudan and the DRC, are evidence that its participation in peace missions is driven by realism (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012). Thus, South Africa's national interest, as understood from the realist perspective, could be the reason why it prioritises countries where it has strategic interests and shows less enthusiasm in areas in which it has no major, direct interests (Landsberg, 2010).

According to the white paper on South Africa's participation for peace missions (1999), the level and extent of South Africa's contribution to a peace mission are determined by "how closely the mission relates to national interests" and thus in instances in which core national interests are at stake, its contribution may even exceed its normal contribution (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999, p. 25). This may, in turn, explain why South Africa's contribution in the DRC, Burundi and Sudan was so high while it sent only military observers and technical experts to countries such as the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia/Eretria (Conwell, 2016).

Although this view may be correct, the focus of the view is both one sided and solely on the realist interpretation of what national interest is in relation to foreign relations. On the other hand, idealists would argue that South Africa's participation in peace missions represents an integral part of South Africa's identity as inspired by the philosophy of *ubuntu*. In this regard, it is true that South Africa's participation is motivated by the desire to pursue its national interests. However, the national interests to which idealists are referring are inspired by the desire to assist those who are the victims of political repression and the scourge of violent conflicts (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Idealists would argue that South Africa is both an economic and a military power and, therefore, its national values and identity compels it to assist in conflict affect areas. Accordingly, South Africa's participation in peace missions is for the sake of human good and is based on humanitarian grounds (Roos, 2016a).

It is important from an academic point of view to accept that it is almost impossible to accurately determine what the motives of political actors are, especially when they claim to be acting in the 'national interests', be it from a realist or idealist perspective. According to Hans Morgenthau (1978), to search for motive of foreign policy on why actors take certain foreign decisions is a futile and a deceptive exercise. It is futile because motives are the most elusive factor in psychological data and frequently beyond recognition, from the point of view of the interests and emotions of the foreign policy actors and also those studying foreign policy actions.

Consequently, researchers already have motives of their own when they embark on scholarly enquiry. Sometimes they are not even aware of their own bias. Consequently, it often becomes almost impossible to gauge the motives of others if the individual is not even sure of his/her own motives and bias. Morgenthau (1978) maintains that history shows that there is no exact correlation between the quality of the motives behind foreign policy and the quality of the foreign policy actions. This is true in both moral and political terms. In short, it was not easy to ascertain whether South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven by national interests as understood by either idealist or realists because both arguments are credible and there is empirical evidence to support either of the two opposing arguments.

### **5.2.2. South Africa's Regional and International Obligation**

Post-apartheid South Africa assured the international community of its desire to break away from the stigma of the 'pariah' state under the apartheid regime and become a law-abiding member of the global community (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). Consequently, South Africa has made commitments to participate in multilateral platforms where the country is duty bound to do so in terms of both its international and regional commitments (Nathan, 2005).

As a signatory to the UN Charter, South Africa recognises that the UN is the primary international body which is responsible for peacekeeping missions. As such, South Africa has committed itself to contribute in peace missions under the principle of volunteerism when requested to do so (Leijenaar, 2016). South Africa has, in fact, been requested several times to participate in both AU and UN peacekeeping. In addition, it has also participated in various regional and sub-regional peace missions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). South

Africa's participation in peace mission is a clear demonstration of its commitment to contribute to international peace and stability through multilateral platforms (Leijenaar, 2016) .

Highlighting this point, Mandela was requested to take over the negotiations and mediation efforts that culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement that was signed on 28 August 2000 (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012). Part of the agreement involved setting up a transactional government. However, some rebel groups protested against this. In order to demonstrate its commitment to the Arusha Accord, South Africa set up a South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) which was later integrated into the AU peace mission (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012). This was a high-risk mission, because under normal circumstances, UN peacekeeping requires that a cease fire must be agreed upon first and this was not the case in Burundi (de Carvalho, 2016).

Similar to this was South Africa's participation in MONUSCO. Through SADC, South Africa played a central role in the process that culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 2001 and the subsequent deployment of MONUSCO. Thus, both the Burundian and the DRC peace missions demonstrate that South Africa is serious about living up to its status of a middle power economy as the realists would proclaim. Its participation in these high risk missions so early after attaining its democracy demonstrated that it would be possible for South Africa to achieve its ambition of becoming a permanent representative of Africa at the UNSC and other multilateral forums (Mathoho, 2016). Realists would argue that participating in peace missions gives some credibility to South Africa's claim that it is a leader on the African continent and a representative of Africa on multilateral platforms (Saunders, 2014).

In addition, the country demonstrated its willingness to lend assistance to other countries facing political turmoil and instability. After all, its philosophy of *ubuntu* involves it being there for those who suffering from the scourge of violent conflict (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016). South Africa's voluntary commitments to both international and regional organisations was, in part, due to its commitment to participate in the resolution of international disputes (Mathoho, 2016) while it is also fully committed to meet its regional obligations, especially in Southern Africa. "Not only has South

Africa committed its meagre resources to these peace missions, but it also risks the lives of its citizens in order for others to enjoy the same peace we enjoy” (Roos, 2016a). This is a point which idealists highlight when referring to South Africa’s participation in peace missions.

### **5.2.3. African Renaissance and African Agenda**

One of the key pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy and which is linked to its regional commitments is the country’s commitment to Africa or, to phrase it differently, the ‘African Agenda’. The African Agenda has been present in South Africa’s three democratic administrations from Mandela, to Mbeki and now Zuma. However, it was during Mbeki’s presidency that Africa took centre stage as a priority of the government (McGurk, 2013). In addition, Zuma’s administration has been credited with the draft policy document (draft white paper on foreign policy) that attempted to clarify what is intended by the African Agenda as a key pillar of government foreign policy (DIRCO, 2011). The African Agenda is premised on the promotion of peace, security and development in Africa (Graham, 2014).

The African Agenda is aimed at achieving the ideals of the Africa’s Renaissance. The main objective of the African Renaissance was intended to address the issues of underdevelopment and the marginalisation of the continent on the global stage. Mbeki argued that peace and stability on the continent was a precondition for realising the Africa’s Renaissance (Vale & Maseko, 1998). It would be impossible for the continent to address issues of underdevelopment, grow its economy and be taken seriously by the international community while torn by conflicts. Thus, for development to take place, it is essential that there is peace and stability in the region (Verhoeven, Murthy, & Soares de Oliveira, 2014).

Linked to the ideals of the African Agenda and the African Renaissance is the concept of “African solutions to African Problems”, especially in terms of conflict resolution on the continent (Verhoeven et al., 2014, p. 517). The Rwandan genocide in 1994, M23’s occupation of Goma in 2012, UNSC Resolution 1978 and the consequent death of Gaddafi in Libya are some of the examples why Africa cannot afford to continue to rely on external partners to resolve its conflicts (Roos, 2016a). External actors have demonstrated that, in the main, they intervene only in cases when their political and economic interests are being threatened, such as the French

intervention in Mali and CAR; and NATO involvement in Libya (Roos, 2016a). South Africa has been a staunch advocate of the ‘African solutions to African problems’, particularly in instances in which conflicts must be resolved (Nathan & others, 2013; Verhoeven et al., 2014). To emphasise this point, Van Nieuwkerk (2012) and Moore (2015) argued that South Africa’s participation in peace missions in Africa could be interpreted as a means of pursuing its foreign policy objective of the ‘African Agenda.

Again, the African Agenda as a key pillar of South Africa’s foreign policy may be interpreted from both the realist and the idealist perspective. Realists would argue that, for South Africa to be able to expand its trade on the continent, it needs to ensure political and economic stability on the continent in the interests of a safe business environment (De Carvalho, 2016). It is worth noting at this point that, South Africa’s businesses dominate in the majority of the regions where it has participated in peace missions.

On the other hand, idealist would argue that the African Renaissance Agenda is noble and does not only benefit South Africa. However, they would also agree that South African business interests have benefited in the places where it helped to build relative peace, such as in Burundi and Sudan (De Carvalho, 2016). Nevertheless, they will also be quick to point out that this was a mutually beneficial relationship as the conflict-affected areas managed to restore the peace and stability and that, in the long term, South Africa’s involvement promoted the development of those countries (Leijenaar, 2016). After South Africa had deployed troops to Burundi between 2001 and 2006, Burundi’s GDP grew from 800 million US Dollars to 1.3 billion US dollars and, by 2016, its GDP stood at 3.1 billion US dollars (World Bank, 2017). Idealists would, therefore, highlight the economic growth in Burundi as an example of a mutually beneficial relationship as both countries benefited from South Africa’s participation in the peace mission (Leijenaar, 2016).

#### **5.2.4. African Solidarity and Regional Stability**

The OAU played a significant role in ending apartheid in South Africa by offering refuge to members of the liberation movements as well as other related support required in the liberation struggle. As a result, the post-apartheid government made a commitment to demonstrate the same kind of solidarity and support which it was

shown during the liberation struggle (DIRCO, 2011). As a country with an oppressed past, South Africa has committed itself to show solidarity and support to those countries in difficult conditions, be it famine, drought or the scourge of conflict (Mathoho, 2016).

The government had already indicated in 1996, before it deployed troops on its first peace mission, that it would show solidarity and support to those affected by conflict. As Mbeki (1996) proclaimed in his most renowned 'I am an African' speech, "the pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear". As a result, wherever there is great suffering on the part of people in Africa, South Africa has been willing to show its support. According to De Carvalho (2016), "South Africa's participation in peace missions is one way of showing support to those who are going through difficult times, just as other African countries helped the liberation movements during apartheid".

In addition to African solidarity, it is in South Africa's interest to establish, maintain and promote peace and stability in Africa, particularly in southern Africa. As early as the 1990s, before the ANC came to power, Mandela had argued that, for South Africa to reach its full potential in terms of its development and economic goals, the region had to be stable. As he explained, "If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we, too, could fall victim to the forces that has brought ruin to its various parts" (Mandela, 1993, p. 87). Mandela was, therefore, clearly aware that South Africa's future growth path was dependent on a peaceful and stable environment and thus it was incumbent on South Africa to demonstrate solidarity with those going through difficult times.

DIRCO frequently emphasises that it is not possible for South Africa to achieve its developmental and economic goals if the African continent is not stable (Leijenaar, 2016). Thus, the prerequisite to achieving the envisaged continental unity that will propel Africa to sustainable development and economic heights is that there must first be peace and stability on the continent (Roos, 2016). After all, it would be impossible for South Africa to achieve meaningful economic growth while surrounded by poverty stricken and conflict-ridden neighbours (de Carvalho, 2016). In other words, South Africa must participate in peace missions to ensure the

regional stability which is a precondition for its own sustainable development and that of Africa.

When realists analyse African solidarity as a reason to participate in peace mission, they would agree that, yes indeed, South Africa must assist in conflict torn areas and show solidarity with the people who are suffering from the scourge of violent conflicts. However, realists would also argue that, by demonstrating the so-called 'African solidarity', South Africa is a major benefactor as it raises its profile in the global arena and also benefits economically. Its participation in peace missions also gives South Africa leverage to negotiate economic deals in its favour, for example, South Africa's mining interests in the DRC (de Carvalho, 2016).

Realists would further argue that South Africa's priority to ensure regional stability is motivated by the realisation that unstable neighbours pose a security threat and, hence, it must participate in conflict resolution and peace missions. They would argue that South Africa is an economic powerhouse in the region and, therefore, it becomes the first choice of destination in Africa for those seeking to flee conflict in their countries (Mathoho, 2016). South Africa is already facing its own challenges of unemployment and poverty and thus large numbers of refugees only exacerbate the problem (Roos, 2016a). Moreover, because economic trade generally declines during conflict this affects South African businesses operating in those countries and thus compromises revenue collection by the South African government. In short, for realists, African solidarity and regional stability as motivations for South Africa's participation in peace missions is biased in favour of South Africa as South Africa benefits the most of these peace missions.

Idealists, on the other hand, will interpret South Africa's prioritisation of regional stability and African solidarity differently from their realist counterparts arguing that regional stability will bring peace and security to all parties and this, in turn, will improve economic development in the region. Moreover, in essence, the philosophy of *ubuntu* is that 'you wash my hands today, and I will wash your hands tomorrow' (Qobo & Nyathi, 2016). South Africa was shown solidarity and received significant support from other African countries during the apartheid era and, therefore, it has a moral obligation to assist conflict ridden countries. In addition, most importantly for idealist is that South Africa has the means and capacity to help due to its military and

economic power in the region and thus it does so because it has the means to help (Conwell, 2016).

### **5.3. CONCLUSION**

South Africa has an extremely difficult past characterised by both colonialism and apartheid. It was the last country on the continent to be liberated from white minority rule. During the apartheid era, both the OAU and global society contributed to the end of apartheid and the democracy that succeeded it. This difficult history has played a significant role in shaping South Africa's foreign policy. In respect to Africa, South Africa has made the continent its priority and wants to contribute to the renaissance of the continent. As a result, one of the foreign policy objectives is to contribute to conflict resolution on the continent.

Since the inception of democracy, South Africa has participated in no less than 15 peace missions on the continent (Heinecken & Ferreira, 2012). South Africa is mainly credited for bringing about peace in Burundi and for its participation in the FIB in the eastern DRC. These peace missions have been costly in terms of both lives and funding for South Africa. Nevertheless, despite the massive challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty it faces, South Africa continues to commit resources to peace missions, including funding continental joint military exercises such as AMANI AFRICA I and II (Institute for Security Studies, 2015).

From an IR theory point of view, this study aimed to determine whether South Africa's participation in peace mission is driven by either an idealist's or a realist's understanding of IR. Those who subscribe to the realist school of thought would argue that, among other reasons, South Africa's participation in peace missions is motivated by its desire to improve its international stature, economic opportunities and global influence (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). On the other hand, idealists would argue that South African participation in peace mission is rooted in its philosophy of 'ubuntu' and altruism (DIRCO, 2011). For the idealist, South Africa has a moral obligation to participate in peace missions due to its economic and military power and thus it cannot afford to distance itself when its neighbours are plunged into political instability and insecurity (Nathan, 2011).

Both the realist and idealist arguments are credible. It was not possible for this study to come to any definite conclusions as to which of the two schools of thought is dominant in South Africa's participation in peace missions. However, it suffices to say that there is empirical evidence supporting either of the arguments. Accordingly, the study concluded that South Africa's participation in peace missions may be narrowed down to the four themes discussed above and that all of them may be explained from either the realist or the idealist perspective of IR.

## **Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Research**

### **6.1. INTRODUCTION**

The preceding chapters discussed two related topics in relation to South Africa's participation in peace mission in Africa. In view of the fact that peace mission concept is so broad and includes distinct stages and actors in the broader spectrum of conflict resolution mechanisms, this research study focused only on the peace missions where the military element is the main actor.

As a result, the research questions were twofold. Firstly, the research report was aimed at determining whether there has been a shift in policy approach from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peace missions. Secondly, the study wanted to determine the motivations behind South Africa's participation in peace missions. Accordingly, this chapter reflects briefly on the research findings in respect of the two research questions posed in the study. In addition, the chapter also suggest areas which were identified for future research.

### **6.2. CONCLUSIONS AND MAIN FINDINGS**

#### **6.2.1. The Shift from a Pacifist to a Robust Military Approach to Peace Missions.**

In order to determine whether South Africa and/or the peacekeeping fraternity at large (UN and AU) has shifted its approach to peace missions from a pacifist to a robust military intervention the paper analysed two case studies, namely, the deployment and success of the robust military intervention by the FIB in the eastern DRC in 2013 and Mali's appeal to the French Army to intervene in the Malian conflict in 2013. The two case studies were analysed in context of the establishment of the ACIRC Brigade as an interim measure that is intended to provide the AU with a rapid deployment capability so as to enable it to intervene in violent conflicts on the continent.

In view of the very nature of case studies, it was possible to generalise the findings from the case studies to determine an approach or peacekeeping policy trends. Accordingly, the research findings of the two case studies were generalised to determine whether the ACIRC Brigade could be seen an indicator of a policy shift in

approach to peace missions from a pacifist to a robust military approach. It was anticipated that the two case studies of the FIB and the intervention of the French army in Mali would shed some light if, indeed, there has been a shift in policy approach. In addition, since the UN had authorised at least four missions involving a 'robust military' approach in the four years prior to the study, the research report also attempted to assess the future of a robust military approach to peace missions.

In January 2013, the AU Commission highlighted to the AU Summit the urgent need to establish an interim measure that would fill the security gap that had resulted from the delay in commissioning the ASF. The ACIRC concept was proposed and was adopted by the AU Summit in January 2014. The proposal to establish the ACIRC was based on two separate, but related, events that had embarrassed the AU and exposed its lack of capacity to resolve violent conflicts in Africa. The AU adopted the ACIRC mechanism as an offensive force that would give the AU a rapid deployment capability to intervene in conflict ridden areas. The difference between the ACIRC mechanism and a normal peacekeeping force was that it would be authorised to actively pursue spoilers of peace and engage them in combat in order to bring an end to harmed hostilities. The question arose as to whether the proposal to establish ACIRC could then indicate a departure from the customary pacifist approach to peacekeeping to a more robust approach?

In 2013 the UNSC passed two resolutions authorising a robust military approach to peace missions to restore peace and stability in the eastern DRC and in Mali. Resolution 2098, which authorised the FIB, was the first instance that the UN had authorised a peacekeeping force to actively pursue and disarm armed groups, thus signalling a change in peace missions as generally known (Cammaert, 2013). Soon after the deployment of the FIB, the French army intervened in Mali in January 2013 at the request of the interim government of Mali (Wing, 2016). The UN also deployed the MINUSMA in July 2013 with the same mandate as that of the FIB.

As a response to the occupation of Goma and the French intervention in Mali during 2012 and 2013 respectively, the AU proposed an establishment of ACIRC as an interim measure to intervene in conflict areas until the commissioning of the ASF. The rationale behind the establishment of ACIRC was to fill the security gap left by the ASF in the APSA mechanism for conflict resolution. However, it is important to

note the approach adopted by the ACIRC mechanism is that of an offensive force such as the FIB and MINUSMA. Did these two cases, FIB and French army intervention in the DRC and Mali respectively, signal a change from a pacifist approach to peace mission to a robust military approach?

The data gathered from the literature review and the interviews conducted for the purposes of the study suggests that, empirically, there was evidence of a shift from a pacifist to a more robust approach to resolving violent conflicts. Since its authorisation for the deployment of the FIB in the eastern DRC and MINUSMA in Mali, the UNSC has deployed similar missions to the CAR and South Sudan. Thus, in respect of empirical evidence from 2013 until 2016, it would appear that there has been a departure from a pacifist approach to robust military intervention to resolving violent conflict in Africa.

Contrary to the quantitative evidence, both the AU and the UN are quick to point out that the preferred approach to resolving conflict is through peaceful means that avoid violence (Mathoho, 2016). The robust military approach to actively engage and pursue armed groups in the DRC and Mali was merely a response to the military threats at the tactical level in order to counter the risk posed by the armed groups (Mathoho, 2016). The ACIRC concept, as with the FIB, would not be the first option regarding intervention in conflict areas and other peaceful means would first have to be exhausted before the AU deployed the ACIRC brigade to a theatre of conflict (African Union, 2016). In other words, ACIRC would be deployed as a last resort in specific circumstances on which this paper has already elaborated.

As explained in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and all the scenarios relating to the deployment of the ACIRC Brigade (Esmenjaud, 2014; Warner, 2015), at the time of the study it appeared that there was a future for a robust peacekeeping force such as the ACIRC to be available to the AU in its response to violent conflicts. The continued instability in Burundi, DRC, Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, CAR and other conflict-torn countries is an indication that it is essential that the AU has the ACIRC Brigade at its disposal so that it may be deployed whenever it is required and as outlined in the guidelines for the deployment of ACIRC. When a military threat at the tactical level requires a response such as the FIB and in situations similar to the intervention by the French army in Mali during 2013, the AU must be ready (Mathoho,

2016). Accordingly, the AU must be able to call on the ACIRC Brigade in the interim while capacitating the ASF.

In short, the research study concluded that the FIB deployment in the eastern DRC, the French army intervention in Mali and the establishment of ACIRC do not indicate a change from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peace missions. All these had happened in response to the prevailing military situation at the tactical level. It is thus important that the AU and the UN are always ready to respond with the appropriate force as outlined in the UN Charter.

### **6.2.2. The Motivation for South Africa's Participation in Peace Missions**

South Africa has been participating in conflict resolutions since the democratic government came to power in 1994. Since 1998 South Africa participated in no less than 15 SADC, AU and UN peace missions with an average of 3 000 troops deployed in various regions on the continent at a time (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014). South Africa is, therefore, clearly one of the key role players in African peace missions and has shown its commitment to peace keeping by deploying troops on high-risk missions such as in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan. It was one of the first countries to volunteer to participate in the FIB. At the time of writing this research report there were talks that South Africa was also contemplating deploying another peace mission to South Sudan (Conwell, 2016).

The second research question aimed at establishing the motivation behind South Africa's participation in peace mission. The data analysis conducted in the study was based on the two classical theories of IR, namely, realism and idealism. Thus, stated differently, is South Africa's participation in peace missions motivated by idealism or idealism in its foreign policy conduct?

The question proved to be more difficult to answer than may appear from the research. The data from the literature reviews and the interviews revealed several reasons for South Africa's participation in peace missions. These reasons/motivations were narrowed down to four broad themes, namely, national interests, regional and international obligations, African Agenda, and African solidarity and regional stability. Using the main basic assumptions of idealism and realism discussed in detail in Chapter two of the research study, the paper was able

codify which of these four broad themes reflected either the realist or the idealist approach in South Africa's participation in peace missions.

In terms of all of the four broad themes discussed, there was sufficient evidence to argue for either the realist or idealist understanding of IR when analysing South Africa's motivation for participating in peace missions. For example, the white paper on South Africa's participation in peace missions is clear that its participation in peace mission is driven by national interest. The white paper goes further to state that the size and level of South Africa's contribution will be determined by "how closely the mission relates to national interests" (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). As much as there is no official document that details South Africa's national interests, the draft white paper on South Africa's foreign policy and public statements from senior government officials continue to attempt to explain what is meant by its national interests. These national interests include the pursuit of economic growth through increased trade and exploring business opportunities in Africa, pursuing economic development and improving governance in the regions through initiatives such as NEPAD and APRM and the pursuit of peace and stability on the continent. All of these could be interpreted as South Africa's national interests.

National interest as a motivation for South Africa's participation in peace missions (and the other three themes discussed in Chapter 5) could be explained from the perspective of both the idealist and the realist understanding for IR. In this regard, the paper concludes that realists would argue that South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven by a realist approach to its foreign policy. For example, they would cite South Africa's business interests in countries such as Burundi and the DRC as the reason why it was prepared to deploy troops to the FIB. Moreover, realists would argue that South Africa is a middle power and a hegemon in the region and, therefore, it must be seen to be taking its leadership role seriously by participating in peace mission.

On the other hand, idealists observing the same events as their realist counterparts would approach the issue of national interest from a different angle. They would argue that it is in South Africa's national interest to assist those suffering from the scourge of conflict due to its national identity which is driven by the philosophy of

*ubuntu*. In addition, it is in South Africa's interest to ensure the mutual growth and upliftment of the region because this is the humane thing to do. The conditions for mutual growth which would propel the continent out of the quagmire of underdevelopment and conflict require regional hegemonies such as South Africa to take the lead and thus South Africa is doing the common good expected from it.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned motivations from the realist and idealist arguments on South Africa's participation in peace missions the conclusion drawn in this paper is that there is more tangible evidence to prove that South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven by a realist understanding of IR rather than an idealist understanding. The basis for this viewpoint is that South Africa is too quick to ensure that there is stability in countries such as Lesotho and the DRC. Any form of political instability and insecurity in these areas has a direct negative impact on South Africa. Its participation in peace missions to the DRC, Burundi and Sudan indicates that South Africa reveals that it tends to participate in areas where it will gain the necessary political mileage and economic opportunities. If this were not the case how would one explain its absence in Somalia and the fact that it sent military observers only to the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia/Eritrea during hostilities in these countries. These interests in those regions were clearly not important for South Africa.

The paper acknowledges that other researchers may arrive at a different conclusion based on the indicators they used to analyse the foreign policy motives behind South Africa's participation in peace mission. It is worth noting the statement by Hans Morgenthau that "to search for the clue of foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most elusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?" (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 4).

### **6.3. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

During the writing of this research report, the UNSC has extended the mandate of the FIB in the DRC to March 2018 while the French army was still actively involved in the pursuit of armed groups in Mali. Although the FIB and the French army

achieved military victories against the M23 and other armed groups in their respective theatre of operations, 4 years later the missions were still ongoing. It is, therefore, clear that military victories over the spoilers of peace do not translate into the end of hostilities. This is in line with the findings of extensive conflict resolution research. It would be interesting to ascertain why, although it is known that military victories do not end the disputes that lead to violent conflict, it is still difficult for the AU and UN to find ways in which to implement measures that would end armed hostilities and achieve long-term sustainable peace, for example in the DRC.

The most violent civil wars on the African continent have taken place in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, since the end of these civil wars, there has been relative peace in these countries. It is true that there is still a degree of political and security instability in these countries but, in the main, there has been progress towards sustainable peace. It would be interesting to conduct a comparative study of the reasons why was it possible to end the violent civil war in Mozambique or Angola although this seems to be impossible in the DRC.

#### **6.4. CONCLUSIONS**

This research study established that there has not been a policy shift from a pacifist to a robust military approach to peace missions in Africa. The interim establishment of ACIRC is not an indication of a policy shift but, rather, a response to the security threat posed by armed groups in conflict torn areas and an interim measure that is intended to fill the security gap as a result of the delay in the commissioning of the ASF. In addition, the ACIRC mechanism provides the AU with a rapid deployment capability to intervene as soon as possible should the PSC determine that the security situation has deteriorated to such a level that a rapid, robust military response is warranted. In addition, ACIRC will help the AU to reduce its reliance of its foreign and international partners in relation to military intervention in African conflicts as the continent pursues its agenda of self-reliance. Thus, ACIRC must not be seen as replacing of a policy of peaceful settlements to disputes.

Lastly, the research study determined that, from an IR perspective, South Africa's participation in peace missions may be explained from both the realist and the idealist approach to foreign policy. Notwithstanding the validity of both arguments,

the researcher is convinced that South Africa's participation in peace missions is driven by the realist understanding of foreign policy.

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